Persons HW # 6 August 25, 2018

MARRIAGE MODELS; TRADITIONAL MARRIAGE c. Mortgage on her property for the

GRAHAM V GRAHAM payment of her husband's debts is
FACTS: enforceable.
4. Even if the contract is otherwise within the
Margrethe Graham (defendant) and Sidney Graham contractual power of parties, it is void because it
(plaintiff) were married. Sidney had a job and wished contravenes public policy.
to keep working, but Margrethe wished to travel and a. Michigan law: marriage is not merely a
for Sidney to accompany her. Accordingly, the private contract between parties, but a
Grahams signed a contract under which Margrethe status which state is vitally interested,
agreed to pay Sidney $300 per month until they and under which, certain rights and duties
decided to end the arrangement. Effectively, the incident to the relationship come into
result of the contract was that Sidney would quit his being, irrespective of the wishes of the
job, travel with Margrethe, and be paid by Margrethe parties.
for doing so. Subsequently, the Grahams were i. E.g. hubby has duty to support
divorced. Sidney brought suit, seeking enforcement of and live with wife; wife must
the contract. contribute her services and
ISSUE: society to husband, and follow
him in his choice of domicile.
WON it was not an implied condition of the contract 5. Private agreement between married or soon-to-
that the obligations were to be effective only so long be married parties which attempt to change
as the parties remained man and wife so that it would essential obligations of marriage contract as
be automatically terminated by divorce; defined by law, is contrary to public policy and
HELD: unenforceable.

1. If the contract states that she is bound only as Sec 587 Bargain to Change Essential Obligations of
long as she wills it, then her promise is obviously Marriage:
illusory and the contract is now and was from the (1) A bargain between married persons or
beginning void. However, the provision in persons contemplating marriage to change
question would seem to require action of both the essential incidents of marriage is illegal.
parties to terminate it, and if that is so the (2) Illustrations:
contract is not illusory a. A and B who are about to marry agree
2. Unnecessary to decide the question of whether it to forego sexual intercourse. The
was not an implied condition of the contract that bargain is illegal.
the obligations were to be effective only so long b. In a state where the husband is
as the parties remained man and wife so that it entitles to determine the residence of
would be automatically terminated by divorce. a married couple, A and B who are
a. Contract itself does not recite any about to marry agree that the wife
consideration. shall not be required to leave the city
b. Even if the consideration is what counsel where she then lives. The bargain is
claims, and plaintiff did agree to refrain illegal.
from work and accompany his wife on her a. Contract says husband will follow wife,
travels, the contract was not a when it should be vice versa.
competent one for married persons to b. Attorney says relinquishment by husband
enter into. of his rights constitutes consideration for
3. Doubtful if the alleged contract is within the the promise of his wife; but, by the same
capacity of a married woman to make under token, it makes the contract violative of
Michigan Law. public policy.
a. Under Michigan statutes a married c. The present contract also implies release
woman has no general power to contract, of husband from his duties to support
but can contract only in relation to her wife, which makes it void.
separate property. 6. law prohibiting married persons from altering by
b. Where the contract charges specific private agreement the personal relationships and
property belonging to the married obligations assumed upon marriage is based on
woman, the law is not so rigid in requiring sound foundations of public policy
that the consideration be for the benefit a. It permitted, can lead to open an endless
of her estate. field for controversy and bickering and
Persons HW # 6 August 25, 2018
would destroy the element of flexibility WON it is mandatory that a married woman assume
needed in making adjustments to new the name of her husband.
conditions arising in marital life.
b. Wife can, of course, volunteer to pay RATIO:
husband a monthly sum, or by husband 1. Tennessee has no statutory enactment saying
by mutual understanding quit his job and women auto assume hubby’s surname upon
travel with his wife. What’s objected upon marriage
is putting such conduct into a binding a. Mere recognizes prevalence of virtually
contract, tying the parties' hands in the universal custom under which woman
future and inviting controversy and normally adopt surname of hubby.
litigation between them. b. Same for Department of Safety drivers’
7. to recognize that married persons could contract license name change.
with each other as freely as strangers would be c. Change name authorized in adoption
inconsistent with their disabilities of testimony proceedings.
and the desirability of preventing them from d. All needed is that person file sworn
placing themselves ‘habitually in business application in court of residence giving
antagonism. reasons for desiring change. No
8. husband and wife cannot become partners with requirement that reasons be good and
each other, largely on the ground that the sufficient; just that given – same for
recognition of the partnership contract would married woman.
impair the marital relationship by affording e. Divorce – wife may restore maiden name.
opportunity for contentions between them. 2. Common law
RULING: a. History
i. 11th century England, no surnames,
leading to confusion.
ii. 14th century, man adopted
CHALLENGES TO THE TRADITIONAL MARRIAGE surnames, by way of place of birth,
MODEL; THE CHANGING STATUS OF WOMEN residence, calling, work, color,
DUNN V PALERMO adding “son”, or “fitz”, “Mac”, “O”,
physical characteristics, moral
FACTS: attributes, nature.
1. Rosary Palermo, Nashville Lawyer, married Denty iii. Edward IV (1465), statutes required
Cheatham, same, but she keeps her maiden surnames.
name. b. Surnames were adopted and abandoned at
2. Tennessee Registration Law mandates married will. No requirement or custom demanded
women to register under their husbands’ names, that women adopt hubby name. Hubby
otherwise be purges from the reg records (Sec 2- sometimes adopt wifey name.
206 T.C.A). c. Common law place more stress of
3. Her name was purged. baptismal than surname per se.
4. Rose seeks declaratory judgment judgement that 3. Legal authorities
defendants’ interpretation of Sec 2-206 is a. Laws of England: Person usually bears
erroneous, or that it is violative of due process surname of father, but may change it as he
and equal protection clause. pleases. No need to take formal steps
5. Chancellor: unless change of name is in compliance
a. Married woman had right to assume with name at arms clause.
husband’s surname. But this is by repute, b. Change of name via repute v marriage v
not by law. deed poll
b. Sec 2-206 does not operate to change the i. Deed poll – name change is not
name of a woman at marriage done by deed poll per se. It is by
c. Action of the Reg in purging plaintiff was reputation, deed poll only good
error - erroneous interpretation of law. evidence.
6. Registrar appealed: woman auto take hubby c. Provided that there is no fraud.
name upon marriage. d. Cohabiting without marriage, ok for
women to assume hubby name.
ISSUE: e. Assumption by woman of hubby name
upon marriage is customary, not of law.
Persons HW # 6 August 25, 2018
4. American jurisdictions stability reduce confusion and
a. Chapman case, woman unable to show up preserve identity of women.
in court and declared in default. She did g. Woman has freedom of choice.
not receive any notice since the “rebel” h. So long as a person's name remains
stock is placed under her maiden name. constant and consistent, and unless and
She was excused, because acc. to court, until changed in the prescribed manner,
she must sue and be sued under her hubby and absent any fraudulent or legally
name, her maiden name absolutely lost. impermissible intent, the State has no
b. People ex rel. Rago v Lipsky. Rago used legitimate concern.
her name professionally, socially, i. We hold that appellee's legal name is
exclusively after marriage. Was denied Rosary T. Palermo.
permission to remain registered under her
maiden name. RULING:
c. Attorney General of Illinois says I do not Affirmed at cost of appellants.
believe this Appellate decision should
control. Other court decisions establish DOCTRINE:
that women may retain maiden name with Women’s adopting of surname of husbands upon
or without court proceedings. marriage is effective in fact, and not of law. Women
d. State ex rel. Krupa v Green. Prohibit Board have liberty of choosing WON to keep their maiden
of Elections form placing maiden name on names.
ballot. Court says it is only by custom” in
English speakers that women adopt hubby
surnames.
