less.

Petitioner was also accused of using a driver of the College as his personal and
[G.R. No. 106296. July 5, 1996] family driver.

ISABELO T. CRISOSTOMO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and the On October 22, 1976, petitioner was preventively suspended from office
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.* pursuant to R.A. No. 3019, 13, as amended. In his place Dr. Pablo T. Mateo, Jr. was
designated as officer-in-charge on November 10, 1976, and then as Acting President
DECISION on May 13, 1977.

MENDOZA, J.: On April 1, 1978, P.D. No. 1341 was issued by then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, CONVERTING THE PHILIPPINE COLLEGE OF COMMERCE INTO A
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 15, POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY, DEFINING ITS OBJECTIVES, ORGANIZATIONAL
1992, the dispositive portion of which reads: STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS, AND EXPANDING ITS CURRICULAR
OFFERINGS.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is partially granted. The questioned Orders and
writs directing (1) reinstatement of respondent Isabelo T. Crisostomo to the position of Mateo continued as the head of the new University. On April 3, 1979, he was
President of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, and (2) payment of salaries appointed Acting President and on March 28, 1980, as President for a term of six (6)
and benefits which said respondent failed to receive during his suspension insofar as years.
such payment includes those accruing after the abolition of the PCC and its transfer
to the PUP, are hereby set aside. Accordingly, further proceedings consistent with On July 11, 1980, the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila rendered judgment
this decision may be taken by the court a quo to determine the correct amounts due acquitting petitioner of the charges against him. The dispositive portion of the decision
and payable to said respondent by the said university. reads:

The background of this case is as follows: WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Isabelo T. Crisostomo, not guilty of the
violations charged in all these three cases and hereby acquits him therefrom, with
Petitioner Isabelo Crisostomo was President of the Philippine College of costs de oficio. The bail bonds filed by said accused for his provisional liberty are
Commerce (PCC), having been appointed to that position by the President of the hereby cancelled and released.
Philippines on July 17, 1974.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 13, R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
During his incumbency as president of the PCC, two administrative cases were known as The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and under which the accused has
filed against petitioner for illegal use of government vehicles, misappropriation of been suspended by this Court in an Order dated October 22, 1976, said accused is
construction materials belonging to the college, oppression and harassment, grave hereby ordered reinstated to the position of President of the Philippine College of
misconduct, nepotism and dishonesty. The administrative cases, which were filed Commerce, now known as the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, from which
with the Office of the President, were subsequently referred to the Office of the he has been suspended. By virtue of said reinstatement, he is entitled to receive the
Solicitor General for investigation. salaries and other benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the
meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
Charges of violations of R.A. No. 3019, 3 (e) and R.A. No. 992, 20-21 and R.A.
No. 733, 14 were likewise filed against him with the Office of Tanodbayan. The bail bonds filed by the accused for his provisional liberty in these cases are
hereby cancelled and released.
On June 14, 1976, three (3) informations for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019, as amended) were filed against SO ORDERED.
him. The informations alleged that he appropriated for himself a bahay kubo, which
was intended for the College, and construction materials worth P250,000.00, more or The cases filed before the Tanodbayan (now the Ombudsman) were likewise
dismissed on August 8, 1991 on the ground that they had become moot and
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academic. On the other hand, the administrative cases were dismissed for failure of was limited to those accruing from the time of petitioners suspension until the
the complainants to prosecute them. conversion of the PCC to the PUP. The case was remanded to the trial court for a
determination of the amounts due and payable to petitioner.
On February 12, 1992, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion for
execution of the judgment, particularly the part ordering his reinstatement to the Hence this petition. Petitioner argues that P.D. No. 1341, which converted the
position of president of the PUP and the payment of his salaries and other benefits PCC into the PUP, did not abolish the PCC. He contends that if the law had intended
during the period of suspension. the PCC to lose its existence, it would have specified that the PCC was being
abolished rather than converted and that if the PUP was intended to be a new
The motion was granted, and a partial writ of execution was issued by the trial institution, the law would have said it was being created. Petitioner claims that the
court on March 6, 1992. On March 26, 1992, however, President Corazon C. Aquino PUP is merely a continuation of the existence of the PCC, and, hence, he could be
appointed Dr. Jaime Gellor as acting president of the PUP, following the expiration of reinstated to his former position as president.
the term of office of Dr. Nemesio Prudente, who had succeeded Dr. Mateo. Petitioner
was one of the five nominees considered by the President of the Philippines for the In part the contention is well taken, but, as will presently be explained,
position. reinstatement is no longer possible because of the promulgation of P.D. No. 1437 by
the President of the Philippines on June 10, 1978.
On April 24, 1992, the Regional Trial Court, through respondent Judge Teresita
Dy-Liaco Flores, issued another order, reiterating her earlier order for the P.D. No. 1341 did not abolish, but only changed, the former Philippine College
reinstatement of petitioner to the position of PUP president. A writ of execution, of Commerce into what is now the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, in the
ordering the sheriff to implement the order of reinstatement, was issued. same way that earlier in 1952, R.A. No. 778 had converted what was then the
Philippine School of Commerce into the Philippine College of Commerce. What took
In his return dated April 28, 1992, the sheriff stated that he had executed the writ place was a change in academic status of the educational institution, not in its
by installing petitioner as President of the PUP, although Dr. Gellor did not vacate the corporate life. Hence the change in its name, the expansion of its curricular offerings,
office as he wanted to consult with the President of the Philippines first. This led to a and the changes in its structure and organization.
contempt citation against Dr. Gellor. A hearing was set on May 7, 1992. On May 5,
1992, petitioner also moved to cite Department of Education, Culture and Sports As petitioner correctly points out, when the purpose is to abolish a department
Secretary Isidro Cario in contempt of court. Petitioner assumed the office of president or an office or an organization and to replace it with another one, the lawmaking
of the PUP. authority says so. He cites the following examples:

On May 18, 1992, therefore, the People of the Philippines filed a petition E.O. No. 709:
for certiorari and prohibition (CA G.R. No. 27931), assailing the two orders and the
writs of execution issued by the trial court. It also asked for a temporary restraining 1. There is hereby created a Ministry of Trade and Industry, hereinafter referred to as
order. the Ministry. The existing Ministry of Trade established pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 721 as amended, and the existing Ministry established pursuant to
On June 25, 1992, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order, Presidential Decree No. 488 as amended, are abolished together with their services,
enjoining petitioner to cease and desist from acting as president of the PUP pursuant bureaus and similar agencies, regional offices, and all other entities under their
to the reinstatement orders of the trial court, and enjoining further proceedings in supervision and control. . . .
Criminal Cases Nos. VI-2329-2331.
E.O. No. 710:
On July 15, 1992, the Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision,[2] the dispositive portion of which is set forth at the beginning of this 1. There is hereby created a Ministry of Public Works and Highways, hereinafter
opinion. Said decision set aside the orders and writ of reinstatement issued by the referred to as the Ministry. The existing Ministry of Public Works established pursuant
trial court. The payment of salaries and benefits to petitioner accruing after the to Executive Order No. 546 as amended, and the existing Ministry of Public Highways
conversion of the PCC to the PUP was disallowed. Recovery of salaries and benefits established pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 458 as amended, are abolished
2|Page
together with their services, bureaus and similar agencies, regional offices, and all The appellate court ruled, however, that the PUP and the PCC are not one and
other entities within their supervision and control. . . . the same institution but two different entities and that since petitioner Crisostomos
term was coterminous with the legal existence of the PCC, petitioners term expired
R.A. No. 6975: upon the abolition of the PCC. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals took
into account the following:
13. Creation and Composition. - A National Police Commission, hereinafter referred
to as the Commission, is hereby created for the purpose of effectively discharging the a) After respondent Crisostomos suspension, P.D. No. 1341 (entitled CONVERTING
functions prescribed in the Constitution and provided in this Act. The Commission THE PHILIPPINE COLLEGE OF COMMERCE INTO A POLYTECHNIC
shall be a collegial body within the Department. It shall be composed of a Chairman UNIVERSITY, DEFINING ITS OBJECTIVES, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND
and four (4) regular commissioners, one (1) of whom shall be designated as Vice- FUNCTIONS, AND EXPANDING ITS CURRICULAR OFFERINGS) was issued on
Chairman by the President. The Secretary of the Department shall be the ex- April 1, 1978. This decree explicitly provides that PUPs objectives and purposes
officio Chairman of the Commission, while the Vice-Chairman shall act as the cover not only PCCs offering of programs in the field of commerce and business
executive officer of the Commission. administration but also programs in other polytechnic areas and in other fields such
as agriculture, arts and trades and fisheries . . . (section 2). Being a university, PUP
xxx xxx xxx was conceived as a bigger institution absorbing, merging and integrating the entire
PCC and other national schools as may be transferred to this new state university.
90. Status of Present NAPOLCOM, PC-INP. - Upon the effectivity of this Act, the
present National Police Commission, and the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated b) The manner of selection and appointment of the university head is substantially
National Police shall cease to exist. The Philippine Constabulary, which is the nucleus different from that provided by the PCC Charter. The PUP President shall be
of the integrated Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police, shall cease to be appointed by the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Secretary
a major service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The Integrated National of Education and Culture after consultation with the University Board of
Police, which is the civilian component of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated Regents (section 4, P.D. 1341). The President of PCC, on the other hand, was
National Police, shall cease to be the national police force and in lieu thereof, a new appointed by the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Board of
police force shall be established and constituted pursuant to this Act. Trustees (Section 4, R.A. 778).

In contrast, P.D. No. 1341, provides: c) The composition of the new universitys Board of Regents is likewise different from
that of the PCC Board of Trustees (which included the chairman of the Senate
1. The present Philippine College of Commerce is hereby converted into a university Committee on Education and the chairman of the House Committee on Education,
to be known as the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, hereinafter referred to in the President of the PCC Alumni Association as well as the President of the Chamber
this Decree as the University. of Commerce of the Philippines). Whereas, among others, the NEDA Director-
General, the Secretary of Industry and the Secretary of Labor are members of the
As already noted, R.A. No. 778 earlier provided: PUP Board of Regents. (Section 6, P.D. 1341).

1. The present Philippine School of Commerce, located in the City of Manila, d) The decree moreover transferred to the new university all the properties including
Philippines, is hereby granted full college status and converted into the Philippine equipment and facilities:
College of Commerce, which will offer not only its present one-year and two-year
vocational commercial curricula, the latter leading to the titles of Associate in . . . owned by the Philippine College of Commerce and such other National
Business Education and/or Associate in Commerce, but also four-year courses Schools as may be integrated . . . including their obligations and appropriations . . .
leading to the degrees of Bachelor of Science in Business in Education and Bachelor (Sec. 12; Italics supplied).[3]
of Science in Commerce, and five-year courses leading to the degrees of Master of
Arts in Business Education and Master of Arts in Commerce, respectively. But these are hardly indicia of an intent to abolish an existing institution and to
create a new one. New course offerings can be added to the curriculum of a school
without affecting its legal existence. Nor will changes in its existing structure and
3|Page
organization bring about its abolition and the creation of a new one. Only an express and provided, further that in case the number of years served is less than 20 years,
declaration to that effect by the lawmaking authority will. he shall be entitled to one month pay for every year of service.

The Court of Appeals also cites the provision of P.D. No. 1341 as allegedly In this case, Dr. Pablo T. Mateo Jr., who had been acting president of the
implying the abolition of the PCC and the creation of a new one the PUP in its stead: university since April 3, 1979, was appointed president of PUP for a term of six (6)
years on March 28, 1980, with the result that petitioners term was cut short. In
12. All parcels of land, buildings, equipment and facilities owned by the Philippine accordance with 7 of the law, therefore, petitioner became entitled only to retirement
College of Commerce and such other national schools as may be integrated by virtue benefits or the payment of separation pay. Petitioner must have recognized this fact,
of this decree, including their obligations and appropriations thereof, shall stand that is why in 1992 he asked then President Aquino to consider him for appointment
transferred to the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, provided, however, that to the same position after it had become vacant in consequence of the retirement of
said national schools shall continue to receive their corresponding shares from the Dr. Prudente.
special education fund of the municipal/provincial/city government concerned as are
now enjoyed by them in accordance with existing laws and/or decrees. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED by SETTING
ASIDE the questioned orders of the Regional Trial Court directing the reinstatement
The law does not state that the lands, buildings and equipment owned by the of the petitioner Isabelo T. Crisostomo to the position of president of the Polytechnic
PCC were being transferred to the PUP but only that they stand transferred to University of the Philippines and the payment to him of salaries and benefits which he
it. Stand transferred simply means, for example, that lands transferred to the PCC failed to receive during his suspension in so far as such payment would include
were to be understood as transferred to the PUP as the new name of the institution. salaries accruing after March 28, 1980 when petitioner Crisostomos term was
terminated. Further proceedings in accordance with this decision may be taken by the
But the reinstatement of petitioner to the position of president of the PUP could trial court to determine the amount due and payable to petitioner by the university up
not be ordered by the trial court because on June 10, 1978, P.D. No. 1437 had been to March 28, 1980.
promulgated fixing the term of office of presidents of state universities and colleges at
six (6) years, renewable for another term of six (6) years, and authorizing the SO ORDERED.
President of the Philippines to terminate the terms of incumbents who were not
reappointed. P.D. No. 1437 provides: Regalado, (Chairman), Romero, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

6. The head of the university or college shall be known as the President of the Puno, J., took no part. Counsel for petitioner is his brother.
university or college. He shall be qualified for the position and appointed for a term of
six (6) years by the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the
Secretary of Education and Culture after consulting with the Board which may be
renewed for another term upon recommendation of the Secretary of Education and
Culture after consulting the Board. In case of vacancy by reason of death, absence or
resignation, the Secretary of Education and Culture shall have the authority to
designate an officer in charge of the college or university pending the appointment of
the President.

The powers and duties of the President of the university or college, in addition to
those specifically provided for in this Decree shall be those usually pertaining to the
office of the president of a university or college.

7. The incumbent president of a chartered state college or university whose term may
be terminated according to this Decree, shall be entitled to full retirement
benefits: provided that he has served the government for at least twenty (20) years;
4|Page
 G.R. No. 115844 August 15, 1997 2.2 Executive Vice-President

CESAR G. VIOLA, Chairman, Brgy. 167, Zone 15, District II, Manila, petitioner, 2.3 First Vice-President
vs.
HON. RAFAEL M. ALUNAN III, Secretary DILG, ALEX L. DAVID, 2.4 Second Vice-President
President/Secretary General, National Liga ng mga Barangay, LEONARDO L.
ANGAT, President, City of Manila, Liga ng mga Barangay, respondents. 2.5 Third Vice-President

2.6 Secretary General

MENDOZA, J.: 2.7 Auditor

This is a petition for prohibition challenging the validity of Art. III, §§ 1-2 of the 2.8 Five (5) Directors
Revised Implementing Rules and Guidelines for the General Elections of the Liga ng
mga Barangay Officers so far as they provide for the election of first, second and third Petitioner Cesar G. Viola brought this action as barangay chairman of Brgy. 167,
vice presidents and for auditors for the National Liga ng mga Barangay and its Zone 15, District II, Manila against then Secretary of Interior and Local Government
chapters. The provisions in question read: Rafael M. Alunan III, Alex L. David, president/secretary general of the National Liga
ng mga Barangay, and Leonardo L. Angat, president of the City of Manila Liga ng
§1. Local Liga Chapters. The Municipal, City, Metropolitan and mga Barangay, to restrain them from carrying out the elections for the questioned
Provincial Chapters shall directly elect the following officers and positions on July 3, 1994.
directors to constitute their respective Board of Directors, namely:
Petitioner's contention is that the positions in question are in excess of those provided
1.1 President in the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160), §493 of which mentions as elective
positions only those of president, vice president, and five members of the board of
1.2 Executive Vice-President directors in each chapter at the municipal, city, provincial, metropolitan political
subdivision, and national levels. Petitioner argues that, in providing for the positions of
1.3 First Vice-President first, second and third vice presidents and auditor for each chapter, §§1-2 of the
Implementing Rules expand the number of positions authorized in §493 of the Local
1.4 Second Vice-President Government Code in violation of the principle that implementing rules and regulations
cannot add or detract from the provisions of the law they are designed to implement.
1.5 Third Vice-President
Although the elections are now over, the issues raised in this case are likely to arise
1.6 Auditor again in future elections of officers of the Liga ng mga Barangay. For one thing, doubt
may be cast on the validity of the acts of those elected. For another, this comes within
1.7 Five (5) Directors the rule that courts will decide a question which is otherwise moot and academic if it
is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." 1
§2. National Liga. The National Liga shall directly elect the following
officers and directors to constitute the National Liga Board of We will therefore proceed to the merits of this case.
Directors namely:
Petitioner's contention that the additional positions in question have been created
2.1 President without authority of law is untenable. To begin with, the creation of these positions
was actually made in the Constitution and By-laws of the Liga ng Mga Barangay,

5|Page
which was adopted by the First Barangay National Assembly on January 11, 1994. the Liga as a whole pursuant to the provisions of the Local
This Constitution and By-laws provide in pertinent parts: Government Code of 1991.

