HAZOP
Hazard &
Operability
Studies
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HAZARD STUDY
HAZAN
SAFETY AUDIT
DOW INDICES (HAZARD RANKING)
ACCIDENT ANALYSIS
EIA
HAZOP
HAZARD & OPERABILITY
SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT
QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT (QRA)
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PLAN (EMP)
The above diagram of inter-relationships shows that there are there are four main areas of hazard study namely :
Hazard analysis (HAZAN), Hazard and Operability study (HAZOP), Scenario development, Quantitative Risk
Assessment (QRA) and finally Emergency Management Plan (EMP). These inter-relationships are more
elaborated in the following diagram :
HAZARD CHECK LIST
SAFETY AUDIT
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
HAZAN
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
DOW INDICES
ACCIDENT ANALYSIS
SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
HAZOP
ACCIDENT CONSEQUENCE
RISK DETERMINATION
RISK AND/OR HAZARD ACCEPTABILITY
QRA
NO
YES
EIA
BUILD AND/OR OPERATE
EMP
ADAPTED FROM GUIDELINES FOR HAZARDS EVALUATION PROCEDURES,
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CHEMICAL ENGINEERS, NEW YORK, 1985, P 1-9
Introduction & Overview
"....the application of a formal systematic critical examination of the process
and engineering intentions of new or existing facilities, to assess the hazard
potential of mal-operation or malfunction of individual items of equipment
and the consequential effects on the facility as a whole.
[courtesy: Chemical Industries Association]
Formal, structured approach to identification
of potential hazards and operability problems
Line by line / by equipment evaluation of the
design
Team exercise - input from all engineering and
design disciplines, plus operations
Structured brainstorming to look for deviations
from the design intent.
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Introduction & Overview
(Contd.)
The HAZOP method has been widely used in the
process industries, particularly in the 1980s and
90s, and has developed a strong reputation as
being an effective and thorough means of
identifying hazards in process plants
A synthetic experience that makes it almost as
easy to spot problems in prospect as it is in
retrospect.
Technique formalized by ICI (UK) in late 60s
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HAZOPS - What ?
THE BASIC CONCEPT
Essentially the HAZOPS procedure involves taking a full
description of a process and systematically questioning
every part of it to establish how deviations from the
design intent can arise. Once identified, an assessment is
made
as
to
whether
such
deviations
and
their
consequences can have a negative effect upon the safe
and efficient operation of the plant.
If considered
necessary, action is then taken to remedy the situation.
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HAZOPS - What ?
(Contd.)
This critical analysis is applied in a structured way by the
HAZOP team, and it relies upon them releasing their
imagination in an effort to discover credible causes of
deviations.
In practice, many of the causes will be fairly obvious, such as
pump failure causing a loss of circulation in a cooling water facility .
The great advantage of this technique is that it encourages
the team to consider other less obvious ways in which a
deviation may occur, however unlikely they may seem at first
consideration.
Much more than a mechanistic check-list type of review.
The result is that there is a good chance that potential failures
and problems will be identified which had not previously been
experienced in the type of plant being studied.
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HAZOPS - Why ?
HAZOP studies are mainly intended to :
Check the design and consider whether any of
the conditions which may occur from either a
mal-function or mal-operation, which may
cause a general hazard to people working on
the installation, to the general public or to
plant and equipment;
Check whether the precautions incorporated
into the design are sufficient to either prevent
the
hazard
occurring or
reduce
any
consequence to an acceptable level;
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HAZOPS - Why ?
(Contd.)
HAZOP studies are mainly intended to :
consider any safety interfaces which exist with other
installations or parts of this installation;
ensure that the plant can be started, maintained and
shutdown safely, and;
where appropriate recommend changes to the process
design or its operation that increase process safety or
enhance unit operability.
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HAZOPS - When ?
HAZOP studies are best performed on:
new plants where the design is nearly firm
and documented;
existing plants as part of a periodic hazard
analysis or a management of change
process. (as for e.g. changes initiated through PCOs
etc)
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FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTION
When a process is operating within its
design envelope, the potential for
hazards or operability problems does
not exist.
It is also a primary assumption that
the original process design and the
equipment standards applied are
correct.
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HAZOPS - How ?
