In re VICENTE SOTTO

EN BANC

[January 21, 1949.]

In re VICENTE SOTTO, for contempt of court.

Vicente Sotto in his own behalf.

SYLLABUS

1. CONTEMPT; POWER TO PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT IS INHERENT IN ALL

COURTS OF SUPERIOR JURISDICTION. That the power to punish for contempt
is inherent in all courts of superior jurisdiction independently of any special
expression of statute, is a doctrine or principle uniformly accepted and applied by
the courts of last resort in the United States, which is applicable in this
jurisdiction since our Constitution and courts of justice are patterned after those
of that country.
2. ID.; CRITICISM OR COMMENT ON DECISIONS OF SUPREME COURT,
EXTENT AND SCOPE OF. Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or
wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending
case made in good faith may be tolerated; because if well founded it may
enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed; but
if it is not well taken and obviously erroneous it should, in no way, inuence the
court in reversing or modifying its decision.
3. ID.; ID. To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last
years committing deliberately "so many blunders and injustices," that is to say,
that it has been deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law and justice is
on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision
was rendered, would tend necessarily to undermine the condence of the people
in the honesty and integrity of the members of this court, and consequently to
lower or degrade the administration of justice.
4. ID.; ID. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the
Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain
relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled
upon, and if the people lose their condence in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this court and believe that they can not expect justice therefrom,
they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and
perhaps chaos would be the result.
5. ID.; ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; DUTIES TOWARD THE SUPREME COURT. As
a member of the bar and an ocer of the courts, Attorney V. S., like any other, is
in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes
delity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote
 distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the
stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a
very shaky foundation.
6. ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS;
MAINTENANCE OF INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY. The constitutional
guaranty of freedom of speech and the press must be protected to its fullest
extent, but license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizen should not be
confused with liberty in its true sense. As important as the maintenance of an
unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the rights of the citizen, is the
maintenance of the independence of the judiciary.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. The administration of justice and the freedom of the
press, though separate and distinct, are equally sacred, and neither should be
violated by the other. The press and the courts have correlative rights and duties
and should cooperate to uphold the principles of the Constitution and laws, from
which the former receives its prerogative and the latter its jurisdiction. The right
of legitimate publicity must be scrupulously recognized and care taken at all
times to avoid impinging upon it. In a clear case where it is necessary, in order to
dispose of judicial business unhampered by publications which reasonably tend to
impair the impartiality of verdicts, or otherwise obstruct the administration of
justice, this Court will not hesitate to exercise its undoubted power to punish for
contempt. This Court must be permitted to proceed with the disposition of its
business in an orderly manner free from outside interference obstructive of the
constitutional functions. This right will be insisted upon as vital to an impartial
court, and, as a last resort, as an individual exercises the right of self-defense, it
will act to preserve its existence as an unprejudiced tribunal.

DECISION

FERIA, J :
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This is a proceeding for contempt of court against the respondent Atty.

Vicente Sotto, who was required by this Court on December 7, 1948, to show
cause why he should not be punished for contempt of court for having issued a
written statement in connection with the decision of this Court in In re Angel
Parazo for contempt of court, which statement, as published in the Manila Times
and other daily newspapers of the locality, reads as follows:
"As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53),
interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a
local daily, who now has to suer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to
divulge the source of a news published in his paper, I regret to say that our
High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but that it is
once more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of
the majority of its members. In the wake of so many blunders and injustices
deliberately committed during these last years, I believe that the only remedy
to put an end to so much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme
 Court. To this eect, I announce that one of the rst measures, which I will
introduce in the coming congressional sessions, will have as its object the
complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now constituted, the
Supreme Court of today constituted a constant peril to liberty and
democracy. It need be said loudly, very loudly, so that even the deaf may
hear: the Supreme Court of today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark
of Justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa,
Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of
the Philippine Judiciary."
Upon his request, the respondent was granted ten days more besides the
ve originally given him to le his answer, and although his answer was led
after the expiration of the period of time given him the said answer was
admitted. This Court could have rendered a judgment for contempt after
considering his answer, because he does not deny the authenticity of the
statement as it has been published. But, in order to give the respondent ample
opportunity to defend himself or justify the publication of such libelous
statement, the case was set for hearing or oral argument on January 4, the
hearing being later postponed to January 10, 1949. As the respondent did not
appear at the date set for hearing, the case was submitted for decision.
In his answer, the respondent does not deny having published the above
quoted threat and intimidation as well as false and calumnious charges against
this Supreme Court. But he therein contends that under section 13, Article VIII of
the Constitution, which confers upon this Supreme Court the power to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, "this Court has no
power to impose correctional penalties upon the citizens, and that the Supreme
Court can only impose nes and imprisonment by virtue of a law, and a law has
to be promulgated by Congress with the approval of the Chief Executive." And he
also alleges in his answer that "in the exercise of the freedom of speech
guaranteed by the Constitution, the respondent made his statement in the press
with the utmost good faith and with no intention of oending any of the
majority of the honorable members of this high Tribunal, who, in his opinion,
erroneously decided the Parazo case; but he has not attacked, nor intended to
attack the honesty or integrity of any one." The other arguments set forth by the
respondent in his defenses deserve no consideration.
Rule 64 of the rules promulgated by this Court does not punish as for
contempt of court an act which was not punishable as such under the law and
the inherent powers of the Court to punish for contempt. The provisions of
sections 1 and 3 of said Rule 64 are a mere reproduction of sections 231 and 232
of the old Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190, as amended, in connection with
the doctrine laid down by this Court on the inherent power of the superior courts
to punish for contempt in several cases, among them In re Kelly, 35 Phil., 944.
That the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts of superior
jurisdiction independently of any special expression of statute, is a doctrine or
principle uniformly accepted and applied by the courts of last resort in the United
States, which is applicable in this jurisdiction since our Constitution and courts of
justice are patterned after those of that country. The doctrine or principle as
expounded in American Jurisprudence is as follows:
 "The power of inicting punishment upon persons guilty of contempt
of court may be regarded as an essential element of judicial authority. It is
possessed as a past of the judicial authority granted to courts created by
the Constitution of the United States or by the Constitutions of the several
states. It is a power said to be inherent in all courts of general jurisdiction,
whether they are State or Federal; such power exists in courts of general
jurisdiction independently of any special or express grant of statute. In many
instances the right of certain courts or tribunals to punish for contempt is
expressly bestowed by statute, but such statutory authorization is
unnecessary, so far as the courts of general jurisdiction are concerned, and
in general adds nothing to their power, although so far as concerns the
inferior courts statutory authority may be necessary to empower them to
act." (Contempt, 12 Am. Jur., pp. 418, 419.)
In conformity with the principle enunciated in the above quotation from
American Jurisprudence, this Court, in In re Kelly, held the following:

"The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to a pending

cause, respecting the same, has always been considered as misbehavior,
tending to obstruct the administration of justice, and subjects such persons
to contempt proceedings. Parties have a constitutional right to have their
causes tried fairly in court, by an impartial tribunal, uninuenced by
publications or public clamor. Every citizen has a profound personal interest
in the enforcement of the fundamental right to have justice administered by
the courts, under the protection and forms of law, free from outside
coercion or interference. Any publication, pending a suit, reecting upon the
court, the parties, the ocers of the court, the counsel, etc., with reference
to the suit, or tending to inuence the decision of the controversy, is
contempt of court and is punishable. The power to punish for contempt is
inherent in all courts. The summary power to commit and punish for
contempt tending to obstruct or degrade the administration of justice, as
inherent in courts as essential to the execution of their powers and to the
maintenance of their authority is a part of the law of the land." (In re Kelly,
35 Phil., 944, 945.)
Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or
unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith
may be tolerated; because if well founded it may enlighten the court and
contribute to the correction of an error if committed; but if it is not well taken
and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way, inuence the court in reversing or
modifying its decision. Had the respondent in the present case limited himself to
a statement that our decision is wrong or that our construction of the intention
of the law is not correct, because it is dierent from what he, as proponent of the
original bill which became a law had intended, his criticism might in that case be
tolerated, for it could not in any way inuence the nal disposition of the Parazo
case by the court; inasmuch as it is of judicial notice that the bill presented by the
respondent was amended by both houses of Congress, and the clause "unless the
court nds that such revelation is demanded by the interest of the State" was
added or inserted; and that, as the Act was passed by Congress and not by any
particular member thereof, the intention of Congress and not that of the
respondent must be the one to be determined by this Court in applying said Act.
But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in
the press, the respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of
the Parazo case, which was then and still is pending reconsideration by this Court
upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the members of
this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one
of the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the members of
Justices from eleven to seven, so as to change the members of this Court which
decided the Parazo case, who according to his statement, are incompetent and
narrow minded, in order to inuence the nal decision of said case by this Court,
and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. But the respondent
also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose of
bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the
administration of justice, for in his above-quoted statement he says:
"In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately
committed during these last years, I believe that the only remedy to put an
end to so much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court. To
this eect, I announce that one of the rst measures, which I will introduce
in the coming congressional sessions, will have as its object the complete
reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now the Supreme Court of
today constitutes a constant peril to liberty and democracy."
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years
committing deliberately "so many blunders and injustices," that is to say, that it
has been deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law and justice is on the
part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was
rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to
undermine the condence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this Court, and consequently to lower or degrade the administration
of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the
Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain
relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled
upon, and if the people lose their condence in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom,
they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and
perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an ocer of the
courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity
and authority of this Court, to which he owes delity according to the oath he
has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which
without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
Respondent's assertion in his answer that "he made his statement in the
press with the utmost good faith and without intention of oending any of the
majority of the honorable members of this high Tribunal," if true may mitigate
but not exempt him from liability for contempt of court; but it is belied by his
acts and statements during the pendency of this proceeding. The respondent in
his petition of December 11, alleges that Justice Gregorio Perfecto is the principal
promoter of this proceeding for contempt, conveying thereby the idea that this
Court acted in the case through the instigation of Mr. Justice Perfecto.
It is true that the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and the
press must be protected to its fullest extent, but license or abuse of liberty of the
press and of the citizen should not be confused with liberty in its true sense. As
important as the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the
right of the citizen, is the maintenance of the independence of the judiciary. As
Judge Holmes very appropriately said in U. S. vs. Sullens (1929), 36 Fed. (2nd),
230, 238, 239: "The administration of justice and the freedom of the press,
though separate and distinct, are equally sacred, and neither should be violated
by the other. The press and the courts have correlative rights and duties and
should cooperate to uphold the principles of the Constitution and laws, from
which the former receives its prerogative and the latter its jurisdiction. The right
of legitimate publicity must be scrupulously recognized and care taken at all
times to avoid impinging upon it. In a clear case where it is necessary, in order to
dispose of judicial business unhampered by publications which reasonably tend to
impair the impartiality of verdicts, or otherwise obstruct the administration of
justice, this court will not hesitate to exercise its undoubted power to punish for
contempt. This Court must be permitted to proceed with the disposition of its
business in an orderly manner free from outside interference obstructive of its
constitutional functions. This right will be insisted upon as vital to an impartial
court, and, as a last resort, as an individual exercises the right of self-defense, it
will act to preserve its existence as an unprejudiced tribunal. . . ."
It is also well settled that an attorney as an ocer of the court is under
special obligation to be respectful in his conduct and communication to the
courts, he may be removed from oce or stricken from the roll of attorneys as
being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L. R. A. [N. S.], 586, 594).
In view of all the foregoing, we nd the respondent Atty. Vicente Sotto
guilty of contempt of this Court by virtue of the above- quoted publication, and
he is hereby sentenced to pay, within the period of fteen days from the
promulgation of this judgment, a ne of P1,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
The respondent is also hereby required to appear, within the same period,
and show cause to this Court why he should not be disbarred from practicing as
an attorney-at-law in any of the courts of this Republic, for said publication and
the following statements made by him during the pendency of the case against
Angel Parazo for contempt of Court.
In his statement to the press as published in the Manila Times in its issue of
December 9, 1948, the respondent said "The Supreme Court can send me to jail,
but it cannot close my mouth;" and in his other statement published on
December 10, 1948, in the same paper, he stated among others: "It is not the
imprisonment that is degrading, but the cause of the imprisonment." In his Rizal
day speech at the Abellana High School in Cebu, published on January 3, 1949, in
the Manila Daily Bulletin, the respondent said that "there was more freedom of
speech when American Justices sat in the Tribunal than now when it is composed
of our countrymen;" reiterated that "even if it succeeds in placing him behind
bars, the court can not close his mouth," and added: "I would consider
imprisonment a precious heritage to leave for those who would follow me
because the cause is noble and lofty." And the Manila Chronicle of January 5
published the statement of the respondent in Cebu to the eect that this Court
"acted with malice" in citing him to appear before this Court on January 4 when
"the members of this Court know that I came here on vacation." In all said
statements the respondent misrepresents to the public the cause of the charge
against him for contempt of court. He says that the cause is for criticizing the
decision of this Court in said Parazo case in defense of the freedom of the press,
when in truth and in fact he is charged with intending to interfere and inuence
the nal disposition of said case through intimidation and false accusations
against this Supreme Court. So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, Tuason, Montemayor,