ARTICLE VI The post of executive vice president is in reality that of the vice president in §493 of
the LGC, so that the only additional positions created for each chapter in the
OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS Constitution and By-laws are those of first, second and third vice presidents and
auditor. Contrary to petitioner's contention, the creation of the additional positions is
Sec. 1. Organization of Board of Directors of Local Chapters. — authorized by the LGC which provides as follows:
The chapters shall directly elect their respective officers, namely, a
president; executive vice president; first, second, and third vice §493. Organization. The liga at the municipal, city, provincial,
presidents; auditor; and five (5) members to constitute the Board of Metropolitan political subdivision, and national levels directly elect a
Directors of their respective chapter. Thereafter, the Board shall president, a vice-president, and five (5) members of the board of
appoint a secretary, treasurer, and public relations officer from directors. The board shall appoint its secretary and treasurer
among the five (5) members, with the rest serving as Directors of and create such other positions as it may deem necessary for the
Board. The Board may create such other positions as it may deem management of the chapter. A secretary-general shall be elected
necessary for the management of the chapter. Pending elections of form among the members of the national liga and shall be charged
the president of the municipal, city, provincial and metropolitan with the overall operation of the liga on the national level. The
chapters of the Liga, the incumbent presidents of the ABCs of the board shall coordinate the activities of the chapters of the liga.
municipality, city province and Metropolitan Manila shall continue to (emphasis added)
act as presidents of the corresponding Liga chapters, subject to the
provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991. This provision in fact requires — and not merely authorizes the board of directors to
"create such other positions as it may deem necessary for the management of the
Sec. 2. Organization of Board of Directors of the National Liga. — chapter" and belies petitioner's claim that said provision (§493) limits the officers of a
The National Liga shall be composed of the presidents of the chapter to the president, vice president, five members of the board of directors,
provincial Liga chapters, highly urbanized and independent secretary, and treasurer. That Congress can delegate the power to create positions
component city chapters, and the metropolitan chapter who shall such as these has been settled by our decisions upholding the validity of
directly elect their respective officers, namely, a president, reorganization statutes authorizing the President of the Philippines to create, abolish
executive vice president; first, second, and third vice president, or merge officers in the executive department. 2 The question is whether, in making a
auditor, secretary general; and five (5) members to constitute the delegation of this power to the board of directors of each chapter of the Liga ng Mga
Board of Directors of the National Liga. Thereafter, the Board shall Barangay, Congress provided a sufficient standard so that, in the phrase of Justice
appoint a treasurer, secretary and public relations officers from Cardozo, administrative discretion may be "canalized within proper banks that keep it
among the five (5) members with the rest serving as directors of the from overflowing."3
Board. The Board may create such other positions as it may deem
necessary for the management of the National Liga. Pending Statutory provisions authorizing the President of the Philippines to make reforms and
election of Secretary-General, the incumbent president of the changes in government owned or controlled corporations for the purpose of
Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay (PKB) shall act as the promoting "simplicity, economy and efficiency"4 in their operations and empowering
Secretary-General. The incumbent members of the Board of the the Secretary of Education to prescribe minimum standards of "adequate and efficient
PKB, headed by the Secretary-General who continue to be instruction" 5 in private schools and colleges have been found to be sufficient for the
presidents of the respective chapters of the Liga to which they purpose of valid delegation. Judged by these cases, we hold that §493 of the Local
belong, shall constitute a committee to exercise the powers and Government Code, in directing the board of directors of the liga to "create such other
duties of the National Liga and with the primordial responsibility of positions as may be deemed necessary for the management of the chapter[s],"
drafting a Constitution and By-Laws needed for the organization of embodies a fairly intelligible standard. There is no undue delegation of power by
Congress.
6|Page
Justice Davide contends in dissent, however, that "only the Board of Directors — and But it is contended in the dissent that "Section 493 of the LGC . . . vests the power to
not any other body — is vested with the power to create other positions as may be create additional positions in the Board of Directors of the chapter." The implication
necessary for the management of the chapter" and that, in any case, there is no seems to be that the board of the directors at the national level did not have that
showing that the Barangay National Assembly was authorized to draft the power. It is necessary to consider the organizational structure of the Liga ng mga
Constitution and By-laws because he is unable to find any creating it. The Barangay Barangay as provided in the LGC, as follows:
National Assembly is actually the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay (PKB)
referred to in Art. 210(f)(2)(3) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local §492. Representation, Chapters, National Liga. — Every barangay
Government Code of 1991, which Justice Davide's dissent cites. It will be helpful to shall be represented in said liga by the punong barangay, or in his
quote these provisions: absence or incapacity, by a sangguniang member duly elected for
the purpose among its members, who shall attend all meetings or
(2) A secretary-general shall be elected from among the members deliberations called by the different chapters of the liga.
of the national liga who shall be responsible for the overall
operation of the liga. Pending election of a secretary-general under The liga shall have chapters at the municipal, city, provincial and
this rule, the incumbent president of the pambansang katipunan ng metropolitan political subdivision levels.
mga barangay shall act as the secretary-general. The incumbent
members of the board of the pambansang katipunan ng mga The municipal and city chapters of the liga shall be composed of
barangay, headed by the secretary-general, who continue to be the barangay representatives of municipal and city barangays,
presidents of the respective chapters of the liga to which they respectively. The duly elected presidents of component municipal
belong, shall constitute a committee to exercise the powers and and city chapters shall constitute the provincial chapter or the
duties of the national liga and draft or amend the constitution and metropolitan political subdivision chapter. The duly elected
by-laws of the national liga to conform to the provisions of this Rule. presidents of highly-urbanized cities, provincial chapters, the
Metropolitan Manila chapter and metropolitan political subdivision
(3) The board of directors shall coordinate the activities of the chapters shall constitute the National Liga ng mga Barangay.
various chapters of the liga.
§493. Organization. — The liga at the municipal, city, provincial,
(Emphasis added) metropolitan political subdivision, and national levels directly elect a
president, a vice-president, and five (5) members of the board of
Pursuant to these provisions, pending the organization of the Liga ng mga Barangay, directors. The board shall appoint its secretary and treasurer and
the board of directors of the PKB was constituted into a committee, headed by the create such other positions as it may deem necessary for the
PKB president, who acted as secretary general, with a two-fold mandate: "[I] exercise management of the chapter. A secretary-general shall be elected
the powers and duties of the national liga and [2] draft or amend the constitution and from among the members of the national liga and shall be charged
by-laws of the national liga to conform to the provisions of this Rule." The board of with the overall operation of the liga on the national level. The
directors of the PKB, functioning in place of the board of directors of the National Liga board shall coordinate the activities of the chapters of the liga.
ng mga Barangay, exercised one of these powers of the National Liga board, namely,
to create additional positions which it deemed necessary for the management of a (Emphasis added)
chapter. There is therefore no basis for the claim that because the power to create
additional positions in the Liga on its chapters is vested only in the board of directors While the board of directors of a local chapter can create additional positions to
the exercise of this power by the Barangay National Assembly is unauthorized and provide for the needs of the chapter, the board of directors of the National Liga must
illegal and positions created are void. The Barangay National Assembly was actually be deemed to have the power to create additional positions not only for its
the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay or PKB. Pending the organization of management but also for that of all the chapters at the municipal, city, provincial and
the Liga ng mga Barangay, it served as the Liga. metropolitan political subdivision levels. Otherwise the National Liga would be no
different from the local chapters. There would then be only so many local chapters
without a national one, when what is contemplated in the above-quoted provisions of
7|Page
the LGC is that there should be one Liga ng mga Barangay with local chapters at all Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Francisco and
levels of local government units. The dissent, by denying to the board of directors at Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
the National Liga the power to create additional positions in the local chapters, would
reduce such board to a board of a local chapter. The fact is that §493 grants the Torres, Jr., J., is on leave.
power to create positions not only to the boards of the local chapters but to the board
of the Liga at the national level as well.

Indeed what was done in the Constitution and By-laws of their liga was to create EN BANC
additional positions in each chapters, whether national or local, without however
precluding the boards of directors of the chapters as well as that of the national liga
from creating other positions for their peculiar needs. The creation by the board of the
National Liga of the positions of first, second and third vice presidents, auditors and
public relations officers was intended to provide uniform officers for the various
chapters in line with the mandate in Art. 210(g)(2) of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 to the Barangay National
Assembly to "formulate uniform constitution and by-laws applicable to the national liga LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO, G.R. No. 192935
and all local chapters." The various chapters could have different minor officers
depending on their local needs, but they must have the same major elective officers, Petitioner,
meaning to say, the additional vice-presidents and auditors.

The dissent further argues that, following the rule of ejusdem generis, what may be
created as additional positions can only be appointive ones because the positions of - versus -
secretary and treasurer are appointive positions. The rule might apply if what is
involved is the appointment of other officers. But what we are dealing with in this case
is the creation of additional positions. Section 493 actually gives the board the power
to "[1] appoint its secretary and treasurer and [2] create such other positions as it may THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010,
deem necessary for the management of the chapter." The additional positions to be
created need not therefore be appointive positions. Respondent.

Nor is it correct to say that §493, in providing that additional positions to be created x-----------------------x
must be those which are "deemed necessary for the management of the chapter,"
contemplates only appointive positions. Management positions are not necessarily REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN,
limited to appointive positions. Elective officers, such as the president and vice-
president, can be expected to be involved in the general administration or REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A. G.R. No. 193036
management of the chapter. Hence, the creation of other elective positions which DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR.,
may be deemed necessary for the management of the chapter is within the purview of
§493. Petitioners,
Present:
WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
CORONA, C.J.,

8|Page
 DECISION
CARPIO,
MENDOZA, J.:
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
VELASCO, JR., boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
NACHURA, legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
BRION, guarantees to them.

PERALTA,

BERSAMIN, Justice Jose P. Laurel

DEL CASTILLO, The role of the Constitution cannot be overlooked. It is through the Constitution that
the fundamental powers of government are established, limited and defined, and by
ABAD, which these powers are distributed among the several departments. [2] The
Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. VILLARAMA, JR., to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must
and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND defer.[3] Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter what may be the
MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. PEREZ, tides of time. It cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate the call of
ABAD, situations and much more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of government and
MENDOZA, and the people who run it.[4]
Respondents.
SERENO, JJ.

For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases[5] both of which
essentially assail the validity and constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, dated July
Promulgated: 30, 2010, entitled Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010.

December 7, 2010

The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition
instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and
x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative
power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution [6] as it usurps the
constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate
funds therefor.[7]
9|Page
 WHEREAS, corruption is among the most despicable acts of
defiance of this principle and notorious violation of this mandate;
The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. WHEREAS, corruption is an evil and scourge which seriously
Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members affects the political, economic, and social life of a nation; in a very
of the House of Representatives. special way it inflicts untold misfortune and misery on the poor, the
marginalized and underprivileged sector of society;

WHEREAS, corruption in the Philippines has reached very alarming

The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic levels, and undermined the peoples trust and confidence in the
May 2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his Government and its institutions;
staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, Kung walang corrupt,
walang mahirap. The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to WHEREAS, there is an urgent call for the determination of the truth
carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency. regarding certain reports of large scale graft and corruption in the
government and to put a closure to them by the filing of the
appropriate cases against those involved, if warranted, and to deter
others from committing the evil, restore the peoples faith and
To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a confidence in the Government and in their public servants;
need for a special body to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly
committed during the previous administration.

WHEREAS, the Presidents battlecry during his campaign for the

Presidency in the last elections kung walang corrupt, walang
Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, mahirap expresses a solemn pledge that if elected, he would end
signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 corruption and the evil it breeds;
(Truth Commission). Pertinent provisions of said executive order read:
WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1 investigating and finding out the truth concerning the reported cases
of graft and corruption during the previous administration, and
which will recommend the prosecution of the offenders and secure
justice for all;
CREATING THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010
WHEREAS, Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of Executive Order
No. 292, otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code of
the Philippines, gives the President the continuing authority to
WHEREAS, Article XI, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution of the reorganize the Office of the President.
Philippines solemnly enshrines the principle that a public office is a
public trust and mandates that public officers and employees, who NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III, President
are servants of the people, must at all times be accountable to the of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in
latter, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and me by law, do hereby order:
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives;
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby created
the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as
10 | P a g e
the COMMISSION, which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, corruption cases filed with the Sandiganbayan or the regular courts,
and toward this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of as the case may be;
such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and
ethical sensibilities of the people, committed by public officers and e) Invite or subpoena witnesses and take their testimonies and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from for that purpose, administer oaths or affirmations as the case may
the private sector, if any, during the previous administration; and be;
thereafter recommend the appropriate action or measure to be
taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be f) Recommend, in cases where there is a need to utilize any
served without fear or favor. person as a state witness to ensure that the ends of justice be fully
served, that such person who qualifies as a state witness under the
The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four (4) Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines be admitted for that
members who will act as an independent collegial body. purpose;

SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission, which shall g) Turn over from time to time, for expeditious prosecution, to
have all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, the appropriate prosecutorial authorities, by means of a special
Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily or interim report and recommendation, all evidence on corruption of
tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of reported public officers and employees and their private sector co-principals,
cases of graft and corruption referred to in Section 1, involving third accomplices or accessories, if any, when in the course of its
level public officers and higher, their co-principals, accomplices and investigation the Commission finds that there is reasonable ground
accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous to believe that they are liable for graft and corruption under
administration and thereafter submit its finding and pertinent applicable laws;
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
h) Call upon any government investigative or prosecutorial
In particular, it shall: agency such as the Department of Justice or any of the agencies
under it, and the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission, for such
a) Identify and determine the reported cases of such graft and assistance and cooperation as it may require in the discharge of its
corruption which it will investigate; functions and duties;

b) Collect, receive, review and evaluate evidence related to or i) Engage or contract the services of resource persons,
regarding the cases of large scale corruption which it has chosen to professionals and other personnel determined by it as necessary to
investigate, and to this end require any agency, official or employee carry out its mandate;
of the Executive Branch, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, to produce documents, books, records and other j) Promulgate its rules and regulations or rules of procedure it
papers; deems necessary to effectively and efficiently carry out the
objectives of this Executive Order and to ensure the orderly conduct
c) Upon proper request or representation, obtain information and of its investigations, proceedings and hearings, including the
documents from the Senate and the House of Representatives presentation of evidence;
records of investigations conducted by committees thereof relating
to matters or subjects being investigated by the Commission; k) Exercise such other acts incident to or are appropriate and
necessary in connection with the objectives and purposes of this
d) Upon proper request and representation, obtain information Order.
from the courts, including the Sandiganbayan and the Office of the
Court Administrator, information or documents in respect to SECTION 3. Staffing Requirements. x x x.
11 | P a g e
SECTION 4. Detail of Employees. x x x. include the investigation of cases and instances of graft and
corruption during the prior administrations, such mandate may be
SECTION 5. Engagement of Experts. x x x so extended accordingly by way of a supplemental Executive Order.

SECTION 6. Conduct of Proceedings. x x x. SECTION 18. Separability Clause. If any provision of this Order is
declared unconstitutional, the same shall not affect the validity and
SECTION 7. Right to Counsel of Witnesses/Resource Persons. x x effectivity of the other provisions hereof.
x.
SECTION 19. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall take effect
SECTION 8. Protection of Witnesses/Resource Persons. x x x. immediately.

SECTION 9. Refusal to Obey Subpoena, Take Oath or Give DONE in the City of Manila, Philippines, this 30th day of July 2010.
Testimony. Any government official or personnel who, without lawful
excuse, fails to appear upon subpoena issued by the Commission (SGD.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO III
or who, appearing before the Commission refuses to take oath or
affirmation, give testimony or produce documents for inspection, By the President:
when required, shall be subject to administrative disciplinary action.
Any private person who does the same may be dealt with in
accordance with law.
(SGD.) PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.
SECTION 10. Duty to Extend Assistance to the Commission. x x x.
Executive Secretary
SECTION 11. Budget for the Commission. The Office of the
President shall provide the necessary funds for the Commission to Nature of the Truth Commission
ensure that it can exercise its powers, execute its functions, and
perform its duties and responsibilities as effectively, efficiently, and As can be gleaned from the above-quoted provisions, the Philippine Truth
expeditiously as possible. Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President
with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-
SECTION 12. Office. x x x. level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories
during the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and
SECTION 13. Furniture/Equipment. x x x. recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it has
been described as an independent collegial body, it is essentially an entity within the
SECTION 14. Term of the Commission. The Commission shall Office of the President Proper and subject to his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a
accomplish its mission on or before December 31, 2012. public office, as an ad hoc body is one.[8]

SECTION 15. Publication of Final Report. x x x. To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative
body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987. It is
SECTION 16. Transfer of Records and Facilities of the not, however, a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or
Commission. x x x. render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect
and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may
SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less
in the judgment of the President there is a need to expand the order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such
mandate of the Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of
12 | P a g e
law. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or administrative penalties or like us to simply forget about the wrongs that they have committed
sanctions. in the past, we have this to say: There can be no reconciliation
without justice. When we allow crimes to go unpunished, we give
The PTC is different from the truth commissions in other countries which consent to their occurring over and over again.
have been created as official, transitory and non-judicial fact-finding bodies to
establish the facts and context of serious violations of human rights or of international The Thrusts of the Petitions
humanitarian law in a countrys past.[9] They are usually established by states
emerging from periods of internal unrest, civil strife or authoritarianism to serve as
mechanisms for transitional justice.
Barely a month after the issuance of Executive Order No. 1, the petitioners
asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing
its functions. A perusal of the arguments of the petitioners in both cases shows that
Truth commissions have been described as bodies that share the following they are essentially the same. The petitioners-legislators summarized them in the
characteristics: (1) they examine only past events; (2) they investigate patterns of following manner:
abuse committed over a period of time, as opposed to a particular event; (3) they are
temporary bodies that finish their work with the submission of a report containing
conclusions and recommendations; and (4) they are officially sanctioned, authorized
or empowered by the State.[10] Commissions members are usually empowered to (a) E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of powers as it
conduct research, support victims, and propose policy recommendations to prevent arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office and
recurrence of crimes. Through their investigations, the commissions may aim to appropriate funds for its operation.
discover and learn more about past abuses, or formally acknowledge them. They may
aim to prepare the way for prosecutions and recommend institutional reforms.[11]

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the

Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because
Thus, their main goals range from retribution to reconciliation. The the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize
Nuremburg and Tokyo war crime tribunals are examples of a retributory or vindicatory the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and
body set up to try and punish those responsible for crimes against humanity. A form efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new
of a reconciliatory tribunal is the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South public office which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth
Africa, the principal function of which was to heal the wounds of past violence and to Commission.
prevent future conflict by providing a cathartic experience for victims.
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and
pertinent statutes when it vested the Truth Commission with quasi-
judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of
The PTC is a far cry from South Africas model. The latter placed more the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the
emphasis on reconciliation than on judicial retribution, while the marching order of the Department of Justice created under the Administrative Code of
PTC is the identification and punishment of perpetrators. As one writer [12] puts it: 1987.

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it

selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials and
The order ruled out reconciliation. It translated the personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their
Draconian code spelled out by Aquino in his inaugural speech: To peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other
those who talk about reconciliation, if they mean that they would administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.
13 | P a g e
 (e) The creation of the Philippine Truth Commission of 3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede
2010 violates the consistent and general international practice of the functions of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and
four decades wherein States constitute truth commissions to the Department of Justice (DOJ), because it is a fact-finding body
exclusively investigate human rights violations, which customary and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate,
practice forms part of the generally accepted principles of supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction.
international law which the Philippines is mandated to adhere to
pursuant to the Declaration of Principles enshrined in the 4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal
Constitution. protection clause because it was validly created for laudable
purposes.
(f) The creation of the Truth Commission is an exercise in
futility, an adventure in partisan hostility, a launching pad for The OSG then points to the continued existence and validity of other
trial/conviction by publicity and a mere populist propaganda to executive orders and presidential issuances creating similar bodies to justify the
mistakenly impress the people that widespread poverty will creation of the PTC such as Presidential Complaint and Action
altogether vanish if corruption is eliminated without even addressing Commission (PCAC) by President Ramon B. Magsaysay, Presidential Committee on
the other major causes of poverty. Administrative Performance Efficiency (PCAPE) by President Carlos P. Garcia and
Presidential Agency on Reform and Government Operations (PARGO) by President
(g) The mere fact that previous commissions were not Ferdinand E. Marcos.[18]
constitutionally challenged is of no moment because neither laches
nor estoppel can bar an eventual question on the constitutionality From the petitions, pleadings, transcripts, and memoranda, the following are
and validity of an executive issuance or even a statute.[13] the principal issues to be resolved:

1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing

to file their respective petitions and question Executive Order No. 1;

In their Consolidated Comment,[14] the respondents, through the Office of the

Solicitor General (OSG), essentially questioned the legal standing of petitioners and 2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the
defended the assailed executive order with the following arguments: principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of
Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices,
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress to agencies and commissions;
create a public office because the Presidents executive power and
power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct 3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the
investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987
(E.O. No. 292), [15] Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1416[16] (as 4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal
amended by P.D. No. 1772), R.A. No. 9970,[17]and settled protection clause; and
jurisprudence that authorize the President to create or form such
bodies. 5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive
relief.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to
appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a mere Essential requisites for judicial review
allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.

14 | P a g e
Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of Executive Order No. Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative,
1, the Court needs to ascertain whether the requisites for a valid exercise of its power powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus,
of judicial review are present. they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind,
infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.[22]
Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is
subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for With regard to Biraogo, the OSG argues that, as a taxpayer, he has no
the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the creation of the PTC and the budget for its operations. [23] It
standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he emphasizes that the funds to be used for the creation and operation of the
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, commission are to be taken from those funds already appropriated by Congress.
or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of Thus, the allocation and disbursement of funds for the commission will not entail
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of congressional action but will simply be an exercise of the Presidents power over
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.[19] contingent funds.

Among all these limitations, only the legal standing of the petitioners has been put at As correctly pointed out by the OSG, Biraogo has not shown that he
issue. sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to
the implementation of Executive Order No. 1. Nowhere in his petition is an assertion
Legal Standing of the Petitioners of a clear right that may justify his clamor for the Court to exercise judicial power and
to wield the axe over presidential issuances in defense of the Constitution. The case
The OSG attacks the legal personality of the petitioners-legislators to file of David v. Arroyo[24] explained the deep-seated rules on locus standi. Thus:
their petition for failure to demonstrate their personal stake in the outcome of the
case.It argues that the petitioners have not shown that they have sustained or are in Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court
danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PTC. Not of justice on a given question. In private suits, standing is governed
claiming to be the subject of the commissions investigations, petitioners will not by the real-parties-in interest rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3
sustain injury in its creation or as a result of its proceedings.[20] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides
that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name
The Court disagrees with the OSG in questioning the legal standing of the of the real party in interest. Accordingly, the real-party-in interest
petitioners-legislators to assail Executive Order No. 1. Evidently, their petition is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Succinctly put,
belong as members. This certainly justifies their resolve to take the cudgels for the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.
Congress as an institution and present the complaints on the usurpation of their
power and rights as members of the legislature before the Court. As held in Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez,[21]
The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public
suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public right in assailing an
allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the
To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently
the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right from any other person. He could be suing as a stranger, or in the
to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution. category of a citizen, or taxpayer. In either case, he has to
adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the
Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a citizen
which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case, or taxpayer.
any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.
15 | P a g e
 Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that the rule on standing is
a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both citizen and citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when
taxpayer standing in public actions. The distinction was first laid the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society,
down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in a or of paramount public interest.[25]
taxpayers suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizens
suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of Thus, in Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,[26] the Court held
public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the that in cases of paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are
public concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court in People involved, the standing requirements may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to
ex rel Case v. Collins: In matter of mere public right, howeverthe prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial
people are the real partiesIt is at least the right, if not the duty, of review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases,[27] ordinary citizens and taxpayers were
every citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders although they had
pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.
remedied. With respect to taxpayers suits, Terr v. Jordan held
that the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in The OSG claims that the determinants of transcendental importance [28] laid
courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury down in CREBA v. ERC and Meralco[29] are non-existent in this case. The Court,
cannot be denied. however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters of
transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There
are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in
view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Where the issues are of
However, to prevent just about any person from seeking transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench
judicial interference in any official policy or act with which he and the Bar, they should be resolved for the guidance of all. [30] Undoubtedly, the
disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental Filipino people are more than interested to know the status of the Presidents first
agencies engaged in public service, the United State Supreme effort to bring about a promised change to the country. The Court takes cognizance of
Court laid down the more stringent direct injury test in Ex Parte the petition not due to overwhelming political undertones that clothe the issue in the
Levitt, later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman. The same Court ruled eyes of the public, but because the Court stands firm in its oath to perform its
that for a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine constitutional duty to settle legal controversies with overreaching significance to
the validity of an executive or legislative action, he must show that society.
he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it
is not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission
members of the public.
In his memorandum in G.R. No. 192935, Biraogo asserts that the Truth
This Court adopted the direct injury test in our Commission is a public office and not merely an adjunct body of the Office of the
jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person who impugns President.[31] Thus, in order that the President may create a public office he must be
the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial empowered by the Constitution, a statute or an authorization vested in him by law.
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain According to petitioner, such power cannot be presumed [32] since there is no provision
direct injury as a result. The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany in the Constitution or any specific law that authorizes the President to create a truth
of cases, such as, Custodio v. President of the Senate, Manila commission.[33] He adds that Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987, granting
Race Horse Trainers Association v. De la Fuente, Pascual v. the President the continuing authority to reorganize his office, cannot serve as basis
Secretary of Public Works and Anti-Chinese League of the for the creation of a truth commission considering the aforesaid provision merely uses
Philippines v. Felix. [Emphases included. Citations omitted] verbs such as reorganize, transfer, consolidate, merge, and abolish. [34] Insofar as it
vests in the President the plenary power to reorganize the Office of the President to
the extent of creating a public office, Section 31 is inconsistent with the principle of
16 | P a g e
separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution and must be deemed repealed executive department in line with his constitutionally granted power of control and by
upon the effectivity thereof.[35] virtue of a valid delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices
under existing statutes.

Thus, the OSG concludes that the power of control necessarily includes the
Similarly, in G.R. No. 193036, petitioners-legislators argue that the creation power to create offices. For the OSG, the President may create the PTC in order to,
of a public office lies within the province of Congress and not with the executive among others, put a closure to the reported large scale graft and corruption in the
branch of government. They maintain that the delegated authority of the President to government.[45]
reorganize under Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code: 1) does not permit
the President to create a public office, much less a truth commission; 2) is limited to The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does the creation of the
the reorganization of the administrative structure of the Office of the President; 3) is PTC fall within the ambit of the power to reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the
limited to the restructuring of the internal organs of the Office of the President Proper, Revised Administrative Code? Section 31 contemplates reorganization as limited by
transfer of functions and transfer of agencies; and 4) only to achieve simplicity, the following functional and structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal organization
economy and efficiency.[36] Such continuing authority of the President to reorganize of the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units
his office is limited, and by issuing Executive Order No. 1, the President overstepped thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another; (2) transferring any function
the limits of this delegated authority. under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3)
transferring any agency under the Office of the President to any other
The OSG counters that there is nothing exclusively legislative about the Department/Agency or vice versa. Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of
creation by the President of a fact-finding body such as a truth commission. Pointing personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or
to numerous offices created by past presidents, it argues that the authority of the redundancy of functions. These point to situations where a body or an office is
President to create public offices within the Office of the President Proper has long already existent but a modification or alteration thereof has to be effected. The
been recognized.[37] According to the OSG, the Executive, just like the other two creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned in said provision.
branches of government, possesses the inherent authority to create fact-finding Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the negative.
committees to assist it in the performance of its constitutionally mandated functions
and in the exercise of its administrative functions. [38] This power, as the OSG explains
it, is but an adjunct of the plenary powers wielded by the President under Section 1
and his power of control under Section 17, both of Article VII of the Constitution. [39] To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the
President under Section 31 is a misplaced supposition, even in the plainest meaning
attributable to the term restructure an alteration of an existing structure. Evidently, the
PTC was not part of the structure of the Office of the President prior to the enactment
It contends that the President is necessarily vested with the power to of Executive Order No. 1. As held in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Executive
conduct fact-finding investigations, pursuant to his duty to ensure that all laws are Secretary,[46]
enforced by public officials and employees of his department and in the exercise of
his authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and
office, or interfere with the discretion of his officials. [40] The power of the President to
investigate is not limited to the exercise of his power of control over his subordinates
in the executive branch, but extends further in the exercise of his other powers, such
as his power to discipline subordinates,[41] his power for rule making, adjudication and But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the
licensing purposes[42] and in order to be informed on matters which he is entitled to President to reorganize any department or agency in the executive
know.[43] branch does not have to end here. We must not lose sight of the
very source of the power that which constitutes an express grant of
The OSG also cites the recent case of Banda v. Ermita,[44] where it was held power. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292
that the President has the power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987), "the
17 | P a g e
 President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order
to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justification
Office of the President." For this purpose, he may transfer the for the President to create a public office. Said decree is already stale, anachronistic
functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the and inoperable. P.D. No. 1416 was a delegation to then President Marcos of the
President. In Canonizado v. Aguirre [323 SCRA 312 (2000)], we authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the national government
ruled that reorganization "involves the reduction of personnel, including the power to create offices and transfer appropriations pursuant to one of
consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy the purposes of the decree, embodied in its last Whereas clause:
or redundancy of functions." It takes place when there is an
alteration of the existing structure of government offices or
units therein, including the lines of control, authority and
responsibility between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to WHEREAS, the transition towards the parliamentary form
the Department of Finance. It falls under the Office of the President. of government will necessitate flexibility in the organization of the
Hence, it is subject to the Presidents continuing authority to national government.
reorganize. [Emphasis Supplied]

Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing manageability and

In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the Presidents resiliency during the interim, P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No.
power of control. Control is essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set 1772, became functus oficio upon the convening of the First Congress, as expressly
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to provided in Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. In fact, even the Solicitor
substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter.[47] Clearly, the power of General agrees with this view. Thus:
control is entirely different from the power to create public offices. The former is
inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid delegation
from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: Because P.D. 1416 was enacted

The question is this, is there a valid delegation of power from Congress, was the last
empowering the President to create a public office? whereas clause of
P.D. 1416 says it
was enacted to
prepare the
According to the OSG, the power to create a truth commission pursuant to transition from
the above provision finds statutory basis under P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. presidential to
1772.[48] The said law granted the President the continuing authority to reorganize the parliamentary. Now,
national government, including the power to group, consolidate bureaus and in a parliamentary
agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, form of government,
services and activities, transfer appropriations, and to standardize salaries and the legislative and
materials. This decree, in relation to Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. 292 has been executive powers
invoked in several cases such as Larin v. Executive Secretary.[49] are fused, correct?
18 | P a g e
 While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on the basis of
P.D. No. 1416 as amended by P.D. No. 1772, the creation of the PTC finds
SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Yes, Your Honor. justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the
President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads:

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: That is why, that P.D. 1416 was

issued. Now would Section 17. The President shall have control of all the
you agree with me executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that
that P.D. 1416 the laws be faithfully executed.(Emphasis supplied).
should not be
considered effective
anymore upon the
promulgation, As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the
adoption, ratification three principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The
of the 1987 Presidents power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful
Constitution. execution of laws in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and
transparency is inherent in the Presidents powers as the Chief Executive. That the
authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute
this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean
SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Not the whole of P.D. [No.] 1416, that he is bereft of such authority.[51] As explained in the landmark case of Marcos v.
Your Honor. Manglapus:[52]

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: The power of the President to x x x. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the
reorganize the presidential system of government and restored the separation of
entire National legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual distribution
Government is among three distinct branches of government with provision for
deemed repealed, checks and balances.
at least, upon the
adoption of the
1987 Constitution,
correct. It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive
power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of
state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in
such positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself
SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Yes, Your Honor.[50] withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the
execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It
also grants the President other powers that do not involve the
execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's
foreign relations.

19 | P a g e
 investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or
that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in
conducting the inquiry. [Emphasis supplied]

On these premises, we hold the view that although the

1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise
of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating
traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to
power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties
be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. And if history is to
Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum be revisited, this was also the objective of the investigative bodies created in the past
of specific powers so enumerated. like the PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, the Feliciano Commission, the Melo Commission
and the Zenarosa Commission. There being no changes in the government structure,
the Court is not inclined to declare such executive power as non-existent just because
the direction of the political winds have changed.
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the
government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be
executive. x x x.
On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of
Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of a public office, suffice it to say that
there will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds
already appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the Executive
of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. Further, there is no need to specify
Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, in the
executed. As stated above, the powers of the President are not limited to those words of the Solicitor General, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the
specific powers under the Constitution.[53] One of the recognized powers of the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the
President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to commission.[55]Moreover, since the amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall
create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations, there is no impropriety in the
determine if laws have been faithfully executed. Thus, in Department of Health v. funding.
Camposano,[54] the authority of the President to issue Administrative Order No. 298,
creating an investigative committee to look into the administrative charges filed
against the employees of the Department of Health for the anomalous purchase of
medicines was upheld. In said case, it was ruled: Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate

The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating The Presidents power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully
Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally executed is well recognized. It flows from the faithful-execution clause of the
granted full control of the Executive Department, to which Constitution under Article VII, Section 17 thereof. [56] As the Chief Executive, the
respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that president represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are
all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He has the authority to
law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is directly assume the functions of the executive department. [57]
sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the
20 | P a g e
Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate "Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to
reports of graft and corruption and to recommend the appropriate action. As adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle.
previously stated, no quasi-judicial powers have been vested in the said body as it The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and
cannot adjudicate rights of persons who come before it. It has been said that Quasi- duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised:
judicial powers involve the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the x x to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x act as judge." And
legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial
by law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. [58] In simpler terms, judicial or quasi-judicial powers: x x to award or grant judicially in a case of
discretion is involved in the exercise of these quasi-judicial power, such that it is controversy x x."
exclusively vested in the judiciary and must be clearly authorized by the legislature in
the case of administrative agencies. In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the
exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous
with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass
on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn.
The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate x x. Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a
was delineated by the Court in Cario v. Commission on Human Rights.[59] Thus: judgment." [Italics included. Citations Omitted]

"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial
explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or office. The function of
dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a
inquire into systematically: "to search or inquire into: x x to subject judicial function. To be considered as such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving
to an official probe x x: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose at factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority
of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be
information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, decided or resolved authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to appeals or
deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired modes of review as may be provided by law.[60] Even respondents themselves admit
into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry. that the commission is bereft of any quasi-judicial power.[61]

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: Contrary to petitioners apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or
"(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the
trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care commission will complement those of the two offices. As pointed out by the Solicitor
and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the General, the recommendation to prosecute is but a consequence of the overall task of
taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an the commission to conduct a fact-finding investigation.[62] The actual prosecution of
investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n suspected offenders, much less adjudication on the merits of the charges against
administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not them,[63] is certainly not a function given to the commission. The phrase, when in the
require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial course of its investigation, under Section 2(g), highlights this fact and gives credence
or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a to a contrary interpretation from that of the petitioners. The function of determining
certain matter or matters." probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains
to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman.[64]
21 | P a g e
 The act of investigation by the Ombudsman as enunciated above
contemplates the conduct of a preliminary investigation or the determination of the
At any rate, the Ombudsmans power to investigate under R.A. No. 6770 is not existence of probable cause. This is categorically out of the PTCs sphere of
exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies. Thus, in functions. Its power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and
the case of Ombudsman v. Galicia,[65] it was written: guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land. In this regard, the PTC commits no act of
usurpation of the Ombudsmans primordial duties.

This power of investigation granted to the Ombudsman by the 1987

Constitution and The Ombudsman Act is not exclusive but is
shared with other similarly authorized government The same holds true with respect to the DOJ. Its authority under Section 3 (2),
agencies such as the PCGG and judges of municipal trial courts Chapter 1, Title III, Book IV in the Revised Administrative Code is by no means
and municipal circuit trial courts. The power to conduct preliminary exclusive and, thus, can be shared with a body likewise tasked to investigate the
investigation on charges against public employees and officials is commission of crimes.
likewise concurrently shared with the Department of Justice.
Despite the passage of the Local Government Code in 1991, the
Ombudsman retains concurrent jurisdiction with the Office of the
President and the local Sanggunians to investigate complaints Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of the
against local elective officials. [Emphasis supplied]. PTC are to be accorded conclusiveness. Much like its predecessors, the Davide
Commission, the Feliciano Commission and the Zenarosa Commission, its findings
would, at best, be recommendatory in nature. And being so, the Ombudsman and the
DOJ have a wider degree of latitude to decide whether or not to reject the
recommendation. These offices, therefore, are not deprived of their mandated duties
but will instead be aided by the reports of the PTC for possible indictments for
Also, Executive Order No. 1 cannot contravene the power of the Ombudsman to violations of graft laws.
investigate criminal cases under Section 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770, which states:

Violation of the Equal Protection Clause

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint
by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to
be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in power of the President, the Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of
the exercise of its primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection
stage, from any investigatory agency of government, the clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987
investigation of such cases. [Emphases supplied] Constitution. Section 1 reads:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or

property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.
22 | P a g e
 The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this First. E.O. No. 1 was issued in view of widespread reports
constitutional safeguard. They contend that it does not apply equally to all members of large scale graft and corruption in the previous administration
of the same class such that the intent of singling out the previous administration as its which have eroded public confidence in public institutions. There is,
sole object makes the PTC an adventure in partisan hostility. [66] Thus, in order to be therefore, an urgent call for the determination of the truth regarding
accorded with validity, the commission must also cover reports of graft and corruption certain reports of large scale graft and corruption in the government
in virtually all administrations previous to that of former President Arroyo.[67] and to put a closure to them by the filing of the appropriate cases
against those involved, if warranted, and to deter others from
committing the evil, restore the peoples faith and confidence in the
Government and in their public servants.
The petitioners argue that the search for truth behind the reported cases of
graft and corruption must encompass acts committed not only during the
administration of former President Arroyo but also during prior administrations where
the same magnitude of controversies and anomalies [68] were reported to have been Second. The segregation of the preceding administration
committed against the Filipino people. They assail the classification formulated by the as the object of fact-finding is warranted by the reality that unlike
respondents as it does not fall under the recognized exceptions because first, there is with administrations long gone, the current administration will most
no substantial distinction between the group of officials targeted for investigation by likely bear the immediate consequence of the policies of the
Executive Order No. 1 and other groups or persons who abused their public office for previous administration.
personal gain; and second, the selective classification is not germane to the purpose
of Executive Order No. 1 to end corruption.[69] In order to attain constitutional
permission, the petitioners advocate that the commission should deal with graft and
grafters prior and subsequent to the Arroyo administration with the strong arm of the Third. The classification of the previous administration as
law with equal force.[70] a separate class for investigation lies in the reality that
the evidence of possible criminal activity, the evidence that could
lead to recovery of public monies illegally dissipated, the policy
lessons to be learned to ensure that anti-corruption laws are
Position of respondents faithfully executed, are more easily established in the regime that
immediately precede the current administration.

