Resolution

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

Resolution March 18, 1954

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful

Candidates of 1946 to 1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.

Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton for
petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.

DIOKNO, J.:

In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest
and concern as Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers'
Act of 1953." Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, "in order
that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be deemed to have passed his
examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per
cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule 127,
sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of the
different bar examinations held since 1946 and the varying degree of strictness
with which the examination papers were graded, this court passed and admitted
to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of only 72 per cent in
1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950
to 1953, the 74 per cent was raised to 75 per cent.

Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and

passed by this court, and feeling conscious of having been discriminated against
(See Explanatory Note to R.A. No. 972), unsuccessful candidates who obtained
averages of a few percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in
Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which,
among others, reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per
cent effective since 1946. The President requested the views of this court on the
bill. Complying with that request, seven members of the court subscribed to and
submitted written comments adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter the President
vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill
No. 371, embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the
members of this court reiterated their unfavorable views on the matter, the
President allowed the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953 without his
signature. The law, which incidentally was enacted in an election year, reads in
full as follows:

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR

EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-
SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN HUNDRED AND
FIFTY-FIVE.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the

Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule

numbered one hundred twenty-seven of the Rules of Court, any bar
candidate who obtained a general average of seventy per cent in any bar
examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six up to the
August nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar examinations; seventy-one per
cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar examinations; seventy-two
per cent in the in the nineteen hundred and fifty-three bar examinations;
seventy-three per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar
examinations; seventy-four per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-five
bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty per
cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the
corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar: Provided,
however, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a
fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the next whole
number.

SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent
in any subject in any bar examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred
and forty-six shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects
and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing
general average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent
examinations that he may take.

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions
for admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while others whose motions for
the revision of their examination papers were still pending also invoked the
aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others who
have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however,
invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the
court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or
not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately, the court has found
no reason to revise their grades. If they are to be admitted to the bar, it must be
pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid, should be applied
equally to all concerned whether they have filed petitions or not. A complete list
of the petitioners, properly classified, affected by this decision, as well as a more
detailed account of the history of Republic Act No. 972, are appended to this
decision as Annexes I and II. And to realize more readily the effects of the law,
the following statistical data are set forth:

(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by section 1 of

Republic Act No. 972 total 1,168, classified as follows:

1946 (August) 206 121 18

1946 (November) 477 228 43

1947 749 340 0

1948 899 409 11

1949 1,218 532 164

1950 1,316 893 26

1951 2,068 879 196

1952 2,738 1,033 426

1953 2,555
968 284

TOTAL 12,230 5,421 1,168

Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent examination, and

only 586 have filed either motions for admission to the bar pursuant to said
Republic Act, or mere motions for reconsideration.

(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be benefited by

section 2 of said Republic Act. These candidates had each taken from two to five
different examinations, but failed to obtain a passing average in any of them.
Consolidating, however, their highest grades in different subjects in previous
examinations, with their latest marks, they would be sufficient to reach the
passing average as provided for by Republic Act No. 972.

(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is

therefore 1,094, of which only 604 have filed petitions. Of these 604 petitioners,
33 who failed in 1946 to 1951 had individually presented motions for
reconsideration which were denied, while 125 unsuccessful candidates of 1952,
and 56 of 1953, had presented similar motions, which are still pending because
they could be favorably affected by Republic Act No. 972, — although as has
been already stated, this tribunal finds no sufficient reasons to reconsider their
grades

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the practice
of the legal profession and the administration of justice, and because some
doubts have been expressed as to its validity, the court set the hearing of the
afore-mentioned petitions for admission on the sole question of whether or not
Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.

We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant assistance
of the members of the bar who have amply argued, orally an in writing, on the
various aspects in which the question may be gleaned. The valuable studies of
Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia, Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and
Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of the validity of the law, and of the U.P.
Women's Lawyers' Circle, the Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz,
Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente del
Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor, Mamerto V. Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta against
it, aside from the memoranda of counsel for petitioners, Messrs. Jose M.
Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and Antonio Enrile Inton, and of
petitioners Cabrera, Macasaet and Galema themselves, has greatly helped us in
this task. The legal researchers of the court have exhausted almost all Philippine
and American jurisprudence on the matter. The question has been the object of
intense deliberation for a long time by the Tribunal, and finally, after the voting,
the preparation of the majority opinion was assigned to a new member in order
to place it as humanly as possible above all suspicion of prejudice or partiality.

Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the
Bar, those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and
inadequate preparation. Quoting a portion of the Explanatory Note of the
proposed bill, its author Honorable Senator Pablo Angeles David stated:

The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the
tremendous handicap which students during the years immediately after
the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency of
reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students who
took up law soon after the liberation.

Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236
passed. And now it is claimed that in addition 604 candidates be admitted
(which in reality total 1,094), because they suffered from "insufficiency of
reading materials" and of "inadequacy of preparation."

By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it

qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for
the practice of the profession, as was exactly found by this Tribunal in the
aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of legal profession
adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem evolved
by the times become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of the
vital requisites for the practice of law that should be developed constantly and
maintained firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted the protection of property,
life, honor and civil liberties. To approve officially of those inadequately
prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to
create a serious social danger. Moreover, the statement that there was an
insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly exaggerated. There were
abundant materials. Decisions of this court alone in mimeographed copies were
made available to the public during those years and private enterprises had also
published them in monthly magazines and annual digests. The Official Gazette
had been published continuously. Books and magazines published abroad have
entered without restriction since 1945. Many law books, some even with revised
and enlarged editions have been printed locally during those periods. A new set
of Philippine Reports began to be published since 1946, which continued to be
supplemented by the addition of new volumes. Those are facts of public
knowledge.

Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be enforced.

The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of view of
applicable principles, but the resolution of the question would have been easier
had an identical case of similar background been picked out from the
jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there any precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon
legal history, from which has been directly derived the judicial system
established here with its lofty ideals by the Congress of the United States, and
which we have preserved and attempted to improve, or in our contemporaneous
judicial history of more than half a century? From the citations of those
defending the law, we can not find a case in which the validity of a similar law
had been sustained, while those against its validity cite, among others, the cases
of Day (In re Day, 54 NE 646), of Cannon (State vs. Cannon, 240 NW, 441), the
opinion of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR 1061), of
Guariña (24 Phil., 37), aside from the opinion of the President which is
expressed in his vote of the original bill and which the postponement of the
contested law respects.

This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other countries had
been promulgated, the judiciary immediately declared them without force or
effect. It is not within our power to offer a precedent to uphold the disputed law.

To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully the case that
has been cited to us as a favorable precedent of the law — that of Cooper (22
NY, 81), where the Court of Appeals of New York revoked the decision of the
Supreme court of that State, denying the petition of Cooper to be admitted to the
practice of law under the provisions of a statute concerning the school of law of
Columbia College promulgated on April 7, 1860, which was declared by the
Court of Appeals to be consistent with the Constitution of the state of New York.

It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:

They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public trust. All
votes for either of them for any elective office except that of the Court of
Appeals, given by the Legislature or the people, shall be void. They shall
not exercise any power of appointment to public office. Any male citizen
of the age of twenty-one years, of good moral character, and who
possesses the requisite qualifications of learning and ability, shall be
entitled to admission to practice in all the courts of this State. (p. 93).

According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional precept is as

follows:

Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of appointing

them had previously rested with the judges, and this was the principal
appointing power which they possessed. The convention was evidently
dissatisfied with the manner in which this power had been exercised, and
with the restrictions which the judges had imposed upon admission to
practice before them. The prohibitory clause in the section quoted was
aimed directly at this power, and the insertion of the provision" expecting
the admission of attorneys, in this particular section of the Constitution,
evidently arose from its connection with the object of this prohibitory
clause. There is nothing indicative of confidence in the courts or of a
disposition to preserve any portion of their power over this subject, unless
the Supreme Court is right in the inference it draws from the use of the
word `admission' in the action referred to. It is urged that the admission
spoken of must be by the court; that to admit means to grant leave, and
that the power of granting necessarily implies the power of refusing, and
of course the right of determining whether the applicant possesses the
requisite qualifications to entitle him to admission.

These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the validity of the
act. (p. 93.)

Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to indicate that
it provided that the possession of a diploma of the school of law of Columbia
College conferring the degree of Bachelor of Laws was evidence of the legal
qualifications that the constitution required of applicants for admission to the
Bar. The decision does not however quote the text of the law, which we cannot
find in any public or accessible private library in the country.