and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., concurring:

Respondent published in the Manila newspapers of Sunday, December 5,

1948, a written statement in relation with the decision rendered by this Court
sentencing Angel Parazo to 30 days imprisonment for contempt.
On December 7, 1948, considering the statement as "intended not only to
intimidate the members of this Court or inuence the nal disposition of said
(Parazo) case, but also to degrade and vilify the administration of justice," this
Court adopted a resolution ordering respondent to show cause within ve days
why he should not be punished for contempt, "without prejudice to taking
further action against him as attorney."
Alleging to be suering from myologenous leukemia, with moderately
severe anemia, and that his physician had advised him to have "absolute rest
and to avoid any form of mental and physical strain for a few weeks," respondent
prayed for a 15-day extension to le his answer. He was granted a 10-day
extension.
In the resolution of December 13, 1948, granting said extension, this Court
branded as false respondent's allegations to the eect that he had formal charges
pending in this Court against Mr. Justice Perfecto and that the latter is the
"moving spirit" of these contempt proceedings.
Two days after the expiration of the 10-day extension granted to him,
respondent led his answer. The belated ling of said answer was overlooked by
this Court in order not to deprive respondent of the benets of his answer. Filed
out of time, due to his unexplained fault, it could legally have been rejected.
In said answer, dated December 24, 1948, respondent repeated one of his
allegations which, in the resolution of December 13, 1948, this Court had already
declared to be false.
 Respondent has not denied that he is the author of the statement for which
he has been summoned to our bar for contempt and he has not denied the
correctness of the text published in the Manila Chronicle and other daily
newspapers and which is reproduced in the resolution of this Court of December
7, 1948.
In his statement, respondent does not limit himself to saying that this
Tribunal has erroneously interpreted Republic Act No. 53, but alleges that said
erroneous interpretation "is once more putting in evidence the incompetency or
narrow-mindedness of the majority of its members," coupled with this sweeping
and calumnious accusation:
"In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately
committed during these last years, I believe that the only remedy to put an
end to so much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court."
To ttingly crown this dastard imputation of deliberately committing
blunders and injustices, respondent would bully the members of this Court, by
making the following intimidating announcement:
"To this eect, I announce that one of the rst measures, which I will
introduce in the coming congressional sessions, will have as its object the
complete reorganization of the Supreme Court."
There are other rhetorical passages in respondent's statement, aimed to
emphasize the nuclear ideas of the statement, to the eect that the majority of
the members of the Supreme Court are incompetent and narrow-minded and
guilty of "so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed" and that the
author will introduce in the coming congressional sessions a measure "to change
the members of the Supreme Court" and to eect a "complete reorganization of
the Supreme Court."
Among such maximizing expressions intended to stress the main ideas and
purposes of the statement are the following:
1. "As it is now constituted, the Supreme Court of today constitutes a
constant peril to liberty and democracy."
2. "It need be said loudly, very loudly so that even the deaf may hear:
The Supreme Court of today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of
Justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victoriano Mapa,
Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the glory of the Philippine
judiciary."
3. "The reporter, who is erroneously convicted of contempt and
unjustly sentenced to 30 days imprisonment by the Supreme Court, should
be immediately and spontaneously pardoned by the Executive Power, to
serve as lesson in law to the majority of the members of that High Tribunal."
4. "That sentence is intolerable, and should be protested by all
newspapers throughout the country, under the cry of 'The press demands
better qualified justices for the Supreme Court.'"
There can be no question that respondent knowingly published false
imputations against the members of this Court. He accused them of such
depravity as to have committed "blunders and injustices deliberately." He has
maliciously branded them to be incompetent, narrow-minded, perpetrators of
evil, "a constant peril to liberty and democracy," to be the opposite of those who
were the honor and glory of the Philippine judiciary, to be needing a lesson in
law, to be rendering an intolerable sentence, to be needing replacement by
better qualified justices.
Respondent has not presented any evidence or oered any to support his