CHALLENGES TO THE TRADITIONAL MARRIAGE
e. Pierce v Brushart. Person may adopt name
MODEL; BY PRIVATE CONTRACT: VALID V VOID
he chooses so long as not for fraud.
f. Etc. IN RE SANTIAGO
5. Conclusion:
a. There is a division of authority: we do not FACTS:
claim judicial infallibility. 1. Complaint of SG v Roque Santiago of malpractice,
b. Court does not hesitate to depart from praying for disciplinary action against Santiago.
rigid common law, where reason for 2. Ernesto Baniquit, separated from Soledad Colares
common law rule does not exist. Common for 9 years, wanted second marriage. He sought
law does not have force of Holy Writ. legal advice of Santiago as notary public in Negros
c. At common law, as of time of separation of Occidental.
colonies, woman acquired new name by 3. May 29, 1939 - Santiago assured that Baniquit can
repute, and her name is changed in fact separate with wife to remarry, and told latter to
NOT in law. bring wife that afternoon.
d. Common law of America is revolutionary 4. Santiago prepared document stipulating that
not static and immutable. parties authorize each other to remarry,
e. The application of a rule of custom and its renouncing or waiving their right of action one
conversion into a rule of law, would stifle might have against the marrying party –
and chill virtually all progress in the rapidly Responded admits this.
expanding field of human liberties. 5. Spouses shake hands, Santiago announce their
i. Had we applied the rules of custom single-ness, and they can contract another
during the last quarter of a century, marriage. Santiago say he will tear his diploma
the hopes, aspirations and dreams apart if agreement turns out to be invalid.
of millions of Americans would have 6. Santiago: thought 7 years of separation entitles
been frustrated and their fruition parties to remarry. That on June 30, parties signed
would have been impossible. a deed of cancellation of agreement.
f. to retain her own name, would eliminate
substantial administrative problems ISSUES:
incident to a change of name: increase of
RATIO:
divorces and re-marriage, name changes.
i. We may reach point of forbidding 1. Contract is contrary to law, morals. And subvert
change on name to bring about vital foundation of family.
Persons HW # 6 August 25, 2018
2. Santiago’s actions constitute malpractice and
justify disbarment.
ISSUES:
a. Admission of a lawyer to practice of law is
upon the implied condition that his RATIO:
continued enjoyment of privilege
conferred is dependent on his remaining a 1. It should be secured beforehand, NOT after
fit and safe person to society, otherwise agreement is made.
right to practice is terminated. 2. Agreement contravenes
b. Here, Santiago was either ignorant or Art 221: the following shall be void and of no
carelessly negligent. Should be disbarred, effect:
acc. to minority of Court. (1) Any contract for personal separation between
3. Majority, though, follow the recommendation of husband and wife;
Honorable Sotero Rodas, Santiago is suspended (2) Every extrajudicial agreement during
for 1 year. marriage, of the dissolution of the conjugal
a. He endeavored to correct his mistakes partnership of gains or of the absolute
immediately by making parties sign community of property between husband and
another document cancelling previous wife.
one. 3. While adultery and concubinage are private
crimes, they are still crimes, and contracts
RULING: legalizing such are contrary to law, morals, and
Santiago is guilty of malpractice and suspended for public order.
one year. 4. Due to Mendoza’s unawareness of the legal
prohibition on contracts for personal separation
SELANOVA V MENDOZA of husband and wife; for the extrajudicial
dissolution prepared by said void agreement; for
DOCTRINE:
Mendoza did not study New Civil Code in law
Extrajudicial contract during marriage is prohibited school (1948); for he acted in good faith,
and void. Mendoza deserves severe censure, NOT drastic
penalty.
FACTS:
RULING:
1. Saturnino Selanova charged Judge Alejandro E.
Mendoza with gross ignorance of law for Respondent is severely censured.
preparing and ratifying document (Nov 21, 1972)
extrajudicially liquidating conjugal partnership of
Selanova and Avelina Ceniza. REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE
a. With 2 witnesses and wife.
b. Title “liquidation of Conjugal properties”. Art 2 FC. No marriage shall be valid, unless these
c. Husband = Riceland; wife = house and lot. essential requisites are present:
2. Conditions of document: (1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who
a. Either spouse will withdraw complaint for must be a male and a female; and
adultery or concubinage which each filed (2) Consent freely given in the presence of the
against each other. solemnizing officer. (53a)
b. They waive their rights to prosecute each
other for infidelity.
3. Mendoza aware of invalidity of agreement, but 1. Legal capacity of parties. article 5 and 14. Should
was assured by spouses that they will ask CFI of have no existing impediment between parties
Negros Oriental for approval. (existing relationship or subsisting prior marriage)
a. Relied on Art 191 (4) NCC “ husband and 2. Mutual consent. Law will not enforce any
wife may agree upon the dissolution of agreement to marry. Parties have power to refuse
conjugal partnership during marriage, to give consent
subject to judicial approval. a. Consent must be real: not vitiated by
b. Cites Lacson v San Jose-Lacson: mistake, duress, fraud.
dissolution during marriage of conjugal b. Must be conscious or intelligent
partnership as long as “subsequently” c. Person must be free from insanity,
approved by Court. intoxication, drugs, hypnosis.
Persons HW # 6 August 25, 2018
d. Personally given consent i. any incumbent member of the
e. Free from terms and conditions judiciary within the court’s
3. Marriage in jest. Subject to annulment at the suit jurisdiction;
of parties. Even though a marriage is legal, if it is ii. any priest, rabbi, imam, or
by joke, and parties have no intention of entering minister of any church or religious
into the actual marriage status, with clear sect duly authorized by his church
understanding that parties are not to be bound; or religious sect and registered
ceremony not followed by any conduct indicating with the civil registrar general,
purpose to enter into such relation; even though acting within the limits of the
solemnizer thought they were serious. written authority, granted him by
a. There is NO MARRIAGE. his church or religious sect and
b. Proving lack of real intent: circumstances provided that at least one of the
and statement of parties, even though contracting parties belongs to the
one of them claim that there was such a solemnizing officer’s church or
marriage. religious sect;
c. lack of real intent of one of the parties, iii. any ship captain or airplane chief
will not prevent sincere party from only in cases mentioned in Art 31;
asserting validity. iv. any military commander of a unit
d. Also does not permit the liar to assert to which a chaplain is assigned, in
validity. the absence of the latter, during a
4. Effect of mistake. military operation, likewise only in
a. Void for lack of consent: the cases mentioned in Article 32;
i. Nature and legal consequence of or
ceremony. v. Any consul-general or vice-consul
ii. Identity of one of the parties (Art in the case provided in Article 10.
35 (5)) (56a)
b. NOT void: b. CC: authority of person solemnizing
i. Rank, fortune, character, health marriage was an essential requisite for
of one of parties. the validity of marriage, and, therefore, a
ii. Reason: “for better or for worse” marriage solemnized by someone w/o
5. Differences of sex of parties. authority is void since beginning (Article
a. Omitted in in NCC, but rule remains. 80 (2))
b. Purpose of marriage is procreation. c. Marriage law (Act # 3613) Sec 27.
c. If marriage is done through deceit (e.g. Marriage is valid when at least on party
hermaphrodite and male), marriage is believed in good faith that that
void and inexistent. No legal effect on solemnizer is empowered to do so, and
person or properties of parties, without that marriage was perfectly legal.
prejudice to liability for damages of i. CC removed this completely,
fraudulent party. making such marriage void – acc.
Code Commission.
Art 3 FC. The formal requisites of marriage are: 1. Since state officiates in
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer; celebration of the
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases marriage through
provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and solemnizer, it is logical
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with that such person has the
the appearance of the contracting parties authority from the
before the solemnizing officer and their government at the time.
personal declaration that they take each Authority is foundation of
other husband and wife in the presence of marriage.
not less that two witness of legal age. (53a, 2. Inconsistent that law
55a) requires a license to
perform marriage, then
1. Absence of above render marriage void from the validate marriages done
beginning (Art 4) by unauthorized persons.
2. Authority to solemnize.
a. Article 7 Marriage may be solemnized by:
Persons HW # 6 August 25, 2018
3. Without authority, (1) Any Muslim male at least fifteen years of age
marriages might as well and any Muslim female of the age of puberty
be performed by anyone. or upwards and not suffering from any
ii. FC restored the old Marriage Law. impediment under the provisions of this
Marriages performed by Code may contract marriage. A female is
unauthorized persons are void presumed to have attained puberty upon
unless such marriages were reaching the age of fifteen.
contracted with either or both (2) However, the Shari’a District Court may,
parties in good faith. upon petition of a proper wali, order the
d. Is a void marriage under CC considered solemnization of the marriage of a female
valid in FC? who though less than fifteen but not below
i. YES. twelve (12) years of age, has attained
ii. Art 255 FC: this code shall have puberty.
retroactive effect insofar as it (3) Marriage through a wali by a minor below
does not prejudice or impair the prescribed ages shall be regarded as
vested or acquired in accordance betrothal and may be annulled upon the
with the CC or other laws. petition of either party within four (4) years
iii. FC is curative remedial, and can after attaining the age of puberty, provided
validate marriage in question; no voluntary cohabitation has taken place
serves interest of public. and the wali who contracted the marriage
3. Marriage license. was other than the father or paternal
a. Essential but ONLY a formal requirement. grandfather.
b. Marriages that precede issuance of
license is void; and subsequent issues
does NOT render such marriage valid AT Art 17 MPC. Marriage ceremony. No particular form
ALL. of marriage ceremony is required but the ijab and
c. BUT, law does not impose solemnizers to the gabul in marriage shall be declared publicly in
investigate existence of license issued by the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage
local civil registrar of the parties’ domicile. and two competent witnesses. This declaration shall
Enough that the license was issued by be set forth in an instrument in triplicate, signed or
competent official, who is assumed to marked by the contracting parties and said
have already validated the residence of witnesses, and attested by the person solemnizing
the marrying parties in his municipality. the marriage. One copy shall be given to the
contracting parties and another sent to the Circuit
d. Marriage under license is NOT invalidated
by fact that license was wrongfully Registrar by the solemnizing officer who shall keep
obtained. the third.
4. Ceremony of marriage.
a. No ceremony = no valid marriage. Even if
there is a marriage license. Art 18 MPC. Authority to solemnizing marriage.
i. 2 witnesses of legal age (Article Marriage may be solemnized:
6). (a) By the proper wali of the woman to be
b. This requirement prevents PH to wedded;
recognize common law marriages (b) Upon authority of the proper wali, by any
(agreement between parties with capacity person who is competent under Muslim law
to enter into such relationship to be to solemnize marriage; or
husband and wife and cohabitate) (c) By the judge of the Shari’a District Court of
WORDS TO DEFINE: Shari’s Cirtuit Court, or any person
designated by the judge, should the proper
 Nikah – marriage wali refuse without justifiable reason, to
 Rabbi – authorize the solemnization.
 Imam –
 Wali –
 Ijab - Art II Sec 22. The State recognizes and promotes the
 Gabul - rights of indigenous cultural communities within the
framework of national unity and development.
Art 16 MPL. Capacity to contract marriage.
Persons HW # 6 August 25, 2018
ISSUES:
Art XIV Sec 17. The State the recognize, respect, and RATIO:
protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities
to preserve and develop their culture, traditions, and 1. Kentucky statutes do not specifically prohibit
institutions. It shall consider these rights in the marriage bet persons of same sex, nor authorize
formulation of national plans and policies. issuance of marriage license to such.
2. Some states recognize common-law marriages,
not needing license nor clergy.
3. Marriage, though, has always been considered as
Indigenous People’s Rights Act 1997 (RA No. 8371) union of a man and a woman; we are presented
Sec 2 (c) IPRA. The State the recognize, respect, and with no authority to the contrary.
protect the rights of ICCs/IPs to preserve and 4. It appears to us the appellants are prevented from
develop their cultures, traditions and institutions. It marrying, NOT by statues of Kent or refusal by
shall consider these rights in the formulation of county to issue license, but own incapability of
national laws and policies. entering into a marriage as that term is defined.
5. If appellants concealed from clerk the fact that
Sec 29 IPRA. [CULTURAL INTEGRITY] Protection of they were of same sex, resulting relationship
indigenous Culture, Traditions, and Institutions. – would not constitute a marriage.
The State shall respect, recognize, and protect the 6. Baker v Nelson.
rights of ICCs/IPs to preserve and protect their a. No constitutional sanction or protection
culture, traditions, and institutions. It shall consider of right of marriage by same sex.
these rights in the formulation and application of b. Claim of religious freedom not extended
national plans and policies. to make professed doctrine superior to
Sec 32 IPRA. Community Intellectual Rights. – law of land, and in effect to permit every
ICCs/IPs have the right to practice and revitalize their citizen to become a law unto himself.
own cultural traditions and customs. The State shall c. Relationship proposed by the appellants
preserve, protect, and develop the past present, and does not authorize issuance of license
future manifestations of their cultures as well as the d. What they propose is not a marriage.
right to the restitution of cultural, intellectual, RULING:
religious and spiritual property taken without their
free and prior informed consent or in violation of Judgment affirmed.
their laws, traditions, and customs. DOCTRINE:
Same-sex marriage is not marriage by its definition.
*GOODRIDGE V DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH
ESSENTIAL REQUISITE; LEGAL CAPACITY; MALE AND FACTS:
FEMALE
In Mass., a gay and lesbian support organization
JONES V HALLAHAN (GLAD) sued the state’s Department of Health for
FACTS: their failure to issue same-sex married couples a
marriage license. GLAD sued under the equal
1. Definition of Marriage protection clause. GLAD also argued that there are
a. Webster’s: state of being married or many other benefits accompanying a marriage
being united…opposite sex as husband or license, such as property rights and tax benefits which
wife… purpose of founding and same-sex couples unjustly cannot receive. The state
maintaining a family. of Mass. argued that there was a legitimate
b. Century Dictionary: Legal union of man governmental interest in discriminating on the basis
and woman for life of gender, in that the institution of marriage existed
c. Black’s Law Dictionary: one man and one to promote procreation; and because same-sex
woman united in law for life, for the couples could not further than goal, the state had an
discharge to each other and the interest in disallowing their marital rights. The state
community of the duties legally also argued that there were parental benefits in
incumbent upon those whose association promoting different sex relationships. Finally, the
is founded on the distinction of sex. state argued that there would be administrative
Persons HW # 6 August 25, 2018
inconvenience in suddenly allowing same sex couples Fifth Amendment. While the lawsuit was pending,
to marry. the Attorney General notified the Speaker of the
House of Representatives that the Department of
ISSUES: Justice would not defend §3’s constitutionality.
Whether the denial of a marriage license to same sex 6. The Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) of
couples violates the equal protection clause and/or the House of Representatives intervened to
the Mass. state constitution. defend its constitutionality.
7. The district court held §3 unconstitutional and
RATIO: ordered the IRS to refund Plaintiff’s taxes with
Yes, the law is invalid and same sex couples shall be interest.
allowed marital rights in the state of Mass. The court 8. The court of appeals affirmed, but the IRS refused
wrote that the state’s arguments for denying marital to pay until ordered by the U.S. Supreme Court,
rights to same sex couples did not supply enough which granted certiorari.
justification in terms of the “governmental interest” ISSUES:
sought in their procurement. The court argued that
modern day technology and fertilization techniques WON Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act
nullified the procreation argument. Same sex defining “marriage” and “spouse” to exclude same-
couples, through adoption of other fertilization sex couples violates the Fifth Amendment’s Equal
methods could procreate. Secondly, the court found Protection Clause?
no productive argument favoring the notion that RATIO:
same sex couples were inferior parents to
children. Finally, the court believed the state did not RULING:
demonstrate adequate administrative difficulty to
fully deny a single class of citizens their basic marital Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act’s definitions
rights. As such, the state failed to supply their of “marriage” and “spouse” that excludes same-sex
legitimate governmental interest burden. couples violates the Fifth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause
RULING:
DOCTRINE:
*SILVERIO V REPUBLIC
*US V WINDSOR
FACTS:
FACTS:
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio, born and registered as
1. Windsor (Plaintiff) sued to recover the tax a male, underwent sex reassignment in Bangkok,
payment she paid after inheriting her same-sex Thailand, the fact of which was certified here in the
spouse’s estate and being denied the estate tax Philippines by virtue of a medical certificate issued by
exemption for surviving spouses because the one Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz. He then lived his life as
Defense of Marriage Act defines “marriage” and a woman. On November 26, 2002, Rommel filed a
“spouse” to exclude same-sex couples. petition for the change of his first name and sex before
2. Plaintiff married Spyer in Canada. Their same-sex the RTC of Manila. The court having underwent the
marriage was recognized by the state of New jurisdictional requirements, and there having no
York. opposition, the court proceeded with the hearing
3. Spyer died, leaving her estate to Plaintiff. Federal where Rommel presented his American Fiance as
law provided an estate tax exemption for witness.
surviving spouses. Plaintiff sought to avail herself
of this exemption, but could not under §3 of the RTC gave due course to his petition, ruling based on
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). equity, that “petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a
a. DOMA defined the terms “marriage” and man’s body is not his own doing and should not be
“spouse” as used in federal law and taken against him” and that “no harm, injury or
regulations to exclude same-sex couples. prejudice will be caused to anybody” if the petition
4. Plaintiff paid $363,053 in estate taxes and sought were to be granted. His name was thus changed to
a refund, which was denied by the Internal Mely, and sex to “female.” Republic filed a petition for
Revenue Service (IRS). certiorari in the CA. The appellate court reversed the
5. Plaintiff then sued for a refund, arguing that decision of the RTC.
DOMA violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
ISSUES:
Persons HW # 6 August 25, 2018
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his the clerical or typographical error. Section 2 of RA
name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under 9048 provides expressly that no correction must
Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 involve the change of nationality, age, status
of the Rules of Court and RA 9048. or sex of the petitioner.
RATIO:
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil
1. Change of Name, primarily Administrative in Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules
nature: Section 1 of RA 9048 provides in essence of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and
that no entry in a civil register shall be changed or 408 of the Civil Code (*please see the codal
corrected without a judicial order, except for provisions). The acts, events or factual errors
clerical or typographical errors, which can be contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code
changed by concerned city or municipal civil include even those that occur after
registrar or consul general. The jurisdiction birth. However, no reasonable interpretation of
therefore is primarily lodged with these officers. the provision can justify the conclusion that it
The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the covers the correction on the ground of sex
change of first name from the coverage of Rules reassignment.
103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the 4. Purposes
Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative a. Correction - To correct simply means "to
petition for change of name is first filed and make or set aright; to remove the faults
subsequently denied. In sum, the remedy and the or error from" while to change means "to
proceedings regulating change of first name are replace something with something else of
primarily administrative in nature, not judicial. the same kind or with something that
Hence, the venue to which petitioner filed is serves as a substitute." The birth
improper. certificate of petitioner contained no
error. All entries therein, including those
2. Grounds for change of name: RA 9048 provides corresponding to his first name and sex,
the grounds for which change of first name may be were all correct. No correction is
allowed: 1) petitioner finds the first name or necessary
nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or b. Entry of Certain Acts under Article 407 -
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; 2) The Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes
new first name or nickname has been habitually the entry in the civil registry of
and continuously used by the petitioner and he has certain acts (such as legitimations,
been publicly known by that first name or acknowledgments of illegitimate children
nickname in the community; or 3) The change will and naturalization), events (such as births,
avoid confusion. marriages, naturalization and deaths)
From these grounds, it can be gleaned that RA and judicial decrees (such as legal
9048 does not sanction a change of first name on separations, annulments of marriage,
the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than declarations of nullity of marriages,
avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s name adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery
for his declared purpose may only create grave of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial
complications. Before a person can legally change determination of filiation and changes of
his given name, he must present proper or name). These acts, events and judicial
reasonable cause or any compelling reason decrees produce legal consequences that
justifying such change. In addition, he must show touch upon the legal capacity, status and
that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true nationality of a person. Their effects are
and official name. In this case, he failed to show, expressly sanctioned by the laws. In
or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer contrast, sex reassignment is not among
as a result of using his true and official name. those acts or events mentioned in Article
407. Neither is it recognized nor even
3. No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth mentioned by any law, expressly or
Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex impliedly.
Reassignment: By virtue of RA 9048, Rule 108
now applies only to substantial changes and 5. Status of a Person is permanent. The status of a
corrections in entries in the civil register, excluding person in law includes all his personal qualities
and relations, more or less permanent in nature,
Persons HW # 6 August 25, 2018
not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being Court because the said petition did not implead
married or not. The comprehensive term status… the local civil registrar.
include such matters as the beginning and end of
legal personality, capacity to have rights in ISSUES:
general, family relations, and its various aspects, The issue in this case is the validity of the change of
such as birth, legitimation, adoption, sex or gender and name of respondent as ruled by the
emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes lower court.
even succession. (emphasis supplied).
6. For these reasons, while petitioner may have RATIO:
succeeded in altering his body and appearance 1. The contention of the Office of the Solicitor
through the intervention of modern surgery, no General that the petition is fatally defective
law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the because it failed to implead the local civil registrar
civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal as well as all persons who have or claim any
basis for his petition for the correction or change interest therein is not without merit. However, it
of the entries in his birth certificate must be stressed that private respondent
RULING: furnished the local civil registrar a copy of the
petition, the order to publish on December 16,
Petitioner’s contention is not meritorious. 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the
DOCTRINE: course of the proceedings. In which case, the
Supreme Court ruled that there is substantial
REPUBLIC V CAGANDAHAN compliance of the provisions of Rules 103 and 108
of the Rules of Court.
SUBJECT: Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45 2. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the
Rules of Court) raising question of law and seeking determination of a person’s sex appearing in his
reversal of Decision January 12, 2005 of RTC, Siniloan birth certificate is a legal issue which in this case
Laguna, granting Petition for Correction of Entries in should be dealt with utmost care in view of the
Birth Certificate by Jennifer (Jeff) Cagandahan. delicate facts present in this case.
FACTS: 3. In deciding the case, the Supreme Court brings
forth the need to elaborate the term
1. Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional “intersexuality” which is the condition or let us
Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a say a disorder that respondent is undergoing.
Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth INTERSEXUALITY applies to human beings who
Certificate of her name from Jennifer B. cannot be classified as either male or female. It is
Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic
from female to male. species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia,
2. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is suffering and/or secondary sex characteristics are
from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a determined to be neither exclusively male nor
rare medical condition where afflicted persons female. It is said that an organism with intersex
possess both male and female characteristics. may have biological characteristics of both male
Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with secondary and female sexes.
male characteristics. 4. In view of the foregoing, the highest tribunal of
3. To further her petition, Cagandahan presented in the land consider the compassionate calls for
court the medical certificate evidencing that she is recognition of the various degrees of intersex as
suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia variations which should not be subject to outright
which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon denial.
of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the 5. The current state of Philippine statutes apparently
Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in compels that a person be classified either as a
addition, explained that “Cagandahan genetically male or as a female, but this Court is not
is female but because her body secretes male controlled by mere appearances when nature
hormones, her female organs did not develop itself fundamentally negates such rigid
normally, thus has organs of both male and classification.
female.” 6. That is, Philippine courts must render judgment
4. The lower court decided in her favor but the based on law and the evidence presented. In the
Office of the Solicitor General appealed before instant case, there is no denying that evidence
the Supreme Court invoking that the same was a
Persons HW # 6 August 25, 2018
points that respondent is male. In determining suit under Texas' wrongful death statute as a surviving
respondent to be a female, there is no basis for a spouse of a male patient.
change in the birth certificate entry for gender.
7. The Supreme Court held that where the person is The doctor who was sued filed a motion for summary
biologically or naturally intersex the determining judgment, asserting that Christie was a male and,
factor in his gender classification would be what therefore, could not be the surviving spouse of
the individual, like respondent, having reached another man. The trial court granted summary
the age of majority, with good reason thinks of judgment to the doctor, and Christie appealed.
his/her sex. Christie had a name and sex change made on her birth
a. Sexual development in cases of intersex certificate during pendency of the suit. During the
persons makes the gender classification at surgical procedures, Christie's penis, scrotum, and
birth inconclusive. testicles were removed, and a vagina and labia were
b. It is at maturity that the gender of such constructed. Christie also had breast construction
persons, like respondent, is fixed. The surgery. One of Christie's doctors testified that
Court will not consider respondent as Christie "has the capacity to function sexually as a
having erred in not choosing to undergo female" after the surgery. 9 S.W.3d at 225. Doctors
treatment in order to become or remain testified that medically Christie was a woman.
as a female.
c. Neither will the Court force respondent to Christie married a man by the name of Jonathon in
undergo treatment and to take 1989, approximately 9 or 10 years after sex
medication in order to fit the mold of a reassignment surgery. The two lived together until
female, as society commonly currently Jonathon's death in 1996, after which time Christie
knows this gender of the human species. filed suit against Jonathon's doctor. In Christie's
Respondent is the one who has to live affidavit, Christie asserted that Jonathon knew about
with his intersex anatomy. Christie's background and sex reassignment surgery.
d. To him belongs the human right to the The court in Littleton stated that in Texas, marriage
pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, must be between two parties of the opposite sex. 9
to him should belong the primordial S.W.3d at 225. Further, in order for Christie to sue
choice of what courses of action to take under the wrongful death statute in Texas, Christie
along the path of his sexual development must be the surviving spouse. 9 S.W.3d at 225. Thus, if
and maturation. In the absence of Christie was a man, summary judgment would be
evidence that respondent is an appropriate. After a brief review of what
“incompetent” and in the absence of transsexualism is, the court next examined the case
evidence to show that classifying law in this area. The court discussed Corbett and the
respondent as a male will harm other case of Anonymous v. Anonymous, 67 Misc. 2d 982,
members of society who are equally 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1971). The court also referenced
entitled to protection under the law, the such cases as M.T. v. J.T., In re Ladrach, and K. v.
Supreme Court affirmed as valid and Health Division. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 227-29.
justified the respondent’s position and his
personal judgment of being a male. Based upon the doctors' testimony, the court came up
with four criteria for assessing the sexual identity of
RULING: an individual. These are:
Supreme Court affirmed as valid and justified the
respondent’s position and his personal judgment of (1) Chromosomal factors;
being a male.
(2) Gonadal factors (i.e., presence or absence of
DOCTRINE: testes or ovaries);

*LITTLETON V PRANGE (3) Genital factors (including internal sex organs);

 and
FACTS:
n Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. Civ. App. (4) Psychological factors.
1999), cert. denied 531 U.S. 872, 148 L. Ed. 2d 119,
121 S. Ct. 174 (2000), a transsexual, now called ISSUES:
Christie, who was born a man but had undergone sex
reassignment surgery, brought a medical malpractice
Persons HW # 6 August 25, 2018
Can there be a valid marriage between a man and a court declared Nikki and Thomas’ marriage
person born as a man, but surgically altered to have void.
the physical characteristics of a woman? ● CA stated there is a genuine issue re: Nikki’s
RATIO: sex so the TC erred in granting summary
judgement.
Thus, the court found that even though surgery and ● Nikki filed no evidence motion for summary
hormones can make a transsexual male look like a
judgment in CA. Hence, main consideration on
woman, including female genitalia, and in Christie's
case, even breasts, transsexual medicine does not this appeal to was whether Heather and
create the internal sex organs of a woman (except for Simona produced evidence to raise an issue of
a man-made vaginal canal). There is no womb, cervix, material fact about Nikki being male during
or ovaries in the post-operative transsexual female. the marriage.
The chromosomes do not change. Biologically, the
post-operative female is still a male. 9 S.W.3d at 230.
Even though some doctors would consider Christie a ISSUE:
female and some a male, the court concluded: "Her
● WON Nikki is entitled to the reliefs prayed
female anatomy, however, is all man-made. The body
that Christie inhabits is a male body in all aspects for/ rendition of judgment in her favor
other than what the physicians have supplied." 9 ● WON the mother and former wife produced
S.W.3d at 231. sufficient evidence to defeat Nikki’s no-
evidence motion for summary judgment of
RULING:
DOCTRINE:
HELD:

● NO – Nikki’s no evidence motion for summary

IN RE ESTATE OF THOMAS TREVINO ARAGUZ
judgment has been denied because it does
SUMMARY: Mother and former wife of decedent filed not support rendition of judgment. Hence, the
a suit to declare the decedent’s second marriage void expert testimony of Dr. Cole she presented to
on the grounds that it is a same-sex marriage. Texas prove she was already a female during her
CA ruled in favor of the mother and former wife. marriage with Thomas even though she has
FACTS: not undergone reassignment was not
considered as evidence.
 After Thomas Trevino Araguz III died, his ● YES- Only the evidence produced by Simona
mother (Simona) filed a suit to declare his and Heather were considered, and they were
marriage to Nikki Araguz as void because it able to prove that Nikki was still male during
constituted a same sex marriage. the marriage.
 Heather Delgado, the decedent’s former wife,
intervened as a next friend and represented
their two children to assert that the second
marriage constitutes a marriage between two RULING:
men because of the following:
● CA ruled in favor of Simona and Heather.
o Nikki has undergone sexual
● CA REVERSED the Trial Court’s judgment and
reassignment only after she married
REMANDED the case for further proceedings
Thomas, meaning she has male
consistent with this opinion.
genitalia when she was married
o She was only declared FEMALE in her
birth certificate after her husband Rule 103 RC. CHANGE OF NAME
died Sec 1. Venue. – A person desiring to change his name
● Nikki filed a counterclaim to declare her shall present the petition to the Court of First Instance
marriage valid. Both parties filed opposing of the province in which he resides, or, in the City of
motions for summary judgment and the trial Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.
Persons HW # 6 August 25, 2018
Sec 2. Contents of petition. – A petition for change of the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a)
name shall be signed and verified by the person births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separation; €
desiring his name changed, or some other person on judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments
his behalf, and shall set forth: declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or
resident of the province where the petition is recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m)
filed for at least three (3) years prior to the judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
date of such filing; emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
(b) The cause for which the change of the
petitioner’s name is sought; Sec 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an
(c) The name asked for. entry in the civil register is sought, the civil register
and all persons who have or claim any interest which
Sec 3. Order for hearing. – If the petition filed is would be affected thereby shall be made parties to
sufficient in form and substance, the court, by an the proceeding.
order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a
date and place for the hearing at least once a week Sec 4. Notice and publication. – Upon the filing of the
for three (3) successive weeks in some newspaper of petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and
general circulation published in the province, as the place for the hearing of the same, and cause
court shall deem best. The date set for the hearing reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons
shall not be within three (30) days prior to an election named in the petition. The court shall also cause the
nor within four (4) months after the publication of the order to be published once a week for three (3)
notice. consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.
Sec 4. Hearing. – Any interested person may appear
at the hearing and oppose the petition. The Solicitor Sec 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and nay person
General or the proper provincial or city fiscal shall having or claiming interest under the entry whose
appear on behalf of the Government of the Republic. cancellation or correction is sought may, within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from
Sec 5. Judgment. – Upon satisfactory proof in open the last date of publication of such notice, file his
court on the date fixed in the order that such order opposition thereto.
has been published as directed and that the
allegations of the petition are true, the court shall, if Sec 6. Expediting proceedings. – The court in which
proper and reasonable cause appears for changing the the proceeding is brought may make orders
name of the petitioner, adjudge that such name be expediting the proceedings and may also grant
changed in accordance with the prayer of the petition. preliminary injunction for the preservation of the
rights of the parties pending such proceedings.
Sec 6. Service of judgment. – Judgments or orders
rendered in connection with this rule shall be Sec 7. Order. – After hearing, the court may either
furnished the civil registrar of the municipality or city dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the
where the court issuing the same is situated, who cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a
shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register. certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon
the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the
same in his record.
Rule 108 RC. CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF
ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
R.A. No. 9048: AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR
Sec 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interest in MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL
any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil GENERAL TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR
status of persons which has been recorded in the civil TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR
register, may file a verified petition for the CHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL
cancellation of correction of any entry relating REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL ORDER,
thereto, with the Court of First Instance of the AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE ARTICLES 376 AND
province where the corresponding civil registry is 412 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
located.
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of
Sec 2. Entries subjects to cancellation or correction. – Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in assembled:
Persons HW # 6 August 25, 2018
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or municipality where the record being sought to be
Typographical Error and Change of First Name or corrected or changed is kept.
Nickname - No entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected without a judicial order, except In case the petitioner has already migrated to another
for clerical or typographical errors and change of first place in the country and it would not be practical for
name or nickname which can be corrected or changed such party, in terms of transportation expenses, time
by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or and effort to appear in person before the local civil
consul general in accordance with the provisions of registrar keeping the documents to be corrected or
this Act and its implementing rules and regulations. changed, the petition may be filed, in person, with the
local civil registrar of the place where the interested
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms - As used in this Act, party is presently residing or domiciled. The two (2)
the following terms shall mean: local civil registrars concerned will then communicate
to facilitate the processing of the petition.
"City or Municipal civil registrar" refers to the head of
the local civil registry office of the city or municipality, Citizens of the Philippines who are presently residing
as the case may be, who is appointed as such by the or domiciled in foreign countries may file their
city or municipal mayor in accordance with the petition, in person, with the nearest Philippine
provisions of existing laws. Consulates.
"Petitioner" refers to a natural person filing the The petitions filed with the city or municipal civil
petition and who has direct and personal interest in registrar or the consul general shall be processed in
the correction of a clerical or typographical error in an accordance with this Act and its implementing rules
entry or change of first name or nickname in the civil and regulations.
register.
All petitions for the clerical or typographical errors
"Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake and/or change of first names or nicknames may be
committed in the performance of clerical work in availed of only once.
writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the
civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or
misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the Nickname. - The petition for change of first name or
like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the nickname may be allowed in any of the following
understanding, and can be corrected or changed only cases:
by reference to other existing record or records: The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be
Provided, however, That no correction must involve ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult
the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the to write or pronounce.
petitioner.
The new first name or nickname has been habitually
"Civil Register" refers to the various registry books and continuously used by the petitioner and he has
and related certificates and documents kept in the been publicly known by that by that first name or
archives of the local civil registry offices, Philippine nickname in the community: or
Consulates and of the Office of the Civil Registrar
General. The change will avoid confusion.

"Civil registrar general" refers to the Administrator of SECTION 5. Form and Contents of the Petition. - The
the National Statistics Office which is the agency petition shall be in the form of an affidavit, subscribed
mandated to carry out and administer the provision of and sworn to before any person authorized by the law
laws on civil registration. to administer oaths. The affidavit shall set forth facts
necessary to establish the merits of the petition and
"First name" refers to a name or nickname given to a shall show affirmatively that the petitioner is
person which may consist of one or more names in competent to testify to the matters stated. The
addition to the middle and last names. petitioner shall state the particular erroneous entry or
SECTION 3. Who May File the Petition and Where. - entries, which are sought to be corrected and/or the
Any person having direct and personal interest in the change sought to be made.
correction of a clerical or typographical error in an The petition shall be supported with the following
entry and/or change of first name or nickname in the documents:
civil register may file, in person, a verified petition
with the local civil registry office of the city or
Persons HW # 6 August 25, 2018
A certified true machine copy of the certificate or of The correction of an entry or entries in the civil
the page of the registry book containing the entry or register is substantial or controversial as it affects the
entries sought to be corrected or changed. civil status of a person; or
At least two (2) public or private documents showing The basis used in changing the first name or nickname
the correct entry or entries upon which the correction of a person does not fall under SECTION 4.
or change shall be based; and
The civil registrar general shall immediately notify the
Other documents which the petitioner or the city or city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general of
municipal civil registrar or the consul general may the action taken on the decision. Upon receipt of the
consider relevant and necessary for the approval of notice thereof, the city or municipal civil registrar or
the petition. the consul general shall notify the petitioner of such
action.
