G.R. No. 105111 July 3, 1992 Ramon L. Labo, JR., Commission On Elections, and Roberto Ortega, Respondents
G.R. No. 105111 July 3, 1992 Ramon L. Labo, JR., Commission On Elections, and Roberto Ortega, Respondents
105111 July 3, 1992 was only on May 5, 1992 that petitioner submitted his Answer claiming Filipino
citizenship.
RAMON L. LABO, Jr., petitioner,
vs. On May 9, 1992, respondent Comelec issued the assailed resolution, the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ROBERTO ORTEGA, respondents. dispositive portion of which reads:
G.R. No. 105384 July 3, 1992 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as
it hereby resolves, to grant the petition; respondent's (Labo's) certificate
ROBERTO C. ORTEGA, petitioner, of candidacy is hereby DENIED due course and ordered
vs. CANCELLED; the City Election Registrar of Baguio City is hereby
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAMON L. LABO, Jr., respondents. directed to delete the name of the respondent (Labo) from the list of
candidates for City Mayor of Baguio City. (Rollo, pp. 47-48; GR No.
105111)
BIDIN, J.:
On the same date, Labo filed a motion to stay implementation of said resolution
This is the second time1 that this Court is called upon to rule on the citizenship
until after he shall have raised the matter before this Court.
of Ramon Labo, Jr., who, believing that he is a Filipino citizen launched his
candidacy for mayor of Baguio City in the last May 11, 1992 elections by filing
his certificate of candidacy on March 23, 1992. On May 10, 1992, respondent Comelec issued an Order which reads:
Petitioner Roberto Ortega (GR No. 105384), on other hand, also filed his Acting on the "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Clarification", filed by
certificate of candidacy for the same office on March 25, 1992. respondent (Labo) on May 9, 1992, the Commission resolves that the
decision promulgated on May 9, 1992 disqualifying respondent Ramon
L. Labo, Jr., shall become final and executory only after five (5) days
Shortly after petitioner Labo filed his certificate of candidacy, petitioner Ortega
from promulgation pursuant to Rule 18, Section 13, Paragraph (b) of
filed on March 26, 1992, a disqualification proceeding against Labo before the
the Comelec Rules of Procedure.
Commission on Elections (Comelec), docketed as SPA No. 92-029, seeking to
cancel Labo's certificate of candidacy on the ground that Labo made a false
representation when he stated therein that he (Labo) is a "natural-born" citizen Accordingly, respondent (Labo) may still continue to be voted upon as
of the Philippines. candidate for City Mayor of Baguio City on May 11, 1992 subject to
the final outcome of this case in the event the issue is elevated to the
Supreme Court either on appeal or certiorari. (Rollo, p. 53; GR No.
Summons in the disqualification case was issued by the Comelec on March 27,
1992 to petitioner Labo followed by a telegram dated April 1, 1992, requiring 105111; emphasis supplied)
him to file his Answer within three (3) non-extendible days but the latter failed
to respond. On May 13, 1992, respondent Comelec resolved, motu proprio to suspend the
proclamation of Labo in the event he wins in the elections for the City Mayor of
Baguio. (Rollo, pp. 64-65; GR No. 105111)
On April 15, 1992, Ortega filed a motion to declare Labo in default for failure to
file his Answer.
On May 15, 1992, petitioner Labo filed the instant petition for review docketed
as G.R. No. 105111 with prayer, among others, for the issuance of a temporary
On April 24, 1992, the Comelec issued another order directing the Election
restraining order to set aside the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec;
Registrar of Baguio City to personally deliver the summons. On May 4, 1992,
to render judgment declaring him as a Filipino citizen; and to direct respondent
the disqualification case was set for reception of evidence. At the said hearing,
Ortega presented the decision of this Court in Labo v. Commission on Elections Comelec to proceed with his proclamation in the event he wins in the contested
(176 SCRA 1 [1989]) declaring Labo not a citizen of the Philippines. Labo, on elections.
the other hand, though represented by counsel, did not present any evidence. It
On the same date, or on May 15, 1992 petitioner Ortega filed before the March 27, 1992 followed by a telegram on April 1, 1992. But petitioner chose to
Comelec an urgent motion for the implementation of its May 9, 1992 resolution ignore the same. Came April 15, 1992, petitioner Ortega filed a motion to
cancelling Labo's certificate of candidacy. declare petitioner Labo in default. Over-extending him (Labo) the benefit of due
process, respondent Comelec issued another order dated April 24, 1992, this
After an exchange of pleadings, respondent Comelec, in its resolution dated time directing the Acting City Election Registrar of Baguio to personally serve
May 26, 1992, denied Ortega's motion in view of the pending case (G.R. No. the summons. The alleged delay in the resolution of SPA No. 92-029 can only
105111) earlier filed by Labo of the same nature before this Court. be attributed to petitioner Labo and no one else. Thus, the respondent Comelec
in its resolution dated May 9, 1992 stated:
On June 1, 1992, Ortega filed a petition for mandamus docketed as G.R. No.
105384 praying for the implementation of the Comelec's May 9, 1992 On May 4, 1992, the Acting Regional Election Registrar called this
resolution. case for reception of evidence. Surprisingly, while as of that date
respondent had not yet filed his Answer, a lawyer appeared for him.
Petitioner Ortega argues that respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion when it refused to implement its May 9, 1992 resolution The petitioner (Ortega) presented the certificate of candidacy of
notwithstanding the fact that said resolution disqualifying Ramon Labo has respondent Ramon L. Labo, Jr., which contained in item 9 thereof the
already become final and executory. verified statement that respondent is a "natural-born" Filipino citizen.
To prove that respondent is not a Filipino citizen, petitioner submitted
After the parties have submitted their respective pleadings, the Court, on June the decision of the Supreme Court in "Ramon L. Labo, Jr., petitioner, v.
16, 1992, Resolved to consider the case submitted for decision. Comelec, et al.," GR No. 86564, August 1, 1989, the dispositive
portion of which states:
I. GR No. 105111
WHEREFORE, petitioner Ramon J. (sic) Labo, Jr. is hereby
declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore
In essence, it is the contention of petitioner Labo that he is a Filipino citizen. DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as Mayor of
Alleging lack of trial on the merits as well as the lack of opportunity to be heard Baguio City. He is ordered to VACATE his office and
in Labo v. Commission on Elections (supra), it is the submission of petitioner surrender the same to the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City once
that he can prove his Filipino citizenship. this decision becomes final and executory.
Petitioner cites the 1980 US case of Vance v. Terrazas (444 US 252), wherein it No evidence was adduced for the respondent as in fact he had no
was held that in proving expatriation, an expatriating act an intent to relinquish Answer as of the hearing.
citizenship must be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
On May 5, 1992, respondent (Labo) filed his verified Answer, insisting
Petitioner contends that no finding was made either by the Commission on that he is a Filipino citizen and continue to maintain and preserve his
Immigration or the Comelec as regards his specific intent to renounce his Filipino citizenship; that he does not hold an Australian citizenship;
Philippine citizenship. that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply in citizenship; and that
"existing facts support his continuous maintenance and holding of
Petitioner also faults the Comelec for the supposed abbreviated proceedings in Philippine citizenship" and "supervening events now preclude the
SPA No. 92-029 which denied him adequate opportunity to present a full-dress application of the ruling in the Labo v. Comelec case and the
presentation of his case. Thus: a) only one (1) day was set for hearing of the respondent (Labo) now hold and enjoys Philippine citizenship.
case, i.e., May 4, 1992; b) two days later, May 6, 1992 the hearing was set; c)
instead of holding a hearing, the Comelec issued the questioned resolution on No evidence has been offered by respondent to show what these
May 9, 1992. existing facts and supervening events are to preclude the application of
the Labo decision. (emphasis supplied)
If only to refresh the mind of petitioner Labo, as well as that of his counsel,
records disclose that summons were issued by respondent Comelec as early as
2
The Commission is bound by the final declaration that respondent is failed to present any evidence before the Comelec to support his claim of
not a Filipino citizen. Consequently, respondent's verified statement in reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
his certificate of candidacy that he is a "natural-born" Filipino citizen is
a false material representation." (Rollo, pp. 45-48; GR No. 105111) Furthermore, we need only to reiterate what we have stated in Labo v. Comelec
(supra), viz.,:
Up to this moment, petitioner Labo still failed to submit a scintilla of proof to
shore his claim before this Court that he has indeed reacquired his Philippine Under CA No. 63, as amended by P.D. No. 725, Philippine citizenship
citizenship. may be reacquired by a direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by
repatriation. It does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner
Instead, petitioner relies in the US case of Vance v. Terrazas (supra). Suffice it claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these
to state that petitioner has already pleaded Vance in his motion for methods. He does not point to any judicial decree of naturalization or to
reconsideration in Labo v. Comelec (supra; Rollo, p. 375). Having been any statute directly conferring Philippine citizenship upon him. . . .
previously passed upon, the Court sees no pressing need to re-examine the same
and make a lengthy dissertation thereon. Petitioner Labo's status has not changed in the case at bar. To reiterate, he
(Labo) was disqualified as a candidate for being an alien. His election does not
At any rate, the fact remains that he has not submitted in the instant case any automatically restore his Philippine citizenship, the possession of which is an
evidence, if there be any, to prove his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship indispensable requirement for holding public office (Sec. 39, Local Government
either before this Court or the Comelec. On this score alone, We find no grave Code).
abuse of discretion committed by respondent Comelec in cancelling his (Labo's)
certificate of candidacy and declaring that he is NOT a Filipino citizen pursuant Still, petitioner takes pains in raising a new argument not litigated before the
to our ruling in the 1989 case of Labo v. Comelec (supra). respondent Comelec. Petitioner claims that he has reacquired his Filipino
citizenship by citing his application for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
Petitioner Labo claims, however, that Sec. 722 of the Omnibus Election Code filed before the Office of the Solicitor General pursuant to PD 725 and Letter of
"operates as a legislatively mandated special repatriation proceeding" and that it Instruction No. 2703 (Rollo, pp. 116-119; G.R. No. 105111).
allows his proclamation as the winning candidate since the resolution
disqualifying him was not yet final at the time the election was held. To date, however, and despite favorable recommendation by the Solicitor
General, the Special Committee on Naturalization had yet acted upon said
The Court finds petitioner Labo's strained argument quixotic and untenable. In application for repatriation. Indeed, such fact is even admitted petitioner. In the
the first place, Sec. 72 of the Omnibus Election Code has already been repealed absence of any official action or approval by the proper authorities, a mere
by Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646, to wit: application for repratriation, does not, and cannot, amount to an automatic
reacquisition of the applicant's Philippine citizenship.
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and II. GR No. 105384
the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be Petitioner Ortega submits that since this Court did not issue a temporary
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of restraining order as regards the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec
votes in such election, the Court or the Commission shall continue with cancelling Labo's certificate of candidacy, said resolution has already become
the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion final and executory. Ortega further posits the view that as a result of such
of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof finality, the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes should be
order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever declared Mayor of Baguio City.
the evidence of his guilt is strong. (emphasis supplied)
We agree with Ortega's first proposition.
A perusal of the above provision would readily disclose that the Comelec can
legally suspend the proclamation of petitioner Labo, his reception of the winning
At the time petitioner Labo filed his petition (GR No. 105111) on May 15, 1992,
number of votes notwithstanding, especially so where, as in this case. Labo
the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling his (Labo's)
3
certificate of candidacy had already become final and executory a day earlier, or Undoubtedly, petitioner Labo, not being a Filipino citizen, lacks the
on May 14, 1992, said resolution having been received by petitioner Labo on the fundamental qualification for the contested office. Philippine citizenship is an
same day it was promulgated, i.e., May 9, 1992 and in the interim no restraining indispensable requirement for holding an elective office. As mandated by law:
order was issued by this Court. "An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines."
Thus, Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides: The issue here is citizenship and/or Labo's alienage — the very essence which
strikes at the very core of petitioner Labo's qualification to assume the contested
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of office, he being an alien and not a Filipino citizen. The fact that he was elected
candidacy — by the majority of the electorate is of no moment. As we have held in Frivaldo
v. Commission on Elections (174 SCRA 245 [1989]):
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not
(e) The decision, order, or ruling of the Commission shall, after five (5) excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office
and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications
days from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, be final and
prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone.
executory unless stayed by the Supreme Court. (emphasis supplied)
The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the
vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this
A similar provision is also found in Sec. 3, Rule 39 of the Comelec Rules of case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires
procedure, to wit: strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person
seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total
Sec. 3. Decisions final after five days. — Decisions in loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and
pre-proclamation cases and petitions to deny due course to or cancel fidelity to any other state.
certificates of candidacy, to declare a candidate as nuisance candidate
or to disqualify a candidate, and to postpone or suspend elections shall This brings us to the second issue raised by petitioner Ortega, i.e., whether the
become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days from their disqualification of petitioner Labo entitles the candidate (Ortega) receiving the
promulgation, unless restrained by the Supreme Court. (emphasis next highest number of votes to be proclaimed as the winning candidate for
supplied) mayor of Baguio City.
The resolution cancelling Labo's certificate of candidacy on the ground that he is We hold in the negative. The disqualification of petitioner Labo does not
not a Filipino citizen having acquired finality on May 14, 1992 constrains Us to necessarily entitle petitioner Ortega as the candidate with the next highest
rule against his proclamation as Mayor of Baguio City. number of votes to proclamation as the Mayor of Baguio City.
To begin with, one of the qualifications of an elective official is that he must be We make mention of petitioner Ortega because in his petition, he alleges that:
a citizen of the Philippines. Thus, the Local Government Code provides:
. . . the May 11, 1992 elections were held with both herein petitioner
Sec. 39. Qualifications. — (a) An elective local official must be a (Roberto Ortega) and respondent LABO having been voted for the
citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, position of Mayor and unofficial results indicate that if the name of
municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the respondent LABO were deleted from the list of candidates, herein
sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, sangguniang petitioner (Ortega) will be entitled to be proclaimed as Mayor-elect of
bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for Baguio City. (Rollo, p. 7, GR No. 105384; emphasis supplied)
at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and
able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
(emphasis supplied) and further prays this Court "to proclaim as the Mayor-elect of Baguio City the
candidate who may have garnered the most number of votes after the exclusion
of the name of respondent candidate LABO." (Rollo, p. 15, Ibid.) Implicit,
4
therefore, is petitioner Ortega's desire to be proclaimed Mayor-elect of Baguio Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent,
City. who filed the quo warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as
mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he obtained only the
As discussed hereunder, however, the Court finds Ortega's prayer devoid of second highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not
merit. the choice of the people of Baguio City.
While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes for the The latest ruling of the Court in this issue is Santos v. Commission on
office of city mayor, the fact remains that he was not the choice of the sovereign Election, (137 SCRA 740) decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate
will. Petitioner Labo was overwhelmingly voted by the electorate for the office who placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his
of mayor in the belief that he was then qualified to serve the people of Baguio winning rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-
City and his subsequent disqualification does not make respondent Ortega the candidate, were all disregarded as stray. In effect, the second placer
mayor-elect. This is the import of the recent case of Abella v. Comelec (201 won by default. That decision was supported by eight members of the
SCRA 253 [1991]), wherein we held that: Court then (Cuevas, J., ponente, with Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr.,
Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Alampay, and Aquino JJ., concurring)
with three dissenting (Teehankee, acting C.J., Abad Santos and
While it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a petition to deny
Melencio-Herrera) and another two reserving their votes (Plana and
due course to the certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and was filed
Gutierrez, Jr.). One was on official leave (Fernando, C.J.)
before Larrazabal could be proclaimed, the fact remains that the local
elections of Feb. 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte proceeded with
Larrazabal considered as a bona fide candidate. The voters of the Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should
province voted for her in the sincere belief that she was a qualified be reversed in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Santos (136
candidate for the position of governor. Her votes was counted and she SCRA 435), which represents the more logical and democratic rule.
obtained the highest number of votes. The net effect is that petitioner That case, which reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in
lost in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate. . . . What Topacio vs. Paredes (23 Phil. 238) was supported by ten members of
matters is that in the event a candidate for an elected position who is the Court (Gutierrez, Jr., J., ponente, with Teehankee, Abad Santos,
voted for and who obtains the highest number of votes is disqualified Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Cuevas and
for not possessing the eligibility requirements at the time of the election Alampay, JJ., concurring), without any dissent, . . . . There the Court
as provided by law, the candidate who obtains the second highest held:
number of votes for the same position cannot assume the vacated
position. (emphasis supplied) . . . it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of
the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate
Our ruling in Abella applies squarely to the case at bar and we see no who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is
compelling reason to depart therefrom. Like Abella, petitioner Ortega lost in the proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a
election. He was repudiated by the electorate. He was obviously not the choice constituency, the majority of which have positively declared
of the people of Baguio City. through their ballots that they did not choose him.
Thus, while respondent Ortega (GR No. 105111) originally filed a Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by
disqualification case with the Comelec (docketed as SPA-92-029) seeking to those who have received the highest number of votes cast in
deny due course to petitioner's (Labo's) candidacy, the same did not deter the the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all
people of Baguio City from voting for petitioner Labo, who, by then, was republican forms of government that no one can be declared
allowed by the respondent Comelec to be voted upon, the resolution for his elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it
disqualification having yet to attain the degree of finality (Sec. 78. Omnibus receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the
Election Code). election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676)
And in the earlier case of Labo v. Comelec (supra), We held: The fact that a candidate who obtained the highest number of
votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the
5
office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the ineligible candidate, much less the electorate as having known of such fact. On
candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to the contrary, petitioner Labo was even allowed by no less than the Comelec
be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast itself in its resolution dated May 10, 1992 to be voted for the office of the city
for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may be valid to mayor as its resolution dated May 9, 1992 denying due course to petitioner
vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in Labo's certificate of candidacy had not yet become final and subject to the final
the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary outcome of this case.
political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were
cast in the sincere belief that that candidate was alive, As aforesaid, the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not
qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void entitle the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared
or meaningless. elected. Ortega failed to satisfy the necessary requisite of winning the election
either by a majority or mere plurality of votes sufficient to elevate him in public
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes office as mayor of Baguio City. Having lost in the election for mayor, petitioner
does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes Ortega was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.
to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed
elected to the office. As a consequence of petitioners' ineligibility, a permanent vacancy in the
contested office has occurred. This should now be filled by the vice-mayor, in
Indeed, this has been the rule in the United States since 1849 (State ex rel. accordance with Sec. 44 of the Local Government Code, to wit:
Dunning v. Giles, 52 Am. Dec. 149).
Chapter 2. Vacancies and Succession
It is therefore incorrect to argue that since a candidate has been disqualified, the
votes intended for the disqualified candidate should, in effect, be considered null Sec. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-
and void. This would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom Governor, Mayor and Vice-Mayor. — (a) If a permanent vacancy
sovereignty resides. At the risk of being repetitious, the people of Baguio City occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or the
opted to elect petitioner Labo bona fide, without any intention to misapply their vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. . . .
franchise, and in the honest belief that Labo was then qualified to be the person (emphasis supplied)
to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of the government.
Unfortunately, petitioner Labo turned out to be disqualified and cannot assume
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
the office. Petitioners both being ineligible for the Office of the City Mayor of Baguio City
and in view of the vacancy created in said office, the vice-mayor elect of said
Whether or not the candidate whom the majority voted for can or cannot be city in the May 11, 1992 elections is hereby declared Mayor of Baguio City after
installed, under no circumstances can a minority or defeated candidate be proclamation by the City Board of Canvassers. No costs.
deemed elected to the office. Surely, the 12,602 votes cast for petitioner Ortega
is not a larger number than the 27,471 votes cast for petitioner Labo (as certified SO ORDERED.
by the Election Registrar of Baguio City; rollo, p. 109; GR No. 105111).
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: concurring and dissenting
The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in fact and in
law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the
realm of notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible There is no need for me to discuss Mayor Ramon L. Labo, Jr.'s reacquisition of
candidate. In such case, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity Philippine citizenship. In the first case brought to us, Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC,
and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or 176 SCRA 1 [1989], I dissented from the resolution denying his motion for
throwing away their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the reconsideration.
next higher number of votes may be deemed elected.
It is my view that since Mayor Labo never validly acquired Australian
But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has not been citizenship, he never lost his Philippine citizenship. His oath of allegiance to
shown, and none was alleged, that petitioner Labo was notoriously known as an Australia was null and void because he was not qualified to be an Australian
citizen. This is clear from the certification of Australia's Embassy officials. To
6
me, a null and void act cannot have the positive and serious effect of stripping a with the failings of their own Government in looking after
Filipino of his natural-born citizenship. their welfare. Being in foreign countries, most of them yearn
for their homeland and realize what they have lost. Only now
Labo's taking an oath as citizen of a foreign country was based on his marriage do they appreciate what they used to take for granted.
to a citizen of that country. It turns out, however, that Labo's marriage was
bigamous and void because his Australian wife had an existing valid marriage If some of them may have been forced by circumstances to
when she tied the knot with him. Not being married to her, Labo could not seemingly renounce their citizenship, let us not summarily
become an Australian. Not being qualified to become an Australian citizen, his condemn them.
oath of allegiance to that country was meaningless act. It should not deprive him
of his Philippine citizenship. I cannot believe that Mayor Labo gave up his xxx xxx xxx
citizenship in order to acquire a stateless status.
Citizenship is a political and civil right no less important than freedom of
I, however, concur in the Court's reiteration of the rule that it is the speech, liberty of abode, right against unreasonable searches and seizures, and
vice-mayor elect who succeeds the disqualified mayor-elect and not the losing other basic guarantees of the Bill of Rights.
candidate for mayor.
In deciding cases involving citizenship, I believe that the presumptions should
I have to be consistent with my ponencia in Geronima v. Santos, 136 SCRA 435 be in favor of its retention and against its loss. We apply this principle to cases
[1985]. The Geronimo ruling is even more applicable to this case because on involving civil liberties. We should also apply it to a sincere invocation of
May 11, 1992, the day of the elections, Labo was not yet disqualified. He was Philippine citizenship. We should not lightly strip a person of his natural born
allowed to vote and to be voted for. The COMELEC decision disqualifying him status but should accord to him every possible interpretation consistent with the
became final and executory only on May 14, 1992. In the meantime, the citizens exercise of a right that was vested in him from birth.
of Baguio had already stated who was their choice for Mayor. He had already
been elected. In view of the foregoing, I vote to GRANT the petition and to order the
proclamation and assumption of office of Baguio Mayor Ramon Labo, Jr.
I would like to repeat some observations made in my dissent in the first Labo
case:
I agree with the Court that the citizen of the Philippines must
take pride in his status as such and cherish this priceless gift
that, out of more than a hundred other nationalities, God has
seen fit to grant it to him. We love the Philippines; it is the
land of our birth; it is the home of our people. The emotions
kindled by love of country cannot be described.