In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the Constitution of
New York, the Court of Appeals said of the object of the law:

The motive for passing the act in question is apparent. Columbia College
being an institution of established reputation, and having a law
department under the charge of able professors, the students in which
department were not only subjected to a formal examination by the law
committee of the institution, but to a certain definite period of study
before being entitled to a diploma of being graduates, the Legislature
evidently, and no doubt justly, considered this examination, together with
the preliminary study required by the act, as fully equivalent as a test of
legal requirements, to the ordinary examination by the court; and as
rendering the latter examination, to which no definite period of
preliminary study was essential, unnecessary and burdensome.

The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning and ability of
the applicant, and for the mere purpose of substituting the examination by
the law committee of the college for that of the court. It could have had no
other object, and hence no greater scope should be given to its provisions.
We cannot suppose that the Legislature designed entirely to dispense with
the plain and explicit requirements of the Constitution; and the act
contains nothing whatever to indicate an intention that the authorities of
the college should inquire as to the age, citizenship, etc., of the students
before granting a diploma. The only rational interpretation of which the
act admits is, that it was intended to make the college diploma competent
evidence as to the legal attainments of the applicant, and nothing else. To
this extent alone it operates as a modification of pre-existing statutes, and
it is to be read in connection with these statutes and with the Constitution
itself in order to determine the present condition of the law on the subject.
(p.89)

xxx xxx xxx

The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the
question of admission, that has simply prescribed what shall be competent
evidence in certain cases upon that question. (p.93)

From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper with that
at bar may be clearly seen. Please note only the following distinctions:

(1) The law of New York does not require that any candidate of Columbia
College who failed in the bar examinations be admitted to the practice of law.

(2) The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper, has not taken
from the court its jurisdiction over the question of admission of attorney at law;
in effect, it does not decree the admission of any lawyer.

(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the Philippines are
entirely different on the matter of admission of the practice of law.

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of
the profession and their supervision have been disputably a judicial function and
responsibility. Because of this attribute, its continuous and zealous possession
and exercise by the judicial power have been demonstrated during more than six
centuries, which certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles." Even considering
the power granted to Congress by our Constitution to repeal, alter supplement
the rules promulgated by this Court regarding the admission to the practice of
law, to our judgment and proposition that the admission, suspension, disbarment
and reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly
belonging to Congress, is unacceptable. The function requires (1) previously
established rules and principles, (2) concrete facts, whether past or present,
affecting determinate individuals. and (3) decision as to whether these facts are
governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial function of the highest
degree. And it becomes more undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if
previous judicial resolutions on the petitions of these same individuals are
attempted to be revoked or modified.

We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the
act of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law in the
practice of the profession is concededly judicial. A comprehensive and
conscientious study of this matter had been undertaken in the case of State vs.
Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in which the validity of a legislative enactment
providing that Cannon be permitted to practice before the courts was discussed.
From the text of this decision we quote the following paragraphs:

This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without parallel in

the history of the English speaking people so far as we have been able to
ascertain. There has been much uncertainty as to the extent of the power
of the Legislature to prescribe the ultimate qualifications of attorney at
law has been expressly committed to the courts, and the act of admission
has always been regarded as a judicial function. This act purports to
constitute Mr. Cannon an attorney at law, and in this respect it stands
alone as an assertion of legislative power. (p. 444)

Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a Senate and

Assembly. (Section 1, art. 4.) In so far as the prescribing of qualifications
for admission to the bar are legislative in character, the Legislature is
acting within its constitutional authority when it sets up and prescribes
such qualifications. (p. 444)

But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications which in its
judgment will serve the purpose of legitimate legislative solicitude, is the
power of the court to impose other and further exactions and
qualifications foreclosed or exhausted? (p. 444)

Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments are

distinct, independent, and coordinate branches of the government. Neither
branch enjoys all the powers of sovereignty which properly belongs to its
department. Neither department should so act as to embarrass the other in
the discharge of its respective functions. That was the scheme and thought
of the people setting upon the form of government under which we exist.
State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis., 525; Attorney General ex rel. Bashford vs.
Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p. 445)

