CANON 8 - A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH

COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARDS HIS

PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID
HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL.
RULE 8.01 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT, IN HIS
PROFESSIONAL DEALINGS, USE LANGUAGE WHICH IS
ABUSIVE, OFFENSIVE OR OTHERWISE IMPROPER.
RULE 8.02 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY,
ENCROACH
UPON
THE
PROFESSIONAL
EMPLOYMENT OF ANOTHER LAWYER, HOWEVER, IT IS THE
RIGHT OF ANY LAWYER, WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR, TO
GIVE PROPER ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE TO THOSE
SEEKING RELIEF AGAINST UNFAITHFUL OR NEGLECTFUL
COUNSEL.

August 2010 Philippine Supreme Court

Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Posted on September 20, 2010 by Ramon G. Songco Posted in Legal Ethics
Tagged delay, dishonesty, forum shopping,gross misconduct, inhibition, misconduct

Here are selected August 2010 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on legal
and judicial ethics:
Attorney; gross discourtesy. When Milagros finally met respondent on September 30,
2008 [in order to collect on his debt to her], respondent, in the presence of several
others, told her Eh kung sabihin ko na sugar mommy kita, adding that
Nagpapakantot ka naman sa akin. The Court finds that respondent is indeed guilty of
gross discourtesy amounting to conduct unbecoming of a court employee. By such
violation, respondent failed to live up to his oath of office as member of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and violated Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The Court has consistently been reminding officials and employees of the
Judiciary that their conduct or behavior is circumscribed with a heavy burden of
responsibility which, at all times, should be characterized by, among other things, strict
propriety and decorum. As such, they should not use abusive, offensive, scandalous,
menacing and improper language. Their every act or word should be marked by
prudence, restraint, courtesy and dignity. Aside from violating Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, respondent appears to have also violated Rule 8.01 of the

same Code. Complaints of Mrs. Milagros Lee & Samantha Lee against Atty. Gil Luisito R.
Capito, A.M. No. 2008-19-SC. August 18, 2010

SECOND DIVISION
[A.M. No. RTJ-03-1813. November 21, 2003]

ATTY. ANTONIO D. SELUDO, complainant, vs. JUDGE ANTONIO J.

FINEZA, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:

The incident which gave rise to this administrative case occurred in the course of
the proceedings of People of the Philippines vs. Alfonso De Villar, Errol De Villar and
Rodeo Lerio, Criminal Case No. C-58093 for attempted murder, before respondent
Judge Antonio J. Fineza, Branch 131 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City.
The respondent judge was charged administratively by Atty. Antonio D. Seludo,
counsel for the accused, before the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme
Court, with the following offenses: (1) gross ignorance of the law, (2) oppression in
office, (3) grave abuse of authority, and (4) conduct unbecoming of a judge.
[1]

It was alleged that on November 27, 2002, respondent judge ordered the arrest of
complainant for the failure of accused, Errol De Villar and Rodeo Lerio, as well as their
counsel, Atty. Antonio Seludo, to appear in todays promulgation of (the) decision despite
due notice, x x x. The Order of Arrest commanded any officer of the law to arrest
complainant and to keep him in jail until the decision in Criminal Case No. 58093 shall
have been promulgated.
[2]

[3]

Complainant averred that he was the defense counsel in two separate Criminal
Cases: (1) Nos. 178462-64 before Judge Edwin B. Ramizo and (2) No. C-58093 before
respondent judge. On November 11, 2002, complainant received an order from
respondent setting the promulgation of the decision in Criminal Case No. 58093 on
November 18. The promulgation did not push through as respondent judge was
confined in a hospital. On November 25, complainant received another order setting the
promulgation at 8:30 a.m. of November 27. However, upon checking his calendar,
complainant noticed that on the said date and time, he had a previously-set hearing of

Criminal Case Nos. 178462-64 before Judge Ramizo. Due to the conflicting schedule,
he instructed his secretary to inform the office of respondent judge that he could not
attend the promulgation of his decision. He was thus surprised to receive on November
28, the aforementioned order directing his arrest and detention.
Upon his arrest, complainant requested permission to go to the court of respondent
judge to ask for reconsideration. In court, respondent judge refused to see
him. Complainant waited and was able to talk to respondent judge when the latter went
out of his chambers and walked to his car. Complainant pleaded with respondent judge,
who opened the windows of his car and, in the presence of the police officers,
said, kung gusto mo, pumunta ka sa harap ng kotse ko at sasagasaan na lang kita.
[4]

Complainant spent the night in jail. The next day, he was brought to court for the
promulgation of the decision. However, Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., the public
prosecutor, came late and was improperly dressed. Respondent judge flared up, fined
him and held the promulgation in abeyance until Prosecutor Mananquil paid the cashier
the one thousand peso (P1,000.00)-fine meted on him. Atty. Eduardo Rodriguez, the
lawyer assisting complainant, requested for a written order to be presented to the
cashier as basis for the payment of the imposed fine, but respondent merely told him, If
you want an order, I will sign that order on Monday. Fortunately,
Prosecutor Mananquil was able to pay the fine. The decision was promulgated on the
same afternoon and complainant was released from jail.
[5]

Complainant claimed that he attended all scheduled hearings of Criminal Case No.
58093 before respondent judge, and that it was only the promulgation set on November
27 that he missed due to a conflict in schedule. He alleged that due to his incarceration,
he failed to attend to the hearing of his cases involving six paying clients set in the
morning of November 29.
In his comment, respondent judge denied the allegations of the complaint. He called
the complainant a fact fabricator, a congenital liar, and an Indian, meaning, he failed to
comply with his commitment. He averred that he ordered the incarceration of
complainant to avoid delay in the promulgation of the decision in Criminal Case No.
58093. Allegedly, complainant failed to attend the first scheduled date of promulgation.
He emphasized his fast disposal of cases such that for the years 1993, 1994, 1997,
1999, 2000 and 2002, his inventory of pending cases showed a zero balance. He
likewise denied the car incident and alleged that he merely asked
complainant, umalis ka diyan at baka masagasaan iyong paa, since complainant was
leaning on the left side of his car.
[6]