slanderous imputations, and no single word can be found in his answer showing
that he ever believed that the imputations are based on fact.
Respondent appears to belong to the class of individuals who have no
compunction to resort to falsehood or falsehoods. The record of this case indicates
that the practice of falsehoods seems to be habitual in respondent, and this is
proved when he reiterated in his answer one of his allegations in a previous
petition which were pronounced by this Court to be false in its resolution of
December 3, 1948.
More than thirty years ago, using the words of respondent himself, in
"those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, and Manuel
Araullo and other learned jurists who were the glory of the Philippine judiciary"
and when it was the "impregnable bulwark of Justice," the Supreme Court
pronounced respondent guilty of falsehoods three times: rst, in a case in which
he was sentenced to 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional for criminally
abducting Aquilina Vasquez, a girl less than 18 years of age, and to pay her a
dowry of P500 and to support the ospring of his relations with her (U. S. vs.
Sotto, 9 Phil., 231); second, in a sentence of disbarment as a blackmailer (In re
Sotto, 38 Phil., 532); and third, in a prison sentence for false libel (U. S. vs. Sotto,
38 Phil., 666). The rst and the last sentences bear the signature of Chief Justice
Cayetano Arellano himself.
In the rst case the Supreme Court found that on July 29, 1906, Vicente
Sotto wrote a letter to Aquilina Vasquez, protesting his love for her and urging
her to leave her house and go with him; on the afternoon of August 1, 1906,
Sotto made an arrangement with Luis Crisologo for the renting of his house since
that night when Sotto went with Aquilina into the room of the house, where she
passed the night; Sotto had told Crisologo that he wanted the house for a
forestry ranger who was just arriving from Bohol; Sotto did not leave the room
until the middle of the night; Aquilina transferred to a house in Sambag where
Sotto brought various housekeeping utensils; during the following days and
nights Aquilina was visited by respondent.
On August 10, 1906, a complaint was led against Vicente Sotto and Pio
Datan, charging them with the crime of rapto. As a defense, respondent oered
evidence to show that on August 5, 1906, a legal marriage was celebrated
between Aquilina and the accused Pio Datan, Sotto's washerman and accomplice
in crime. Upon the evidence, the Supreme Court pronounced the celebration of
the alleged marriage to be false. The certicate of marriage oered as evidence
in support of the claim that the marriage took place had been declared a forgery.
It is not necessary to give the details of the whole disgusting affair, wherein
the revolting and sinister nature of an individual is pictured in bold relief with
some of its ugliest features. The more than 4 years of imprisonment imposed
upon the accused did not reform him. It only served to emphasize the beginning
of a long career of falsehoods and slanders already spanning more than 40 years,
soon nearing half of a century.
Respondent also chose not to deny his intimidating announcement to
introduce in the coming sessions of Congress, among the rst measures, one for
the change of the members of the Supreme Court and for the latter's complete
reorganization.
He has not explained or justied why he has to intimidate the members of
the Supreme Court with change and reorganization, and why, to make the
intimidation more dreadful, he had to announce the horrible course of subverting
and trampling down the Constitution, as all who can read and understand the
fundamental law know that it is beyond the powers of Congress to reorganize
and change the membership of the Supreme Court.
Because the announcement is highly subversive, being aimed at shaking
the very foundations of this Republic, it could have been no less terrible than for
the respondent to have announced an intention to attain his purposes by
resorting to open rebellion. The fact that respondent is a lawyer and a senator
aggravates his aunted purpose to assault the very Constitution he has sworn to
obey and defend.
We have devoted considerable time to respondent's answer.
As rst defense, respondent alleges that he made the written press
statement, not as a lawyer or as a private citizen, but as a senator. He avers that
a senator should have ample liberty to discuss public aairs and should not be
annoyed with contempt proceedings.
No law or valid authority has been invoked in support of the theory, unless
we could countenance a ctitious maxim that respondent is the sovereign. The
theory lacks even the merit of novelty. Long before the claim of respondent that,
because he is a senator, he is above the law, Mussolini, Hitler and all the tyrants
and dictators who preceded them since the dawn of history had always claimed
that they were above the law and acted as if they were really so. Unfortunately
for respondent, senators are creatures of the Constitution and the Constitution
makes them amenable to law.

