Conflict Prevention in the OSCE

An Assessment of Capacities

J. Cohen

October 1999

NETHERLANDS INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

‘CLINGENDAEL’
CIP-Data Koninklijke bibliotheek, The Hague

Cohen, J.

Conflict Prevention in the OSCE. An Assessment of Capacities / J. Cohen –

The Hague, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael.
Clingendael-Study
ISBN 90-5031-73-7

Desk top publishing by Birgit Leiteritz

Netherlands Institute of
International Relations Clingendael
Clingendael 7
2597 VH The Hague
Phonenumber 31 - 70 - 3245384
Telefax 31 - 70 - 3282002
P.O. Box 93080
2509 AB The Hague
E-mail: info@clingendael.nl
Website: http://www.clingendael.nl

The Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael is an indepen-

dent institute for research, training and public information on international
affairs. It publishes the results of its own research projects and the monthly
‘Internationale Spectator’ and offers a broad range of courses and conferences
covering a wide variety of international issues. It also maintains a library and
documentation centre.

© Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael. All rights

reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,
or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photo-
copying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the
copyrightholders. Clingendael Institute, P.O. Box 93080, 2509 AB The Hague,
The Netherlands.
 Acknowledgements

I would like to thank a number of people for generously giving time to be inter-
viewed during the preparation of this study. These include diplomats and officials
in The Hague, London and Vienna in February 1998. In particular I am grateful
to Walter Kemp for his hospitality during my stay in Vienna. My former col-
leagues at the Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations in The Hague and in the
office of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, were generous
with their insights and I learned a great deal during almost two years of collabor-
ative work in 1996 and 1997. Finally, I am grateful to Klaas van Walraven, Clem
McCartney and John Packer who all read earlier drafts of this study and made
many constructive comments challenging me to improve the quality of the work. I
remain responsible for all errors and mistakes contained in the text.

5
 1 Introduction

The Development of the OSCE: Practical and Conceptual Underpinnings

Since its inception the OSCE1 has been an inter-governmental forum to promote
security in Europe by eliminating barriers. The OSCE has been a process in which
diplomatic practices and the rules of international political behaviour have evolved,
creating a web of obligations and interdependencies among a wide range of states.
Throughout its existence the prevention of conflicts has been a significant structural
component and philosophical underpinning of the OSCE. The prevention of conflict
was central to the Helsinki Final Act. The result of a diplomatic conference con-
vened in Geneva and Helsinki between 1972 and

1) In this study I will generally refer to the OSCE, the name assumed in 1995 as a result of a
decision at the Budapest Summit in December 1994. According to the Budapest Decisions,
Chapter I, paragraph 29: ‘the change in name from CSCE to OSCE alters neither the character of
our CSCE commitments nor the status of the CSCE and its institutions. In its organizational
development, the CSCE will remain flexible and dynamic.’ Budapest Decisions, Strengthening
the CSCE, in Arie Bloed, ed., The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Basic Documents,
1993-95, The Hague, 1997, p. 156.

7
1975, the Final Act established basic principles for behaviour among the partici-
pating states and of governments towards their citizens. The principles were spelt
out in the so-called ‘Decalogue’.2 Most importantly the process provided an
agreed set of standards for countries from a politically, culturally and ideologi-
cally heterogeneous region, which at the time was riven by the bi-polarity of the
Cold War.
The end of the Cold War impelled the OSCE participating states to rede-
fine the focus of the OSCE, both as an inter-governmental process and with
regard to the rules and procedures that had evolved to govern its operation.
Conflict prevention in the bi-polar Cold War world was primarily concerned
with the problems of an accidental or inadvertent war: a form of military diplo-
macy focused on crisis prevention. The 1990 Charter of Paris3 marked the
transition from the OSCE’s role as a forum for negotiation in this confronta-
tional era to an organisation for security through cooperation and the promotion
of democracy. The optimistic tone of the Charter, reflecting the 1989-90 politi-
cal watershed in Europe, was rebuffed by subsequent events in Europe, which
saw instability and violent conflict become the characteristic experiences of parts
of Central and Eastern Europe. The disintegration of multinational states,
political and economic transitions towards democracy and the market economy,
social trauma experienced in the wake of these processes, and the reemergence of
nationalism, all served to make Europe a less stable region than it was when
subject to its Cold War straightjacket.
In the early 1990s, and especially in view of the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia, it became clear that the apparatus at the disposal of the CSCE for
preventing or resolving conflicts was inadequate. The need to develop a more
sophisticated conflict prevention capacity necessitated a strengthening of the
political instruments and organs of the CSCE and a reconsideration of the types
of intervention that would be feasible. This was necessary to address conflicts
arising in the wake of the disintegration of multinational states which were
generally of an

2) The ten principles are: sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty; refrain-
ing from the threat or use of force; inviolability of frontiers; territorial integrity of States; peaceful
settlement of disputes; non-intervention in internal affairs; respect for human rights and funda-
mental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief; equal rights and
self-determination of peoples; co-operation among States; and fulfillment in good faith of obliga-
tions under international law. See Final Act of Helsinki, 1 August 1975, in Arie Bloed, ed., The
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Analysis and Basic Documents, 1972-1993,
Dordrecht, 1993, pp. 143-149.
3) Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Paris, 21 November 1990, in A. Bloed, 1993, op.cit., pp.
537-566.

8
ethno-political character, occurring within states, involving unrecognised politi-
cal entities. The international community had only limited scope for action in
such cases.
The Budapest Summit Meeting in 1994, cast the OSCE as ‘a primary
instrument for early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management’,4 with
a ‘flexible and dynamic’ approach.5 New mechanisms, procedures and political
instruments have been established to facilitate this role. The emphasis has shifted
from the regulatory mechanisms of inter-state conflict, based on military secu-
rity issues, to a preoccupation with those factors that generate conflicts within
states.6 This shift has encompassed an attempt to respond more flexibly but also
more effectively (than the various formalised mechanisms allowed) to conflicts.
To this end ‘second generation’7 instruments, the High Commissioner on Na-
tional Minorities and the missions of long duration, were created. Both are new
forms of international intervention into potential conflict situations, and as such
change the relationships between the states involved.
Despite the enhanced focus on early warning, conflict prevention and
preventive diplomacy, these concepts are not clearly defined in OSCE docu-
ments or by OSCE practitioners.8 Preference is given to distinctions between
short and long term, and light and deep conflict prevention.9 The avoidance of
precision in the OSCE’s usage of the concepts possibly emanates from the politi-
cal nature of the organisation. Max van der Stoel has stated that early warning
and conflict prevention are not abstract goals in themselves but are modes of
operation that are dependent upon the behaviour of political actors and in the

4) Budapest Document 1994, Budapest, 6 December 1994, Budapest Summit Declaration, ‘To-
wards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era’, paragraph 8, in A. Bloed, 1997, op.cit., p. 146.
5) Budapest Decisions, Strengthening the CSCE, Chapter I, paragraph 29, in A. Bloed, 1997,
op.cit., p. 156.
6) Jeannie Grussendorf, ‘Theory, the OSCE and Social Change’ in Issues in Peace Research: Theory and
Practice, L.-A Broadhead, ed., forthcoming 1998.
7) Berthold Meyer, ‘Dispute Settlement Procedures and Crisis Management’, pp. 53-81 in Michael
Bothe, Natalino Ronzitti and Allan Rosas, eds., The OSCE in the Maintenance of Peace and Security:
Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, The Hague, 1997, p. 80.
8) See the discussion of the imprecision of the definitions in Conflict Prevention and Early Warning in
the Political Practice of International Organizations, Clingendael, 1996, pp. 9-11.
9) Rob Zaagman, ‘Some Reflections on OSCE Conflict Prevention and the Code of Conduct’, pp.
29-39 in Helsinki Monitor, Vol. 7, 1996, No. 2, p. 30 and Keynote Speech by Max van der Stoel,
to the CSCE Seminar on Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy, Warsaw, 19-21 January
1994, in CSCE/ODIHR Bulletin, Spring/Summer 1994, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 7-13.

9
OSCE context of the participating states themselves.10 Concepts have been used
as markers to facilitate political action and it has served the purpose of the
OSCE to make them vague and inclusive signals that would not inhibit action.
This is mirrored in the general interpretation of the security risks and
factors that the OSCE has assigned to the generation of conflicts. These factors
are grouped together without priority being established, and distinctions regard-
ing background conditions, structural factors and proximate causes of violence
are absent. Instead, the OSCE takes a broad view of the potential causes of
conflict, with the Helsinki Summit Declaration emphasising that, ‘Economic
decline, social tension, aggressive nationalism, intolerance, xenophobia and
ethnic conflict threaten stability in the CSCE area. Gross violations of CSCE
commitments in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including
those related to national minorities, pose a special threat to peaceful develop-
ment ... [and the States] reject racial, ethnic and religious discrimination in any
form.’11 Creating a specific instrument, the High Commissioner on National
Minorities, to address one potential cause of conflict is the most significant
statement the OSCE has made regarding the factors that generate conflict.
Beyond this the participating states of the OSCE have preferred to stick to
general approaches, providing mandates and terms of reference for specific
purposes and avoiding the creation of a more generalised approach.

A Conflict Prevention Ethos: Characteristics of the OSCE

The OSCE has developed characteristics that orientate the organisation towards
conflict prevention. In order to frame the operation of specific instruments and
mechanisms, these characteristics will be outlined in brief.
Linking all European states as well as the United States and Canada, the
OSCE has created a forum with an inclusiveness unrivaled in other European
security and political bodies. While the heterogeneity can create difficulties, in
regard to achieving political consensus, all participating states are signed up to a
body of standards. Allied to this inclusive membership is the fact that states
participate on the basis of equality. There is no hierarchy in relations between
participating states. Inevitably there is a power dynamic in which equal access is
not matched by equal influence, but no states are excluded from the fora which
make the OSCE tick. Equality as a promoter of inclusiveness is reflected in the

10) Keynote Speech by Max van der Stoel, ibid.

11) CSCE Helsinki Document 1992: The Challenges of Change, Helsinki, 10 July 1992, Helsinki
Summit Declaration, paragraph 12 in A. Bloed, 1993, op.cit., pp. 703-704.

10
consensus decision-making process, the rotating chairmanship (of the OSCE in
general and of bodies such as the Forum for Security Cooperation) and by and
large the absence of political organs of limited composition (although some such
organs have been created, for instance the Minsk Conference). Equality of par-
ticipation means that all states have been engaged in dialogue over security
issues, not just more powerful states. Equality has another important aspect in
that all OSCE commitments have been accepted by all and apply in their en-
tirety and equally to all participating states.
The political character of norms and activities provides an important
flexibility. The Helsinki Final Act was not legally binding, nor was it a treaty
under international law, rather it was and continues to be a comprehensive code
of conduct, ‘a politically binding statement of principles and commitments by
states to their behaviour towards their citizens and each other.’12 The nature of
political rather than legal commitments enables participating states to respond to
altered circumstances relatively quickly. In practical terms, this has meant that
commitments could accumulate without having to jump the hurdle of ratifica-
tion in each participating state. It has, however, made the task of securing proper
respect for commitments more challenging since the OSCE has neither enforce-
ment powers nor any recourse to legally bind its members. This has required the
OSCE to give consideration to methods to induce compliance with its principles,
based on persuasion and not coercion.
The procedural rather than institutional character of the OSCE in its
formative period made it a persistent diplomatic forum able to address problems
from a long-term perspective. Furthermore, process orientation has been critical
in preventing the OSCE from evolving into a rigid structure with immutable
interests, a bureaucratic agenda and a large institutional structure. Its ‘quiet’
approach has been key to this evolution. Obligations have expanded as and when
states have been able to or needed to develop new relations. A drawback of this
light structure, however, has been that the OSCE has not always been able to
keep pace with the conflict agenda in Europe. The OSCE has developed a range
of institutional and political options for dealing with different conflict situations,
but political will is what makes the difference. If states are not committed to or
capable of being persuaded of the necessity of a course of action, then regardless
of the institutional structures available, inertia will be the result.
The rule of consensus has been essential to the inclusiveness of the OSCE.
Together with sovereign equality of the participating states, it facilitates a pro-
cess of dialogue that promotes broad political support for decisions taken by the

12) Walter Kemp, Making Sense of the CSCE, Federal Trust Discussion Paper, April 1994, London, p.
3.

11
OSCE. It could be argued that this process presents a danger of decision-making
in accordance with the lowest common denominator, with inclusiveness leading
to compromises. It is however a stimulus to find common solutions, through
negotiations, and not the imposition of stifling conformity. In conflict prevention
this is an effective starting point because cooperation is an integral part of a
mutual prevention and resolution process. More coercive measures are not
conducive to a cooperative preventive approach that has the potential to be
sustained by its own dynamic rather than enforcement.
One of the defining characteristics of the OSCE is its comprehensive ap-
proach to security, relating peace, security and prosperity directly to human
rights and democratic freedoms, the existence of a market economy and military
transparency. This provides a framework for addressing multifaceted conflicts
and security issues. Particularly important is the way in which the human dimen-
sion operates: the commitments and responsibilities apply in their entirety and
equally for each participating state; and the commitments are matters of direct
and legitimate concern to all participating states and do not belong to the inter-
nal affairs of the state concerned. This provides for an intrusiveness that enables
the OSCE to play a proactive role in the prevention of internal conflicts.13
Comprehensive security is matched by a cooperative security policy which
aims at preventing emerging conflicts from escalating, emphasising improved
predictability by increased openness and transparency. The OSCE is a co-oper-
ative security forum ‘proceeding from the assumption that nations, even adver-
saries, have an interest in reducing each other’s insecurity ... cooperative security
refrains from the very idea of enforcing stability in a confrontational way. By
promoting the ideas of mutual reassurance instead of deterrence, and cooper-
ation instead of confrontation, cooperative security arrangements seek to prevent
crises from happening and/or reducing the risk of already existing situations
from getting worse.’14
Cooperation as a mode of inter-action expands beyond the security dimen-
sion to cooperative implementation. Implementation is regarded as not only the

13) See Merja Penikainen, ‘The Role of the Human Dimension of the OSCE in Conflict Prevention
and Crisis Management’ pp. 83-122 in M.Bothe, N. Ronzitti and A. Rosas eds., op.cit., pp. 88-
89 and pp. 102-107 for a discussion of the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
and its role in supporting conflict prevention and standard setting in the human dimension
within the OSCE. The role of ODIHR will not be dealt with extensively in this report: although
its remit is to contribute to the promotion of peace, security and stability, assigning this a
specific role in conflict prevention would risk rendering conflict prevention, as a category of
analysis, too broad.
14) W. Kemp, op.cit., p. 2.

12
responsibility of individual states but also a common and cooperative responsi-
bility. As such the OSCE sanctions the legitimacy of international interference in
the internal developments of states, a step of critical importance in the evolution
of approaches to conflict prevention. The interventions of the OSCE in the
internal affairs of a state are generally presented in terms of offering assistance to
the state, thereby the mechanisms at the disposal of the OSCE wield few sanc-
tions but rather espouse cooperative solutions as a means to be helpful. This is a
limited interventionism.
The above characteristics predispose the OSCE, structurally and conceptu-
ally, to an active conflict prevention role. Nevertheless, despite the proliferation
of specific conflict prevention instruments and mechanisms the number of dis-
putes and conflicts within the OSCE region has increased and not decreased. As
events in Kosovo in 1998 suggest, despite several years of institutional and
practical evolution, the fundamental roots of these conflicts are not necessarily
amenable to the modes of intervention at the OSCE’s disposal. In the following
sections the primary institutions and mechanisms in the OSCE’s conflict preven-
tion regime will be examined. The main focus of attention will be on innovative
instruments such as the High Commissioner on National Minorities and the
long-term Missions, the structures that are most engaged in operative conflict
prevention. Before turning to these, the institutional structures which are respon-
sible for coordinating the activity of the High Commissioner and the Missions
will be assessed for their contribution to conflict prevention, as will the options
available within the context of the human dimension and the Peaceful Settlement
of Dispute Mechanisms.

13
 2 The Main Political Bodies of
the OSCE and their Contribu-
tion to Conflict Prevention

Growing from an ongoing diplomatic conference into a more institutionalised

body the OSCE has maintained two key characteristics that condition the way in
which the decision-making structures operate to facilitate the prevention of
conflicts. As a forum for enhanced political consultations among foreign and
other high level ministers as well as permanent delegations in Vienna, the OSCE
acts as a primary location for dialogue and hence the prevention of conflicts.
Dialogue within the OSCE is a process that in itself is also a goal, on the as-
sumption that if parties keep talking they are less likely to start fighting.
The second characteristic, which conditions the operation of the OSCE
from its Summits of Heads of State or Government, through the Ministerial
Council, Senior Council and Permanent Council, is the consensus decision-
making procedure. In the context of the OSCE, consensus is considered to mean
the absence of an expressed objection by a participating state to taking a deci-
sion.15

15) Kari Mottola, ‘The OSCE: Institutional and Functional Developments in an Evolving Security
Order’, pp. 1-34 in M. Bothe, N. Ronzitti and A. Rosas, 1997, op.cit., p. 7.

15
 This rule provides legitimacy and acceptability for joint decisions, fostering
a sense of responsibility among all states, thereby encouraging them to consider
their own interests in the context of the security of the whole region. Former
OSCE Secretary General Wilhelm Hoynck has commented, ‘The right to block
any decision is a powerful form of leverage. The OSCE “institutional culture”
teaches us to use it in a responsible way ... a common, although unwritten,
understanding exists that a single State may block decision-making only when
vital interests related to the issue justify it.’16
Consensus decision-making can be a time consuming way to ensure agree-
ment. There is a limit to the degree to which the persuasion of states can influ-
ence a state to act contrary to its perceived interests. To facilitate efficiency there
have been procedural additions to the rule allowing for the activation of certain
mechanisms by a limited number of sponsors. Furthermore, in cases of ‘clear,
gross and uncorrected violations of relevant [OSCE] commitments’17 the Minis-
terial Council and Senior Council can take decisions based on consensus-minus-
one, or in regard to directed conciliation consensus-minus-two. Bloed has called
these possibilities largely theoretical since the political will to use these options
has been conspicuously lacking.18 Modifying the cumbersome aspects of the
process in search of more efficiency has not been resolved. The essence of con-
sensus remains: the approach harnesses the political process as an instrument of
preventive diplomacy, rather than suppressing the member states’ pursuit of
their own interests. This is an essential component emphasising a persuasion-
based rather than a coercion-based approach to conflict prevention.
The structures of the OSCE can be split in two. There are the political
decision-making structures: the Summits, Ministerial Council, Senior Council,
Permanent Council and the Forum for Security Cooperation. In addition there
are more operational structures: the Chairman-in-Office, the Troika, the Secre-
tary General (in a limited sense), the High Commissioner on National Minor-
ities, the Missions and the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.
The operational structures have assumed increasing importance in the context of
conflict prevention. The operation of the political bodies as consultation mech-
anisms placing conflict prevention at the heart of the OSCE is examined below.
Since the Permanent Council ‘is undoubtedly the core political (inter-govern-
mental) body of the OSCE in the field of early warning, conflict prevention and

16) Speech by Wilhelm Hoynck at the seminar on the ‘Contribution of the OSCE to Security of
Smaller States’, Nicosia, 15 January 1996.
17) Prague IV, paragraph 16.
18) Arie Bloed, ‘The OSCE Main Political Bodies and their Role in Conflict Prevention and Crisis
Management’, pp. 35-52 in M. Bothe, N. Ronzitti and A. Rosas, 1997, op.cit., p. 40.

16
crisis management’19 it receives most attention. The Chairman-in-Office is
examined in this section since it is so closely intertwined with the Permanent
Council.

2.1 The Decision-Making Structures

The decision-making structures of the OSCE have evolved during the course of
the 1990s. The Summits of Heads of State or Government set the priorities and
provide orientation at the highest political level. A number of commentators
consider that there is no need for the summits to be held routinely on a bi-an-
nual basis, but rather as the need arises.20 The central decision-making and
governing body of the OSCE is the Ministerial Council. Meeting once a year,
towards the end of every term of chairmanship, it has the capacity to provide
guidelines for the more operational or constant bodies, but in itself does not have
a significant role in terms of actual conflict prevention, although it may increas-
ingly do so through the work of Special Representatives. The role of the Senior
Council, the next body in the hierarchy of decision-making, is also limited by the
infrequency of its meeting – twice a year. It is responsible for the overview,
management and coordination of OSCE activities, in particular discussing and
setting forth policy and broad budgetary guidelines. Both Bloed and Ghebali
recognise the importance of the Senior Council in its broad policy agenda and
convening of high level representatives, but question the extent to which its work
is increasingly a duplication of the Permanent Council.21

The Permanent Council: Institutional Relevance

The Permanent Council, based in Vienna and comprising permanent representa-

tives of the OSCE participating states, is responsible for the day-to-day oper-
ational tasks of the OSCE and as such is ‘the king-spider in the OSCE’s web of
conflict prevention.’22 As the regular body for political consultation and decision-

19) A. Bloed, ibid., p. 39.

20) See Victor-Yves Ghebali, ‘CSCE Basic Needs Before the 1994 Budapest Review Meeting’, pp.
71-80 in Studia Diplomatica XLVII 4, 1994, p. 72 and Arie Bloed ‘De OVSE na de top van
Lissabon. Gebrek aan visie’, pp. 156-160 in Internationale Spectator 51(3) 1997, p. 160.
21) A. Bloed in M. Bothe, N. Ronzitti and A. Rosas, op.cit., pp. 35-52, and Victor-Yves Ghebali,
op.cit., p. 72.
22) A. Bloed, ibid., p. 35.

17
making, meeting weekly it is chaired by a representative of the Chairman-in-
Office. The Permanent Council acts as a forum for discussing developments
pertinent to conflict situations in the OSCE region where declarations are adopt-
ed and decisions taken.
The predecessor of the Permanent Council was the Permanent Committee.
Its establishment in December 1993 considerably enhanced the capacity of the
OSCE for early warning of potential conflicts through regular in depth political
consultations. It was created to ensure improved capabilities for day-to-day
operational tasks to be fulfilled. Renamed the Permanent Council at the Buda-
pest Ministerial Meeting in December 1994, the remit was widened to include
greater authority in regard to emergency situations. This was mainly a result of
the restructuring of the Committee of Senior Officials as the Senior Council,
which meets less frequently than its predecessor. In view of the infrequency of
meetings of the Ministerial Council and Senior Council, the Permanent Council
has evolved into the core political organ within the OSCE. This also reflects the
increasing confidence of state sin dealing with issues in such a forum.

Mandate
In as much as the Permanent Council has a specific mandate it is provided by
the Rome Council Decisions of December 1993, which established the Perma-
nent Committee. The relevant clause establishes that:

In order to enhance the capacity of the CSCE to respond to challenges in the

CSCE area, the Ministers decided to create a permanent body consisting of
representatives of the participating states for political consultations and
decision-making in Vienna. The new body will be responsible for the day-to-
day operational tasks of the CSCE under the chairmanship of the Chairman-
in-Office and will meet under the name of the Permanent Committee of the
CSCE. The Permanent Committee will conduct comprehensive and regular
consultations and, when the CSO is not in session, take decisions on all issues
pertinent to the CSCE. The Permanent Committee will be responsible to the
CSO, and undertake preliminary discussion of items suggested for the agenda
of the CSO. The CSO will continue to lay down political guidelines and take
key decisions between Council meetings.23

The Budapest Document of December 1994 added another element to the role
of the Permanent Council by stipulating that: ‘The Permanent Council will be

23) Rome Decisions, Chapter VII, paragraph 7.1. Text in Helsinki Monitor, Vol. 5, 1994, No. 1, p.
106.

18
the regular body for political consultation and decision-making. It can also be
convened for emergency purposes.’24
The general mandate of the Permanent Council therefore allows for a
flexible operation and critically provides the basis for the political consultations
that have been instrumental in making the Permanent Council a crucial conflict
prevention structure. Furthermore, the decision-making capacity provides direct
political competence. As a result the Permanent Council is empowered to ad-
dress tensions or conflicts in any way it sees fit, as long as it conforms to the
consensus condition of operation. Consensus itself is not mentioned in the man-
date but operates by extension of its centrality to all political decision-making in
the OSCE, except where explicitly stated. The way in which the Permanent
Council has operated in practice, in relation to the other decision-making struc-
tures of the OSCE, is what has made it so instrumental.

Working Methods, Procedures and Practice

The mandate of the Permanent Council was not specifically articulated to create
an instrument for conflict prevention or crisis management. With these issues
increasingly dominating the OSCE’s agenda it has assumed a pivotal role in this
regard. As a permanent forum for dialogue and decision-making, this is shown
in a number of ways.
The participation of all states, usually represented at the level of Ambassa-
dor, in the Permanent Council makes it an inclusive body. It enables the Perma-
nent Council to exist as a forum for frank and open multilateral dialogue and
therefore as the primary forum for regular political consultations. States can
bring any issue that they consider relevant to the Permanent Council. The
agenda is established by the Chairman-in-Office, and to function effectively it
has to include those issues that actively concern states. Thus the agenda is con-
structed partly in response to pressing issues as identified by the Chairman-in-
Office, partly to accomplish necessary ongoing tasks and partly in response to
requests from states to put issues on the agenda. The agenda conforms to a
regular format, with headings covering a review of current issues, a report on the
activities of the Chairman-in-Office and a report on the activities of the Secre-
tary General, as well as periodic reports on missions, the High Commissioner on
National Minorities, personal representatives of the Chairman-in-Office, organ-
isational issues and budgetary matters. There is always scope for specific issues
to be brought up in the ‘any other business’ section of the session. In this sense
the Permanent Council is an ongoing security council without privilege. If a

24) Budapest Document 1994, Chapter I, paragraph 18.

19
small country continuously chooses to raise an issue the major players can not
avoid it.
By providing such a forum the ongoing weekly consultations afford an
opportunity to discuss and address at an early stage all situations which have the
potential to degenerate into crisis. Discussion can facilitate broad understanding
of the problems and mobilise unified action. This is therefore a readily available
instrument for early warning and early action, since political dialogue acts both
as a source of information and a method for determining action. Discussion also
provides a low-key and non-confrontational form of scrutiny of state behaviour
and existing tensions as well as a means to clarify misconceptions. Repeated
appearance of an issue on the agenda will sensitise states to the importance of the
issue. The Permanent Council is also able to issue clear official statements in
closed meetings, either for public or restricted distribution, when it feels that it is
useful to do so.
Additionally, the Permanent Council is a forum in which information
about OSCE norms and standards can be disseminated and discussed. Reference
to these norms and the concomitant expectations can have a sobering affect on
states, and serve to remind them of their commitments. This is essentially a
transparency function, aided by the drafting of consensus statements which
provides an impetus to states to comply with OSCE standards.
As a political decision-making organ, deciding on actions and to a large
extent determining the use of other instruments and mechanisms, the Permanent
Council has a pivotal role in regard to OSCE conflict prevention instruments. In
structural terms the available conflict prevention options focus upon the estab-
lishment of ad hoc fact-finding or rapporteur missions or missions of long dur-
ation. The long-term missions are particularly relevant since the Permanent
Council drafts their mandates and is responsible for their prolongation. Addi-
tionally, the Permanent Council has the authority to refer conflicts to procedures
of peaceful settlement of disputes.
The Permanent Council, or as it was at the time the Permanent Commit-
tee, is not in fact mentioned in the mandate of the High Commissioner on
National Minorities.25 The High Commissioner is accountable to the Chairman-
in-Office and the Senior Council (at the time the mandate was written the Com-
mittee of Senior Officals). In view of the more circumscribed operation of the
Senior Council vis-à-vis the Committee of Senior Officals, the Permanent
Council has in practice assumed a more important role in the operation of the
High Commissioner. The nature of the High Commissioner is that of a more
independent

25) Helsinki Decisions 1992, Chapter II. See the section on the High Commissioner for a more
detailed examination of the mandate.

20
instrument, and the Permanent Council’s approval is not required by the High
Commissioner in order to become active in a situation, rather involvement is in
practice at the discretion of the High Commissioner, although the Permanent
Council could request the High Commissioner to investigate a situation. The
Permanent Council plays a crucial role in securing the accountability of the High
Commissioner and in providing political support to his initiatives. The High
Commissioner presents reports and recommendations to the Permanent Coun-
cil, which is in a position to coordinate pressure that might need to be exerted to
achieve goals. Furthermore, in view of the role the Permanent Council has
assumed, if the High Commissioner were to issue an early warning it is likely
that due to the frequency of its meetings the Permanent Council and not the
Senior Council would be the body to respond.
The presence of a mission on the ground or the visits of the High Commis-
sioner are two means through which sensitive issues can be addressed, but politi-
cal support from Vienna will add weight to the actions, recommendations or
advice of these instruments. To a large extent coordination is facilitated by
written reports, visits to Vienna and presentations by relevant personnel (the
High Commissioner and Heads of Missions). But the operation of the Perma-
nent Council is instrumental in providing political backing.

Conditions of Success and Failure

The OSCE provides an environment in which corridor diplomacy flourishes in
an informally structured consultative process. Discussion in the Permanent
Council is to an extent an orchestrated debate, dependent upon the informal
consultations which take place around the sessions of the Permanent Council.
This informal process hones the major issues of concern for a focused discussion
in the Permanent Council. The corridors and the coffee bar in the Hofburg
Congress Centre, where the Permanent Council meets in Vienna, see important
discussions around the Permanent Council. The many bilateral and multilateral
meetings that occur also facilitate the informal exchange of information and a
process by which positions "emerge". Decisions are prepared behind closed doors
and the public discussion forum is there to be used as much or as little as states
wish.
States recognise that to achieve a decision, through consensus, or even to
raise an issue with appropriate gravity, it is necessary to consult in advance with
all those with an interest in the matter. There are three main actors in the oper-
ation of the Permanent Council: the United States, the Russian Federation and
the states of the European Union, often but not always acting in unison. They
are constantly seeking to harmonise their interests. Increasingly, therefore, the
tendency is for a round of bilateral and multilateral negotiations to take place in
advance of the Permanent Council and drafts of decisions are subsequently

21
presented to the Permanent Council.26 As a result of the intensive caucusing
prior to Permanent Council discussions many diplomats consider that there is in
fact less discussion in the Permanent Council than previously. This is partly
because the Permanent Council is a decision-making body with an increasingly
full agenda and array of decisions to be taken. It is also due to recognition by
diplomats that in the interests of effectiveness issues for discussion need to be
well prepared. There is a danger that by reducing dialogue in the Permanent
Council divisions can be created through excessive caucusing. However for the
caucusing to be effective it has to be inclusive and ensure that consultations do
not exclude interested parties.
A factor that has had an impact on the operation of the caucusing is the
evolution of the European Union’s common foreign and security policy. This in
itself has required a high degree of caucusing among EU states in order to nego-
tiate positions in advance. The EU does, however, attempt to broaden its inter-
nal discussions, or at least prevent the EU position from being a cause of exclu-
sion. This is achieved through a follow up meeting immediately after its twice-
weekly meetings between the EU troika and the EU associate members. There is
also a constant throughway of meetings between the EU and other players, in
particular the United States and Russia. In addition the larger EU states conduct
bilateral meetings with other key protagonists. These meetings help to focus the
debate of the Permanent Council as well as building coalitions for action beyond
the confines of the Permanent Council.
Some countries do not fall into the more influential or obvious categories
of caucuses, such as the EU or NATO, and therefore other groupings form their
own caucuses, such as the Baltic states, the Central Asian states or the Vishegrad
states. These tend to operate less regularly than the EU and NATO caucuses. In
addition less obvious groupings have come into being, for instance a grouping
which has been named ‘GUAM’, consisting of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and
Moldova. The operation of such caucuses facilitates the expression of views by
the states involved as well as enhancing solidarity.27 The extensive range of
groups bring together different interests and present a challenge to the
Chairman-in-Office, whose task it is to facilitate the arrival at decisions in the
Permanent Council.
Fluid multi-layered dialogue and frequent consultations are critical starting
points for conflict preventing behaviour to be established. The conditions of
success for the operation of the Permanent Council are to an extent those of the
OSCE at large. Its all-inclusive composition allows for the main issues of inter-

26) Author’s interview with a member of the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna, February 1998.
27) Author’s interview with member of an OSCE Delegation in Vienna, February 1998.

22
national relations to be addressed on a weekly basis, thereby allowing all prob-
lems that could cause conflicts to be dealt with collectively. The sometimes-
maligned consensus decision-making process provides for considerable political
weight for those decisions that are taken.
To be effective, however, the Permanent Council is no more than the sum
of the commitment of the participating states themselves. To judge the effective-
ness of the Permanent Council as the starting point for conflict prevention is
therefore to judge its ability to encourage the willingness of participating states to
use the instruments at their disposal. The powers of the Permanent Council are
in some ways rather limited, covering the adoption of political statements, the
establishment of missions and following up the reports and recommendations of
the High Commissioner. The Permanent Council has no sharper teeth in its own
right. There are no specific, pre-determined sanctions which it can impose, but
the political responses that it can reach through consensus do have weight and
can serve to influence states on their own or can be utilised as means to stimulate
the action of other inter-governmental bodies which do possess sharper teeth.

The Chairman-in-Office: Institutional Relevance

The position of the Chairman-in-Office is held by the Foreign Minister of one of

the OSCE participating states on an annually rotating basis. The Chairman-in-
Office is responsible, on behalf of the participating states, for coordination of
and consultation on current OSCE business. In addition the Chairman-in-Office
is responsible for coordinating relations with other international bodies such as
the United Nations and the Council of Europe. As a result of having responsibil-
ity for chairing the Permanent Council the Chairman-in-Office has developed
into the central political actor of the OSCE.
The Chairman-in-Office is assisted in its role by the Troika (a body con-
sisting of the preceding, present and succeeding Chairman-in-Office), by ad hoc
steering groups that can be established on a case by case basis and by Personal
Representatives. In addition the Chairman-in-Office is closely supported by the
Secretary General who is appointed by the Ministerial Council for a period of
three years. The Secretary General is the Chief Administrative Officer of the
OSCE and is responsible for the management of OSCE structures and oper-
ations. In this sense the Secretary General works closely with the Chairman-in-
Office in the preparation and guidance of OSCE meetings and ensures the
implementation of OSCE decisions.28 In regard to conflict prevention the Secre-

28) OSCE Handbook 1996, Vienna 1997, p. 12.

23
tary General plays an advisory not a political role, seeking to support the
Chairman-in-Office. The State visits conducted by the Secretary General con-
tribute additional access to high level contacts. This could provide scope for a
conflict prevention role, but this would assume a more political function and at
present it is not foreseen that this will develop alongside the administrative
functions of the position.
Important factors in the operation of the Chairman-in-Office are the
character of the foreign minister and the ability to combine two onerous roles;
the breadth of experience, the commitment of his or her government to the tasks
at hand; and the quantity of resources at the disposal of the Chairman-in-Of-
fice’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A weak Chairman-in-Office could jeopardise
the effectiveness of the Permanent Council and nullify the use of Personal
Representatives, which have become increasingly important in the OSCE’s
conflict prevention toolkit.
In addition to this role at the heart of the OSCE’s political and administra-
tive apparatus, the Chairman-in-Office has a number of functions that explicitly
pertain to conflict prevention. The Chairman-in-Office is formally the only
interlocutor of the High Commissioner on National Minorities during the pre-
early warning phase of operation.29 The Chairman-in-Office is responsible for
the day-to-day management of the long-term missions. Additionally, the
Chairman-in-Office is in a position to travel to areas of tension (alone or ac-
companied by members of the Troika); can send Personal Representatives; can
put issues on the agenda of the Permanent Council and provide discussion
papers; and can act as an informal channel for communications prior to an issue
being brought into the more public light of the Permanent Council.
These functions give the Chairman-in-Office responsibility and scope for
engagement in the realm of conflict prevention. The Chairman-in-Office acts as
a political executive and in order to be effective requires the political backing of
the Permanent Council. The independence of the Chairman-in-Office is, how-
ever, constantly with reference to the Permanent Council, to which the
Chairman-in-Office is accountable, and it can only function effectively with the
political support of the participating states. The Permanent Council is prepared
to give this because it is always in a position to rein in the Chairman-in-Office
and because the rotating nature of the position and the existence of a Troika
mean that no Chairman-in-Office will be able to act in a maverick fashion or
seek to impose too specific an agenda.

29) Helsinki Decisions 1992, Chapter II, paragraphs 17-20.