[7]

Complainant replied stating that his secretary called respondents office on

November 18, and was told that all hearings scheduled for the day were cancelled due
to respondents hospitalization. He denied he was delaying the case.
The report of the Office of the Court Administrator is adverse to the respondent
judge, viz:

xxxxxxxxx
The arrest of the complainant was, therefore, not only illegal, but also oppressive, and
it violated his constitutional right to due process. Complainant was arrested and
detained without giving him the opportunity to be heard. In so doing, respondent
judge, wittingly or unwittingly, committed arbitrary detention defined and penalized
under Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code when the order of arrest was issued for
complainant (who) was not committing a crime
xxxxxxxxx
In his COMMENT, respondent judge used the words: fact fabricator, congenital liar,
Indian who fails to comply with his commitment and dim-witted lawyer, as
descriptive of the complainant. These words are inflammatory which should have
been avoided. In explaining why he issued the order of arrest against the complainant,
the use of intemperate and insulting rhetorics is not necessary, if only to maintain the
dignity of, and respect for, the court as an institution.
[8]

The OCA recommended that respondent judge be penalized to pay a FINE in the
amount of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) for gross ignorance of the law,
oppression, grave abuse of authority and violation of Rule 8.01, Canon 8 and Rule
10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
[9]

[10]

[11]

We agree with modification.

In the case at bar, respondent based his authority in ordering complainants
incarceration on Section 14, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:

Sec. 14. Bail to secure appearance of material witness. When the court is satisfied,
upon proof or oath, that a material witness will not testify when required, it may, upon
motion of either party, order the witness to post bail in such sum as may be deemed

proper. Upon refusal to post bail, the court shall commit him to prison until he
complies or is legally discharged after his testimony has been taken.
It does not need a keen intellect to hold that the rule relied upon by the respondent
cannot be used as basis for the detention of complainant since he is a counsel and not
a material witness to a case.
Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court is likewise of no help to the respondent. It
does not require the presence of the counsel during the promulgation of a judgment, viz:

SEC. 6. Promulgation of judgment The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the

presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However,
if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the
presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or is outside the
province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.
If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city, the judgment may be
promulgated by the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction
over the place of confinement or detention upon the request of the court which
rendered the judgment. The court promulgating the judgment shall have authority to
accept the notice of appeal and to prove the bail bond pending appeal; provided, that if
the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense
from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed and resolved
by the appellate court.
The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or through his
bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at the promulgation of
the decision. If the accused was tried in absentia because he jumped bail or escaped
from prison, the notice to him shall be served at his last known address.
In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment
despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the
criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his
counsel.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without
justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these Rules against the
judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from

promulgation of the judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a motion
for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence
at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable
cause, he shall be allowed to avail of these remedies within fifteen (15) days from
notice.
We hold that respondent violated Rule 3.04, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, which states:

Rule 3.04. A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers, especially
the inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A
judge should avoid consciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are
made for the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants.
It is plain that respondent was impatient and discourteous in dealing with
complainant. Judges should respect all people appearing before their courts, be they
lawyers or litigants.Respondent ordered complainants arrest without according him the
elementary right to challenge the order. The violation of his right to due process cannot
be denied. To be sure, complainant satisfactorily explained his absence in the
November 18 scheduled promulgation. Before the promulgation, complainants secretary
called respondents office to verify the schedule and was informed that all hearings for
the day were cancelled due to respondents confinement in the hospital. It is therefore
inaccurate to contend that complainant was absent twice, and he has to be arrested to
prevent delay in the promulgation of the decision. The Office of the Court Administrator
correctly observed that the respondent should have followed the following procedure:

What respondent judge should have done under the circumstances obtaining at the
time he issued the order of arrest of complainant was first to issue an order directing
him (Seludo), within a reasonable time, to show cause why he should not be punished
for indirect contempt of court and, reset the promulgation of the decision to some
other time at the convenience of the court. If the explanation is not satisfactory to the
court, then and only then, that a penalty should be imposed upon the contemner.
It is likewise provided in A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC Re: Automatic Conversion of Some
Administrative Cases Against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan;
Judges of Regular and Special Courts; and Court Officials Who are Lawyers as
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Them Both as Such Officials and as Members of the
Philippine Bar, that administrative cases against judges of lower courts, who are
likewise lawyers, are based on grounds which are also grounds for disciplinary action of

members of the Bar, among others, for violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

We consider respondent judge to have violated: (1) Rule 8.01, Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which prohibits the use of inappropriate language:
Rule 8.01. A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper; and
(2) Rule 10.03, Can-on 10, which mandates the proper observance of the rules of
procedure:
Rule 10.03 A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to
defeat the ends of justice.
We are disappointed by respondents penchant for improper words when he called
the complainant a fact fabricator, a congenital liar, an Indian who fails to comply with his
commitment and dim-witted. We had previously admonished respondent judge for using
inappropriate language. In Judge Antonio J. Fineza vs. Romeo P. Aruelo,
respondent judge filed a complaint against Aruelo, a Clerk of Court of another branch
for interfering with a case pending in his sala. He later withdrew his complaint on the
ground that x x x the Supreme Court and the OCAD did not take prompt action on (the)
matter. It took for (sic) (them) two years and eight months without favorably giving due
course to this administrative case which was filed by this representation against the
respondent. I am downgraded (sic) not to say I am saddened by the inaction of the
Supreme Court so I am withdrawing my complaint. He also added that (he is) already
demoralized and (has) lost faith in the system. In our decision, respondent judge was
enjoined to be more circumspect in his language. He was likewise made to show cause
why he should not be administratively sanctioned for casting the Court and the Judiciary
in bad light.
[12]

In his explanation, respondent claimed that he had no intention to speak ill against
the Court or the Judiciary and attributed his intemperate language to being human and
having his own share of human frailties. Nonetheless, we admonished him to exercise
prudence and restraint in his language and sternly warned that a repetition of the same
or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
[13]

