LOTUS
CASE	
France	vs.	Turkey	
	
A	 French	 ship	 (the	 S.S.	 Lotus),	 collided	 with	 a	 Turkish	 ship	 in	 international	
waters,	killing	some	Turkish	sailors.	The	French	ship	then	docked	in	Turkey.		
Turkey	 attempted	 to	 try	 the	 French	 officer	 in	 charge	 of	 the	 Lotus	 for	
negligence.	They	found	him	guilty	and	sentenced	him	to	80	days	in	jail.	France	went	
to	the	Permanent	Court	of	International	Justice	(P.C.I.J.)	and	argued	that	Turkey	did	
not	have	jurisdiction	to	try	the	French	officers,	because	they	were	on	a	French	boat	
in	 international	 waters	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 accident.	 Turkey	 argued	 that	 since	 their	
nationals	were	killed,	they	had	jurisdiction	to	try	those	responsible	for	the	deaths.	
France	argued	that	as	a	matter	of	customary	international	law,	the	flag	of	the	vessel	
(in	this	case	France)	has	exclusive	jurisdiction.		
The	PCIJ	found	that	Turkey	did	have	the	right	to	try	the	French	sailors.	The	
PCIJ	 basically	 found	 that	 since	 the	 two	 ships	 were	 involved	 in	 the	 same	 accident,	
that	 both	 countries	 had	 concurrent	 jurisdiction	 over	 the	 accident.	 The	 PCIJ	 found	
that	 customary	 international	 law	 gave	 France	 jurisdiction,	 but	 it	 didn't	 give	 them	
exclusive	 jurisdiction.	 "Under	 international	 law,	 everything	 that	 isn't	 prohibited	 is	
permitted."		
This	case	led	to	the	Lotus	Principle	(aka	the	Lotus	Approach),	which	says	that	
sovereign	states	may	act	in	any	way	they	wish	so	long	as	they	do	not	contravene	an	
explicit	prohibition.		
The	 Lotus	 Principle	 was	 later	 overruled	 by	 the	 1958	 High	 Seas	 Convention.	
Article	11(1)	says	that	only	the	flag	State	or	the	State	of	which	the	alleged	offender	
was	 a	 national	 has	 jurisdiction	 over	 sailors	 regarding	 incidents	 occurring	 in	 high	
seas.	
	
	
	
	
TRAIL	SMELTER	ARBITRATION	
US	vs.	Canada	
	
Facts:	
The	Trail	Smelter	located	in	British	Columbia	since	1906,	was	owned	and	operated	
by	a	Canadian	corporation.	The	resultant	effect	of	from	the	sulfur	dioxide	from	Trail	
Smelter	resulted	in	the	damage	of	the	state	of	Washington	between	1925	and	1937.	
This	 led	 to	 the	 United	 States	 (P)	 filing	 a	 suit	 against	 the	 Canada	 (D)	 with	 an	
injunction	against	further	air	pollution	by	Trail	Smelter.	
	
Issue:	
Is	 it	 the	 responsibility	 of	 the	 State	 to	 protect	 other	 states	 against	 harmful	 acts	 by	
individuals	from	within	its	jurisdiction	at	all	times?	
	
Held:	
Yes.	It	is	the	responsibility	of	the	State	to	protect	other	states	against	harmful	acts	
by	individuals	from	within	its	jurisdiction	at	all	times.	No	state	has	the	right	to	use	
or	permit	the	use	of	the	territory	in	a	manner	as	to	cause	injury	by	fumes	in	or	to	the	
territory	 of	 another	 or	 the	 properties	 or	 persons	 therein	 as	 stipulated	 under	 the	
United	States	(P)	laws	and	the	principles	of	international	law.		
By	looking	at	the	facts	contained	in	this	case,	the	arbitration	held	that	Canada	
(D)	is	responsible	in	international	law	for	the	conduct	of	the	Trail	Smelter	Company.	
Hence,	the	onus	lies	on	the	Canadian	government	(D)	to	see	to	it	that	Trail	Smelters	
conduct	 should	 be	 in	 line	 with	 the	 obligations	 of	 Canada	 (D)	 as	 it	 has	 been	
confirmed	 by	 International	 law.	 The	 Trail	 Smelter	 Company	 will	 therefore	 be	
required	 to	 prevent	 causing	 any	 damage	 through	 fumes	 as	 long	 as	 the	 present	
conditions	of	air	pollution	exist	in	Washington.		
So,	in	pursuance	of	the	Article	III	of	the	convention	existing	between	the	two	
nations,	the	indemnity	for	damages	should	be	determined	by	both	governments.		
Finally,	a	regime	or	measure	of	control	shall	be	applied	to	the	operations	of	
the	smelter	since	it	is	probable	in	the	opinion	of	the	tribunal	that	damage	may	occur	
in	the	future	from	the	operations	of	the	smelter	unless	they	are	curtailed.	
	
	
Blackmer	vs.	US	
	
Facts:	
Blackmer	(D),	a	U.S.	(P)	citizen	who	was	residing	in	France,	was	served	subpoenas	
to	appear	in	court	as	a	witness	in	a	criminal	trial	in	the	U.S.	Contempt	proceedings	
were	initiated	against	Blackmer	(D)	when	he	failed	to	respond	to	the	subpoenas	and	
he	was	found	guilty	and	fined.	Blackmer	(D)	appealed	on	the	ground	that	the	federal	
statute	was	unconstitutional.	
	
Issue:	
Must	there	be	due	process	for	the	exercise	of	judicial	jurisdiction	in	personam?	
	
Held:	
Yes.	There	must	be	due	process	for	the	exercise	of	judicial	jurisdiction	in	personam.	
The	court	may	adjudge	the	witness	guilty	of	contempt	if	the	witness	fails	to	comply	
with	the	court	order.	Congress	acted	pursuant	to	its	authority	in	enacting	the	statute	
and	it	could	prescribe	a	penalty	to	enforce	it.	
	