24
 Mandate
The Chairman-in-Office’s mandate, laid out in the 1992 Helsinki Document is
rather general, with an emphasis on coordination and consultation with regard
to current OSCE business. The pertinent clause with regard to the Chairman-in-
Office states that: ‘The Chairman-in-Office will be responsible on behalf of the
Council/CSO for the coordination of and consultation on current OSCE busi-
ness. The Chairman-in-Office will be requested to communicate Council and
CSO decisions to the OSCE institutions and to give them such advice regarding
those decisions as may be required’.30 The Budapest Summit Document of
December 1994 provided some extra insight in stating that: ‘Overall responsibil-
ity for executive action will remain with the Chairman-in-Office (CIO). The
CIO will continue to take full advantage of his/her mandate, inter alia, by dis-
patching personal representatives. The CIO will be assisted by the Troika. The
term of the chairmanship will normally last one calendar year.’31

Working Methods and Practice

The Chairman-in-Office plays a crucial role in marshalling the necessary politi-
cal support for operations to prevent conflicts and galvanizing the OSCE into
action. Prompt action by the Chairman-in-Office, arising from consultations
with the OSCE community, should be the driving force in all OSCE endeavour.
The degree to which the Chairman-in-Office is proactive depends upon the
person of the Chairman-in-Office and the strategy of his/her government, as well
as the extent to which participating states are prepared to make demands on the
Chairman-in-Office.
The Chairman-in-Office can act independently and judge the scope that
the Permanent Council will allow for such action. One example of this was the
exploratory role of the Hungarian Chairmanship in preparing the ground for
further OSCE involvement in Chechnya. Through a persuasive consultation
process the Hungarian Chairman-in-Office secured the readiness of the govern-
ment of the Russian Federation to cooperate with the OSCE in regard to the
conflict there. This was an effective response within certain limitations and, as
shall be discussed in the concluding section of this report, the conflict in Chech-
nya in fact raises more questions than it answers with regard to the ability of the
OSCE to respond effectively to imminent crises.
There are certain means at the disposal of the Chairman-in-Office in
initiating a process of conflict prevention. One is the very nature of consultation
itself – by ensuring that issues are on the agenda of the Permanent Council the

30) Helsinki Decisions 1992, I.12 and I.13.

31) Budapest Document 1994, Budapest Decisions I.19, in A. Bloed, 1997, op.cit., p. 155.

25
Chairman-in-Office is initiating the first step on the ladder to a collective OSCE
response. Beyond this the Chairman-in-Office can issue statements which oper-
ate in the absence of consensus or serve to emphasise the Chairman-in-Office’s
concern with regard to a specific issue. Statements are a form of censure, but
beyond the actual censure there are no teeth to them and they have no binding
competence. An example of the latter is the way in which the Chairman-in-
Office issued two statements to emphasise concern over events in Kosovo in
March 1998.32 The first statement urged the parties to refrain from acts of viol-
ence and to start meaningful dialogue; instructed the Chairman’s Personal
Representative on Kosovo to increase efforts; and drew the attention of the
Permanent Council to the gravity of the situation. The second statement an-
nounced a new mission by Felipe Gonzalez as Personal Representative on the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; and stated that the crisis in Kosovo was not
solely an internal affair for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia because of viol-
ations of OSCE principles and commitments on human rights, and the impact
on security in the region.
The Troika is more of a mechanism providing diplomatic support than an
actual tool. Its functioning provides a means for a state to be involved in the
work of the Chairman-in-Office for three years, ideally providing support,
consistency and coordination of approach over a period of time. The Troika can
be used as a preliminary advisory body in which initiatives can be discussed prior
to their presentation to broader OSCE fora. Whether it assumes a role in the
ongoing consultation round as a sounding board for the Chairman-in-Office
depends upon the working relations among the Troika states. The Troika can
also be used as a means of direct intervention. At the instigation of the
Chairman-in-Office missions can be undertaken by representatives of the Troika
at an Ambassadorial level or on the part of country based representatives of the
Troika, as was the case of a mission to Belgrade in early February 1998 as a
result of rising tensions in Kosovo. Such missions are a means to demonstrate
concern and to act as a signalling device to participating states. It is not neces-
sary to go through the full Permanent Council in order for such a mission to
occur, but important and interested delegations are consulted.
There are two more specific and proactive forms of intervention that the
Chairman-in-Office can utilise. These are ad hoc steering groups and Personal
Representatives. Ad hoc steering groups can provide support in cases of conflict
prevention and crisis management. The instrument was elaborated upon in the
sub-chapter on the functions of the Chairman-in-Office in the Helsinki Deci-

32) See the Chairman-in-Office press releases no. 15/98 and no. 18/98, which cite the Chairman-in-
Office Statements of 2 March and 10 March respectively.

26
sions (paragraphs 16-21 of Chapter I in the 1992 Helsinki Decisions), although
in Chapter III (paragraph 9) the Council and the CSO were explicitly granted
the competence to establish steering groups.33 The rules provided in the Helsinki
Decisions enable the Chairman-in-Office to initiate an ad hoc steering group in
particularly urgent cases. Such groups have limited composition and apart from
including the Troika there are no rules regarding the composition other than the
need for impartiality and efficiency. Ad hoc steering groups are intended to be
temporary but can be prolonged for a specific time period, even assuming a
more or less permanent status in the case of the Minsk Group.
The Minsk Group, dealing with the conflict in and around Nagorno Kara-
bakh is in fact the principal example of the use of an ad hoc steering group. It
has operated with only limited success since 1992. It is a crisis management
rather than a conflict prevention steering group. Bloed notes that other examples
of ad hoc steering groups relate to the former Yugoslavia, but their impact has
been minimal and the instrument seldom used. One explanation is that the
Troika has become more active as a support for the Chairman-in-Office. Fur-
thermore, states that are interested in a particular situation regularly convene in
informal ways to discuss specific problems. Bloed, in fact, conjectures that the
use of ad hoc steering groups could enhance the efforts of interested states to
address specific problems since such groups avoid the ‘often cumbersome pro-
cedure of plenary discussions at (regular) meetings of the OSCE permanent
political bodies.’34

Personal Representatives of the Chairman-in-Office

The Chairman-in-Office is empowered to appoint Personal Representatives to

address specific issues at his or her own discretion, as a means to complement
the Chairman-in-Office’s own field visits. The regulations concerning this instru-
ment are contained in the Helsinki Document 1992 and state the following:

When dealing with a crisis or a conflict, the Chairman-in-Office may, on

his/her responsibility, designate a personal representative with a clear and
precise mandate in order to provide support. The Chairman-in-Office will

33) A. Bloed in M. Bothe, N. Ronzitti and A. Rosas, op.cit., p. 42.

34) A. Bloed ibid., p. 44.

27
inform the CSO of the intention to appoint a personal representative and of the mandate.
In reports to the Council/CSO, the Chairman-in-Office will include information on the
activities of the personal representative as well as any observation or advice submitted by
the latter.35

The mandate of the Personal Representative is at the discretion of the

Chairman-in-Office. This provides considerable leeway for the Chairman-in-
Office to identify a problem and decide how best to address it, making the Per-
sonal Representative a flexible means of intervention, the tasks of which will vary
according to circumstance. Having said this the overriding task is to provide the
Chairman-in-Office with advice on further measures based upon field visits.
Informally the Personal Representative acts as an instrument of early warning,
both signalling that a situation already merits attention but also in a position to
identify any escalation. Furthermore, the designation of a Personal Representa-
tive is a means of early action, initiating a process to identify options for further
action. Depending upon the mandate a Personal Representative can engage in
action on the Chairman-in-Office’s behalf.
Since 1992 Personal Representatives of the Chairman-in-Office have visit-
ed, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chechnya,
Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Macedonia, Moldova, Nagorno Karabakh,
Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
with particular regard, but not exclusively, to Kosovo. In a number of cases the
visit of a Personal Representative has helped to prepare the way for the deploy-
ment of a long-term Mission or field presence. A well documented case is that of
Moldova where the mandate of the Personal Representative was to consult with
the parties concerned and present the Chairman-in-Office with relevant sugges-
tions and recommendations as to how the CSCE could contribute to the solu-
tion of the conflict there.36 Albania and Belarus have been more recent examples
in which the designation of a Personal Representative led to the deployment of
an ongoing field presence.
The Chairman-in-Office’s facility to dispatch Personal Representatives
goes some way towards providing the OSCE scope for direct action thereby
circumventing some of the inherent caution involved in a consensus decision-
making procedure. Indeed the designation of a Personal Representative has
become the primary means for the Chairman-in-Office to respond to a situation
quickly without being bogged down in the formal procedures of Vienna. For
example, Franz Vranitzky was operational and visiting Albania within a couple
of

35) Helsinki Document 1992, Paragraph I.22.

36) See Adam Daniel Rotfeld, ‘In Search of a Political Settlement. The Case of the Conflict in
Moldova’, pp. 100-137 in The Challenge of Preventive Diplomacy. The Experience of the OSCE, Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 1994.

28
days of having been appointed. A field presence takes longer to put in place both
in terms of logistics but also in regard to agreeing a mandate. Yet while enhanc-
ing the role of the Chairman-in-Office the instrument does not undermine the
pivotal position of the Permanent Council because it could not work if the
Chairman-in-Office did not undertake an adequate consultation process with key
actors in the Permanent Council. Therefore, the Personal Representative is not
an instrument to bypass the Permanent Council or other instruments but rather
a specific and quick response to particular circumstances, which might not be
addressed as effectively if left to the other instruments available, and with fewer
constraints involved than in establishing a mission or field presence.37
Since the instrument is the individual selected to perform the function, even
more than other instruments a great deal rests upon the selection of an appropri-
ate figure. In many instances the Personal Representative has been an Ambassa-
dor appointed from the ranks of the state holding the Chairmanship. In other
cases it has been deemed necessary to appoint a more high profile figure. Belarus
and Albania are instructive cases. The Danish Chairman-in-Office appointed
Ambassador Thorning-Pertersen as Personal Representative in response to
concerns about Belarus’ compliance with internationally accepted democratic
and constitutional principles and practices and other OSCE commitments such
as freedom of the press and freedom of movement.38 Appointing a professional
diplomat rather than a more visible international personality signified a low-key
approach commensurate with the need to establish a diplomatic channel for
negotiations. This was intended to offer Belarus a way out without losing face. It
also offered the Chairman-in-Office the opportunity to raise the stakes by subse-
quently appointing a higher profile figure if no progress was made, thereby
escalating the pressure.39
The task of the Personal Representative in Albania was of a different order.
In the face of the breakdown of law and order and a serious political crisis, it was
deemed necessary to appoint a figure with the profile to coordinate the varied
international efforts and able to exert authority over other participating organis-
ations. This task was given to former Austrian Chancellor, Vranitzky. Likewise
in the case of the Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office to Belgrade
it was considered that a high profile figure with the eminence of former Spanish
Prime Minister Gonzalez would have more leverage, both in terms of influencing
the Belgrade authorities but also in reporting back to the OSCE.

37) Author’s interview with the head of a delegation to the OSCE in Vienna, February 1998.
38) Annual Report 1997 on OSCE Activities, Vienna 1998, p. 17.
39) Author’s interview with a member of a delegation in Vienna, February 1998.

29
 The person of the Personal Representative can also complicate matters.
Some delegations have argued that this was the case with regard to the appoint-
ment of Max van der Stoel as Personal Representative for Kosovo in early
1997.40 The view expressed was that van der Stoel’s position as High Commis-
sioner on National Minorities presented a complication in that the Kosovo
Albanians refused to be viewed as a national minority and therefore would not
engage with him. Furthermore, it was argued that van der Stoel’s involvement
brought with it the perspective and mode of operation of the High Commis-
sioner and there are those that feel the engagement should have been more
public and not characterised by the quiet diplomacy that generally signifies the
High Commissioner’s work. It is difficult to assess the extent to which these
factors determined the difficulties that van der Stoel faced in the capacity of
Personal Representative for Kosovo. It is arguable whether the almost year-long
delay in visiting Kosovo was related to the dual role or whether the more critical
factor was the general geopolitical situation of the Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via, its refusal to engage on the issue and the question of the country’s suspen-
sion from the OSCE. Nevertheless, even if geo-political factors were more
instrumental, the potential for confusion was increased by the appointment of
van der Stoel and the fact that it took a year before the Personal Representative
was able to visit Kosovo did not aid the OSCE in being able to prevent a
deterioration of the situation there. It should be emphasised that it was van der
Stoel’s own initiative, in the absence of other action by the OSCE, to become
active in regard to Kosovo. Furthermore, the Personal Representative is the
Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office, therefore it is incumbent
upon the Chairman-in-Office to reconsider the mandate if, for whatever reason,
the issue is not addressed adequately.

Conditions of Success of the Chairman-in-Office

Bloed comments that it is striking that the responsibility entailed in the position
of Chairman-in-Office has often be borne by smaller states (Hungary, Switzer-
land and Denmark). Furthermore, he adds that ‘For reasons of political effec-
tiveness, it is advisable that major OSCE States should also regularly accept the
Chairmanship ... Although there is an understanding within the OSCE that a
major OSCE State should always be part of the Troika, so far this unfortunately
is not always the case.’41 So-called smaller states have, however, made a signifi-
cant contribution as Chairman-in-Office. The Swedish chairmanship was mark-
ed by an expansion in the number of field missions and flexible encouragement

40) Author’s interviews with the Ambassadors of three delegations in Vienna, February 1998.
41) A. Bloed in M. Bothe, N. Ronzitti and A. Rosas, op.cit., p. 47.

30
for the work of the High Commissioner on National Minorities, which put
conflict prevention at the heart of the work of the OSCE.42 As Chairman-in-
Office Switzerland was also very supportive, in political and financial terms, of
the OSCE’s endeavours in the realm of conflict prevention, and post-conflict
reconstruction in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. One way in which this
manifested itself was in direct support of the activities of the High Commissioner
on National Minorities. This has occurred through ad hoc ways, for instance the
provision of a plane to facilitate the High Commissioner’s travel in Central Asia
in September 1996, the funding of a round table on multicultural and multieth-
nic issues in Kazakhstan, which took place in Locarno in December 199643 and
through the support of a number of projects carried out by the Foundation on
Inter-Ethnic Relations in Albania, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine, under the auspices
of the High Commissioner. Swiss support for such initiatives has continued since
the end of tenure as Chairman-in-Office, especially with regard to initiatives in
Croatia.
Some so-called smaller states, such as Poland and Hungary have seen the
opportunity of assuming the Chairmanship as a means to show that they are
responsible partners. It could also be argued that smaller states often have no
major interests on many of the issues that surface within OSCE discussion and
practice, in the way that larger states do, and are thus more impartial, and
perceived so. Indeed, assuming the Chairmanship can be the only diplomatic
forum within which such countries can play such a role. Furthermore, it could
even be argued that if a major power, particularly the United States or Russia,
were to assume the position, instead of bringing added influence to the position,
national agendas would enter the domain of the Chairman-in-Office to a much
greater, and potentially damaging, extent. The influence of the Chairman-in-
Office is dependent upon the resources, energy and intellect that the state con-
cerned is prepared to lend to the office. It is also partly a question of gaining the
confidence of the Permanent Council, including smaller states and coalitions of
states as well as the major powers, in order to be able to act flexibly and
proactively.
Although each Chairman-in-Office is part of the Troika for a year before
assuming the Chairmanship, a dilemma which has to be faced is that the circle
of problems widens constantly – the Chairman-in-Office inherits the baggage of
previous crises as well as those which arise during the course of its own tenure.

42) See Margaretha af Ugglas, ‘Conditions for Successful Preventive Diplomacy’, in The Challenge of
Preventive Diplomacy, The Experience of the CSCE, Ministry for Foreign Affairs Stockholm, 1994, pp.
11-32.
43) The Role of the High Commissioner on National Minorities in OSCE Conflict Prevention, The Founda-
tion on Inter-Ethnic Relations, 1997, The Hague, pp. 63-64.

31
This raises the question as to whether or not one individual state will be capable
of filling this role in the future.
As with all conflict prevention instruments the effectiveness of Personal
Representatives can be evaluated from two perspectives: on the one hand
whether they have addressed the particular task that called for the designation of
the particular Personal Representative, and on the other hand what has been the
contribution to the longer-term situation not only in terms of security and stabil-
ity but whether root causes of a potential conflict are being addressed. Gonza-
lez’s mission is of interest in that his intervention and recommendations, in
conjunction with increasing domestic and international pressure, led to the
acknowledgment of the municipal election results in the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, which had initially been annulled. In broader terms, however, it can
be argued that the twenty-four hour fact-finding visit paid by Gonzalez to Bel-
grade and the stinging report, while contributing to the international pressure
which led to the overturn of the annulled results, aggravated the authorities to
the extent that it made them more obdurate in dealing with other issues, such as
Kosovo, and therefore less receptive to treat with the Personal Representative on
Kosovo.
The suspension of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia presents severe
limitations on the ability of the OSCE in general and Personal Representatives in
particular to be effective in terms of conflict prevention there. In regard to the
designation of two Personal Representatives to the country, in the view of one
diplomat, the preparation of mandates for both has been complicated by the
absence of the Federal Republic from the Permanent Council and it diminished
the scope for the Personal Representatives to act cooperatively. Having said this,
that the Personal Representatives were designated indicates the flexibility of the
instrument, enabling intervention, however limited, even in a suspended state.
Personal Representatives can accomplish little in isolation. Acting on behalf
of the Chairman-in-Office it is necessary for the Chairman-in-Office to respond
and take matters further. The responses of the Chairman-in-Office can include
utilisation of the various mechanisms which will be discussed in subsequent
sections, or seeking to exert political pressure by issuing a Statement or bringing
the issue to the attention of the Permanent Council.
Effectiveness in this context presents one link in a wider chain. Recent
experiences in regard to Kosovo are instructive about the effectiveness of Per-
sonal Representatives but also the OSCE in general. As the violence in Kosovo
escalated from February/March 1998 concern among participating states grew,
but other than issue statements of concern the Chairman-in-Office and the
Permanent Council were limited in their scope for action. Felipe Gonzalez was
nominated ‘as the Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office for the

32
 FRY which would include a mandate for addressing the problems in Kosovo’.44
Max van der Stoel stood down from his position as Personal Representative for
Kosovo in the wake of this appointment. Gonzalez was additionally supplied
with an EU mandate to mediate in the Kosovo conflict. The key role in the
appointment of Gonzalez was played by the Contact Group France, Germany,
the Russian Federation, the UK and the USA) which, despite internal divisions,
recognised the need to be seen to be doing something. The evolution of the crisis
in Kosovo has, however, been such that despite ten years of recognition that the
situation was potentially explosive no measures have been applied effectively to
prevent the escalation of the conflict, which has ultimately rendered the role of
Personal Representatives and even that of the OSCE marginal.

2.2 Military Security Instruments

There are also a number of instruments in the OSCE which deal with the mili-
tary security field. These will only be touched on briefly since they do not form a
central part of this study. Structurally, the Conflict Prevention Centre has been
important in the development and management of the bodies and practices in
this field. This body ‘has from the beginning been poised precariously between a
political function – consultation among the representatives of all participant
states on situations of crisis and potential conflict in Europe – and a more strictly
technical-operative one – support of the actions undertaken for conflict preven-
tion and crisis management.’45 The institutional restructuring of recent years has
emphasised the latter function above the former. This Centre also plays an
important role in mission support and support for the Chairman-in-Office as
discussed elsewhere.

The Forum for Security Cooperation

The Forum for Security Cooperation was established by the 1992 Helsinki
Summit (Helsinki Decisions, Chapter V). In 1994 it took over several tasks
which had previously been fulfilled by the Consultative Committee of the Con-
flict Prevention Centre. In the FSC the emphasis is on the military aspect of
actual and potential conflicts, dealing with threat perceptions, the structure of

44) Permanent Council Journal No. 156, Agenda item 3, Decision 218, 11 March 1998.
45) Ettore Greco, ‘The Role of the Conflict Prevention Centre in the Security System of the OSCE’,
pp. 5-15 in Helsinki Monitor, Vol. 5, 1994, No. 1, p. 14.

33
armed forces, the military code of conduct, conversion and arms control, as such
it is a consultation forum in the field of security issues with politico-military
implications. The raison d’être is to provide a forum in which states can raise
issues which they consider to have military security implications and to provide
scope for dialogue on security perceptions and policies and the military’s role in
a democracy. Negotiations for the code of conduct, prescribing the limits on a
government’s use of force on its own territory, have been a key component of
this. In addition the FSC has assumed responsibility for some of the OSCE’s
confidence and security building measures, for instance dealing with the ‘mech-
anisms for consultation and cooperation as regards unusual military activities’
and another concerning ‘cooperation as regards hazardous incidents of a military
nature’. Although used in the context of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia
these mechanisms have been assimilated into the OSCE’s existing permanent
political consultation machinery.46
The FSC meets on a weekly basis in Vienna, and although it plays a role in
regard to political consultations in the field of conflict prevention and crisis
management, the major body in this field is the Permanent Council. Apart from
the fact that the states themselves give precedence to the political forum, the
biggest problem for the FSC is the institutional one that the chair rotates
monthly. A number of delegations feel that this makes coordination very diffi-
cult, especially given the burden it imposes upon some of the smaller states with
more limited representation in Vienna. The benefit of this is that it keeps every-
one involved and through participation in the FSC’s Troika it provides experi-
ence to all states.

The Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security

The Code of Conduct is aimed at enhancing cooperation between states in the

field of politico-military security.47 The Code of Conduct ‘is designed to pro-
mote security and cooperation by placing the activities of armed forces of partic-
ipating states explicitly within the OSCE’s politically binding framework of
human-dimension, security-related, and other norms and obligations.’48 The

46) Arie Bloed in Bothe, Ronzitti and Rosas, op.cit., pp. 44-45.
47) For further information see Rob Zaagman, ‘Some Reflections on OSCE Conflict Prevention and
the Code of Conduct’, pp. 29-39 in Helsinki Monitor, Vol. 7, 1996, No. 2, and Gert de Nooy ed.,
Cooperative Security, the OSCE and its Code of Conduct, The Hague, 1996.
48) See M.R. Lucas, ‘The War in Chechnya and the OSCE Code of Conduct’, pp. 32-42 in Helsinki
Monitor, Vol. 6, 1995, No. 2, p. 32.

34
Code’s central aim is to prevent the misuse of military, paramilitary and internal
security forces for political ends. The use of the Russian Army in Chechnya
demonstrated one of the critical problems with the Code, namely whether the
participating states, having created a sophisticated tool, are prepared to use it.
With regard to Chechnya it has been apparent that civilian control of the Rus-
sian armed forces is far from being stable and guaranteed as requested by the
Code of Conduct. The issue of the Code of Conduct and Chechnya presents a
very important case and will be returned to in the conclusion of this study.

Confidence and Security Building Measures

The development of Confidence and Security Building Measures has been part
of the OSCE since its inception, as a typical instrument of preventive coopera-
tive security policy. The concept was introduced in the Helsinki Final Act49 as a
means to build trust through increased transparency and predictability of mili-
tary activities. The concept has evolved into a system of measures relating to
defence planning, information on armed forces, risk reduction, military contacts,
notification and observation of military activities, verification and evaluation,
constraints and communication.50
The system of CSBMs operating within the CSCE framework was devel-
oped to prevent military border attacks and was very much part of the bipolar
Cold War world. The system was less transferable to the internal conflicts that
arose after the Cold War. These conflicts emphasised that the protection of
human rights is also a security issue and as such indicate that old style CSBMs
are not redundant in that internal security destabilisation can lead to cross-
border conflicts. Therefore, the programme approved at Helsinki in 1992 sought
to emphasise the need for a comprehensive human rights regime as a major
component of the prevention of conflicts – both internal but also external con-
flict that may be spillovers of internal ones.51

49) Final Act of Helsinki, in Bloed Basic Documents, op.cit., pp. 151-155.
50) For a brief summary of the Confidence and Security-Building Measures in the OSCE see the
OSCE Handbook 1996, Vienna 1996, pp. 63-67.
51) Ettore Greco, ‘The Role of the Conflict Prevention Centre in the Security System of the OSCE’,
pp. 5-15 in Helsinki Monitor, Vol. 5, 1994, No. 1, pp. 5-6.

35
 3 OSCE Mechanisms and
Instruments of Peaceful
Settlement of Disputes

This section explores the OSCE mechanisms functioning at an operational level

in cases requiring rapid reaction to tensions as well as the instruments for peace-
ful settlement of disputes. Conceptually, these comprise a significant component
of the OSCE’s early warning and conflict prevention architecture. Practically,
they present a body of formalised instruments and mechanisms, some of which
(the Berlin, Vienna and Moscow Mechanisms) are not dispute settlement mecha-
nisms in the narrow sense and were applied during a short phase, others of which
are highly formal and have yet to be activated.
The fifth principle of the Helsinki Final Act raises the issue of the peaceful
settlement of disputes, advocating the use of negotiation, enquiry, mediation,
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful means to settle
disputes so that they do not threaten international peace, security and justice.52
From 1975 to 1989 all efforts to develop means of operating in the field of local
and regional conflicts were limited by the ongoing bi-polarity of the Cold War,
when time most participating states were not inclined to look for or establish

52) See Arie Bloed, From Helsinki to Vienna: Basic Documents of the Helsinki Process, 1990, Dordrecht, p.
46.

37
procedures and mechanisms for the settlement of smaller conflicts. During the
period of change following the end of the East-West confrontation ‘cautious
diplomats invented the complicated system of CSCE Mechanisms’.53 The limi-
tation of these political mechanisms was revealed by the crises erupting in and
around the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s.
Concurrent with the development of operational political mechanisms,
dubbed emergency mechanisms, there has also been an evolution in structural
rather than political methods for dealing with disputes. The emergency mech-
anisms and the instruments and procedures of peaceful settlement of disputes
and their application are examined separately, but their effectiveness is consid-
ered jointly.

3.1 The Political, Military and Human Dimension Mechanisms

The OSCE operates on the premise that energy spent on building consensus is
an important investment. Nevertheless, states recognise that joint political deci-
sions taken in accordance with the consensus rule can only be one form of action
and need to be complemented by direct action through agreed mechanisms
activated by a limited number of states, facilitating prompt and direct contact
between parties. This realisation led to the creation of a series of mechanisms to
address different types of emergency situations in the military field, in the field of
general political crises, and in the human dimension.

The Berlin Emergency Mechanism

This is a ‘mechanism for consultation and cooperation with regard to emergency

situations’. It was adopted in June 1991 at the Berlin meeting of the CSCE
Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs. The procedure, which may be used in
crisis situations regarding all four security dimensions (military, economic,
environmental and societal) provides for the possibility of emergency meetings
of the Ministerial Council.54 As such it is an early warning mechanism. The
Mechanism applies to a serious emergency which may arise from a violation of
one of the Principles of the Final Act or as a result of major disruptions endan-
gering peace, security or stability. The consensus principle is restricted in a
procedural

53) Berthold Meyer, ‘Dispute Settlement Procedures and Crisis Management’ pp. 53-81 in M.
Bothe, N. Ronzitti and A. Rosas, op.cit., p. 63.
54) The text of the mechanism is in A. Bloed, 1993, op.cit., pp. 811-813.

38
sense. Until the Budapest Meeting in 1994 it was necessary for 12 states to
declare their support for the mechanism to activate a meeting of the Committee
of Senior Officials (now the Senior Council). Since then all that is required is for
the concerned state and the Chairman-in-Office to request an Emergency Meet-
ing.55
The Mechanism has been used on few occasions: in 1991 in regard to the
former Yugoslavia, in 1993 in regard to Nagorno Karabakh and in 1993 Hun-
gary tried to have an Emergency Meeting regarding the Gabcikovo Dam on the
Danube, but failed to gain the necessary support of twelve states.56 The meetings
which were convened had marginal impact on the parties to the conflicts.57 The
Mechanism has been made redundant by the partial institutionalisation of the
OSCE in Vienna, particularly in regard to the role of the Permanent Council,
which supplants the need to have a special mechanism to raise an issue at the
highest political level. Urgent security questions can be brought up by any partic-
ipating state at the weekly meetings of the Permanent Council, which can also be
convened for extraordinary meetings at any time without formally triggering the
Berlin Mechanism.

Vienna Mechanism on Unusual Military Activities

This is a ‘mechanism for consultation and cooperation as regards unusual mili-

tary activities’. It was established in November 1990 as part of a series of new
confidence and security building measures, together with the related mechanism
on ‘Co-operation as regards hazardous incidents of a military nature’.58 These
mechanisms may be used to alert the international community in case of specific
emergency situations, they include a right of information at short notice and
consultations if requested, and are located in the Conflict Prevention Centre.
Like the Berlin Mechanism, the mechanism on unusual military activities can be
activated in two phases, the second of which can encompass the request of an
emergency meeting in the framework of the Conflict Prevention Centre. The

55) See Berthold Meyer in Bothe, Ronzitti and Rosas, op.cit., pp. 67-68.
56) Torsten Lohmann, ‘Dispute Settlement Procedures in the OSCE – Genesis and Overview’, pp.
343-366 in Bothe, Ronzitti and Rosas, op.cit., p. 358.
57) Berthold Meyer, ‘Dispute Settlement Procedures and Crisis Management’, op.cit., pp. 67-68.
58) The mechanism is laid down in the Vienna Document on Confidence and Security-Building
Measures, formally adopted at the CSCE Summit of Paris. The text is in A. Bloed, 1993, op.cit.,
pp. 656-658. The text of the related mechanism on ‘Co-operation as regards hazardous incidents
of a military nature’ is provided on p. 658.

39
primary focus of the Vienna military-behaviour mechanism is to detect military
activities of member states which deviate from agreed customary military behav-
iour. The consultation mechanism was activated on three occasions during the
Yugoslav crisis, but in no case did the consultations achieve a decrease of the
scope of violence in the then Yugoslavia. The mechanism was not intended to
address internal conflicts and only did so when such a conflict manifested a
direct external threat. 59
Meyer suggests that since the 1992 Prague Council Meeting of the Foreign
Ministers there has been a connection between the ‘Vienna Mechanism’ or
consultation and cooperation concerning unusual military activities and the
deployment of fact-finding and monitoring missions. In this sense he considers
that it is possible to speak of an indirect use of the Vienna Mechanism.60 Never-
theless, this Mechanism has also been supplanted by developments in the politi-
cal bodies of the OSCE. The fact that neither the Russian entry into Chechnya
nor the military re-occupation of the Krajina by Croatia during the summer of
1995 triggered this mechanism is indicative of its marginalisation. Menacing
developments can now be discussed regularly in the weekly meetings of the
OSCE bodies in Vienna.

The Human Dimension Mechanisms

The adoption of the wide ranging set of human dimension commitments within
the OSCE has created a framework for the behaviour of states that is intended to
contribute to stability, peace and security. The implementation of the human
dimension commitments therefore has a direct bearing upon the maintenance of
peace and the prevention of conflicts. The ‘Human Dimension Mechanism’ was
established at the Vienna Follow-Up Meeting (1986-89) and further elaborated
at the meetings of the Conference on the Human Dimension in Copenhagen
(1990) and Moscow (1991). The so-called Vienna and Moscow Mechanisms
comprise a permanent means of supervising the implementation of the OSCE
human dimension commitments.
The Vienna Mechanism consists of four separate phases: the exchange of
information relating to the human dimension; bilateral meetings between partici-
pating states with a view to examine and resolve situations and specific cases
relating to the human dimension; notification of all OSCE states of situations

59) Heinz Vetschera, ‘European Conflict Prevention: The Role of the CSCE’, pp. 72-112 in The Art
of Conflict Prevention, Werner Bauwens and Luc Reychler eds., Brasseys, 1994, p. 85.
60) Berthold Meyer, ‘Dispute Settlement Procedures and Crisis Management’, op.cit., p. 54.

40
and cases in the human dimension; and the discussion of issues, raised under the
mechanism, at Review Conferences, Human Dimension Implementation Meet-
ings, meetings of the Senior Council or Permanent Council.61
The Moscow Mechanism further elaborated the Vienna Mechanism as well
as introducing new supervisory procedures. It is a complex mechanism present-
ing five separate procedures which may be used independently to establish mis-
sions of experts or rapporteurs. Two of the new procedures in the Moscow
Mechanism are linked to the Vienna Mechanism: after the request for informa-
tion or for a bilateral meeting under the Vienna Mechanism, the requesting state
may suggest that the other state should invite a mission of experts ‘to address a
particular, clearly defined question on its territory related to the human dimen-
sion.’62 If the state refuses to establish such a mission within ten days, or if the
requesting state judges that the issue in question has not been resolved, then the
requesting state may initiate the establishment of a mission of rapporteurs. This
requires the support of at least six OSCE states and the consent of the requested
state is not necessary.63 This created the possibility of an independent investiga-
tion into violations of human dimension commitments.
The Moscow Mechanism introduced three other procedures not linked to
the Vienna Mechanism. These are: the voluntary invitation of a mission of
experts by an OSCE state; the establishment of a mission of experts or rappor-
teurs following a decision of the Permanent Council or Senior Council, upon the
request of any participating state; and the establishment of an ‘emergency’
mission of rapporteurs in cases of ‘a particularly serious threat’ to the fulfillment
of human dimension provisions if at least ten OSCE states agree. The missions
are composed of independent experts selected from the resource list of the OSCE
maintained by the ODIHR and comprising the names of experts appointed by
the OSCE states.
The powers of missions of experts are more extensive than those of rappor-
teurs. Firstly, they are established in cooperation with the host state. Secondly,
whereas missions of rapporteurs have a fact-finding mandate combined with the
possibility to give advice on possible solutions, expert missions have a broader
mandate. They may facilitate ‘resolution of a particular question or problem
relating to the human dimension’ by gathering information, ‘and, as appropriate,
use their good offices and mediation services to promote dialogue and co-oper-
ation among interested parties.’ The state concerned participates in the agree-

61) See Pentikainen in Bothe, Ronzitti and Rosas, op.cit., pp. 95-96.
62) Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the OSCE,
Moscow 3 October 1991, pp. 605-629, in A.Bloed, 1993, op.cit., paragraph 8, p. 609.
63) Moscow Document, paragraph 9, p. 610, ibid.

41
ment of the precise terms of reference of the mission of experts. The missions are
required to submit reports to the Permanent Council (or the Senior Council),
which may decide on any follow-up action.
The Moscow Mechanism, thus, provides for missions which have to be
admitted even without the consent of the state concerned in cases of internal
violations of human dimension commitments in the spheres of human rights,
fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law. Pentikainen comments,
the mechanism ‘is applicable in respect of any OSCE state on the basis of the
mere adherence of all OSCE states to the entirety of the human dimension
provisions.’64
The Vienna Mechanism was activated extensively between January 1989
and April 1990. The mechanism was predominantly invoked in the context of
East-West relations, most often by Western states against Eastern states.65 From
1991 onwards the mechanism was rarely invoked. In 1991, for instance the
mechanism was used to draw attention to the civil war in Yugoslavia and mili-
tary actions by Soviet forces in Lithuania. In 1992 Austria used the mechanism
with respect to the treatment of Kurdish civilians by Turkish security forces in
South Eastern Turkey. In Spring 1992 the Russian Federation activated the first
phase of the mechanism (exchange of information) with regard to Estonian
citizenship legislation.66
As opposed to the Vienna Mechanism the Moscow Mechanism has only
been activated a few times. A mission of rapporteurs was sent to Croatia and
Bosnia and Herzegovina in September/October 1992 under the so-called ‘emerg-
ency procedure’; Estonia (December 1992) and Moldova (January/February)
invited missions of experts to study legislation and its implementation with
regard to citizenship and language in Estonia and legislation, the implementation
of minority rights and inter-ethnic relations in Moldova. There have also been a
number of failed attempts to activate the Moscow Mechanism, in regard to
Russia and Estonia in 1992, Turkey and Austria in 1992, the Committee of
Senior Officials and Serbia and Montenegro in 1993, and Turkey and the Nor-

64) Pentikainen, in Bothe, Ronzitti and Rosas, op.cit., p. 99.

65) See Arie Bloed and Pieter van Dijk, ‘Supervisory Mechanism for the Human Dimension of the
CSCE: its setting up, its present functioning and possible development towards a general proce-
dure for peaceful settlement of CSCE disputes’, pp. 74-108, in Bloed and van Dijk, eds., The
Human Dimension of the Helsinki Process: The Vienna Follow-Up Meeting and its Aftermath, Dordrecht
1991, pp. 79-80.
66) Pentikainen in Bothe, Ronzitti and Rosas, op.cit., p. 100.

42
dic countries in 1994.67 No activation of the Human Dimension Mechanism has
taken place in recent years.

