On June 15, 2006, the IBP, through its then National President Jose Anselmo

FIRST DIVISION
Cadiz (Cadiz), filed with the Office of the City Mayor of Manila a letter
application[4] for a permit to rally at the foot of Mendiola Bridge on June 22,
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE G.R. No. 175241 2006 from 2:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. to be participated in by IBP officers and
PHILIPPINES represented by its
National President, Jose Anselmo I. Present: members, law students and multi-sectoral organizations.
Cadiz, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, and
JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
Petitioners, CARPIO MORALES, Respondent issued a permit[5] dated June 16, 2006 allowing the IBP to stage
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, a rally on given date but indicated therein Plaza Miranda as the venue,
BERSAMIN, and
instead of Mendiola Bridge, which permit the IBP received on June 19,
- versus - VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
2006.

HONORABLE MANILA MAYOR

JOSE LITO ATIENZA, Aggrieved, petitioners filed on June 21, 2006 before the Court of Appeals a
Respondent. Promulgated: petition for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 94949. [6] The petition
February 24, 2010
having been unresolved within 24 hours from its filing, petitioners filed
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x before this Court on June 22, 2006 a petition for certiorari docketed as G.R.
No. 172951 which assailed the appellate courts inaction or refusal to resolve
the petition within the period provided under the Public Assembly Act of
DECISION 1985.[7]

The Court, by Resolutions of July 26, 2006, August 30, 2006 and
CARPIO MORALES, J.: November 20, 2006, respectively, denied the petition for being moot and
academic, denied the relief that the petition be heard on the merits in view of
Petitioners Integrated Bar of the Philippines [1] (IBP) and lawyers H. Harry L. the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 94949, and denied the motion for
Roque and Joel R. Butuyan appeal the June 28, 2006 Decision [2] and the reconsideration.
October 26, 2006 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals that found no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Jose Lito Atienza, the then
mayor of Manila, in granting a permit to rally in a venue other than the one The rally pushed through on June 22, 2006 at Mendiola Bridge,
applied for by the IBP. after Cadiz discussed with P/Supt. Arturo Paglinawan whose contingent
from the Manila Police District (MPD) earlier barred petitioners from
proceeding thereto. Petitioners allege that the participants voluntarily Undoubtedly, the petition filed with the appellate court on June 21,
dispersed after the peaceful conduct of the program. 2006 became moot upon the passing of the date of the rally on June 22,
2006.
The MPD thereupon instituted on June 26, 2006 a criminal action,
[8]
docketed as I.S. No. 06I-12501, against Cadiz for violating the Public A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable
Assembly Act in staging a rally at a venue not indicated in the permit, to controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon
which charge Cadiz filed a Counter-Affidavit of August 3, 2006. would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction
over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness. However, even in cases
In the meantime, the appellate court ruled, in CA-G.R. SP No. 94949, by the where supervening events had made the cases moot, this Court did not
first assailed issuance, that the petition became moot and lacked merit. The hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate
appellate court also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration by the controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and public. Moreover, as an
second assailed issuance. exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise
moot if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review. [9]
Hence, the filing of the present petition for review on certiorari, to which
respondent filed his Comment of November 18, 2008 which merited In the present case, the question of the legality of a modification of a permit
petitioners Reply of October 2, 2009. to rally will arise each time the terms of an intended rally are altered by the
concerned official, yet it evades review, owing to the limited time in
The main issue is whether the appellate court erred in holding that the processing the application where the shortest allowable period is five days
modification of the venue in IBPs rally permit does not constitute grave prior to the assembly. The susceptibility of recurrence compels the Court to
abuse of discretion. definitively resolve the issue at hand.

Petitioners assert that the partial grant of the application runs Respecting petitioners argument that the issues presented in CA-G.R. SP
contrary to the Pubic Assembly Act and violates their constitutional right to No. 94949 pose a prejudicial question to the criminal case against Cadiz, the
freedom of expression and public assembly. Court finds it improper to resolve the same in the present case.

The Court shall first resolve the preliminary issue of mootness.