HAZOP studies the stages in the conduct of the study
Select a section (node)
Select a Parameter
Apply guidewords to identify potential deviations
Brainstorm all possible causes (stay within the section)
Select the first identified cause
Develop ultimate potential consequence(s) (look inside and outside
the section)
List existing safeguards (look inside and outside the section)
Develop risk ranking
Propose recommendations (weigh consequences and safeguards)
Repeat for each cause / deviation / parameter / section
Follow up and recording
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How To Lead A HAZOP
His role is to:
Organize a team
Act as a facilitator to bring to bear the
expert knowledge of the team members in
a structured interaction.
Get the team to think the unthinkable.
Focus more on the human element.
Not to identify hazards and operability
problems, but rather to ensure that such
identification takes place.
Manage the personal interactions between the team members.
Obtain balanced contributions and to minimize the effect on
individuals when the design is subject to criticism.
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Organizing a HAZOP Study
Persons needed:
Chairman
Scribe
Process & Systems Engineer(s)
Operations Representative(s)
Other engineering disciplines (Control, Electrical, etc.)
Documents needed:
Design Basis
P&IDs
Cause & Effects Diagrams
Operating Philosophy/ Instructions..
Dedicated room and facilities
Dedicated (available full time) team members
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Organizing a HAZOP Study
(Contd.)
Roles and responsibilities:
Chairman ensures all are:
familiar with technique,
directs on selection of nodes, parameters, etc.
ensures meeting stays on track
Produces report
Scribe:
records proceedings,
prepares action lists after each session
Team members actively and freely participate
Recording of Study (HAZOP Software or
Manually)
Assigning and close out of recommendations
Follow up by Chairman/ designated Project Engineer
Prepare close out report
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Selection of a Team Leader
there needs to be a person appointed who will be in overall
charge; with Hazop Studies this person is usually called the
Chairman or Study Leader.....
Ideally, he should not have been too closely associated
with the project under review as there might be a risk
of him not being sufficiently objective in his direction of
the team.
He should be carefully chosen and be fully conversant
with the Hazop methodology and is capable of ensuring
smooth and efficient progress of the study
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Selection of a Scribe
Another important member of the team will be the Scribe or
the Secretary.....
His contribution to the discussion may be minimal, as
his main function during the sessions will be to record
the study as it proceeds. He will therefore need to have
sufficient technical knowledge to be able to understand
what is being discussed.
He helps organise the various meetings, takes notes
during the examination sessions and circulates the
resultant lists of actions or questions.
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Typical HAZOPS Ground Rules
Start on time
All
peers
No bad ideas
Safe environment
Everyone contributes
Do not design it here
Leader/facilitator limits opinions
Frequent breaks
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Supplementary Ground Rules
Diversity is good
Present your views but avoid arguing for them
Listen to others
Look for compromise
Do not change your views to avoid conflict
Be suspicious of agreements reached too
easily
Avoid majority votes, seek consensus
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Terminology
Section/Node
Study reference section of the process: used to organize the
study into manageable segments
Intentions
How the process sections are expected to operate
Parameters
Process and operating variables such as flow, pressure and
temperature
Guidewords
no more less as well as part of reverse and other than
Deviations
Departures from the design and operating intentions
(Guide word + Parameter)
Causes
Reasons why deviations may occur (possible causes)
Consequences
Results of the unique cause - a hazard causing damage,
injury, or other loss (potential consequences)
Safeguards
Design and operating features that reduce the frequency or
mitigate the consequences (existing systems and
procedures)
Risk Ranking
Evaluation of the possibility that an identified consequence
will occur, and will cause harm
Recommendations Recommendations for design or operating changes, or
further study
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Keywords/ Guidewords
An essential feature in this process of questioning and systematic analysis
is the use of keywords to focus the attention of the team upon deviations
and their possible causes. These keywords are divided into two sub-sets:
Primary Keywords which focus attention upon
a particular aspect of the design intent or an
associated process condition or parameter.
Secondary Keywords which, when combined
with a primary keyword, suggest possible
deviations.
The entire technique of Hazops revolves around the effective use of
these keywords, so their meaning and use must be clearly understood
by the team.
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Keywords/ Guidewords
Primary Keywords:
These reflect both the process design intent and operational aspects of the
plant being studied. Typical process oriented words might be as follows.
Flow
Pressure
Separate (settle, filter, centrifuge)
Composition
React
Reduce (grind, crush, etc.)