3.2 The Formalized Mechanisms for the Peaceful Settlement of

Disputes

It took almost 20 years to produce a convention which formalised dispute settle-

ment procedures, from the initial Swiss proposal on dispute settlement in 1973.
Many states refused to countenance any mandatory third party involvement
inherent in this idea and the concomitant impingement upon state sovereignty in
such a procedure. A number of OSCE meetings were held on the general prob-
lem of peaceful settlement of disputes (Montreux 1978, Athens 1984 and La
Valletta 1991). The prospects for a generally acceptable method for the peaceful
settlement of inter-state disputes changed as a result of the political changes in
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.68 A significant landmark was the 1989
Vienna Concluding Document which contained an explicit reference to the
acceptance, in principle, by the participating states of ‘the mandatory involve-
ment of a third party when a dispute cannot be settled by other peaceful
means.’69

Valletta Dispute Settlement Mechanism

The Valletta Mechanism, created as a result of a meeting of experts in Janu-

ary/February 1991, was the first formal CSCE procedure for peaceful settlement
of disputes. The mechanism, which provides for the possibility of appointing a
conciliatory mechanism to prepare non-binding recommendations, can be char-
acterised ‘as a form of binding conciliation even though of a very soft nature.’70
It enables any state party to a dispute to call for a third-party mechanism. This
is limited to third-party comment or advice, and does not involve concrete
recom-

67) Pentikainen, ibid., pp. 100-101, for further information regarding Estonia and Moldova see
Michael R. Lucas, ‘Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States: The Role of the
CSCE’, pp. 5-37 in Helsinki Monitor, Vol. 5, 1994, No. 4.
68) Gerard Tanja, ‘Peaceful Settlement of Disputes within the CSCE: Bridge over Troubled Water’,
in Helsinki Monitor, Vol. 4, 1993, No. 1, pp. 22-33.
69) Concluding Document of Vienna, Vienna, 15 January 1989, Principles 6, in A. Bloed, 1993,
op.cit., p. 331.
70) Lohmann in Bothe, Ronzitti and Rosas, op.cit., p. 345.

43
mendations. The mechanism can only be applied ‘when a dispute cannot be
settled by other peaceful means’. It provides an initial stage to help parties select
an adequate procedure rather than immediately look into the substance of the
dispute and contains specific and broad escape clauses.71
The Valletta Mechanism is a complicated and multiphase political, not
legal, mechanism with only limited chance of being applied in practice. The non-
usage of the Valletta Mechanism can be attributed to several factors. The Mech-
anism is itself a compromise which requires extremely complicated and time
consuming procedures if it is to be initiated. Consensus was only possible at the
expense of an exception clause which provides states ample excuse to object to
the establishment or continuance of the mechanism if the dispute ‘raises issues
concerning its territorial integrity, or national defence, title to sovereignty over
land territory, or competing claim with regard to jurisdiction over other areas.’72
Furthermore, the Mechanism is limited to inter-state disputes in an era in which
intra-state disputes are more common.73 Meyer considers that by accepting the
sophisticated procedure of the Valletta Mechanism, the states ‘deliberately
invented an instrument which could not be used against its creators.’74

The Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration

The adoption of the Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration within the

CSCE (signed 15 December 1992) signified a break with previous practice. It
goes beyond the level of politically binding agreements and enters the domain of
legally binding ones. It is the first OSCE document adopted to which not all
states are bound. This resulted in a number of objections, specifically that it
could undermine existing obligations and alter the political, flexible and subtle
OSCE process by introducing a rigid legal instrument.75
Institutionally, the Convention provides for the establishment of a Court of
Conciliation and Arbitration composed of Conciliation Commissions and Arbi-
tral Tribunals, which will be created if necessary for each dispute with headquar-

71) For more detail concerning the Valletta Mechanism see Susanne Jacobi, ‘Subsidiarity and Other
Obstacles to the Use of the OSCE Dispute Settlement Procedures’, pp. 425-458 in M. Bothe, N.
Ronzitti and A. Rosas, op.cit., pp. 426-433.
72) Section XII of the Provisions for a CSCE Procedure for Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, in A.
Bloed, 1993, op.cit., p. 576.
73) Meyer ‘Dispute Settlement Procedures and Crisis Management’, op.cit., p. 66.
74) ibid., p. 67.
75) Jacobi, op.cit., p. 433.

44
ters in Geneva, able to draw on a number of possible conciliators and arbitrators
nominated by the parties to the convention. The Convention came into force in
December 1994 after the deposit of the twelfth instrument of ratification or
accession.76
The main pillar of this Convention is obligatory conciliation. If it has not
been possible to settle a dispute by other means, any party to the Convention
may require that the dispute be brought before a Conciliation Commission. The
other party is not entitled to block this procedure. The recommendations of the
Conciliation Commission are not binding. The Convention also introduced an
arbitration procedure. This is optional, however, and cannot be brought into
play without the agreement of both parties to the dispute. In contrast to the
recommendations of the Conciliation Commission, the decision of the Arbitra-
tion Tribunal is binding.77
In establishing the Convention, ‘mindful of the all-pervading dogma of
sovereignty, [the States] strove to avoid settlements imposed by third parties.’78
The effectiveness of the instruments for the settlement of disputes largely de-
pends upon their acceptance by the states. Therefore, while the Convention is far
reaching in what it provides in theory and this in itself is meaningful as a sign of
what many states are prepared to accept, its real importance will only come if it
is implemented. This is predicated upon the political will of the states concerned.
That 34 of the 55 participating states have signed and 22 ratified/acceded to it is
not a bad record, but some of the main OSCE actors have not yet adhered (the
United States, the United Kingdom and Turkey) and do not intend to do so,
thereby undermining the possibility of it being utilised.79 Jacobi considers that
the possibility of the Court being used is not high since non-participation in the
Convention by certain states as well as participation in other legal instruments
by a majority of states, will likely prove obstacles to its use.80
A Directed Conciliation Procedure was introduced by the United States as
a counter proposal to the draft Convention. It aims to strengthen the possibilities
for political settlement of disputes within the OSCE, without resort to the Con-
vention, empowering the Permanent Council to direct disputing states to seek
conciliation to assist them in resolving a dispute if they are unable to resolve it

76) Lohmann, op.cit., pp. 346-7.

77) OSCE Handbook 1996, pp. 49-50.
78) Lucius Caflisch, ‘The OSCE Court of Conciliation and Arbitration: Some Facts and Issues’, pp.
381-408 in Bothe, Ronzitti and Rosas, op.cit., p. 396.
79) Jacobi, op.cit., p. 441.
80) ibid., pp. 441-544.

45
themselves ‘within a reasonable period of time’. Decisions may be taken, if
necessary, without the consent of the two parties to the dispute in question (the
so-called consensus-minus-two rule).81

Conditions for Success or Failure

The instruments and mechanisms for peaceful settlement of disputes are formal-
ised and complicated and as a result have seldom been used, or in the case of the
Valletta Mechanism not at all. Likewise the Conciliation Commission and the
OSCE Court of Conciliation and Arbitration have remained inactive. This
would suggest that the mechanisms and instruments have a limited utility. In
practical terms even when the mechanisms were utilised their effectiveness was
limited by the narrowness of their ambition and the inherent caution of states.
The peaceful settlement of dispute mechanisms are classic examples of how
the compromise nature of decision-making can so water-down a decision as to
render it impotent through multiple escape clauses. From a procedural perspec-
tive the exception clause in the Valletta Mechanism is perhaps most significant
since it excludes the sources of some of the major conflicts that have bedeviled
the OSCE region in the past decade. One commentator, however, sees in this a
degree of realism: ‘The history of the peaceful settlement of disputes shows that
a dispute cannot be settled peacefully against the will of one of the parties even if
the legal question forming the basis of the dispute may be decided.’82 It is argued
that the mechanism not only respects political realities but the guarantee to
exclude certain disputes from the dispute settlement mechanism procedure can
only enhance the preparedness of states to apply the method. To date this has
not proved the case.
More fundamentally the Convention, the Valletta Mechanism and the
Conciliation Commission procedure have been reproached for being too tradi-
tional given that new approaches are required to address many of the current
conflicts in the OSCE region. These conflicts increasingly arise out of intra-state
and not inter-state disputes, over claims of minorities to seek protection against
repression or to seek autonomy/secession. ‘The question is whether the OSCE
dispute settlement procedures will be able to deal with (these) “modern” con-
flicts [protection of the environment and natural resources, the economic transi-

81) A. Bloed, ed., 1993, op.cit., p. 34, and Lohmann, op.cit., p. 346.
82) Karin Oellers-Frahm, ‘The Mandatory Component in the CSCE Dispute Settlement System’,
pp. 195-211 in International Courts for the Twenty-First Century, edited by Mark W. Janis, 1992, pp.
200-201.

46
tion and trans-border economic relations] because a number of them do not
necessarily involve States as parties to a conflict ... and/or may arise within the
territory of a participating State.’83 In procedural terms non-state parties have no
capacity before OSCE dispute settlement mechanisms.
Another limitation is that the instruments are of a static nature, which to a
certain extent goes against the grain of the OSCE process to date. The flexibility
of the OSCE process has been one of its main tools for promoting peaceful
change. Conflict prevention in the OSCE is less oriented towards straightfor-
ward answers and legally binding commitments and more towards questions of
process, confidence and cooperation. It is characterised by a political-diplomatic
approach rather than a legalistic one (although this does not imply that stan-
dards do not matter in problem-solving). This is partly due to the types of
conflicts that have arisen, particularly relating to ethnic identity, but also social,
political and economic problems arising out of the process of democratization
which are less amenable to comprehensive legally binding agreements. It is also a
factor of inter-state relations in that with the development of an interventionist
capacity on the part of the OSCE states are less inclined to subject themselves to
the conclusive arbitration of third parties. The instruments of peaceful settle-
ment of disputes represent a different element in the political process, since they
‘do not share the cooperative, informal and flexible character of the
CSCE/OSCE due to the confrontational character that is inherent in any such
formalized procedure.’84 The fact that influential states have not acceded to the
Convention also limits the scope of the Court. As one West European diplomat
commented, ‘Arbitration is dangerous – if you engage in it you are committed to
the outcome. But the parties to a conflict or dispute have interests and if they
submit to arbitration they realise that they might lose.’85
The lack of willingness on the part of states to activate the inter-state
supervisory mechanisms or to submit to third-party jurisdiction is reflective of
the inherent caution of states. States tend to evaluate such procedures in terms of
the risks they entail should they be used against their own problems, rather than
a means of expanding the resources at the disposal of the international commu-
nity to resolve a problem. Primarily they are concerned that the involvement of a
third party could diminish their control over the process. This is particularly
reflected in the attitude of Western states that have demonstrated a clear unwill-
ingness to apply international supervisory mechanisms in their mutual relation-
ships. This reluctance is explained by referring to the existence of other human

83) Jacobi, op.cit., p. 448.

84) ibid., p. 453.
85) Author’s interview, Vienna, February 1998.

47
rights mechanisms (such as the mechanism of the European Convention on
Human Rights) and their better suitability in the resolution of human rights
problems. But as Pentikainen comments, this argument ‘is seriously undermined
by the fact that the Western states are clearly not prepared to activate even these
other mechanisms in their mutual relationships.’86
It is argued that the non-utilisation of these mechanisms undermines their
utility and credibility. Zaagman comments that ‘an instrument which is not used
loses its power.’87 That the emergency mechanisms and the instruments for the
peaceful settlement of disputes appear unlikely to be used in the foreseeable
future can in part be attributed to the changed nature of the OSCE since they
were formulated. It has transformed into a permanently functioning apparatus
and therefore the limited use of specific instruments does not necessarily mean
that the issues are not addressed. This is particularly the case with regard to the
Berlin Mechanism and the Vienna Military Mechanism, which have been super-
seded by the manner in which the political bodies, and especially the Permanent
Council, are increasingly preoccupied with dispute settlement and conflict pre-
vention from a political perspective. Furthermore, by helping to ensure the
implementation of Human Dimension commitments before a conflict escalates,
primarily through the work of the ODIHR but also the Missions, the High
Commissioner on National Minorities and the dialogue in the Permanent Coun-
cil, the OSCE may have to resort to its crisis procedures far less often. The
Human Dimension Mechanism did not live up to its potential to be widely used
as an instrument of early warning and conflict prevention, but the Human Di-
mension itself has, in that monitoring compliance is a central means of assessing
the extent to which states are prepared to take on board commitments, and, if
not assessing the possible consequences.
The effectiveness of the human dimension rests on the notion that political
pressure can be applied to states by other participating states to encourage them
to abide by their obligations. The issue of pressure within the OSCE context,
related to the use of carrots and sticks, has considerable limits due to the cooper-
ative ethos which is one of the instrumental characteristics of the OSCE. The
peaceful settlement of dispute instruments, particularly the advent of the Con-
vention and legally binding obligations, could be regarded as one way to over-
come the limitations of persuasion, but politically speaking this is something that
states appear loathe to take on board.

86) Pentikainen, op.cit., p. 102, note 62.

87) Rob Zaagman, ed., ‘Focus on the Future: A Contribution to Discussions on a new OSCE,’ pp.
40-51 in Helsinki Monitor, Vol. 6, 1995, No. 3, p. 47.

48
 Although the Moscow Mechanism was not conceived as a confrontational
device but as a means of drawing another country’s attention to an apparent lack
of implementation of human dimension commitments (and only if a country’s
response to the activation of the Mechanism in its bilateral, confidential phase
was judged unsatisfactory would recourse be made to the multilateral elements
of the Mechanism88), it began to be perceived as a confrontational, unfriendly
act. The Vienna Mechanism was certainly perceived as a weapon in the political
confrontation between the Cold War blocs. The perception of the mechanisms
as unfriendly or even hostile acts has damaged their application.89
Nevertheless, the principle that commitments accepted in the area of the
human dimension constitute a direct and rightful concern of all participating
states and are not exclusively an internal affair of the state concerned, constitutes
a milestone for the OSCE. It opens the way to a right of oversight for the com-
munity of OSCE states in questions relating to the practical application of
human dimension commitments. A participating state can not appeal to its
sovereignty in order to reject questions, complaints and recommendations of
other OSCE states concerning its fulfillment of these commitments as an inad-
missible interference in its internal affairs. However, the practical exercise of this
right has turned out to be extremely difficult. So far the Moscow Mechanism has
rarely been applied. All elements of compulsion – for example the sending of an
expert mission against the will of the receiving state – are extremely problematic
in a security organisation which relies so heavily on cooperation. Participating
states prefer to achieve practical implementation of human dimension commit-
ments on the basis of cooperation. Most important in this regard have been
implementation meetings and assistance with implementation as well as dialogue
concerning the observance of OSCE commitments, which increasingly takes
place under the auspices of the political bodies.
The fact that the mechanisms and instruments have not proved particularly
effective in practice should not diminish the importance of the issues they ad-
dress. The instruments do perform a cautionary function in the sense that their
existence may encourage states to settle their disputes through a political process
rather than with reference to third party intervention via a more legalistic pro-
cess. From a positive perspective it could be argued that the importance of these
instruments is that a community of diverse states has been able to reach minimal

88) Thomas M. Buchsbaum, ‘The Future of the Human Dimension of the CSCE’ pp. 5-24 in
Helsinki Monitor, Vol. 4, 1993, No. 2, pp. 16-17.
89) ‘Seminar on Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy’, summary of Workshop B ‘Review of
Existing Early Warning Mechanisms’, pp. 116-118 in, Helsinki Monitor, Vol. 5, 1994, No. 2, p.
117.

49
agreement. In this sense modest instruments have a confidence building effect. It
has to be noted that the mandatory component of the instruments is solely the
requirement of the formal involvement of a third party in the settlement of a
dispute, the instrument itself has no power to render an obligatory judgement.
Despite this ‘soft’ component states have nevertheless preferred to stick to politi-
cal rather than juridical means to resolve disputes.90 Political means are con-
sidered to be less confrontational and certainly less restrictive in that they do not
involve the same binding force on states. Such concerns have led to the evolution
of flexible third party mechanisms such as the High Commissioner and missions,
the mandates of which are the product of mutual agreement.

90) Oellers-Frahm, op.cit.

50
 4 The High Commissioner on
National Minorities

The Institutional Relevance of the High Commissioner on National Minorities

The office of High Commissioner on National Minorities was created in 1992

with a remit to focus explicitly on conflicts relating to national minorities.91 This
was a reflection of the experience since 1990 that ethnic conflicts, frequently
rooted in conflictual perceptions of minority rights and their maintenance or
violation, carry the danger of violent conflict and international escalation. In
particular the experience of the violent dissolution of the former Yugoslavia was
a stimulus to establish an early warning security instrument to focus on prevent-
ing such potential conflicts from escalating into violence.92
The High Commissioner was established as ‘an instrument of conflict
prevention at the earliest possible stage’ and as such is expressly an instrument

91) See Bibliography on the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities: Documents, Speeches and
Related Publications, The Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations, March 1997, The Hague.
92) On the origins of the mandate see Rob Zaagman and Hannie Zaal, ‘The CSCE High Commis-
sioner on National Minorities: Prehistory and Negotiations’ in Arie Bloed ed., The Challenges of
Change: The Helsinki Summit of the CSCE and its Aftermath, Dordrecht, 1994, pp. 95-111.

51
linking security and the respect of human rights as a root cause of conflict. The
instrument was designed to facilitate the role of the OSCE in managing change
resulting from transition in Central and Eastern Europe – essentially to address
the relationship between minorities and majorities as part of the political process
in the broadest sense.93 Given the OSCE’s comprehensive approach to security,
this has meant that although the High Commissioner is primarily a security
instrument and not an instrument of the human dimension, the importance of
the latter can not be detached.
The establishment of a security instrument devoted to potential conflicts
involving non-state entities is a significant achievement of the OSCE’s approach
to conflict prevention. Nevertheless, the general framework of the High Com-
missioner’s activity is determined by the prevention of inter-state disputes, as
indicated by the direction that the High Commissioner is to address ‘tensions
involving national minority issues which ... have the potential to develop into a
conflict within the CSCE area, affecting peace, stability or relations between the
participating States.’94
In this context the High Commissioner is a very flexible instrument of
conflict prevention. Structurally it is a highly autonomous body. The primary
contact point within the OSCE for the High Commissioner, as indicated in the
mandate, is the Chairman-in-Office. This relationship is crucial in regard to the
duties of consultation and reporting concerning the High Commissioner’s activ-
ities. The High Commissioner is required to consult with the Chairman-in-
Office prior to visiting a participating state and to submit confidential reports
following a visit and on termination of his involvement.95 Furthermore, consul-
tations under the auspices of the Chairman-in-Office are a means by which
support can be gathered for the High Commissioner’s activities.
Contact with the political bodies of the OSCE occurs through invitations
to address the annual meeting of the Ministerial Council and periodically the
weekly meetings of the Permanent Council at the initiative of the Chairman-in-
Office. The periodic reports to the Permanent Council allow for issues to be
addressed directly to this key political body. Furthermore, the visits furnish the
High Commissioner with the opportunity to consult delegations, thereby joining
the process of consultations and lobbying that lubricates the OSCE. Informal
consulta-

93) John Packer, ‘Conflict Prevention by the OAU: The Relevance of the OSCE High Commissioner
on National Minorities’, pp. 279-291, in The African Yearbook on International Law, Vol. 4, 1996,
p. 285.
94) CSCE Helsinki Document 1992: The Challenges of Change, Helsinki, 10 July 1992, Chapter II,
paragraph 3 in A. Bloed, 1993, op.cit., pp. 715-721.
95) Chapter II, paragraphs 17-20, ibid.

52
tions have in fact allowed the avoidance of formal petitions to the Permanent
Council as the mandate originally proposed. Another structural relationship of
the utmost importance is that with the missions of long duration, which will be
considered below.
According to the mandate the High Commissioner should be ‘an eminent
international personality with long-standing relevant experience from whom an
impartial performance of the function may be expected’.96 This places an onus
on the participating states to appoint a candidate with appropriate skills and
background. Max van der Stoel, the former Dutch Foreign Minister, was ap-
pointed High Commissioner in December 1992 and his office began operating in
January 1993. Initially appointed for 3 years, his mandate has been renewed for
a second term until the end of 1998, with a subsequent one year extension until
the end of 1999. The position required a mediator able to act on the basis of
substantial knowledge while at the same time being perceived as an impartial
interlocutor by parties involved in a dispute. The mandate calls for an indepen-
dent, unbiased individual of high stature, capable of exercising discretionary
judgement and to maintain the confidential nature of the office. A number of
diplomatic interlocutors in Vienna perceive van der Stoel’s intuition, gained over
a political career spanning some fifty years, as critical in navigating the pitfalls
presented by potential conflict situations and balancing the need for quiet or
more assertive and public diplomacy.

The Mandate of the High Commissioner on National Minorities

The mandate provides the framework for the operation of the High Commis-
sioner. It reflects an attempt to initiate a new approach to addressing conflicts
through intervention, containment and if possible resolution at the stage of
tension rather than outright conflict. Its underlying premises is that an external
third-party can play a preventive role, that this can come at the third-party’s
own discretion, that the third-party can have far-reaching competencies as an
independent non-state entity and that it has a specific focus as an early warning
mechanism dealing with the area of national minorities in the context of com-
prehensive security.97 The mandates is based on the assumption that the protec-
tion of minorities enhances stability.

96) Chapter II, paragraph 8, ibid.

97) For analysis of the mandate see Rob Zaagman, ‘The CSCE High Commissioner on National
Minorities: An Analysis of the Mandate and the Institutional Context’, pp. 113-175 in A. Bloed,
1994, op.cit.

53
 According to the mandate the High Commissioner ‘will provide “early
warning” and, as appropriate, “early action” at the earliest possible stage in
regard to tensions involving national minority issues which have not yet devel-
oped beyond an early warning stage, but, in the judgement of the High Commis-
sioner, have the potential to develop into a conflict within the CSCE area, affect-
ing peace, stability or relations between participating States, requiring the atten-
tion of and action by the Council or the CSO’.98 The mandate indicates the
means at the High Commissioner’s disposal. These include the collection of
information on national minorities from reliable sources; the assessment of the
nature of tensions and their potential consequences; authorisation to visit partici-
pating states to obtain first-hand information, and ‘where appropriate promote
dialogue, confidence and cooperation between’ parties.
The High Commissioner has a dual function involving both early media-
tion and early warning. The primary task is designed to contain and deescalate
tensions (involving national minorities). The second function is to act as a ‘trip-
wire’. If the High Commissioner concludes that a situation is likely to escalate an
‘early warning’ may be issued, with the possibility of alerting the OSCE, via the
Chairman-in-Office and the Permanent Council of tensions that could lead to
conflict. The High Commissioner is also empowered to recommend that a
special mandate be provided for further contact and consultations with the
parties concerned with a view to finding possible solutions. In the mandate this is
termed ‘early action’.
Important restrictions and exclusions are contained in the mandate. The
High Commissioner is excluded from considering national minority situations
involving organised acts of terrorism and as a corollary should not communicate
with persons or organisations practising or publicly condoning terrorism or
violence. The inclusion of a terrorism clause, at the insistence of Turkey and the
UK, was viewed by some observers with considerable concern in that it ‘could tie
the hands of the High Commissioner permitting him/her to deal only with less
important simmering conflicts, thereby not adequately fulfilling the “early
warning” function, and thus casting doubt on the credibility of the new institu-
tions and on the CSCE as a whole.’99 One observer presents a case for the High
Commissioner’s involvement in situations involving such acts, partly because
other OSCE instruments are not directly engaged, partly because such acts often
occur in the context of situations which would otherwise be within the remit of

98) CSCE Helsinki Document 1992: The Challenges of Change, Helsinki, 10 July 1992, Chapter II,
pp. 715-721, in A. Bloed, op.cit.,1993, Chapter II, paragraph 3.
99) Alexis Heraclides, ‘The CSCE and Minorities: The Negotiations between the Commitments,
1972-1992’, pp. 5-18, in Helsinki Monitor. Vol. 3, 1992, No. 3, p. 17.

54
the High Commissioner’s operation and also because the ‘characteristic low-key,
confidential and impartial character of the High Commissioner’s preventive
diplomacy would favour its involvement over other possible types of OSCE
involvement in this kind of situation.’100 However, engagements in such situ-
ations would require an approach that many states would be unlikely to accept.
The High Commissioner is also prohibited from considering violations of
OSCE commitments with regard to an individual person belonging to a national
minority. It is important to see the High Commissioner as being ‘on’ and not
‘for’ national minorities – the High Commissioner is neither an ombudsman
dealing with specific cases, nor a rapporteur on violations of OSCE commit-
ments, nor an advocate for minorities, but an interlocutor mediating over dis-
putes concerning national minorities. In this capacity violations are relevant in
that they may indicate potential instability but the High Commissioner’s per-
spective is that of a security instrument and not a human dimension one.101
Two other restrictions, which have not proved of consequence in the oper-
ation of the mandate to date, are the following. Firstly, the High Commissioner
is prohibited from addressing a national minority issue which has already been
brought to the attention of the CSO unless he requests and is granted a specific
mandate to do so. No such mandate has been requested to date. Secondly, in the
event that the High Commissioner requests advice from experts the mandate
restricts his choice to those on the ODIHR list under the Moscow Mechanism.
The High Commissioner has utilised experts from this list on occasion and while
this provision formally limits the ability of the High Commissioner to extend his
reach through the use of expert delegations, in practice means have been found
to engage expert analysis and insight without having to go through any bureau-
cratic procedures.
Perhaps the key restriction for the activity of the High Commissioner as a
security instrument concerned with preventing conflicts is contained in the title,
namely focusing on ‘national minorities’. The OSCE assumes a broad interpre-
tation of national minorities in its documents, including ethnic, cultural, linguis-

100) Maria Amor Martin Estebanez, ‘The High Commissioner on National Minorities: Development
of the Mandate’ pp. 123-166 in Bothe, Ronzitti and Rosas, 1997, op.cit., p. 130.
101) An example of the High Commissioner addressing a situation in which concern over individual
cases could have wider ramifications is that of the Greek minority in Albania in relation to the
arrest and subsequent trial of five members of the Greek minority association Omonia. The Role of
the High Commissioner on National Minorities in OSCE Conflict Prevention: An Introduction, The
Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations, The Hague, June 1997, p. 45.

55
tic and religious elements,102 nevertheless, the High Commissioner is not man-
dated to engage in potential conflict situations that are not related to national
minority issues. This is not a restriction in the mandate, which is designed to
address those situations concerning national minorities, but it has allowed a
lacunae in the operation of the OSCE’s conflict prevention regime, which will be
examined below in regard to the conflicts in Albania and Chechnya.
The above outline highlights two key aspects of the High Commissioner’s
third-party involvement. Firstly, the involvement is designed to be at the earliest
possible stage; and secondly, the involvement is at the discretion of the High
Commissioner, without the need for approval from the political bodies of the
OSCE. A wide margin is provided for the High Commissioner to determine the
areas, nature and timing of engagement. Critically, the High Commissioner does
not require the prior consent of the state in question in order to pursue the
mandate, since the consent of all participating states for the High Commissioner
to enjoy free movement within states and unrestricted contacts (apart from
specified exclusions), is provided by the existence of the mandate itself, which
was approved by consensus as part of the Helsinki 1992 Decisions.
Issuing a formal early warning is the most direct step the High Commis-
sioner can take if he considers a situation to threaten imminent escalation.
Therefore what constitutes an early warning is critical. The mandate does not
define criteria for when an early warning should be issued. The High Commis-
sioner is empowered to issue a ‘formal early warning’ if he concludes that a
direct risk of potential conflict exists. The assessment of this risk is left to the
High Commissioner’s judgement as to whether the factors impinge upon issues
of peace, stability or relations between participating states and if so whether they
require the attention of the political bodies of the OSCE.103 The mandate re-
quires that once a formal early warning is issued the High Commissioner’s
further involvement is dependent upon the decision of the political bodies. ‘The
transfer of a pre-conflict situation to the OSCE’s political bodies and procedures
through the provision of an “early warning” would entail the recognition that the
High Commissioner has reached the limit of its ability to deal with this pre-
conflict situation using the means at its disposal.’104
In more than five years of operation no early warning has been issued. Van
der Stoel has intimated that issuing an early warning could in fact exacerbate a
fragile situation, although ultimately this is not a reason for not utilising the

102) Martin Estebenez, op.cit., p. 130 cites the 1989 Vienna Concluding Document, Cooperation in
Humanitarian and Other Fields, paragraphs 59 and 68.
103) Helsinki Decisions 1992, Chapter II, paragraph 3.
104) Martin Estebanez, op.cit., pp. 132-133.

56
mandate to its full if the need existed. Rather, the suggestion is that the compet-
encies provided in the mandate have enabled the High Commissioner to engage
sufficiently early and with sufficient leeway, providing scope for action in ad-
vance of an ‘early warning’. Indeed there seems to be some overlap. The process
of early warning not only encompasses obtaining information from parties
directly involved, but also empowers the High Commissioner, ‘where appropri-
ate [to] promote dialogue, confidence and co-operation between’ the parties105,
which is manifestly a form of action. In this light, although formal ‘early action’,
as defined by paragraph 16 of the mandate,106 has not occurred, early action has
been an integral part of the High Commissioner’s activities, since the High
Commissioner has actively promoted a range of activities designed to facilitate
dialogue and problem solving between parties. Furthermore, the nature of the
High Commissioner’s regular reports to the Chairman-in-Office, in writing
following each visit to a country and periodic oral presentations to the Perma-
nent Council, means that there is an ongoing assessment of specific situations
designed to keep the political bodies of the OSCE appraised of situations which
could at a later date demand their more specific attention. This could be classi-
fied as an informal early warning process.
That the High Commissioner has not issued a formal early warning might
be an adequate institutional assessment of effectiveness, but it does not address
two key issues of effectiveness with regard to the operation of the instrument.
The first is the operational effectiveness of the High Commissioner in preventing
relations between parties from deteriorating and concomitantly contributing to
an improvement in these relations. This issue will be examined in the section
below dealing with the actual practice of the High Commissioner. Secondly, the
construction of the mandate poses a question as to whether or not there have
been conflict situations that have fallen through the net. The issue is whether
situations such as those which arose in Albania or Chechnya were outside the
remit of the High Commissioner, and if so which other instruments could or
should have been utilised in an early warning and conflict prevention capacity.

105) Helsinki Decisions 1992, Chapter II, paragraph 12.

106) ‘The High Commissioner may recommend that he/she be authorized to enter into further
contact and closer consultations with the parties concerned with a view to possible solutions,
according to a mandate to be decided by the CSO.’ Helsinki Decisions 1992, Chapter II, para-
graph 16.

57
 The Theory and Practice of the High Commissioner’s Interventions

When Does an Intervention take Place and Why?

The mandate provides minimal guidance as to when the High Commissioner
should become engaged in a situation, when an early warning should be issued or
how and when the High Commissioner should ‘promote dialogue, confidence
and co-operation’107 among parties. The High Commissioner is therefore given
considerable leeway in deciding which situations he will address and at what
stage it might be appropriate to seek assistance from the political bodies of the
OSCE or particular participating states. As a result van der Stoel has evolved his
own style and approach. This has involved intensive and extensive consultations
(in the countries concerned and with other relevant experts and political actors),
fact-finding, the promotion of dialogue, producing recommendations for the
governments concerned, and routinely informing the OSCE political bodies of
his activities.
The fact that the High Commissioner can operate independently, but with
the backing of the political bodies, is of utmost importance to his operation as an
effective instrument of conflict prevention. The relationship of independence and
accountability is important in allowing the High Commissioner to take a num-
ber of steps without consensus being needed. Thereby the timing and method of
the High Commissioner’s involvement in any given situation is at his discretion
and does not need approval from the political organs. Nevertheless, this latitude
of activity can not negate the need to act with the political support of the
participating states, and it is to these states that the High Commissioner is
accountable, initially through the Chairman-in-Office but also through the
Permanent Council.
In addition to being independent in his relations to the political bodies and
the states, the High Commissioner is independent of the minority populations in
the situations to which he attends. Although the High Commissioner is an in-
strument established by a body of states, the High Commissioner is not the
instrument of these states, but rather is mandated by the states to act as an
impartial third-party facilitating enhanced relations between governments and
minorities. Despite the independence from the states and political bodies of the
OSCE, from the perspective of non-state entities and often the minorities with
which the High Commissioner intercedes, this impartiality is conditioned by the
fact that the instrument was created by an inter-governmental process. There-
fore, however independent or impartial the High Commissioner might be, there
is a perceived baggage, particularly with regard to the emphasis placed by the

107) Helsinki Document 1992: II, paragraph 12.

58
OSCE community on the issue of territorial integrity. Nevertheless, more than
other instruments the High Commissioner is able to play a third-party
facilitative role.
Confidentiality is stated as an operational priority for the High Commis-
sioner in the mandate. The low-key operational approach has been designed to
present a non-threatening image to interlocutors: ‘Parties directly involved often
feel they can be more cooperative and forthcoming if they know that the content
of their discussions will not be revealed to the outside world.’108 Furthermore,
informal facilitated dialogue avoids conferring recognition and status on com-
munal groups, and this can remove a constraint which states often place on
dialogue with such groups. Consultation with the Chairman-in-Office is in strict
confidence. Criticism has been levelled at the High Commissioner for not utilis-
ing public opprobrium as a means of exerting pressure on states, thereby limiting
the OSCE’s ability to persuade governments to change policies that cause ten-
sions. However, such an approach would severely limit the High Commissioner’s
ability to engage parties in a productive cooperation.109
These points and a reading of the mandate indicate that the answer to the
key question, when does an intervention take place and why, lies very much in
the realm of the discretion of the High Commissioner. The High Commissioner
determines which situations he addresses based on his own judgement within the
context that the High Commissioner is a security instrument mandated to ad-
dress tensions that ‘have the potential to develop into a conflict within the CSCE
area, affecting peace, stability or relations between participating States’.
The High Commissioner’s starting point has been an application of the
OSCE notion of comprehensive security, creating an interdependent framework
linking peace, security and justice. In this context the High Commissioner regu-
larly employs existing human rights standards as a barometer, since many prob-
lems concerning national minorities involve non-respect of human rights, includ-
ing the rights of persons belonging to national minorities. In particular the High
Commissioner has seen a range of substantive issues as determining the potential
for whether or not a situation could deteriorate, thus warranting his intervention.
Issues which have frequently drawn the High Commissioner’s attention and
around which tensions can escalate can be divided into several categories, includ-
ing the following: identity (including the status and use of language, of names
and of symbols); citizenship (particularly the extent to which it has functioned as
an inclusive or exclusive element in the provision of rights); political

108) The Role of the High Commissioner in Conflict Prevention: 1997, op.cit., p. 22.
109) Diane Chigas, ‘Bridging the Gap between Theory and Practice: the CSCE High Commissioner
on National Minorities’, pp. 27-41 in Helsinki Monitor, Vol. 5, 1994, No. 3, pp. 35-36.

59
participation (especially the existence or otherwise of effective participation in
decision-making and the ability of minorities to enjoy adequate say over the
development of national policies in which they hold an interest and will be
expected to conform); education (as a transmitter of identity, as well as a mode
of socialisation, education has been a highly sensitive issue including control over
its form and content, languages of tuition, curricula and private versus public
educational facilities); and access to resources (including resources in educational
and cultural spheres as well as employment within public service, access to
governmental contracts and an equitable share of government financed invest-
ment and development projects).110
In this light it is important to examine how the High Commissioner per-
ceives the scope for his intervention. An important point is that although the
mandate has created, first and foremost, an instrument for short-term conflict
prevention, the High Commissioner can not overlook the long-term aspects of
the situations he addresses if he wishes to be effective. This is essential if sustain-
able solutions are to be achieved. Drawing a distinction between short-term and
long-term conflict prevention, van der Stoel himself has indicated that in the
short-term the High Commissioner’s role is to prevent acute escalation of ten-
sions while seeking to set in motion a longer-term process of dialogue between
governments and minorities that will address their on-going relationship and
underlying causes of the tensions.111
Furthermore, the High Commissioner has pointed to the importance of the
human dimension in conflict prevention: ‘Human dimension concerns are often
a critical component of conflict prevention in the short term, although it is in
particular from the longer-term perspective that the intimate relationship be-
tween conflict prevention and the human dimension becomes apparent. Viol-
ations of human dimension commitments lead to tensions, social conflicts and
distrust. At times they may have cross-border consequences, such as involuntary

110) These categories are taken from John Packer, ‘The OSCE High Commissioner on National
Minorities’, a contribution to the Liber Amicorum for Jacob Moller, to be published by Kluwer
Law International, The Hague, 1999.
111) Intervention by Max van der Stoel at the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, Warsaw,
September 28-29, 1993. Cited by Chigas in A. Chayes and A. Handler Chayes eds., Preventing
Conflict in the Post-Communist World: Mobilizing International and Regional Organizations, 1996,
Washington, D.C. p. 52.

60
migration. Especially if large groups, such as minorities are affected, the stability
of States or even a region may be at risk.’112
In accordance with the mandate the majority of the High Commissioner’s
interventions have occurred when the High Commissioner has judged that action
is required and opportune. That is to say if combinations of the criteria indicated
above suggest that there is a potential threat to peace and stability and if the
High Commissioner feels that he is in a position to make a contribution to
addressing the challenges, then he will seek to become involved. This is often
intuitive rather than systematic. Additionally, the High Commissioner has
become involved in situations at the request of the Chairman-in-Office (his first
visit to Central Asia) and at the request of Heads of State (at the Lisbon summit
van der Stoel received an invitation from President Shevardnadze to visit Geor-
gia).