According to respondents, while Executive Order No. 1 identifies the

previous administration as the initial subject of the investigation, following Section 17 Fourth. Many administrations subject the transactions of
thereof, the PTC will not confine itself to cases of large scale graft and corruption their predecessors to investigations to provide closure to issues
solely during the said administration.[71] Assuming arguendo that the commission that are pivotal to national life or even as a routine measure of due
would confine its proceedings to officials of the previous administration, the diligence and good housekeeping by a nascent administration like
petitioners argue that no offense is committed against the equal protection clause for the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),
the segregation of the transactions of public officers during the previous created by the late President Corazon C. Aquino under Executive
administration as possible subjects of investigation is a valid classification based on Order No. 1 to pursue the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of her
substantial distinctions and is germane to the evils which the Executive Order seeks predecessor former President Ferdinand Marcos and his cronies,
to correct.[72] To distinguish the Arroyo administration from past administrations, it and the Saguisag Commission created by former President Joseph
recited the following: Estrada under Administrative Order No, 53, to form an ad-hoc and
independent citizens committee to investigate all the facts and
23 | P a g e
 circumstances surrounding Philippine Centennial projects of his It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all
predecessor, former President Fidel V. Ramos.[73] [Emphases persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals
supplied] as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause
permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test
of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited
Concept of the Equal Protection Clause to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. [81] Superficial differences do
not make for a valid classification.[82]

One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the
equality of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987
Constitution.The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must
process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. [83] The classification
play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated,
specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the
government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the
process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity
or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.[74] will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are
to be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from
the other members, as long as that class is substantially distinguishable from all
others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him.[84]
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed.[75] It requires public bodies and institutions to treat
similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. [76] The purpose of the equal The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so
protection clause is to secure every person within a states jurisdiction against constituted as to preclude addition to the number included in the class. It must be of
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances
statue or by its improper execution through the states duly constituted and conditions. It must not leave out or underinclude those that should otherwise fall
authorities.[77] In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the into a certain classification. As elucidated in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers'
state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely Union[85] and reiterated in a long line of cases,[86]
on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective. [78]
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a
guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of
the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman
those of the legislature.[79] Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation
including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons
denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances
taken. [80] surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The
Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact
be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal
protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are
24 | P a g e
 different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby created
object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as
operate. the COMMISSION, which shall primarily seek and find the truth on,
and toward this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of
such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and
ethical sensibilities of the people, committed by public officers and
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from
classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of the private sector, if any, during the previous administration; and
knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or thereafter recommend the appropriate action or measure to be
practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be
A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of served without fear or favor.
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that
the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it
be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission, which shall
on substantial distinctions which make for real differences, that it have all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37,
must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily
limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of reported
each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is cases of graft and corruption referred to in Section 1, involving third
satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable level public officers and higher, their co-principals, accomplices and
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. [Citations accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous
omitted] administrationand thereafter submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
[Emphases supplied]

Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck
down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned
truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but
of graft and corruption during the previous administration[87] only. The intent to single just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its
out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness
made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order. Specifically, these which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation
are: clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and
selective retribution.

WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to

investigating and finding out the truth concerning the reported cases Though the OSG enumerates several differences between the Arroyo
of graft and corruption during the previous administration, and administration and other past administrations, these distinctions are not substantial
which will recommend the prosecution of the offenders and secure enough to merit the restriction of the investigation to the previous administration
justice for all; only. The reports of widespread corruption in the Arroyo administration cannot be
taken as basis for distinguishing said administration from earlier administrations which
were also blemished by similar widespread reports of impropriety. They are not

25 | P a g e
inherent in, and do not inure solely to, the Arroyo administration. As Justice Isagani is still within the prohibition of the constitution. [Emphasis
Cruz put it, Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification. [88] supplied]

It could be argued that considering that the PTC is an ad hoc body, its scope
is limited. The Court, however, is of the considered view that although its focus is
The public needs to be enlightened why Executive Order No. 1 chooses to restricted, the constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws should not
limit the scope of the intended investigation to the previous administration only. The in any way be circumvented. The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law
OSG ventures to opine that to include other past administrations, at this point, may of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all
unnecessarily overburden the commission and lead it to lose its effectiveness.[89]The private rights determined and all public authority administered. [93] Laws that do not
reason given is specious. It is without doubt irrelevant to the legitimate and noble conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being
objective of the PTC to stamp out or end corruption and the evil it breeds. [90] unconstitutional.[94] While the thrust of the PTC is specific, that is, for investigation of
acts of graft and corruption, Executive Order No. 1, to survive, must be read together
with the provisions of the Constitution. To exclude the earlier administrations in the
guise of substantial distinctions would only confirm the petitioners lament that the
The probability that there would be difficulty in unearthing evidence or that subject executive order is only an adventure in partisan hostility. In the case of US v.
the earlier reports involving the earlier administrations were already inquired into is Cyprian,[95] it was written: A rather limited number of such classifications have
beside the point. Obviously, deceased presidents and cases which have already routinely been held or assumed to be arbitrary; those include: race, national origin,
prescribed can no longer be the subjects of inquiry by the PTC. Neither is the PTC gender, political activity or membership in a political party, union activity or
expected to conduct simultaneous investigations of previous administrations, given membership in a labor union, or more generally the exercise of first amendment
the bodys limited time and resources. The law does not require the impossible (Lex rights.
non cogit ad impossibilia).[91]

To reiterate, in order for a classification to meet the requirements of

Given the foregoing physical and legal impossibility, the Court logically constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the
recognizes the unfeasibility of investigating almost a centurys worth of graft class.[96] Such a classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or
cases.However, the fact remains that Executive Order No. 1 suffers from arbitrary so constituted as to preclude additions to the number included within a class, but
classification. The PTC, to be true to its mandate of searching for the truth, must not must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar
exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to circumstances and conditions. Furthermore, all who are in situations and
investigate all past administrations. While reasonable prioritization is permitted, it circumstances which are relative to the discriminatory legislation and which are
should not be arbitrary lest it be struck down for being unconstitutional. In the often indistinguishable from those of the members of the class must be brought under the
quoted language of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,[92] influence of the law and treated by it in the same way as are the members of the
class.[97]

Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in

appearance, yet, if applied and administered by public authority The Court is not unaware that mere underinclusiveness is not fatal to the
with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make validity of a law under the equal protection clause.[98] Legislation is not
unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar unconstitutional merely because it is not all-embracing and does not include all the
circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice evils within its reach.[99] It has been written that a regulation challenged under the
equal protection clause is not devoid of a rational predicate simply because it
26 | P a g e
happens to be incomplete.[100] In several instances, the underinclusiveness was not that they would be covered in the future. Such expanded mandate of the commission
considered a valid reason to strike down a law or regulation where the purpose can will still depend on the whim and caprice of the President. If he would decide not to
be attained in future legislations or regulations. These cases refer to the step by step include them, the section would then be meaningless. This will only fortify the fears of
process.[101] With regard to equal protection claims, a legislature does not run the risk the petitioners that the Executive Order No. 1 was crafted to tailor-fit the prosecution
of losing the entire remedial scheme simply because it fails, through inadvertence or of officials and personalities of the Arroyo administration. [105]
otherwise, to cover every evil that might conceivably have been attacked. [102]

In Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no inadvertence. That the

previous administration was picked out was deliberate and intentional as can be
gleaned from the fact that it was underscored at least three times in the assailed
executive order. It must be noted that Executive Order No. 1 does not even mention The Court tried to seek guidance from the pronouncement in the case
any particular act, event or report to be focused on unlike the investigative of Virata v. Sandiganbayan,[106] that the PCGG Charter (composed of Executive
commissions created in the past. The equal protection clause is violated by Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14) does not violate the equal protection clause. The decision,
purposeful and intentional discrimination.[103] however, was devoid of any discussion on how such conclusory statement was
arrived at, the principal issue in said case being only the sufficiency of a cause of
action.

To disprove petitioners contention that there is deliberate discrimination, the

OSG clarifies that the commission does not only confine itself to cases of large scale
graft and corruption committed during the previous administration.[104] The OSG A final word
points to Section 17 of Executive Order No. 1, which provides:

The issue that seems to take center stage at present is - whether or not the
Supreme Court, in the exercise of its constitutionally mandated power of Judicial
Review with respect to recent initiatives of the legislature and the executive
SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when department, is exercising undue interference. Is the Highest Tribunal, which is
in the judgment of the President there is a need to expand the expected to be the protector of the Constitution, itself guilty of violating fundamental
mandate of the Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to tenets like the doctrine of separation of powers? Time and again, this issue has been
include the investigation of cases and instances of graft and addressed by the Court, but it seems that the present political situation calls for it to
corruption during the prior administrations, such mandate may be once again explain the legal basis of its action lest it continually be accused of being
so extended accordingly by way of a supplemental Executive a hindrance to the nations thrust to progress.
Order.

The Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article VIII, Section 1 of the

1987 Constitution, is vested with Judicial Power that includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
The Court is not convinced. Although Section 17 allows the President the and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave of abuse of
discretion to expand the scope of investigations of the PTC so as to include the acts discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
of graft and corruption committed in other past administrations, it does not guarantee instrumentality of the government.
27 | P a g e
 Furthermore, in Section 4(2) thereof, it is vested with the power of judicial The Constitution must ever remain supreme. All must bow
review which is the power to declare a treaty, international or executive agreement, to the mandate of this law. Expediency must not be allowed to sap
law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation its strength nor greed for power debase its rectitude.[109]
unconstitutional. This power also includes the duty to rule on the constitutionality of
the application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders,
instructions, ordinances, and other regulations. These provisions, however, have
been fertile grounds of conflict between the Supreme Court, on one hand, and the two
co-equal bodies of government, on the other. Many times the Court has been
accused of asserting superiority over the other departments. Lest it be misunderstood, this is not the death knell for a truth commission as
nobly envisioned by the present administration. Perhaps a revision of the executive
issuance so as to include the earlier past administrations would allow it to pass
the test of reasonableness and not be an affront to the Constitution.Of all the
To answer this accusation, the words of Justice Laurel would be a good branches of the government, it is the judiciary which is the most interested in knowing
source of enlightenment, to wit: And when the judiciary mediates to allocate the truth and so it will not allow itself to be a hindrance or obstacle to its attainment. It
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other must, however, be emphasized that the search for the truth must be within
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only constitutional bounds for ours is still a government of laws and not of men. [110]
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the
parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them.[107] WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is
hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.

Thus, the Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is not imposing its
own will upon a co-equal body but rather simply making sure that any act of
government is done in consonance with the authorities and rights allocated to it by the As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby ordered to cease and desist
Constitution. And, if after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of from carrying out the provisions of Executive Order No. 1.
any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under review.
Otherwise, the Court will not be deterred to pronounce said act as void and
unconstitutional.
SO ORDERED.

It cannot be denied that most government actions are inspired with noble
intentions, all geared towards the betterment of the nation and its people. But then
again, it is important to remember this ethical principle: The end does not justify the
means. No matter how noble and worthy of admiration the purpose of an act, but if
the means to be employed in accomplishing it is simply irreconcilable with
constitutional parameters, then it cannot still be allowed. [108] The Court cannot just
turn a blind eye and simply let it pass. It will continue to uphold the Constitution and
its enshrined principles.
28 | P a g e
SECOND DIVISION
KAPISANAN NG MGA KAWANI NG ENERGY G.R. No. 150974
REGULATORY BOARD,

Petitioner,
Present:

QUISUMBING,* J.,

Chairperson,

CARPIO,**
- versus -
CARPIO MORALES,

TINGA, and

VELASCO, JR., JJ.

COMMISSIONER FE B. BARIN, DEPUTY

COMMISSIONERS CARLOS R. ALINDADA,
LETICIA V. IBAY, OLIVER B. BUTALID, and
MARY ANNE B. COLAYCO, of the ENERGY
REGULATORY COMMISSION,

Respondents.

Promulgated:

June 29, 2007

29 | P a g e
 RA 9136 provides for the abolition of the ERB and the creation of the ERC. The
pertinent portions of Section 38 read:
x--------------------------------------------------x

Creation of the Energy Regulatory Commission. There is hereby

created an independent, quasi-judicial regulatory board to be
named the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC).For this purpose,
DECISION the existing Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) created under
Executive Order No. 172, as amended, is hereby abolished.

The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four (4)

CARPIO, J.: members to be appointed by the President of the Philippines. x x x

Within three (3) months from the creation of the ERC, the Chairman
shall submit for the approval of the President of the Philippines the
The Case new organizational structure and plantillapositions necessary to
carry out the powers and functions of the ERC.

xxxx
This is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition [1] of the selection and
appointment of employees of the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) by the ERC The Chairman and members of the Commission shall assume
Board of Commissioners. office at the beginning of their terms: Provided, That, if upon
the effectivity of this Act, the Commission has not been constituted
and the new staffing pattern and plantilla positions have not been
approved and filled-up, the current Board and existing personnel of
Petitioner Kapisanan ng mga Kawani ng Energy Regulatory Board (KERB) seeks to ERB shall continue to hold office.
declare Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9136 (RA 9136), which abolished the Energy
Regulatory Board (ERB) and created the ERC, as unconstitutional and to prohibit the
ERC Commissioners from filling up the ERCs plantilla.
The existing personnel of the ERB, if qualified, shall be given
preference in the filling up of plantilla positions created in the ERC,
subject to existing civil service rules and regulations.

At the time of the filing of this petition, the ERC was composed of Commissioner Fe
The Facts B. Barin and Deputy Commissioners Carlos R. Alindada, Leticia V. Ibay, Oliver
B. Butalid, and Mary Anne B. Colayco (collectively, Commissioners). The
Commissioners assumed office on 15 August 2001. Pursuant to Section 38 of RA
9136, the Commissioners issued the proposed Table of Organization, Staffing
RA 9136, popularly known as EPIRA (for Electric Power Industry Reform Act of Pattern, and Salary Structure on 25 September 2001 which the President of
2001), was enacted on 8 June 2001 and took effect on 26 June 2001. Section 38 of the Philippinesapproved on 13 November 2001. Meanwhile, KERB submitted to the
Commissioners its Resolution No. 2001-02 on 13 September 2001. Resolution No.

30 | P a g e
2001-02 requested the Commissioners for an opportunity to be informed on the committee is no longer necessary because there is already a prescribed set of
proposed plantilla positions with their equivalent qualification standards. guidelines for the recruitment of personnel. The ERC hired an independent consultant
to administer the necessary tests for the technical and managerial levels. Finally, the
ERC already posted the plantilla positions, which prescribe higher standards, as
approved by the Department of Budget and Management. Commissioner Barinstated
On 17 October 2001, the Commissioners issued the guidelines for the selection and that positions in the ERC do not need the prior approval of the CSC, as the ERC is
hiring of ERC employees. A portion of the guidelines reflects the Commissioners view only required to submit the qualification standards to the CSC.
on the selection and hiring of the ERC employees vis-a-vis Civil Service rules, thus:

On 5 December 2001, the ERC published a classified advertisement in the Philippine

Since R.A. 9136 has abolished the Energy Regulatory Board Star. Two days later, the CSC received a list of vacancies and qualification standards
(ERB), it is the view of the Commission that the provisions of from the ERC. The ERC formed a Selection Committee to process all applications.
Republic Act No. 6656 (An Act to Protect the Security of [Tenure of]
Civil Service Officers and Employees in the Implementation of
Government Reorganization) will not directly apply to ERCs current
efforts to establish a new organization. Civil Service laws, rules and KERB, fearful of the uncertainty of the employment status of its members, filed the
regulations, however, will have suppletory application to the extent present petition on 20 December 2001. KERB later filed an Urgent Ex ParteMotion to
possible in regard to the selection and placement of employees in Enjoin Termination of Petitioner ERB Employees on 2 January 2002. However, before
the ERC.[2] (Emphasis supplied) the ERC received KERBs pleadings, the Selection Committee already presented its
list of proposed appointees to the Commissioners.

On 5 November 2005, KERB sent a letter to the Commissioners stating the KERB
members objection to the Commissioners stand that Civil Service laws, rules and In their Comment, the Commissioners describe the status of the ERB employees
regulations have suppletory application in the selection and placement of the ERC appointment in the ERC as follows:
employees. KERB asserted that RA 9136 did not abolish the ERB or change
the ERBs character as an economic regulator of the electric power industry. KERB
insisted that RA 9136 merely changed the ERBs name to the ERC and expanded
the ERBs functions and objectives. KERB sent the Commissioners yet another letter As of February 1, 2002, of the two hundred twelve (212) ERB
on 13 November 2001. KERB made a number of requests: (1) the issuance of a employees, one hundred thirty eighty [sic] (138) were rehired and
formal letter related to the date of filing of job applications, including the use of Civil appointed to ERC plantilla positions and sixty six (66) opted to
Service application form no. 212; (2) the creation of a placement/recruitment retire or be separated from the service. Those who were rehired
committee and setting guidelines relative to its functions, without prejudice to existing and those who opted to retire or be separated constituted about
Civil Service rules and regulations; and (3) copies of the plantilla positions and their ninety six (96%) percent of the entire ERB employees. The list of
corresponding qualification standards duly approved by either the President of the the ERB employees appointed to new positions in the ERC is
Philippines or the Civil Service Commission (CSC). attached hereto as Annex 1. Only eight (8) ERB employees could
not be appointed to new positions due to the reduction of the
ERC plantilla and the absence of positions appropriate to their
respective qualifications and skills. The appropriate notice was
Commissioner Barin replied to KERBs letter on 15 November 2001. She stated that issued to each of them informing them of their separation from the
Civil Service application form no. 212 and the ERC-prescribed application format are service and assuring them of their entitlement to separation pay
substantially the same. Furthermore, the creation of a placement/recruitment and other benefits in accordance with existing laws.[3]
31 | P a g e
 The Issues All laws enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. To justify the nullification of a law,
there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. KERB failed to
show any breach of the Constitution.

KERB raises the following issues before this Court:

A public office is created by the Constitution or by law or by an officer or tribunal to

which the power to create the office has been delegated by the legislature. [6] The
1. Whether Section 38 of RA 9136 abolishing the ERB is power to create an office carries with it the power to abolish. President Corazon
constitutional; and C. Aquino, then exercising her legislative powers, created the ERB by issuing
Executive Order No. 172 on 8 May 1987.

2. Whether the Commissioners of the ERC were correct in

disregarding and considering merely suppletory in The question of whether a law abolishes an office is a question of legislative
character the protective mantle of RA 6656 as to the ERB intent. There should not be any controversy if there is an explicit declaration of
employees or petitioner in this case.[4] abolition in the law itself.[7] Section 38 of RA 9136 explicitly abolished the
ERB. However, abolition of an office and its related positions is different from removal
of an incumbent from his office. Abolition and removal are mutually exclusive
concepts. From a legal standpoint, there is no occupant in an abolished office. Where
The Ruling of the Court there is no occupant, there is no tenure to speak of. Thus, impairment of the
constitutional guarantee of security of tenure does not arise in the abolition of an
office. On the other hand, removal implies that the office and its related positions
subsist and that the occupants are merely separated from their positions.[8]
The petition has no merit.

A valid order of abolition must not only come from a legitimate body, it must also be
We disregard the procedural defects in the petition, such as KERBs personality to file made in good faith. An abolition is made in good faith when it is not made for political
the petition on behalf of its alleged members and Elmar Agirs authority to institute the or personal reasons, or when it does not circumvent the constitutional security of
action, because of the demands of public interest.[5] tenure of civil service employees.[9] Abolition of an office may be brought about by
reasons of economy, or to remove redundancy of functions, or a clear and explicit
constitutional mandate for such termination of employment. [10] Where one office is
abolished and replaced with another office vested with similar functions, the abolition
is a legal nullity.[11] When there is a void abolition, the incumbent is deemed to have
never ceased holding office.
Constitutionality of the ERBs Abolition

and the ERCs Creation

32 | P a g e
KERB asserts that there was no valid abolition of the ERB but there was merely a SEC. 3. Jurisdiction, Powers and Functions of the Board. ― When
reorganization done in bad faith. Evidences of bad faith are enumerated in Section 2 warranted and only when public necessity requires, the Board may
of Republic Act No. 6656 (RA 6656),[12] Section 2 of RA 6656 reads: regulate the business of importing, exporting, re-exporting,
shipping, transporting, processing, refining, marketing and
distributing energy resources. Energy resource means any
substance or phenomenon which by itself or in combination with
No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed others, or after processing or refining or the application to it of
except for a valid cause and after due notice and hearing. A valid technology, emanates, generates or causes the emanation or
cause for removal exists when, pursuant to a bona generation of energy, such as but not limited to, petroleum or
fide reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered petroleum products, coal, marsh gas, methane gas, geothermal
redundant or there is a need to merge, divide, or consolidate and hydroelectric sources of energy, uranium and other similar
positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service, or other radioactive minerals, solar energy, tidal power, as well as non-
lawful causes allowed by the Civil Service Law. The existence of conventional existing and potential sources.
any or some of the following circumstances may be considered as
evidence of bad faith in the removals made as a result of The Board shall, upon proper notice and hearing, exercise the
reorganization, giving rise to a claim for reinstatement or following, among other powers and functions:
reappointment by an aggrieved party:
(a) Fix and regulate the prices of petroleum products;
(a) Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions
in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned; (b) Fix and regulate the rate schedule or prices of piped gas to be
charged by duly franchised gas companies which distribute gas by
(b) Where an office is abolished and another performing means of underground pipe system;
substantially the same functions is created;
(c) Fix and regulate the rates of pipeline concessionaires under the
(c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms provisions of Republic Act No. 387, as amended, otherwise known
of status of appointment, performance and merit; as the Petroleum Act of 1949, as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1700;
(d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or
agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially (d) Regulate the capacities of new refineries or additional
the same function as the original offices; capacities of existing refineries and license refineries that may be
organized after the issuance of this Executive Order, under such
(e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in terms and conditions as are consistent with the national interest;
Section 3 hereof.
(e) Whenever the Board has determined that there is a shortage of
any petroleum product, or when public interest so requires, it may
take such steps as it may consider necessary, including the
KERB claims that the present case falls under the situation described in Section 2(b) temporary adjustment of the levels of prices of petroleum products
of RA 6656. We thus need to compare the provisions enumerating the powers and and the payment to the Oil Price Stabilization Fund created under
functions of the ERB and the ERC to see whether they have substantially the same Presidential Decree No. 1956 by persons or entities engaged in the
functions. Under Executive Order No. 172, the ERB has the following powers and petroleum industry of such amounts as may be determined by the
functions: Board, which will enable the importer to recover its cost of
importation.

33 | P a g e
SEC. 4. Reorganized or Abolished Agency. ― (a) The Board of On the other hand, Section 43 of RA 9136 enumerates the basic functions of the
Energy is hereby reconstituted into the Energy Regulatory Board, ERC.
and the formers powers and functions under Republic Act No.
6173, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1208, as amended, SEC. 43. Functions of the ERC. ― The ERC shall promote
are transferred to the latter. competition, encourage market development, ensure customer
choice and discourage/penalize abuse of market power in the
(b) The regulatory and adjudicatory powers and functions exercised restructured electricity industry. In appropriate cases, the ERC is
by the Bureau of Energy Utilization under Presidential Decree No. authorized to issue cease and desist order after due notice and
1206, as amended, are transferred to the Board, the provisions of hearing. Towards this end, it shall be responsible for the following
Executive Order No. 131 notwithstanding. key functions in the restructured industry:

SEC. 5. Other Transferred Powers and Functions. ― The power of (a) Enforce the implementing rules and regulations of this
the Land Transportation Commission to determine, fix and/or Act;
prescribe rates or charges pertaining to the hauling of petroleum
products are transferred to the Board. The power to fix and regulate (b) Within six (6) months from the effectivity of this Act, promulgate
the rates or charges pertinent to shipping or transporting of and enforce, in accordance with law, a National Grid Code and a
petroleum products shall also be exercised by the Board. Distribution Code which shall include, but not limited to, the
following:
The foregoing transfer of powers and functions shall include
applicable funds and appropriations, records, equipment, property (i) Performance standards for TRANSCO O & M
and such personnel as may be necessary; Provided, That with Concessionaire, distribution utilities and
reference to paragraph (b) of Section 4 hereof, only such amount of suppliers: Provided, That in the establishment of the
funds and appropriations of the Bureau of Energy Utilization, as performance standards, the nature and function of the
well as only the personnel thereof who are completely or primarily entities shall be considered; and
involved in the exercise by said Bureau of its regulatory and
adjudicatory powers and functions, shall be affected by such (ii) Financial capability standards for the generating
transfer: Provided, further, That the funds and appropriations as companies, the TRANSCO, distribution utilities and
well as the records, equipment, property and all personnel of the suppliers: Provided, That in the formulation of the financial
reorganized Board of Energy shall be transferred to the Energy capability standards, the nature and function of the entity
Regulatory Board. shall be considered: Provided, further, That such
standards are set to ensure that the electric power industry
SEC. 6. Power to Promulgate Rules and Perform Other participants meet the minimum financial standards to
Acts. ― The Board shall have the power to promulgate rules and protect the public interest. Determine, fix, and approve,
regulations relevant to procedures governing hearings before it and after due notice and public hearings the universal charge,
enforce compliance with any rule, regulation, order or other to be imposed on all electricity end-users pursuant to
requirements: Provided, That said rules and regulations shall take Section 34 hereof;
effect fifteen (15) days after publication in the Official Gazette. It
shall also perform such other acts as may be necessary or (c) Enforce the rules and regulations governing the operations of
conducive to the exercise of its powers and functions, and the the electricity spot market and the activities of the spot market
attainment of the purposes of this Order. operator and other participants in the spot market, for the purpose
of ensuring a greater supply and rational pricing of electricity;

34 | P a g e
(d) Determine the level of cross subsidies in the existing retail rate (ii) Interest expenses are not allowable deductions from
until the same is removed pursuant to Section 73 hereof; permissible return on rate base;

(e) Amend or revoke, after due notice and hearing, the authority to (iii) In determining eligible cost of services that will be
operate of any person or entity which fails to comply with the passed on to the end-users, the ERC shall establish
provisions hereof, the IRR or any order or resolution of the ERC. In minimum efficiency performance standards for the
the event a divestment is required, the ERC shall allow the affected TRANSCO and distribution utilities including systems
party sufficient time to remedy the infraction or for an orderly losses, interruption frequency rates, and collection
disposal, but shall in no case exceed twelve (12) months from the efficiency;
issuance of the order;
(iv) Further, in determining rate base, the TRANSCO or
(f) In the public interest, establish and enforce a methodology for any distribution utility shall not be allowed to include
setting transmission and distribution wheeling rates and retail rates management inefficiencies like cost of project delays not
for the captive market of a distribution utility, taking into account all excused by force majeure, penalties and related interest
relevant considerations, including the efficiency or inefficiency of during construction applicable to these unexcused delays;
the regulated entities. The rates must be such as to allow the and
recovery of just and reasonable costs and a reasonable return on
rate base (RORB) to enable the entity to operate viably. The ERC
may adopt alternative forms of internationally-accepted rate setting
methodology as it may deem appropriate. The rate-setting
methodology so adopted and applied must ensure a reasonable
price of electricity. The rates prescribed shall be non-discriminatory. (v) Any significant operating costs or project investments
To achieve this objective and to ensure the complete removal of of TRANSCO and distribution utilities which shall become
cross subsidies, the cap on the recoverable rate of system losses part of the rate base shall be subject to the verification of
prescribed in Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7832, is hereby the ERC to ensure that the contracting and procurement of
amended and shall be replaced by caps which shall be determined the equipment, assets and services have been subjected
by the ERC based on load density, sales mix, cost of service, to transparent and accepted industry procurement and
delivery voltage and other technical considerations it may purchasing practices to protect the public interest.
promulgate. The ERC shall determine such form of rate-setting
methodology, which shall promote efficiency. In case the rate (g) Three (3) years after the imposition of the universal charge,
setting methodology used is RORB, it shall be subject to the ensure that the charges of the TRANSCO or any distribution utility
following guidelines: shall bear no cross subsidies between grids, within grids, or
between classes of customers, except as provided herein;
(i) For purposes of determining the rate base, the
TRANSCO or any distribution utility may be allowed to (h) Review and approve any changes on the terms and conditions
revalue its eligible assets not more than once every three of service of the TRANSCO or any distribution utility;
(3) years by an independent appraisal company: Provided,
however, That ERC may give an exemption in case of (i) Allow the TRANSCO to charge user fees for ancillary services to
unusual devaluation: Provided, further, That the ERC shall all electric power industry participants or self-generating entities
exert efforts to minimize price shocks in order to protect connected to the grid. Such fees shall be fixed by the ERC after
the consumers; due notice and public hearing;

(j) Set a lifeline rate for the marginalized end-users;

35 | P a g e
(k) Monitor and take measures in accordance with this Act to (q) Act on applications for cost recovery and return on demand side
penalize abuse of market power, cartelization, and anti-competitive management projects;
or discriminatory behavior by any electric power industry
participant; (r) In the exercise of its investigative and quasi-judicial powers,
act against any participant or player in the energy sector for
(l) Impose fines or penalties for any non-compliance with or breach violations of any law, rule and regulation governing the same,
of this Act, the IRR of this Act and the rules and regulations which it including the rules on cross ownership, anticompetitive practices,
promulgates or administers; abuse of market positions and similar or related acts by any
participant in the energy sector, or by any person as may be
(m) Take any other action delegated to it pursuant to this provided by law, and require any person or entity to submit any
Act; report or data relative to any investigation or hearing conducted
pursuant to this Act;
(n) Before the end of April of each year, submit to the Office of the
President of the Philippines and Congress, copy furnished the (s) Inspect, on its own or through duly authorized representatives,
DOE, an annual report containing such matters or cases which the premises, books of accounts and records of any person or
have been filed before or referred to it during the preceding year, entity at any time, in the exercise of its quasi-judicial power for
the actions and proceedings undertaken and its decision or purposes of determining the existence of any anticompetitive
resolution in each case. The ERC shall make copies of such behavior and/or market power abuse and any violation of rules and
reports available to any interested party upon payment of a charge regulations issued by the ERC;
which reflects the printing costs. The ERC shall publish all its
decisions involving rates and anticompetitive cases in at least one (t) Perform such other regulatory functions as are appropriate and
(1) newspaper of general circulation, and/or post electronically and necessary in order to ensure the successful restructuring and
circulate to all interested electric power industry participants copies modernization of the electric power industry, such as, but not
of its resolutions to ensure fair and impartial treatment; limited to, the rules and guidelines under which generation
companies, distribution utilities which are not publicly listed shall
(o) Monitor the activities of the generation and supply of the electric offer and sell to the public a portion not less than fifteen percent
power industry with the end in view of promoting free market (15%) of their common shares of stocks: Provided, however, That
competition and ensuring that the allocation or pass through of bulk generation companies, distribution utilities or their respective
purchase cost by distributors is transparent, non-discriminatory and holding companies that are already listed in the PSE are deemed in
that any existing subsidies shall be divided pro rata among all retail compliance. For existing companies, such public offering shall be
suppliers; implemented not later than five (5) years from the effectivity of this
Act. New companies shall implement their respective public
offerings not later than five (5) years from the issuance of their
certificate of compliance; and
(p) Act on applications for or modifications of certificates of public
convenience and/or necessity, licenses or permits of franchised (u) The ERC shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction over
electric utilities in accordance with law and revoke, review and all cases contesting rates, fees, fines and penalties imposed by the
modify such certificates, licenses or permits in appropriate cases, ERC in the exercise of the abovementioned powers, functions and
such as in cases of violations of the Grid Code, Distribution Code responsibilities and over all cases involving disputes between and
and other rules and regulations issued by the ERC in accordance among participants or players in the energy sector.
with law;

36 | P a g e
 All notices of hearings to be conducted by the ERC for the purpose prescribed in the Distribution Code and the performance
of fixing rates or fees shall be published at least twice for two standards prescribed in the IRR of this Act. Distribution
successive weeks in two (2) newspapers of nationwide circulation. utilities which do not comply with any of the prescribed
technical specifications and performance standards shall
submit to the ERC a plan to comply, within three (3)
years, with said prescribed technical specifications and
Aside from Section 43, additional functions of the ERC are scattered throughout RA performance standards. The ERC shall, within sixty (60)
9136: days upon receipt of such plan, evaluate the same and
notify the distribution utility concerned of its action. Failure
to submit a feasible and credible plan and/or failure to
implement the same shall serve as grounds for the
1. SEC. 6. Generation Sector. ― Generation of electric imposition of appropriate sanctions, fines or penalties.
power, a business affected with public interest, shall be
competitive and open. xxxx

Upon the effectivity of this Act, any new generation 4. SEC. 28. De-monopolization and Shareholding
company shall, before it operates, secure from the Energy Dispersal. ― In compliance with the constitutional
Regulatory Commission (ERC) a certificate of compliance mandate for dispersal of ownership and de-monopolization
pursuant to the standards set forth in this Act, as well as of public utilities, the holdings of persons, natural or
health, safety and environmental clearances from the juridical, including directors, officers, stockholders and
appropriate government agencies under existing laws. related interests, in a distribution utility and their respective
holding companies shall not exceed twenty-five (25%)
xxxx percent of the voting shares of stock unless the utility or
the company holding the shares or its controlling
2. SEC. 8. Creation of the National Transmission stockholders are already listed in the Philippine Stock
Company. ― x x x Exchange (PSE): Provided, That controlling stockholders
of small distribution utilities are hereby required to list in
That the subtransmission assets shall be operated and the PSE within five (5) years from the enactment of this
maintained by TRANSCO until their disposal to qualified Act if they already own the stocks. New controlling
distribution utilities which are in a position to take over the stockholders shall undertake such listing within five (5)
responsibility for operating, maintaining, upgrading, and years from the time they acquire ownership and control. A
expanding said assets. x x x small distribution company is one whose peak demand is
equal to Ten megawatts (10MW).
In case of disagreement in valuation, procedures,
ownership participation and other issues, the ERC shall The ERC shall, within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of
resolve such issues. this Act, promulgate the rules and regulations to
implement and effect this provision.
xxxx
xxxx
3. SEC. 23. Functions of Distribution Utilities. ― x x x
5. SEC. 29. Supply Sector. ― x x x all suppliers of
Distribution utilities shall submit to the ERC a statement of electricity to the contestable market shall require a license
their compliance with the technical specifications from the ERC.
37 | P a g e
 For this purpose, the ERC shall promulgate rules and 9. SEC. 34. Universal Charge. ― Within one (1) year from
regulations prescribing the qualifications of electricity the effectivity of this Act, a universal charge to be
suppliers which shall include, among other requirements, determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, shall be
a demonstration of their technical capability, financial imposed on all electricity end-users x x x x
capability, and creditworthiness: Provided, That the ERC
shall have authority to require electricity suppliers to 10. SEC. 35. Royalties, Returns and Tax Rates for Indigenous
furnish a bond or other evidence of the ability of a supplier Energy Resources. ― x x x
to withstand market disturbances or other events that may
increase the cost of providing service. To ensure lower rates for end-users, the ERC shall
forthwith reduce the rates of power from all indigenous
xxxx sources of energy.