In case of change of first name or nickname, the
petition shall likewise be supported with the The petitioner may seek reconsideration with the civil
documents mentioned in the immediately preceding registrar general or file the appropriate petition with
paragraph. In addition, the petition shall be published the proper court.
at least once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks in
a newspaper of general circulation. Furthermore, the If the civil registrar general fails to exercise his power
petitioner shall submit a certification from the to impugn the decision of the city or municipal civil
appropriate law enforcement agencies that he has no registrar or of the consul general within the period
pending case or no criminal record. prescribed herein, such decision shall become final
and executory.
The petition and its supporting papers shall be filed in
three (3) copies to be distributed as follows: first copy Where the petition is denied by the city or municipal
to the concerned city or municipal civil registrar, or civil registrar or the consul general, the petitioner may
the consul general; second copy to the Office of the either appeal the decision to the civil registrar general
Civil Registrar General; and third copy to the or file the appropriate petition with the proper court.
petitioner.
SECTION 6. Duties of the City or Municipal Civil ESSENTIAL REQUISITE; LEGAL CAPACITY; MINIMUM
Registrar or the Consul General. - The city or AGE OF MARRIAGE
municipal civil registrar or the consul general to whom
the petition is presented shall examine the petition EIGENMANN V GUERRA
and its supporting documents. He shall post the SUBJECT:
petition in a conspicuous place provided for that
purpose for ten (10) consecutive days after he finds Eduardo Eigenman action for annulment of marriage
the petition and its supporting documents sufficient in to Maryden Guerra.
form and substance.
FACTS:
The city or municipal civil registrar or the consul
1. Eigenman wants an annulment of his marriage to
general shall act on the petition and shall render a
Maryden for the ff. reasons:
decision not later than five (5) working days after the
a. Age – He was only 16 – 20 y.o. at the time
completion of the posting and/or publication
of marriage, and there was no consent
requirement. He shall transmit a copy of his decision
from his mother, Maria de Mesa.
together with the records of the proceedings to the
b. Forced – His own consent the marriage
Office of the Civil Registrar General within five (5)
was obtained via threat, intimidation, and
working days from the date of the decision.
force by Froilan Guerra (Maryden’s dad).
SECTION 7. Duties and Powers of the Civil Registrar c. Invalid license – marriage license was
General. - The civil registrar general shall, within ten obtained from a councilor of Quezon City,
(10) working days from receipt of the decision who is not authorized to administer
granting a petition, exercise the power to impugn oaths; hence an invalid marriage license.
such decision by way of an objection based on the 2. Guerra made the ff. counterclaims:
following grounds: a. False age– Eigenman represented himself
to be over 21 y.o.
The error is not clerical or typographical; b. Not forced – his mother was present
during the marriage ceremony, and
impliedly gave consent to marriage
Persons HW # 6 August 25, 2018
c. No excuse – Eigenman should not excuse a. Licensed marriages are not invalidated by
himself from marital obligations, to the wrongfully obtained licenses, including
prejudice of Maryden and detriment of lack of authority of subscribing officer.
public interest; marriage as inviolable b. Local civil registrar and solemnizing officer
social institution. are not even required to investigate
3. Background marriage license.
a. They met each other at Clover Theater, 4. Re. consent:
Manila as performers; decided to marry. a. Article 61 CC: Males under 20 years old
b. Feb 17, 1932. Filed applications for license and females less than 18 years old shall
with Local Civil Registrar, Quezon City. exhibit to the local registrar the consent
Eigenman indicates he is 25 years, 8 to their marriage by their father, mother,
months old, Bday. or guardian, or persons having legal
c. Nov 3, 1957. Parents of parties discussed charge over them. Such consent shall be
marriage at Maryden’s house. in writing under oath.
d. Nov 5, 1957. Marriage by Judge Prudencio i. Article 61 pertains only to
Encomienda, license 358036. issuance of marriage license; not
e. They lived a week in M’s house, needed for validity of marriage
transferred to E’s house for 3-4 mos. solemnized under license.
4. Lower Court dismissed the action; hence this ii. Court considers licensed
appeal. marriages valid, even though
license, which was issued by
ISSUES: competent official, was
1. WON a marriage in which one party is older than improperly obtained or defective
16 but younger than 20 years old is valid. (in this case, defective because of
2. WON the consent to a marriage by a parent or false representation of age).
guardian must be in writing and under oath to b. Article 85 CC. Marriage may be annulled
make such marriage valid. for the ff: Party who seeks annulment was
16 – 20 years old (male) or 14 – 18 years
RATIO: old (female); that marriage is solemnized
1. Re. age: E falsely represented his age, making without consent of parent, guardian, etc.;
defendants believe that he is of age to marry unless, after attaining proper age, party
without consent freely cohabits with other as husband and
a. He is now prevented by estoppel in trying wife.
to prove otherwise. (Art 1431 CC: through i. Article 85 declares as voidable
estoppel, an admission or representation marriage those that are
is rendered conclusive upon the person solemnized without consent of
making it, and cannot be denied or the parent, guardian, or person…
disproved as against the person relying authority.
thereon. ii. Thus, it is reasonable to infer that
b. If Court allows him to, it would be in bad consent may be given in any form,
faith and disregard of rules on fair play including impliedly.
and honest dealing. 5. There is so merit on the contention that trial court
2. Re. threat: court finds no reasonable and well- erred in holding that the mere presence of
grounded fear of imminent and grave evil upon appellant’s mother at time of marriage ceremony
appellant’s person or property. was sufficient parental consent.
a. Father said: Balia ko’y lumiligaw ka sa RULING:
aking anak. Pag niloko mo iyan, mag-ingat
ka. Court a quo’s decision affirmed.
b. Above is expected from concerned
parents.
3. Re. license. The law declared null and void ab ESSENTIAL REQUISITE; CONSENT FREELY GIVEN
initio marriages that are WITHOUT license, AT
ALL. *PEOPLE V SANTIAGO
FACTS:
Persons HW # 6 August 25, 2018
On November 23, 1926, herein appellant Felipe 9. 15 Jun 1956. Wassmer says expired na 2
Santiago raped Felicita Masilang, his wife’s niece, in an weeks, tagal na.
uninhabited place across a river in Gapan, Nueva Ecija. 10. 13 July 1956. Another amicable settlement;
After the deed, he took her to the house of his brother, counsel of Velez says unlikely.
Agaton Satiago, who in turn fetched a protestant 11. 21 Jul 1956. Court denies petition FR; Velez
minister who there and then officiated the ceremony appeals to SC with excusable negligence.
of their marriage. After having given money by Felipe, Affidavit not accepted – not factual but
Felicita proceeded home to her father and told what opinionative.
had just occurred. 12. Velez says first judgment is void because
ISSUES: evidence was adduced to clerk.
a. Pangasinan v Palisoc says Clerk is ok
Whether or not the marriage executed by the to receive evidence (Rule 34)
protestant minister is of legal effect. b. Velez’ consent is not needed – in
RATIO: default, no standing in court.