How Does the Intervention Occur?

The High Commissioner seeks to facilitate the conditions in which the parties
themselves can address the root causes and the real or perceived conflicting
values and interests that generate conflicts. To meet this objective the High
Commissioner needs to operate on the basis of clear and concise information.
The mandate indicates the sources of information about national minority issues
that the High Commissioner should utilise as well as indicating both govern-
mental and non-governmental interlocutors.
Fact finding in the High Commissioner’s context encompasses a number of
activities, not all outlined in the mandate. Field visits provide the High Commis-
sioner and advisers opportunities to meet with governmental and non-govern-
mental interlocutors as well as representatives of international organisations in
situ. During field visits the High Commissioner meets with a range of officials
from presidential apparatuses, governments and their bureaucracies, parlia-
ments, political parties and non-governmental organisations. Field schedules
often reflect the fact that there is a great heterogeneity both within the authorities
and minority communities and that it is important to be aware of the subtleties
of different positions within each so-called ‘party’. Not only do visits provide
first-hand information but they enable personal relations to develop with the
major interested parties, thereby providing the foundation for trust and confi-
dence. Even in those circumstances in which the High Commissioner’s repeated
visits or efforts to bring attention to specific issues, have led to some antagonism,

112) Max van der Stoel, ‘The Role of the CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities in CSCE
Preventive Diplomacy’, pp. 33-54 in The Challenge of Preventive Diplomacy. The experience of the
OSCE, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1994, Stockholm, p. 35.

61
parties are assured that the High Commissioner’s attention is constant and not
fleeting. This reflects the High Commissioner’s attempt to facilitate sustainable
solutions based on consent and that ‘cooperative implementation of commit-
ments and recommendations will in the end be more fruitful than enforce-
ment.’113
The mandate provides scope for experts to travel on behalf of the High
Commissioner. Expert teams have visited Ukraine, Slovakia and Hungary on
behalf of the High Commissioner, however the High Commissioner has not
made extensive use of this tool.114 Instead, the advisers of the High Commis-
sioner often travel to areas of interest, either to prepare visits by the High Com-
missioner or to continue dialogue with interlocutors in the absence of the High
Commissioner. This is a more informal means of continuing an on the ground
process of fact finding and while not provided for by the mandate such trips have
been on the increase.
An additional form of fact finding that the High Commissioner has utilised
has been to engage a local NGO in Kyrgyzstan to initiate an early warning
reporting network. Beginning operation in 1996 the Kyrgyz Peace Research
Centre provided regular reports on the situation in Southern Kyrgyzstan. In late
1997 it was decided to extend the report writing to include the conduct of a
sociological survey on inter-ethnic attitudes in Southern Kyrgyzstan. The objec-
tive of the reports and the survey has been to provide clearer information about
sensitive issues, initially for the High Commissioner but also to be shared with
the authorities in Kyrgyzstan as a means of highlighting that there is a common
perception of the issues to be addressed. In both cases the initiatives were dis-
cussed with representatives of the authorities in Kyrgyzstan in order that the
exercise could have a bearing on policy development. In the wake of these pro-
jects a similar process has been initiated in Kazakhstan in collaboration with the
Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan.115

113) Max van der Stoel, Keynote Speech to the OSCE Seminar on Early Warning and Preventive
Diplomacy, Warsaw, January 1994, p. 10.
114) A team of three minority rights experts made several visits to Hungary and Slovakia between
September 1993 and May 1996. The High Commissioner used their reports to make specific
recommendations. For more detail on the work of the team of experts see The Role of the High
Commissioner on National Minorities in OSCE Conflict Prevention, op.cit., pp. 59-61 and pp. 72-73.
The High Commissioner also advised the dispatch of a team of experts on constitutional and
economic matters to Ukraine in 1994, p. 75.
115) In Kyrgyzstan the work was managed by the Office of the High Commissioner. The initiative in
Kazakhstan, to get under way in 1998, will be conducted by the Foundation on Inter-Ethnic
Relations in liaison with the Office of the High Commissioner.

62
 Field work is complemented by extensive review of local and international
media conducted by the High Commissioner and advisers. Additionally the High
Commissioner has convened expert consultations, generally utilising the Foun-
dation on Inter-Ethnic Relations, an NGO established in 1993 to support the
activities of the High Commissioner. The consultations convene experts with the
High Commissioner and his staff to provide a forum in which to explore issues
he is addressing at any one time. Initially the consultations assumed a wide
ranging approach, exploring how the High Commissioner could most effectively
contain, deescalate, and resolve inter-ethnic tensions that might eventually
threaten peace and stability in the region.116 Subsequently, consultations focused
either on particular regions prior to the High Commissioner’s visits there (for
instance Central Asia and Ukraine in 1994), or more thematic issues such as
explorations of the roles of kin-states; bilateral treaties with minority-related
provisions for moderating ethnic tensions and improving bilateral relations; the
education and linguistic rights of persons belonging to minorities; and gover-
nance and participation in relation to minorities.
On the basis of analysis the High Commissioner utilises a range of tools to
act as an interlocutor between parties, promoting dialogue and confidence, as
well as contributing to the development of policies and practices which address
actual or potential tensions. These include issuing recommendations; the promo-
tion of mechanisms to advance government-minority dialogue on underlying
causes of tension; specific interventions as a mediator regarding issues of particu-
lar tensions, a kind of crisis prevention diplomacy; and attention to what have
been termed tension reducing projects of a more developmental kind.117
It should be noted that in carrying out the mandate the activities of the
High Commissioner touch on a number of aspects of the transition processes
current in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Engage-
ment has been designed to be most directly concerned with the political and
legislative processes of the states concerned. Martin Estebanez points out that in
order to facilitate their integration into ‘Western’ structures, OSCE participating
states have occasionally incorporated the texts of international standards directly
into national legislation but that this does not necessarily provide for an ade-
quate adaptation of policies and practices. As a result ‘the High Commissioner
has often been faced with the complex task of determining the scope and the
content

116) See Methods and Strategies in Conflict Prevention, Conflict Management Group, Boston, 1994.
117) The term tension reducing projects is taken from ongoing research conducted by Olivier
Brenninkmeijer, into the ‘Lessons Learned from the Activities of the OSCE High Commissioner
on National Minorities for the New Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for
the 21st Century’.

63
of international standards in practice, their applicability to minority tensions and
the possibilities they provide for adequate solutions.’118 Indeed, some states have
approached the High Commissioner for an opinion on legislation regarding
national minorities prior to its promulgation in order to ascertain whether or not
the legislation conforms to international standards.119

Recommendations as a Tool for Intervention

Although not provided for in the reporting procedures outlined in the mandate,
written recommendations have evolved into one of the main tools of the High
Commissioner. This evolution has occurred on the basis of positive experience,
not as the result of a specific strategy. Following his initial visits to states in
1993, the High Commissioner considered that it would be appropriate to convey
his considerations of the situation to the states concerned in the form of a letter
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.120 The practice has developed that following
receipt of a response the High Commissioner shares the correspondence with the
Permanent Council, and is available to discuss the recommendations at the
Permanent Council. When the High Commissioner verbally presents his recom-
mendations to the Permanent Council it has generally been the case that a repre-
sentative of the country concerned can provide comments.
Several months generally elapse between the communication of the corre-
spondence to the Chairman-in-Office and the Permanent Council and its publi-
cation. There is no formal period and this has been more a result of administra-
tive practice than policy. An adviser to the High Commissioner has commented
that this ‘now established practice affords the parties adequate time without
public scrutiny in which to act in good-faith ....The system of delayed publica-
tion thus maintains the space necessary to conduct quiet diplomacy, but ulti-
mately invites the public scrutiny which is some times necessary to keep parties
to their words.’121 That the correspondence between the High Commissioner and
states can and does become public has led to a criticism from some quarters that
the diplomacy is not in fact as silent as is purported.122
The recommendations have come to serve a variety of functions, with
regard to the political bodies of the OSCE, individual states and governments,
and minority actors. The circulation of the correspondence to the OSCE delega-
tions, at the initiative of the Chairman-in-Office, allows the OSCE community

118) Martin Estebanez, op.cit., p. 145.

119) This has been the case with Kyrgyzstan and Georgia.
120) Author’s interview with Max van der Stoel, The Hague 10 February 1998.
121) John Packer, 1996, op.cit., p. 288.
122) Author’s interview with delegations in Vienna, February 1998.

64
to become acquainted with the High Commissioner’s concerns regarding the
security situation in those countries in which the High Commissioner is active
and as such they can be regarded as an informal early warning mechanism. The
High Commissioner also uses the recommendations as a way to lobby partici-
pating states for support in specific cases.
The recommendations tend to be precise and detailed in substantive terms
rather than providing a general commentary. The High Commissioner uses
them to spell out his concerns with regard to issues that are either the matter of
existing tensions or could develop in that direction. Issues examined frequently
include domestic legislation, language usage, education and citizenship, as well as
policy approaches. In examining specific issues the High Commissioner generally
suggests options for governments to consider. In this way they are designed to
aid policy makers in developing feasible policy responses. They provide a frame-
work within which governments and minorities can address general and specific
legal, policy, institutional and process issues.
Recommendations also have a cautionary function. They can be used to
make states aware that the ratification of international instruments is itself not
an adequate means of ensuring compliance with the duties they establish.123
They can serve to counsel governments about the attendant risks of following a
particular path of action. For example, in Estonia and Latvia the High Commis-
sioner emphasised the risk of treating non-citizens, predominantly ethnic Rus-
sians in both cases, as less than full members of a society. The High Commis-
sioner emphasised that by excluding a large segment of society from access to
political rights could alienate and radicalise a marginalised community and have
negative repercussions for the security of the countries.124 The High Commis-
sioner also remarked that a reduction of tensions would require an equal ‘contri-
bution on the part of the non-Estonian population’.125 This indicates a frequent
tendency of the High Commissioner to impress upon minorities the responsibil-
ity they can have in exacerbating or deescalating tensions. In this light recom-
mendations serve to encourage reflection by the parties as to whether their

123) See ‘Letter from the OSCE High Commissioner to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak
Republic regarding the Law on State Language’, dated 13 November 1995 REF/HC/11/95.
124) ‘Recommendations by the CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities upon his visits to
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania’, CSCE Communication 124/93, April 23, 1993, and ‘Recommen-
dations by the CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities about the Latvian Draft
Citizenship Law’, dated 10 December 1993, CSCE Communication 8/94.
125) ‘Recommendations by the CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities upon his visits to
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania’, CSCE Communication 124, April 23, 1993, op.cit.

65
course of action is best served to meet their needs, but also those of the society in
which all parties are members. Recommendations aim to lubricate this process,
in themselves they might offer suggestions as to how to address specific bottle-
necks, but they do not pretend to provide all-encompassing answers.
The recommendations are diplomatically phrased, not seeking to apportion
blame but rather to make constructive contributions to and analyses of sensitive
issues. The recommendations are non-binding and there exists no enforcement
mechanism but they are accompanied by political pressure. The degree to which
they are implemented is entirely at the discretion of the recipient state. As a
result there has been no formal monitoring of their implementation, although
informally the High Commissioner, missions and the political bodies of the
OSCE do heed the extent to which recommendations influence policy. It could
be argued that the non-binding quality of the recommendations weakens them
because there is no obligation to act on them. However, were they to be binding
the likelihood is that states would be less receptive to the High Commissioner
and be less likely to engage in a process of dialogue, seeing them in a censorious
light. The recommendations have weight in that they provide an informal means
to convey insight and suggestions without committing the parties to detailed
legal negotiations nor threatening them with sanctions in the event of non-com-
pliance. Their perspicacity can be heeded by the governments and minorities
concerned and utilised if deemed pertinent.
The High Commissioner has generally focused on the dynamics of a par-
ticular situation rather than following a legalistic approach, employing OSCE
commitments and legal obligations in the field of human and minority rights as
the basis for recommendations. Reference to international commitments serves
to remind governments and minorities of the substance of international stan-
dards which pertain in regard to specific situations. Nevertheless, the recommen-
dations are not in themselves commitments, but an added means of facilitating
compliance and implementation. Extra credibility is provided by bedding the
recommendations in the framework of international law. This means that the
recommendations can not be dismissed as merely the whim of one observer. In
general there has been a trend for the recommendations to be based increasingly
on international legal norms and standards. The author’s discussions with a
number of delegates in Vienna indicate that this could be perceived as a result of
the reluctance of some states to accept the content of the recommendations.
The political reality is that the High Commissioner on occasions needs to
lobby in order to gain support for his recommendations. This is accomplished
through frequent visits to Vienna to present his recommendations to the Perma-
nent Council and to discuss matters with more influential delegations there. But
the High Commissioner has also deemed it necessary on occasion to visit major

66
capitals in order to discuss his recommendations (and general views) with For-
eign Ministries as a means to gain political backing for his actions.
The fact that the High Commissioner feels the need to gain support for his
recommendations indicates that although they are intended as a cooperative
instrument, they are not always perceived as such. The response of the Estonian
government to recommendations concerning Estonia has been instructive. In
March 1997 Foreign Minister Ilves sent a Ministry of Foreign Affairs analysis to
the High Commissioner in which he presented an overview of Estonia’s fulfill-
ment of the High Commissioner’s recommendations since 1993. The intention
was to assert the extent to which Estonian law and practice conforms with inter-
national commitments and possibly to try to undermine the vigour with which
the High Commissioner persistently addressed the issue of the citizenship of
stateless children. This stimulated the High Commissioner through his office to
undertake a review of his recommendations to Estonia. Further exchanges oc-
curred when a team of the High Commissioner’s advisers visited Tallinn in
August 1997 in order to discuss the issue of the citizenship of stateless children.
While it reflects the political sensitivities in the relationship between the High
Commissioner and the Estonian government, the detailed exchange it produced
was a means of ensuring a mutually comprehensive understanding of the issues
and according to an Estonian diplomat was a good means of developing confi-
dence.126
Monitoring the degree to which recommendations are implemented, or
whether they have an impact upon either government policy vis-a-vis minorities
or the way in which minorities seek to attain their goals, has been sensitive. For
the recommendations to be effective there needs to be follow up, but formal
monitoring of a non-binding third-party contribution could be seen as an at-
tempt to scrutinise or threaten states. The High Commissioner himself generally
follows up each set of recommendations with subsequent visits and or correspon-
dence if it is deemed politically appropriate. Added assistance is provided in
those countries where missions are located since the missions are able to track
the response of governments and in the cases that recommendations concern
specific legislation they can follow it through committee stages and parliament.
This enables them to inform the High Commissioner and the Permanent Coun-
cil of the extent to which questions at issue are being addressed. A number of
delegations in Vienna indicated in interviews with the author that they request
their embassies in certain countries to attend to the degree with which recom-
mendations are complied, thereby the recommendations can serve to stimulate a
broader, although generally informal, political pressure.

126) Author’s interview conducted in Vienna February 1998.

67
 The recommendations are the product of dialogue with the parties. Dia-
logue serves to sensitise interlocutors to the needs of the other parties and to
what support they might expect from the international community. Frequent
visits to a country, occasional recommendations and dialogue with the interlocu-
tors serve to have a cumulative impact. Since recommendations become a public
tool the High Commissioner needs to judge when it is most appropriate to wield
them. Not every visit results in the drafting of a recommendation, but in the
recommendations the High Commissioner is in a position to put difficult issues
on the table which one or other party might prefer to avoid, but which will have
to be addressed at some point. Thus parties are not pressured into hasty re-
sponses, but have less recourse to brush an issue under the carpet.
Recommendations have made specific contributions to revisions of national
legislation and the establishment of consultation mechanisms between minorities
and majorities. In Estonia, for example, expressions of concern and recommen-
dations contributed on three occasions to revisions of provocative laws which
had already been passed by parliament. On these occasions international assist-
ance was instrumental in refocusing debate in order to stave off potentially
antagonistic measures. Furthermore, the involvement of the High Commissioner
assisted in identifying appropriate face saving compromises as well as in an
informal way acting as a guarantor of the good will of the parties.127 The contri-
bution of the High Commissioner must be seen in conjunction with that of the
mission of long duration and other IGOs as well as an evolution in the behav-
iour of the parties – in part influenced by the activities of third parties, but also
by broader geo-political and economic circumstances. Paramount among these
being the issues of EU and NATO membership.
Recommendations have looked at the institutionalisation of dialogue
through the establishment of round tables, ombudsmen, minority rights offices
and at the way in which governments can furnish themselves and minorities with
a better understanding of inter-ethnic relations through more effective research
and analysis.
In addition to the body of recommendations, which have become a practi-
cal commentary on the way in which international commitments relate to the
implementation of policy, van der Stoel has commissioned recommendations to
provide practical guidelines on specific issues. From 1995 to 1997 he directed
the Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations to convene expert consultations exam-
ining first the education rights of national minorities and subsequently the lin-

127) Hanne-Margret Birkenbach, Preventive Diplomacy Through Fact-Finding: How international organisa-
tions review the conflict over citizenship in Estonia and Latvia, Lit Verlag, Hamburg, 1997, pp. 44-46.

68
guistic rights of national minorities. In both cases the objective was to develop
policy guidelines to which the High Commissioner could refer when addressing
these often sensitive issues. The guidelines were not intended to be new stan-
dards, rather they are expert interpretations of existing standards which the High
Commissioner can present to interlocutors (both governmental and the repre-
sentatives of minority organisations) in order to facilitate the development of
appropriate policies.128

The Promotion of Mechanisms to Advance Government-minority Dialogue

The mandate explicitly assigns the promotion of dialogue between parties to the
High Commissioner. This has taken different forms: the promotion of dialogue
as a process to enhance mutual understanding; the promotion of mechanisms
which advance dialogue in a more institutional way; and facilitating dialogue
with regard to specific contentious issues.
The High Commissioner’s frequent visits to a country establish an ongoing
dialogue with relevant interlocutors. These focus on dialogue and information
gathering ‘as a means of establishing a safe space to engage the parties in an
effort to deescalate tensions.’129 From this basis dialogue between the parties can
develop. The nature of the situations in which the High Commissioner is en-
gaged is such that there is rarely a complete absence of communication between
parties, but there is often an absence of constructive dialogue.
The lack of dialogue between governmental authorities and minority repre-
sentatives has been identified by the High Commissioner as a factor contributing
to potential conflict. Nascent democracies in central and eastern Europe have
been seen by many as the rule of the majority, implying the exclusion of minor-
ities. Dialogue mechanisms that attempt to build bridges and prevent prejudicial
and often inaccurate perceptions from dominating public and policy discourses
can be of great benefit in establishing democratic processes. As such the High
Commissioner has encouraged the establishment of round tables, ombudsmen
(in Lithuania) or minority rights offices to hear individual complaints (a Na-
tional Commissioner on Ethnic and Language Questions in Estonia and Latvia,

128) The Hague Recommendations Regarding the Education Rights of National Minorities and The Oslo
Recommendations Regarding the Linguistic Rights of National Minorities were published by the Founda-
tion on Inter-Ethnic Relations in October 1996 and February 1998 respectively. See International
Journal on Minority and Group Rights, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1996/97, for a Special Issue on the Education
Rights of National Minorities in which there are a number of papers concerning the origin,
development and substance of The Hague Recommendations.
129) Diane Chigas, ‘Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Practice: The CSCE High Commissioner
on National Minorities pp. 27-41, in Helsinki Monitor, Vol. 5, 1994, No. 3, p. 29.

69
and a Special Office for Minority Questions in Albania). Some processes have
assumed structured formats leading to the convening of councils or assemblies in
Estonia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia or Romanian. The High Commis-
sioner has provided support to existing or nascent institutional dialogue mecha-
nisms through the Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations. Seminars have been
organised to bring together governmental and non-governmental participants in
such dialogue processes to provide an environment in which experiences can be
exchanged, seeking to enhance the policy relevance of the processes and the skills
and resources available to participants. Some meetings have been for representa-
tives from several countries at once and others on a country specific basis.130
These mechanisms have stuttered on their way to providing a procedural
confidence and to date have not in themselves inspired a sense that the states are
promoting dialogue as a top priority. In some instances mechanisms have been
used as window dressing, providing a token excuse for not making other re-
sponses to minority-related problems. In other cases the root cause of the prob-
lems are more related to an absence of state-society dialogue and national mi-
norities find themselves as one set of communities among a series of excluded
communities. The High Commissioner has attempted to stimulate processes of
dialogue whilst recognising that success is conditional on the political will of the
government. The High Commissioner has commented that ‘dialogue itself must
not become a surrogate for action, indeed empty dialogue structures can become
a starting point for alienation on the part of groups that feel marginalised.
Therefore, dialogue as a component of conflict prevention should have real
content, and it can also function to identify problems and initiate means to solve
them.’131
More ad hoc dialogue processes have involved round tables addressing
specific issues. Such round tables have been akin to problem-solving workshops
structured to allow a free flowing dialogue around a series of pressing issues,
generally under the chairmanship of the High Commissioner. Round tables of
this sort have addressed situations in Croatia, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Macedonia,
Ukraine and with regard to the situation of Meskhetian Turks in Georgia and
the Russian Federation.132 Workshops have aimed at enhancing opportunities for

130) See the annual reports of the Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations for 1994 and 1995. Meetings
in Prague (1994) and Tallinn (1995) brought together participants from several countries.
131) Speech by the High Commissioner to the Tenth Annual Conference of the International Associ-
ation for Conflict Management, Gustave-Stresemann-Institut e.V., Bonn (Bad Godesberg), 16
June 1997.
132) For introductory comments on such meetings see the relevant country sections in The Role of the
High Commissioner on National Minorities in OSCE Conflict Prevention, op.cit.

70
communication between parties, removed from the glare of the media or their
constituencies at home. The workshops have sought to move from the basis of
mutual suspicion by overcoming reciprocal infringements to produce practical
proposals and recommendations that allow the parties to see ways of satisfying
their basic needs without infringing those of the other party/ies. This is very
much a process oriented approach and requires a preparedness to ‘keep going
back’ on the part of the third party, rather than expecting one-off solutions. The
High Commissioner’s workshops in this sense have been an innovative adapta-
tion of different types of second-track problem-solving approaches addressing
factors critical to identity, security and participation. Pioneered by academics
like Burton and Kelman133 the second-track approach has traditionally worked
with ‘influentials’, individuals close to but not directly engaged in decision-mak-
ing processes, with the objective of influencing first-track negotiation processes.
Van der Stoel has straddled the tracks by bringing together high level political
and governmental representatives, but maintaining an informal facilitative
approach. In this way van der Stoel has attempted to use his authority as a
leverage to bring government officials, parliamentarians and minority leaders
together in order to facilitate discussion. In addition the High Commissioner has
had the leverage of being a representative of a political community to which the
state parties are affiliated. This role brings a degree of authority to the proceed-
ings, but in itself it bestows no official status to any agreements that are reached.
The critical aspect of such workshops has been the High Commissioner’s ability
to instill confidence in the parties that they have something to gain by participat-
ing, even if for the state representatives this might be a sense that non-participa-
tion could lead the situation beyond the ‘soft’ leverage of the High Commis-
sioner and towards the more political leverage of other bodies within the OSCE.
On the part of the minorities, participation in such processes has offered an
opportunity to voice positions and interests in anticipation that the participation
of the High Commissioner will give more weight to the proceedings, which will
thereby influence government responses more directly.

Crisis Prevention Diplomacy

The High Commissioner has noted that there is a need ‘to enable societies to
develop the means to address conflicts in a timely fashion before they escalate
into violence. This requires a long-term perspective that includes notions of

133) Norbert Ropers and Peter Schlotter, ‘The CSCE: Multilateral Conflict Management in a Trans-
forming World Order: Future Perspectives and New Impulses for Regional Peace Strategies’,
Interdependence, 1993, No. 14, Foundation Development and Peace, Bonn, and the Institute for
Development and Peace, Duisburg, p. 31.

71
social justice. Nevertheless, while the long-term perspective governs the broader
strategy of my engagement, there are frequently immediate needs that have to be
addressed.’134 As part of this short-term approach to conflict prevention the High
Commissioner has engaged in crisis prevention diplomacy. This can be termed
an intervention at a point at which tensions are escalating and the High Com-
missioner is able to engage with the parties to address a specific cause of conten-
tion and thereby have a calming affect. It is generally a very short-term measure,
and if not accompanied by other steps, both by the High Commissioner but also
by other actors engaged in conflict prevention and conflict resolution initiatives,
it is akin to using a band aid to stem the flow of blood after major surgery. The
High Commissioner’s intervention at such times is, as with his other engage-
ments, a matter of his personal judgement.
For such interventions to occur the High Commissioner has to be able to
travel to a region at short notice. Effective intervention is predicated on being
familiar with the issues and already having access to the parties and a degree of
trust. One such intervention that has been documented is with regard to Estonia
in July 1993 when the High Commissioner intervened to facilitate the resolution
of an impending crisis sparked by the call for a referenda on ‘national-territorial
autonomy’ by the Russophone-dominated city councils in Narva and
Sillamae.135 The High Commissioner has also intervened in Albania, Macedonia
and Ukraine in similar fashions – addressing very specific points of tension
between governments and minorities that have produced a stand-off. Crisis
prevention diplomacy of this kind is based upon the prior establishment of
credibility by the High Commissioner with the appropriate interlocutors.
It is difficult to evaluate the specific contribution of such quiet diplomacy.
The High Commissioner’s visit to Gostivar in Macedonia in July 1997 presents
a good example. The Albanian community hoisted an Albanian flag on the town
hall despite the fact that such an act was prohibited by law. A ruling by the
constitutional court decided that the law had to be upheld and the police re-
moved the flag. This sparked violent clashes during the course of which two
people died. In an attempt to halt the cycle of escalation van der Stoel travelled
to Gostivar and following discussions with the government authorities and the
Albanian community he issued a statement in which he observed that the law
under which the flag was removed conformed with international standards

134) Speech by the High Commissioner to the Tenth Annual Conference of the International Associ-
ation for Conflict Management, op.cit.
135) See Konrad Huber, ‘Averting Inter-Ethnic Conflict: an Analysis of the CSCE High Commis-
sioner on National Minorities in Estonia, January-July 1993’, Working Paper Series, 1994, Vol.
1, No. 2, The Carter Center of Emory University, Atlanta 1994.

72
(thereby backing the government) but that the issue warranted an independent
investigation to identify those responsible for the violence (thereby seeking to
assuage the concerns of the Albanian community that the perpetrators of viol-
ence should be held to account). The High Commissioner effectively backed the
government but also criticised the government in an attempt to calm the situ-
ation. By visiting the region, and in particular visiting the local Mayor in prison,
the High Commissioner was able to disclaim rumours that the Mayor had been
subject to physical abuse.136
Although the root causes of the escalation were not addressed by this par-
ticular intervention, the High Commissioner was able to contribute (along with
others) to a de-escalation of the immediate crisis, enabling the search for more
sustainable options to continue via other initiatives.

Tension Reducing Projects

These projects can be classed as small scale projects that seek to target aid to
address specific issues that seem to be the causes of friction. The High Commis-
sioner tends to approach issues from a very pragmatic perspective and therefore
if he identifies specific measures that could contribute to the resolution of par-
ticular problems he will seek to identify some assistance.137 The High Commis-
sioner has utilised the Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations to perform tasks in
this area at his behest. The Foundation has implemented initiatives to address
concerns identified by the High Commissioner in a range of countries and fields.
Facilitating improved opportunities in the field of minority education has been
an ongoing area of work, with initiatives at a policy level as well as programmes
addressing curriculum development (Albania), the access of students from
minorities to higher education (Macedonia), text-book production and design
(Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine), and the provision of ‘home school’ education (Cri-
mea).138 Projects have been designed in collaboration with local interlocutors

136) Information provided in private communication to the author. A report by Human Rights Watch,
Macedonia: Police Violence in Macedonia, Vol. 10, No. 1, April 1998, is critical of van der Stoel’s
role, commenting that he did not question the behavior of the police in the violence. p. 37.
137) This is a point made by an adviser to the High Commissioner in private discussion, but can also
be inferred from the High Commissioner’s speech to the conference on ‘Governance and Euro-
pean Integration’, Rotterdam, May 1997.
138) Reference to these projects can be found in the annual reports of the Foundation on Inter-Ethnic
Relations for the years 1993-1996.

73
from the appropriate government departments and NGOs, including those
representing minorities and in liaison with the High Commissioner and his
advisers.
In addition to educational projects others have addressed issues such as
public administration skills (Macedonia), legal aid (Croatia), the production of
materials concerning citizenship exams (Estonia and Latvia) and the training of
government officials dealing with inter-ethnic relations (Romanian and Kazakh-
stan). The development of these have been statements of concern by an NGO
linked to, and seen by local interlocutors as being closely associated with, the
High Commissioner. The Foundation’s engagement in project development of
this kind allows the High Commissioner to maintain an involvement and to
enhance relations with interlocutors and key communities but at one remove.139
In this sense it has been part of a confidence building process, enabling the High
Commissioner to show his ongoing concern for matters arousing tension, often
at a community or societal level, whilst his main focus has been on the political
process.
There is a delicacy in the High Commissioner becoming perceived as a
humanitarian donor since this could alter the perception of his role as an impar-
tial mediator. Such assistance is not excluded from this role, but rather it is
imperative that the parties to the project are aware of the engagement in this
form so that at a later date it is not possible to use the action as an example of
partiality. Given the limited resources that the Foundation channels into such
projects it is more appropriate and strategic for the High Commissioner to liaise
with humanitarian assistance organisations (UNHCR, aid agencies) or develop-
ment institutions (World Bank, EBRD, UNDP, the Asian Bank for Develop-
ment) in order to influence their approach and mode of operation. The High
Commissioner has been active in developing relations with some of these bodies,
particularly UNHCR and UNDP, and has chaired UNHCR meetings seeking to
influence donor agendas in Crimea. Nevertheless, there is scope for further

139) It should be noted that the Foundation pursues projects specifically designed to aid the work of
the High Commissioner, with a budget of approaching $1million a year. Some funds are re-
stricted to specific projects but there are also unrestricted funds from some donors, providing
considerable leeway. In practice the use of these funds has been almost entorely influenced by
the priorities of the High Commissioner. This is a substantial addition to the funds at the High
Commissioner’s disposal. For more information on the relationship between the Foundation and
the High Commissioner see Jonathan Cohen, ‘A Case Study of NGO-IGO Collaboration in the
field of conflict prevention: the Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations and the High Commis-
sioner on National Minorities of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’,
forthcoming chapter in a compilation on the civilian role in peacemaking edited by the Austrian
Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution.

74
developing relations with development and financial institutions in order to assist
in the instrumentalisation of conflict prevention in the strategies of institutions
wielding significant resources and engaged in broader socio-economic develop-
ment.
Engagement in the developmental sphere raises the question of the feasibil-
ity of isolating such issues from broader development or assistance agendas. Do
such projects merely become symbolic carrots that a community will accept out
of need but nevertheless recognise as a palliative rather than a strategic attempt
to address the underlying causes of a conflict? Discussion of the carrots and
sticks available to the OSCE is addressed below, but is should be pointed out
that the High Commissioner and the OSCE in general are not disposed to use
conventional sticks. On the part of the High Commissioner there are no sticks
that can be wielded other than the concern a state might feel with regard to a
negative recommendation or an early warning – although it would be wrong to
construe an early warning as being ‘against’ a state, rather if issued it would
indicate the measure of gravity a state is confronting. With regard to wider
OSCE practice the only substantive sticks are the implementation of sanctions
imposed by other bodies or suspension as in the case of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. Such a step is far from ideal since it removes the opportunity for the
OSCE’s brand of inclusiveness and cooperative adherence to commitments
being met. Compliance is therefore not compelled, but encouraged.

Conditions for Success or Failure and the Characteristics of Effective Intervention

Success in conflict prevention in always difficult to attribute since it is generally

the result of multiple interventions as well as internal changes which are influ-
enced by a whole gamut of social, economic and political processes. Further-
more, successes are not always visible since the absence of conflict is not suffi-
cient to conclude that a conflict has been prevented. Failure, on the other hand,
tends to be more visible and intervenors scurry to avoid the limelight of associ-
ation.
The High Commissioner on National Minorities presents an instrument of
intervention which is deployed in a ‘quiet’ manner, potentially obscuring any
contribution to ‘success’. In addition failure, as perceived by the High Commis-
sioner, that is the issuing of an early warning, could be interpreted as a successful
utilisation of the instrument within the terms of reference of the mandate. In the
conclusion to this section on the High Commissioner I will briefly examine what
can be termed successes and, if not failures, then problems, in the operation of
the instrument. I will then comment on the characteristics of the instrument
which pave the way for its potential effectiveness.

75
 As indicated in the text above the High Commissioner has served to facili-
tate precise changes in legislation and at times political relations by offering
options for the consideration of disputing parties. Recommendations have been
the means to deliver these suggestions and facilitate changes as in the case of
legislation on citizenship and stateless children in Estonia and Latvia. Contribu-
tions have also been made through timely interventions in negotiations between
states. For instance a couple of visits to both Hungary and Romania in summer
1996 gave the opportunity to the High Commissioner to influence the bilateral
Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation between the two countries, in particular
in regard to article 12, emphasising how critical the issue of minorities is to
broader reconciliation. The drafting of such a good neighbour treaty involved a
variety of governmental and non-governmental actors, both internal and exter-
nal. This makes it very difficult to qualify the precise input of the High Commis-
sioner, however, he was thanked for his intervention by the Romanian Foreign
Minister, who described his activities as a ‘catalyst’ in the negotiating process.140
The very fact of an international engagement itself widened the perspective of
the discussions.
Diplomatic observers in Vienna comment that it is often such behind the
scenes interventions that are the most influential aspects of the High Commis-
sioner’s functioning. In this sense the High Commissioner is able to prompt
parties through informal discussions that are not necessarily part of a public
discourse on a sensitive issue. Such interventions are difficult to demonstrate
since their very nature is part of an off the record process, either in frequent
meetings during High Commissioner visits to a country, through phone conver-
sations with key interlocutors or during discussions during or at the margins of
round table meetings organised by or for the High Commissioner.
The operation of the High Commissioner has also provided scope for an
educative role. Reflection on broad ranges of options have been provided by
round tables, seminars and publications. The most visible example has been the
aforementioned Hague Recommendations, which has initiated much discussion
within countries, both as a result of seminars organised by the Foundation on
Inter-Ethnic Relations, but also through discussions at the United Nations
Working Group on Minorities in 1997, and the publication of the recommenda-
tions in the press at the instigation of representatives of minorities, for instance
in Latvia. The Hague Recommendations together with the Oslo Recommendations,
have been translated into several languages, and can be seen as attempts to

140) The Role of the High Commissioner on National Minorities in OSCE Conflict Prevention, op.cit., p. 71.

76
address some of the more enduring issues that provoke tensions in Europe, going
beyond a focus on short-term escalatory factors.
One of the achievements of the OSCE in creating the instrument of High
Commissioner has been that it emphasises the point that sovereignty and exclus-
ive rights in internal affairs are more malleable in political terms than previously
was the case. This represents an achievement of the early 1990s, that interven-
tion in internal affairs is permissable. Whether or not the High Commissioner
produces tangible results, that he is accepted as an interlocutor, as an impartial
outsider, is a major first step. The need to establish this first step conditions the
High Commissioner’s approach. Criticism has been levelled at the High Com-
missioner for not criticising states with records that leave much to be desired in
terms of human rights or minority rights observance. However the task of the
High Commissioner is not an advocacy one, rather it is to act as an interlocutor,
a mediator, with all relevant parties. The task is to keep the parties on board in a
process of dialogue, and only in the event of a manifest security threat would a
formal early warning be activated, thereby altering the role of a mediator. It is a
task for other instruments or bodies of the OSCE to condemn publicly or repri-
mand states for non-compliance or violations. That this does not always happen
when there are good grounds for it to do so is a comment on the OSCE in
general, not the High Commissioner in particular.
As an often cited success story for the OSCE during a period when many
were questioning the ability of the organisation to be an effective proponent of
conflict prevention as a result of the debacle in former Yugoslavia, states have
been reluctant to voice criticisms in public. Those criticisms that have been
levelled often relate to the instrument rather than the way in which it has been
operated. One relates to a perception on the part of states from eastern Europe
that a double standard operates. Despite the fact that the High Commissioner is
competent to act throughout the OSCE region, the exclusive focus of activities
has been on central and eastern Europe and not western Europe and states feel
that this is politically motivated.141 OSCE officials argue that, firstly, the High
Commissioner is an instrument of conflict prevention and violent conflicts
arising out of inter-ethnic tensions are less a feature in western European states.
Secondly, those situations in western Europe where there are tensions around
minority issues have already experienced violence in a manner that precludes the
High Commissioner’s involvement or there is the engagement of terrorist organ-
isations (PKK in Turkey, ETA in Spain, various para-militaries in the UK).
Certain states clearly wielded their influence in pursuit of their national interests
in the construction of the mandate.

141) Author’s interviews with diplomats in Vienna, February 1998.

77
 The High Commissioner is himself sensitive to concerns that his focus is a
politically expedient one. In one initiative to address a significant root cause of
tensions, a questionnaire on the use of minority languages was sent to all OSCE
participating states. This corresponds with the wish expressed by a number of
countries that comparative studies would be made on the situation of minorities
in all OSCE states. The replies to this questionnaire will be used to draw con-
clusions with a view to determining common practices and to revealing the
variety of existing approaches from which each state may wish to draw in rela-
tion to particular situations.142
To date the High Commissioner has been involved in situations in fifteen
countries, but no longitudinal surveys have been done to assess the precise im-
pact of his involvement in each state. Despite frequent interventions the root
causes of many conflict situations persist, but these root causes are often of a
broader dimension than the position of national minorities in the societies. In
terms of the specific issues that the High Commissioner has addressed, fre-
quently there has been movement that could presage a positive contribution in
both the short and long-term. As is discussed elsewhere in regard to Estonia and
Latvia it is difficult to dissect the multiple interventions and ascribe which has
been of greatest influence. Therefore, it is easier to pinpoint those situations that
have not improved as a result of the High Commissioner’s involvement – al-
though the involvement still has to be seen in the context of multiple actors. In
Macedonia, for example, according to an NGO representative,143 despite many
constructive suggestions by the High Commissioner with regard to the volatile
issue of education entitlements, none of the High Commissioner’s proposals
have been adopted. Nevertheless, it would be premature to label this as failure
since these interventions could be a contributory factor in the climate of negoti-
ations around other issues.
The greatest concern regarding the operation of the High Commissioner is
that some conflicts have slipped through the net of OSCE conflict prevention.
There is room to question to what extent the High Commissioner could or
should have played a role in these situations. This will be addressed in the con-
clusion.
There are certain features of the High Commissioner’s practice that have
been essential to the operation of the office as an instrument of conflict preven-
tion. Firstly, independence with accountability has been central. Despite having
discretion over which situations to address the High Commissioner remains

142) See speech by Max van der Stoel to the conference on ‘Governance and European Integration’,
Rotterdam, May 1997.
143) Communication with the author, March 1998.

78
accountable to the political organs of the OSCE. The High Commissioner has
kept this in mind and utilised opportunities for consultation and cooperation
with the political bodies and individual states to his advantage.
Secondly, being a cooperative instrument and not a coercive one has given
scope to provide access to durable options or solutions based upon the consent
of all parties. The mandate gives the High Commissioner no power to bind the
parties to any process or recommendation or to impose any solutions. This has
required van der Stoel to develop constructive relations through which advice
can be offered. It would be wrong to idealise the situation: the High Commis-
sioner does have a role in advising the political organs of the OSCE which might
choose to censure a state as a result of information or advice received, and states
are aware of the role of such advice. On occasion the High Commissioner has
sought support from the political organs of the OSCE and individual states or
other international bodies, such as the European Union, to undertake parallel
contacts with the state(s) concerned in order to achieve particular objectives.
Confidentiality and discretion can facilitate the establishment of trust and
openness with the parties, providing the opportunity for dialogue on difficult
issues without the participants having to be concerned about the immediate
reaction of the media or more radical constituencies. It would be mistaken to
assert that such relations have always been the case in the operation of the High
Commissioner. On occasions relations with representatives of certain states or
minority organisations have been frosty. In such cases the High Commissioner
has used other channels to exert pressure, bearing in mind that the task of the
High Commissioner is not to shame parties and hence make it more difficult to
interact with them, but to prevent tensions becoming security risks. Conversely,
the High Commissioner has stepped outside the realms of confidentiality to
publicise some positive informal commitments and assurances that he consid-
ered would enhance reconciliation and prevent escalation. Occasional use has
been made of the media to publicise the assurances given by the parties, as a
confidence building measure or as a means to encourage the parties to adhere to
agreements that have been reached. For example in Estonia, statements have
been issued to clarify public misconceptions about the government’s or minor-
ity’s intentions and to create public pressure for the parties to maintain their
engagement in a process of dialogue.144 In some instances the parties themselves
have publicised the visits of the High Commissioner. This has particularly been
the case in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan where the authorities have used the visits
as a means of impressing upon the general public that the governments are
engaging actively with the international community.

144) Chigas 1996, op.cit., see note 23, p. 35.

79
 This leads to the conclusion that the High Commissioner’s work is about
process and keeping issues on the agenda, or putting them there, but not in itself
producing concrete outcomes. Hence frequent assertions that dialogue is the best
means to address tensions. This presupposes a continuing involvement. Multiple
visits allow the High Commissioner to be an interlocutor able to act on the basis
of detailed insight, reinforcing his capacity by facilitating more intimate and
insightful relationships.
Van der Stoel has, to an extent, operated with a flexibility that the mandate
does not specifically grant. A couple of examples indicate this. The mandate
requires that experts will only visit a participating state at the same time as the
High Commissioner. This has not always been the case, for instance the expert
team to Slovakia and Hungary was on occasion accompanied by an adviser and
not the High Commissioner. Furthermore, the High Commissioner has used
experts not on the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights’ list by
directing initiative through the operation of the Foundation on Inter-Ethnic
Relations. Frequent trips have been made by advisers without the High Com-
missioner, which is neither sanctioned nor precluded by the mandate. With
regard to liaison with the Chairman-in-Office, theoretically the High Commis-
sioner is supposed to inform the Chairman-in-Office prior to all visits. This has
not been the case – the frequency of High Commissioner visits and the tendency
for plans to change depending upon new priorities arising, could be impeded by
the practice of seeking clearance prior to all visits.
An ambassador in Vienna commented that states are inclined not to be
disturbed that the High Commissioner follows the spirit rather then the word of
the mandate, as long as he consults widely and acts quietly. The High Commis-
sioner therefore needs to be aware of building confidence with the states through
adequate consultation. For this to be successful much is personality dependent –
an individual with extensive political experience, knowing how to forge and
maintain relations is required. This means that the ongoing effectiveness of such
an instrument is based on the credibility of operation to an even greater extent
than other instruments, since it is so dependent upon one individual. In this light
it is difficult to institutionalise such an instrument. Nevertheless, this is an issue
which has to be addressed, especially since van der Stoel is approaching the end
of his second term in office, and although a further one year extension of his
mandate has been given, in itself this will not address the long-term needs of the
instrument.
Flexibility is reflected in another important area. By definition the High
Commissioner is concerned with conflicts dealing with national minorities.

80
However, no OSCE document attempts to define what a national minority is.145
In constructing the mandate the position was taken that ‘the majority of poten-
tial conflicts that can be identified at present appear to be rooted mainly in
questions concerning national minorities.’146 But the OSCE used the term ‘na-
tional minority’ quite loosely, providing a framework for discussing a broad
range of inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations between minorities and major-
ities.
The High Commissioner’s first mission was to the Baltic states to investi-
gate the security implications of a situation in which members of the minorities
were not normally citizens of the respective states. The High Commissioner has
employed a flexible understanding of the concept of minority, addressing the
issue from the perspective of politics and the implications of the situations of
minorities for security, rather than being hidebound by conceptual delimitations.
In this way he has bypassed some of the discussions regarding the meaning of the
term ‘national minority’ and whether or not it comprises only persons of a
minority having the citizenship of the state where they live. This has been rel-
evant for interventions in Estonia, Latvia and Kazakhstan with regard ethnic
Russians, and in Ukraine with regard to Crimean Tatars.
Having said this, the designation of the object of attention as ‘persons
belonging to a national minority’ implies that the OSCE treats national minor-
ities in the context of human rights for individuals within the collectivity rather
than rights for the collective, and this is a stance which is not appreciated by
representatives of many minority communities.
The mandate of the High Commissioner not only has a high degree of
flexibility, but it encourages a breadth of engagement in terms of the contacts the
High Commissioner should pursue in the fulfillment of the mandate. In particu-
lar the mandate not only encourages but sanctions contact with ‘representatives
of associations, non-governmental organization, religious and other groups of
national minorities directly concerned in the area of tension.’ This recognises
that the types of conflict which have arisen and are likely to do so are influenced
in their escalation and in their resolution, as much by non-state actors as by state
parties.
While issues such as independence, process orientation, personality, conti-
nuity, confidence-building, impartiality and flexibility, are necessary they are not

145) For a discussion of the lack of a general agreement on the definition of what constitutes a
minority see John Packer and Kristian Myntti eds., The Protection of Ethnic and Linguistic Minorities
in Europe, Institute of Human Rights, Abo Akademi University, 1993.
146) Hannie Zaal, ‘The CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities’, pp. 33-37 in Helsinki
Monitor, Vol. 3, 1992, No. 4, pp. 33-34.

81
 sufficient. As Ropers and Schlotter have commented, ‘the mediator should have
resources at his disposal with which he can change the framework of the conflict
in so far as the conflicting parties recognize that a violent enforcement of their
interests would be to their own disadvantage.’147 Such an approach on the part of
an intermediary such as the High Commissioner requires action in concert,
backed by a preparedness to invest financially to support political capital.
The political backing the High Commissioner receives from the OSCE
political bodies and individual states provides critical leverage. Both states and
minorities recognise the High Commissioner as a channel to other structures
which have both political power and access to resources. As the High Commis-
sioner has stated this requires the maintenance of good relations with the politi-
cal bodies and individual states through effective reporting and consultation in
order that issues which could generate conflict receive the requisite attention, and
those recommendations that require political backing receive this, both within
the OSCE but also from other relevant international bodies or individual
states.148 To garner such support requires an effective political operator, able to
lobby effectively as well as prioritise issues to attract the attention and action of
powerbrokers who are invariably confronted by a mass of high-priority issues.
The High Commissioner has to recognise that it is necessary to be strategic in
seeking the political backing of states for particular causes. Short of issuing an
early warning the High Commissioner has to utilise the influence of strategically
placed states. For example, in regard to citizenship issues in Estonia the High
Commissioner has actively lobbied the Nordic states and the EU for support of
his position. In this context, individual states are in a position to provide political
influence to encourage states to address minority questions as well as specific
financial support for the implementation of the High Commissioner’s initiatives.
In as much as the High Commissioner has to refer back to the political
bodies of the OSCE for support if action is to be taken, he is obliged to weigh
the likely support that will be received for involvement in each situation. While it
is the responsibility of the High Commissioner to ensure that sensitive issues that
might not attract much attention are not brushed under the carpet, by the same
token, those issues for which the High Commissioner will not receive political
backing might be left unattended. One could speculate that this was one factor in
the non-involvement of the High Commissioner in Chechnya in the period prior
to the outbreak of the conflict there in December 1994.

147) Norbert Ropers and Peter Schlotter, op.cit., p. 21.

148) See the Speech by Max van der Stoel to the conference on ‘Governance and European Integra-
tion’ in Rotterdam, May 1997.

82
 The need for political backing has gained a new impetus as the situations
which the High Commissioner is addressing themselves evolve. It has been
apparent that throughout much of van der Stoel’s second three year mandate the
honeymoon period has been over. Initially, states in the region were more recep-
tive to the engagement of an international mediator in assisting in the develop-
ment of policy and practice in relation to minorities and conflict prevention.
This was part of an open door policy to aid integration into a variety of Euro-
pean institutions. Many of these states have grown in confidence and sophistica-
tion and become more bullish, both in terms of their relations to the outside
world and in terms of dealing with minority situations internally. Some states in
which the High Commissioner has been active are now preparing for European
Union membership. This aspiration provides considerable leverage over their
policies and practices in a number of areas, including the handling of diversity
and minority rights. To an extent the prospect of EU membership has made
states more receptive to the recommendations of the High Commissioner, recog-
nising that the High Commissioner’s input was requested by EU officials in
evaluating certain of the criteria for membership, especially the Copenhagen
criteria of 1993. Leverage of this sort serves to focus the attention of the state
concerned and other EU member states. Once it is clearer which states will be in
the first round for accession and what the timetable will be it will be all the more
important for the collaboration between the High Commissioner and the EU to
continue. This will help prevent lapses in adherence to commitments, and to
encourage those countries that are not in line for the first round of membership
to continue in their efforts to enhance policy and practice in this area and not
drift towards more intolerant regimes.

83
 5 Missions

The Institutional Relevance and Role of Missions

This section will focus on long-term missions, but it should be noted that mis-
sions have taken different forms in the practice of the OSCE. Fact-finding,
rapporteur or expert missions have been dispatched on a short-term basis to
investigate specific situations of a human dimension or military nature. In addi-
tion the Chairman-in-Office can dispatch a personal representative with investi-
gative tasks, or missions of the Chairman-in-Office and his representatives,
including the Secretary General or the Troika, can be utilised, and Sanctions
Assistance Missions have also be deployed in the field.
According to former Secretary General Wilhelm Hoynck missions of long
duration were ‘strictly speaking, not provided for by the inventory codified at the
Helsinki Summit Meeting of July 1992. But there was a growing need for an
international presence in areas of potential or actual conflict.’149 A series of long-
term missions filled the gap between the short-term missions and traditional

149) Wilhelm Hoynck, ‘CSCE Missions in the Field as an Instrument of Preventive Diplomacy –
Their Origin’, paper distributed by the Centre for Conflict Prevention, p. 4.

85
peacekeeping and as such carved out a new preventive mode of operation. Be-
tween 1992 and 1996 eleven long-term missions were established. Each of these
is still operational except the first one which was established in Kosovo, Sanjak
and Vojvodina150 and the Mission to Sarajevo which was reorganised as a dis-
tinct section of the new Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995.151
Until the establishment of the Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina the size
of missions had been relatively small, no mission exceeding 20 members and
generally being composed of fewer than ten. The Missions to Bosnia and Herze-
govina and Croatia dramatically changed this. The former was created with 246
international staff and the latter was given a ceiling of 250 expatriates.152 This
has had a tremendous impact on the financing of the missions, and the OSCE in
general. In 1997 OSCE tasks in Bosnia and Herzegovina accounted for 37% of
the OSCE’s budget, the Mission in Croatia accounted for 12% and the other
missions accounted for only 16%. The Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina is
clearly exceptional in its nature. Nevertheless, missions accounted for over 65%
of the OSCE’s budget for 1997 (to November), and a planned expansion in the
budget for Croatia means this figure will increase to almost 75% of the OSCE’s
budget in 1998. This is an indication of the importance of the OSCE field activ-
ities.153
Missions are subject to a chain of command that leads back to the Perma-
nent Council through the Chairman-in-Office. The fact that mandates are
provided or extended by the Permanent Council means that they are subject to
the consensus procedure. As a result terms of reference are adopted by consensus
and all OSCE states can be regarded as politically committed to support the

150) This mission was withdrawn in June 1993 owing to the fact that the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia made the renewal of its mandate conditional on the restoration of its status in the OSCE.
151) The other OSCE missions are (in order of establishment) the Spillover Monitor Mission to
Skopje (1992), and missions to Georgia (1992), Estonia (1993), Moldova (1993), Latvia (1993),
Tajikistan (1994), Sarajevo (1994), Ukraine (1994), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995), and Croatia
(1996). For details of the mandates and technical data relating to missions see ‘Survey of OSCE
Long-Term Missions and other OSCE Field Activities’, The OSCE Secretariat, 7 October 1997,
Vienna. In addition there are a number of OSCE field presences that are not classified as mis-
sions: the OSCE Liaison Office in central Asia (1995), the OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya
(1995) and the OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group in Belarus (1997).
152) Details of the composition of all missions is available in ‘Survey of OSCE Long-Term Missions
and other OSCE Field Activities’, The OSCE Secretariat, 7 October 1997, Vienna.
153) Annual Report 1997 on OSCE Activities (1 November 1996 – 30 November 1997), OSCE, The Secre-
tary General, 18 December 1997, Vienna, pp. 49-51.

86
work of the mission, including the host country. This has been particularly
important in relation to the Russian Federation, given the number of missions
located in the former Soviet Union. In practice mandates are generally reviewed
by the Permanent Council on a six-monthly basis.
As the missions have developed from ad hoc arrangements into a regular
OSCE instrument the nature of the support they receive has evolved. The first
missions drew on the resources and organisational capabilities of individual
participating states. The Stockholm Council Meeting in December 1992 estab-
lished a special mission support unit within the Conflict Prevention Centre to
provide technical preparation and logistical support. It is increasingly well re-
sourced and more professional, currently having a staff of about 30.154 The
support section deals with personnel, procurement, and logistics for missions. In
addition to the administrative tasks the section has assumed a role in briefing
prospective mission members and providing relevant information about in-
country situations. Diplomatic advisers provide the political background. Politi-
cal guidance comes from the Chairman-in-Office who is also responsible for
facilitating a common approach, in as much as this is possible across such a
variety of regions and situations. At present there are twice yearly meetings of all
Heads of Mission to share information, discuss problems and refine approaches.
A handicap is that there is limited institutional memory. This is influenced
by the fact that the OSCE has maintained a policy of staffing all field positions
via official secondment from participating states (seconded personnel have not
always been diplomats). The deployment of appropriate mission members has
proven a problem at times, not only because of the absence of language or
technical skills or relevant experience, but also because it touches upon the
delicate issue of patronage or quota politics that international institutions have
to face. Finding a balance between diplomats from ‘East’ and ‘West’ has also
been an issue, as has the fact that some states have used missions as a way to
‘farm out’ difficult diplomats from their own service.155 Furthermore, there are
allegations that some mission members simply receive their relatively large daily
standard allowance but do little to justify this. These problems can alienate both
the public and officials in host countries.
Better training is regarded as a means to address this problem, especially in
light of the increased numbers deployed in the field. There is currently discussion
about developing a more general approach for field operations. A proposal
submitted to the Secretary General in February 1998 advocates a more system-
atic preparation prior to deployment in the field. The objective is to increase

154) Interview with a member of the OSCE Secretariat, February 1998, Vienna.
155) Interview with a diplomat in Brussels, September 1997.

87
 professionalism and ‘to secure the sustainability of the impact of OSCE involve-
ment in local situations.’156 A training regime could help to weed out bad cases
and therefore training should not only be national but also on an OSCE wide
level. States themselves have to exercise greater responsibility in deploying per-
sonnel to missions, but direct responsibility lies with the Heads of Mission in
that they are able to remove bad mission members, although this can be a highly
political measure depending upon which country the mission member is from.
Much of the success of missions depends upon the background and qualifi-
cations of the Head of Mission. There is no formal procedure for recruitment or
selection, Heads of Missions are essentially political appointees, selected by the
Chairman-in-Office in consultation with delegations in Vienna and confirmed by
the Permanent Council. States do exercise the power of suggestion by putting
forward candidates. Inevitably those delegations with a greater interest in the
operation of a particular mission will have more of a say. A host government
could reject a nomination, and although there have been occasions when states
have been unhappy with the Head of a Mission (there have been rumours of
highly inappropriate activities in some instances), no Heads of Mission have
been officially opposed or removed as a result of a protest. To date mission
heads have nearly always been serving diplomats. According to the Ambassador
heading one major delegation in Vienna, ‘the more seriously the host country
takes a mission the more likely it is to get a good Head of Mission.’157
Missions are a good example of how the OSCE delegates the implementa-
tion of conflict prevention strategies. While the larger political questions and
guiding frameworks are decided in the Permanent Council or Senior Council,
day-to-day implementation is left to the Head of Mission who has to refine the
mandate on the ground. In operational terms the Head of Mission is accountable
on a day-to-day basis to the Chairman-in-Office. A mission’s relationship with
the Chairman-in-Office provides a channel for maintaining constant dialogue
between the missions and the participating states. Heads of Mission confer with
the Chairman-in-Office on a frequent basis but the core of their accountability is
provided through written reports and periodic presentations to the Permanent
Council allowing for consultation and debriefing, and an opportunity for the
political preferences, priorities and sensitivities of the OSCE community in
general and of individual states in particular to be communicated to them. The
current practice is that Heads of Mission report back to the Chairman-in-Office
with fortnightly written reports. In such reports the mission will convey insight
into matters of a general nature, as mandated, but also with specific concern to

156) ‘OSCE Field Office Training: A New Concept’, unpublished paper, February 6, 1998, p. 5.
157) Author’s interview with the head of a delegation, February 1998, Vienna.

88
issues that are particularly sensitive. These reports are a critical form of early
warning within the OSCE system, being circulated to the Permanent Council,
the Chairman-in-Office, the High Commissioner on National Minorities and the
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. These reports can play an
instrumental role in enabling the political bodies of the OSCE to be in tune with
developments that might have an impact on the fulfillment of the mandate and
hence on any factors that could have a destabilising affect. The quality of the
reports is therefore of paramount importance. They are not publicly available.158
In addition Heads of Mission present oral reports to the Permanent Council on a
periodic basis. When a Head of Mission is in Vienna there is an informal ad hoc
meeting of the Permanent Council on Wednesday afternoons, prior to the for-
mal meeting of the Permanent Council on Thursdays, at which states with
special interests in a particular mission meet to discuss issues related to its opera-
tion.
While the above relationships are pivotal in terms of the management of
missions, missions also interact with and have structural relations with other
OSCE bodies. All missions are mandated to address human dimension, democ-
racy and rule-of-law issues. By necessity this brings the Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights into a close orbit. On the basis of the Budapest
Decisions, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights must be
consulted on an OSCE mission’s mandate before adoption and the office will
also contribute to the follow-up of the mission reports as decided by the Perma-
nent Council.159 Furthermore, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Hu-
man Rights’ knowledge of experts on the human dimension should be utilised to
help staff missions, which are obliged to designate a mission member to liaise
with the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and NGOs on
human dimension issues.160
Missions play a complementary role to the High Commissioner on Na-
tional Minorities in conflict prevention, although having a wider remit of action
than the High Commissioner, not solely dealing with national minorities. Im-
portantly, the existence of armed conflict does not preclude the dispatch of a
mission, unlike the High Commissioner. In a sense missions are more intrusive

158) There has been strong criticism of reports, for instance in regard to Macedonia. Human Rights
Watch in its April 1998 report on Police Violence in Macedonia criticised the mission’s forthnightly
reports for failing to condemn human rights abuses committed by the government, arguing that
this ‘serves to increase the government’s sense of impunity, as well as the sense of abandonment
by those whose rights have been violated.’ Human Rights Watch Press Statement, 28 April 1998.
159) Chapter VIII (Human Dimension) of the 1994 Budapest Decisions.
160) Chapter VIII (Human Dimension) of the 1994 Budapest Decisions, paragraph 11.

89
than the High Commissioner in that they are resident in a country. Unlike the
High Commissioner, however, the missions do not have independent authority.
In those countries where missions are located and the High Commissioner
is engaged they are able to provide assistance in substantive and logistical terms.
Reporting and assessment of the political situation by the mission gives easy
access to up-to-date, detailed information about current developments and can
help the High Commissioner in formulating his recommendations. The ongoing
presence of a mission can provide a means to follow-up responses to the High
Commissioner’s recommendations and the various undertakings and assurances
given to him by the government. The former Swedish Chairman-in-Office,
Margaretha af Ugglas, has described missions as operating as ‘the eyes and ears
of the High Commissioner’.161 Missions can also benefit from the activity of the
High Commissioner, whose recommendations can provide clear-cut guidelines
for their work. The relationship between the High Commissioner and the Head
of Mission is important for ensuring cooperation.
The task of a Head of Mission is not straightforward. With mandates being
relatively open-ended, Heads of Missions have to glean from the general atmos-
phere of the Permanent Council which lines of action they should follow. Often
they complain that they have too many bosses: the Conflict Prevention Centre,
the Permanent Council, the High Commissioner on National Minorities, the
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, and the Chairman-in-
Office (both from Vienna and the capital).162 In addition the Head of Mission
has a delicate relationship with the host country. Missions are creations of the
political process and depend upon the continuing consent of the host country.
This requires missions to work cooperatively with the government concerned. A
negative effect of this is that it can curtail the ability of missions to criticise the
government for fear of a loss of support and subsequent expulsion or non-re-
newal of the mandate. The task for the mission head, therefore, is to navigate the
different constituencies without blunting or compromising the potency of the
mission. Ultimately, although the Permanent Council wrote the mandate there is
reluctance for there to be too much central control because this could limit the
scope for action; this gives the Head of Mission some leeway.163

161) Margaretha af Ugglas, ‘Conditions for Successful Preventive Diplomacy’, in The Challenge of
Preventive Diplomacy, The Experience of the CSCE, Stockholm 1994, p. 26.
162) Interview with a diplomat representing a previous Chairman-in-Office, February 1998, Vienna.
163) Interviews with diplomats, February 1998 in Vienna.

90
 Mandates: What are the Competencies and Powers of Missions?

While all mission mandates are produced by the political bodies of the OSCE,
they do not conform to a uniform pattern, but are characterised by a flexibility
arising out of their ad hoc nature – being designed to confront specific issues and
situations.164 The political will of states to address the circumstances is para-
mount. There is no defining general mandate. Rather each is formulated through
consultations in the Permanent Council. As a result there are no general exclu-
sion clauses that prevent mission engagement in particular circumstances – they
are an instrument with as much flexibility as the Permanent Council, including
the host country, is prepared to negotiate.
The mandate has to be negotiated so that it is acceptable to all states con-
cerned. Its formulation is a highly sensitive process, especially since states are
very reluctant to admit that there are problems of a security nature within their
state, or to admit that they may not have the means at their disposal to address
problems. A successful mandate needs to be a common effort on the part of the
host government and the OSCE. The mandate needs to be elaborated cooper-
atively and not imposed since missions are often seen by the host state as an
intervention in internal affairs and not as a normal instrument of the interna-
tional community.165
A number of diplomats in Vienna articulated the view that mandates will
never be especially precise. Firstly, because many states are involved in negoti-
ating the mandates, the outcome will always be the result of a compromise.
Secondly, states are reluctant to impose too rigid a framework; allowing scope
for a broad interpretation enables a range of activities to take place under their
umbrella.
The long-term missions and field presences which have been deployed to
date have had various orientations: conflict prevention/preventive diplomacy
tasks as their priority (Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine, the Former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia, Belarus and the Kosovo, Sanjak and Vojvodina mission); a crisis
management orientation (Georgia, Tajikistan, Moldova and Albania); and those
engaged in post-conflict reconstruction (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia).
It would be over-schematic, however, to represent all missions as falling
neatly into one category or another. The changing dynamic of conflicts means
that roles evolve. For instance the Moldova and Georgia crisis management
missions (which have functions in the realm of mediation) have assumed more
preventive characters (preventing re-escalation) than crisis management, as the

164) OSCE Handbook 1996, p. 18.

165) Author’s interview with the Head of a Delegation, February 1998, Vienna.

91
original situation has evolved. In Moldova, there is an element of post-conflict
rebuilding involved as the mission has set about addressing issues of economic
reconstruction as well as civil society development in the form of assisting local
NGOs. In a number of cases, therefore, the tasks of the missions can be said to
have a more complex profile, which depends upon the nature of the situation
that needs to be addressed and the terms of reference and hence the mandate
that is produced by the Permanent Council.
It is clear that all missions are engaged in some activities that have a pre-
ventive function. A brief examination of the mandates reveals this from the
perspective of two issues that are pertinent to conflict prevention: the promotion
of dialogue and engagement in human dimension issues. The human dimension
issues will be broken down into reference to issues of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms, and explicit reference to developing the capacities of societies
to regulate their own dysfunctions through democratisation, adherence to the
rule of law and other appropriate measures.
The promotion of dialogue features in the mandates of many of the mis-
sions. This is critical in providing the missions with the competence to contribute
to conflict prevention processes. In Kosovo, Sanjak and Vojvodina the mission
was required to ‘promote dialogues between authorities concerned and represen-
tatives of the populations and communities in the three regions’.166 The mandate
of the Mission to Estonia places the emphasis on the need to ‘contribute to the
efforts of Estonian national and local authorities to re-create a civic society, inter
alia through the promotion of local mechanisms to facilitate dialogue and under-
standing’. In Latvia the mission has the role to ‘provide information and advice
to institutions, organizations and individuals with an interest in a dialogue on
these issues’ (principally citizenship). In Ukraine the tasks of the mission include
‘establishing contacts with all authorities concerned, relevant institutions, repre-
sentatives of various communities and non-governmental organisations, with the
aim of collecting information as well as helping to prevent tensions and improve
mutual understanding’. There is explicit reference to the need to promote and
intensify dialogue in the mandates of the missions to Georgia, Moldova,
Tajikistan and the Assistance Group to Chechnya.
The above excerpts from mission mandates indicate that the promotion of
dialogue and/or understanding between the parties is often linked to the task to
gather or disseminate information. This is of importance with regard to the
human dimension activities of missions.

166) Citations are taken from the Survey of OSCE Long-Term Missions and other OSCE Field Activities,
produced and updated by the OSCE Secretariat. I refer to the 7 October 1997 version.

92
 Almost all missions refer in one way or another to the fulfillment of human
dimension tasks. In some cases the reference to human dimension activities is
straightforward. In Kosovo, Sanjak and Vojvodina the mission was tasked to
‘collect information on all aspects relevant to violations of human rights and
fundamental freedoms’. The mandate of the Mission to Ukraine states that the
mission should engage in ‘preparing reports on the situation of human rights and
rights of persons belonging to national minorities in the Autonomous Republic
of Crimea (Ukraine)’. In Belarus the Advisory and Monitoring Group is to
‘assist the Belarussian authorities in promoting democratic institutions and in
complying with other OSCE commitments’. In the case of Estonia the relation
to the human dimension is less overtly stated, but nevertheless can be inferred as
being relevant, since the mission is to act ‘as a clearing house for information,
technical assistance and advice on matters relating to the status of communities
in Estonia and their rights and duties’. In Latvia the mandate delegates the
mission to ‘gather information and report on developments relevant to the full
realization of CSCE principles, norms and commitments.’ The Mission to
Skopje which has no reference to the human dimension nevertheless performs a
human dimension role in practice in regard to human rights monitoring.167 The
missions to Georgia, Moldova, Tajikistan and the presences in Chechnya and
Albania also refer to the human dimension, through the promotion of respect for
international obligations and commitments regarding human rights, fundamen-
tal freedoms and minority rights. This confirms the flexibility of the operation of
the missions in relation to their mandates.168
In a number of mandates reference to human rights and democratization
fall in the same clause. The Mission to Kosovo, Sanjak and Vojvodina had the
task to ‘assist in providing information on relevant legislation on human rights,
protection of minorities, free media and democratic elections.’ In Ukraine the

167) This is a good example of the way in which practise evolves in ways not laid down in detail in the
mandate. Although set up to guard against a spillover of the conflict from the former Yugoslavia
into Macedonia, as the military activities there decreased the greater threat of instability in
Macedonia became the tense relations between the Macedonian majority and the Albanian
minority. As a result the mission shifted its monitoring priorities from the border situation to
internal developments, primarily inter-ethnic relations but also the economic situation and the
rising levels of crime. The mission has also acted as a focal point for OSCE activities in Macedo-
nia, assisting the High Commissioner on National Minorities and the ODIHR in conflict preven-
tion and human dimension initiatives respectively. This change of focus was not accompanied by
any rewriting of the mandate, but was a response to changing priorities and needs.
168) Allan Rosas and Timo Lahelma, ‘OSCE Long-term Missions’, pp. 167-190 in M. Bothe, N.
Ronzitti and A. Rosas, op.cit., p. 176 and pp. 183-186.

93
mission has been mandated to monitor and promote ‘free media principles’
whereas in Bosnia and Herzegovina the mission’s mandate has been particularly
concerned with democracy building in terms of the role of the Ombudspersons
and the conduct of elections. The mandate of the Mission to Croatia links the
protection of human and minority rights to broader issues in that the mission is
‘to promote reconciliation, the rule of law and conformity with the highest
internationally recognized standards, the Mission will also assist and advise on
the full implementation of legislation and monitor the proper functioning and
development of democratic institutions, processes and mechanisms.’ The man-
date of the Mission to Georgia is quite specific in how the mission should ‘assist
in the development of legal and democratic institutions and processes, including
advice on the elaboration of a new constitution, the implementation of legisla-
tion on citizenship and the establishment of an independent judiciary as well as
monitoring elections’. Clearly these tasks make this more than a mission engaged
in crisis management. The same is the case with Moldova.
It is clear that there is much common ground in the tasks which the mis-
sions are mandated to fulfil. The array of tasks points to a comprehensive ap-
proach, not only over all, but the specific mission mandates tend to be compre-
hensive as well. This would suggest that formulation of the mandates is broad to
enable missions to function in line with the changing dynamic of the specific
country situations as well as to address unexpected developments without the
mandate having to undergo revision. Mandates also extend the roles of missions
to performing functions such as being information contact points, or in some
circumstances containing reference to the military dimension through monitor-
ing arms control and peacekeeping, or with regard to addressing humanitarian
crises.
The comprehensive remits of the mandates lead to the conclusion that it is
what is excluded from them which raises the most pressing questions about the
capacity of missions to be effective. Only in the case of the Mission to Estonia
does the mandate actually refer directly to the ‘temporary nature of the Mission’.
While all the mandates are established for a set period, usually six months, the
practice has been for them to be renewed every six months.169 The mandates do
not, however, consider what sort of exit strategies would be necessary for their
termination. Again the mandate for the Mission to Estonia is instructive on this
point. While many of the missions are mandated to promote, assist or enhance

169) In some cases mandates have been renewed for longer, for instance the mandate of the Mission
to Croatia, consisting of two Permanent Council Decisions Nos. 112 (18 April 1996) and 176
(26 June 1997) has been extended until 31 December 1998. See Annual Report 1997 on OSCE
Activities (1 November 1996 – 30 November 1997), Vienna, p. 14.

94
capacities of individuals, institutions and organisations in the countries con-
cerned to address the problems they face, only with regard to Estonia does the
mandate refer to the need for the mission to ‘consider ways and means of trans-
ferring its responsibilities to institutions or organizations representing the local
population’.
Underpinning competencies of the missions is the cooperative nature of
their operation. As cooperative instruments they do not have ‘powers’ as such,
rather the missions seek to influence relations between parties in the field and are
able to report back to the political bodies of the OSCE in order to encourage
specific actions to be taken. However, the missions themselves wield no power of
sanction over parties with whom they engage.

The Theory and Practice of Missions as a Means of Intervention

A key premise in understanding the role of missions and their intended contrib-
ution to OSCE conflict prevention is that they are intended to provide informa-
tion for early warning and deterrence. One of the missions’ primary tasks is to
maintain transparency by gathering and disseminating accurate information for
the political bodies of the OSCE. Reliable and timely information provides the
basis upon which the political bodies can act in any given situation. By being
located in a country missions are able to provide more dedicated information
than individual states receive from embassies which have a wider remit. There-
fore, the key to the operational effectiveness of the missions is their capacity to
establish and maintain good and varied contacts with all parties and groups, as a
basis for understanding processes within the state.
In order to be able to do this missions draw upon the fact of their on-going
presence in the field. This enables the missions to develop contacts with a broad
spectrum of interlocutors, develop relations and in theory be privy to insights
that enhance analysis and hence action. At the least ongoing presence facilitates a
familiarity with the political dynamics of a society. Presence has another critical
function, acting as a reminder that the international community is not only
concerned about a situation but is also monitoring its development. This can
have the effect of deterring escalation or violations of rights.
Acquiring reliable information is of central importance. The provision of
this information to each party is a means of facilitating communication and
decisions about negotiations. This role seeks to prevent information becoming
the victim of prejudices, distortions and misperceptions between the parties.
Dissemination of information concerning OSCE commitments and principles is
also important. On the one hand information needs to be provided to primary
interlocutors, in the government and also the representatives of other groups,

95
communities or organisations within society which are potential conflict agents.
As states become increasingly familiar with the standards and norms to which
they are committed as a result of their participation in the OSCE, the dissemina-
tion of such information to the politically active strata might become less necess-
ary. On the other hand, disseminating information to the public about existing
rights and procedures for minorities or about legislative changes, and to specific
professional groups remains important.
A role of the missions most directly related to conflict prevention is with
regard to local crisis diffusion: ‘As an on-the-ground presence with extensive
contacts, the missions are in the best position to detect developments that might
lead to escalation of tensions and to intervene quickly and effectively with all
sides as a moderating influence.’ Chigas cites as an example a situation between
the Albanian community in Macedonia and the authorities in 1992.170
In many ways the missions are advantageously placed to be able to play
instrumental roles in laying the groundwork for negotiation and conflict resol-
ution processes. In the context of conflict prevention, missions are able to assist
in facilitating relations between the parties by changing parties’ perceptions and
reducing fears, exploring options for settlement, and helping governments to set
up legislative and regulatory frameworks ... in short, opening a space in which
the forces of moderation might eventually take hold.171 The performance of this
facilitative or mediatory role by the mission is to a large part dependent upon the
confidence the mission is able to instill in the parties. Ultimately this confidence
will be derived from the extent to which the practical endeavours of missions
match the aspirations which have been set.

When Does an Intervention take Place and Why?

Long-term missions came into being as a cooperative instrument to support
states undergoing the travails of transition which had become subject to violent
conflicts or the threat of violent conflicts. In this sense they were intended as a
form of intervention that was a sign of solidarity with the state concerned, bear-
ing in mind that all long-term missions were dispatched to states which had
recently become participants in the OSCE process and with their approval.
Unlike the interventions of the High Commissioner on National Minori-
ties, which take place on the basis of the High Commissioner’s judgement,
missions

170) D. Chigas, E. McClintock and C. Kamp, ‘Preventive diplomacy and the Organization for Secu-
rity and Cooperation in Europe: Creating incentives for dialogue and cooperation’, in Preventing
conflict in the post-communist world, A.H. Chayes and A. Chayes, Washington, D.C. The Brookings
Institute, 1995, p. 61.
171) ibid., p. 62.

96
are the creation of the political bodies of the OSCE. The establishment of some
long-term missions have followed short-term expert or rapporteur missions.
Exploratory missions have been used in several cases, for example under the
Moscow Mechanism to Croatia, Estonia and Moldova. Personal representatives
of the Chairman-in-Office have also been instrumental in determining OSCE
action in particular cases and advised the establishment of missions or field
presences, such as in Moldova172, Georgia and Chechnya.173 Short-term missions
can therefore help to lay the basis for a long-term mission, but as Timo
Lahelma, Head of Mission to Estonia from August 1993 until February 1995,
has indicated, discussions were necessary between Estonia, as prospective host
state and representatives of the Chairman-in-Office before a decision was taken
at the level of the Council of Ministers.174
One of the reasons that interventions have taken place is that states have
recognised that their self-interest is at stake. In the case of Estonia and Latvia the
creation of missions can be considered to have facilitated the reconnection of the
countries to Europe and at the same time acted as a form of solidarity and a
guarantee against any possible threat from Russia. The establishment of mis-
sions has indeed had broader strategic implications than a literal reading of
mandates suggests. The mandates are often superceded by geo-political con-
cerns. At the time of the establishment of missions to Estonia, Latvia and
Ukraine, a particular concern on the part of Western states was to provide a
buffer to protect the states vis-a-vis the instability and unpredictability of the
Russian Federation. The wider jigsaw of relations with Russia also influenced the
deployment of a field presence in Belarus. This was subject to prolonged and
delicate negotiations both with Belarus and with Russia. Diplomats have conjec-
tured that the reason for final acquiescence on the part of Belarus was a combi-
nation of the prospect of isolation and the threat of losing financial assistance
from European financial institutions, as well as a delaying tactic.175 Russia had to
be assured that this was not an excessive infringement of its sphere of influence.

172) For a detailed account of the way in which the Personal Representative of the CSCE Chairman-
in-Office advised and contributed to the establishment of a long-term mission in Moldova see
Adam Daniel Rotfeld, ‘In Search of a Political Settlement. The Case of the Conflict in Moldova’,
pp. 100-137 in The Challenge of Preventive Diplomacy: The Experience of the CSCE, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 1994.
173) L. Kovacs, ‘The OSCE: Present and future challenges’, in Helsinki Monitor, Vol. 6, 1995, No. 3,
pp. 7-10.
174) Timo Lahelma, ‘The OSCE’s Role in Conflict Prevention: the Case of Estonia’, 20 February
1996, unpublished paper, p. 4.
175) Interview with a member of the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna, February 1998.

97
 These very different motives suggest that if the state concerned does not per-
ceive a benefit from the deployment of a mission it might resist. The most
obdurate case has been the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its refusal to
readmit missions to Kosovo, Sanjak and Vojvodina.
Missions, therefore, come into operation as a result of a combination of
factors: the analysis and interpretation of political circumstances by individual
states; their collective decisions as the political bodies of the OSCE; and their
political will to act on the basis of these decisions. In terms of the preventive
missions circumstances have had to be such that concerns regarding potential
deterioration have been met by a perception that an international presence has
the potential to make a constructive contribution to alleviating these concerns.
Furthermore, the deployment tends to coincide with a recognised weakness on
the part of the recipient state. The degree to which the prospective host views the
field presence as beneficial can have an influence on the speed with which a
mission is deployed, the nature of its mandate and its prospects for success as a
cooperative security instrument. If a mission is to be effective in terms of conflict
prevention it is commonly agreed that the earlier the deployment the more
chance it has of having an impact.
Certainly the deployment of long-term OSCE missions is a measure which
can be taken before the necessity to consider the more complex step of a preven-
tive deployment of military forces. Deployment of military forces itself sends an
important message, but as one commentator states with regard to the deploy-
ment of UN forces in FYROM ‘(I)ts deterrent value has been mainly symbolic,
since the number of troops deployed could not stop an attack on any significant
scale.’176 Such a deployment was effective because it was perceived by the parties
as a tangible sign of commitment to a peaceful resolution to tensions. This is
instructive, because it points to the fact that the effectiveness of an action is also
related to the perception of its credibility as a measure that could make a contri-
bution to prevention by the parties to the dispute. The effectiveness of a preven-
tive deployment will also depend upon the degree to which the dispute has esca-
lated. In the context of the OSCE any preventive deployment of a more ‘muscu-
lar’ nature would have to take place under the auspices of NATO or WEU.177

176) Gabriel Munuera, Preventing Armed Conflict in Europe: Lessons from Recent Experience, Challiot
Papers 15/16, June 1994, p. 83.
177) The OSCE has sanctioned the deployment of a peacekeeping force in Nagorno Karabakh, but
the deployment of this force remains unlikely and its peacekeeping mandate is qualitatively
different from an early preventive deployment of military or police force. See Heikki Vilen,
‘Planning a Peace-keeping Mission for the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict’, Security Dialogue, Vol.
27, No. 1, March 1996.

98
 What have Been the Actual Practices with Regard to the Use of Missions?
Mission mandates provide details concerning general tasks, deployment (geo-
graphical scope within a particular country), duration, composition and financial
implications, but there are no explicit guidelines as to how they should operate.
This provides the Head of Mission with scope to interpret the most effective way
to undertake the tasks the mission has been given.
In practical terms Margaretha af Ugglas has described missions as having
one or several of the following objectives: to be an ‘ombudsman’ for aggrieved
parties, able to listen to complaints and channel these to the authorities; to be the
political antennae for the OSCE, picking up the first tremors of an impending
political upheaval or military confrontation; to act as an intermediary in arrang-
ing contacts between the parties concerned and external actors; to become a
trusted partner in dialogue with the parties and to act as an adviser on specific
issues; or to be a mediator.178 Subsequently, missions have acquired other tasks.
Partly this has been a result of the expansion of needs addressed as missions have
been mandated and deployed in a growing number of countries, but also through
practice the tasks of missions have evolved.
Mission engagement in the field will be reviewed in the following catego-
ries: facilitating dialogue and negotiations; providing advice on legislative mea-
sures and monitoring implementation; providing technical assistance, including
in the realm of elections; and defusing specific tensions. Although activities have
touched on other spheres, these encompass the main fields of engagement.

Facilitating Dialogue and Negotiations

As indicated above many missions have been mandated to engage in activities
related to dialogue. This can be regarded from different perspectives. Missions
engage in dialogue with different parties separately as a means of both under-
standing the situation but also in order to convey information about OSCE
norms and standards. This enables the missions to share ideas about options
available to the parties and by doing so in a confidential manner they can stimu-
late thought without exposing the party to the risks of public disclosure at a
premature time. In addition when called upon the missions are also able to play
a direct mediatory or facilitative role, bringing the parties together.
In Estonia the mission has worked in close collaboration with the High
Commissioner on National Minorities to urge the establishment of, and subse-
quently support, the Presidential Round Table of Non-citizens and Ethnic

178) Margaretha af Ugglas, op.cit., p. 23.

99
Minorities as a means to institutionalise dialogue, especially since the large
Russophone population had no representation in Parliament in the early 1990s.
The establishment of the Round Table was an important conciliatory step in its
own right and the mission was able to assist both as an official observer and
informally as a legal adviser.179
The Round Table has had a chequered track record. Its very existence was
a positive sign of a process of institutionalised dialogue and it initiated discussion
of legislation as well as sociological studies concerning attitudes of Estonian
residents on inter-ethnic relations. It also developed the confidence to call for the
relaxation of the country’s language and citizenship laws in 1995; ‘This call was
underpinned by the argument that these laws do not contribute to the integration
of the Russian speaking population, but on the contrary create obstacles to the
integration process.’180 The absence of concrete results, the lack of prominence in
the media, parliament and public debate of the Round Table’s recommendations
and, more damagingly, a sense on the part of the Russophone community that
the Round Table has been marginalised has, however, undermined its integrity
as a dialogue body, reducing the confidence of the Russophone community in it
as an instrument of dialogue.181 This indicates that although the mission can
play a supportive role it can be difficult for the mission to play an instrumental
role in matters of internal politics and policy.
The Mission to Estonia has also acted to facilitate cross-border dialogue by
assisting in the establishment of the Narva Forum which took place 31 October
– 1 November 1997. Convening members of NGOs, Estonian and Russian
government officials (national, regional, municipal), representatives of interna-
tional organisations and other interested parties from the Estonian-Russian
border area, discussions focused on social questions and problems exacerbated
by the border crossing arrangements. The objective was to inform the authorities
about the problems faced by the local population as a result of the border re-
gime.182
The existence of the Round Table in Estonia for some time presented a
marked comparison with Latvia, where no such mechanism existed. This led one
observer to state that, in the absence of an ‘institutionalized second party’ (since
non-citizens were not represented at any level of the official political framework)
the OSCE failed to facilitate any kind of ‘inner dialogue’. Instead the non-citi-
zens were represented by the OSCE in dialogue with the authorities, without

179) T. Lahelma, unpublished paper, op.cit., p. 12.

180) Hanne-Margret Birckenbach, Preventive Diplomacy Through Fact-Finding: How international organisa-
tions review the conflict over citizenship in Estonia and Latvia, Lit Verlag, 1997, p. 47.
181) Interview with a Russaphone participant in the Round Table, September 1997.
182) OSCE Newsletter, Vol. 4, No. 10, October 1997, p. 11.

100
having authorised it to perform this role and not being informed of the contentof
dialogue between the OSCE and the Latvian government.183 A National Council
was established in 1997 with both the mission and the High Commissioner on
National Minorities stimulating the process, and convening a seminar to assist it.
It has not yet played an effective role as a dialogue fora. In both Latvia and
Estonia experience has been that ‘intervention did not succeed in creating a
dialogue within civil society on the disputed issues.’ Birckenbach cites the Repre-
sentative of the Estonian President at the Round Table to emphasise this
point.184
The Mission to Ukraine has concentrated much effort on the legislative and
administrative disputes between the authorities in Kiev and Simferopol regarding
the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. In May 1995 at the joint
initiative of the mission and the High Commissioner a Ukrainian Round Table
was organised in Locarno, Switzerland to promote dialogue and discuss the
future status of Crimea. The Mission and the High Commissioner also collab-
orated in organising a Round Table in Yalta in September 1995 regarding the
situation of the Crimean Tatars185 and a further Round Table in Noordwijk (the
Netherlands) in March 1996 on the constitutional relationship between Kyiv and
Crimea.186 Together with the ongoing presence of the mission and the frequent
visits by the High Commissioner, the round tables contributed to an atmosphere
of dialogue, led to concrete proposals that influenced constitutional relations
(particularly the meeting in Noordwijk) and acted as statements of international
concern.
The Mission in Moldova has been deeply engaged in conflict resolution,
facilitating negotiations between the parties to the conflict,187 as has the Mission
in Georgia with regard to South Ossetia.188 In both instances proposals have
been drafted by the missions with regard to the future status of the disputed
territories. These proposals have provided food for thought for the participants

183) Boris Tsilevich, High Commissioner and Permanent Mission: The OSCE at Work in the Latvia (-
Russian) Conflict on Citizenship and Human Rights, Projektverbund Friedenswissenschaften Kiel,
1995, pp. 4-5.
184) H-M. Birckenbach, op.cit., 1997, pp. 54-55.
185) OSCE Handbook 1996, p. 33.
186) See The Role of the High Commissioner on National Minorities in Conflict Prevention, Foundation on
Inter-Ethnic Relations, The Hague, 1997, p. 76 and John Packer, ‘Autonomy within the OSCE:
the case of Crimea’, pp. 295-316 in Markku Suksi, ed., Autonomy: Applications and Implications,
The Netherlands, 1998, pp. 306-311.
187) OSCE Handbook 1996, p. 25, OSCE Newsletter, February 1998, Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 6.
188) OSCE Handbook 1996, p. 23.

101
in negotiation processes. They have been able to encourage the participants to
address the hard realities of their situations and to acknowledge the key issues
that have to be addressed for a settlement to proceed. In Moldova, for example
the mission presented ‘Report no.13’ in December 1993, outlining a framework
for a future status for Transdniestria, emphasising the Transdniestrians’ separate
feeling of identity, a sensitive issue that can not be ignored in searching for a
settlement, but suggesting that the introduction of three levels of jurisdiction in
Moldova – central, regional and mixed – could contribute to a reconceptualis-
ation of relations.189 The mission’s input in the negotiations process has been
intensive, particularly in the search for a new constitutional status and has in-
volved the Head of Mission chairing meetings of the teams of experts delegated
by both parties to push forward the exploration of solutions.190 The Mission has
had to balance the active participation of Russia and subsequently Ukraine as
mediators. In 1997 further documents were drafted by the mediators defining
the status of Transdniestria and dividing competencies.191
In Moldova and South Ossetia the OSCE missions have worked alongside
NGO initiatives that have tried to contribute problem-solving and confidence
building approaches. Examples of such relationships include an initiative in
Moldova orchestrated by a community development activist from Belfast and
the Centre for Conflict Analysis at the University of Kent, another involves the
European Centre for Minority Issues and a third the Conflict Management
Group.192 CMG has also been active in South Ossetia working with the Norwe-
gian Refugee Council. The British NGO Links has also been active in South
Ossetia, initially working as a project of the NGO VERTIC. The engagement of
these NGOs has been particularly useful in assisting the parties to broaden their
perspectives of the options available to them. The OSCE mission in Moldova
has been an important interlocutor for the Belfast/Kent group and the ECMI
and has participated as an observer in some of the processes, recognising that it
can itself benefit from the input of informed outsiders. These relations can be
delicate since inter-governmental organisations do not always respond positively

189) Conflicts in the OSCE Area, PRIO, 1997, Oslo, p. 92.

190) OSCE Handbook 1996, p. 26.
191) Annual Report 1997 on OSCE Activities, p. 8.
192) See Joe Camplisson and Michael Hall, Hidden Frontiers: Addressing deep-rooted violent conflict in
Northern Ireland and the Republic of Moldova, Island Publications, 1996, Co. Antrim for comments
on the work of the Centre for Conflict Analysis; From Ethnopolitical Conflict to Inter-Ethnic Accord in
Moldova, European Centre for Minority Issues, 1998, Flensburg on the ECMI’s work; CMG
brought representatives (including the Presidents) of Moldova and Transdniestria to meetings in
The Hague in January 1995 and January 1996.

102
to the role of NGOs seeking to play a facilitative role in confidence-building,
mediations and negotiations processes. The OSCE has been more responsive
than many other IGOs to the sort of informal contact that such initiatives have
involved.
The continuing presence of missions gives representatives the opportunity
to understand the actors involved and the dynamics of the conflicts as well as
developing relations with actors. There is concern, however, that dialogue is
focused at a narrow spectrum within society (decision-makers and opinion
formers), and that dialogue within civil society or between authorities and repre-
sentatives of civil society remains more limited. Dialogue alone (facilitated by
missions, the High Commissioner on National Minorities or the Office for
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, as well as non-governmental or-
ganisations) may not be intended as a means to change attitudes and behaviour
in society at large, although depending upon how ideas are disseminated this can
be an indirect effect. As such dialogue is one component in a wider strategy –
although to what extent a strategy is coherently elaborated by the different actors
is another question.

Advice on Legislative Measures and Monitoring the Implementation of

Legislation
In Estonia and Latvia the OSCE missions have been one of a number of inter-
locutors addressing the respective governments on the process and content of the
implementation of legislation concerning the non-citizen population and citizen-
ship. The Mission to Estonia has actively sought to provide advice and assistance
in integrating the non-indigenous population193 and the Mission to Latvia has
stressed the need to concentrate on effective implementation of the laws194 and
its main activity throughout 1997 remained the monitoring of the implementa-
tion of laws in regard to these issues.195
In both countries the advice of the missions was effective in giving priority
to the political dynamics instead of following a more legalistic approach. This
was also the path followed by the High Commissioner on National Minorities.196
Neither sought to establish that the denial of citizenship to the majority of the
Russophone populations in Estonia and Latvia was a human rights violation,

193) OSCE Handbook 1996, p. 29.

194) OSCE Handbook 1996, p. 31.
195) Annual Report 1997 on OSCE Activities, p. 9.
196) H-M. Birckenbach, op.cit., p. 36.

103
rather the emphasis was placed upon the necessity to consider the political and
security implications of not resolving the issue in an inclusive fashion.197
In Estonia concerns and recommendations led at least three times to revi-
sions of provocative laws which had already been passed by successive Estonian
parliaments. Following the adoption of the Law on Aliens in June 1993, which
triggered a crisis, the President of Estonia requested international expert legal
opinions. Within weeks the government had at its disposal comments by the
High Commissioner on National Minorities, the Mission and the Council of
Europe which enabled the President to return the law to Parliament with sug-
gested amendments and subsequently promulgate an amended law.198 To some
extent the role of the mission as an adviser in the field of legislation has dimin-
ished since the 1995 elections which produced a Russian parliamentary faction
enabling Russians to participate in the legislative process.199
While international assistance was important in refocusing debate in order
to stave off potentially antagonistic measures, the contribution of the mission
and the High Commissioner on National Minorities must be seen in conjunction
with that of other international bodies. Equally important was an evolution in
the behaviour of the parties themselves – in part influenced by the activities of
third parties, but also by broader geo-political and economic circumstances.
Paramount among these being the issues of EU and NATO membership, as well
as increased experience of being involved in the process of government (the
youth of the newly sovereign states can easily be forgotten).
In addition to providing timely advice and exerting pressure, missions’
activities helped Latvia and Estonia to rebut Russian accusations that they were
massively violating human rights: the missions provided the international com-
munity and the parties themselves with detailed and shared information, as well
as external facilitators and formal and informal assistance. Missions also served
national NGOs as sources of information: ‘missions have made up for lack of
domestic support for reforms and for lack of consultative functions, in democ-
racies, roles usually played by social groups, which, for the time being, have not
appeared in either country.’200
While the missions to Estonia and Latvia represent two of the most visible
and possibly instrumental examples of advice on legislation being proffered, it
has also been a common feature in regard to the activities of other missions. For
example the Mission to Ukraine has sought to make a contribution to facilitate

197) ibid., p. 38.

198) T. Lahelma, unpublished paper, op.cit., p. 15.
199) ibid., p. 5.
200) H-M. Birkenbach, op.cit., p. 43.

104
 the acquisition of Ukrainian citizenship by the approximately 100,000 Crimean
Tatars who have yet to do so. Additionally, working with UNHCR it has been
seeking to publicise the new citizenship law among deportee communities in
Crimea.201

Technical Assistance
Missions have provided assistance in a number of practical or technical initiat-
ives, as well as in some ad hoc ways. Such assistance has responded to the most
pressing needs of the states in which they are located.
In Latvia and Estonia two of the most pressing concerns regarding the large
non-citizen population have been speeding up the process of naturalisation and
assisting in the provision of language training opportunities. Endeavours have
been in collaboration with other international governmental and non-govern-
mental bodies. In Estonia the mission has collaborated with the Council of
Europe in providing assistance to establish a system of language training for
aliens living in Estonia202 and in channeling foreign aid into language training
projects.203 Lahelma comments that ‘The Mission and the High Commissioner
on National Minorities have campaigned vigorously in order that the govern-
ment increase opportunities for the non-native population to learn the state
language.’204 Sponsoring low-cost effective language training programmes is
perceived by both as a means to promote integration. Nevertheless as Lahelma
commented in 1996 there ‘is still a long way to go before the programs will be
functioning effectively on a nation-wide scale’205 and even then the elderly, less-
educated and those living in mono-lingual residential areas will struggle to gain
full mastery of Estonian. The Mission to Latvia is also involved in activities
relating to language training in cooperation with other international organis-
ations.206 In both countries the efforts and financial contribution of UNDP and
the Open Society Institute have outweighed those of the OSCE. What has been
important however is the concerted message conveyed by the international
community that this is a priority issue.

201) Annual Report 1997 on OSCE Activities, pp. 10-11. Missions in Moldova (language legislation),
Tajikistan (constitutional advice) and Georgia (constitution and citizenship legislation) have also
contributed in this sphere. See the OSCE Handbook 1996, p. 25 and p. 27, and Annual Report 1997
on OSCE Activities, p. 8.
202) OSCE Handbook, 1996, p. 29.
203) Annual Report 1997, OSCE Activities, p. 9.
204) T. Lahelma, op.cit., p. 10.
205) ibid., p. 10.
206) Annual Report 1997 On OSCE Activities, p. 31.

105
 This activity is complemented by attention paid to the naturalisation pro-
cess, particularly with regard to the standardisation of the language test for the
citizenship and naturalisation exams in Estonia and Latvia respectively.207 The
Mission to Latvia has observed that the pace of progress in the conduct of these
exams has been sluggish,208 but has been unable to contribute to a speeding up.
In Estonia the mission placed an advertisement in the press encouraging non-
citizen residents to register to vote in the local elections in October 1994.209
The provision of advice and recommendations to Governments has been
an important area of Mission activity. Although missions are not directed to
address individual cases in regard to the human dimension, in some cases the
practice has developed that missions accumulate considerable information
regarding the general situation through attention to individual cases. This proves
to be of assistance in engaging with the authorities.
In Estonia individuals seeking to air grievances and receive personal advice
took advantage of the mission and became ‘drop-in clients’. As one Head of
Mission has commented ‘Helping individuals from the street involved the Mis-
sion partly with functions similar to those of public legal assistance or an om-
budsman’s office. Visits by the clients have also proved to be a valuable source of
information indicative of the problems in the society.’210 Lahelma argues that
through its flexible operation the Mission was able to gain insight into ongoing
social, economic and political processes from across the spectrum and gain the
confidence of members of the Russophone community, while being able to share
its reflections with the authorities to contribute to the legislative process. The
OSCE Handbook reports that in Latvia by examining patterns of rigid and at
times arbitrary administrative practices the mission has been able to share its
insights with the authorities in an attempt to ameliorate some of the less con-
structive practices.211 Likewise, this role has enabled missions to act as a safety
valve for non-citizens often not aware where to turn with their problems, allow-
ing grievances to be aired even if there are no specific mechanisms for redressing
them. Although this is not a long-term solution to a problem, the Mission is in a
position to share its conclusions with the authorities and thereby in an informal
capacity ensure that the authorities are aware of concerns experienced by seg-
ments of the population.

207) Annual Report 1997 On OSCE Activities, p. 8 and p. 9.

208) Annual Report 1997 On OSCE Activities, p. 9.
209) D. Chigas et.al., in A. H. Chayes and A. Chayes op.cit., p. 60.
210) T. Lahelma, op.cit., p. 5.
211) OSCE Handbook 1996, p. 30.

106
 This has been contested by a representative of the Russophone community
in Latvia, who comments that, ‘Very broad communications with public bodies
and individuals were rather of one-way kind, aimed to gain but not to distribute
information/opinions. E.g., members of OSCE mission receive and consider
individual complaints but they do not forward them to Latvia’s authorities nor
help the applicants. Those complaints are used to gather and generalize informa-
tion.’212 The importance of this different opinion on the role of the mission is not
only whether it is more accurate than the comments by Lahelma or those in the
OSCE Handbook, but that there is a perception that the missions are not doing
something when the OSCE considers that they are.
Often the activities of the missions seek to build confidence between com-
munities. This is not only done through the formal or informal dialogue pro-
cesses mentioned above. Examples of initiatives in Macedonia indicate this. In
1994 the mission contributed to building a broad political acceptance of the
census which was a means of clarifying disputes concerning the exact proportion
of the population the Albanian minority constituted. The successful implementa-
tion and acceptance of the results required an ongoing international presence to
guarantee credibility. The mission was able to assist the authorities and the
Council of Europe as a result of its ongoing presence.213 Although still focusing
its attention on the continuing risk of ‘spillover’ the Mission to Skopje has in-
creasingly attended to the deterioration of the internal situation with regard to
inter-ethnic relations. In an attempt to address issues relating to security and
stability the mission has made specific efforts to promote economic growth,
despite the fact that there is no explicit reference to such activity in the mission’s
mandate. The mission has sought to perform this task by focusing on the issue
more in its reports, acting to facilitate the involvement of potential donors and
working with aid providers, international organisations and financial institutions
in identifying sectors for development.214
The only Mission explicitly mandated to attend to economic issues is that
in Ukraine. The mandate includes the stipulation that the mission should ‘con-
tribute to the development of economic programmes’ in Crimea on the basis of
recommendations by the OSCE Experts team which had been established to
address constitutional and economic matters with regard to the status of the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Indeed the mission was established to support
the work of the experts and report on the situation in Crimea. In 1997 the focus
of Mission activity shifted to the unresolved economic and social problems of the

212) B. Tsilevich, op.cit., p. 3.

213) OSCE Handbook 1996, p. 21.
214) Annual Report 1997 on OSCE Activities, 1 November 1996-30 November 1997, Vienna, p. 6.

107
Crimean peninsula and in particular the return of some 250,000 formerly de-
ported Crimean Tatars. A number of inter-agency donor meetings facilitated by
UNDP and UNHCR, with OSCE involvement, did not lead to significant
contributions and as a result initiatives on the ground were initially slow-paced.
An international donor conference in June 1998, chaired by Max van der Stoel
raised several million US dollars for use in assisting with the reintegration of
former deportees.215 In view of the situation on the ground this contribution was
an important but modest part of a long-term assistance process.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina practical assistance has encompassed democra-
tisation initiatives in three main areas: confidence-building aimed at developing
dialogue between ethnic groups; civil society development programmes aimed at
increasing participation, strengthening the media and NGOs; and democratic
institution building, particularly with regard to educational institutions and the
promotion of an independent judiciary, as well as support to a legal aid
programme.216 The role of the mission is highly complex given its close but
distinct relationship from the Office of the High Representative. The success of
the Mission in implementing its tasks since the Dayton Agreement has yet to be
evaluated. The effectiveness with regard to the broader geo-politics of the region
has been questioned since the tasks the mission addresses in Bosnia and Herze-
govina are currently far from being met.
Missions in a number of countries have been able to contribute to the
conduct and monitoring of parliamentary and presidential elections and refer-
enda. The ongoing presence of missions has made them ideal for contributing to
the coordination of international observers. This has been the case in Moldova
in 1994, in Georgia in 1995, in Macedonia in 1996/7, in Bosnia and
Herzegovina in 1996 and 1997, in Croatia in 1997, in Chechnya in 1997 and in
Albania in 1997. The primary role of the missions in this context has been to
facilitate the engagement of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights. Elections have not always been endorsed without reservation, for in-
stance the election in Croatia was regarded as ‘free but not fair’ and in Albania
they were declared as ‘adequate and acceptable’.217

215) Annual Report 1997 on OSCE Activities, p. 10 and communication with the author following the
June conference.
216) Annual Report 1997 on OSCE Activities, pp. 12-13.
217) See the OSCE Handbook 1996, p. 25 and Annual Report 1997 on OSCE Activities, pp. 6, 11, 14, 15,
16.

108
 Defusing Tensions
The ongoing presence of a mission enables it to perform an early warning role
by understanding the tensions and analysing the potential these might have for
destabilising a situation and then acting in specific ways to address the tension. A
good example of how this has defused a potentially destabilising situation took
place in 1994 in northeastern Estonia in Narva. The mission and the High
Commissioner became aware of a planned civil disobedience campaign and by
discussing the potential consequences with both the Russophone activists behind
the campaign and the Estonian authorities they were able to assist in averting the
campaign and hence the potentially dangerous situation. Other areas where
advice from the mission to Estonia was able to defuse sensitive issues include
proposals to safeguard the availability of candidates legitimately representing the
Russophone population in municipal elections in 1993 and advice concerning the
travel documents of aliens.218 These are concrete examples indicating that the
input from an external interlocutor can contribute to an evolution of policy that
seeks to address the concerns of communities. The discrete nature of advice
proffered by the mission enabled changes in policies in a way which did not
undermine the authority of the government but at the same time met some of
the needs of the Russophone community.
Another example of a mission’s ability to act to alleviate tensions was in
Macedonia during the unrest in February 1995. The mission was actively in-
volved in defusing the tensions that arose in connection with attempts to estab-
lish a private Albanian university in Tetovo, which was regarded as illegal by the
authorities of FYROM.219

Conditions for Success or Failure: Evaluation of Effectiveness

In the preceding sections I have addressed the institutional context within which
the long-term missions operate; the institutional practices and assumptions
which underpin their deployment and operation; the mandates of the missions;
and experiences of how the missions intervene and operate in practice. This
assessment gives rise to a number of observations concerning the degree to which
long-term missions can be considered effective, and which conditions influence
the success or failure of their operation.
In evaluating the input of long-term missions to the prevention of conflicts
in those countries in which they have been deployed there are a number of

218) T. Lahelma, op.cit., p. 15.

219) OSCE Handbook 1996, p. 21.

109
obstacles. A first obstacle is that many mission mandates have a process orienta-
tion, in the sense that important aspects of the mandate focus on the fulfillment
of tasks which it is difficult to quantify, both in terms of the time frames in-
volved but also in terms of the quality of a product. The establishment and
promotion of dialogue or mutual understanding are prime examples of this
difficulty: it is one thing if a dialogue mechanism has been established, but how
can the quality of dialogue or mutual understanding be evaluated or fulfilled?
A second obstacle is the fact that long-term missions do not operate in
isolation. The involvement of a range of actors makes it difficult to single out the
instrumental role of one or another actor. Coordination with other OSCE
bodies and other international organisations is crucial. Yet since missions have
acted together with other international agencies, non-governmental organisations
and initiatives undertaken at a bilateral level, it is difficult to assess the specific
contributions of any one actor. Furthermore, different OSCE instruments have
been at work in several situations and therefore there is a cumulative affect that
can be difficult to disentangle. Moreover, it is important not to overlook the
input of local players when analysing the role of international interventions.
The roles of different institutional actors also has to be correlated with geo-
political influences. The degree to which governments are amenable to outside
influence not only depends upon the way in which the influence is exerted. In the
cases of Estonia and Latvia despite reluctance arising out of a deep historical
antipathy, the admixture of pressure and advice has been sufficient to influence
modifications in legislation. Although some human rights organisations have
seen the moderating influence of the OSCE and the Council of Europe as too
accommodating, significant amendments were made to legislation, which could
otherwise have had a significant affect in aggravating relations between commu-
nities.220 Earlier controversial legislation on citizenship adopted in 1991-92 could
not be influenced by the missions or the High Commissioner on National Mi-
norities, since neither was in operation at the time. The array of suggestions and
recommendations that have been provided have met with a degree of receptiv-
eness. One of the principal reasons for this can be located in the desire of Estonia
and Latvia to reconnect with Europe in order to benefit in economic terms from
the EU and security terms from NATO. These carrots have produced a degree
of responsiveness to external advice.
Duration is a useful criterion for evaluating the effectiveness of missions
that have been in the field for a number of years. The continued prolongation of
these missions, with the exception of the first missions dispatched to and subse-

220) Graham Smith, ‘The Ethnic Democracy Thesis and the Citizenship Question in Estonia and
Latvia’, pp. 199-216 in Nationalities Papers, Vol. 24, No. 2, 1996, p. 205.

110
quently removed from Kosovo, Sanjak and Vojvodina, also presents an obstacle
to the evaluation of success. That missions continue to be located in the field
could suggest that they have not fulfilled their tasks. The ongoing work of con-
ciliation and monitoring means that although some incremental results can be
identified, more concrete long-term results are premature. This is partly due to
the nature of conflict prevention. The fact that conflicts have not escalated into
violence in those states where long-term missions have been deployed as a pre-
ventive measure is one crude barometer of their success, but it is not an indicator
that can be used to reflect with accuracy upon the particular contribution of a
mission.
The argument can also be approached from another perspective: while
conflict has not arisen, to what extent have the social and political tensions that
warranted the dispatch of the mission in the first place been ameliorated or
addressed, or do the sources of conflict persist? Objectively speaking the poten-
tial for conflict appears to be less likely in the late 1990s than it did when the
missions were deployed in Estonia, Latvia and Ukraine: that is the explicitly
conflict prevention missions. Tensions still remain regarding the issues which
gave rise to the missions, but the level of these tensions and the general evolution
of the societies (particularly an improved, although still fragile, economic situ-
ation) suggests that there is not a sense that violent conflict might be imminent.
The Spillover Mission to Skopje finds itself in a continuing unstable environ-
ment. While this is influenced by the inability to address the underlying frictions
in inter-ethnic relations, the fundamental driver of instability remains the loca-
tion of the country and the fragility of stability among its neighbours.
Having said this the roots of the potential conflicts still persist and have not
been ‘resolved’. In Estonia, Latvia and Russia much emotionally loaded rhetoric
not oriented to harmonising relations continues to be used by politicians on both
sides of the divide. Additionally disputes have continued regarding the process,
speed and demands of naturalisation as well as the situation of stateless children.
In March 1998 language legislation in Latvia once again caused considerable
tensions between communities. In other cases similar assessments are pertinent,
for instance in Ukraine the issue of citizenship for Crimean Tatars and the social
and economic hardships the Tatars confront remain acute, but these issues do
appear much less likely to spark conflict than might have been the case in the
early to mid 1990s.
The lack of a comfortable resolution to these problems lies in the nature of
conflict and the fact that potential conflicts of the sort that the missions address
are rarely amenable to short-term solutions and therefore require significant
social, political and economic processes to evolve before they are transformed
into tensions or disputes that will be addressed through the ongoing functioning
of stable political systems. One could question whether or not the resources of

111
 OSCE participating states have been deployed in a sufficiently targeted or
proactive fashion, for example in providing assistance to language training in the
Baltics or addressing economic underdevelopment or hardship in Crimea or
Macedonia. However, the strategy of seeking to address these underlying issues
and provide information to the political bodies of the OSCE, thereby maintain-
ing the profile of the potential conflict, seems to be sound, if incomplete. This
does not however answer the question about whether long-term missions are the
appropriate means to address these problems.
Another related obstacle is that, while the complexity of many of the scen-
arios with which missions deal is an inherent and expected burden, the difficulty
of changing the perceptions of parties to one another, in the context of often
grievous historical legacies, has sometimes been underestimated by traditional
approaches to diplomacy. Missions are not a traditional diplomatic instrument,
but they have been established by state actors and are staffed, by and large, by
diplomats and therefore they operate in the context of their diplomatic heritage,
even if they are in the process of changing this context.
In view of the panoply of tasks which most missions have, including infor-
mation gathering, human rights monitoring, maintaining contacts with political
and popular movements, governmental authorities at central and local levels and
NGOs, providing assistance in the range of human dimension and political areas
mentioned above (including high level mediation in some cases), their size will
undoubtedly have an impact upon their ability to function effectively. It seems
reasonable to suggest that missions are at times inadequately staffed in terms of
number and the requisite expertise to fulfil their mandates. Although some
assistance is forthcoming from outside, particularly with regard to the Office for
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights’ work in the realm of technical
assistance and the contribution of the High Commissioner’s office in terms of
guidance provided by recommendations, the perception is that the mandates
demand more than a small team of seconded, ad hoc staff is likely to accom-
plish.
This is of consequence in terms of the fulfillment of mission tasks and the
termination of mandates. To date no mission is considered to have fulfilled its
mandate. The regular prolongation of mission mandates suggests that the OSCE
still regards them as an appropriate tool to address the issues at hand. Yet there
is no formal evaluation procedure to facilitate a performance review, other than
the regular review of mandates for the purpose of prolongation. Rather, missions
are evaluated informally, often through bilateral meetings between interested
parties and the Chairman-in-Office. This informal process makes it difficult for

112
 smaller states to fully engage and the focus is often on the regional political
priorities.221
Some states, which no longer welcome the presence of missions, pose the
question that with such broad mandates, frequently couched in vague language,
how is it actually possible to fulfil the mandate and hence close down the mis-
sion? The dilemma of developing an exit strategy is that it would require a clear
definition of the criteria which signalled the intervention in the first place. As has
been seen in the analysis of the mandates above, the missions were given broad
fields of operation which intimated but did not clarify the criteria for interven-
tion. An assumption in the establishment of missions is that they are not in-
tended to be permanent fixtures. Great sensitivity therefore, surrounds the pro-
spective termination of missions. For the sake of the integrity of all missions it is
regarded as imperative that no mission is seen to close in the face of overt politi-
cal pressure. Nevertheless, some states have lobbied for the closure of the mis-
sions they host and it is of importance that all host countries see the termination
of missions as a realistic prospect. They accepted missions as instruments to
address specific problems in a transition phase. Without a notion of how mis-
sions might be wound up it could be argued that they does not contribute to a
process of development, but rather are a mark of dependency or lack of confi-
dence. Additionally, perpetual missions risk a bureaucratization of the OSCE
itself.
The difficulty is in assessing how long a security risk persists. With regard
to the missions in Estonia and Latvia, it seems that there is an unspoken consen-
sus that missions will come to a conclusion when the Atlantic community no
longer feels the need to have the degree of access to facilitate support and when
the host country no longer feels the need to have the particular buffer against the
Russian Federation. While these host countries may increasingly feel that the
missions represent a stigma, the broader security architecture and politico-econ-
omic relations have yet to reach a point to convince the West that these states are
at the point of comprehensive integration.
Conversely, Birckenbach highlights the dilemma in terms of the potential
for abuse of the intervention by the parties concerned. In an ironic way ‘interna-
tional intervention [in Estonia and Latvia] within the framework of preventive
policy accompanied by financial aid may have encouraged certain kinds of
interests in preserving existing problems related to the integration of non-citi-
zens, instead of solving them.’222 The contention being that perpetuating the
issue secures an intensive protection of the Baltic states, vis-à-vis Russia, by the
inter-

221) Author’s interview with a member of a delegation to the OSCE in Vienna, February 1998.
222) H-M. Birkenbach, op.cit., p. 59.