6. SEC. 30. Wholesale Electricity Spot Market. ― x x x 11. SEC. 36. Unbundling of Rates and Functions. ― x x x

Subject to the compliance with the membership criteria, all each distribution utility shall file its revised rates for the
generating companies, distribution utilities, suppliers, bulk approval by the ERC. x x x x
consumers/end-users and other similar entities authorized
by the ERC shall be eligible to become members of the 12. SEC. 40. Enhancement of Technical Competence. ― The
wholesale electricity spot market. ERC shall establish rigorous training programs for its staff
for the purpose of enhancing the technical competence of
The ERC may authorize other similar entities to become the ERC in the following areas: evaluation of technical
eligible as members, either directly or indirectly, of the performance and monitoring of compliance with service
wholesale electricity spot market. and performance standards, performance-based rate-
setting reform, environmental standards and such other
xxxx areas as will enable the ERC to adequately perform its
duties and functions.
7. SEC. 31. Retail Competition and Open Access. ― x x x
13. SEC. 41. Promotion of Consumer Interests. ― The ERC
Upon the initial implementation of open access, the ERC shall handle consumer complaints and ensure the
shall allow all electricity end-users with a monthly average adequate promotion of consumer interests.
peak demand of at least one megawatt (1MW) for the
preceding twelve (12) months to be the contestable 14. SEC. 45. Cross Ownership, Market Power Abuse and
market. xxx Subsequently and every year thereafter, the Anti-Competitive Behavior. ― No participant in the
ERC shall evaluate the performance of the market. x x x electricity industry may engage in any anti-competitive
behavior including, but not limited to, cross-subsidization,
8. SEC. 32. NPC Stranded Debt and Contract Cost price or market manipulation, or other unfair trade
Recovery. ― x x x practices detrimental to the encouragement and protection
of contestable markets.
The ERC shall verify the reasonable amounts and
determine the manner and duration for the full recovery of xxxx
stranded debt and stranded contract costs as defined
herein x xx x (c) x x x The ERC shall, within one (1) year from
the effectivity of this Act, promulgate rules and regulations
38 | P a g e
 to promote competition, encourage market development all pertinent data and information relating to the
and customer choice and discourage/penalize abuse of performance of their respective functions in the
market power, cartelization and any anticompetitive or industry. xxx
discriminatory behavior, in order to further the intent of
this Act and protect the public interest. Such rules and xxxx
regulations shall define the following:
18. SEC. 65. Environmental Protection. ― Participants in the
(a) the relevant markets for purposes of establishing abuse generation, distribution and transmission sub-sectors of
or misuse of monopoly or market position; the industry shall comply with all environmental laws,
rules, regulations and standards promulgated by the
(b) areas of isolated grids; and Department of Environment and Natural Resources
including, in appropriate cases, the establishment of an
(c) the periodic reportorial requirements of electric power environmental guarantee fund.
industry participants as may be necessary to enforce the
provisions of this Section.

The ERC shall, motu proprio, monitor and penalize any 19. SEC. 67. NPC Offer of Transition Supply
market power abuse or anticompetitive or discriminatory Contracts. ― Within six (6) months from the effectivity of
act or behavior by any participant in the electric power this Act, NPC shall file with the ERC for its approval a
industry. transition supply contract duly negotiated with the
distribution utilities containing the terms and conditions of
15. SEC. 51. Powers. ― The PSALM Corp. shall, in the supply and a corresponding schedule of rates, consistent
performance of its functions and for the attainment of its with the provisions hereof, including adjustments and/or
objective, have the following powers: x x x indexation formulas which shall apply to the term of such
contracts.
(e) To liquidate the NPC stranded contract costs utilizing
proceeds from sales and other property contributed to it, xxxx
including the proceeds from the universal charge;
20. SEC. 69. Renegotiation of Power Purchase and Energy
xxxx Conversion Agreements between Government
Entities. ― Within three (3) months from the effectivity of
16. SEC. 60. Debts of Electric Cooperatives. ― x x x The ERC this Act, all power purchase and energy conversion
shall ensure a reduction in the rates of electric agreements between the PNOC-Energy Development
cooperatives commensurate with the resulting savings due Corporation (PNOC-EDC) and NPC, including but not
to the removal of the amortization payments of their loans. limited to the Palimpinon, Tongonan and
xxxx Mt. Apo Geothermal complexes, shall be reviewed by the
ERC and the terms thereof amended to remove any
17. SEC. 62. Joint Congressional Power Commission. ― x x x hidden costs or extraordinary mark-ups in the cost of
power or steam above their true costs. All amended
x x x the Power Commission is hereby empowered to contracts shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional
require the DOE, ERC, NEA, TRANSCO, generation Power Commission for approval. The ERC shall ensure
companies, distribution utilities, suppliers and other that all savings realized from the reduction of said mark-
electric power industry participants to submit reports and ups shall be passed on to all end-users.
39 | P a g e
 Rate Commission, the Supervising Railway Expert, and the Board
of Rate Regulation.
After comparing the functions of the ERB and the ERC, we find that the ERC indeed
assumed the functions of the ERB. However, the overlap in the functions of the ERB Thereafter, several laws were enacted on public utility regulation.
and of the ERC does not mean that there is no valid abolition of the ERB. The On November 7, 1936, Commonwealth Act No. 146, otherwise
ERC has new and expanded functions which are intended to meet the specific known as the Public Service Law, was enacted by the National
needs of a deregulated power industry. Indeed, National Land Titles and Deeds Assembly. The Public Service Commission (PSC) had jurisdiction,
Registration Administration v. Civil Service Commission stated that: supervision, and control over all public services, including the
electric power service.

After almost four decades, significant developments in the energy

[I]f the newly created office has substantially new, different or sector changed the landscape of economic regulation in the
additional functions, duties or powers, so that it may be said in fact country.
to create an office different from the one abolished, even though it
embraces all or some of the duties of the old office it will be April 30, 1971 ― R.A. No. 6173 was passed creating the
considered as an abolition of one office and the creation of a new Oil Industry Commission (OIC), which was tasked to
or different one. The same is true if one office is abolished and its regulate the oil industry and to ensure the adequate supply
duties, for reasons of economy are given to an existing officer or of petroleum products at reasonable prices.
office.[13]
September 24, 1972 ― then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1 which ordered
the preparation of the Integrated Reorganization Plan by
the Commission on Reorganization. The Plan abolished
the PSC and transferred the regulatory and adjudicatory
KERB argues that RA 9136 did not abolish the ERB nor did it alter its essential functions pertaining to the electricity industry and water
character as an economic regulator of the electric power industry. x x x RA 9136 resources to then Board of Power and Waterworks
rather changed merely ERBs name and title to that of the ERC even as it expanded (BOPW).
its functions and objectives to keep pace with the times. To uphold KERBsargument
regarding the invalidity of the ERBs abolition is to ignore the developments in the October 6, 1977 ― the government created the
history of energy regulation. Department of Energy (DOE) and consequently abolished
the OIC, which was replaced by the creation of the Board
of Energy (BOE) through Presidential Decree No. 1206.
The BOE, in addition, assumed the powers and functions
The regulation of public services started way back in 1902 with the of the BOPW over the electric power industry.
enactment of Act No. 520 which created the Coastwise Rate
Commission. In 1906, Act No. 1507 was passed creating the May 8, 1987 ― the BOE was reconstituted into the
Supervising Railway Expert. The following year, Act No. 1779 was Energy Regulatory Board (ERB), pursuant to Executive
enacted creating the Board of Rate Regulation. Then, Act No 2307, Order No. 172 issued by then President Corazon
which was patterned after the Public Service Law of the State of C. Aquino as part of her governments reorganization
New Jersey, was approved by the Philippine Commission in 1914, program. The rationale was to consolidate and entrust into
creating the Board of Public Utility Commissioners, composed of a single body all the regulatory and adjudicatory functions
three members, which absorbed all the functions of the Coastwise pertaining to the energy sector. Thus, the power to

40 | P a g e
 regulate the power rates and services of private electric and the delineation of the roles of various government agencies
utilities was transferred to the ERB. and the private entities. The law ordains the division of the industry
into four (4) distinct sectors, namely: generation, transmission,
December 28, 1992 ― Republic Act No. 7638 signed, distribution and supply. Corollarily, the NPC generating plants have
where the power to fix the rates of the National Power to privatized and its transmission business spun off and privatized
Corporation (NPC) and the rural electric cooperatives thereafter.
(RECs) was passed on to the ERB. Non-pricing functions
of the ERB with respect to the petroleum industry were In tandem with the restructuring of the industry is the establishment
transferred to the DOE, i.e., regulating the capacities of of a strong and purely independent regulatory body. Thus, the law
new refineries. created the ERC in place of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB).

February 10, 1998 ― enactment of Republic Act 8479: To achieve its aforestated goal, the law has reconfigured the
Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1998, which organization of the regulatory body. x x x[15]
prescribed a five-month transition period, before full
deregulation of the oil industry, during which ERB would
implement an automatic pricing mechanism (APM) for
petroleum products every month. There is no question in our minds that, because of the expansion of
the ERCs functions and concerns, there was a valid abolition of the ERB. Thus, there
June 12, 1998 ― the Philippine oil industry was fully is no merit to KERBs allegation that there is an impairment of the security of tenure of
deregulated, thus, ERBs focus of responsibility centered the ERBs employees.
on the electric industry.

June 8, 2001 ― enactment of Republic Act No. 9136,

otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. No costs.
Act (EPIRA) of 2001. The Act abolished the ERB and
created in its place the Energy Regulatory Commission
(ERC) which is a purely independent regulatory body
performing the combined quasi-judicial, quasi-legislative SO ORDERED.
and administrative functions in the electric industry.[14]

Throughout the years, the scope of the regulation has gradually narrowed from that of
public services in 1902 to the electricity industry and water resources in 1972 to the
electric power industry and oil industry in 1977 to the electric industry alone in SECOND DIVISION
1998. The ERC retains the ERBs traditional rate and service regulation
functions.However, the ERC now also has to promote competitive operations in the [G.R. No. 155336. November 25, 2004]
electricity market. RA 9136 expanded the ERCs concerns to encompass both the
consumers and the utility investors. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (CHREA)
Represented by its President, MARCIAL A. SANCHEZ, JR., petitioner,
Thus, the EPIRA provides a framework for the restructuring of the vs. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, respondent.
industry, including the privatization of the assets of the National
Power Corporation (NPC), the transition to a competitive structure, DECISION
41 | P a g e
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: facilities and equipment; (c) purchase of books, journals, periodicals and equipment;
(d) necessary expenses for the employment of temporary, contractual and casual
Can the Commission on Human Rights lawfully implement an upgrading and employees; (e) payment of extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses, commutable
reclassification of personnel positions without the prior approval of the Department of representation and transportation allowances, and fringe benefits for their officials and
Budget and Management? employees as may be authorized by law; and (f) other official purposes, subject to
accounting and auditing rules and regulations. (Emphases supplied)
Before this Court is a petition for review filed by petitioner Commission on
Human Rights Employees Association (CHREA) challenging the Decision[1] dated 29 On the strength of these special provisions, the CHR, through its then
November 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59678 affirming the Chairperson Aurora P. Navarette-Recia and Commissioners Nasser A.
Resolutions[2] dated 16 December 1999 and 09 June 2000 of the Civil Service Marohomsalic, Mercedes V. Contreras, Vicente P. Sibulo, and Jorge R. Coquia,
Commission (CSC), which sustained the validity of the upgrading and reclassification promulgated Resolution No. A98-047 on 04 September 1998, adopting an upgrading
of certain personnel positions in the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) despite the and reclassification scheme among selected positions in the Commission, to wit:
disapproval thereof by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM). Also
assailed is the resolution dated 11 September 2002 of the Court of Appeals denying WHEREAS, the General Appropriations Act, FY 1998, R.A. No. 8522 has provided
the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner. special provisions applicable to all Constitutional Offices enjoying Fiscal Autonomy,
particularly on organizational structures and authorizes the same to formulate and
The antecedent facts which spawned the present controversy are as follows: implement the organizational structures of their respective offices to fix and determine
the salaries, allowances and other benefits of their personnel and whenever public
On 14 February 1998, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8522, otherwise interest so requires, make adjustments in the personnel services itemization
known as the General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special Provisions including, but not limited to, the transfer of item or creation of new positions in their
Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. The last portion of respective offices: PROVIDED, That officers and employees whose positions are
Article XXXIII covers the appropriations of the CHR. These special provisions state: affected by such reorganization or adjustments shall be granted retirement gratuities

1. Organizational Structure. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding

Number of Position Title Salary Grade Total Salary
and within the limits of their respective appropriations as authorized in this
Positions Requirements
Act, the Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy are
authorized to formulate and implement the organizational structures of their
From To From To
respective offices, to fix and determine the salaries, allowances, and other
benefits of their personnel, and whenever public interest so requires, make
1 Attorney V Director IV 25 28 P28,092.00
adjustments in their personal services itemization including, but not limited to, the
transfer of item or creation of new positions in their respective
offices: PROVIDED, That officers and employees whose positions are affected 2 Security Officer Security 11 15 57,456.00
by such reorganization or adjustments shall be granted retirement gratuities and I Officer II
separation pay in accordance with existing laws, which shall be payable from any
unexpended balance of, or savings in the appropriations of their respective ------------------
offices: PROVIDED, FURTHER,That the implementation hereof shall be in
accordance with salary rates, allowances and other benefits authorized under Total 3 P 85,548.00[7]
compensation standardization laws. and separation pay in accordance with existing laws, which shall be payable from any
unexpanded balance of, or savings in the appropriations of their respective offices;
2. Use of Savings. The Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal
autonomy are hereby authorized to use savings in their respective appropriations for: WHEREAS, the Commission on Human Rights is a member of the Constitutional
(a) printing and/or publication of decisions, resolutions, and training information Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) and on July 24, 1998, CFAG passed an approved
materials; (b) repair, maintenance and improvement of central and regional offices,
42 | P a g e
 for the Caraga Regional Office, four Security Officer II with Salary Grade 15, and
Number Position Salary Grade Total Salary five Process Servers, with Salary Grade 5 under the Office of the
of Requirements Commissioners. [4]
Positions Title
On 19 October 1998, CHR issued Resolution No. A98-055[5] providing for
From To From To the upgrading or raising of salary grades of the following positions in the
Commission:
12 Attorney VI (In the Director IV 26 28 P229,104.00
Regional Field It, likewise, provided for the creation and upgrading of the following
Offices) positions:

A. Creation
4 Director III Director IV 27 28 38,928.00

Number of Position Title Salary Grade Total Salary

1 Financial & Director IV 24 28 36,744.00
Positions Requirements
Management
Officer II
4 Security Officer II 15 684,780.00
(Coterminous)
1 Budget Officer Budget 18 24 51,756.00
III Officer IV
B. Upgrading
1 Accountant III Chief 18 24 51,756.00
To support the implementation of such scheme, the CHR, in the same
Accountant
resolution, authorized the augmentation of a commensurate amount generated
from savings under Personnel Services.
1 Cashier III Cashier V 18 24 51,756.00
By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062 dated 17 November 1998, the CHR
1 Information Director IV 24 28 36,744.00[6]
collapsed the vacant positions in the body to provide additional source of funding
Officer V
for said staffing modification. Among the positions collapsed were: one Attorney
Joint Resolution No. 49 adopting internal rules implementing the special provisions III, four Attorney IV, one Chemist III, three Special Investigator I, one Clerk III, and
heretoforth mentioned; one Accounting Clerk II.[8]

NOW THEREFORE, the Commission by virtue of its fiscal autonomy hereby The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the
approves and authorizes the upgrading and augmentation of the commensurate DBM with a request for its approval, but the then DBM secretary Benjamin Diokno
amount generated from savings under Personal Services to support the denied the request on the following justification:
implementation of this resolution effective Calendar Year 1998;
Based on the evaluations made the request was not favorably considered as it
Let the Human Resources Development Division (HRDD) prepare the necessary effectively involved the elevation of the field units from divisions to services.
Notice of Salary Adjustment and other appropriate documents to implement this
resolution; . . . .[3] (Emphasis supplied) The present proposal seeks further to upgrade the twelve (12) positions of Attorney
VI, SG-26 to Director IV, SG-28. This would elevate the field units to a bureau or
Annexed to said resolution is the proposed creation of ten regional office, a level even higher than the one previously denied.
additional plantilla positions, namely: one Director IV position, with Salary Grade 28

43 | P a g e
The request to upgrade the three (3) positions of Director III, SG-27 to Director IV, In light of the DBMs disapproval of the proposed personnel modification
SG-28, in the Central Office in effect would elevate the services to Office and change scheme, the CSC-National Capital Region Office, through a memorandum dated 29
the context from support to substantive without actual change in functions. March 1999, recommended to the CSC-Central Office that the subject appointments
be rejected owing to the DBMs disapproval of the plantilla reclassification.
In the absence of a specific provision of law which may be used as a legal basis to
elevate the level of divisions to a bureau or regional office, and the services to offices, Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHREA, in representation of the rank and
we reiterate our previous stand denying the upgrading of the twelve (12) positions of file employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central Office to affirm the
Attorney VI, SG-26 to Director III, SG-27 or Director IV, SG-28, in the Field recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office. CHREA stood its ground in saying that
Operations Office (FOO) and three (3) Director III, SG-27 to Director IV, SG-28 in the the DBM is the only agency with appropriate authority mandated by law to evaluate
Central Office. and approve matters of reclassification and upgrading, as well as creation of
positions.
As represented, President Ramos then issued a Memorandum to the DBM Secretary
dated 10 December 1997, directing the latter to increase the number of Plantilla The CSC-Central Office denied CHREAs request in a Resolution dated 16
positions in the CHR both Central and Regional Offices to implement the Philippine December 1999, and reversed the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office that
Decade Plan on Human Rights Education, the Philippine Human Rights Plan and the upgrading scheme be censured. The decretal portion of which reads:
Barangay Rights Actions Center in accordance with existing laws. (Emphasis in the
original) WHEREFORE, the request of Ronnie N. Rosero, Hubert V. Ruiz, Flordeliza A.
Briones, George Q. Dumlao [and], Corazon A. Santos-Tiu, is hereby denied.[10]
Pursuant to Section 78 of the General Provisions of the General Appropriations Act
(GAA) FY 1998, no organizational unit or changes in key positions shall be authorized CHREA filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CSC-Central Office denied
unless provided by law or directed by the President, thus, the creation of a Finance the same on 09 June 2000.
Management Office and a Public Affairs Office cannot be given favorable
recommendation. Given the cacophony of judgments between the DBM and the CSC, petitioner
CHREA elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed
Moreover, as provided under Section 2 of RA No. 6758, otherwise known as the the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office and upheld the validity of the
Compensation Standardization Law, the Department of Budget and Management is upgrading, retitling, and reclassification scheme in the CHR on the justification that
directed to establish and administer a unified compensation and position classification such action is within the ambit of CHRs fiscal autonomy. The fallo of the Court of
system in the government. The Supreme Court ruled in the case of Victorina Cruz vs. Appeals decision provides:
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119155, dated January 30, 1996, that this Department
has the sole power and discretion to administer the compensation and position IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is ordered DISMISSED and
classification system of the National Government. the questioned Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 99-2800 dated December
16, 1999 as well as No. 001354 dated June 9, 2000, are hereby AFFIRMED. No
Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency with the cost.[11]
authority to reclassify, upgrade, and create positions without approval of the DBM.
While the members of the Group are authorized to formulate and implement the Unperturbed, petitioner filed this petition in this Court contending that:
organizational structures of their respective offices and determine the compensation
of their personnel, such authority is not absolute and must be exercised within the A.
parameters of the Unified Position Classification and Compensation System
established under RA 6758 more popularly known as the Compensation THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT UNDER THE
Standardization Law. We therefore reiterate our previous stand on the 1987 CONSTITUTION, THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ENJOYS FISCAL
matter.[9] (Emphases supplied) AUTONOMY.

B.
44 | P a g e
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE On petitioners personality to bring this suit, we held in a multitude of cases that
CONSTRUCTION OF THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS OF REPUBLIC ACT a proper party is one who has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an
NO. 8522 (THE GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1998) injury as a result of the act complained of.[13] Here, petitioner, which consists of rank
DESPITE ITS BEING IN SHARP CONFLICT WITH THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AND and file employees of respondent CHR, protests that the upgrading and collapsing of
THE STATUTE ITSELF. positions benefited only a select few in the upper level positions in the Commission
resulting to the demoralization of the rank and file employees. This sufficiently meets
C. the injury test. Indeed, the CHRs upgrading scheme, if found to be valid, potentially
entails eating up the Commissions savings or that portion of its budgetary pie
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING otherwise allocated for Personnel Services, from which the benefits of the employees,
THE VALIDITY OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION RESOLUTION NOS. including those in the rank and file, are derived.
992800 AND 001354 AS WELL AS THAT OF THE OPINION OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IN STATING THAT THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN Further, the personality of petitioner to file this case was recognized by the CSC
RIGHTS ENJOYS FISCAL AUTONOMY UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AND when it took cognizance of the CHREAs request to affirm the recommendation of the
THAT THIS FISCAL AUTONOMY INCLUDES THE ACTION TAKEN BY IT IN CSC-National Capital Region Office. CHREAs personality to bring the suit was a non-
COLLAPSING, UPGRADING AND RECLASSIFICATION OF POSITIONS issue in the Court of Appeals when it passed upon the merits of this case. Thus,
THEREIN.[12] neither should our hands be tied by this technical concern. Indeed, it is settled
jurisprudence that an issue that was neither raised in the complaint nor in the court
The central question we must answer in order to resolve this case is: Can the below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, as to do so would be offensive to
Commission on Human Rights validly implement an upgrading, reclassification, the basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process.[14]
creation, and collapsing of plantilla positions in the Commission without the prior
approval of the Department of Budget and Management? We now delve into the main issue of whether or not the approval by the DBM is
a condition precedent to the enactment of an upgrading, reclassification, creation and
Petitioner CHREA grouses that the Court of Appeals and the CSC-Central collapsing of plantilla positions in the CHR.
Office both erred in sanctioning the CHRs alleged blanket authority to upgrade,
reclassify, and create positions inasmuch as the approval of the DBM relative to such Germane to our discussion is Rep. Act No. 6758, An Act Prescribing a Revised
scheme is still indispensable. Petitioner bewails that the CSC and the Court of Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government and For Other
Appeals erroneously assumed that CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy insofar as financial Purposes, or the Salary Standardization Law, dated 01 July 1989, which provides in
matters are concerned, particularly with regard to the upgrading and reclassification Sections 2 and 4 thereof that it is the DBM that shall establish and administer a
of positions therein. unified Compensation and Position Classification System. Thus:

Respondent CHR sharply retorts that petitioner has no locus standi considering SEC. 2. Statement of Policy. -- It is hereby declared the policy of the State to provide
that there exists no official written record in the Commission recognizing petitioner as equal pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon
a bona fide organization of its employees nor is there anything in the records to show substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements
that its president, Marcial A. Sanchez, Jr., has the authority to sue the CHR. The CHR of the positions. In determining rates of pay, due regard shall be given to, among
contends that it has the authority to cause the upgrading, others, prevailing rates in the private sector for comparable work. For this purpose,
reclassification, plantilla creation, and collapsing scheme sans the approval of the the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is hereby directed to establish
DBM because it enjoys fiscal autonomy. and administer a unified Compensation and Position Classification System,
hereinafter referred to as the System as provided for in Presidential Decree No. 985,
After a thorough consideration of the arguments of both parties and an as amended, that shall be applied for all government entities, as mandated by the
assiduous scrutiny of the records in the case at bar, it is the Courts opinion that the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied.)
present petition is imbued with merit.
SEC. 4. Coverage. The Compensation and Position Classification System herein
provided shall apply to all positions, appointive or elective, on full or part-time basis,
45 | P a g e
now existing or hereafter created in the government, including government-owned or In Victorina Cruz v. Court of Appeals,[17] we held that the DBM has the sole
controlled corporations and government financial institutions. power and discretion to administer the compensation and position classification
system of the national government.
The term government refers to the Executive, the Legislative and the Judicial
Branches and the Constitutional Commissions and shall include all, but shall not be In Intia, Jr. v. Commission on Audit,[18] the Court held that although the
limited to, departments, bureaus, offices, boards, commissions, courts, tribunals, charter[19] of the Philippine Postal Corporation (PPC) grants it the power to fix the
councils, authorities, administrations, centers, institutes, state colleges and compensation and benefits of its employees and exempts PPC from the coverage of
universities, local government units, and the armed forces. The term government- the rules and regulations of the Compensation and Position Classification Office, by
owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions shall include all virtue of Section 6 of P.D. No. 1597, the compensation system established by the
corporations and financial institutions owned or controlled by the National PPC is, nonetheless, subject to the review of the DBM. This Court intoned:
Government, whether such corporations and financial institutions perform
governmental or proprietary functions. (Emphasis supplied.) It should be emphasized that the review by the DBM of any PPC resolution affecting
the compensation structure of its personnel should not be interpreted to mean that the
The disputation of the Court of Appeals that the CHR is exempt from the long DBM can dictate upon the PPC Board of Directors and deprive the latter of its
arm of the Salary Standardization Law is flawed considering that the coverage discretion on the matter. Rather, the DBMs function is merely to ensure that the
thereof, as defined above, encompasses the entire gamut of government action taken by the Board of Directors complies with the requirements of the law,
offices, sans qualification. specifically, that PPCs compensation system conforms as closely as possible with
that provided for under R.A. No. 6758. (Emphasis supplied.)
This power to administer is not purely ministerial in character as erroneously
held by the Court of Appeals. The word to administer means to control or regulate in As measured by the foregoing legal and jurisprudential yardsticks, the
behalf of others; to direct or superintend the execution, application or conduct of; and imprimatur of the DBM must first be sought prior to implementation
to manage or conduct public affairs, as to administer the government of the state.[15] of any reclassification or upgrading of positions in government. This is consonant to
the mandate of the DBM under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, Section 3,
The regulatory power of the DBM on matters of compensation is encrypted not Chapter 1, Title XVII, to wit:
only in law, but in jurisprudence as well. In the recent case of Philippine Retirement
Authority (PRA) v. Jesusito L. Buag,[16] this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. The Department of Budget and Management shall
Reynato Puno, ruled that compensation, allowances, and other benefits received by assist the President in the preparation of a national resources and expenditures
PRA officials and employees without the requisite approval or authority of the DBM budget, preparation, execution and control of the National Budget, preparation and
are unauthorized and irregular. In the words of the Court maintenance of accounting systems essential to the budgetary process, achievement
of more economy and efficiency in the management of government
Despite the power granted to the Board of Directors of PRA to establish and fix a operations, administration of compensation and position classification systems,
compensation and benefits scheme for its employees, the same is subject to the assessment of organizational effectiveness and review and evaluation of legislative
review of the Department of Budget and Management. However, in view of the proposals having budgetary or organizational implications. (Emphasis supplied.)
express powers granted to PRA under its charter, the extent of the review authority of
the Department of Budget and Management is limited. As stated in Intia, the task of Irrefragably, it is within the turf of the DBM Secretary to disallow the upgrading,
the Department of Budget and Management is simply to review the compensation reclassification, and creation of additional plantilla positions in the CHR based on its
and benefits plan of the government agency or entity concerned and determine if the finding that such scheme lacks legal justification.
same complies with the prescribed policies and guidelines issued in this regard. The
role of the Department of Budget and Management is supervisorial in nature, its main Notably, the CHR itself recognizes the authority of the DBM to deny or approve
duty being to ascertain that the proposed compensation, benefits and other incentives the proposed reclassification of positions as evidenced by its three letters to the DBM
to be given to PRA officials and employees adhere to the policies and guidelines requesting approval thereof. As such, it is now estopped from now claiming that the
issued in accordance with applicable laws. nod of approval it has previously sought from the DBM is a superfluity.

46 | P a g e
 The Court of Appeals incorrectly relied on the pronouncement of the CSC- Nor is there any legal basis to support the contention that the CHR enjoys fiscal
Central Office that the CHR is a constitutional commission, and as such enjoys fiscal autonomy. In essence, fiscal autonomy entails freedom from outside control and
autonomy.[20] limitations, other than those provided by law. It is the freedom to allocate and utilize
funds granted by law, in accordance with law, and pursuant to the wisdom and
Palpably, the Court of Appeals Decision was based on the mistaken premise dispatch its needs may require from time to time.[22] In Blaquera v.
that the CHR belongs to the species of constitutional commissions. But, Article IX of Alcala and Bengzon v. Drilon,[23] it is understood that it is only the Judiciary, the Civil
the Constitution states in no uncertain terms that only the CSC, the Commission on Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and
Elections, and the Commission on Audit shall be tagged as Constitutional the Office of the Ombudsman, which enjoy fiscal autonomy. Thus, in Bengzon,[24] we
Commissions with the appurtenant right to fiscal autonomy. Thus: explained:

Sec. 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the
Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit. Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections,
and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to
Sec. 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs
appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released. require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix
rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for
Along the same vein, the Administrative Code, in Chapter 5, Sections 24 and 26 compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums
of Book II on Distribution of Powers of Government, the constitutional commissions as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of
shall include only the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and their functions.
the Commission on Audit, which are granted independence and fiscal autonomy. In
contrast, Chapter 5, Section 29 thereof, is silent on the grant of similar powers to the ...
other bodies including the CHR. Thus:
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the
SEC. 24. Constitutional Commissions. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The
be independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent
the Commission on Audit. constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is
anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the
SEC. 26. Fiscal Autonomy. The Constitutional Commissions shall enjoy fiscal Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and
autonomy. The approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is
released. based. In the interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme Court, [the]
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far limited their objections
SEC. 29. Other Bodies. There shall be in accordance with the Constitution, an Office to constant reminders. We now agree with the petitioners that this grant of autonomy
of the Ombudsman, a Commission on Human Rights, and independent central should cease to be a meaningless provision. (Emphasis supplied.)
monetary authority, and a national police commission. Likewise, as provided in the
Constitution, Congress may establish an independent economic and planning Neither does the fact that the CHR was admitted as a member by the
agency. (Emphasis ours.) Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) ipso facto clothed it with fiscal
autonomy. Fiscal autonomy is a constitutional grant, not a tag obtainable by
From the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code, it is abundantly clear membership.
that the CHR is not among the class of Constitutional Commissions. As expressed in
the oft-repeated maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the express mention of We note with interest that the special provision under Rep. Act No. 8522, while
one person, thing, act or consequence excludes all others. Stated cited under the heading of the CHR, did not specifically mention CHR as among
otherwise, expressium facit cessare tacitum what is expressed puts an end to what is those offices to which the special provision to formulate and implement organizational
implied.[21] structures apply, but merely states its coverage to include Constitutional
47 | P a g e
Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy. In contrast, the Special Provision Indeed, the law upon which respondent heavily anchors its case upon has
Applicable to the Judiciary under Article XXVIII of the General Appropriations Act of expressly provided that any form of adjustment in the organizational structure must be
1998 specifically mentions that such special provision applies to the judiciary and had within the parameters of the Salary Standardization Law.
categorically authorized the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to formulate and
implement the organizational structure of the Judiciary, to wit: The Salary Standardization Law has gained impetus in addressing one of the
basic causes of discontent of many civil servants.[27] For this purpose, Congress has
1. Organizational Structure. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding and delegated to the DBM the power to administer the Salary Standardization Law and to
within the limits of their respective appropriations authorized in this Act, the Chief ensure that the spirit behind it is observed. This power is part of the system of checks
Justice of the Supreme Court is authorized to formulate and implement organizational and balances or system of restraints in our government. The DBMs exercise of such
structure of the Judiciary, to fix and determine the salaries, allowances, and other authority is not in itself an arrogation inasmuch as it is pursuant to the paramount law
benefits of their personnel, and whenever public interest so requires, make of the land, the Salary Standardization Law and the Administrative Code.
adjustments in the personal services itemization including, but not limited to, the
transfer of item or creation of new positions in the Judiciary; PROVIDED, That officers In line with its role to breathe life into the policy behind the Salary
and employees whose positions are affected by such reorganization or adjustments Standardization Law of providing equal pay for substantially equal work and to base
shall be granted retirement gratuities and separation pay in accordance with existing differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and
law, which shall be payable from any unexpended balance of, or savings in the qualification requirements of the positions, the DBM, in the case under review, made
appropriations of their respective offices: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the a determination, after a thorough evaluation, that the reclassification and upgrading
implementation hereof shall be in accordance with salary rates, allowances and other scheme proposed by the CHR lacks legal rationalization.
benefits authorized under compensation standardization laws. (Emphasis supplied.)
The DBM expounded that Section 78 of the general provisions of the General
All told, the CHR, although admittedly a constitutional creation is, nonetheless, Appropriations Act FY 1998, which the CHR heavily relies upon to justify its
not included in the genus of offices accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or reclassification scheme, explicitly provides that no organizational unit or changes in
legislative fiat. key positions shall be authorized unless provided by law or directed by the President.
Here, the DBM discerned that there is no law authorizing the creation of a Finance
Even assuming en arguendo that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy, we share the Management Office and a Public Affairs Office in the CHR. Anent CHRs proposal to
stance of the DBM that the grant of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, all government upgrade twelve positions of Attorney VI, SG-26 to Director IV, SG-28, and four
offices must, all the same, kowtow to the Salary Standardization Law. We are of the positions of Director III, SG-27 to Director IV, SG-28, in the Central Office, the DBM
same mind with the DBM on its standpoint, thus- denied the same as this would change the context from support to substantive without
actual change in functions.
Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency with the
authority to reclassify, upgrade, and create positions without approval of the DBM. This view of the DBM, as the laws designated body to implement and administer
While the members of the Group are authorized to formulate and implement the a unified compensation system, is beyond cavil. The interpretation of an
organizational structures of their respective offices and determine the compensation administrative government agency, which is tasked to implement a statute is
of their personnel, such authority is not absolute and must be exercised within the accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the courts.
parameters of the Unified Position Classification and Compensation System In Energy Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals,[28] we echoed the basic rule that the
established under RA 6758 more popularly known as the Compensation courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
Standardization Law.[25] (Emphasis supplied.) government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the
special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.
The most lucid argument against the stand of respondent, however, is the
provision of Rep. Act No. 8522 that the implementation hereof shall be in accordance To be sure, considering his expertise on matters affecting the nations coffers,
with salary rates, allowances and other benefits authorized under compensation the Secretary of the DBM, as the Presidents alter ego, knows from where he speaks
standardization laws.[26] inasmuch as he has the front seat view of the adverse effects of an unwarranted

48 | P a g e
upgrading or creation of positions in the CHR in particular and in the entire
government in general. CORONA,

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the Decision dated 29 November CARPIO MORALES,
2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59678 and its Resolution dated 11
September 2002 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ruling dated 29 March AZCUNA,
1999 of the Civil Service Commision-National Capital Region is REINSTATED. The
Commission on Human Rights Resolution No. A98-047 dated 04 September 1998, THE EXECUTIVE TINGA,
Resolution No. A98-055 dated 19 October 1998 and Resolution No. A98-062 dated
17 November 1998 without the approval of the Department of Budget and SECRETARY, THE HON. EDUARDO R. CHICO-NAZARIO,
Management are disallowed. No pronouncement as to costs. ERMITA, and THE SECRETARY OF
AGRARIAN/LAND REFORM, THE HON. GARCIA,
SO ORDERED. RENE C. VILLA,
VELASCO, JR.,
Puno, Acting C.J., Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur. Respondents.
NACHURA, and

REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:

EN BANC

August 29, 2007

ANAK MINDANAO PARTY-LIST GROUP, G.R. No. 166052 x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

as represented by Rep. Mujiv S.
Hataman, andMAMALO DESCENDANTS Present:
ORGANIZATION, INC., as represented
by its Chairman Romy Pardi,

Petitioners, PUNO, C.J., DECISION

QUISUMBING,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CARPIO MORALES, J.:

- versus - CARPIO,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

49 | P a g e
Petitioners Anak Mindanao Party-List Group (AMIN) and Mamalo Descendants WHEREAS, another of the five reform packages of the Arroyo
Organization, Inc. (MDOI) assail the constitutionality of Executive Order (E.O.) Nos. administration is Anti-Corruption and Good Government;
364 and 379, both issued in 2004, via the present Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief.