Under the Rules,[10] the existence of a prejudicial question is a ground in a Section 6. Action to be taken on the application -

petition to suspend proceedings in a criminal action. Since suspension of the (a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in
proceedings in the criminal action may be made only upon petition and not his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless there is clear and
convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a
at the instance of the judge or the investigating prosecutor, [11] the latter clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public
cannot take cognizance of a claim of prejudicial question without a petition convenience, public morals or public health.
to suspend being filed. Since a petition to suspend can be filed only in the
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on
criminal action,[12] the determination of the pendency of a prejudicial the application within two (2) working days from the date the
question should be made at the first instance in the criminal action, and not application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be
deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any
before this Court in an appeal from the civil action. official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application for
In proceeding to resolve the petition on the merits, the appellate court found a permit, said application shall be posted by the applicant on
the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed
no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent because the Public to have been filed.
Assembly Act does not categorically require respondent to specify in writing
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and
the imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil which warrants the
grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or
denial or modification of the permit and merely mandates that the action modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the
taken shall be in writing and shall be served on respondent within 24 applicant who must be heard on the matter.

hours. The appellate court went on to hold that respondent is authorized to (d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on
regulate the exercise of the freedom of expression and of public assembly the application [sic] within twenty-four hours.
which are not absolute, and that the challenged permit is consistent with (e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the
Plaza Mirandas designation as a freedom park where protest rallies are application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the
applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of
allowed without permit.
law.

The Court finds for petitioners. (f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court,
the Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate Court,
its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within
forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of the same. No appeal
bond and record on appeal shall be required. A decision
granting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to
the applicant shall, be immediately executory.

(g) All cases filed in court under this Section shall be decided
Section 6 of the Public Assembly Act reads: within twenty-four (24) hours from date of filing. Cases filed
 hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other
judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank. legitimate public interest.[14] (emphasis supplied)

(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme

Court. The Court in Bayan stated that the provisions of the Public Assembly Act of
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are 1985 practically codified the 1983 ruling in Reyes v. Bagatsing.[15] In
hereby allowed. (underscoring supplied) juxtaposing Sections 4 to 6 of the Public Assembly Act with the pertinent
portion of the Reyes case, the Court elucidated as follows:

x x x [The public official concerned shall] appraise whether there

may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but
at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such
In Bayan, Karapatan, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP) v. Ermita, refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the
[13] standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is
the Court reiterated: such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the
applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision,
x x x Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the
meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters of earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to
public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost the proper judicial authority.[16] (italics and underscoring supplied)
deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much less
denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of In modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely abused his discretion
expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive when he did not immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard
evil that the state has a right to prevent. Even prior to the
1935 Constitution, Justice Malcolm had occasion to stress first on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave danger of a
that it is a necessary consequence of our republican substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the venue. The
institutions and complements the right of free speech. To
opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit, since the
paraphrase the opinion of Justice Rutledge, speaking for the
majority of the American Supreme Court in Thomas v. applicant may directly go to court after an unfavorable action on the permit.
Collins, it was not by accident or coincidence that the rights
to freedom of speech and of the press were coupled in a
single guarantee with the rights of the people peaceably to Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of
assemble and to petition the government for redress of the permit against the standard of a clear and present danger test which, it
grievances. All these rights, while not identical, are
inseparable. In every case, therefore, where there is a bears repeating, is an indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing
limitation placed on the exercise of this right, the judiciary is in the issued permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a
called upon to examine the effects of the challenged
substantive evil, which blank denial or modification would, when granted
governmental actuation. The sole justification for a
limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render illusory any judicial
the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, scrutiny thereof.
of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil
 It is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is
not devoid of discretion in determining whether or not a
permit would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered
discretion. While prudence requires that there be a realistic
appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what
may probably occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still
the assumption especially so where the assembly is scheduled
for a specific public place is that the permit must be for the
assembly being held there. The exercise of such a right, in
the language of Justice Roberts, speaking for the
American Supreme Court, is not to be "abridged on the
plea that it may be exercised in some other place.
[17]
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Notably, respondent failed to indicate in his Comment any basis or

explanation for his action. It smacks of whim and caprice for respondent to
just impose a change of venue for an assembly that was slated for a specific
public place. It is thus reversible error for the appellate court not to have
found such grave abuse of discretion and, under specific statutory

provision, not to have modified the permit in terms satisfactory to the

applicant.[18]

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94949 are REVERSED. The Court
DECLARES that respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in
modifying the rally permit issued on June 16, 2006 insofar as it altered the
venue from Mendiola Bridge to Plaza Miranda.

SO ORDERED.