113
national community, allied with financial support, that might otherwise not be
forthcoming. This would suggest a sophisticated counter-usage of the missions
by the host state. At the same time effectiveness of the mission is however chal-
lenged if not undermined through internal criticism that there is an absence of an
articulated view as to when the intervention will or should be concluded.
Furthermore, sustainable conflict prevention requires a degree of autonomy
on the parts of actors themselves and not the constant attention of an interna-
tional presence. The timing of any withdrawal is critical, but constant engage-
ment, seemingly in perpetuity, could act to contain a potential conflict but not
necessarily enhance a society’s capacity to deal with the causes of conflict itself.
This also risks a dependency. As Birckenbach comments, ‘patience, may become
exhausted, if the long term approach becomes an endless one.’223
The presence of missions presents the problem that host states feel they
indicate instability to the outside world. Therefore some states are keen to ter-
minate the mandate of the missions they host. Yet the political threshold for
requesting the withdrawal of an OSCE long-term mission seems to be rather
high. Complacency would seem to be wholly out of order given the increasing
disenchantment on the part of several host states. States not happy with the
continued presence of missions on their territory have periodically raised the
issue of the amendment of the terms of reference of the mission in the Perma-
nent Council. Ukraine is a good example. Following the Permanent Council
decision to extend the mandate for a further six months in June 1996, the delega-
tion of Ukraine issued an interpretative statement. This commended the contri-
bution the mission had made to the settlement of problems associated with
Crimea, but made it clear that the government of Ukraine was of the view that a
long-term mission was no longer the optimal means to address those problems
that persisted, since the outstanding issues lay under the prerogative of the High
Commissioner on National Minorities and it would be a costly duplication to
maintain a mission as well. The statement therefore argued for the winding up of
the mission.224 Since then the mandate of the mission has been extended on three
occasions but with the office in Simferopol closing and its size being reduced.225

223) ibid., p. 90.

224) Interpretative Statement by the delegation of Ukraine, Annex to PC.DEC/131, OSCE Decisions
1996 Reference Manual, Vienna, 1997, pp. 196-198.
225) In December 1997 the mission was reduced from six to four members as part of the prolongation
of the mandate until 30 June 1998. The implication being that there are now fewer tasks for the
mission. See Decision 204, Permanent Council Plenary Meeting no. 143 11 December 1997.

114
Nevertheless, despite Ukraine’s insistence that the mission be terminated it
remains.
The fear that the presence of a mission is damaging to a country’s image
has also been strong in Latvia and Estonia. Representatives of these states have
argued that the missions label them as potential crisis areas. Therefore, they are
reluctant to be associated with regions of instability in which manifest human
dimension violations occur and violent conflicts persists, fearing that they could
be tainted as ‘members of the same club’. They perceive this as having a dam-
aging affect upon their international image, questioning the level of their devel-
opment and frightening away investment.226 Therefore they seek a differentiation
and further clarification of the tasks of missions.227 The views of such states are
possibly a contributory factor to the recent field deployments not being termed
missions. In Chechnya there is an Assistance Group, in Albania a Presence and
in Belarus an Assistance and Monitoring Group. While the hosts of already
existing missions might be reluctant to see the proliferation of the instrument,
the host countries for these new field operations have little interest in receiving
missions because there is a feeling that ‘once you get a mission you can’t get rid
of it.’
That states willingly accept field operations that do not have the perceived
longevity and intrusiveness of missions reflects concerns that have arisen over the
functioning of missions. Although missions were intended to be security instru-
ments that were a sign of solidarity, receptivity towards them has changed and
now they are perceived by some states as intrusive rather than cooperative struc-
tures. On the one hand this suggests an effectiveness in the ability of the missions
to engage in matters of internal significance. On the other hand it reveals a
considerable cautiousness on the part of host governments concerning the degree
of intrusiveness that the missions allow.
Regardless of the nomenclature of OSCE field presences, the role they play
in wider political relationships should not be lost. The reluctance on Estonia’s
part to the continued presence of the mission has been met by a European Union

226) The claim that the presence of a mission detracts from international investment is regarded as an
overestimation of the impact of missions and an avoidance of strictly economic factors, in the
view of one OSCE official. Far more important than the presence of a mission is the absence of
sufficient legal and institutional frameworks to make investment secure. It is argued that missions
are used as excuses for not addressing other issues. Furthermore, it could be argued that since
each situation is very different the presence of a mission, as a sign of solidarity and preventive
diplomacy, could just as well provide investors with confidence.
227) Author’s interviews in Vienna. Such views were also presented by representatives of other States
where missions are located.

115
response making it clear that it attaches great importance to the consolidation of
security in the Baltics and that although the region is not a crisis area the mission
is important to the reduction of tensions between different communities.228 If
Estonian accession to the EU does go ahead then the issue of the continuation of
the mission will certainly have to be reviewed.
Diplomatic advocates of the continuing presence of missions in those
countries which are increasingly reluctant to host them, emphasise that the
mandates of missions need to be read in the context that they are primarily
security instruments seeking to address broad security risks by preventing or
managing conflicts. Facilitating dialogue and endeavours in the realm of the
human dimension contribute to the practical definition of the missions’ role.229
Missions, therefore, are political and not legal instruments and while certain
milestones can be used as criteria to evaluate the extent to which missions have
fulfilled their roles, it is the political judgement of the community of states that is
the final arbiter. By the same token it is the political support of the states that
will determine the extent to which host states will take on board the messages
that the missions are communicating.

228) T. Lahelma, op.cit., pp. 4-5.

229) Author’s interview with an OSCE official, Vienna, February 1998.

116
 6 The Effectiveness of the OSC E
in Conflict Prevention

Conflict prevention has increasingly become a strategic priority for the OSCE
and its participating states. The OSCE has transformed itself from a bipolar
dialogue forum to a multilateral structure with semi-autonomous institutions,
displaying an extensive operational capacity in conflict prevention and crisis
management. Its theoretical competence in this sphere has increased substan-
tially. This concluding section examines the extent to which there remain gaps in
the existing conflict prevention net and some of the limitations that inhibit the
functioning of the OSCE in this regard.

Gaps in the OSCE Conflict Prevention Net?

In terms of conflict prevention, judgement of the efficacy of the OSCE depends

less on the body of commendable norms and standards that have been amassed,
than on how the organisation operates in those areas where OSCE principles are
threatened and tensions could escalate into violent conflict. If the wars in the
former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, Nagorno Karabakh, Abkhazia and Tajiki-
stan are discounted as having arisen when the CSCE was developing its conflict

117
prevention focus and mechanisms, there are other situations which reflect on the
comprehensiveness of the OSCE’s conflict prevention architecture.

Chechnya
It has been common, and appropriate, to condemn Russia’s conduct in Chech-
nya since the commencement of the war in December 1994.230 It has been less
common to assess the extent to which the OSCE should have taken action prior
to the full military conflict. The question at hand is not whether the OSCE acted
effectively once the Russian military intervention had commenced, and certainly
the issue is not to diminish the contribution of the Assistance Group to Chech-
nya in facilitating a negotiations process, but rather to assess the degree to which
the OSCE failed to engage in any preventive action in Chechnya.
Discussions with OSCE officials and delegations in Vienna reveal argu-
ments explaining the lack of a preventive intervention in Chechnya. One expla-
nation argues that this was an internal conflict in the most self-protective state in
the OSCE and it was hardly likely that Russia would have countenanced any
intervention during the course of 1994. An additional perspective is that the
escalation of hostilities in December 1994 was more a question of power politics
and internal divisions in Moscow than events in Chechnya and therefore would
hardly have been amenable to the interventions at the disposal of the OSCE. A
further argument is that despite the manifest tension it was unexpected that the
war escalated in the way that it did. Diplomats suggest that the fact that the
OSCE was allowed to develop the role that it did in early 1995 was a testimony
to the comfort the Russian government felt with the organisation.
The fact remains, however, that several of the OSCE’s early warning, early
action and conflict prevention mechanisms could have been utilised prior to the
Russian invasion of Chechnya. The Vienna Mechanism for Consultation and
Co-operation on Unusual Military Activities could have been invoked during
troop movements or other stages of military preparation for the invasion by
Russian forces. The Vienna Human Dimension Mechanism could have been
used to obtain information on human rights abuses prior to the commencement
of hostilities. The Moscow Mechanism could have been activated to send a
mission to Moscow and/or Chechnya. Russia was not held to account for its
actions either by use of these mechanisms, nor by the Code of Conduct which
was signed just three days before President Yeltsin issued the order for Russian
armed forces to enter Chechnya. As Lucas states ‘the failure to act in a more
decisive fashion had the effect of granting the Russian government a de facto

230) Rachel Denber ‘The Legacy of Abuse in Chechnya and the OSCE Intervention’ in Helsinki
Monitor, Vol. 8, 1997, No. 1, pp. 59-74.

118
license to flagrantly disregard the most basic principles of international law,
including those reiterated in the Code [of Conduct], before and during the first
stages of the conflict.’231 Not only does this jeopardise the credibility of the
Code, but it risks compromising the OSCE as a whole, since if the participating
states are not prepared to act in the face of such violations its inclusiveness,
broad membership and profession of common values are merely token.
In addition to the failure of the mechanisms to be operated it is also necess-
ary to consider whether other instruments could have signalled a potential crisis.
The Chairman-in-Office did not nominate a Personal Representative or employ
other discretionary powers, such as dispatching a mission, until the crisis had
turned into a full blown armed struggle. At no point did the High Commissioner
on National Minorities address the potential for conflict, although in its nascent
phase the conflict in Chechnya involved a minority which had had some similar
experiences to the Crimean Tatars (a situation with which the High Commis-
sioner was engaged) and was situated on the border of the Russian Federation
and therefore could have been seen to be a threat to regional peace and stability.
It could be argued that the High Commissioner was excluded because of the
incidence of violence. This was, however, of a sporadic nature in 1993 and the
first half of 1994. By comparison, the High Commissioner has become attentive
to the situation in Georgia/Abkhazia in 1997 and 1998 (paying visits to Georgia
in June 1997 and June and August 1998) despite sporadic violence there (which
in May 1998 was of a greater degree than in Chechnya prior to late 1994), the
engagement of armed guerrilla formations, which could be labelled terrorists,
and the existence of other international attempts at mediation.232
The lack of intervention in Chechnya was, therefore, not so much related
to an absence of mechanisms or instruments. It could be argued that there was a
lack of information concerning a small and distant potential conflict zone, but to
do so is self-defeating: early warning, to be effective, should encompass just such
situations. Although not a high profile issue, the potential for conflict in
Chechnya had been indicated by NGOs and information circulated to interna-
tional organisations including the OSCE.233 Therefore the absence of an inde-

231) Michael Lucas, ‘The Code, Early Warning, and Conflict Prevention’, pp. 57-74 in Gert de Nooy
ed., Cooperative Security, the OSCE, and its Code of Conduct, The Hague 1996, p. 67.
232) For an analysis of the situation in Abkhazia and the role of guerrilla/terrorist formations see
Jonathan Cohen, ‘Peace Postponned: The war continues in Abkhazia’ in Transitions, Vol. 5, No.
7, July 1998, pp. 66-73.
233) See International Alert, Chechnya: A Situation Report, London, September 1992 as an early
example of information being circulated concerning the situation in Chechnya.

119
pendent analytical capacity in Vienna could be cited as a gap in the conflict
prevention armoury of the OSCE.
A more plausible explanation for the lack of action relates to the fact that
the Chairman-in-Office, the High Commissioner on National Minorities and the
participating states of the OSCE did not consider that they would be able to
exert much influence over the Russian Federation and were therefore reluctant to
intervene in the internal affairs of Russia. Realpolitik held sway. This was borne
out by the minimal success of western states in influencing Russia once the
conflict had begun in earnest. This reveals flaws in the conflict prevention oper-
ation of the OSCE, but it does point to a fundamental lesson of conflict preven-
tion in the OSCE, namely that the political will of participating states to hold
other states accountable for their actions, and be prepared to act correspond-
ingly, is paramount.
The above factors indicate the limited options available to the OSCE to
engage in conflict prevention activities in the face of a powerful but ‘rogue’ state,
thereby confirming some of the concerns of Central and East European states
which have been subject to OSCE interventions, that Russia receives separate
treatment. This is worrying in view of other potential conflict situations in the
Russian Federation, such as Dagestan or North Ossetia/Ingushetia. It does bring
one back to the purpose of the OSCE, which is to tie states into a web of co-
operative security. Of course power politics can never be ignored in such webs.
Chechnya is not the only example of the OSCE being undermined by Russia’s
maverick activities, but it is the most blatant.

Albania
The key question with regard to Albania is whether the OSCE could have acted
in a consolidated fashion at an earlier point in order to stave off the near collapse
of the state in early 1997. Once Vranitzky was appointed as Personal Represen-
tative of the Chairman-in-Office and the international operation on the ground
developed, the effectiveness was high. In managing the crisis, which was a mani-
fest breakdown of peace and security, it was prevented from escalating into a
considerably more serious one. Nevertheless, this does not camouflage the tardi-
ness of the response from a conflict prevention perspective. At best, in the con-
text of Miall’s distinction between light and deep conflict prevention the OSCE’s
intervention in Albania at this time can be regarded as a success for light conflict
prevention. It would perhaps be more appropriate to characterise the interven-
tion as an early crisis management, and the fact that the crisis escalated to the
point that it did reflects a failure in policy to address deep conflict

120
prevention.234 Indeed, the intervention became effective when a coalition of the
willing was led by the West European state, Italy, whose interests were most
directly affected by the chaos and ensuing flows of refugees.
Miall identifies four dimensions of potential conflict in Albania in the mid
1990s. These were the political polarisation between the two major parties; the
economic turmoil of the transition and the rapid social stratification that
emerged; the status of the Greek minority in the south of the country; and the
diversity of religious identity groups.235 The OSCE had a clear mandate for
intervention in regard to the status of the Greek minority and the High Commis-
sioner on National Minorities made several trips to Albania prior to October
1994.236 However, the ethnic issue was not an immediate cause of the escalation
of tension in the latter part of 1996, thus involvement by the High Commis-
sioner was precluded. In regard to the political process in Albania the OSCE’s
criticism of the 1996 elections was the most strongly worded judgement the
OSCE had given on a participating state’s elections.237 Nevertheless, despite the
backing of the EU and the United States, the OSCE was able to do little to
influence the obdurate President Berisha, who had previously been the recipient
of western plaudits and assistance.
An additional and central element to the final escalation of the tensions in
Albania, reflecting on the failure of the OSCE is emphasised by the Secretary
General: ‘What the crisis in Albania highlighted, however, was the failure of
Europe’s security organizations to tackle economic and social crises at an early
stage. The early warning was there – the collapse of the pyramid schemes and
the resultant discontent were front page news. What was lacking was co-ordina-
tion between economic organizations, security organizations and the Albanian
authorities to address the simmering problem before it boiled over.’238
The proximate sources of the conflict, lying in the fraudulent elections and
the economic disaster of the collapse of the pyramid schemes, did not necessarily
presage the type or scale of societal collapse that occurred. Nevertheless, the

234) Hugh Miall, ‘The OSCE Role in Albania: A Success for Conflict Prevention?’ Helsinki Monitor,
Vol. 8, 1997, No. 4, pp. 74-85.
235) ibid., pp. 76-78.
236) The Role of the High Commissioner on National Minorities in OSCE Conflict Prevention, The Founda-
tion on Inter-Ethnic Relations, The Hague, June 1997, pp. 44-48.
237) Observation on the Parliamentary Elections held in the Republic of Albania, May 26 and June 2, 1996,
ODIHR, Warsaw, 11 June 1996.
238) Speech by Ambassador Giancarlo Aragona, Secretary General of the OSCE, ‘Preventive Action
in Europe: The Role of the OSCE’, at the International Conference on Preventive Strategy,
Tokyo 13 January 1998, p. 11.

121
acuity of Aragona’s statement does not divert attention from the more funda-
mental failing of the OSCE in regard to Albania. Namely, there was an insuffi-
cient response to the structural causes of the breakdown, which had deeper roots,
especially the weak governance, political polarisation and inadequate and chaotic
economic institutions. Aragona highlights the lack of attention to the final point,
but too many western governments had seen Berisha as the person who had
brought democracy to Albania, and thus were disinclined to respond to his
increasingly dictatorial style of rule sufficiently early. Miall cites as an example
the West’s inaction concerning the struggle over the independence of the judi-
ciary as allowing Berisha to perceive that democratic deficits would be excused as
long as he conformed in terms of the foreign policy the West desired.239 This
reveals a typical fault in western policy towards Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union in the post-communist period, that of investing in individuals as
much if not more than structures, institutions and processes of change. A large
part of the problem was Berisha’s unwillingness to co-operate, and this under-
lines the limitation of the OSCE in influencing, or twisting the arm, of a govern-
ment or President not inclined to comply.

Kosovo
Ever since the break-up of Yugoslavia commenced, the international community
has feared the spread of conflict to the southern Balkans. At the root of the
concern was that if fighting broke out and the Serb authorities began the expul-
sion of Albanians from Kosovo, the scale of the forced displacement could have
a significant impact on regional security. Tensions in Kosovo have been on the
international agenda for at least a decade, since the autonomy of the region was
revoked by the Yugoslav authorities in 1988. Despite this tensions escalated to
the verge of all out war in the summer of 1998. The international community in
general, and the OSCE in particular, must reflect upon why efforts at preventive
diplomacy have uniformly failed to restrain the escalation.
The first long-term mission of the OSCE was sent to Kosovo (as well as
Sanjak and Vojvodina) in 1992, an early recognition of the frailty of stability in
the region. The mission was withdrawn in 1993 owing to the refusal of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to prolong the Memorandum of Understanding.
A watch-group was established in Vienna to examine events in the areas formerly
covered by the mission. In 1997 a Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-
Office was appointed, although as noted above was only able to play a limited

239) Miall, op.cit., p. 84.

122
role.240 The escalation of the tensions since early 1998, including heavy handed
and brutal police action by the Serb authorities, effectively oriented towards a
policy of ‘ethnic cleansing’, and an increasingly military response from the
Kosovo Liberation Army, have demanded a more urgent response from the
OSCE.
Despite the efforts of the Chairman-in-Office (who has issued a number of
statements, such as one on June 11 deploring ‘the excessive and indiscriminate
use of force by Serb military and police units which has brought the crisis to the
brink of war and threatens international peace and security’241) and the appoint-
ment of a new Personal Representative, the OSCE’s efforts have taken a back
seat, with the Contact Group playing a more instrumental role. Nevertheless, the
Contact Group is struggling to grapple with the resolute decision of President
Milosevic not to accept international involvement on the Kosovo issue, since in
his view it is an internal affair.
A number of factors appear to have limited the effectiveness of engage-
ment. The prioritisation of the war in Bosnia crippled the OSCE, both concep-
tually and in terms of resources. The fear was that if secession was allowed in
Kosovo, nothing would prevent the Bosnian Serbs from seceding from Bosnia,
thereby undermining Western policy. However, such a cautious policy effectively
assumed that secession was an inevitable consequence of autonomy, and by not
pushing for a meaningful autonomy at an earlier stage the escalation of the
conflict has undermined the credibility of the OSCE’s preferred solution, namely
autonomy (regardless of whether or not this would have actually succeeded in
addressing root causes of the conflict). The OSCE’s strategy was passive,
emphasising the need for Serbia to respect human rights and minorities and to
grant autonomy to Kosovo within the Yugoslav Federation. The insistence that
Kosovo belongs within the frontiers of Serbia and Yugoslavia left the interna-
tional community seeking to maintain the same position it had held at the begin-
ning of the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, with the same lack of effect. The
approach effectively appeased Serbia with regard to Kosovo in order to keep
Serbia on board in the resolution of the Bosnian conundrum. As Miall com-

240) A detailed account of OSCE involvement in Kosovo is provided in Stefan Troebst, Conflict in
Kosovo: Failure of Prevention? An Analytical Documentation, 1992-1998, ECMI Working Paper # 1,
1998, pp. 26-32. For a specific discussion of the role of Max van der Stoel see John Packer, ‘The
Role of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities in the Former Yugoslavia’, pp.
169-184, in Cambridge Review of International Affairs, spring/summer 1999, Vol. XII/2, pp. 176-
178.
241) Statement by the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE, Bronislaw Geremek, 11 June 1998, reported
in OSCE Newsletter, Vol. 5, No. 6, June 1998, p. 2.

123
ments, ‘[T]he interests of conflict prevention in Kosovo were therefore sacrificed
in order to achieve a conflict settlement in Bosnia.’242 Inevitably the issue did not
remain suppressed for long and returned to the agenda in a far more sensitive
format.
The failure of the Kosovar Albanian’s policy of non-violence to produce
any results tilted them towards a policy of violence, which they had seen re-
warded elsewhere in the Balkans. As a result the international community is now
faced with the dilemma of whether to launch a more rigorous and possibly
military intervention before the war has developed further or wait until later to
do the same. The parties are being urged to negotiate, but outcomes are already
prescribed before they reach the negotiating table (namely enhanced autonomy is
the limit of the resolution of the status issue) and thus the party whose aspir-
ations are ruled out has little incentive to negotiate.
The failure of conflict prevention in Kosovo has not been the OSCE’s
alone, but it does suggest that the mechanisms and instruments at the disposal of
the OSCE can not always carry out their functions without a favourable interna-
tional climate. In this instance the OSCE’s options for action are severely cir-
cumscribed by the unwillingness of the Serbian authorities to engage in a process
of dialogue. Milosevic has been masterful in the cat and mouse game that has
delayed more stringent intervention. The OSCE has had little impact in redefin-
ing the nature of the process. The suspension of the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia from the OSCE has both diminished the scope for engagement and meant
that the toughest measure in the OSCE’s arsenal has already been exhausted. A
large part of the problem has been that the participating states have been locked
into the thinking that drove policy towards the Yugoslav debacle in the early
1990s. This is a question of state policy and the failure of co-operative
approaches. The escalation of the conflict therefore suggests that the OSCE is
only able to play a constructive role when there is an inclination on the part of
both parties to engage in a process. At present this is not the case in Kosovo,
where one party believes it can spurn international pressure and the other feels
betrayed by the international community and perceives itself as having been
driven into a position of self-help.

242) Hugh Miall, ‘Kosovo in Crisis: Conflict Prevention and Intervention in the Southern Balkans’,
forthcoming in Peace and Security, October 1998.

124
 Limitations in the OSCE’s Conflict Prevention Endeavours

The examination of experiences in Chechnya, Albania and Kosovo, suggest that

there are clear limitations in the OSCE’s conflict prevention endeavours. With
some additional concerns these can be broken down into the following catego-
ries: political will; the nature of the instruments and mechanisms; the question of
the universality of standards; early warning; the internal operation of the OSCE;
and the public profile of the OSCE.

Political Will and how it is Wielded

The key commodity in promoting effective multilateral conflict prevention is
political will. The underlying question is whether the community of states has
the political will or interest to act in the face of a potential conflict. If states
exercise excessive restraint in the application of OSCE mechanisms and instru-
ments, these will lose their potency and ability to address conflicts. To a large
extent political will is a balance of considerations that a particular conflict might
actually go away and all the effort and implications of direct intervention could
therefore be avoided. It takes serious violence, or the manifest prospect of this,
with the resultant strategic implications, to tip the scales in favour of interven-
tion. As an inter-governmental body, although the OSCE has developed its own
identity through the process of gradual institutionalisation, it continues to repre-
sent the collective will of the participating states and can act only within the
limits of the means (financial, conceptual and contractual) afforded to it.
Certain constraints confront the collective operation of political will. The
relationship between national policy and multilateralism is particularly delicate
in that double agendas are often at play. In the case of the former Yugoslavia,
despite the emphasis on territorial integrity and national sovereignty over self-
determination, the renationalisation of foreign policies helped to legitimate
principles (territorial partition along ethnic, religious and cultural lines) in con-
flict with the process of integration and enlargement that was occurring at the
time within the EU.243 This has also been noticeable in the case of Nagorno
Karabakh in the roles of Russia, the United States, Turkey and France. The
balance between national interest and common security always has realpolitik
weighing heavily on the scales.244 The nature of intervention is qualified by the
degree to which an issue impinges on wider issues of security and stability. In

243) Sophia Clement, Conflict Prevention in the Balkans: Case Studies of Kosovo and the FYR of Macedonia,
Challiot Papers 30, Institute for Security Studies, December 1997, pp. 47-49.
244) Heather Hurlburt and David Storr, ‘A Gesamtkonzept for Conflict Management: Bringing
Capabilities into Line with Exigencies’ in Helsinki Monitor, Vol. 5, 1994, No. 3, pp. 55-62.

125
this context the Balkans was a lot closer to home for West European states which
had to deal with the prospect of refugee flows and the ‘CNN factor’, whereas
Chechnya was a more distant concern and the situation in Dagestan, for exam-
ple, even more so.
The OSCE disposes of ‘soft’ measures that depend upon compromise
between the parties in the conflict as much as international pressure. The
OSCE’s task is to avoid the need to raise the stakes towards ‘hard’ intervention.
This questions the extent to which the OSCE has sufficient teeth, to act in those
instances when the mechanisms and instruments themselves are unable to pre-
vent an escalation. The OSCE possesses limited sanctions. It has no enforcement
mechanisms and is not in a position to compel states to follow a particular line
of action. The objective of its approach has been to assist states, through a web
of mechanisms, to avoid conflicts or confrontations rather than forcing them to
do so.245 But such approaches require sufficient interest on the part of all parties
to engage and this is a fragile diplomacy, since obdurate parties can chose to
ignore it. One response growing out of, but also threatening, the co-operative
approach is the imposition of sanctions, from application in the economic sphere
to expulsion. To have an impact sanctions have to be backed by significant
political will. As a coercive instrument sanctions are unlikely to foster long term
prevention, rather they contain and threaten.246 In Yugoslavia sanctions initially
were imposed in line with the EU and UN. Subsequently the OSCE resorted to
the sanction of exclusion as a means to exert influence over the behaviour of a
state. However, suspending Yugoslavia from the OSCE deprived it of what
meagre means it possessed to monitor and influence events. An organisation
which legitimises interference in the internal affairs of its participating states
diminished its capacity to do so through this decision.
Clearly exclusion is not a co-operative means with which to solve prob-
lems, but is rather a display of power. In other cases compliance is pursued more
co-operatively and is aided by a ‘carrot and stick’ policy. The OSCE has some
carrots and sticks at its disposal, but for sticks to be effective there has to be a
sense that they encompass a range of actions that precede a more coercive inter-
vention. It is not categorical that the OSCE itself disposes of coercive sanctions.
After all, participating states are linked in the operation of other multilateral
bodies. It is, however, imperative that there is a commitment and a means to
utilise coercive measures as and when necessary. This demands a multilayered
and co-ordinated approach.

245) Walter Kemp, Making Sense of the CSCE, Federal Trust Discussion Paper, April 1994, p. 12.
246) See Renee de Nevers, ‘Democratization and Ethnic Conflict’, Survival Summer 1993, pp. 31-48.

126
 This is seen in regard to prospective membership of other international
bodies. The EU, for example, has established a rigorous threshold for member-
ship, including fiscal, governance and human rights criteria. From the outset the
OSCE has had an inclusive approach to participation: the OSCE’s approach has
been to bring states on board and to assist participating states with flawed rec-
ords to improve their compliance with commitments from within. The under-
lying assumption is that through support programmes the roots of societal
instability will be addressed. Participation in such a club can help to change
motivations and interests regardless of the presence or absence of pressure to
conform. The more onerous criteria for EU membership have been a means to
exert influence over states to comply with OSCE commitments. EU enlarge-
ment, and the carrot of accession, is a distinct process, a trump card that can
only be played once for each state. However, fulfillment of criteria along the
road to accession are an important means through which to have a sustained
impact upon both the behavioural and structural evolution of states.
Political will is crucial to the preparedness of states to act in concert in the
face of potential conflicts. This requires action not only in cases of manifest
violations of commitments or highly visible escalatory tensions. A bottom up
approach to prevention encompasses the will to ensure the implementation of
OSCE standards and commitments. Failure in this is also an indicator, not
necessarily of imminent conflict but certainly that the mode of governance which
the OSCE as a community has agreed to, is not being undertaken and the poten-
tial for discord within society rises. The degree to which standards are imple-
mented at a national level offers ‘yardsticks by which states can gauge develop-
ments regarding their potential for conflict.’247 Leverage only comes in the wake
of a preparedness to ensure that participating states realise that commitments are
real (and as such intended to be beneficial for development) and not merely for
window dressing.
Insufficient implementation or outright violations require a prompt re-
sponse. If OSCE states are unwilling to challenge those states which are seen to
transgress in the implementation of norms, then the commitments themselves
are undermined. For example, states were very cautious in their response to the
conflict in Chechnya, refraining from using the Code of Conduct as a means to
assess the ‘quality’ of Russian behaviour.248 However, during the Permanent
Council’s discussions of Croatia’s operations in Western Slavonia and the

247) Rob Zaagman, ‘Some Reflections on OSCE Conflict Prevention and the Code of Conduct’, pp.
29-39, in Helsinki Monitor, Vol. 7, 1996, No. 2, p. 31.
248) See Michael Lucas, ‘The War in Chechnya and the OSCE Code of Conduct’ pp. 32-42 in
Helsinki Monitor, 1995, No. 2, pp. 35-37.

127
Krajina, provisions of the Code were invoked. As Zaagman points out, ‘the
legitimacy of international commitments and monitoring thereof is under threat
if “big boys” can consistently violate such commitments and get away with it.’249
This points to one of the critical dilemmas faced by the OSCE community.
Much of the evolution of the OSCE in the post-Cold War period has implicitly
been to socialise Russia. The OSCE has been used as a forum to constrain
Russia’s excesses and at the same time to integrate Russia into the common
practice of the wider European community – a balance which has rarely been
easy.

The Nature of Formalised Dispute Settlement Procedures

In general, states have been reluctant to create mechanisms to address internal
conflicts because they prefer to avoid the prospect of intervention in internal
affairs which could compromise their own national sovereignty. Those instru-
ments which do sanction internal intervention were established, by and large, at
a time when Central and East European states have been weak and prepared to
open themselves up to scrutiny as part of the process of gravitating toward the
West. This is less the case today.
In inter-state relations sophisticated procedures can take priority over the
search for simple, pragmatic and workable solutions. To a certain extent this
appears to have been the case with the OSCE in regard to its formalised mech-
anisms for peaceful settlement of disputes, which as one commentator states,
betrays the way in which ‘States develop complex mechanisms to protect their
complex interests’.250 The non-usage of these mechanisms within the OSCE
indicates the reluctance of states to accept formalised third party intervention
that is based on legal rather than political criteria. This reluctance imposes a
limitation on the possibility for effective multilateral conflict prevention. Never-
theless, while parties might resist outside interference they cannot necessarily
resolve issues without some level of intervention. This reveals the adaptability of
the OSCE, since in practice a shift from over-complicated mechanisms to the
use of politically designed instruments such as the High Commissioner on Na-
tional Minorities, the missions and the Personal Representatives of the
Chairman-in-Office has occurred. Despite the trend for integration (primarily
economic but also political) within the EU it is difficult to envisage circum-
stances in which OSCE participating states will be prepared to lower the thresh-

249) R. Zaagman, ‘Some Reflections ...’, op.cit., p. 35.

250) Heather Hurlburt, ‘CSCE Conflict Resolution in Practice: A work in progress’ pp. 25-38 in
Helsinki Monitor, Vol. 5, 1994, No. 2, p. 36.

128
old for internal intervention and the subjugation of sovereignty to the extent that
the legalistic mechanisms will perform instrumental roles.

Universality or Double Standards

One of the defining characteristics of the OSCE is the equality of all partici-
pating states: equal access exists for all and commitments apply equally to all.
The operation of the OSCE, however, leaves room for concern that instruments
are applied by one half of a continent to another half. A number of diplomats in
Vienna expressed the view that the touchstone of whether the OSCE is inclusive
and co-operative rather than a stick with which to beat transitional states will be
when the OSCE addresses an issue in a west European state, intimating the
existence of politically motivated double standards. One argument is that it
would be warranted for OSCE conflict prevention instruments to operate in
regard to situations such as Corsica, the Basque region, Italian separatism or
Quebec. Another is that the non-operation of instruments in regard to Russia or
Turkey, indicates a lack of commitment to apply standards universally.
This evaluation emanates from representatives of states for whom ‘joining
the West’ has been an important stimulus. They can be prone to judging the
effectiveness of the OSCE from the perspective of whether or not it has helped
meet this goal. In pursuit of this goal states were initially more amenable to
measures that might impinge upon their sovereignty, but saw this as a necessary
first step to the structural adjustment that was required for EU and NATO
membership. Undoubtedly this has afforded considerable leverage for influence
over internal legislation and the general orientation of these states. A counter
argument, suggests that, although there are tensions and actual crises in Western
Europe these are either outside the parameters of OSCE engagement (for in-
stance the intervention of the High Commissioner on National Minorities re-
quires a situation to pose a threat to broader security issues) or the EU is more
likely to become involved at an early stage.
A cause for concern in these perceptions of double standards is that the
objective of much of the conflict prevention work is to be inclusive, to draw
states into a wider community. Yet in being drawn in some states feel patronised.
As a result of being interpreted as one condition of a wider political manoeuvre,
the hurdles to be negotiated could actually serve to alienate states and cease to
influence their behaviour, especially those that might be left on the outside of the
EU or NATO.

