REPUBLIC VS.

CA and Tancinco
Alluvium must be the exclusive work of nature. It has 3 requirements: 1) that the deposit be
gradual and imperceptible; 2) through the current of the river; and 3) the land where the
accretion takes place is adjacent to the river bank. Deposits made by human intervention are
excluded.

FACTS:
The respondents (Tancinco’s) were registered owners of a parcel of land in Bulacan,
bordering on the Maycauayan and Bocaue Rivers. They filed an application for the
registration of three lots adjacent to their fishpond, but because of the recommendation of
the Commissioner, they only pushed for the registration of two. The RTC and CA granted
the petition despite the opposition of the Bureau of Lands.

The respondents based their claim on accretions to their fishponds. They presented a lone
witness (their overseer). The Bureau of Lands argue that the lands in dispute are not
accretions. They assert that what actually happened was that the respondents simply
transferred their dikes simply further down the river bed of the Meycauayan River. Thus, if
there was any accretion to speak of, it was man-made.

Respondents counter that the their evidence shows that accretion happened without human
intervention and that the transfer of the dikes occurred only after.

ISSUE:
Whether accretion took place

RULING: No
Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. There is not evidence that the addition to
said property was made gradually through the effects of the currents of the two rivers. The
lands in question total almost 4 hectares of land, which are highly doubtful to have been
caused by accretion. The lone witness testified that she observed an increase in the area in
1939, but the lots in question were not included in the survey of their adjacent property
conducted in 1940. They were also not included in the Cadastral Survey of the entire
Municipality of Maycauayan between the years 1958-1960. If the overseer was indeed telling
the truth, the accretion was sudden, not gradual. When the respondents transferred their
dikes towards the river beds, the dikes were meant for reclamation purposes and not to
protect their property from the destructive force of the waters of the river. The lots in
question were portions of the bed of the Meycauayan River and are therefore classified as
public property.
Registration denied, decisions appealed are reversed. Note: The lands sought were not even
dry land. The entire area was under one to two meters of water.

Land Registration Proceedings. In land registration proceedings, the applicant has

the burden of overcoming the presumption of State ownership.
Reversion of property. Reversion is the remedy where the State, pursuant to the
Regalian doctrine, seeks to revert land back to the mass of the public domain.34 It is
proper when public land is fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private
individuals or corporations.35 There are also instances when we granted reversion on
grounds other than fraud, such as when a “person obtains a title under the Public
Land Act which includes, by oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the
Torrens system, or when the Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction over the
same because it is of the public domain

Remedial Law. The rules require that documentary evidence must be formally
offered in evidence after the presentation of testimonial evidence, and it may be done
orally, or if allowed by the court, in writing.4

Republic of the Philippines vs. Espinosa, G.R. No. 186603, April 5, 2017
Facts
A cadastral decree was issued in favor of Espinosa. The Original Certificate of Title was
issued in the name of Espinosa who later sold to Caliston which a Transfer Certificate of
Title was issued.
The Sated through Regional Executive Director of the DENR filed a Complaint for
annulment of title and reversion of land with the RTC claiming the property is inalienable
public land because it fell within the timberland area.
RTC ruled in favor of the State and ordered reversion of the property.
CA ruled in favor of Espinosa and found that the State failed to prove fraud or
misrepresentation when she was issued the Original Certificate of Title. It further
ruled that the State failed to prove that the property is forest land. The lone piece of
evidence consisting of LC Map No, 2978 was not authenticated pursuant to Section
24 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It noted that the parties stipulated only as to the
existence of the map, but not as to genuineness of truthfulness of its content. Assuming
that the map is admitted in evidence, Espinosa’s rights over the property, which accrued in
1962, should not be prejudiced by a subsequent classification by the State done in 1986, or
after 24 years.
Issue
Whether or not the State has sufficiently proved that the property is part of inalienable forest
land at the time Espinosa was granted the cadastral decree and issued a title.