Corrode
Temperature
Level
Mix
Absorb
Erode
Other operational words that may be added are:
Drain
Vent
Inspect
Start-up
Isolate
Purge
Maintain
Shutdown
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Keywords/ Guidewords
Secondary Keywords:
when applied in conjunction with a Primary Keyword, these suggest potential
deviations or problems. They tend to be a standard set as listed below
No
Less
More
Reverse
Also
The design intent does not occur (e.g. Flow/No), or the
operational aspect is not achievable (Isolate/No)
A quantitative decrease in the design intent occurs (e.g.
Pressure/Less)
A quantitative increase in the design intent occurs (e.g.
Temperature/More)
The opposite of the design intent occurs (e.g.
Flow/Reverse)
The design intent is completely fulfilled, but in addition
some other related activity occurs (e.g. Flow/Also indicating
contamination in a product stream, or Level/Also meaning
material in a tank or vessel which should not be there)
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Keywords/ Guidewords
Secondary Keywords: (Contd.)
Other
The activity occurs, but not in the way intended (e.g.
Fluctuation
The design intention is achieved only part of the time (e.g.
an air-lock in a pipeline might result in Flow/Fluctuation)
Early
Usually used when studying sequential operations, this
would indicate that a step is started at the wrong time or
done out of sequence
Late
As for Early
Flow/Other could indicate a leak or product flowing where
it should not, or Composition/Other might suggest
unexpected proportions in a feedstock)
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Selecting Nodes, Parameters and
Guidewords
Nodes:(discrete location on the P&ID at which the process parameters are investigated
for deviations)
Lines between major pieces of equipment
Equipment items (tanks/vessels, columns, reactors)
Packages (compressors, chemical injection)
Utilities/Services (Air, N2, Steam, Drains,Vents Flare,
Sewers..)
Parameters: :(Physical or chemical property associated with the process)
Flow, Pressure, Temperature, reaction others
Applicable to the Node
Guidewords:(Simple words used to qualify or quantify the intention and to guide and
stimulate the process for identifying process hazards)
No, More, Less, As well as, others
Applicable to the Parameter
Parameter + Guideword = Potential Deviation
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HAZOP Review Guideline Table
Typical Nodes
Deviations
Column,
Departure from Design
Reactor
Fired
Exchanger
Vessel,
Pump &
Intention
Heater
Tank
Compressor
USE THE DEVIATIONS BELOW FOR ALL NODES INDICATED
FLOW
No, Low, More, Reverse
X
X
X
X
PRESSURE
No, Lower, Higher
X
X
X
X
X
TEMPERATURE
Lower, Higher
X
X
X
X
X
LEVEL/INTERFACE
No, Lower, Higher
X
X
START-UP/SHUTDOWN
Using All the Above
X
X
X
X
X
Lines
X
X
X
CONSIDER THE FOUR DEVIATIONS BELOW FOR ALL NODES INDICATED
CONTAMINANT
More
REACTION
Low, High
TOXICITY
Sampling, Maintenance
CORROSION/EROSION
More
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Brainstorming Causes
Deviations are used to help team identify causes of
upsets, i.e. how does the process break down ?
The same cause may apply to two or more deviations
Do not criticize causes during brainstorming
Do not argue about whether or not a cause belongs in a
particular deviation (no flow, less flow); develop it
when it comes up
Do not list the same cause twice; develop it the first
time; if a new deviation triggers some thoughts for
additional consequences of a previously developed
scenario, go back and revise the scenario
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Common Deviations and Their Causes
Guide Words
No, Not, None
Process Parameters
Flow
Pressure
Temperature
Level
Less, Low, Short
Part of
More, High
Wrong routing, blockage,
blind flange left in, faulty
non-return valve, burst
pipe, control valve,
isolation valve, pump or
vessel failure.
Partial blockage (filters),
vessel or valves failing,
leaks, loss of pump
efficiency.
N/A
More than 1 pump
operating, reduced
delivery head, increased
suction pressure, other
routes, exchanger tube
leaks.
Open to atmosphere.
Generation of vacuum by
pump drain out of
vessels, cooling or
condensation from
vapour or gas dissolving
in a liquid.
Pump/compressor
suction lines blocked.
N/A
Surge, relief, leakage
from HP connection (lines
and flanges), thermal,
rate of pressurising lines.
Freezing, loss of
pressure, loss of heating,
failed exchanger tubes.
N/A
Fouled cooler tubes,
cooling water failure,
failed exchanger tubes.
Exothermic reaction.
N/A
Empty tank, vessel.
Composition viscosity, Mixing failure. Additive
density, phase
(e.g. chemical injection)
failure.
Control valve failure,
manual error, pump out.
High or Low interface
level.
Poor mixing, or
Passing through
interruption during mixing. isolations, leaking
exchanger tubes, phase
change, out of spec.
Control valve failure,
manual error, blocked
outlet.
Excessive additives,
mixing.
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Develop Consequences without
Safeguards
Identify ultimate potential consequences for
each deviation
Common error by process hazards review
teams is to take credit for safeguards when
developing consequences
When developing consequences consider the
following:
Operator is not available or is not paying attention
Control valves are in manual
Alarms and safety interlocks do not function
Procedures are not followed or are not understood
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Deviation from design intent
Design Intent
defines how a plant or just a part of it is expected
to operate. It may be to produce a certain tonnage per year
of a particular chemical, to manufacture a specified number of
cars, to process and dispose of a certain volume of effluent
per annum, etc
but in the vast majority of cases it would also be
understood that an important subsidiary intent
would be to conduct the operation in the safest and
most efficient manner possible.
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Deviation from design intent
(Contd.)
To illustrate, let us imagine that as part of the overall
production requirement we needed a cooling water facility. A
much simplified statement as to the design intent of this small
section of the plant would be "to continuously circulate cooling
water at an initial temperature of xC and at a rate of xx liters
per hour".
Fan
Cooler
Heat Exchanger
A deviation or departure from the
design intent in this case would be
a cessation of circulation, or the
water being at too high an initial
temperature. Note the difference
between a deviation and its cause.
In this case, failure of the pump
would be a cause, not a deviation.
Pump
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Priority for Safeguards
Cause elimination first, Consequence
mitigation second
Inherent design cushion (better than
minimum consensus standards)
Written procedures for :
Operations
Maintenance
Inspection
Testing
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Priority for Safeguards (cont.)
Training
History
Previous incidents (lack of)
Equipment inspection (i.e. clean or non corrosive
service)
Equipment
PSVs
Redundant/ voting systems
Independent alarms/ shutdowns
Control instruments
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Qualitatively Estimating Risk
SLR
R = risk is an assessment of how serious and how
credible is each identified deviation, its causes
and consequences; a combination of the
likelihood and the severity of the predicted or
ultimate consequences
R=S*L
S
L
= The severity of the predicted consequences
= The likelihood of the predicted consequences
developing given the safeguards that are
currently in place
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RISK RANKING MATRIX
Likelihood
1
2
3
4
5
1
1
2
3
4
5
2
2
4
6
7
8
Severity
3
3
6
7
8
9
4
4
7
8
9
10
5
5
8
9
10
10
SEVERITY - FIVE POINT SCHEME FOR SEVERITY LEVEL
Class
Definition
In plant fatality; Public fatalities; Extensive
property damage; environmental damage;
Extended downtime ( > or = 2 days )
Class
1 V High
Possible to occur ( < 5 years )
Lost time injury; Public injuries or public
impact; Significant property damage; Exceeds
MEPA standards; Downtime ( 1 to 2 days )
2 High
Possible to occur ( 5 < 15 years )
V High
High
Medium
Minor injury; Moderate property damage; No
environmental impact; Downtime ( 4 to 24
hours ); Off-spec product
Low
No worker injuries; Minor property damage;
No environmental impact; Downtime ( < 4
hours )
V Low
No worker injuries; No property damage; No
environmental impact; Recoverable
operational problem
LIKELIHOOD - FIVE POINT SCHEME FOR LIKELIHOOD
Frequency of Occurrence
3 Medium Possible to occur under unusual circumstances
( 15 < 30 years )
4 Low
Possible to occur over the lifetime of the plant
( 30 < 100 years)
5 V Low
Could occur, however not likely over plant life
(1 / 100 years)
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HAZOPS Study Methodology
In simple terms, the HAZOP study process involves applying in a
systematic way all relevant keyword combinations to the plant in
question in an effort to uncover potential problems. The results are
recorded in columnar format under the following headings:
DEVIATION
CAUSE
CONSEQUENCE
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION
In considering the information to be recorded in each of these
columns, it may be helpful to take as an example the following
simple schematic.
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HAZOPS Study Methodology
Mixer
V1
Dosing
Tank T1
P1
Strainer S1
Pump P1
Note that this is purely representational, and not intended to illustrate an actual
system.
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HAZOPS Study Methodology
(Contd.)
Deviation
The keyword combination being applied (e.g.
Flow/No).
Cause
Potential causes which would result in the deviation
occurring. (e.g. "Strainer S1 blockage due to
impurities in Dosing Tank T1" might be a cause of
Flow/No).
Consequence
The consequences which would arise, both from the
effect of the deviation (e.g. "Loss of dosing results in
incomplete separation in V1") and, if appropriate,
from the cause itself (e.g. "Cavitation in Pump P1,
with possible damage if prolonged").
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HAZOPS Study Methodology
(Contd.)
Safeguards
Any existing protective devices which either prevent
the cause or safeguard against the adverse
consequences would be recorded in this column. For
example, you may consider recording "Local pressure
gauge in discharge from pump might indicate problem
was arising".
Note that safeguards need not be restricted to hardware where
appropriate, credit can be taken for procedural aspects such as
regular plant inspections (if you are sure that they will actually be
carried out!).
Action
Actions fall into two groups:
1.Actions that remove the cause.
2.Actions that mitigate or eliminate the consequences.
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HAZOPS Study Methodology
(Contd.)
Always investigate removing the cause first, and
only where necessary mitigate the consequences.
For example "Strainer S1 blockage due to impurities
etc". we might approach the problem in a number of
ways:
Ensure that impurities cannot get into T1 by fitting a strainer in the
road tanker offloading line.
Consider carefully whether a strainer is required in the suction to the
pump. Will particulate matter pass through the pump without
causing any damage, and is it necessary to ensure that no such
matter gets into V1. If we can dispense with the strainer altogether,
we have removed the cause of the problem.
Fit a differential pressure gauge across the strainer, with perhaps a
high dP alarm to give clear indication that a total blockage is
imminent.
Fit a duplex strainer, with a regular schedule of changeover and
cleaning of the standby unit.
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Preparatory Work
This preparatory work will be the responsibility of the
Chairman, and the requirements can be summarized as
follows:
1.Assemble the data (PFDs, P&IDs, Layouts, C&E diagrams etc...)
2.Understand the subject (enable him to plan a sensible strategy, duration of the
review, etc.......)
3.Subdivide the plant and plan the sequence (Split into manageable sections,
endeavour to group smaller items into logical units...)
4.Mark-up the drawings (use distinctive and separate colours, when node spans
two or more drawings, the colours used should remain constant)
5.Devise a list of appropriate Keywords
6.Prepare Table Headings and an Agenda ( like reference drawings, parameter,
node intention, session no.etc...)
7.Prepare a timetable
8.Select the team (chairman also to ensure the core team members are available for
the duration of the review,)
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RUNNING A HAZOP STUDY
After the preparatory work, the chairman should be in a
position to easily guide an efficient and comprehensive
study through to a successful conclusion.
However, there are certain guideline to remember:
Forbid team members to illustrate their ideas on the master P&IDs.(
Establish the rule right at the beginning of the session)
Resist temptation to hasten the process by listing potential cause/
consequences if schedule is slipping.
Do not allow a separate meeting to develop, with two team members
conversing in low voices at the corner of the table.
Ensure that all team members participate, even those who might feel
unsure of themselves.
Recognize and reward with praise the team member/s who contribute
to the discussion wholeheartedly and sensibly. However, do not allow
them to overshadow the rest of the team.
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RUNNING A HAZOP STUDY
(Contd.)
If discussion wanders away from the matter under consideration, refocus the attention of the team either by requesting that the Secretary
read out what he has recorded, or by asking for an action to be
formulated.
The Chairman should be independent and unbiased, and should not be
perceived as constantly favoring one section of the team as opposed to
another
Take as an example the situation where the client wishes to have an additional High Level Alarm, but the
contractor strongly disputes its necessity. Consider the following actions:
"Fit a High Level Alarm". In the view of the contractor, the Chairman has sided with the client. He may,
wrongly or otherwise, perceive this to be a biased decision.
The action "Justify the requirement for a High Level Alarm" is addressed to the client. The Chairman
favors the contractor's argument, but is not dismissing altogether the views of the client. Both parties are
likely to be content with this formula.
The action "Justify the absence of a High Level Alarm" is addressed to the contractor. The Chairman
favors the client's argument, but is not dismissing altogether the views of the contractor. As before, neither
party will have cause to feel aggrieved.
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The Report
The HAZOP Report is a key document pertaining to the safety of the plant.
It is crucial that the benefit of this expert study is easily accessible and
comprehensible for future reference in case the need arises to alter the plant
or its operating conditions.
The major part of such a report is the printed Minutes, in which is listed
the team members, meeting dates, Keywords applied, and every detail of
the study teams findings.
However, with this is included a general summary. The contents of such a
summary might typically be:
- An outline of the terms of reference and the scope of study
- A very brief description of the process which was studied
- The procedures and protocol employed.
- A brief description of the Action File should be included
- General comments
- Results. (usually states the number of recommended actions)
- Appendix (master copies of dwgs., studied, tech data used, cals produced,
C&E charts, corr. bet contractor to vendor, or client to contractor etc. )
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HAZOP Method Flow Chart
Explain
design intent
Select Process
Parameter
Apply
Guidewords
Identify
credible
Deviations
Identify
credible
Causes
Examine
Consequences
Select a Node
Identify
existing
Safeguards
Repeat for all
Nodes
Repeat for all
Parameters
Repeat for all
Guidewords
Develop
Recommended
Actions
Assess Risk
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HAZOP : DETAILED SEQUENCE OF EXAMINATION
(COURTSEY: Chemical Industry Safety and Health Council, 1977/3)
Beginning
Select a vessel
11
Repeat 6-10 for all meaningful deviations
derived from the first guide words
11
Explain the general intention of the
vessel and its lines
12
Repeat 5-11 for all the guide words
12
Repeat 5-12
Mark vessel as
completed
Repeat 1-22 for all vessels
on flow sheet
Select a line
13
Mark line as having been examined
13
Explain the intention of the
line
14
Repeat 313 for each line
14
Mark flow sheet as
completed
Apply the first guide words
15
Select an auxiliary (e.g.
heating system)
15
Repeat 1-24 for
all flow sheets
Develop a meaningful deviation
16
Explain the intention of the
auxiliary
Examine Possible causes
17
Repeat 5-12 for auxiliary
Examine Consequences
18
Mark auxiliary as having
examined
Detect Hazards
19
Repeat 5-18 for all
auxiliaries
10
Make suitable record
20
Explain intention of the vessel
End
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HAZOP Procedure: Flow diagram
Select a section of the Plant
Have all the relevant Primary Keywords for this plant section been considered ?
Yes
No
Select a Primary Keyword not previously considered. (e.g. pressure)
Have all the relevant Secondary Keywords for this Primary Keyword been considered ?
Yes
No
Select a Secondary Keyword not previously considered. (e.g. More)
Are there any causes for this deviations not previously
discussed and recorded ?
No
Yes
Record this new cause.
No
Are associated consequence of any significance?
Yes
Record the consequence/s
Record any Safeguards identified.
No
Having regard to the Consequences and Safeguards, is an action necessary?
Yes
Record the agreed action
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The reasons for such widespread use of
HAZOPS
Although no statistics are available to verify the
claim, it is believed that the HAZOP methodology
is perhaps the most widely used aid to loss
prevention. The reason for this can most probably
be summarized as follows:
It is easy to learn.
It can be easily adapted to almost all the operations
that are carried out within process industries.
No special level of academic qualification is
required. One does not need to be a university graduate
to participate in a study.
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HAZOP Summary
HAZOP is a qualitative, verbal and an interactive group
process
that
attempts
to
identify
hazards
and
subsequently recommend modifications in order to
eliminate unacceptable risk situations
Provides a means to reveal potential hazards and
operability problems at design stage
Creative approach to identifying hazards
Systematic and thorough
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HAZOP Summary
Formal Record of Study
Minimizes cost to implement appropriate
safeguards in new or modified facilities
Participants gain a thorough understanding of
the facility
Always Remember the primary assumption
in a HAZOP study is that the original process
design and the equipment standards applied
are correct.
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