In a more recent case decided by the Court En Banc, Lim vs. Judge Antonio
J. Fineza, respondent judge was also found guilty of gross misconduct for failing to
[14]

execute a judgment which had become final, and was fined P30,000.00, with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same act will be dealt with more severely.
We consider respondents act of ordering the detention of complainant without just
cause as gross ignorance of the law or procedure, and the improper use of words in his
Comment as gross misconduct, both under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules
of Court, as amended, viz:
[15]

[16]

Sec. 8. Serious charges Serious charges include:

xxxxxxxxx
3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct;
xxxxxxxxx
9. Gross ignorance of the law or procedure;
xxxxxxxxx
Section 11 of the same Rule, provides the following penalty, viz:
SEC. 11. Sanctions A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the
following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the
Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits
shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than
three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
xxxxxxxxx

IN VIEW WHEREOF, we find respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of

procedure and impose on him a fine of P40,000.00, and gross misconduct and impose
on him a fine ofP40,000.00, considering his repetition of the offense.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

A.C. No. 6396 October 25, 2005

ROSALIE DALLONG-GALICINAO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. VIRGIL R. CASTRO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
Tinga, J.:
This administrative case concerns a lawyer who hurled invectives at a Clerk of Court. Members of
the bar decorum must at all times comfort themselves in a manner befitting their noble profession.
Complainant Atty. Rosalie Dallong-Galicinao is the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya. On 8 May 2003, she filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a Complaint-Affidavit1 with supporting
documents2 against respondent Atty. Virgil R. Castro for Unprofessional Conduct, specifically
violation of Canon 7, Rule 7.03, Canon 8 and Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.3 The charge in the complaint is summed up as follows:
Respondent Atty. Castro was a private practitioner and Vice-President of IBP-Nueva Vizcaya
Chapter. On 5 May 2003, respondent went to complainants office to inquire whether the complete
records of Civil Case No. 784, entitled Sps. Crispino Castillano v. Sps. Federico S. Castillano and
Felicidad Aberin, had already been remanded to the court of origin, MCTC Dupax del Norte, Alfonso
Castaned, Nueva Vizcaya. It must be noted that respondent was not the counsel of record of either
party in Civil Case No. 784.
Complainant informed respondent that the record had not yet been transmitted since a certified true
copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals should first be presented to serve as basis for the
transmittal of the records to the court of origin. To this respondent retorted scornfully, "Who will certify
the Court of Appeals Decision, the Court of Appeals? You mean to say, I would still have to go to
Manila to get a certified true copy?" Surprised at this outburst, complainant replied, "Sir, its in the
Rules but you could show us the copy sent to the party you claim to be representing." Respondent
then replied, "Then you should have notified me of the said requirement. That was two weeks ago

and I have been frequenting your office since then, but you never bothered to notify me."
Complainant replied, "It is not our duty, Sir, to notify you of the said requirement."
Respondent then answered, "You mean to say it is not your duty to remand the record of the case?"
Complainant responded, "No, Sir, I mean, its not our duty to notify you that you have to submit a
copy of the Court of Appeals decision." Respondent angrily declared in Ilocano, "Kayat mo nga sawen, awan pakialam yon? Kasdiay?" ("You mean to say you dont care anymore? Is that the way it
is?") He then turned and left the office, banging the door on his way out to show his anger. The
banging of the door was so loud it was heard by the people at the adjacent RTC, Branch 30 where a
hearing was taking place.4
After a few minutes, respondent returned to the office, still enraged, and pointed his finger at
complainant and shouted, "Ukinnan, no adda ti unget mo iti kilientek haan mo nga ibales kaniak
ah!" ("Vulva of your mother! If you are harboring ill feelings against my client, dont turn your ire on
me!") Complainant was shocked at respondents words but still managed to reply, "I dont even know
your client, Sir." Respondent left the office and as he passed by complainants window, he again
shouted, "Ukinnam nga babai!" ("Vulva of your mother, you woman!")5
Complainant suffered acute embarrassment at the incident, as it happened in her office of which she
was, and still is, the head and in front of her staff. She felt that her credibility had been tarnished and
diminished, eliciting doubt on her ability to command full respect from her staff. 6
The Complaint-Affidavit, filed three days after the incident, was supported by an Affidavit7 signed by
employees of RTC-Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya who witnessed the incident. The Affidavit narrated the
same incident as witnessed by the said employees. A Motion to File Additional
Affidavit/Documentary Evidence was filed by complainant on 25 September 2003.8
On 26 May 2003, the CBD-IBP issued an Order9 requiring respondent to submit his answer to the
complaint. Respondent submitted his Compliance10 dated 18 June 2003. Respondent explained that
he was counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 847, entitled Sps. Federico Castillano, et al. v. Sps.
Crispin Castillano, et al., filed with the RTC of Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 30. He learned of the finality of
the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 64962 with respect to Civil Case No. 847 before
the lower court. Prior to the incident, he went to the office of the complainant to request for the
transmittal of the records of the case to the MCTC and the complainant reassured him of the same.
Respondent admits having inquired about the status of the transmittal of the records on 5 May 2003.
However, he has no explanation as to what transpired on that day. Instead, he narrates that on 25
May 2003, twelve days after the incident, the records had not yet been transmitted, and he
subsequently learned that these records were returned to the court of origin.
The hearing for the administrative complaint before the CBD was set on 25 September 2003 by the
Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan. However, on said date, only complainant
appeared. The latter also moved that the case be submitted for resolution. 11 Respondent later on
filed a Manifestation stating that the reason for his non-appearance was because he was still
recuperating from physical injuries and that he was not mentally fit to prepare the required pleadings