As a second defense, respondent alleges that, not having appeared either as

attorney or a witness in the Parazo case, he cannot be held either for direct or for
indirect contempt.
The defense is based on a stark ignorance of the law on the subject.
Respondent alleges, as third defense, that he made his statement with
"utmost good faith," with "no intention of oending any of the majority of the
honorable members of the High Tribunal," and that he has not attacked nor
intended to attack the honesty or integrity of any one.
This allegation lacks sincerity in view of his imputation, among several
others equally false and calumnious, that the majority members of the Supreme
Court have committed "many blunders and injustices deliberately." The
slanderous imputation can only be attributed to bad faith.
As another defense, respondent questions the validity of the penal
provisions of Rule 64, implying that said penalties are not procedural in nature,
and invoking the provisions of section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution,
limiting the rule-making power of the Supreme Court to matters of pleading,
practice, and procedure in courts, and to the admission to the practice of law.
Respondent's contention can be easily disposed of by quoting the following
provisions of Act No. 190:
"SEC. 231. What Contempts of Court may be Punished Summarily.
A Court of First Instance of a judge of such court at chambers, may punish
summarily, by ne not exceeding two hundred pesos, or by imprisonment
not exceeding ten days, or both, a person guilty of misbehavior in the
presence of or so near the court or judge as to obstruct the administration
of justice, including the refusal of a person present in court to be sworn as a
witness or to answer as a witness when lawfully required.
"SEC. 232. What Other Acts are Contempts of Court. A person
guilty of any of the following acts may be punished as for contempt:
"1. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order,
judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or judge;
"2. Misbehavior of an ocer of the court in the performance of of his
official duties, or in his official transactions;
"3. A failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
"4. The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the
custody of an ocer by virtue of an order or process of the court held by
him.
"5. The persons defeated in a civil action concerning the ownership or
possession of real estate who, after being evicted by the sheri from the
realty under litigation in compliance with the judgment rendered, shall enter
or attempt to enter upon the same for the purpose of executing acts of
ownership or possession or who shall in any manner disturb possession by
the person whom the sheriff placed in possession of said realty.
xxx xxx xxx
"SEC. 235. Trial of the Charge . Upon the day xed for the trial, the
court shall proceed to investigate the charge and shall hear any answer or
testimony which the accused may make or offer.
"SEC. 236. Punishment if Found Guilty . The court shall then
determine whether the accused is guilty of the contempt charged; and, if it
be adjudged that he is guilty, he may be ned not exceeding one thousand
pesos, or imprisoned not more than six months, or both. If the contempt
consist in the violation of an injunction, the person guilty of such contempt
may also be ordered to make complete restitution to the party injured by
such violation."
Therefore, even on the false hypothesis that penalties for contempt are not
procedural in nature, courts of justice may impose said penalties, if not under
Rule 64, under the provisions of Act No. 190.
 The power to punish for contempt is inherent in courts of justice. It springs
from the very nature of their functions. Without such power, courts of justice
would be unable to perform eectively their functions. They function by orders.
Every decision is a command. The power to punish disobedience to command is
essential to make the commands effective.
Respondent is in error in maintaining that the Supreme Court has no
power to enact Rule 64. He is correct in calling it judicial legislation although he
fails to remember that judicial legislation in matters of judicial practice and
procedure is expressly authorized by section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution.
As a last defense, respondent invokes the constitutional freedom of the
press, which includes the right to criticize judges in court proceedings.
Respondent, undoubtedly, misses the point, and his citations about said
freedom, with which we fully agree, have absolutely no bearing on the question
involved in these proceedings.
No one, and the members of the Supreme Court would be the last to do so,
has ever denied respondent the freedom of the press and his freedom to criticize
our proceedings, this Court and its members. Respondent's statement goes much
further than mere criticism of our decision and the majority members of this
Court. The statement is an attempt to interfere with the administration of
justice, to miscarry and defeat justice, by trammelling the freedom of action of
the members of the Supreme Court, by bullying them with the menace of
change, reorganization, and removal, upon the false accusation that they have
been committing "blunders and injustices deliberately," and that menacing
action constitutes a agrant violation of the Constitution. Such a thing is not
covered by the freedom of the press or by the freedom to criticize judges and
court proceedings, as no one in his senses has ever conceived that such freedoms
include any form of expressed gangsterism, whether oral or written.
The freedom of the press is not involved in these proceedings. To assert
otherwise is to mislead. What is at stake in these proceedings is the integrity of
our system of administration of justice and the independence of the Supreme
Court and its freedom from any outside interference intended to obstruct it or to
unduly sway it one way or another.
The freedom of the press is one of the causes which we have always
endeared. The repeated prosecutions and persecutions we have endured in the
past for its sake we have been hailed to court eight times, are conclusive
evidence of the rm stand we have taken as defender of such freedom. It can be
seen from official records that every acquittal handed down to us by the Supreme
Court had been a new step forward and a new triumph for the freedom of the
press. (U. S. vs. Perfecto, 42 Phil., 113, Sept. 9, 1921; U. S. vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil.,
58, March 4, 1922; U. S. vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil., 225, March 23, 1922; People vs.
Perfecto, 43 Phil., 887, Oct. 4, 1922.) That stand has remained the same, as can
be shown in our written opinion in another contempt proceedings in the Ben
Brillantes case, which failed to attract public attention at the time.
Among the facts which we cannot ignore in deciding this case, are the
following:
 1. That this is not the rst time respondent has been brought to a court of
justice, for a grave misbehavior and for perpetrating stark falsehoods. In a
decision by the Supreme Court on September 6, 1918, respondent was removed
from the oce of attorney-at-law and incapacitated from exercising the legal
profession. He was found guilty of:
(a) Lack of fidelity to clients;
(b) Blackmailing, by abusing his position as director of a newspaper whose
columns he used to blacken the reputation of those who refused to yield to
demands made by him in his business as lawyer;
(c) Publication of malicious and unjustiable insinuations against the
integrity of a judge who had fined him for the crime of libel;
(d) Giving false testimony or perjury. (38 Phil., 532.)
2. On September 24, 1918, the Supreme Court sentenced respondent to
imprisonment for libel, for besmirching the honesty of three private individuals,
Lope K. Santos, Jose Turiano Santiago and Hermenegildo Cruz with false charges.
(38 Phil., 666.)
3. After having been cited for contempt in these proceedings, respondent, in
order to pose as a martyr for the freedom of the press, waged a campaign of
vituperation against the Supreme Court. He made repeated press statements
and delivered speeches in his home province to show that he cannot expect
justice from the Supreme Court, that the Supreme Court will imprison him, that
he will be imprisoned for the sake of the freedom of the press, thereby posing as
a false martyr for it.
4. In his persecutory obsession, respondent would make all believe that,
contrary to fact, the writer of this opinion is the moving spirit behind these
contempt proceedings and that the Supreme Court is acting merely as a tool.
Apparently, respondent was irked by his failure to sit even for a single moment in
the Senate Electoral Tribunal, because of our objection. The publicity given to our
objection has exposed the illegality of respondent's designation made by the
Senate President as, under section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, the power
to choose Senators for the Electoral Tribunal belongs to the Senate, and not to its
presiding ocer. At the bar of public opinion, the Senate President and
respondent appeared either to be ignorant of the Constitution or to be bent on
flagrantly violating it.
5. Respondent is the author of the bill which was enacted into Republic Act
No. 53, but the purposes of his bill were thwarted by an amendment introduced
by the Senate, denying the privilege granted therein when in conict with the
interest of the State. Respondent's bill was for an absolute privilege. Because the
majority decision of the Supreme Court has made his failure patent, respondent
took occasion to give vent to his grudge against the Supreme Court, wherein, of
the 15 cases he had since liberation, he lost all except three, as can be seen in
the records of the following cases:

L-23, Filomena Domiit Cabiling vs. The Prison Officer of the

 Military Prison of Quezon City LOST

L-212, Narcisa de la Fuente, et al. vs. Fernando Jugo, etc. et al WON

L-247, Monsig. Canilo Diel vs. Felix Martinez,

etc. et al. WON

L-301, In the matter of the petition of Carlos Palanca to

be admitted a Citizen of the Philippines LOST

(As

amicus

curiae)

L-307, Eufemia Evangelista et al. vs. Rafael Maninang LOST

L-599, Amalia Rodriguez vs. Pio E. Valencia et al LOST

L-1201, Vicente Sotto vs. Tribunal del Pueblo et al. LOST

L-1287, Ong Sit vs. Edmundo Piccio et al. LOST

L-1365, Vitaliano Jurado vs. Marcelo Flores LOST

L-1509, Tagakotta Sotto vs. Francisco Enage LOST

L-1510, Bernarda Ybaez de Sabido et al. vs. Juan V. Borromeo

et al. LOST

L-1938, Vicente Sotto vs. Crisanto Aragon et al. WON

L-1961, The People of the Philippines vs. Antonio de los Reyes LOST

L-2041, Quirico Abeto vs. Sotero Rodas LOST

L-2370, Voltaire Sotto vs. Rafael Dinglasan et al. LOST

Upon the records of his previous cases in 1918, and of these proceedings, it
is inevitable to conclude that we have before us the case of an individual who has
lowered himself to unfathomable depths of moral depravity, a despicable
habitual liar, unscrupulous vilier and slanderer, unrepented blackguard and
blackmailer, shameful and shameless libeler, unmindful of the principles of
decency as all hardened criminals. He is a disgrace to the human species. He is a
shame to the Senate. Aghast at the baseness of his character, we felt, at rst
blush, the impulse of acquitting him, as his contemptible conduct, culminating in
the press statement in question, seemed compatible only with the complete
irresponsibility of schizophrenics, idiots, or those suffering from doddery.
His repeated press releases in which he tried to focus public attention to the
most harmless part of his statement, wherein he accuses the majority of the
Supreme Court of incompetency or narrow- mindedness, have shown, however,
that respondent is not completely devoid of personal responsibility, as he is
aware that he has no possible defense for alleging that the members of the
Supreme Court have committed "blunders and injustices deliberately," for which
reason he has widely publicized his expectation that he will be sentenced in this
case to imprisonment, a penalty that, by his repeated public utterances, he
himself gives the impression that he is convinced he deserves.
Verily he deserves to be sentenced to six months imprisonment, the
maximum allowed by Rule 64, and such penalty would not be heavy enough
because of the attendance of several aggravating circumstances, namely, the
falsehoods he resorted to in this case, his insolence after he was cited for
contempt, the fact that he is a lawyer and a Senator, the fact that he has already
been sentenced to imprisonment for falsely libeling three private individuals, the
fact that more than 30 years ago he had been disbarred as a blackmailer, the fact
that more than 40 years ago he was sentenced to be jailed for more than 4 years
as an abductor. The majority of this Court has sentenced a young and humble
newspaperman to 30 days imprisonment only for refusing to answer a question.
The oense committed by respondent is much graver than a mere refusal to
answer a question.
We concur, however, in the decision imposing upon respondent a ne of
P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment and ordering him to show cause why he
should not be completely deprived of the privilege of practicing the profession of
a lawyer. High reasons of humanity restrained us from sending respondent to
prison, unless he should voluntarily choose to enter therein, instead of paying the
ne. He is old and, according to his physician, suering from myologenous
leukemia with moderately severe anemia, requiring absolute rest and avoidance
of any form of mental and physical strain, and we do not wish to endanger
respondent's life by sending him to prison, and thus causing him the mental and
physical strains which his physician advised him to avoid. Although the continued
existence of respondents is more harmful than benecial to our Republic and to
human society, we have to be consistent with our abidance by the injunction of
the Sermon on the Mount: "Thou shalt not kill." (Matth., Chapter 5, paragraph
21.) Although their segregation from the society of decent men is advisable
because of the dangers of corruptive contamination, even the lives of moral
lepers have to be spared. After all, the heaviest punishment for an evildoer is the
inherent stigma of shame of his evildoings.
Let it be clear that we are not punishing respondent because we want to
curtail his freedom of the press, but because of his wanton interference in the
independence of the Supreme Court his overt attempt to deprive us of our
freedom of judgment in a pending case, his swashbuckling bravado to intimidate
the members of this Court to sway their decision in favor of a litigant.
The freedom of the press is not in the least involved in these proceedings.
The oensive statement has not been published by respondent as a
