Republic of the Philippines v. Maria Lourdes P.A.
Sereno
G.R. No. 237428
May 11, 2018
Tijam, J.:
DOCTRINE:
Quo warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public official, may be availed of when
the question involves whether an act or omission committed prior to or at the time of
appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office will render such
appointment or election invalid. On the other hand, acts or omissions, even if it relates to the
qualification of integrity, being a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed during the
incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official, cannot be the subject of quo
warranto proceeding, but of either impeachment if it concerns an impeachable officer and the act
or omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or disciplinary, administrative or criminal
action, if otherwise.
FACTS:
In this petition for quo warranto, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of
the Solicitor General, seeks the declaration of respondent Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno ineligible
to hold the position as Chief Justice for failing to regularly disclose her assets, liabilities and net
worth as a member of the career service prior to her appointment as an Associate Justice, later as
Chief Justice, of the Supreme Court. The Republic further asserts that such failure shows that she
is not possessed of “proven integrity” demanded of every aspirant to the Judiciary.
Integrity is a qualification of being honest, truthful, and having steadfast adherence to
moral and ethical principles. It connotes being consistent – doing the right thing in accordance
with the law and ethical standards every time.
Appointment as Chief Justice
Respondent served as a faculty member of the University of the Philippines-College of
Law from November 1986 to June 1, 2006, and subsequently, as practitioner in various outfits
including as legal counsel for the Republic until 2009. Respondent was appointed as Associate
Justice on August 13, 2010.
In 2012, the position of the Chief Justice was declared vacant. The JBC then agreed to
require the applicants for said position to submit, instead of the usual submission of the SALNs
for the last two years of public service, all previous SALNs up to December 31, 2011 for those in
government service.
In support of her nomination, respondent submitted her SALN for the years 2009, 2010,
and 2011. She claimed in her letter that her period of private practice between her service in U.P.
ending in 2006 and her appointment as Associate Justice in 2010 presents a break in government
service. Hence, she is considered to have rendered government service anew from the time of her
appointment in 2010. Further, considering that most of her government records in the academe
are more than fifteen years old, it is reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all of those
files. She also attached a copy of the Clearance issued by U.P. clearing her of all
academic/administrative responsibilities, claiming that such can be taken as assurance that the
SALN requirements have been met. However, there was no record that neither the regular
members of the JBC nor the JBC En Banc deliberated on such letter.
Despite submitting only 3 SALNs, respondent was listed as applicant with an annotation
stating she had “COMPLETE REQUIREMENTS”, and a note stating that “considering that
[respondent’s] government records in the academe are more than fifteen years old, it is
reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all of those files.” Respondent was then included
in the short list, and was later on appointed by President Aquino III as Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court.
Impeachment and Quo Warranto
On August 30, 2017, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon against
respondent with the House Committee on Justice for culpable violation of the Constitution,
corruption, high crimes, and betrayal of public trust; further alleging that respondent failed to
make truthful declarations in her SALNs.
During the impeachment hearings, it was found out that respondent failed to file most of
her SALNs while she was serving at the U.P. College of Law. Thus, the House Committee
proposed for the Court to investigate the proceedings of the JBC relative to the nomination of
respondent as Chief Justice. Then, a letter dated February 21, 2018 of Atty. Eligio Mallari was
sent to the OSG requesting that the latter initiate a quo warranto proceeding against respondent.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition
for quo warranto against respondent who is an impeachable officer and against whom an
impeachment complaint has already been filed with the House of Representatives
2. Whether respondent, who is an impeachable officer, can be removed from office
through a quo warranto proceeding
3. Whether to take cognizance of the instant petition for quo warranto is violative of the
principle of separation of powers
4. Whether the petition is outrightly dismissible on the ground of prescription
5. Whether respondent is eligible for the position of Chief Justice
RULING:
1. The Court has Jurisdiction over the case. Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution,
provides that the Supreme Court shall exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. Under Section 7, Rule 66 of the
Rules of Court, the venue of an action for quo warranto, commenced by the Solicitor General, is
either the RTC in the City of Manila, in the Court of Appeals, or in the Supreme Court.
Impeachment and quo warranto are materially different. The former is a legislative
proceeding to vindicate the breach of trust reposed by the public in a public officer by
determining his/her fitness to stay in the office; the latter involves a judicial determination of the
eligibility or validity of the election or appointment of a public official based on predetermined
rules. Considering that the petition is of transcendental importance, the Court is empowered to
exercise its power of judicial review. To deter from reviewing an impeachable officer’s
appointment is a clear renunciation of judicial duty.
Contrary to respondent’s allegation of forum shopping, impeachment and quo warranto
may proceed simultaneously and independently of each other since both remedies are also
distinct as to (1) jurisdiction, (2) grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing and
dismissal, and (4) limitations. Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of
several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially
founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues, either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other
court, to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in
another. The causes of action and the reliefs sought in the two proceedings are different. The
question in this quo warranto proceeding is whether the respondent legally holds the position as
Chief Justice, and the relief sought is to declare her ineligible to hold such office. Meanwhile,
impeachment is for respondent’s prosecution for certain impeachable offenses, and the relief
sought is a conviction resulting to her removal from the office she is legally holding.
Further, the impeachment case is yet to be initiated by the filing of the Articles of
Impeachment before the Senate. Thus, at the moment, there is no pending impeachment case that
would bar the quo warranto petition on the ground of forum shopping.
2. Respondent maintains that she may only be removed through impeachment as stated
under Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution. Said provision does not foreclose a quo warranto
action against impeachable officers since it used the term “may be removed from office.” The
provision uses the permissive term "may" which, in statutory construction, denotes discretion
and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect, and as consistently held by the Court, said
term is indicative of a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option. The grantee of that
opportunity is vested with a right or faculty which he has the option to exercise. An option to
remove by impeachment admits of an alternative mode of effecting the removal.
Though it was previously held in various cases that during their incumbency,
impeachable officers cannot be criminally prosecuted for an offense that carries with it the
penalty of removal, and if they are required to be members of the Philippine Bar to qualify for
their positions, they cannot be charged with disbarment – the proscription does not extend to
actions assailing the public officer's title or right to the office he or she occupies. Even the PET
Rules expressly provide for the remedy of either an election protest or a petition for quo
warranto to question the eligibility of the President and the Vice-President, both of whom are
impeachable officers.
A quo warranto petition is predicated on grounds distinct from those of impeachment.
The fact that the enumeration of "impeachable offenses" is made absolute, that is, only those
enumerated offenses are treated as grounds for impeachment, is not equivalent to saying that the
enumeration likewise purport to be a complete statement of the causes of removal from office.
Otherwise, it might lead to an absurd situation where the appointment of an impeachable officer
cannot be questioned even when, for instance, he or she has been determined to be of foreign
nationality or, in offices where Bar membership is a qualification, when he or she fraudulently
represented to be a member of the Bar. Unless such an officer commits any of the grounds for
impeachment and is actually impeached, he can continue discharging the functions of his office
even when he is clearly disqualified from holding it.
3. There is no argument that the constitutionally-defined instrumentality which is given
the power to try impeachment cases is the Senate. However, the Court may still assume
jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto involving a person who would otherwise be an
impeachable official had it not been for a disqualification, without violating the Constitution and
the principle of separation of powers. As already discussed, impeachment and quo warranto are
materially distinct remedies. The former concerns actions that make the officer unfit to continue
exercising his or her office, the latter involves matters that render him or her ineligible to hold
the position to begin with.
The fact that the violation of the SALN requirement formed part of the impeachment
complaint does not justify shifting responsibility to the Congress. The fact remains that the
Republic raised an issue as to respondent's eligibility to occupy the position of Chief Justice, an
obviously legal question which can be resolved through review of jurisprudence and pertinent
laws. To abdicate from resolving a legal controversy simply because of perceived availability of
another remedy, in this case impeachment, would be to sanction the initiation of a process
specifically intended to be long and arduous and compel the entire membership of the Legislative
branch to momentarily abandon their legislative duties to focus on impeachment proceedings for
the possible removal of a public official, who at the outset, may clearly be unqualified under
existing laws and case law. Further, to authorize Congress. to rule on public officials' eligibility
would disturb the system of checks and balances as it would dilute the judicial power of courts,
upon which jurisdiction is exclusively vested to rule on actions for quo warranto.
4. Prescription does not lie against the State. Section 11, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court
provides the rule on quo warranto that “nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to
authorize an action against a public officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the
same be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the
petitioner to hold such office or position, arose”.
The Supreme Court has applied the one-year prescriptive period in previous cases
involving private individuals asserting their right of office, unlike in the instant case where the
government itself commenced the present petition for quo warranto and questions the
qualification of the person holding the highest position in the Judiciary. In connection to such,
Section 2, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides that “The Solicitor General or a public
prosecutor, when directed by the President of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or
otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified in the preceding section can be
established by proof must commence such action.” The Solicitor General is mandated under said
Rule to commence the necessary quo warranto petition.
The State, acting in its character as sovereign, is not bound by any statute of limitation or
technical estoppel. It is the general rule that laches, acquiescence, or unreasonable delay in the
performance of duty on the part of the officers of the state, is not imputable to the state when
acting in its character as a sovereign. It is important to note that quo warranto is intended to
prevent a continuing exercise of an authority unlawfully asserted and to ascertain whether one is
constitutionally authorized to hold the office he claims, whether by election or appointment;
thus, we must liberally interpret the quo warranto statutes to effectuate such purpose. Indeed,
when the government is the real party in interest, and is proceeding mainly to assert its rights,
there can be no defense on the ground of laches or prescription. Indubitably, the basic principle
that "prescription does not lie against the State" which finds textual basis under Article 1108 (4)
of the Civil Code, applies in this case.
Needless to say, no prudent and just court would allow an unqualified person to hold
public office, much more the highest position in the Judiciary. The Republic cannot be faulted
for questioning respondent's qualification· for office only upon discovery of the cause of ouster.
Respondent was never forthright as to whether or not she filed the required SALNs. The defect
on respondent's appointment was therefore not discernible, but was, on the contrary, deliberately
rendered obscure. Finally, it is more important to rule on the merits of the novel issues imbued
with public interest presented, than to dismiss the case outright merely on technicality.
5. Respondent is ineligible as a candidate and nominee for the position of Chief Justice.
As declared by the Constitution, “[a] member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven
competence, integrity, probity, and independence.” To ensure the fulfillment of these standards
in every member of the Judiciary, the JBC has been tasked to screen aspiring judges and justices,
among others, making certain that the nominees submitted to the President are all qualified and
suitably best for appointment.
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution provides that “A Judicial and Bar Council is
hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court,” and as held by the Court, the power
of supervision means "overseeing or the authority of an officer to see to it that the subordinate
officers perform their duties." Part of the Court's supervisory power over the JBC is to see to it
that the JBC complies with its own rules and procedures.
The filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory requirement. It is so important for
purposes of transparency and accountability that failure to comply with such requirement may
result not only in dismissal from public service but also in criminal liability. Noncompliance
with the SALN requirement indubitably reflects on a person’s integrity.
Respondent chronically failed to file her SALNs and thus violated the Constitution, the
law and the Code of Judicial Conduct. A member of the Judiciary who commits such violations
cannot be deemed to be a person of proven integrity. As part of the U.P. College of Law faculty,
Sereno was in government service for 20 years, but only 11 SALNs have been filed.
Respondent's failure to submit her SALNs to the JBC means that she was not able to prove her
integrity at the time of her application as Chief Justice.
Sereno’s ineligibility for lack of proven integrity cannot be cured by her nomination and
subsequent appointment as Chief Justice. Well-settled is the rule that qualifications for public
office must be possessed at the time of appointment and assumption of office and also during the
officer’s entire tenure as continuing requirement. The voidance of the JBC nomination as a
necessary consequence of the Court’s finding that Sereno is ineligible, in the first place, to be a
candidate for the position of Chief Justice and to be nominated for said position follows as a
matter of course.
Upon a finding that respondent is in fact ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice
and is therefore unlawfully holding and exercising such public office, the consequent judgment
under Section 9, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court is the ouster and exclusion of respondent from
holding and exercising the rights, functions and duties of the Office of the Chief Justice.