Held
No. The State failed to prove that the property was classified as forest land at the time of the
grant of the cadastral decree and issuance of title to Espinosa.
In land registration proceedings, the applicant has the burden of overcoming the
presumption of State ownership. It must establish, through incontrovertible
evidence, that the land sought to be registered is alienable or disposable based on a
positive act of the government.30 Since cadastral proceedings are governed by the
usual rules of practice, procedure, and evidence, a cadastral decree and a certificate
of title are issued only after the applicant proves all the requisite jurisdictional facts-
that they are entitled to the claimed lot, that all parties are heard, and that evidence is
considered.31 As such, the cadastral decree is a judgment which adjudicates
ownership after proving these jurisdictional facts.32
Here, it is undisputed that Espinosa was granted a cadastral decree and was subsequently
issued OCT No. 191-N, the predecessor title of Caliston’s TCT No. 91117. Having been
granted a decree in a cadastral proceeding, Espinosa can be presumed to have overcome the
presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.33 This
means that Espinosa, as the applicant, was able to prove by incontrovertible evidence that
the property is alienable and disposable property in the cadastral proceedings.
This is not to say, however, that the State has no remedy to recover the property if indeed it
is part of the inalienable lands of the public domain. The State may still do so through an
action for reversion, as in the present case.
Reversion is the remedy where the State, pursuant to the Regalian doctrine, seeks to
revert land back to the mass of the public domain.34 It is proper when public land is
fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private individuals or corporations.35 There
are also instances when we granted reversion on grounds other than fraud, such as
when a “person obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes, by
oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens system, or when the
Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction over the same because it is of the public
domain.”36
In this case, the State, through the Solicitor General, alleges neither fraud nor
misrepresentation in the cadastral proceedings and in the issuance of the title in Espinosa’s
favor. The argument for the State is merely that the property was unlawfully included in the
certificate of title because it is of the public domain.
Since the case is one for reversion and not one for land registration, the burden is on
the State to prove that the property was classified as timberland or forest land at the
time it was decreed to Espinosa.37 To reiterate, there is no burden on Caliston to prove
that the property in question is alienable and disposable land.38 At this stage, it is reasonable
to presume that Espinosa, from whom Caliston derived her title, had already established that
the property is alienable and disposable land considering that she succeeded in obtaining the
OCT over it.39 In this reversion proceeding, the State must prove that there was an oversight
or mistake in the inclusion of the property in Espinosa’s title because it was of public
dominion. This is consistent with the rule that the burden of proof rests on the party who, as
determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts the affirmative of an issue.40
Here, the State hinges its whole claim on its lone piece of evidence, the land
classification map prepared in 1986. The records show, however, that LC Map No.
2978 was not formally offered in evidence. The rules require that documentary
evidence must be formally offered in evidence after the presentation of testimonial
evidence, and it may be done orally, or if allowed by the court, in writing.41 Due
process requires a formal offer of evidence for the benefit of the adverse party, the trial
court, and the appellate courts.42 This gives the adverse party the opportunity to examine and
oppose the admissibility of the evidence.43 When evidence has notbeen formally offered,
it should not be considered by the court in arriving at its decision.44 Not having been
offered formally, it was error for the trial court to have considered the survey map.
Consequently, it also erred in ordering the reversion of the property to the mass of
the public domain on the basis of the same.
Moreover, even assuming that the survey can be admitted in evidence, this will not help to
further the State’s cause. This is because the only fact proved by the map is one already
admitted by the State, that is, that the land was reclassified in 1986.45 This fact does not
address the presumption/ conclusion that Espinosa has, at the time of the cadastral
proceedings conducted in 1955, proved that the land is alienable and disposable, as
evidenced by the decree issued in his favor in 1962.
At this juncture, we agree with the CA’s application of SAAD Agro-Industries, Inc.,50 which
involved a complaint for annulment of title and reversion of a lot covered by a free patent
and original title. To support its claim that the lot was part of the timberland and forest
reserve, the State submitted as evidence a photocopy of a land classification map.
This map also became the basis of the testimonies of City Environment and Natural
Resources Office officers declaring that the lot falls within the timberland or forest reserve.
The State, however, failed to submit either a certified true copy or an official
publication of the map, prompting the trial court to deny its admission in
evidence. After proceedings, the trial court dismissed the complaint due to the State’s
failure to show that the subject lot therein is part of the timberland or forest reserve or has
been classified as such before the issuance of the free patent and the original title. The CA,
relying on the map, reversed the trial court.