newspaperman, editor or journalist. He does not appear to be a member of the
sta of any one of the newspapers which published his statement. We did not
even molest said newspapers. Their editors have not been cited for contempt. We
did not interfere with their freedom to publish the scurrilous statement.
If respondent has not attempted by his browbeating to undermine and
overthrow the very foundations of our judicial system and actually sought to
defeat and miscarry the administration of justice in a pending litigation, we
would certainly have abstained from summoning him merely for criticizing,
insulting and slandering the members of the Court. After all his reputation for
lack of veracity, malice, and unscrupulosity is well-known in ocial records
branding him with the indelible stigma of infamy.
His blatant posing, therefore, in this case as a martyr for the freedom of the
press, as part of his systematic campaign of falsehoods and slanders directed
against the Supreme Court, is an imposture that only ignorants, blockheads and
other mental pachyderms can swallow.
It takes too much erontery for such a character as respondent to pose as a
martyr and no less than for the sake of a sacred cause, the freedom of the press,
which no one has so much dishonored with his blackmailing practices and by his
long list of cases in the courts of justice, starting as far back as 1901. (Julia vs.
Sotto, 2 Phil., 247; U. S. vs. Sotto, 9 Phil., 231; In re Sotto, 38 Phil., 532; U. S. vs.
Sotto, 38 Phil., 666; U. S. vs. Sotto, R. G. No. 201; U. S. vs. Sotto, R. G. No.
11067; U. S. vs. Sotto, R. G. No. 14284; U. S. vs. Vicente Sotto, R. G. No. 16004;
People vs. Sotto, R. G. No. 23643.).
Respondent belongs to that gang of unprincipled politicians headed by a
Senate President who trampled down the popular will by the arbitrary and
unconstitutional suspension of Senators Vera, Diokno and Romero (Vera vs.
Avelino, 77 Phil., 192), who issued the false certication as to the voting of the
congressional resolution regarding the infamous Parity Amendment, thus
perpetrating falsication of public document (Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1),
who muzzled the people by ordering, in usurpation of executive powers, mayors
all over the country not to allow the holding of public meetings which the
opposition had organized to denounce the frauds in the elections of November
11, 1947 (Cipriano C. Primicias, as General Campaign Manager of the Coalesced
Minority Parties vs. Valeriano E. Fugoso, as Mayor of the City of Manila, 80 Phil.,
71), who wantonly violated the Constitution by interfering with the
management of the funds of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (Suanes vs. The Chief
Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil., 819), who, again in violation of the
fundamental law, usurped the exclusive powers of the Senate when he
designated respondent to sit in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and who crowned
his misdeeds by enunciating on Saturday, January 15, 1949, the most immoral
political philosophy that of open toleration of rackets, graft and corruption in
public office.
According to Rizal, the victims immolated in the altar of great ideals, to be
acceptable, have to be noble, spotless and pure. They should, therefore, be as
noble and pure as Socrates, Christ, Joan of Arc, Lincoln, Bonifacio, Mabini, Gandhi
and Rizal himself. Then and only then will martyrdom be hallowed and gloried
because it is worthy of the eulgent grandeur of sacred ideals. "Hate never
produces anything but monsters and crime criminals! Love alone realizes
wonderful works, virtue alone can save! Redemption presupposes virtue, virtue
sacrice, and sacrice love! Pure and spotless must the victim be that the
sacrifice may be acceptable!" (El Filibusterismo.)
Respondent complains in his answer that he is not accorded fair dealing
because the writer of this opinion has not abstained from taking part in this case.
The complaint is absolutely groundless. It is based on two false premises,
concocted by respondent to make it appear that he is a victim of persecution, and
on a conclusion, also false, because based on the two false premises.
Respondent alleges that there are pending in the Supreme Court certain
charges he led against the writer and that the undersigned is the "moving
spirit" behind these proceedings. Both trump-up allegations are false, and the
Supreme Court has declared it to be so in its resolution of December 13, 1948.
The records of the Supreme Court show that no such charges have been
led. Respondent ought to know, if he can read and understand the Constitution,
that if he has any charge to le against a Justice of the Supreme Court to seek
his ouster, he has to le it with the House of Representatives, the only agency
authorized by the fundamental law to institute impeachment proceedings.
If the House of Representatives should institute it, the respondent will have
the opportunity to sit in judgment as a senator as, under the Constitution, the
Senate is the sole tribunal on cases of impeachment.