Chief	 Justice	 Hughes,	 in	 delivering	 the	 opinion	 of	 the	 Court,	 stated	 "[n]or	 can	 it	 be	
doubted	 that	 the	 United	 States	 possesses	 the	 power	 inherent	 in	 sovereignty	 to	
require	 the	 return	 to	 this	 country	 of	 a	 citizen,	 resident	 elsewhere,	 whenever	 the	
public	interest	requires	it,	and	to	penalize	him	in	case	of	refusal."	Also,	"[i]t	is	also	
beyond	controversy	that	one	of	the	duties	which	the	citizen	owes	to	his	government	
is	 to	 support	 the	 administration	 of	 justice	 by	 attending	 its	 courts	 and	 giving	 his	
testimony	whenever	he	is	properly	summoned."	
	
	
NOTTEBOHM	CASE	
Liechtienstein	vs.	Guatemala	
	
Facts:	
Nottebohm	(P),	a	German	by	birth,	lived	in	Guatemala	(D)	for	34	years,	retaining	his	
German	 citizenship	 and	 family	 and	 business	 ties	 with	 it.	 He	 however	 applied	 for	
Liechtenstein	 (P)	 citizenship	 a	 month	 after	 the	 outbreak	 of	 World	 War	 II.	
Nottebohm	(P)	had	no	ties	with	Liechtenstein	but	intended	to	remain	in	Guatemala.	
The	 naturalization	 application	 was	 approved	 by	 Liechtenstein.	 After	 this	 approval,	
Nottebohm	(P)	travelled	to	Liechtenstein	and	upon	his	return	to	Guatemala	(D),	he	
was	refused	entry	because	he	was	deemed	to	be	a	German	citizen.	His	Liechtenstein	
citizenship	 was	 not	 honored.	 Liechtenstein	 (P)	 thereby	 filed	 a	 suit	 before	 the	
International	Court	to	compel	Guatemala	(D)	to	recognize	him	as	one	of	its	national.	
Guatemala	 (D)	 challenged	 the	 validity	 of	 Nottebohms	 (P)	 citizenship,	 the	 right	 of	
Liechtenstein	 (P)	 to	 bring	 the	 action	 and	 alleged	 its	 belief	 that	 Nottebohm	 (P)	
remained	a	German	national.		
	
Issue:	
Must	nationality	be	disregarded	by	other	states	where	it	is	clear	that	it	was	a	mere	
device	 since	 the	 nationality	 conferred	 on	 a	 party	 is	 normally	 the	 concerns	 of	 that	
nation?	
	
Held:	
NO.	issues	relating	to	citizenship	are	solely	the	concern	of	the	granting	nation.	This	
is	the	general	rule.	But	it	does	not	mean	that	other	states	will	automatically	accept	
the	conferring	states	designation	unless	it	has	acted	in	conformity	with	the	general	
aim	of	forging	a	genuine	bond	between	it	and	its	national	aim.	In	this	case,	there	was	
no	 relationship	 between	 Liechtenstein	 (P)	 and	 Nottebohm	 (P).	 The	 change	 of	
nationality	was	merely	a	subterfuge	mandated	by	the	war.	Under	this	circumstance,	
Guatemala	(D)	was	not	forced	to	recognize	it.			
MEJOFF	vs.	DIRECTOR	OF	PRISONS	
Facts:	
Boris	 Mejoff,	 a	 Russian,	 was	 captured	 as	 a	 Japanese	 spy	 by	 the	 US	 Army	
Counter	 Intelligence	 Corps	 on	 March	 18,	 1948.	 He	 was	 turned	 over	 to	 the	 Phil	
Commonwealth	 Government	 for	 appropriate	 disposition.	 His	 case	 was	 decided	 on	
by	the	Board	of	Commissioners	of	Immigration	who	declared	him	as	an	illegal	alien.	
The	 Board	 ordered	 his	 immediate	 deportation.	 In	 the	 meantime,	 he	 was	 placed	 in	
prison	awaiting	the	ship	that	will	take	him	back	home	to	Russia.	Two	Russian	boats	
have	 been	 requested	 to	 bring	 him	 back	 to	 Russia	 but	 the	 masters	 refused	 as	 they	
had	no	authority	to	do	so.		
Two	 years	 passed	 and	 Mejoff	 remained	 under	 detention	 awaiting	 the	 ship	
that	 will	 take	 him	 home.	 This	 case	 is	 a	 petition	 for	 habeas	 corpus.	 However,	 the	
respondent	 held	 that	 the	 Mejoff	 should	 stay	 in	 temporary	 detention,	 as	 it	 is	 a	
necessary	 step	 in	 the	 process	 of	 exclusion	 or	 expulsion	 of	 undesirable	 aliens.	 It	
further	states	that	is	has	the	right	to	do	so	for	a	reasonable	length	of	time.		
Issue:	
Whether	or	not	Mejoff	should	be	released	from	prison	awaiting	his	deportation.			
Ruling:	
The	 Supreme	 Court	 decided	 that	 Mejoff	 be	 released	 from	 custody	 but	 be	 placed	
under	reasonable	surveillance	of	the	immigration	authorities	to	insure	that	he	keep	
peace	and	be	available	when	the	Government	is	ready	to	deport	him.	In	the	doctrine	
of	 incorporation,	 the	 Philippines	 in	 its	 constitution	 adopts	 the	 generally	 accepted	
principles	of	international	law	as	part	of	the	law	of	Nations.	Also,	the	Philippines	has	
joined	the	United	Nations	in	its	Resolution	entitled	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	
Rights	in	proclaiming	that	life	and	liberty	and	all	other	fundamental	rights	shall	be	
applied	to	all	human	beings.				
FILARTIGA	vs.	PENA-IRALA	
The	 suit	 was	 brought	 by	 an	 alien	 residing	 in	 the	 United	 States	 against	 a	 former	
official	of	Paraguay	then	visiting	the	United	States.	The	complaint	alleged	torture	of	
the	plaintiff's	brother	leading	to	his	death.	The	court	of	appeals	ruled	that	deliberate	
torture	 perpetrated	 by	 a	 person	 invested	 with	 official	 authority	 was	 a	 violation	 of	
customary	law	supporting	the	jurisdiction	of	the	district	courts	over	"a	civil	action	
by	an	alien	for	a	tort	only,	committed	in	violation	of	the	law	of	nations."	The	court	
further	declared	that	"indeed,	for	purposes	of	civil	liability,	the	torturer	has	become	
like	 the	 pirate	 and	 slave	 trader	 before	 him	hostis	 humani	 generis,	 an	 enemy	 of	 all	
mankind".	 The	 court	 found	 that	 torture	 perpetrated	 by	 a	 person	 invested	 with	
official	 authority	 violates	 universally	 accepted	 human	 rights	 norms,	 regardless	 of	
the	nationality	of	the	parties.	Whenever	an	alleged	torturer	is	found	and	served	with	
process	by	an	alien	within	US	territory,	28	U.S.C.		1350	applies	and	provides	federal	
jurisdiction.	
	