The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane upon

which the administration of justice is maintained. Its responsibility in this
respect is exclusive. By committing a portion of the powers of
sovereignty to the judicial department of our state government, under 42a
scheme which it was supposed rendered it immune from embarrassment
or interference by any other department of government, the courts cannot
escape responsibility fir the manner in which the powers of sovereignty
thus committed to the judicial department are exercised. (p. 445)

The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship.
The bar is an attache of the courts. The quality of justice dispense by the
courts depends in no small degree upon the integrity of its bar. An
unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and reproach to the administration
of justice and bring the courts themselves into disrepute. (p.445)

Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe supervision
over their bars, at least in the English speaking countries. (p. 445)

After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:

Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six

centuries prior to the adoption of our Constitution, the courts of England,
concededly subordinate to Parliament since the Revolution of 1688, had
exercise the right of determining who should be admitted to the practice
of law, which, as was said in Matter of the Sergeant's at Law, 6 Bingham's
New Cases 235, "constitutes the most solid of all titles." If the courts and
judicial power be regarded as an entity, the power to determine who
should be admitted to practice law is a constituent element of that entity.
It may be difficult to isolate that element and say with assurance that it is
either a part of the inherent power of the court, or an essential element of
the judicial power exercised by the court, but that it is a power belonging
to the judicial entity and made of not only a sovereign institution, but
made of it a separate independent, and coordinate branch of the
government. They took this institution along with the power traditionally
exercise to determine who should constitute its attorney at law. There is
no express provision in the Constitution which indicates an intent that this
traditional power of the judicial department should in any manner be
subject to legislative control. Perhaps the dominant thought of the framers
of our constitution was to make the three great departments of
government separate and independent of one another. The idea that the
Legislature might embarrass the judicial department by prescribing
inadequate qualifications for attorneys at law is inconsistent with the
dominant purpose of making the judicial independent of the legislative
department, and such a purpose should not be inferred in the absence of
express constitutional provisions. While the legislature may legislate with
respect to the qualifications of attorneys, but is incidental merely to its
general and unquestioned power to protect the public interest. When it
does legislate a fixing a standard of qualifications required of attorneys at
law in order that public interests may be protected, such qualifications do
not constitute only a minimum standard and limit the class from which the
court must make its selection. Such legislative qualifications do not
constitute the ultimate qualifications beyond which the court cannot go in
fixing additional qualifications deemed necessary by the course of the
proper administration of judicial functions. There is no legislative power
to compel courts to admit to their bars persons deemed by them unfit to
exercise the prerogatives of an attorney at law. (p. 450)

Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of

appointment. It is quite likely true that the legislature may exercise the
power of appointment when it is in pursuance of a legislative functions.
However, the authorities are well-nigh unanimous that the power to admit
attorneys to the practice of law is a judicial function. In all of the states,
except New Jersey (In re Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as our
investigation reveals, attorneys receive their formal license to practice law
by their admission as members of the bar of the court so admitting. Cor.
Jur. 572; Ex parte Secombre, 19 How. 9,15 L. Ed. 565; Ex parte Garland,
4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 53, 19 L. Ed.
285; Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan, 843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519;
Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N.W. 1021, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1030,
20 Ann. Cas. 413.

The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually

exercised by the courts, it having been so generally held that the act of the
court in admitting an attorney to practice is the judgment of the court, and
an attempt as this on the part of the Legislature to confer such right upon
any one being most exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the
licensing of an attorney is and always has been a purely judicial function,
no matter where the power to determine the qualifications may reside. (p.
451)

In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in answering a

consultation of the Senate of that State, 180 NE 725, said:

It is indispensible to the administration of justice and to interpretation of

the laws that there be members of the bar of sufficient ability, adequate
learning and sound moral character. This arises from the need of
enlightened assistance to the honest, and restraining authority over the
knavish, litigant. It is highly important, also that the public be protected
from incompetent and vicious practitioners, whose opportunity for doing
mischief is wide. It was said by Cardoz, C.L., in People ex rel. Karlin vs.
Culkin, 242 N.Y. 456, 470, 471, 162 N.E. 487, 489, 60 A.L.R. 851:
"Membership in the bar is a privilege burden with conditions." One is
admitted to the bar "for something more than private gain." He becomes
an "officer of the court", and ,like the court itself, an instrument or agency
to advance the end of justice. His cooperation with the court is due
"whenever justice would be imperiled if cooperation was withheld."
Without such attorneys at law the judicial department of government
would be hampered in the performance of its duties. That has been the
history of attorneys under the common law, both in this country and
England. Admission to practice as an attorney at law is almost without
exception conceded to be a judicial function. Petition to that end is filed in
courts, as are other proceedings invoking judicial action. Admission to the
bar is accomplish and made open and notorious by a decision of the court
entered upon its records. The establishment by the Constitution of the
judicial department conferred authority necessary to the exercise of its
powers as a coordinate department of government. It is an inherent power
of such a department of government ultimately to determine the
qualifications of those to be admitted to practice in its courts, for assisting
in its work, and to protect itself in this respect from the unfit, those
lacking in sufficient learning, and those not possessing good moral
character. Chief Justice Taney stated succinctly and with finality in Ex
parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, "It has been well settled, by
the rules and practice of common-law courts, that it rests exclusively with
the court to determine who is qualified to become one of its officers, as an
attorney and counselor, and for what cause he ought to be removed."
(p.727)

In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to secure license
to practice the legal profession by virtue of a law of state (In re Day, 54 NE
646), the court said in part:

In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the court,
holding the test oath for attorneys to be unconstitutional, explained the
nature of the attorney's office as follows: "They are officers of the court,
admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of their possessing sufficient
legal learning and fair private character. It has always been the general
practice in this country to obtain this evidence by an examination of the
parties. In this court the fact of the admission of such officers in the
highest court of the states to which they, respectively, belong for, three
years preceding their application, is regarded as sufficient evidence of the
possession of the requisite legal learning, and the statement of counsel
moving their admission sufficient evidence that their private and
professional character is fair. The order of admission is the judgment of
the court that the parties possess the requisite qualifications as attorneys
and counselors, and are entitled to appear as such and conduct causes
therein. From its entry the parties become officers of the court, and are
responsible to it for professional misconduct. They hold their office
during good behavior, and can only be deprived of it for misconduct
ascertained and declared by the judgment of the court after opportunity to
be heard has been afforded. Ex parte Hoyfron, admission or their
exclusion is not the exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is the exercise
of judicial power, and has been so held in numerous cases. It was so held
by the court of appeals of New York in the matter of the application of
Cooper for admission. Re Cooper 22 N. Y. 81. "Attorneys and
Counselors", said that court, "are not only officers of the court, but
officers whose duties relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a
judicial nature; and hence their appointment may, with propriety, be
entrusted to the court, and the latter, in performing his duty, may very
justly considered as engaged in the exercise of their appropriate judicial
functions." (pp. 650-651).

We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:

Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded

everywhere to be the exercise of a judicial function, and this opinion need
not be burdened with citations in this point. Admission to practice have
also been held to be the exercise of one of the inherent powers of the
court. — Re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.

Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function, and

is an inherent power of the court. — A.C. Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of
California, 281 Pac. 1018; See Annotation on Power of Legislature
respecting admission to bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.

On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the
judicial and legislative departments of the government.

The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial
departments is that it is the province of the legislature to establish rules
that shall regulate and govern in matters of transactions occurring
subsequent to the legislative action, while the judiciary determines rights
and obligations with reference to transactions that are past or conditions
that exist at the time of the exercise of judicial power, and the distinction
is a vital one and not subject to alteration or change either by legislative
action or by judicial decree.

The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by either
of the other departments of the government. — 16 C.J.S., Constitutional
Law, p. 229.

If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts by
requiring of them construction of the law according to its own views, it is
very plain it cannot do so directly, by settling aside their judgments,
compelling them to grant new trials, ordering the discharge of offenders,
or directing what particular steps shall be taken in the progress of a
judicial inquiry. — Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 192.

In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to
1952, a general average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any
subject, be admitted in mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is not a
legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment revoking those promulgated by this
Court during the aforecited year affecting the bar candidates concerned; and
although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for
justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the
legislative nor executive department, that may be so. Any attempt on the part of
any of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its functions, as is the
case with the law in question.

That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter or
supplement the rule promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the admission to
the practice of law, is no valid argument. Section 13, article VIII of the
Constitution provides:

Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts
of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power
of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall