1. Jalosjos v. COMELEC [G.R. No.

191970 April 24, 2012]

The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial governor to be a
resident of the province for at least one year before the election. For purposes of the election laws, the
requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person must not only intend to
reside in a particular place but must also have personal presence in such place coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention.

The question of residence is a question of intention. Jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines:
(a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile
remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.

It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them that Jalosjos has met the
residency requirement for provincial governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.

Quezon City was Jalosjos’ domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It may be taken for granted that he
effectively changed his domicile from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there at the age of eight,
acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years. Australia became his domicile by
operation of law and by choice.

When he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is
evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his
Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he reacquired his old
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued
a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos
forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has
since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his
domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia) would
violate the settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence somewhere.

The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he has merely
been staying at his brother’s house. But this circumstance alone cannot support such conclusion. Indeed,
the Court has repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to have a house in a community to
establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should live there even if it
be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate own the house
where he lives would make property a qualification for public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has
proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile.

Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a residential lot in the same village where he lived and a
fish pond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He showed correspondences with political leaders,
including local and national party-mates, from where he lived. Moreover, Jalosjos is a registered voter of
Ipil by final judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga Sibugay.

While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of administrative bodies like the COMELEC, this
does not prevent it from exercising its review powers to correct palpable misappreciation of evidence or
wrong or irrelevant considerations. The evidence Jalosjos presented is sufficient to establish Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay, as his domicile. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in holding otherwise.

Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for Zamboanga Sibugay. The
Court will respect the decision of the people of that province and resolve all doubts regarding his
qualification in his favor to breathe life to their manifest will.

Court GRANTED the petition and SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC.

2. Fermin v COMELEC

SSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC en banc gravely abused its discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the Orders dated May 9, 2006 and May 16, 2006.

HELD: No.

RULING EXPLAINED

Sections 3 and 4, Rule 1 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provide:

“Sec. 3. Construction. These rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote

the effective and efficient implementation of the objectives of ensuring the holding of
free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections and to achieve just expeditious
and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought
before the Commission.

Sec. 4. Suspension of the Rules. - - In the interest of justice and in order to

obtain speedy disposition of all matters pending before the Commission, these rules or
any portion thereof may be suspended by the Commission.”

A scripted scenario of violence initiated by persons identified with petitioner and

abetted by the PNP contingent marred the second special elections on May 6, 2006.
Further, the Chairman of the SMBOC allegedly stopped the election at 2:15 p.m.
although there were still voters lined up to vote in the precinct.

Hence, the COMELEC issued the first Order dated May 9, 2006 requiring
petitioner and the SMBOC to file their respective Comments on the omnibus motion,
and to hold in abeyance the Special Public Hearing set on May 14, 2006.

However, despite notice to both parties and the SMBOC, the Special Public
Hearing proceeded on May 14, 2006. In its Order dated May 16, 2006, the COMELEC
annulled the proceedings of the Special Public Hearing and set aside the proclamation
of petitioner therein as the duly elected mayor of Kabuntalan, evidently for failure to
heed its Order dated May 9, 2006.
 Under Section 227 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC is vested with
the power of direct control and supervision over the board of canvassers; hence, it took
cognizance of the complaint in the omnibus motion which questioned the conduct of the
special elections by the SMBOC.

Under the circumstances, COMELEC's action is not tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.

3. Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal, Alfredo Lim vs COMELEC and Joseph Ejercito Estrada

Issue: whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in ruling that former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as
a result of the pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo.

Ruling:

ART. 36. Pardon; its effects.– A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold public office, or
the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon.

A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him
by the sentence.

ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal – Their accessory penalties.– The penalties of
reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or
during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute disqualification
which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall
have been expressly remitted in the pardon.

Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which
naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording
of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified.

The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon conditional.

Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph
Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office," neither makes
the pardon conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that former President Estrada’s rights to
suffrage and to seek public elective office have been restored.

This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or limitation,
considering the unqualified use of the term "civil and political rights"as being restored. Jurisprudence
educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause
that explains the reasons for the enactment, usually introduced by the word "whereas." Whereas
clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative
language of the statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of
the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the pardon conditional or to make
its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope
of the pardon.

5. Coquilla v COMELEC

ISSUE:
Whether or not Coquilla had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least on year before the elections
held on May 14, 2001 as what he represented in his COC.

RULING:
No. The statement in petitioner’s certificate of candidacy that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern
Samar for “two years” at the time he filed such certificate is not true. The question is whether the
COMELEC was justified in ordering the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for this reason.
Petitioner made a false representation of a material fact in his certificate of candidacy, thus rendering
such certificate liable to cancellation. In the case at bar, what is involved is a false statement concerning
a candidate’s qualification for an office for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. This is a
misrepresentation of a material fact justifying the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy.
The cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy in this case is thus fully justified.