ATTORNEY	GENERAL	OF	ISRAEL	vs.	EICHMANN	
The	Appellant,	Adolf	Eichmann,	was	an	Austrian	by	birth	who	volunteered	to	work	
for	 the	 Security	 Service	 (SD)	 in	 Berlin.	 He	 rose	 through	 the	 ranks	 and	 eventually	
occupied	the	position	of	Head	of	Section	(Referant)	for	Jewish	Affairs	charged	with	
all	 matters	 related	 to	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 Final	 Solution	 to	 the	 Jewish	
Question.	 In	 this	 capacity,	 he	 oversaw	 the	 transport	 and	 deportation	 of	 Jewish	
persons,	 set	 up	 and	 personally	 ran	 an	 operations	 center	 in	 Hungary	 in	 order	 to	
implement	the	Final	Solution	there,	organized	the	transfer	of	money	from	evacuated	
Jews	to	the	State	and	was	responsible	for	the	administration	of	the	camps	at	Terezin	
and	Bergen-Belsen.	
He	 was	 captured	 by	 Israeli	 Security	 Forces	 in	 Argentina	 and	 handed	 over	 to	 the	
District	 Court	 of	 Jerusalem	 to	 stand	 trial	 for	 war	 crimes,	 crimes	 against	 humanity	
and	 crimes	 against	 the	 Jewish	 people.	 He	 was	 convicted	 of	 all	 15	 counts	 and	
sentenced	to	death	by	the	District	Court	of	Jerusalem.	His	appeal	was	rejected	by	the	
Supreme	 Court	 of	 Israel	 and	 he	 was	 executed	 by	 hanging	 a	 few	 minutes	 before	
midnight	on	31	May	1962.	
There	 is	 no	 rule	 of	 general	 customary	 international	 law,	 which	 prohibits	 the	
enactment	 of	 retroactive	 penal	 legislation.	 Furthermore,	 the	 argument	 that	 to	
punish	 an	 individual	 for	 conduct	 which	 was	 not	 yet	 criminal	 at	 the	 time	 of	 its	
commission	 would	 be	 unethical	 loses	 its	 force	 in	 face	 of	 the	 odious	 crimes	
committed	 by	 the	 Appellant.	 The	 Appellants	 contention	 that	 the	 Law	 of	 1950	 is	
therefore	contrary	to	the	principle	of	non-retroactivity	and	cannot	therefore	apply	
to	the	Appellant	is	rejected.	
There	 is	 no	 rule	 of	 general	 customary	 international	 law	 that	 the	 principle	 of	
territorial	sovereignty	prohibits	the	enactment	of	a	criminal	law	applicable	to	extraterritorial	crimes	committed	by	a	foreign	national.	The	Appellants	second	ground	of	
appeal	must	also	be	rejected.	
These	findings	are	reinforced	by	positive	international	law:	the	crimes	for	which	the	
Appellant	 was	 convicted	 were	 international	 crimes	 under	 international	 law	
entailing	 individual	 criminal	 responsibility	 at	 the	 time	 that	 they	 were	 committed,	
and	their	universal	character	is	such	that	each	State	is	vested	with	the	power	to	try	
and	punish	anyone	who	assisted	in	their	commission.	
Finally,	 the	 Appellant	 contends	 that	 his	 crimes	 were	 Acts	 of	 the	 State,	 the	
responsibility	for	which	rests	with	the	State	alone	and	another	State	has	no	right	to	
punish	the	person	who	committed	the	act,	save	with	the	consent	of	the	state	whose	
mission	he	carried	out.	This	ground	of	appeal	was	rejected	by	the	Supreme	Court	as	
there	 is	 no	 basis	 for	 applying	 the	 doctrine	 to	 acts	 prohibited	 by	 international	 law,	
particularly	in	cases	of	such	heinous	international	crimes.		
	
US	vs.	Fawaz	Yuniz	
	
US	vs	Alvarez-Machain	
Facts:	
Respondent,	a	citizen	and	resident	of	Mexico,	was	forcibly	kidnaped	from	his	
home	 and	 flown	 by	 private	 plane	 to	 Texas,	 where	 he	 was	 arrested	 for	 his	
participation	 in	 the	 kidnaping	 and	 murder	 of	 a	 Drug	 Enforcement	 Administration	
(DEA)	 agent	 and	 the	 agent's	 pilot.	 Mter	 concluding	 that	 DEA	 agents	 were	
responsible	 for	 the	 abduction,	 the	 District	 Court	 dismissed	 the	 indictment	 on	 the	
ground	that	it	violated	the	Extradition	Treaty	between	the	United	States	and	Mexico	
(Extradition	Treaty	or	Treaty),	and	ordered	respondent's	repatriation.	The	Court	of	
Appeals	affirmed.	Based	on	one	of	its	prior	decisions,	the	court	found	that,	since	the	
United	States	had	authorized	the	abduction	and	since	the	Mexican	Government	had	
protested	the	Treaty	violation,	jurisdiction	was	improper.	
	