No Justice with full sense of responsibility should commit a dereliction of

ocial duty by inhibiting himself in a case upon imaginary or fabricated grounds.
The members of the Supreme Court are not such moral weaklings as to easily
yield to dishonest appeals to a false sense of delicacy. A cowardly surrender to
groundless challenges of unscrupulous parties is unbecoming to a judge, and
much more to a Justice of the Highest Tribunal of the Republic.
It is true that, after respondent had failed to sit in the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, because we objected to the designation issued to him by Senate
President Avelino on constitutional grounds, he requested the Chief Justice to
relieve us as one of the members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and
respondent would make it appear that for his move we are prejudiced against
him.
He is absolutely wrong. His request to the Chief Justice did not disturb us
the least. The Constitution does not grant anyone the power to oust, replace, or
dismiss any member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, judicial or senatorial,
during his term of oce in the Tribunal. Although an illegal substitution has been
made once in the case of Senators Sebastian and Cuenco, such precedent did not
make constitutional what is unconstitutional, and the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court has made clear his stand to uphold the Constitution by stating it
in black and white in the decision he penned in the Suanes case, L-2460.
Respondent's failure was so obvious for us to mind his move.
 After all, why should we waste time and energy by entertaining any kind of
prejudice against respondent, when there are so many great minds, beautiful
characters, and wonderful personalities that are demanding our attention and
whose spiritual companionship makes life enjoyable?
If we had entertained any prejudice against respondent, we would have
meted out to him the penalty of imprisonment which he well deserves, without
minding the ill consequences it may entail to his health and life and without
heeding the promptings of our pity and sense of humanity. Fortunately, very
many years have already elapsed since we acquired the state of mind with which
we can judge things and persons with an open and free conscience, truly
emancipated from the shackles of any prejudice. The hateful events during the
Japanese occupation were the best mycelium for spawning and the choicest
fertilizers for growing prejudices against Generals Yamashita and Homma, to the
extent of justifying any measure or action that would spell their doom.
Immediate members of our family and ourselves endured agonizing suerings
and some of our near relatives were liquidated under their regime. But when
Yamashita and Homma came to this Supreme Court, seeking remedy against the
absurdly iniquitous procedure followed by the military commissions which tried
them, so iniquitous that it closed to the Japanese generals all chances of fair trial,
no scintilla of prejudice precluded us from casting the lone vote intended to give
them the remedy and justice they sought for, notwithstanding the fact that
Yamashita and Homma, appeared, in the general concept of our people, to be
veritable monsters of cruelty and murder. Certainly, respondent would not
pretend having given us, if ever, stronger grounds for prejudice than Yamashita
and Homma, or that he is worse than both of them.
We are not to end this opinion without expressing our steadfast addiction
to the following propositions:
1. The independence of the judiciary from outside interference or
obstruction is essential to the eectivity of its functions so that it can aord
protection to fundamental rights, including the freedom of the press, against
encroachments and illegal assaults.
2. The freedom of the press includes the right to comment on pending
judicial cases and the right to criticize the public and private life of all public
officers, without any exception.
3. The freedom of the press does not, however, safeguard any publication
intended to bully courts and judges in order to sway their judgments on pending
cases, and such interference and obstruction should be promptly and drastically
checked for the sake of an effective administration of justice.
4. Tribunal should be prompt in stopping the threatening and browbeating
tactics of swaggering political ruans and cutthroats bend on thwarting the scale
of justice, as the opposing alternative to such a stern judicial attitude is
surrendered to judicial anarchy.
5. Courts of justice annealed to face and ever ready to deal vigorously with
attempts to turn them into puppets of domineering would-be dictators are
essential in maintaining the reign of law and guaranteeing the existence of an
orderly society.
This opinion has been written to modify and clarify our stand in concurring
in the decision.