When the case was brought before this court, we reinstated the trial court’s decision. We
held that the photocopy of the land classification map cannot be considered in
evidence because it is excluded under the best evidence rule. We emphasized that all
parties, including the Government, are bound by the rules of admissibility and must
comply with it-
The rules of admissibility must be applied uniformly. The same rule holds true when the
Government is one of the parties. The Government, when it comes to court to litigate with
one of its citizens, must submit to the rules of procedure and its rights and privileges at every
stage of the proceedings are substantially in every respect the same as those of its citizens; it
cannot have a superior advantage. This is so because when a [sovereign] submits itself to the
jurisdiction of the court and participates therein, its claims and rights are justiciable by every
other principle and rule applicable to the claims and rights of the private parties under
similar circumstances. Failure to abide by the rules on admissibility renders the L.C. Map
submitted by respondent inadmissible as proof to show that the subject lot is part of the
forest reserve.51
he result would have been different had the State proved that the property was already
classified as part of forest land at the time of the cadastral proceedings and when title was decreed to
Espinosa in 1962. However, it failed to discharge this burden; the grant of title which carries
with it the presumption that Espinosa had already proved the alienable character of the
property in the cadastral proceedings stands. To grant the reversion based on a subsequent
reclassification, more so on lack of evidence, would amount to taking of private property
without just compensation and due process of law.53 This, however, is not what our
Constitution envisions; fairness and due process are paramount considerations that must still
be observed.54
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’
July 25, 2008 Decision and February 4, 2009 Resolution are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC vs. DOLDOL

FACTS:
Sometime in 1959, respondent Nicanor Doldol occupied a portion of land in Opol,
Misamis Oriental. On 1963, he filed an application for saltwork purposes for the said
area but the Director of Forestry rejected the same. Sometime in 1965, the
Provincial Board of Misamis Oriental passed a resolution reserving a certain lot as a
school site. This lot unfortunately included the lot of Doldol. Sometime in 1970, the
Opol High School filed a complaint for accion possessoria with the RTC, the court
ruled on school’s power. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of teh court ruling
that Doldol was entitledto the portion he occupied, he having possessed the same
for 32 years (1959-1991).
ISSUE: Whether or not Doldol has the better right to possess the land in dispute?
HELD: No. The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove (a) that the
land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the same must either be since time
immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the
conditions set by law are complied with the possessor of the land, by operation of
law, acquires a right to grant, a government grant, without the necessity of
title/certificate of tile being issued.

The evidence presented shows that the land in dispute is alienable and
disposable in accordance with the District Forester’s Certification. Doldol thus
meets the first requirement.

Consequently, Doldol could not have acquired an imperfect title to the

disputed land since his occupation of the same started only in 1955, much later than
June 12, 1945. Not having complied with the conditions set forth by law, Doldol
cannot be said to have acquired a right to the land or a right to assert a right
superior to the school given that then Pres. Aquino had reserved the lot for Opol
National School.

“The privilege occupying public lands with a view of pre-empting confers no

contractual or vested right in the land occupied and the authority of the President to
withdraw such lands for sale or acquisition by the public, or to reserve them for
public use, prior to divesting by the government of title thereof stands eventhough
this may defeat the imperfect right of settler. Lands covered by reservation are not
subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be acquired” (Solicitor
General)

In sum, Opol National Schoolhas the better right of possession over the land
in dispute.