Held:	
The	 fact	 of	 respondent's	 forcible	 abduction	 does	 not	 prohibit	 his	 trial	 in	 a	
United	States	court	for	violations	of	this	country's	criminal	laws.		
(a)	 A	 defendant	 may	 not	 be	 prosecuted	 in	 violation	 of	 the	 terms	 of	 an	 extradition	
treaty.	United	States	v.	Rauscher,	119	U.	S.	407.	However,	when	a	treaty	has	not	been	
invoked,	 a	 court	 may	 properly	 exercise	 jurisdiction	 even	 though	 the	 defendant's	
presence	is	procured	by	means	of	a	forcible	abduction.	Ker	v.	Illinois,	119	U.	S.	436.	
Thus,	 if	 the	 Extradition	 Treaty	 does	 not	 prohibit	 respondent's	 abduction,	 the	 rule	
of	Ker	applies	and	jurisdiction	was	proper.		
(b)	Neither	the	Treaty's	language	nor	the	history	of	negotiations	and	practice	under	
it	 supports	 the	 proposition	 that	 it	 prohibits	 abductions	 outside	 of	 its	 terms.	 The	
Treaty	says	nothing	about	either	country	refraining	from	forcibly	abducting	people	
from	 the	 other's	 territory	 or	 the	 consequences	 if	 abduction	 occurs.	 In	 addition,	
although	the	Mexican	Government	was	made	aware	of	the	Ker	doctrine	as	early	as	
1906,	and	language	to	curtail	Ker	was	drafted	as	early	as	1935,	the	Treaty's	current	
version	contains	no	such	clause.		
(c)	 General	 principles	 of	 international	 law	 provide	 no	 basis	 for	 interpreting	 the	
Treaty	to	include	an	implied	term	prohibiting	international	abductions.	It	would	go	
beyond	 established	 precedent	 and	 practice	 to	 draw	 such	 an	 inference	 from	 the	
Treaty	based	on	respondent's	argument	that	abductions	are	so	clearly	prohibited	in	
international	law	that	there	was	no	reason	to	include	the	prohibition	in	the	Treaty	
itself.	It	was	the	practice	of	nations	with	regard	to	extradition	treaties	that	formed	
the	 basis	 for	 this	 Court's	 decision	 in	Rauscher,	 supra,	to	 imply	 a	 term	 in	 the	
extradition	treaty	between	the	United	States	and	England.	Respondent's	argument,	
however,	would	require	a	much	larger	inferential	leap	with	only	the	most	general	of	
international	law	principles	to	support	it.	While	respondent	may	be	correct	that	his	
abduction	 was	 "shocking"	 and	 in	 violation	 of	 general	 international	 law	 principles,	
the	 decision	 whether	 he	 should	 be	 returned	 to	 Mexico,	 as	 a	 matter	 outside	 the	
Treaty,	is	a	matter	for	the	Executive	Branch.	
	
	
SECRETARY	OF	JUSTICE	vs.	LANTION	
Facts:		
On	 June	 18,	 1999,	 the	 Department	 of	 Justice	 received	 from	 the	 Department	 of	
Foreign	Affairs	of	the	United	States	requesting	for	the	extradition	of	Mark	Jimenez	
for	various	crimes	in	violation	of	US	laws.	In	compliance	with	the	related	municipal	
law,	 specifically	 Presidential	 Decree	 No.	 1069	 Prescribing	 the	 Procedure	 for	
Extradition	of	Persons	Who	Have	committed	Crimes	in	a	Foreign	Country	and	the	
established	Extradition	Treaty	Between	the	Government	of	the	Philippines	and	the	
Government	 of	 the	 United	 States	 of	 America,	 the	 department	 proceeded	 with	 the	
designation	of	a	panel	of	attorneys	to	conduct	a	technical	evaluation	and	assessment	
as	provided	for	in	the	presidential	decree	and	the	treaty.	The	respondent	requested	
for	 a	 copy	 of	 the	 official	 extradition	 request	 as	 well	 as	 the	 documents	 and	 papers	
submitted	therein.		
The	petitioner	denied	the	request	as	it	alleges	that	such	information	is	confidential	
in	nature	and	that	it	is	premature	to	provide	such	document	as	the	process	is	not	a	
preliminary	investigation	but	a	mere	evaluation.	Therefore,	the	constitutional	rights	
of	the	accused	are	not	yet	available.	
	
Issue:	
Whether	or	not	private	respondent,	Mark	B.	Jimenez,	shall	be	granted	access	to	the	
official	extradition	request	and	documents	with	an	opportunity	to	file	a	comment	on	
or	opposition	thereto	
	
Held:	
NO.	 	 The	 extraditee's	 right	 to	 know	 is	 momentarily	 withheld	 during	 the	
evaluation	 stage	of	 the	 extradition	 process	 to	 accommodate	 the	 more	 compelling	
interest	 of	 the	 State	 to	 prevent	 escape	 of	 potential	 extraditees	 which	 can	 be	
precipitated	 by	 premature	information	 of	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 request	 for	 his	
extradition.	No	 less	 compelling	at	 that	 stage	of	 the	 extradition	 proceedings	 is	 the	
need	to	be	more	deferential	to	the	judgment	of	a	co-equal	branch	of	the	government,	
the	 Executive,	 which	 has	 been	 endowed	 by	 our	 Constitution	 with	 greater	 power	
over	 matters	 involving	 our	 foreign	 relations.	Needless	 to	 state,	 this	 balance	 of	
interests	 is	not	 a	 static	 but	 a	 moving	 balance	which	 can	 be	 adjusted	 as	 the	
extradition	process	moves	from	the	administrative	stage	to	the	judicial	stage	and	to	
the	 execution	 stage	 depending	 on	 factors	 that	 will	 come	 into	 play.	In	 sum,	 we	 rule	
that	the	temporary	 hold	on	private	respondent's	privilege	of	notice	and	hearing	is	
a	soft	 restraint	on	 his	 right	 to	 due	 process	 which	 will	 not	 deprive	 him	
of	fundamental	 fairness	should	 he	 decide	 to	 resist	 the	 request	 for	 his	 extradition	
to	the	United	States.	There	 is	 no	 denial	 of	 due	 process	 as	 long	 as	 fundamental	
fairness	is	assured	a	party.	
	