as his vehicle was rained with bullets on 19 August 2003. He also expressed his public apology to
the complainant in the same Manifestation.12
Complainant filed a Manifestation expressing her desire not to appear on the next hearing date in
view of respondents public apology, adding that respondent personally and humbly asked for
forgiveness which she accepted.13
The Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be reprimanded and warned that
any other complaint for breach of his professional duties shall be dealt with more severely.14 The IBP
submitted to this Court a Notice of Resolution adopting and approving the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner.15
At the onset, it should be noted that respondent was not the counsel of record of Civil Case No. 784.
Had he been counsel of record, it would have been easy for him to present the required certified true
copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals. He need not have gone to Manila to procure a certified
true copy of the decision since the Court of Appeals furnishes the parties and their counsel of record
a duplicate original or certified true copy of its decision.
His explanation that he will enter his appearance in the case when its records were already
transmitted to the MCTC is unacceptable. Not being the counsel of record and there being no
authorization from either the parties to represent them, respondent had no right to impose his will on
the clerk of court.
Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Rule 8.02A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of
another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and
assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
Through his acts of constantly checking the transmittal of the records of Civil Case No. 784,
respondent deliberately encroached upon the legal functions of the counsel of record of that case. It
does not matter whether he did so in good faith.
Moreover, in the course of his questionable activities relating to Civil Case No. 784, respondent
acted rudely towards an officer of the court. He raised his voice at the clerk of court and uttered at
her the most vulgar of invectives. Not only was it ill-mannered but also unbecoming considering that
he did all these to a woman and in front of her subordinates.
As held in Alcantara v. Atty. Pefianco,16 respondent ought to have realized that this sort of public
behavior can only bring down the legal profession in the public estimation and erode public respect
for it.17 These acts violate Rule 7.03, Canon 8 and Rule 8.01, to wit:
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflect on his fitness to practice law,
now shall he, whether in public or private life behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.

Canon 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.
Moreover, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that lawyers conduct
themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers. Lawyers are duty bound
to uphold the dignity of the legal profession. They must act honorably, fairly and candidly towards
each other and otherwise conduct themselves without reproach at all times. 18
As correctly evaluated by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent did not categorically deny the
charges in the complaint. Instead, he gave a lengthy narration of the prefatory facts of the case as
well as of the incident on 5 May 2003.
Complainant also alleged in her Complaint-Affidavit that respondents uncharacteristic behavior was
not an isolated incident. He has supposedly done the same to Attys. Abraham Johnny G. Asuncion
and Temmy Lambino, the latter having filed a case against respondent pending before this
Court.19 We, however, cannot acknowledge such allegation absent any evidence showing the
veracity of such claim. No affidavits to that effect were submitted by either Atty. Asuncion or Atty.
Lambino.
Nonetheless, the penalty to be imposed should be tempered owing to the fact that respondent had
apologized to the complainant and the latter had accepted it. This is not to say, however, that
respondent should be absolved from his actuations. People are accountable for the consequences
of the things they say and do even if they repent afterwards. The fact remains that things done
cannot be undone and words uttered cannot be taken back. Hence, he should bear the
consequences of his actions.
The highest reward that can be bestowed on lawyers is the esteem of their brethren. This esteem
cannot be purchased, perfunctorily created, or gained by artifice or contrivance. It is born of sharp
contexts and thrives despite conflicting interest. It emanates solely from integrity, character, brains
and skills in the honorable performance of professional duty.20
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby FINED in the amount of TEN
THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS with a warning that any similar infraction with be dealt with more
severely. Let a copy of thisDecision be furnished the Bar Confidant for appropriate annotation in the
record of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
(On Leave)
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

ADM. CASE NO. 5737

October 25, 2004

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. STANLEY CABRERA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
In an administrative complaint dated July 7, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz charges Atty. Stanley Cabrera
with misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Complainant alleges that he is a fourth year law student; since the latter part of 2001, he instituted
several actions against his neighbors; he appeared for and in his behalf in his own cases; he met
respondent who acted as the counsel of his neighbors; during a hearing on January 14, 2002, in one
case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay City, presided by Judge Caridad Cuerdo,
the following exchange transpired:

xxx xxx So, may we know your honor, if he is a lawyer or not?

The Court having been inhibited by the respondent from hearing the case, replied:
You are asking for my inhibition and yet you want me to rule on his appearance xxx
xxx.
Thereafter, the respondent said:
Because your honor, he (pertaining to the complainant) is misrepresenting himself to
be a lawyer!
To this the complainant remarked:
"Your Honor, Im not xxx xxx."
Respondent, this time engulfed with anger in a raising voice said:
Appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna; x x x.
Respondents imputations were uncalled for and the latters act of compelling the court to ask
complainant whether he is a lawyer or not was intended to malign him before the public, inasmuch
as respondent knew that complainant is not a lawyer, having appeared for and in his behalf as a
party litigant in prior cases; respondents imputations of complainants misrepresentation as a lawyer
was patently with malice to discredit his honor, with the intention to threaten him not to appear
anymore in cases respondent was handling; the manner, substance, tone of voice and how the
words "appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna!" were uttered were totally with the intention to
annoy, vex and humiliate, malign, ridicule, incriminate and discredit complainant before the public.
Complainant claims that respondents display of improper attitude, arrogance, misbehavior,
misconduct in the performance of his duties both as a lawyer and officer of the court, before the
public and the court, was a patent transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn to uphold
in their dealings with society and corresponding appropriate penalty or sanctions for the said
administrative violations should be imposed on the respondent.
In his Comment, respondent contends that the complaint filed against him is a vicious scheme to
dissuade him from appearing as counsel for the Mina family against whom complainant had filed
several civil and criminal cases including him to further complainants illegal practice of law;
complainants complaint occurred during a judicial proceeding wherein complainant was able to
represent himself considering that he was appearing in barong tagalog thus the presiding judge was
misled when she issued an order stating "[i]n todays hearing both lawyers appeared;" because of
which, respondent stated: "Your honor I would like to manifest that this counsel (referring to
complainant) who represents the plaintiff in this case is not a lawyer," to which complainant replied:
"The counsel very well know that I am not yet a lawyer;" the reason he informed the court that
complainant is not a lawyer was because the presiding judge did not know that complainant is not a
lawyer and complainant did not inform the presiding judge that he is not a lawyer when he stated:

"for the plaintiff your honor;" he stated "pumasa ka muna" out of indignation because of
complainants temerity in misrepresenting himself as lawyer; it is surprising that the City Prosecutor
of Pasay City filed a complaint for oral defamation against him considering that in a precedent case
the Supreme Court stated: "It is a settled principle in this jurisdiction that statements made in the
course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged (Navarrete vs. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA
540);" in another malicious prosecution being perpetuated by the complainant against the Mina
family pending before Judge Priscilla Mijares of RTC Branch 108, Pasay City, they were able to
prohibit the appearance of complainant as counsel for himself as authenticated by an Order of Judge
Priscilla Mijares which allegedly stated among other; to wit:
In connection with Ferdinand A. Cruzs motion to appear as counsel, the motion is likewise
denied, movant not having satisfied the requirements and conditions under Rule 138-A,
Sections 1 and 2.
Respondent alleges that when complainant filed an administrative case against Judge Priscilla
Mijares when said Judge stated in Tagalog in open court "Hay naku masama yung marunong pa sa
Huwes! OK?" the same was dismissed by the Honorable Courts Third Division which stated among
others: "That the questioned remarks of respondent were uttered more out of frustration and in
reaction to complainants actuations and taking into account that complainant is not yet a lawyer but
was already lecturing the court on a matter which is not even a point of discussion was sheer
arrogance on the part of the complainant." Respondent prays that the complaint against him be
dismissed for lack of merit.
The administrative case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.
In a report, dated March 4, 2004, IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro recommended respondents
suspension from the practice of law for a period of three months for violating Rule 8.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which provides:
A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
In her report, Commissioner Navarro stated:
After going over the evidence submitted by the parties, the undersigned noted that
respondents averment that the utterances he made in open court is (sic) privileged
communication does not hold water for the same was (sic) not relevant to the issue of the
case in question under trial before the said court.
Respondent did not refute the fact that the same utterances he made in open court against the
complainant had been the basis for his indictment of Oral Defamation and later Unjust Vexation
under Criminal Cases Nos. 02-1031 and No. 02-2136 respectively, pending trial before MTC Branch
45, Pasay City.

Likewise respondent did not refute complainants allegation that in 1979 he was held in contempt
and was not allowed to practice law for seven years by the Supreme Court in the administrative case
filed against him by Emilia E. Andres on December 14, 1979 docketed as A.M. L-585 for his
fondness in using contumacious language in his dealing with others.
From the facts obtaining, it is apparent that the utterance hurled by the respondent in the manner,
substance and tone of his voice which was not refuted by him "that appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka
muna" in whatever manner it was uttered are in itself not only abusive but insulting specially on the
part of law students who have not yet taken nor passed the bar examination required of them.
Respondent should have been more discreet and cautious in informing the court if it was his purpose
relative to complainants appearance in court; although the latter appeared only in his behalf but not
for others if he had complied with the requirements of Rule 138 (Sections 1 and 3) of the Rules of
Court.
Respondent should have been more temperate in making utterances in his professional dealings so
as not to offend the sensitivities of the other party as in this case.
On April 16, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution to annul and set aside the
recommendation of the investigating commissioner and to approve the dismissal of the case for lack
of merit.
Prefatorily, we note that the IBP Board of Governors failed to observe the procedural requirements of
Sec. 12 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on review and decision by the Board of Governors which
states:
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. (a) Every case heard by an
investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence
transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The decision of the Board upon such
review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on
which it is based. It shall be promulgated within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from
the next meeting of the Board following the submittal of the Investigators report. (Emphasis
supplied)
In Teodosio vs. Nava,1 the Court stressed the important function of the requirement that the decision
of the Board of Governors state the facts and the reasons on which it is based, which is akin to what
is required of the decisions of courts of record, thus:
For aside from informing the parties the reason for the decision to enable them to point out to
the appellate court the findings with which they are not in agreement, in case any of them
decides to appeal the decision, it is also an assurance that the judge, or the Board of
Governors in this case, reached his judgment through the process of legal reasoning. 2
In this case, the Board of Governors resolution absolving respondent of any misconduct does not
contain any findings of facts or law upon which it based its ruling. Ordinarily, non-compliance with the
rule would result in the remand of the case. Nonetheless, where the controversy has been pending

resolution for quite sometime and the issues involved could be resolved on the basis of the records
on appeal, the Court has opted to resolve the case in the interest of justice and speedy disposition of
cases.3 This case falls within the exception.
We hold that respondents outburst of "appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna" does not amount to
a violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Based on the facts of this case, such outburst came about when respondent pointed out to the trial
court that complainant is not a lawyer to correct the judges impression of complainants appearance,
inasmuch as the judge, in her Order of January 14, 2002, noted that complainant is a lawyer.4 Such
single outburst, though uncalled for, is not of such magnitude as to warrant respondents suspension
or reproof. It is but a product of impulsiveness or the heat of the moment in the course of an
argument between them. It has been said that lawyers should not be held to too strict an account for
words said in the heat of the moment, because of chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way is for
the court to condone even contemptuous language.5
Nonetheless, we remind respondent that complainant is not precluded from litigating personally his
cases. A partys right to conduct litigation personally is recognized by Section 34 of Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court:
SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. -- In the court of a justice of the peace a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar.
In Maderada vs. Mediodea,6 this Court expounded on the foregoing provision, thus:
This provision means that in a litigation, parties may personally do everything during its
progress -- from its commencement to its termination. When they, however, act as their own
attorneys, they are restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as those qualified
to practice law; otherwise, ignorance would be unjustifiably rewarded. Individuals have long
been permitted to manage, prosecute and defend their own actions; and when they do so,
they are not considered to be in the practice of law. "One does not practice law by acting for
himself any more than he practices medicine by rendering first aid to himself."
The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly, involves the exercise of a profession or
vocation usually for gain, mainly as attorney by acting in a representative capacity and as counsel by
rendering legal advise to others. Private practice has been defined by this Court as follows:
x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise.
Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute [referring to the prohibition for judges
and other officials or employees of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General
from engaging in private practice] has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding
one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. x x x.

Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or habitually holding
herself out to the public as a lawyer. Neither was she demanding payment for such services.
Hence, she cannot be said to be in the practice of law.7
On the other hand, all lawyers should take heed that lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who
are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities
and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence. Membership in the bar imposes upon them
certain obligations. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, they must conduct
themselves honorably and fairly.8 Though a lawyers language may be forceful and emphatic, it
should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of
intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum. 9
WHEREFORE, the complaint against respondent Atty. Stanley Cabrera for misconduct in violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility is DISMISSED for lack of merit. He is,
however, admonished to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties as an officer of the
court.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Callejo, Sr., Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Footnotes

Senator abuses parliamentary immunity

In the recent administrative case of ANTERO J. POBRE vs. Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR- SANTIAGO,
A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009, the Philippine Supreme Court dismissed the letter-complaint of Antero
J. Pobre against Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the
Constitution, but castigated, so to speak, the feisty and aggressive, if not foul-mouth, respondent lady
senator for using what I would call intemperate and hate-filled language in a privilege speech she had
delivered before the Philippine Senate which was directed against the Philippine Supreme Court Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban and the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).
The JBC had previously rejected her nomination as Chief Justice of the Philippine Supreme Court.
I am truly glad the JBC had rejected her nomination to the highest tribunal of the land, considering her
notorious public image as a war-freak person.
In the aforecited case, although the Court held that the privilege speech of the combative lady senator
was not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court, it however
expressed its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar, used in her
speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly
crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is at once apparent that her
statements in question were intemperate and highly improper in substance. To reiterate, she was
quoted as stating that she wanted to spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and

his cohorts in the Supreme Court, and calling the Court a Supreme Court of idiots.
The offensive and disrespectful words of the lady senator were as follows:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am
humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my
middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of
Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not
in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.
Let me digest the case for legal research purposes.
In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with enclosures, Antero J. Pobre invited the
Courts attention to the following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiagos speech delivered on the
Senate floor:

"x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated,
debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a
country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his
cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be
surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x
x."

To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then
Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of
court. Accordingly, Pobre asked that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken
against the lady senator.
In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator Santiago, through counsel, did not deny
making the aforequoted statements. She, however, explained that those statements were covered by the
constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge
of her duty as member of Congress or its committee. The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to
bring out in the open controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial legislation. She
averred that she wanted to expose what she believed to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council
[JBC], which, after sending out public invitations for nomination to the soon to-be vacated position of
Chief Justice, would eventually inform applicants that only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would
qualify for nomination. She felt that the JBC should have at least given an advanced advisory that nonsitting members of the Court, like her, would not be considered for the position of Chief Justice.
The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the
Constitution, which provides: A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in
session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in
the Congress or in any committee thereof.
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity to enable and encourage a representative of the
public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success for it is indispensably necessary that he

should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he should be protected from resentment of every one,
however, powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense, the Court said, citing
previous decided cases.
Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and
ineffective debating forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their
legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good. The privilege would be of little
value if they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a
conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judges speculation
as to the motives.
The Court said that it does not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform
their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the
falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the
privilege. The disciplinary authority of the assembly and the voters, not the courts, can properly
discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity.
Although the Court held that the privilege speech of the combative lady senator was not actionable
criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court, it felt, however, expressed its deep
concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on
the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency
and good professional conduct. It is at once apparent that her statements in question were intemperate
and highly improper in substance. To reiterate, she was quoted as stating that she wanted to spit on the
face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, and calling the Court a
Supreme Court of idiots.
No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be allowed to erode the
peoples faith in the judiciary. The Court stated that in this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8,
Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide:
"Canon 8, Rule 8.01.A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.
"Canon 11.A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial officers
and should insist on similar conduct by others."

It will be noted that Senator/Atty. Santiago was a former Regional Trial Court judge, a law professor, an
oft-cited authority on constitutional and international law, an author of numerous law textbooks, and an
elected senator of the land. Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of
the court, like any other, was duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to maintain
the respect due its members. Lawyers in public service are keepers of public faith and are burdened with
the higher degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than their brethren in private practice. Senator
Santiago should have known, as any perceptive individual, the impact her statements would make on the
peoples faith in the integrity of the courts.
The Court stressed that a careful re-reading of her foul and repulsive utterances would readily show that
her statements were expressions of personal anger and frustration at not being considered for the post of
Chief Justice. In a sense, therefore, her remarks were outside the pale of her official parliamentary

functions. Even parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to ridicule, demean,
and destroy the reputation of the Court and its magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and disgust.
Authorities are agreed that parliamentary immunity is not an individual privilege accorded the individual
members of the Parliament or Congress for their personal benefit, but rather a privilege for the benefit of
the people and the institution that represents them.
The Court stated that Senator Santiagos outburst was directly traceable to what she considered as an
unjust act the JBC had taken in connection with her application for the position of Chief Justice. But
while the JBC functions under the Courts supervision, its individual members, save perhaps for the Chief
Justice who sits as the JBCs ex-officio chairperson, have no official duty to nominate candidates for
appointment to the position of Chief Justice. The Court is, thus, at a loss to understand Senator
Santiagos wholesale and indiscriminate assault on the members of the Court and her choice of critical
and defamatory words against all of them.
As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that it is the duty of a lawyer to maintain
towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office,
but for the maintenance of its supreme importance. That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly
incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against unjust criticism and clamor. And more. The
attorneys oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be with all good fidelity to the courts.
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the
ends of justice. His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, not
to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Faith in the courts, a lawyer should seek to preserve.
For, to undermine the judicial edifice is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment
of the liberties of the people. Thus has it been said of a lawyer that [a]s an officer of the court, it is his
sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards
the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice.
The Court in a subtle way criticized the Senate itself for neglecting its duty to discipline the respondent
senator for her offensive language. The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on
Unparliamentary Acts and Language that enjoins a Senator from using, under any circumstance,
offensive or improper language against another Senator or against any public institution. But as to
Senator Santiagos unparliamentary remarks, the Senate President had not apparently called her to order,
let alone referred the matter to the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as the
Rules dictates under such circumstance. The lady senator clearly violated the rules of her own chamber.
It is unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on her.