Early Warning
Of utmost importance to a commitment to conflict prevention is a capacity to
detect potential conflicts at an early stage and to respond appropriately as early
as possible. The OSCE possesses a number of antennae which in theory play an

129
early warning role: the High Commissioner on National Minorities, the long-
term missions, the monitoring of structural factors within the human dimension
and the existence of a permanent political consultation process in Vienna. Early
warning is only effective if it leads to an understanding of how the root causes of
conflict should be identified and then dealt with. If the analysis of the roots of
conflict are limited then the range of actions are also limited. Although it is not
necessarily systematic the OSCE’s approach emphasises the need for political
appreciation of potential security risks, through the co-ordination of the political
bodies of the OSCE, but there is not an internal analytical capacity. The
OSCE’s dilemma is more in the realm or translating early warning into appro-
priate action and intervention. Coalitions of action have to be built. Strategies
which substantively contribute to change (not simply at the level of rhetoric)
need to be considered. Financial resources have to be available. Early interven-
tion, which can be perceived as an affront to a state’s sovereignty and indepen-
dence, has to be set in train.
An area which suggests that there have been gaps in the OSCE’s approach
to conflict prevention is the economic dimension. Although the second basket of
the OSCE put economic issues among the founding priorities of the CSCE,
these have received marginal attention as the OSCE has developed. The OSCE
has not been sufficiently attentive to the political consequences of economic
irresponsibility. That a close link exists between security and economic and
social stability in the participating states has become increasingly apparent, since
the economic weakness of any state can damage other aspects of its stability and
have an impact on the stability of sub regions as well as individual countries. As
a result of this recognition, and with the precipitous events in Albania in late
1996 and early 1997, serving to emphasise the need, an OSCE Co-ordinator on
Economic and Environmental Activities has been established.
This instrument will not be an information accumulator, which would
duplicate roles played by international financial institutions that compile detailed
reports on the viability and sustainability of individual countries’ financial sys-
tems. The OSCE’s need is for economic analysis to contribute to assessments of
internal and external security concerns and for more effective liaison with inter-
national financial institutions in order to maximise the impact of intervention.251

The Internal Operation of the OSCE

Participating states have long been concerned that the OSCE should not amass
its own bureaucracy, bedevilled by internal institutional needs. Questions have

251) See Speech by Ambassador Giancarlo Aragona, ‘Preventive Action in Europe: The Role of the
OSCE’, op.cit., p. 12.

130
been posed concerning how well different OSCE offices and missions are run, in
relation to secondments and personnel matters, whether or not field staff have
appropriate skills and experience, management structures and administrative
processes within offices, the use of new technologies to facilitate communication
and information gathering, and fiscal rectitude. The relevance is twofold: first,
good practice in internal management is germane to an organisation seeking to
promote good practice in issues of governance and rights as a cornerstone of
conflict prevention; second, inefficient management can only hamper the efficacy
of operations.
This raises the issue of personalities. The efficacy of a number of conflict
prevention instruments depends upon the way in which individuals (Heads of
Mission, the High Commissioner on National Minorities, Personal Representa-
tives of the Chairman-in-Office, as well as the Chairman him or herself) per-
form their roles. The operation of these instruments allows scope for individual
discretion as to how and when to become engaged in preventive activities. This is
inevitable since conflict escalation and conflict prevention are about politics. It
can lead, however, toward intuitive rather than systematic conflict prevention. It
is not only the diplomatic skills with regard to the exercise of mandates and
developing the confidence of government and non-governmental interlocutors,
which count. It is also important that the instruments collaborate effectively with
one another. Accountability to the political bodies of the OSCE and a prepared-
ness to scrutinise the operation of institutions is the only means to surmount
friction that inevitably exist between them.
An area in which the operation of the OSCE is often far from transparent
is in the appointment of senior officials to positions within the organisation.
Deliberations for such positions are not conducted openly and the criteria for
appointments are not always clear. Officials and representatives of individual
states or groups of states engage in back room deals that are often a question of
bargaining over political turf and claims to prominent international positions. As
a result compromise appointees are not always the ablest and this has an impact
on the competence of the organisations operation.

Public Profile
The public profile of an organisation engaged in conflict prevention work can
both contribute to and diminish the effectiveness of its work. Confidentiality is
an important element which often conditions the way in which OSCE officials
operate, especially the High Commissioner. Therefore, reports are often not
released to wider audiences. But as a result the findings can be used by politicians
in a selective form, and the failure of missions to counter the selective use of

131
material has led, in some cases, to a loss of credibility.252 This can be detrimental
since public awareness and public pressure can be effective tools. If local and
international opinion is oblivious to the activities of the OSCE in the realm of
conflict prevention governments might feel less motivated to follow through with
the hard decisions that invariably accompany conflict scenarios.253
A former Head of Mission to Estonia has commented that the public image
of missions and their ability to swing public debate has not always been
positive.254 There appears not to be a strategy on the part of the OSCE to ad-
dress the local and international media as a means to disseminate information
about conflict prevention or human dimension commitments. It would be diffi-
cult to prove the impact a media strategy could have. Nevertheless, allowing
mistaken rhetoric to dominate public discourse not only damages the credibility
of the organisation but it fails to impact on broader social attitudes allowing
discordant perceptions to be entrenched. There is a need for serious presentation
to the public for the purpose of initiating ‘myth-free public debates’255.

Is There an Adequate Framework for Conflict Prevention?

The levels of tensions in those states in which the OSCE has been active, before
and after the commencement of an intervention, is a measure of the extent to
which effectiveness can be judged. Assessing levels of tension is an imprecise art.
Nevertheless, there are certain features that shed light on the question. In a
number of countries the institutions and experience of statehood are more en-
trenched now than in the early 1990s when the OSCE began to deploy its instru-
ments of conflict prevention. This is reflected in a number of ways: constitutions
have been rewritten and bodies of laws put on the statute books; governments
have been removed through electoral processes which have not drawn the ire of
the international community; integration into the international community
through participation in, membership or associate membership of a range of
international bodies has enhanced the status and profile of many states; and
states which were newly independent or released from the constraints of an
immobilising bloc system, have become more confident in their dealings with the
international community and more sophisticated, if not aggressive, in fending off

252) H-M. Birckenbach, op.cit., pp. 55-60.

253) H. Hurlburt, ‘CSCE Conflict Resolution ...’, op.cit., pp. 25-38.
254) T. Lahelma, op.cit., p. 16.
255) H-M. Birkenbach, op.cit., p. 87.

132
perceived infringements of their sovereignty. Thus the character of states has
undoubtedly changed.
This evolution suggests that some of the states in which the OSCE has
most actively pursued a conflict prevention agenda, despite not having passed
completely beyond human dimension concerns or violations of human and
minority rights, are distant from the prospect of any violent conflict. In Estonia
and Latvia debates persist about the content of legislation on language and
education and concerns are aired about the prospects of integrated multicultural
societies, but the potential for intervention by the Russian Federation seems
much less likely. The cumulative interest of the international community, often
in ways that has tried the patience of the Estonian authorities, appears to have
set out a marker restraining the Russian Federation, if not some of the more
volatile voices within. In Ukraine, the fundamental questions relating to the
status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea took a long time to be resolved.
The debate has now moved beyond the question of Crimean secession and
threats to Ukrainian sovereignty. With regard to the Crimean Tatars, they
remain a community in need, but not one which is likely to spark a wider confla-
gration, given that there are international attempts to meet their needs, co-ordi-
nated by the OSCE (mission and High Commissioner on National Minorities),
UNHCR, UNDP and the Ukrainian Government. These examples suggest that
the OSCE, in collaboration (actively or incidentally) with other international
organisations, NGOs and political and economic circumstances, has contributed
to a lessening of tensions.
Macedonia presents a somewhat different case and hence a different per-
spective on conflict prevention. The international community’s priority was the
interposition of forces (UNPREDEP) and the provision of good offices (the
High Commissioner on National Minorities and the long-term mission) as a
reaction to concerns that the Balkan conflicts could spillover and ignite internal
tensions. The international presence provided several signals: as an indication of
a determination to be involved; the combination of military and civil compo-
nents to the engagement provided a deterrent and a persuasive capability; and
the early deployment of resources meant that there was scope for adapting the
role in advance of any potential conflict. Internal factors also had a major im-
pact: the level of violence at the time of deployment was low and the agreement
of the authorities concerned was unanimous. Nevertheless, Macedonia has
remained in a precarious state. Internally, ethnic relations remain tense and
society remains polarised along ethnic lines, with issues over autonomy, educa-
tion and status still

133
unresolved, and leading to periodic flare ups.256 Externally, the deterioration of
the situation in the southern Balkans has added to international fears of a
spillover and consequently led to a reinforcement of the international presence
on Macedonia’s borders with Albania and Kosovo.
These factors suggest that the OSCE’s capacity for conflict prevention
must be seen in a broader context than the operation of its own instruments. The
OSCE’s effectiveness is conditioned both by the complementary roles of other
agencies and wider economic, political and social circumstances. Nevertheless,
the functioning of the OSCE’s instruments and its political structures, as a
dialogue forum, are inextricably linked to the wider canvass. Through the oper-
ation of the instruments and mechanisms examined in this report, despite the
problems that have been outlined, the OSCE remains well-placed to act early. In
doing so it has begun to change the way states perceive the potential to prevent
conflicts.
The OSCE’s comprehensive approach allows for a broad remit of concern
and intervention. The human dimension, protocols regarding human rights and
specific political commitments have legitimised interference in the domestic
jurisdiction of participating states, although many governments remain nervous
about the implications of this. Encompassing issues relating to good governance,
the rule of law, strengthening civil society, and respect for human and minority
rights, the human dimension is critical to the development of societies capable of
addressing the dysfunctions that could generate violent conflicts.
The co-operative ethos of the OSCE provides an innovative basis for
engagement. The operation of the High Commissioner on National Minorities,
the long-term missions and the Personal Representatives of the Chairman-in-
Office have ‘turned away from the view of the third party as a “resolver” of
conflict. They are ... concerned less with using power than with using persuasion
as a means for inducing changes of policy, less with judging compliance with
legal obligations than with generating practical decisions, and less with formality
than with acting with the flexibility needed to address the situation at hand and
as a facilitator and adviser over the long term.’257 Their limited mandates, ex-
ploratory and non-binding nature enables parties, especially governments, to feel
that they remain in control and are not forced or humiliated into compromises.
Utilising non-coercive instruments at the point of departure in conflict preven-
tion is an attempt to address conflicts co-operatively.

256) See Hugh Miall, ‘Kosovo in Crisis: Conflict Prevention and Intervention in the Southern Bal-
kans’, forthcoming in Peace and Security, October 1998.
257) D. Chigas et.al., in A. H. Chayes and A. Chayes, op.cit., p. 63.

134
 Prioritising process and policy rather than substance and settlement, these
instruments of the OSCE give precedence to the need to address the interests,
needs and fears of parties, thereby assisting them towards mutually acceptable
ways of satisfying these. Primary responsibility for resolving problems neverthe-
less lies with the actors concerned. The process orientation is based on the as-
sumption that if better relationships can be facilitated (between the parties to the
dispute/conflict themselves, and between the third party and the other parties)
then the scope for a more productive outcome will be greater. While emphasising
process over substance is in theory an important step it is not always the case in
practice, as the example of negotiations over Kosovo indicates. The process
orientation remains founded on certain common precepts, principally maintain-
ing a particular balance between territorial integrity and self-determination, and
it remains the case that the OSCE has not proved effective in facilitating political
solutions to deep rooted conflicts.
The political bodies of the OSCE, and hence the participating states, have
delegated the right of independent initiative to conflict prevention instruments,
particularly the High Commissioner, but also missions. This provides flexibility
and scope for quick responses to changing circumstances. Host governments
retain a right to influence the use of these instruments, even if this is subject to
political pressure exerted by the Chairman-in-Office, the Permanent Council or
leading states. The implication drawn from experience to date is that the input
and control governments retain does not inhibit the leeway for operation pos-
sessed by the instruments. Host governments have to calculate to what extent it
is in their interests to push to curtail an engagement. Such calculations are
bound up in other political processes and decisions, most notably for a number
of states the issue of accession to the EU.
The OSCE has been obliged to take on board new scenarios. This has been
necessary given the changed nature of conflict in post Cold War Europe, which
has challenged the state centred orientation of the OSCE. One response to the
growth of internal conflicts has been to build a regime of minority protection.
Another has been a recognition that such conflicts are not merely the domain of
traditional diplomacy and peacekeeping. The OSCE has acted to address this by
creating instruments with an interventionist capacity. It has been difficult to
apply these conclusively since resolving ethno-political conflicts has proven to be
less a question of procedure and law, although undoubtedly these are necessary,
and more a factor of societal relations and the politics of recognition combined
with finding ways to reconcile the real or perceived grievances of communities
between which harsh barriers of hatred and violence have been established.
New types of conflicts have required the OSCE to reconsider the role of
sub-state entities and non-state parties. In Crimea, South Ossetia, Chechnya,
Nagorno Karabakh and Kosovo the OSCE has experience in dealing with sub-

135
state actors. The instruments, mechanisms, principles and decision-making
procedures of the OSCE traditionally have been oriented towards conduct
between states. Hence the OSCE continues to grapple with means to involve
such entities in political processes. These entities are less inclined to consider
themselves subject to international sanction than recognised states, since they do
not necessarily feel obliged to adhere to the norms and commitments of interna-
tional bodies to which they are not affiliated. Inevitably these parties have to be
included to achieve durable solutions based on peaceful relations and not vio-
lence.
Nevertheless, sub-state actors are only able to inform the OSCE and its
bodies of concerns, as they possess no official designation within the OSCE.
Responsibility lies with the OSCE, in the guise of its various instruments and the
Permanent Council, to pursue matters further. This requires a calculation of the
opportunity cost of inaction. While all conflict prevention involves this calcula-
tion there is a risk involved when states and their instruments are able to over-
look the claims of non-state actors. For the OSCE to be effective it must rely on
the participating states being prepared to address such problems. Addressing
them through political means, rather than in ways which have been codified by
law, provides a flexibility which is theoretically less threatening. While the sub-
state actors might not be able to initiate OSCE mechanisms for conflict preven-
tion per se, the OSCE does have recourse to intrusive action in the event that a
state itself does not draw a problem to the attention of the OSCE, to attempt to
prevent an escalation in tensions. Whether these actions have been applied suffi-
ciently is another question, as the escalation of the conflict in Kosovo has dem-
onstrated.
One form of non-state actor to which the OSCE has been increasingly
receptive has been non-governmental organisations. Increasingly, there has been
an appreciation of the multifaceted roles necessary in the prevention and resol-
ution of conflicts, and that NGOs contribute to this.258 The relationship between
the OSCE instruments which address conflict issues and NGOs remains com-
plex, in some instances being mutually supportive and in other instances being
more cautious if not suspicious, with some of the newly independent states
regarding NGOs more as a form of internal opposition.

258) Paula Gutlove and Gordon Thompson, ‘Conflict Management and the OSCE’, in OSCE/ODIHR
Bulletin, Vol. 5, No. 3, Fall 1997.

136
 Conclusion

During the past twenty-five years the OSCE has helped to introduce new forms
of intervention in regard to potential conflicts in Europe. Its mode of operation
has been the product of a particular time and specific geo-political
circumstances. These would suggest that caution needs to be applied in drawing
lessons from the applicability of the OSCE’s conflict prevention endeavours for
other regions, where there might not be cultures of political consensus or bodies
of specific standards applying to a political community.
Despite the existence of a range of conflict prevention mechanisms and
instruments, tensions can still evolve into violent conflicts within the OSCE,
suggesting that its influence is at times more aspirational than de facto. Although
in some circumstances and in some ways the OSCE can act effectively its archi-
tecture is far from complete. This is not a new assessment. In 1994 prior to the
Budapest Summit, Austria and Hungary put forward a proposal aimed at in-
creasing the ability of the CSCE to address sources of instability by establishing
the function of a CSCE Adviser on Issues of Stability and Security. It was con-
ceived ‘with a mandate modelled on that of the CSCE High Commissioner on
National Minorities – which meant a quiet, low profile mediator for the preven-
tion of tensions not related to national minority issues’.259 The proposal was not
adopted. It can be assumed that this was partly because most conflicts were
perceived as having their origins in ethnic factors and therefore would be ad-
dressed by the High Commissioner, and also because the proposal would have
given rise to an instrument of intervention with too broad a remit.
The effectiveness of the OSCE’s conflict prevention architecture as it
stands derives from the political flexibility of a body that provides a forum for
continuous review. This flexibility has allowed specific instruments to evolve,
while at the same time allowing states to retain influence over them. Indeed, the
OSCE has expanded its means of engaging in situations which could degenerate
into conflicts (most recently the appointment of a Representative on Freedom of
the Media and a Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities
are designed to expand capacities with regard to a comprehensive approach) but
it has not found ways to overcome the political reticence of some of the partici-
pating states. This reticence will be part of the ongoing balancing process that
constitutes the OSCE. The fact that conflict prevention processes are bedded in
political relations has its drawbacks. One of the paramount problems that has
been highlighted is that for the OSCE to intervene in a meaningful way requires

259) Victor-Yves Ghebali, ‘After the Budapest Conference: The Organisation for Security and Coop-
eration in Europe’, in NATO Review, Vol. 42, No. 2, March 1995, p. 25.

137
the parties to a potential conflict to support the intervention, or at least not be
antagonised by it to the extent that they withdraw from the process. If the parties
are not disposed to a process of dialogue and negotiation with the intervention of
a third party mediator, the lack of teeth renders the OSCE less than effective.
Ultimately, therefore, the OSCE is only as effective as the participating states
want it to be, for it is the states which carve out the compromises, provide the
ideas and the resources which fuel the OSCE.

138
 Postscript (August 1999)

This study was completed in September 1998. Events in and around Kosovo
since that time warrant a brief commentary, as do two other events with implica-
tions for the OSCE’s conflict prevention capacities: the change of status of the
OSCE representation in Ukraine and first use of a formal early warning by the
High Commissioner on National Minorities.

Kosovo

The events of 1999 in the Balkans serve as one of the clearest illustrations of the
lack of a concerted conflict prevention strategy or policy among inter-govern-
mental bodies and the international community in general. The NATO bombing
campaign in Serbia and Kosovo represents a failure to act early or seriously
enough in Kosovo. Despite warning signs throughout the 1990s,260 international
engagement did not progress beyond the formula ‘human rights, yes; restored

260) For an overview of interventions in Kosovo see Stefan Troebst op.cit.

139
autonomy, yes; independence, no.’261 Satisfying neither party to the conflict the
lack of deep engagement sufficiently early enabled an escalation to occur that
comprehensively polarised communities and reduced the space for dialogue and
compromise.
Heightened diplomatic activity in 1998 led to the acceptance by the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia of the possibility of diplomatic monitors to be deployed
in Kosovo in July 1998. Under the threat of NATO bombing agreement was
reached in October 1998 for the deployment of an OSCE Kosovo Verification
Mission (KVM) of 2,000 unarmed ‘verifiers’ in October 1998. This was the
largest mission the OSCE had undertaken. The verifiers were deployed to verify
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s compliance with UN Security Council
resolutions 1160 and 1199; to verify the maintenance of the cease-fire, monitor
movement of forces, provide assistance in the return of refugees and displaced
persons, supervise elections, help in forming elected bodies of self-administration
and police forces and promote human rights and democracy building.262 In-
tended as a restraining mechanism and a means to check the extent to which
agreements were being complied with in a highly volatile situation, this was an
innovative departure for OSCE conflict prevention.
The likelihood of success for the KVM was conditioned by two sets of
factors: first, the broader political environment over which it had little sway and
second, its mode of deployment and operation. The broader political environ-
ment has been referred to in the text of this study. For the purposes of consider-
ing the role of the KVM as a new departure for OSCE conflict prevention the
manner of its deployment and operation is more relevant. This is especially so
since the OSCE is beginning a new engagement with a post-conflict deployment.
In the aftermath of NATO’s military campaign the KVM has been replaced by a
Transitional Task Force which is likely to be a precursor for an OSCE mission
that will constitute a distinct component within the framework of the United
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo. The OSCE Mission will
focus on matters relating to institution and democracy building and human
rights,263 thereby seeking to contribute to the prevention of a return to violence.
Furthermore, experience in Kosovo will be relevant should the OSCE seek
similar deployments elsewhere in the future.
A number of problems arose specific to the internal operation of the KVM.
The deployment, once agreed, was not rapid, thereby undermining its effective-

261) Howard Clark, ‘Kosovo: Preparing for After the War’. A report for The Committee for Conflict
Transformation Support, London, April 1999, p. 1.
262) OSCE Handbook, 3rd Edition, Vienna 1999, pp. 46-49.
263) OSCE Newsletter, Vol. 6, No. 6, June 1999, pp. 1-2.

140
ness from the outset. Since the security vacuum was not filled quickly, militar-
ised groups were able to become entrenched and extend their reach throughout
the province. One observer points to two specific problems: recruitment and
local impact.264 The mission suffered from the lack of availability of appropri-
ately trained personnel and the inconsistent recruitment policies of participating
states. It was not able to recruit staff with significant local knowledge and did not
last long enough for them to acquire such knowledge. In particular there was a
predisposition to underestimate the level of local self-organisation among
Kosovo Albanians. Few of the international personnel deployed had training or
experience of unarmed conflict management or the relationship between democ-
racy building and security as elements of conflict prevention. Certain countries
prioritised personnel with military experience and the United States reserved the
right to act separately, which led to some speculation that the deployment was in
fact an information gathering operation on behalf of NATO. Subsequently,
pulling out the KVM a few days before the NATO bombing commenced in
March 1999 acted as a virtual green light for the ethnic cleansing of Kosovar
Albanians to begin in earnest.
The short duration of the KVM detracted from a meaningful conflict
prevention role, although it achieved a great deal in terms of publicising and
documenting human rights violations. Political and military events beyond its
control simply swamped the mission and prospects for conflict prevention. This
highlighted that ‘experience in the former Yugoslavia as elsewhere shows the
need and value of comprehensive approaches and consistent action. It seems
clear that half-measures will give rise to recurrent conflict and jeopardise confi-
dence in declared values.’265

Ukraine

As indicated in the study, the Government of Ukraine had advocated the termi-
nation of the mission for some time. On 31 December 1998 the Ukrainian
Parliament approved a Constitution for the Autonomous Republic of Crimea,
consistent with the Ukrainian constitution and earlier adopted by the Supreme
Soviet of Crimea. The improvement in the situation in Crimea following the
ratification of the Agreement of Friendship and Co-operation between Ukraine
and the Russian Federation and further measures to address the question of

264) Howard Clark, ibid., p. 5.

265) John Packer, ‘The Role of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities in the Former
Yugoslavia’, op.cit., p. 182.

141
citizenship and the integration of the Crimean Tatars reflected the considerable
improvement in relations between the Government of Ukraine and the local
authorities in Crimea. With the achievement of structural changes in governance
and a qualitative development in policies regarding the situation in Crimea
adequate grounds were presented for the mandate of the Mission not to be
renewed at the end of April 1999.266
As a result the mission was terminated and a new form of co-operation
between Ukraine and the OSCE is under preparation to be confirmed by a
Memorandum of Understanding. For the purposes of instituting the new co-
operation an OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine is being established, on the
basis of the former mission.267 The ongoing presence of the OSCE in Ukraine in
its new capacity partly reflects the institutional difficulty of completely winding
up a presence, but also indicates that states can also perceive some benefits in
retaining some form of multilateral international presence on their territory.

The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

The military campaign in Kosovo and the massive influx of Albanian refugees
into the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, increasing the population by
more than ten per cent, caused the High Commissioner on National Minorities
to issue his first formal early warning in May 1999. The purpose of the early
warning was to alert the international community to the urgent need to signifi-
cantly increase its assistance to the country in order to avoid destabilisation in
the realisation that ‘the economic crisis in the FYROM caused by the conflict in
the Balkans increases the risk of social discontent and interethnic tensions.’268 It
could be argued that the fact that open conflict did not erupt would suggest that
the early warning was not needed. To argue this would be self-defeating. Had
violence erupted it would have been a failure for early warning, since the early
warning would then have been shown to have been too late. It is unlikely that the
early warning on its own was a key factor in the avoidance of a violent conflict in
FYROM (the return of refugees to Kosovo at the conclusion of the bombing
campaign went a long way towards defusing the situation). Nevertheless, it
served to concentrate attention at a time when the main focus of the interna-
tional community was Serbia and Kosovo. For the early warning to serve a long-

266) OSCE Newsletter, Vol. 6, No. 4, April 1999, pp. 2-3.

267) Permanent Council Decision No. 295, PC Journal 231, Agenda item 1, 1 June 1999.
268) High Commissioner on National Minorities, Press Release addressed to the permanent Council on
the situation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 12 May 1999.

142
term purpose sustained attention will need to be devoted to the situation in
FYROM, not just by the High Commissioner but perhaps more importantly by
those members of the international community able to institute substantial and
practical measures to alleviate the roots of the tension.

Conclusion

Both the changing of status of a mission and the issuing of an early warning
(despite the gravity of the situation this represents) are positive events for the
OSCE and its conflict prevention portfolio. These steps affirm the organisation’s
ability to respond to change and utilise the tools at its disposal to address certain
potential conflicts. Reviewed in tandem with the military escalation and the
widespread instability generated by the war in Kosovo, however, the past year
offers a sobering lesson for the OSCE, and the community of states it represents,
as it seeks to enhance its capacity to prevent political, social and economic con-
flicts from degenerating into violence and the consequent instability against
which the OSCE community is motivated to act.

143
 Bibliography

Speech by Ambassador Giancarlo Aragona, Secretary General of the OSCE,

‘Preventive Action in Europe: The Role of the OSCE’, at the International
Conference on Preventive Strategy, Tokyo 13 January 1998
Hanne-Margret Birkenbach, Preventive Diplomacy Through Fact-Finding: How
international organisations review the conflict over citizenship in Estonia and
Latvia, Lit Verlag, Hamburg, 1997
Arie Bloed, From Helsinki to Vienna: Basic Documents of the Helsinki Process,
1990, Dordrecht
See Arie Bloed and Pieter van Dijk, ‘Supervisory Mechanism for the Human
Dimension of the CSCE: its setting up, its present functioning and possible
development towards a general procedure for peaceful settlement of CSCE
disputes’, pp. 74-108, in Bloed and Van Dijk eds., The Human Dimension of
the Helsinki Process: The Vienna Follow-Up Meeting and its Aftermath, Dor-
drecht, 1991
Arie Bloed ed., The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Analysis
and Basic Documents, 1972-1993, Dordrecht, 1993
Arie Bloed, ed., The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Basic
Documents, 1993-95, The Hague, 1997

145
Arie Bloed ‘De OVSE na de top van Lissabon. Gebrek aan visie’, pp. 156-160 in
Internationale Spectator 51(3) 1997
Michael Bothe, Natalino Ronzitti and Allan Rosas, eds., The OSCE in the Main-
tenance of Peace and Security: Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and
Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, The Hague, 1997
Thomas M. Buchsbaum, ‘The Future of the Human Dimension of the CSCE’
pp. 5-24 in Helsinki Monitor, Vol. 4, 1993, No. 2
Joe Camplisson and Michael Hall, Hidden Frontiers: Addressing deep-rooted violent
conflict in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Moldova, Island Publications,
1996, Co. Antrim
Diane Chigas, ‘Bridging the Gap between Theory and Practice: the CSCE High
Commissioner on National Minorities’, pp. 27-41 in Helsinki Monitor, Vol.
5, 1994, No. 3
D. Chigas, E. McClintock and C. Kamp, ‘Preventive diplomacy and the Organ-
ization for Security and Cooperation in Europe: Creating incentives for
dialogue and cooperation’, in Preventing conflict in the post-communist world,
A.H. Chayes and A. Chayes, Washington, D.C. The Brookings Institute,
1995
Howard Clark, ‘Kosovo: Preparing for After the War’ a report for The Commit-
tee for Conflict Transformation Support, London, April 1999
Conflict Prevention and Early Warning in the Political Practice of International Or-
ganizations, Clingendael, 1996
Jonathan Cohen, ‘A Case Study of NGO-IGO Collaboration in the field of
conflict prevention: the Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations and the High
Commissioner on National Minorities of the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe’, forthcoming chapter in a compilation on the civil-
ian role in peacemaking edited by the Austrian Study Centre for Peace and
Conflict Resolution
Jonathan Cohen, ‘Peace Postponned: The war continues in Abkhazia’, pp. 66-73
in Transitions, Vol. 5, No. 7, July 1998
Methods and Strategies in Conflict Prevention, Conflict Management Group, Bos-
ton, 1994
Rachel Denber, ‘The Legacy of Abuse in Chechnya and the OSCE Intervention’
pp. 59-74 in Helsinki Monitor, Vol. 8, 1997, No. 1
From Ethnopolitical Conflict to Inter-Ethnic Accord in Moldova, European Centre
for Minority Issues, 1998, Flensburg
Annual reports of the Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations for 1994 and 1995
Bibliography on the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities: Documents,
Speeches and Related Publications, The Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations,
March 1997, The Hague

146
The Role of the High Commissioner on National Minorities in OSCE Conflict Preven-
tion, The Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations, 1997, The Hague
The Hague Recommendations Regarding the Education Rights of National Minorities,
the Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations, October 1996
The Oslo Recommendations Regarding the Linguistic Rights of National Minorities,
the Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations, February 1998
Victor-Yves Ghebali, ‘CSCE Basic Needs Before the 1994 Budapest Review
Meeting’, pp. 71-80 in Studia Diplomatica, XLVII 4, 1994, p. 72
Victor-Yves Ghebali, ‘After the Budapest Conference: The Organisation for
Security and Cooperation in Europe’, in NATO Review, Vol. 42, No. 2,
March 1995
Ettore Greco, ‘The Role of the Conflict Prevention Centre in the Security Sys-
tem of the OSCE’, pp. 5-15 in Helsinki Monitor, Vol. 5, 1994, No. 1
Jeannie Grussendorf, ‘Theory, the OSCE and Social Change’ in Issues in Peace
Research: Theory and Practice, L.A. Broadhead, ed., forthcoming 1998
Paula Gutlove and Gordon Thompson, ‘Conflict Management and the OSCE’,
in OSCE/ODIHR Bulletin, Vol. 5, No. 3, Fall 1997
Alexis Heraclides, ‘The CSCE and Minorities: The Negotiations between the
Commitments, 1972-1992’ pp. 5-18, in Helsinki Monitor, Vol. 3, 1992, No.
3
Speech by Wilhelm Hoynck at the seminar on the ‘Contribution of the OSCE to
Security of Smaller States’, Nicosia, 15 January 1996
Wilhelm Hoynck, ‘CSCE Missions in the Field as an Instrument of Preventive
Diplomacy – Their Origin’, paper distributed by the Centre for Conflict
Prevention
Konrad Huber, ‘Averting Inter-Ethnic Conflict: an Analysis of the CSCE High
Commissioner on National Minorities in Estonia, January-July 1993’, Work-
ing Paper Series, 1994, Vol. 1, No. 2, The Carter Center of Emory Univer-
sity, Atlanta 1994
Human Rights Watch, Macedonia: Police Violence in Macedonia, Vol. 10, No. 1,
April 1998
Heather Hurlburt, ‘CSCE Conflict Resolution in Practice: A work in progress’
pp. 25-38 in Helsinki Monitor, Vol. 5, 1994, No. 2
Heather Hurlburt and David Storr, ‘A Gesamtkonzept for Conflict Manage-
ment: Bringing Capabilities into Line with Exigencies’ in Helsinki Monitor,
Vol. 5, 1994, No. 3, pp. 55-62
International Alert, Chechnya: A Situation Report, London, September 1992
International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1996/97
Walter Kemp, Making Sense of the CSCE, Federal Trust Discussion Paper, April
1994, London
L. Kovacs, ‘The OSCE: Present and future challenges’, in Helsinki Monitor, Vol.
6, 1995, No. 3

147
Timo Lahelma, ‘The OSCE’s Role in Conflict Prevention: the Case of Estonia’
20 February 1996, unpublished paper
M.R. Lucas, ‘The War in Chechnya and the OSCE Code of Conduct’, pp. 32-
42 in Helsinki Monitor, Vol. 6, 1995, No. 2
Hugh Miall, ‘The OSCE Role in Albania: A Success for Conflict Prevention?’
pp. 74-85, Helsinki Monitor, Vol. 8, 1997, No. 4
Hugh Miall, ‘Kosovo in Crisis: Conflict Prevention and Intervention in the
Southern Balkans’, forthcoming in Peace and Security, October 1998
The Challenge of Preventive Diplomacy. The Experience of the OSCE, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 1994
Gabriel Munuera, Preventing Armed Conflict in Europe: Lessons from Recent Expe-
rience, Challiot Papers 15/16, June 1994
Renee de Nevers, ‘Democratization and Ethnic Conflict’, Survival Summer
1993, pp. 31-48
Gert de Nooy ed., Cooperative Security, the OSCE and its Code of Conduct, The
Hague, 1996
Karin Oellers-Frahm, ‘The Mandatory Component in the CSCE Dispute Settle-
ment System’, pp. 195-211 in International Courts for the Twenty-First Cen-
tury, edited by Mark W. Janis, 1992
OSCE Handbook 1996, Vienna 1997
Annual Report 1997 on OSCE Activities, Vienna 1998
‘Survey of OSCE Long-Term Missions and other OSCE Field Activities’, The
OSCE Secretariat, 7 October 1997, Vienna
Annual Report 1997 on OSCE Activities (1 November 1996 – 30 November 1997),
OSCE, The Secretary General, 18 December 1997, Vienna
‘OSCE Field Office Training: A New Concept’, unpublished paper, February 6,
1998
John Packer and Kristian Myntti eds., The Protection of Ethnic and Linguistic
Minorities in Europe, Institute of Human Rights, Abo Akademi University,
1993
John Packer, ‘Conflict Prevention by the OAU: The Relevance of the OSCE
High Commissioner on National Minorities’, pp. 279-291, in The African
Yearbook on International Law, Vol. 4, 1996
John Packer, ‘The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities’, a contri-
bution to the Liber Amicorum for Jacob Moller, to be published by Kluwer
Law International, The Hague, 1999
John Packer, ‘The Role of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minor-
ities in the Former Yugoslavia’ pp. 169-184, in Cambridge Review of Interna-
tional Affairs, spring/summer 1999, Vol. XII/2

148
John Packer, ‘Autonomy within the OSCE: the case of Crimea’, pp. 295-316 in
Markku Suksi (ed.) Autonomy: Applications and Implications, The Nether-
lands, 1998
Conflicts in the OSCE Area, PRIO, 1997, Oslo
Norbert Ropers and Peter Schlotter, ‘The CSCE: Multilateral Conflict Manage-
ment in a Transforming World Order: Future Perspectives and New Im-
pulses for Regional Peace Strategies’, Interdependence, 1993, No. 14, Foun-
dation Development and Peace, Bonn, and the Institute for Development
and Peace, Duisburg
‘Seminar on Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy’, summary of Workshop
B ‘Review of Existing Early Warning Mechanisms’, pp. 116-118 in Helsinki
Monitor, Vol. 5, 1994, No. 2
Graham Smith, ‘The Ethnic Democracy Thesis and the Citizenship Question in
Estonia and Latvia’, pp. 199-216 in Nationalities Papers, Vol. 24, No. 2,
1996
Keynote Speech by Max van der Stoel, to the CSCE Seminar on Early Warning
and Preventive Diplomacy, Warsaw, 19-21 January 1994, in CSCE/ODIHR
Bulletin, Spring/Summer 1994, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 7-13.
High Commissioner’s speech to the conference on ‘Governance and European
Integration’, Rotterdam, May 1997
Speech by the High Commissioner to the Tenth Annual Conference of the
International Association for Conflict Management, Gustave-Stresemann-
Institut e.V., Bonn (Bad Godesberg), 16 June 1997
Gerard Tanja, ‘Peaceful Settlement of Disputes within the CSCE: Bridge over
Troubled Water’, in Helsinki Monitor, Vol. 4, 1993, No. 1, pp. 22-33
Stefan Troebst, Conflict in Kosovo: Failure of Prevention? An Analytical Documen-
tation, 1992-1998, European Centre for Minority Issues Working Paper, No.
1, May 1998
Boris Tsilevich, High Commissioner and Permanent Mission: The OSCE at Work in
the Latvia (-Russian) Conflict on Citizenship and Human Rights, Projekt-
verbund Friedenswissenschaften Kiel, 1995
Margaretha af Ugglas, ‘Conditions for Successful Preventive Diplomacy’, pp.
11-32 in The Challenge of Preventive Diplomacy, The Experience of the CSCE,
Ministry for Foreign Affairs Stockholm, 1994
Heinz Vetschera, ‘European Conflict Prevention: The Role of the CSCE’, pp.
72-112 in The Art of Conflict Prevention, Werner Bauwens and Luc Reychler
eds., Brasseys, 1994
Heikki Vilen, ‘Planning a Peace-keeping Mission for the Nagorno Karabakh
Conflict’, Security Dialogue, Vol. 27, No. 1, March 1996
Rob Zaagman, ed., ‘Focus on the Future: A Contribution to Discussions on a
new OSCE,’ pp. 40-51 in Helsinki Monitor, Vol. 6, 1995, No. 3

149
Rob Zaagman and Hannie Zaal, ‘The CSCE High Commissioner on National
Minorities: Prehistory and Negotiations’ in Arie Bloed ed., The Challenges of
Change: The Helsinki Summit of the CSCE and its Aftermath, Dordrecht, 1994,
pp. 95-111
Rob Zaagman, ‘Some Reflections on OSCE Conflict Prevention and the Code
of Conduct’, pp. 29-39 in Helsinki Monitor, Vol. 7, 1996, No. 2
Hannie Zaal, ‘The CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities’, pp. 33-
37 in Helsinki Monitor, Vol. 3, 1992, No. 4

150