13. Velez says no provision of Civil Code for action
The marriage ceremony was a mere ruse by which the for mere breach of promise.
appellant hoped to escape from the criminal
consequence of his act. It shows that he had no bona ISSUES:
fide intention of making her his wife and the
ceremony cannot be considered binding on her 1. WON mere breach of a promise to marry is
because of duress. The marriage was therefore void an actionable wrong;
for lack of essential consent, and it supplies no 2. WON defendant’s petition for relief on the
impediment to the prosecution of the wrongdoer. ground of excusable negligence is valid;
RULING: 3. WON defendant must be held answerable in
damages;
DOCTRINE: 4. WON the damages awarded were excessive.

HELD AND RATIO DECIDENDI:

WASSMER V VELEZ
G.R. No. L-20089 ll Dec. 26, 1964 1. Defendant’s petition was NOT VALID because
it wasn’t supported by an affidavit of merits
FACTS: based on FACTS. The contention that his
failure to marry plaintiff was due to fortuitous
1. Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer decided event is a conclusion or opinion.
to marry 4 Sept 1954. 2. Mere breach of a promise to marry is NOT AN
2. 2 Sept 1954. Velez left note: Will have to ACTIONABLE WRONG (Estopa v. Biansay).
postpone wedding – My mother opposes it. Congress deliberately eliminated from the
Am leaving on the Convair today. Please do draft of the new Civil Code the provisions that
not ask too many people about the reason would have it so.
why – that would only create a scandal. – 3. Art. 21 NCC. The circumstances surrounding
Paquing” the breach of promise to marry are contrary
3. 3 Sept 1954. “Nothing has changed rest to good customs for which defendant MUST
assured returning very soon apologize mama BE HELD ANSWERABLE in damages. Article 21,
papa love Paking”. CC, provides that "any person who willfully
4. Velez never found again; Bea filed for causes loss or injury to another in a manner
damages, Velez no answer and in default. that is contrary to morals, good customs or
5. Bea adduced evidence to clerk of court as public policy shall compensate the latter for
comm. the damage."
6. 29 Apr 1954. Judgment: Velez to pay Bea P2K a. Article 2219 NCC, moral damages are
(actual) + P25K (moral and exemplary) + recoverable in this case.
P2.5K (atty) + costs. i. No question was raised as to
7. 21 Jun 1955. Velez filed petition for relief and the award of actual damages.
motion for reconsideration. b. Article 2232 NCC, exemplary
8. 23 Aug 1955. Date for amicable settlement. damages are also recoverable
Velez failed to appear; motion to defer because the circumstances indicate
resolution for petition for relief for 2 weeks.
Persons HW # 6 August 25, 2018
that defendant acted in a wanton, possession of a natural child status;
reckless and oppressive manner. compelling Def to acknowledge Ismael un Art.
4. Considering the particular circumstances, the 135 No. 2 NCC
SC affirmed the lower court’s judgment but
REDUCED the initial moral and exemplary HELD:
damages from PHP25000 to PHP15000 as a
reasonable award. 1. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of
the trial court in refusing to give damages to
Antonia for breach of promise to marry. The
DE JESUS V SYQUIA action has no standing in civil law, apart from
G.R. No. L-39110 ll Nov. 28, 1933 the right to recover money or property
advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: ANTONIA L. DE JESUS, ET AL. such promise. This case exhibits none of the
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: CESAR SYQUIA features necessary to maintain such an action.
Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a
FACTS: judgment could be based requiring the
defendant to recognize the second child,
Plaintiff Antonia Loanco-De Jesus worked as a cashier
Pacita Loanco.
for a barber shop of which defendant Cesar Syquia, an
2. The sufficiency of acknowledgement of
unmarried man from a prominent family, was
paternity is satisfied by the production of one
accustomed to get his haircut. The two became
or more documents, of indubitable
acquainted and developed an amorous relationship
authenticity, written by the recognizing
which resulted to Antonia getting pregnant and giving
father, as contemplated in subsection 1 of
birth to a baby boy on June 17, 1931.
article 135 of the Civil Code. The admission of
During the early months of Antonia’s pregnancy, paternity is contained in the note to the priest
defendant was a constant visitor at her home, and in and the other letters addressed to Antonia
February 1931, he handed Antonia a letter which was during her pregnancy.
addressed to the priest who was to christen the baby a. Child, upon being conceived,
acknowledging that “the baby” is his and that it be becomes bearer of legal rights
christened in his name. b. Identity of child which Syquia
intended to acknowledge is clear,
Defendant showed paternal interest in the situation based on the letters – he repeatedly
that even when he was abroad, he continued to write referred to junior.
to Antonia cautioning her to take care of herself so c. It is ok that there are several
that “junior” would be strong. documents: Admission of paternity is
contained in letter to padre, others
After giving birth, Syquia took Antonia and the child in connect it to the child Junior.
his house where they lived together in regular family d. Only requirement is that letters are
style with all household expenses paid for by Syquia. indubitable.
When Antonia showed signs of a second pregnancy, 3. NO.
Syquia left her and thereafter married another a. Def agave child and mother a home,
woman. in which they lived together.
b. The law gives no fixed period during
During the christening of the child, the defendant which child must be in continuous
caused the child to be given the name Ismael Loanco possession… Even though the dad
instead of the originally planned Cesar Syquia, Jr. conceded the status, child still had his
for quite some time
ISSUE: c. “continuous” in Subsec 2 Art 135 NCC
does not mean forever, as long as not
1. WON the breach of promise to marry is intermittent.
actionable.
2. WON the several letters made by defendant
prove sufficiency of acknowledgment of Art 4 FC. Absence of any of the essential or formal
paternity. requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,
3. WON Trial Court erred in holding that Ismael except as stated in Article 35 (a).
Loanco had been in the uninterrupted
Persons HW # 6 August 25, 2018
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall 1. Care and diligence must be exercised by the
render the marriage voidable as provided in Article parties to ascertain facts which are basis of and
45. form the incentive to the mutual undertaking.
a. Marriage contracts are more difficult to
An irregularity in the formal requisite shall not affect avoid because of fraud than ordinary
the validity of the marriage but the party or parties contracts.
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, 2. The present FC limits the cases which would
criminally, and administratively liable. constitute fraud sufficient for annulment to those
1. Essential requisites. in Article 46. No other fraud may be admitted.
a. Found in Article 2 a. FALSE that any serious fraud of a fact
b. If a party gives consent to be husband or material to the marital relation is enough
wife, but unknowingly and voluntarily or ground for annulment.
free, or is misled, there is merely a defect
in the essential requisite of consent. Here,
consent is vitiated or defective, and
marriage is not void ab initio; only
voidable or annullable.
2. Formal requisite.
a. Absence of formal requisite in Article 3
has same effect as absence of essential
requisite; marriage is void ab initio.
b. Exception: Authority of solemnizing
officer. Even if he has no authority, if
party/parties were in good faith, marriage
is valid (Article 35 (2)).
c. Mere defect or irregularity in any formal
requirement has no effect on marriage
itself – remains valid IF all essential
requisites are present.
i. Party responsible for defect may
be prosecuted for crime
committed, or punished
administratively for breach of
duties.
d. Thus, when marriage license is issued by
local civil registrar without requiring
presentation of documentary proofs, or
when marriage license is issued before
expiration of period required by law for
posting of notice of the application for
license, or the notice is not posted, or if
marriage is solemnized in a place not
provided by law, there is mere defect in
formal requisites. Marriage remains valid
if essential requisites are present.
Art 45 (3) FC. A marriage may be annulled for any of
the following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage:
(3) That the consent of either party was
obtained by fraud, unless such party
afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts
constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with
the other as husband and wife.