	
REGINA	vs.	BARTLE	
	
Pinochet	 (D),	 the	 former	 head	 of	 state	 of	 Chile,	 was	 considered	 by	 the	 House	 of	
Lords	 (P)	 to	 have	 contravened	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	 Torture	 Convention.	 This	
convention	 became	 law	 on	 the	 8th	 of	 December	 1988	 and	 Chile,	 Spain	 and	 the	
United	Kingdom	were	all	parties	to	it.	But	Pinochet	(D),	citing	the	fact	that	he	was	a	
former	 head	 of	 state,	 claimed	 that	 he	 was	 immune	 under	 the	 principle	 of	
international	law.	
	
Issue:	
Is	the	provision	of	the	Torture	Convention	consistent	with	the	notion	of	continued	
immunity	for	former	head	of	states?	
	
Held:	
Yes.	 The	 provision	 of	 the	 Torture	 Convention	 is	 not	 consistent	 with	 the	 notion	 of	
continued	 immunity	 for	 former	 head	 of	 states.	 Pinochet	 (D)	 was	 not	 acting	 in	 any	
capacity	that	gives	rise	to	immunity	if	as	alleged;	he	masterminded	and	authorized	
torture	 after	 the	 8th	 of	 December	 1988	 because	 these	 acts	 clearly	 contravene	
international	 law.	 Hence,	 the	 torture	 proceedings	 brought	 against	 the	 defendant	
should	only	continue	on	the	allegation	that	torture	in	pursuance	of	a	conspiracy	to	
commit	torture	was	being	committed	by	the	defendant	after	he	lost	his	immunity	in	
December	1988.	
	
REPUBLIC	OF	INDONESIA	vs.	VINZON	
FACTS:	Petitioner	Vinzon	entered	into	a	Maintenance	Agreement	with	respondent.	
The	 maintenance	 agreement	 includes	 the	 following	 specific	 equipment:	 air	
conditioning	 units,	 generator	 sets,	 electrical	 facilities,	 water	 heaters	 and	 water	
motor	pumps.	The	agreement	shall	be	effective	for	4	years.	
	
The	 new	 Minister	 Counselor	 allegedly	 found	 respondent's	 work	 and	 services	
unsatisfactory	and	not	in	compliance	with	the	standards	set	in	the	Agreement.	The	
respondent	terminated	the	agreement	with	the	respondent.	The	latter	claimed	that	
it	was	unlawful	and	arbitrary.	Respondent	filed	a	Motion	to	Dismiss	alleging	that	the	
Republic	 of	 Indonesia,	 as	 a	 foreign	 state,	 has	 sovereign	 immunity	 from	 suit	 and	
cannot	be	sued	as	party-defendant	in	the	Philippines.	
	
ISSUE:	W/N	 the	 CA	 erred	 in	 sustaining	 the	 trial	 court's	 decision	 that	 petitioners	
have	 waived	 their	 immunity	 from	 suit	 by	 using	 as	 its	 basis	 the	 provision	 in	 the	
Maintenance	Agreement.	
	
HELD:	The	 mere	 entering	 into	 a	 contract	 by	 a	 foreign	 state	 with	 a	 private	 party	
cannot	be	construed	as	the	ultimate	test	of	whether	or	not	it	is	an	act	juri	imperii	or	
juri	gestionis.	Such	act	is	only	the	start	of	the	inquiry.	There	is	no	dispute	that	the	
establishment	of	a	diplomatic	mission	is	an	act	juri	imperii.	The	state	may	enter	into	
contracts	with	private	entities	to	maintain	the	premises,	furnishings	and	equipment	
of	the	embassy.	The	Republic	of	Indonesia	is	acting	in	pursuit	of	a	sovereign	activity	
when	 it	 entered	 into	 a	 contract	 with	 the	 respondent.	 The	 maintenance	 agreement	
was	entered	into	by	the	Republic	of	Indonesia	in	the	discharge	of	its	governmental	
functions.	It	cannot	be	deemed	to	have	waived	its	immunity	from	suit.	
	
US	vs.	TEHRAN	
	
Facts:	
In	 November	 4,	 1974,	 student	 militants	 of	 the	 group	 Muslim	 Student	 Followers	 of	
the	Imam's	Line	barged	into	the	US	Embassy	in	Tehran	and	held	US	diplomats	and	
consulars	hostage	for	444	days.	The	cause	of	the	Iranian	students	action	against	the	
US	was	believed	to	be	the	latters	grant	of	medical	asylum	to	Shah	Mohammad	Reza	
Pahlavi	and	its	refusal	to	turn	the	Shah	over	for	trial.	
	
The	US	sought	recourse	before	the	international	court,	asking	that	the	hostages	be	
freed	 and	 that	 reparations	 be	 given	 to	 the	 US	 by	 the	 Iranian	 government	 for	 the	
latters	failure	to	carry	its	international	legal	obligations.	US	averred	that	Iran	was	
responsible	 due	 to	 its	 initial	 inaction	 to	 the	 crisis	 and	 its	 subsequent	 statement	 of	
support	to	the	seizure.	
	
Issue:	
Whether	or	not	Iran	was	liable	to	the	United	States	for	the	seizure	of	the	US	embassy	
and	the	hostage-taking	of	the	US	nationals	by	the	Iranian	militants.	
	
Ruling:	
Iran	 was	 under	 obligation	 to	 make	 reparations	 for	 the	 injury	 caused	 to	 the	 United	
States.	
Irans	 failure	 to	 take	 appropriate	 steps	 to	 protect	 the	 US	 embassy	 and	 Consulates	
was	a	violation	of	its	obligations	under	the	1961	Vienna	Convention	on	Diplomatic	
Relations,	 the	 1963	 Vienna	 Convention	 on	 Consular	 Relations,	 and	 1955	 Treaty	 of	
Amity,	Economic	Relations	and	Consular	Rights	between	Iran	and	the	United	States.	
Iran	had	the	international	legal	responsibility	to	keep	the	embassy	inviolable.	Iran	
was	fully	aware	of	its	obligations	but	it	did	nothing	to	prevent	the	take	over	and	the	
captivity	of	the	US	nationals.	
	
Although	the	take-over	of	the	embassy	was	not	held	to	have	been	an	act	of	the	state,	
the	 consequent	 detention	 of	 the	 US	 nationals	 was	 attributed	 to	 Iran	 because	 of	 its	
approval	and	support	to	said	detention,	such	act	was	a	violation	of	the	provisions	in	
the	aforenamed	conventions	and	treaty.	Once	organs	of	the	Iranian	State	had	thus	
given	approval	to	the	acts	complained	of	and	decided	to	perpetuate	them	as	a	means	
of	 pressure	 on	 the	 United	 States,	 those	 acts	 were	 transformed	 into	 acts	 of	 the	
Iranian	 State:	 the	 militants	 became	 agents	 of	 that	 State,	 which	 itself	 became	
internationally	responsible	for	their	acts.	
	
For	its	breaches,	the	Islamic	Republic	of	Iran	had	incurred	responsibility	towards	
the	United	States	of	America.	Iran	is	obliged	to	make	reparations	and	to	endeavor	
for	the	release	of	the	hostages.	
	
CASE	
Mighell	vs.	Sultan	of	Johore	
DOCTRINE	
The	Sultan	of	Johore	was	sued	for	breach	
of	 promise	 to	 marry	 in	 a	 British	 court.	
The	 subject	 of	 the	 suit	 therefore	 was	 a	
private	 matter,	 not	 a	 state	 matter.	 Upon	
verification	 of	 his	 being	 a	 sitting	 foreign	
sovereign,	 the	 case	 was	 dismissed.	 The	
immunity	 that	 is	 recognized	 here	 is	
absolute	for	a	sitting	head	of	state.		
Pinochet	Case		
Pinochet	 did	 not	 enjoy	 immunity	 from	
prosecution	 as	 a	 former	 head	 of	 state	
and	could	be	extradited	to	Spain.		
The	Schooner	Exchange	v.	MacFaddon		
Chief	 Justice	 Marshall	 noted	 that	 the	
nation	 within	 its	 own	 territory	 is	
necessarily	 exclusive	 and	 absolute.	 It	 is	
susceptible	of	no	limitation	not	imposed	
by	 itself.	 However,	 he	 immediately	
added	
that	
absolute	
territorial	
jurisdiction	 would	 not	 seem	 to	
contemplate	foreign	sovereigns	nor	their	
sovereign	 rights	 as	 its	 objects.	 One	
sovereign	 being	 in	 no	 respect	 amenable	
to	 another;	 and	 being	 bound	 by	
obligations	 of	 the	 highest	 character	 not	
to	 degrade	 the	 dignity	 of	 his	 nation,	 by	
placing	 himself	 or	 its	 sovereign	 rights	
within	the	jurisdiction	of	another,	can	be	
supposed	to	enter	a	foreign	territory	...	in	
the	 confidence	 that	 the	 immunities	
belonging	 to	 his	 independent	 sovereign	
station,	 though	 not	 expressly	 stipulated,	
are	 reserved	 by	 implication,	 and	 will	 be	
extended	to	him.		
Dralle	v.	Republic	of	Czechoslovakia		
It	 can	 no	 longer	 be	 said	 that	 by	
international	 law	 so-called	 acta	
gestionis	 are	 exempt	 from	 municipal	
jurisdiction.	 This	 subjection	 of	 the	 acta	
gestionis	to	the	jurisdiction	of	States	has	
its	 basis	 in	 the	 development	 of	 the	
commercial	activity	of	States.	
United	States	of	America	v.	Hon.	V.M.	Ruiz		 A	State	may	be	said	to	have	descended	to	
the	level	of	an	individual	and	can	thus	be	
deemed	to	have	tacitly	given	its	consent	
to	 be	 sued	 only	 when	 it	 enters	 into	
business	contracts.	
United	States	v.	Hon.	Luis	Reyes		
Inasmuch	 as	 the	 State	 authorizes	 only	
legal	 acts	 by	 its	 officers,	 unauthorized	
acts	 of	 government	 officials	 or	 officers	
are	 not	 acts	 of	 the	 State,	 and	 an	 action	
against	 the	 officials	 or	 officers	 by	 one	
whose	 rights	 have	 been	 invaded	 or	
violated	 by	 such	 acts,	 for	 the	 protection	
of	 his	 rights,	 is	 not	 a	 suit	 against	 the	
State	 within	 the	 rule	 of	 immunity	 of	 the	
State	from	suit.	
Holy	See	v.	Eriberto	Rosario,	Jr.		
The	 logical	 question	 is	 whether	 the	
foreign	state	is	engaged	in	the	activity	in	
the	 regular	 course	 of	 business.	 If	 the	
foreign	 state	 is	 not	 engaged	 regularly	 in	
a	business	or	trade,	the	particular	act	or	
transaction	 must	 then	 be	 tested	 by	 its	
nature.	 If	 the	 act	 is	 in	 pursuit	 of	 a	
sovereign	activity,	or	an	incident	thereof,	
then	 it	 is	 an	 act	 jure	 imperii,	 especially	
when	 it	 is	 not	 undertaken	 for	 gain	 or	
profit.		
Underhill	v.	Hernandez		
Every	sovereign	state	is	bound	to	respect	
the	 independence	 of	 every	 other	
sovereign	 state,	 and	 the	 courts	 of	 one	
country	 will	 not	 sit	 in	 judgment	 on	 the	
acts	of	the	government	of	another,	done	
within	 its	 own	 territory.	 Redress	 of	
grievances	 by	 reason	 of	 such	 acts	 must	
be	 obtained	 through	 the	 means	 open	 to	
be	 availed	 of	 by	 sovereign	 powers	 as	
between	themselves.		
Banco	National	de	Cuba	v.	Sabbatino		
The	 act	 of	 state	 doctrine	 does,	 however,	
have	 constitutional	 underpinnings.	 It	
arises	 out	 of	 the	 basic	 relationships	
between	 branches	 of	 government	 in	 a	
system	 of	 separation	 of	 powers.	 It	
concerns	 the	 competency	 of	 dissimilar	
institutions	 to	 make	 and	 implement	
particular	 kinds	 of	 decisions	 in	 the	 area	
of	 international	 relations.	 The	 doctrine	
as	 formulated	 in	 past	 decisions	
expresses	the	strong	sense	of	the	Judicial	
Branch	that	its	engagement	in	the	task	of	
passing	on	the	validity	of	foreign	acts	of	
state	may	hinder	rather	than	further	this	
countrys	 pursuit	 of	 goals	 both	 for	 itself	
and	 for	 the	 community	 of	 nations	 as	 a	
whole	in	the	international	sphere		
Alfred	Dunhill	of	London,	Inc.	v.	Cuba		
Kirkpatrick	 Co.	
Tectonics	Corp		
v.	
The	concept	of	an	act	of	state	should	not	
be	 extended	 to	 include	 the	 repudiation	
of	 a	 purely	 commercial	 obligation	 owed	
by	 a	 foreign	 sovereign	 or	 by	 one	 of	 its	
commercial	instrumentalities.		
Environmental	 The	 act	 of	 state	 doctrine	 does	 not	
establish	 an	 exception	 for	 cases	 and	
controversies	 that	 may	 embarrass	
foreign	 governments,	 but	 merely	
requires	that,	in	the	process	of	deciding,	
the	 acts	 of	 foreign	 sovereigns	 taken	
within	 their	 own	 jurisdictions	 shall	 be	
deemed	 valid.	 That	 doctrine	 has	 no	
application	 to	 the	 present	 case	 because	
the	 validity	 of	 a	 foreign	 sovereign	 act	 is	
not	at	issue.		
	
	
CAIRE	CLAIM	
	
On	 11	 December	 1914,	 M	 Jean-Baptiste	 Caire,	 a	 French	 national,	 was	
unlawfully	 shot	 and	 killed	 at	 an	 army	 barracks	 in	 Mexico	 by	 two	 Mexican	 army	
officers,	 a	 major	 and	 a	 captain	 aided	 by	 a	 few	 privates,	 after	 M	 Caire	 refused	 a	
demand	by	one	of	the	officers	to	pay	a	sum	of	money.	
	
In	 awarding	 an	 indemnity	 in	 the	 sum	 of	 20,000	 Mexican	 gold	 piastres	 in	
favour	of	M	Caires	widow,	the	French-Mexican	Claims	Commission	held	that	Mexico	
was	internationally	responsible	for	the	conduct	of	the	army	officers.		In	this	regard,	
Presiding	 Commissioner	 Verzijl	 observed	 that,	 under	 the	 doctrine	 of	 objective	
responsibility	(state	responsibility	for	the	acts	of	state	officials	or	state	organs	even	
in	 the	 absence	 of	 fault	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 state),	 a	 state	 is	 internationally	
responsible	for	acts	committed	by	its	officials	or	organs	outside	their	competence	if	
the	 officials	 or	 organs	 acted	 at	 least	 to	 all	 appearances	 as	 competent	 officials	 or	
organs,	 or	 used	 powers	 or	 methods	 appropriate	 to	 their	 official	 capacity	 .		
Applying	 this	 principle	 to	 the	 facts	 of	 the	 present	 case,	 Presiding	 Commissioner	
Verzijl	concluded	as	follows:			
The	officers	in	question		consistently	conducted	themselves	as	officers	;	
in	 this	 capacity	 they	 began	 by	 exacting	 the	 remittance	 of	 certain	 sums	 of	
money;	 they	 continued	 by	 having	 the	 victim	 taken	 to	 a	 barracks	 of	 the	
occupying	troops;	and	it	was	clearly	because	of	the	refusal	of	M	Caire	to	meet	
their	 repeated	 demands	 that	 they	 finally	 shot	 him.	 	 Under	 these	
circumstances,	there	remains	no	doubt	that,	even	if	they	are	to	be	regarded	
as	having	acted	outside	their	competence,	which	is	by	no	means	certain,	and	
even	if	their	superior	officers	issued	a	counter-order,	these	two	officers	have	
involved	the	responsibility	of	the	State,	in	view	of	the	fact	that	they	acted	in	
their	 capacity	 of	 officers	 and	 used	 the	 means	 placed	 at	 their	 disposition	 by	
virtue	of	that	capacity.			
CORFU	CHANNEL	CASE	
On	22	October	1946	in	the	Corfu	Strait,	two	British	destroyers	struck	mines	
in	 Albanian	 waters	 and	 suffered	 damage,	 including	 serious	 loss	 of	 life.	 On	 22	 May	
1947,	 the	 Government	 of	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 filed	 an	 Application	 instituting	
proceedings	 against	 the	 Government	 of	 the	 People's	 Republic	 of	 Albania	 seeking	 a	
decision	to	the	effect	that	the	Albanian	Government	was	internationally	responsible	
for	 the	 consequences	 of	 the	 incident	 and	 must	 make	 reparation	 or	 pay	
compensation.	 Albania,	 for	 its	 part,	 had	 submitted	 a	 counter-claim	 against	 the	
United	Kingdom	for	having	violated	Albanian	territorial	waters.	On	9	April	1949,	the	
Court	 found	 that	 Albania	 was	 responsible	 for	 the	 explosions	 and	 for	 the	 resulting	
damage	 and	 loss	 of	 human	 life	 suffered	 by	 the	 United	 Kingdom.	 The	 Court	 also	
found	 that	 the	 later	 minesweeping	 by	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 had	 violated	 Albanian	
sovereignty.	 On	 19	 December	 1949,	 the	 Court	 ordered	 Albania	 to	 pay	 the	 United	
Kingdom	a	total	compensation	of	843,	947.		
NICARAGUA	vs.	US	
On	 9	 April	 1984,	 Nicaragua	 filed	 an	 Application	 instituting	 proceedings	
against	the	United	States	of	America	concerning	a	dispute	relating	to	responsibility	
for	 military	 and	 paramilitary	 activities	 in	 and	 against	 Nicaragua.	 One	 of	 the	
measures	 required	 the	 United	 States	 to	 immediately	 cease	 and	 refrain	 from	 any	
action	restricting	access	to	Nicaraguan	ports,	and,	in	particular,	the	laying	of	mines.	
On	18	January	1985,	the	United	States	announced	that	it	intended	not	to	participate	
in	any	further	proceedings	relating	to	this	case.			
In	its	Judgment	of	27	June	1986,	the	Court	rejected	the	justification	of	collective	selfdefense	advanced	by	the	United	States	and	stated	that	it	had	violated	the	obligations	
imposed	 by	 customary	 international	 law	 not	 to	 intervene	 in	 the	 affairs	 of	 another	
State.	 The	 Court	 also	 found	 that	 the	 United	 States	 had	 violated	 certain	 obligations	
arising	from	a	bilateral	Treaty	of	Friendship,	Commerce	and	Navigation	of	1956	and	
that	it	must	make	reparation	for	all	injury	caused.		
	
	
HOME	MISSIONARY	SOCIETY	CLAIM	
The	 British	 administration	 of	 the	 protectorate	 Sierra	 Leone	 imposed	 a	 hut	
tax	on	the	native	population.		This	lead	to	rioting,	during	which	missionaries	were	
killed	and	Society	property	destroyed.		The	US	brought	a	claim	against	Great	Britain.	
In	rejecting	the	claim,	the	tribunal	appeared	to	favor	the	subjective	approach,	
noting	 that:	 It	 is	 a	 well-established	 principle	 of	 international	 law	 that	 no	
Government	 can	 be	 held	 responsible	 for	 the	 act	 of	 rebellious	 bodies	 of	 men	
committed	in	violation	of	its	authority,	where	it	is	itself	guilty	of	no	breach	of	good	
faith,	or	of	no	negligence	in	suppressing	insurrection.		
	
	
SHORT	vs.	IRAN	
Short	commenced	employment	with	a	United	States	owned	company	in	Iran	
in	April	1977.		He	alleged	that	following	the	onset	of	the	Islamic	revolution	in	late	
1978	 and	 the	 subsequent	 declaration	 of	 martial	 law	 he	 was	 virtually	 under	 house	
arrest,	 living	 with	 progressively	 increasing	 stress	 caused	 by	 vehement	 threats	
against	 the	 lives	 of	 Americans,	 shooting	 in	 the	 streets,	 firebombing	 of	 American	
homes	 and	 automobiles,	 and	 other	 violence	 propagated	 by	 revolutionaries	 against	
Americans.		Short	was	evacuated	in	haste	from	Iran	by	the	United	States	Air	Force	
in	February	1979.	
The	 Claimant	 relies	 on	 acts	 committed	 by	 revolutionaries	 and	 seeks	 to	
attribute	 responsibility	 for	 their	 acts	 to	 the	 government	 that	 was	 established	
following	the	success	of	the	Revolution.		He	is	unable,	however,	to	identify	any	agent	
of	 the	 revolutionary	 movement,	 the	 actions	 of	 which	 compelled	 him	 to	 leave	 Iran.		
The	 acts	 of	 supporters	 of	 a	 revolution	 cannot	 be	 attributed	 to	 the	 government	
following	the	success	of	the	revolution	just	as	the	acts	of	supporters	of	an	existing	
government	are	not	attributable	to	the	government.			
	
	
CHORZOW	FACTORY	CASE	
The	 German	 Empire	 had	 a	 contract	 with	 a	 company,	 where	 the	 company	
undertook	 to	 establish	 for	 the	 Reich	 and	 forthwith	 to	 begin	 the	 construction	 of	 a	
nitrate	factory	at	Chorzow,	Upper	Silesia.	Subsequently,	Germany	and	Poland	signed	
a	convention	concerning	the	Upper	Silesia	of	Geneva.			
The	 Polish	 Government	 took	 possession	 of	 the	 factory	 and	 took	 over	 its	
management.	During	such	undertaking,	the	German	Government	contended	and	the	
Polish	Government	admitted	that	the	delegate	of	the	latter	also	took	possession	of	
the	movable	property,	patents,	licenses,	etc.	
Germany	brought	action	in	behalf	of	the	companies	in	violation	of	the	Geneva	
Convention.		
The	 Permanent	 Court	 of	 International	 Justice	 stated:	 "[R]eparation	 must,	 as	
far	 as	 possible,	 wipe	 out	 all	 the	 consequences	 of	 the	 illegal	 act	 and	 reestablish	 the	
situation	 which	 would,	 in	 all	 probability,	 have	 existed	 if	 that	 act	 had	 not	 been	
committed."	The	Court	then	ruled	that	this	can	be	accomplished	through	restitution	
in	kind,	or	if	that	is	not	possible,	through	just	compensation,	meaning	"payment	of	a	
sum	 corresponding	 to	 the	 value	 which	 a	 restitution	 in	 kind	 would	 bear,"	 and	 "the	
award,	if	need	be,	of	damages	for	loss	sustained	which	would	not	be	recovered	by	
restitution	in	kind	or	payment	in	place	of	it,"	such	as	lost	profits.