CANON 8
by Martin Gavino

ATTY. REYES v. ATTY. CHIONG JR.

(A.C. No. 5148, July 1, 2003)

FACTS:
Complainant Atty. Reyes filed a case for disbarment against respondent Atty. Chiong
because of the latters violation of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility dealing
with the idea that lawyers should treat each other with courtesy, dignity and civility. Chiongs
client did not appear upon the court when Prosecutor Salonga issued a subpoena for their
preliminary investigation, the Prosecutor filed a criminal complaint for estafa against said client.
After which Chiong made an urgent motion to quash the warrant concomitant with his filing for
a civil complaint and collection for a sum of money and damages against Atty. Reyes, Xu (the
complainants client) and the Prosecutor. Upon their confrontation, no settlement was reached.
Chiong argues that there was no disrespect impleading Atty. Reyes as co-defendant in Civil Case
No. 4884 and no basis to conclude that the suit was groundless. He argues that he impleaded the
Prosecutor because the criminal investigation had irregularities due to the action of the
Prosecutor to file estafa case despite the pendency for his clients motion for an opportunity to
submit counter affidavit and evidence.

ISSUE:
Did respondent violate Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?

HELD:
Yes, it was recommended by the IBP that defendants purpose of filing for the collection
suit with damages was to be able to obtain leverage against the estafa case of his client. Clearly
there was no need to implead complainant and Prosecutor Salonga because they never had any
participation in the business transactions between Pan and Xu, clearly it was for the mere
harassment of the two. Chiong was suspended for two (2) years from the practice of law and was
implemented immediately.

CANON 8
by Martin Gavino

ATTY. BARANDON, JR v. ATTY. FERRER, SR.

(A.C. No. 5768, March 26, 2010)

FACTS:
On January 11, 2001 Atty.Barandon filed a complaint-affidavit with the IBP seeking the
disbarment, suspension or proper disciplinary action against Atty.Ferrer,Sr. for offenses such as
the use of offensive language when insinuating that the complainant presented a falsified
document in court, filing a fabricated charge against Atty. Barandon, the usage of threatening
phrases before the start of a hearing such as patayan kung patayan, kasamaang lahat ng
pamilya., accusing Atty. Barandon without bothering to check the facts and lastly the plethora
of cases he was facing that time predominantly the one that deals with sexual harassment.

Atty. Ferrer filed an answer concomitant with his motion to dismiss. In his answer
contains the improbability of the charges against him because he could have not said those
remarks without being reprimanded while the court was in session. Also, the offended party in
the falsification case vouchsafed that her thumbmark in the document has been falsified and
other conflicting stories against what Atty. Barandon filed.

While there was this constant clash between the complainant and the respondent on
December 29, 2000, Atty. Barandon boarded a taxi that was owned by defendants son and it was
involved in an accident, the incident was shady because no help was given to the victims and that
respondent denied knowing the driver of said taxi. Atty. Ferrer also prevented an eyewitness
from reporting the accident to the proper authorities.

On October 10, 2001 the IBP investigation commissioner recommended the suspension
of respondent for two (2) years because they have found enough evidence to prove his violation
of Canon 8.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. On June 29, 2002 the IBP
board of governors accepted the recommendations of the investigation commissioner with the
reduction of one (1) year from the suspension.

ISSUES:
1. Did the IBP err in finding Atty. Ferrer guilty of the charges set against him?
2. In the affirmative, was the penalty imposed on him justified?
HELD:
No, there was no reason to disagree with the findings of the IBP because it can be seen
that there was an appropriate and tedious investigation set upon him for administrative purposes
and it can be inferred that the decision went through a rigorous process.

Yes, because as stated in Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, all lawyers
conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor towards their fellow lawyer and more
specifically in Rule 8.01 a lawyer shall not in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive, or otherwise improper. It was clearly seen in this case that there was a
violation of this Canon and also Canon 7 which dealt with the proper conduct of a lawyer and
how he should not behave in a scandalous manner that would discredit the legal profession,
appearing drunk and having multiple cases piled against him would be very clear that there is a
clear-cut violation of said Canon.

RULE 8.02

FIRST DIVISION
PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, A.C. No. 6672
Complainant,
Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO,
Respondent. Promulgated:
September 4, 2009

x-----------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment [1] filed by Pedro Linsangan of the

Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty.
Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of
professional services.
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe
Marie

Labiano,

representation.

convinced
Respondent

his

clients [2] to

promised

transfer
them

legal

financial

assistance[3] and expeditious collection on their claims.[4] To induce

them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them
text messages.

To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn

affidavit[5] of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail
upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and
utilize respondents services instead, in exchange for a loan
of P50,000. Complainant also attached respondents calling card: [6]
Front

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO

LAW OFFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal

1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01 Tel: 362-7820

6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Fax: (632) 362-7821
Grace Park, Caloocan City Cel.: (0926) 2701719

Back
SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.

(emphasis supplied)

Hence, this complaint.

Respondent,

in

his

defense,

denied

knowing

Labiano

and

authorizing the printing and circulation of the said calling card. [7]
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.[8]
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its
report

and

recommendation,[9] found

that

respondent

had

encroached on the professional practice of complainant, violating

Rule 8.02[10] and other canons[11] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against
soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or
brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138 [12] of the Rules of Court.
Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded
with a stern warning that any repetition would merit a heavier
penalty.
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of
respondent but we modify the recommended penalty.
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by
respondent into complainants professional practice in violation of
Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by respondent in
furtherance of the said misconduct themselves constituted distinct
violations of ethical rules.

Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to,
including the manner by which a lawyers services are to be made
known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:

CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL

SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR,
DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT
OF FACTS.

Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law
is a profession and not a business; lawyers should not advertise
their talents as merchants advertise their wares.[13] To allow a lawyer
to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law,
degrade the profession in the publics estimation and impair its
ability to efficiently render that high character of service to which
every member of the bar is called.[14]

Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:

RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE

DONE ANY ACT DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL
BUSINESS.

Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers. [15] Such
actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment. [16]

Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the

CPR which provides:

RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT

MOTIVE OR INTEREST, ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR
PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MANS CAUSE.

This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost

any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or through an
agent in order to gain employment)[17] as a measure to protect the
community from barratry and champerty.[18]
Complainant presented substantial evidence[19] (consisting of the
sworn statements of the very same persons coaxed by Labiano and
referred to respondents office) to prove that respondent indeed
solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals suits.

Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his

answer, he later admitted it during the mandatory hearing.

Through Labianos actions, respondents law practice was

benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer representation

on the strength of Labianos word that respondent could produce a

more favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment
violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
With regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled
is the rule that a lawyer should not steal another lawyers client nor
induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good
result or reduced fees for his services.[20] Again the Court notes that
respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor
receiving benefits from Labianos referrals. Furthermore, he never
denied Labianos connection to his office. [21] Respondent committed
an unethical, predatory overstep into anothers legal practice. He
cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients
as borrowers, respondent violated Rule 16.04:

Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the
clients interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client
except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance
necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.

The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his

client. The only exception is, when in the interest of justice, he has
to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographers

fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for

surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.

The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of

mind so that the free exercise of his judgment may not be adversely
affected.[22] It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he
is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the clients
cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the
clients case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject
matter of the case or an additional stake in its outcome. [23] Either of
these circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own
recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement
which may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of
the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the clients
cause.[24]
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes
malpractice[25] which calls for the exercise of the Courts disciplinary
powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious
sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for the
purpose of obtaining employment.[26] Thus, in this jurisdiction, we
adhere to the rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian
machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of
the legal profession.

Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including

violation of the prohibition on lending money to clients), the
sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy
slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate
to its findings.

A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by

petitioner. A lawyers best advertisement is a well-merited reputation
for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character
and conduct.[27] For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to
announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use
of simple professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:

(a)

lawyers name;

(b)

name of the law firm with which he is connected;

(c)

address;

(d)

telephone number and

(e)

special branch of law practiced.[28]

Labianos calling card contained the phrase with financial

assistance. The phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who

already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of

loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure
clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of
their financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass
commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no
place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of substantial
evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule
that respondent was personally and directly responsible for the
printing and distribution of Labianos calling cards.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating

Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of one year effective immediately from receipt of this
resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same
or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the

Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines, and
be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office
of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

Solicitation of clients. With regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the
rule that a lawyer should not steal another lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain him by a
promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services. Again the Court notes that
respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits
from Labianos referrals. Furthermore, he never denied Labianos connection to his office.
Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into anothers legal practice. He cannot
escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR. Pedro L. Linsangan vs. Atty. Nicodemes Tolentino, A.C.
No. 6672, September 4, 2009.

1. . G.R. No. L- 24114 June 30, 1970 IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR
DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. CLEMENTE M. SORIANO IN L-24114, People's
Homesite and Housing Corporation and University of the Philippines,

38. LANCE M. APOLONIO LEGAL ETHICS vs. HON. EULOGIO MENCIAS, ELPIDIO TIBURCIO,
MARCELINO TIBURCIO, ET AL. FACTS: On October 10, 1969, Clemente M. Soriano, a member of
the Philippine Bar entered his appearance inthe presentcase (L-24114, PHHC and U.P. vs.
Mencias,Tiburcio,etal.) as "chief counsel of record"for the respondentsMarcelinoTiburcio,etal.Thisact
initself wouldhave beeninnocuous were it not for the fact that it was done one year and eight months
after the decision in this case became final. Atty. Soriano asked the Court to exhume the case from
the archives. Atty. Soriano's subsequent explanation did not, however, serve to dissuade this Court
from requiring him to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for
entering an appearance at such a late date. He allegedthatsometimeduringthe firstweekof October
1969, the respondent Marcelino Tiburcio, in his own behalf and as attorney-in-fact of the other
respondents, went to him to engage his professional services in two cases, to wit: this terminated
case (L-24114) and the Varsity Hills case (L-30546). Atty. Sorianoallegedlyrelieduponthe assurance
of a mutual acquaintance and representation of Marcelino Tiburciothat the twocases were
pendinginthe Court.He thenagreedtorenderprofessional servicesin the two cases in consideration of
a contingent fee of 143.33 hectares of land out of the 430 hectares (more or less) involved in the two
cases. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Soriano is guilty of negligence. HELD: YES. Before taking over a
case handled by a peer in the Bar, a lawyer is enjoined to obtain the conformityof the counsel
whomhe wouldsubstitute. And if this cannot be had, then he should, at the veryleast,give notice to
such lawyer of the contemplated substitution. His entry of appearance in the case without the
consent of the first lawyer amounts to an improper encroachment upon the
professionalemploymentof the original counsel. Atty. Soriano violates Rule 8.02, Canon 8 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility: Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach
upon the professional employment of anotherlawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without
fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or
neglectful counsel. We find Atty. Clemente M. Soriano guilty of gross negligence in the performance
of his duties as a lawyer and as an officer of this Court. This inexcusable negligence would merit no
less than his suspension from the practice of the law profession, were it not for his candor, at the
hearing of this incident, in owning his mistake and the apology he made to this Court. It is the sense
of this Court, however, that he must be as he is hereby severely censured. Atty. Soriano is further
likewise warned that any future similar act will be met with heavier disciplinary sanction.
Atty.Sorianoisherebyordered,inthe present case, to forthwith withdraw the appearance that he has
entered as chief counsel of record for the respondents Marcelino