WHEREAS, one of the Good Government reforms of the Arroyo

administration is rationalizing the bureaucracy by consolidating
E.O. No. 364, which President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued on September 27, related functions into one department;
2004, reads:

WHEREAS, under law and jurisprudence, the President of

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 364 the Philippines has broad powers to reorganize the offices under
her supervision and control;

TRANSFORMING THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM

INTO THE DEPARTMENT OF LAND REFORM NOW[,] THEREFORE[,] I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, by the powers
vested in me as President of the Republic of the Philippines, do
hereby order:

WHEREAS, one of the five reform packages of the Arroyo

administration is Social Justice and Basic [N]eeds;
SECTION 1. The Department of Agrarian Reform is
hereby transformed into the Department of Land Reform. It shall
be responsible for all land reform in the country, including agrarian
WHEREAS, one of the five anti-poverty measures for social justice reform, urban land reform, and ancestral domain reform.
is asset reform;

SECTION 2. The PCUP is hereby placed under the supervision

WHEREAS, asset reforms covers [sic] agrarian reform, urban land and control of the Department of Land Reform. The Chairman of
reform, and ancestral domain reform; the PCUP shall be ex-officio Undersecretary of the Department of
Land Reform for Urban Land Reform.

WHEREAS, urban land reform is a concern of the Presidential

Commission [for] the Urban Poor (PCUP) and ancestral domain SECTION 3. The NCIP is hereby placed under the supervision and
reform is a concern of the National Commission on Indigenous control of the Department of Land Reform. The Chairman of the
Peoples (NCIP); NCIP shall be ex-officio Undersecretary of the Department of Land
Reform for Ancestral Domain Reform.

50 | P a g e
 SECTION 4. The PCUP and the NCIP shall have access to the
services provided by the Departments Finance, Management and
Administrative Office; Policy, Planning and Legal Affairs Office, NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,
Field Operations and Support Services Office, and all other offices President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
of the Department of Land Reform. vested in me by the Constitution and existing laws, do hereby order:

SECTION 5. All previous issuances that conflict with this Executive Section 1. Amending Section 3 of Executive Order No. 364. Section
Order are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. 3 of Executive Order No. 364, dated September 27, 2004 shall now
read as follows:

SECTION 6. This Executive Order takes effect immediately.

(Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Section 3. The National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP) shall be an attached agency of the
Department of Land Reform.

E.O. No. 379, which amended E.O. No. 364 a month later or on October 26,
2004, reads:
Section 2. Compensation. The Chairperson shall suffer no
diminution in rank and salary.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 379

Section 3. Repealing Clause. All executive issuances, rules and

regulations or parts thereof which are inconsistent with this
AMENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 364 ENTITLED Executive Order are hereby revoked, amended or modified
TRANSFORMING THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM accordingly.
INTO THE DEPARTMENT OF LAND REFORM

Section 4. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall take effect

WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 8371 created the National immediately. (Emphasis and underscoring in the original)
Commission on Indigenous Peoples;

WHEREAS, pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987, the

President has the continuing authority to reorganize the Petitioners contend that the two presidential issuances are unconstitutional for
administrative structure of the National Government. violating:

51 | P a g e
 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of respondents, concedes that
AMIN[5] has the requisite legal standing to file this suit as member[6] of Congress.
- THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF SEPARATION OF
POWERS AND OF THE RULE OF LAW[;]

- THE CONSTITUTIONAL SCHEME AND POLICIES FOR Petitioners find it impermissible for the Executive to intrude into the domain of the
AGRARIAN REFORM, URBAN LAND REFORM, Legislature. They posit that an act of the Executive which injures the institution of
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS AND ANCESTRAL Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be
DOMAIN[; AND] questioned by a member of Congress.[7] They add that to the extent that the powers
of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office
- THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE AND confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution. [8]
THEIR ORGANIZATIONS TO EFFECTIVE AND
REASONABLE PARTICIPATION IN DECISION-MAKING,
INCLUDING THROUGH ADEQUATE CONSULTATION[.][1]
Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain
inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his
office.[9]

By Resolution of December 6, 2005, this Court gave due course to the Petition and
required the submission of memoranda, with which petitioners and respondents The OSG questions, however, the standing of MDOI, a registered peoples
complied on March 24, 2006 and April 11, 2006, respectively. organization of Teduray and Lambangian tribesfolk of (North) Upi and South Upi in
the province of Maguindanao.

As co-petitioner, MDOI alleges that it is concerned with the negative impact of NCIPs
The issue on the transformation of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) into the becoming an attached agency of the DAR on the processing of ancestral domain
Department of Land Reform (DLR) became moot and academic, however, the claims. It fears that transferring the NCIP to the DAR would affect the processing of
department having reverted to its former name by virtue of E.O. No. 456[2] which was ancestral domain claims filed by its members.
issued on August 23, 2005.

Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial
The Court is thus left with the sole issue of the legality of placing the interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
Presidential Commission[3] for the Urban Poor (PCUP) under the supervision and result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of
control of the DAR, and the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
under the DAR as an attached agency. controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.[10]

Before inquiring into the validity of the reorganization, petitioners locus standi or legal
standing, inter alia,[4] becomes a preliminary question.
It has been held that a party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a
direct and personal interest. It must show not only that the law or any governmental
52 | P a g e
act is invalid, but also that it sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some following elements must be established: (1) the public character of the funds or other
direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that it suffers thereby in assets involved in the case, (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a
some indefinite way. It must show that it has been or is about to be denied some right constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or
or privilege to which it is lawfully entitled or that it is about to be subjected to some instrumentality of government, and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct
burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. [11] and specific interest in raising the questions being raised. The presence of these
elements MDOI failed to establish, much less allege.

For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must show

that (1) it has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the Francisco, Jr. v. Fernando[18] more specifically declares that the transcendental
allegedly illegal conduct of the government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the importance of the issues raised must relate to the merits of the petition.
challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. [12]

This Court, not being a venue for the ventilation of generalized grievances, must thus
An examination of MDOIs nebulous claims of negative impact and probable deny adjudication of the matters raised by MDOI.
setbacks[13] shows that they are too abstract to be considered judicially
cognizable. And the line of causation it proffers between the challenged action and
alleged injury is too attenuated.
Now, on AMINs position. AMIN charges the Executive Department with transgression
of the principle of separation of powers.

Vague propositions that the implementation of the assailed orders will work
injustice and violate the rights of its members cannot clothe MDOI with the requisite
standing. Neither would its status as a peoples organization vest it with the legal Under the principle of separation of powers, Congress, the President, and
standing to assail the validity of the executive orders.[14] the Judiciary may not encroach on fields allocated to each of them. The legislature is
generally limited to the enactment of laws, the executive to the enforcement of laws,
and the judiciary to their interpretation and application to cases and controversies.The
principle presupposes mutual respect by and between the executive, legislative and
La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos,[15] which MDOI cites in judicial departments of the government and calls for them to be left alone to discharge
support of its claim to legal standing, is inapplicable as it is not similarly situated with their duties as they see fit.[19]
the therein petitioners who alleged personal and substantial injury resulting from the
mining activities permitted by the assailed statute. And so is Cruz v. Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources,[16] for the indigenous peoples leaders and
organizations were not the petitioners therein, who necessarily had to satisfy AMIN contends that since the DAR, PCUP and NCIP were created by
the locus standi requirement, but were intervenors who sought and were allowed to statutes,[20] they can only be transformed, merged or attached by statutes, not by
be impleaded, not to assail but to defend the constitutionality of the statute. mere executive orders.

Moreover, MDOI raises no issue of transcendental importance to justify a relaxation While AMIN concedes that the executive power is vested in the President [21] who, as
of the rule on legal standing. To be accorded standing on the ground of Chief Executive, holds the power of control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
transcendental importance, Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita[17] requires that the and offices,[22] it posits that this broad power of control including the power to
53 | P a g e
reorganize is qualified and limited, for it cannot be exercised in a manner contrary to
law, citing the constitutional duty[23] of the President to ensure that the laws, including
those creating the agencies, be faithfully executed. While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the
President executes the laws. The executive power is vested in the
President. It is generally defined as the power to enforce and
administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into
AMIN cites the naming of the PCUP as a presidential commission to be clearly an practical operation and enforcing their due observance.
extension of the President, and the creation of the NCIP as an independent agency
under the Office of the President.[24] It thus argues that since the legislature had seen
fit to create these agencies at separate times and with distinct mandates, the
President should respect that legislative disposition. As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief
Executive. He represents the government as a whole and sees to it
that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his
department. He has control over the executive department, bureaus
In fine, AMIN contends that any reorganization of these administrative and offices. This means that he has the authority to assume directly
agencies should be the subject of a statute. the functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or
interfere with the discretion of its officials. Corollary to the power of
control, the President also has the duty of supervising and
enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and
AMINs position fails to impress. public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus
and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties
effectively.[25] (Italics omitted, underscoring supplied)

The Constitution confers, by express provision, the power of control over

executive departments, bureaus and offices in the President alone. And it lays down a
limitation on the legislative power.

The Constitutions express grant of the power of control in the President justifies an
executive action to carry out reorganization measures under a broad authority of
The line that delineates the Legislative and Executive power is not law.[26]
indistinct. Legislative power is the authority, under the Constitution,
to make laws, and to alter and repeal them.The Constitution, as the
will of the people in their original, sovereign and unlimited capacity,
has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. The grant In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to have deliberated with full
of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and knowledge of all existing laws and jurisprudence on the subject. [27] It is thus
comprehensive. The legislative body possesses plenary power for reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute which places an agency under the
all purposes of civil government. Any power, deemed to be Office of the President, it was in accordance with existing laws and jurisprudence on
legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by the Presidents power to reorganize.
Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. In
fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or
impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to
matters of general concern or common interest. In establishing an executive department, bureau or office, the legislature necessarily
ordains an executive agencys position in the scheme of administrative structure.Such
54 | P a g e
determination is primary,[28] but subject to the Presidents continuing authority to
reorganize the administrative structure. As far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the
executive department are concerned, the power of control may justify the President to In carrying out the laws into practical operation, the President is best equipped to
deactivate the functions of a particular office. Or a law may expressly grant the assess whether an executive agency ought to continue operating in accordance with
President the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures. [29] The its charter or the law creating it. This is not to say that the legislature is incapable of
Administrative Code of 1987 is one such law:[30] making a similar assessment and appropriate action within its plenary power. The
Administrative Code of 1987 merely underscores the need to provide the President
with suitable solutions to situations on hand to meet the exigencies of the service that
may call for the exercise of the power of control.
SEC. 30. Functions of Agencies under the Office of the President.
Agencies under the Office of the President shall continue to operate
and function in accordance with their respective charters or laws
creating them, except as otherwise provided in this Code or by x x x The law grants the President this power in recognition of the
law. recurring need of every President to reorganize his office to
achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. The Office of the
SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his President is the nerve center of the Executive Branch. To remain
Office. The President, subject to the policy in the Executive effective and efficient, the Office of the President must be capable
Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he
efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. After all, the
administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this Office of the President is the command post of the President. This
purpose, he may take any of the following actions: is the rationale behind the Presidents continuing authority to
reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the
President.[32]

(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the

President Proper, including the immediate Offices, the Presidential
Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support
System, by abolishing, consolidating, or merging units thereof or
transferring functions from one unit to another; The Office of the President consists of the Office of the President proper and the
agencies under it.[33] It is not disputed that PCUP and NCIP were formed as agencies
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any under the Office of the President.[34] The Agencies under the Office of the President
other Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the refer to those offices placed under the chairmanship of the President, those under the
Office of the President from other Departments and Agencies; and supervision and control of the President, those under the administrative supervision of
the Office of the President, those attached to the Office for policy and program
coordination, and those that are not placed by law or order creating them under any
special department.[35]
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any
other department or agency as well as transfer agencies to the
Office of the President from other departments or
agencies.[31] (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring As thus provided by law, the President may transfer any agency under the Office of
supplied) the President to any other department or agency, subject to the policy in the
Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. Gauged

55 | P a g e
against these guidelines,[36] the challenged executive orders may not be said to have In transferring the NCIP to the DAR as an attached agency, the President effectively
been issued with grave abuse of discretion or in violation of the rule of law. tempered the exercise of presidential authority and considerably recognized that
degree of independence.

The references in E.O. 364 to asset reform as an anti-poverty measure for social
justice and to rationalization of the bureaucracy in furtherance of good The Administrative Code of 1987 categorizes administrative relationships into (1)
government[37] encapsulate a portion of the existing policy in the Executive Office. As supervision and control, (2) administrative supervision, and (3) attachment. [41]With
averred by the OSG, the President saw it fit to streamline the agencies so as not to respect to the third category, it has been held that an attached agency has a larger
hinder the delivery of crucial social reforms.[38] measure of independence from the Department to which it is attached than one which
is under departmental supervision and control or administrative supervision. This is
borne out by the lateral relationship between the Department and the attached
agency. The attachment is merely for policy and program coordination. [42] Indeed, the
The consolidation of functions in E.O. 364 aims to attain the objectives of simplicity, essential autonomous character of a board is not negated by its attachment to a
economy and efficiency as gathered from the provision granting PCUP and NCIP commission.[43]
access to the range of services provided by the DARs technical offices and support
systems.[39]

AMIN argues, however, that there is an anachronism of sorts because there can be
no policy and program coordination between conceptually different areas of reform.It
The characterization of the NCIP as an independent agency under the Office of the claims that the new framework subsuming agrarian reform, urban land reform and
President does not remove said body from the Presidents control and supervision ancestral domain reform is fundamentally incoherent in view of the widely different
with respect to its performance of administrative functions. So it has been opined: contexts.[44] And it posits that it is a substantive transformation or reorientation that
runs contrary to the constitutional scheme and policies.

That Congress did not intend to place the NCIP under the control
of the President in all instances is evident in the IPRA itself, which AMIN goes on to proffer the concept of ordering the law[45] which, so it alleges, can be
provides that the decisions of the NCIP in the exercise of its quasi- said of the Constitutions distinct treatment of these three areas, as reflected in
judicial functions shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals, like separate provisions in different parts of the Constitution. [46] It argues that the
those of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and the Constitution did not intend an over-arching concept of agrarian reform to encompass
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Nevertheless, the the two other areas, and that how the law is ordered in a certain way should not be
NCIP, although independent to a certain degree, was placed by undermined by mere executive orders in the guise of administrative efficiency.
Congress under the office of the President and, as such, is still
subject to the Presidents power of control and supervision granted
under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution with respect to its
performance of administrative functions[.][40] (Underscoring The Court is not persuaded.
supplied)

56 | P a g e
The interplay of various areas of reform in the promotion of social justice is not In the present case, AMIN glaringly failed to show how the reorganization by
something implausible or unlikely.[47] Their interlocking nature cuts across labels and executive fiat would hamper the exercise of citizens rights and privileges. It rested on
works against a rigid pigeonholing of executive tasks among the members of the the ambiguous conclusion that the reorganization jeopardizes economic, social and
Presidents official family. Notably, the Constitution inhibited from identifying and cultural rights. It intimated, without expounding, that the agendum behind the
compartmentalizing the composition of the Cabinet. In vesting executive power in one issuances is to weaken the indigenous peoples rights in favor of the mining
person rather than in a plural executive, the evident intention was to invest the power industry. And it raised concerns about the possible retrogression in DARs
holder with energy.[48] performance as the added workload may impede the implementation of the
comprehensive agrarian reform program.

AMIN has not shown, however, that by placing the NCIP as an attached agency of
AMIN takes premium on the severed treatment of these reform areas in marked the DAR, the President altered the nature and dynamics of the jurisdiction and
provisions of the Constitution. It is a precept, however, that inferences drawn from adjudicatory functions of the NCIP concerning all claims and disputes involving rights
title, chapter or section headings are entitled to very little weight. [49] And so must of indigenous cultural communities and
reliance on sub-headings,[50] or the lack thereof, to support a strained deduction be
given the weight of helium.
indigenous peoples. Nor has it been shown, nay alleged, that the reorganization was
made in bad faith.[55]

Secondary aids may be consulted to remove, not to create doubt. [51] AMINs
thesis unsettles, more than settles the order of things in construing the
Constitution. Its interpretation fails to clearly establish that the so-called ordering or As for the other arguments raised by AMIN which pertain to the wisdom or soundness
arrangement of provisions in the Constitution was consciously adopted to imply a of the executive decision, the Court finds it unnecessary to pass upon them. The
signification in terms of government hierarchy from where a constitutional mandate raging debate on the most fitting framework in the delivery of social services is
can per se be derived or asserted. It fails to demonstrate that the ordering or layout endless in the political arena. It is not the business of this Court to join in the
was not simply a matter of style in constitutional drafting but one of intention in fray.Courts have no judicial power to review cases involving political questions and,
government structuring. With its inherent ambiguity, the proposed interpretation as a rule, will desist from taking cognizance of speculative or hypothetical cases,
cannot be made a basis for declaring a law or governmental act unconstitutional. advisory opinions and cases that have become moot. [56]

A law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For it to be nullified, it must Finally, a word on the last ground proffered for declaring the unconstitutionality of the
be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The ground assailed issuances ─ that they violate Section 16, Article XIII of the Constitution [57] on
for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt.[52] Any reasonable doubt the peoples right to participate in decision-making through adequate consultation
should, following the universal rule of legal hermeneutics, be resolved in favor of the mechanisms.
constitutionality of a law.[53]

Ople v. Torres[54] on which AMIN relies is unavailing. In that case, an administrative

order involved a system of identification that required a delicate adjustment of various The framers of the Constitution recognized that the consultation
contending state policies properly lodged in the legislative arena. It was declared mechanisms were already operating without the States action by law, such that the
unconstitutional for dealing with a subject that should be covered by law and for role of the State would be mere facilitation, not necessarily creation of these
violating the right to privacy. consultation mechanisms. The State provides the support, but eventually it is the
people, properly organized in their associations, who can assert the right and pursue

57 | P a g e
the objective. Penalty for failure on the part of the government to consult could only On 11 November 1998, the rank and file employees of NTA Batac, among
be reflected in the ballot box and would not nullify government action. [58] whom included herein petitioners, filed a letter-appeal with the Civil Service
Commission and sought its assistance in recalling the OSSP. On 04 December 1998,
the OSSP was approved by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
subject to certain revisions.On even date, the NTA created a placement committee to
assist the appointing authority in the selection and placement of permanent personnel
in the revised OSSP. The results of the evaluation by the committee on the individual
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Executive Order Nos. 364 and 379 issued qualifications of applicants to the positions in the new OSSP were then disseminated
on September 27, 2004 and October 26, 2004, respectively, are declared not and posted at the central and provincial offices of the NTA.
unconstitutional. SO ORDERED.
On 10 June 1996, petitioners, all occupying different positions at the NTA office
in Batac, Ilocos Norte, received individual notices of termination of their employment
with the NTA effective thirty (30) days from receipt thereof. Finding themselves
without any immediate relief from their dismissal from the service, petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction and/or temporary restraining order, with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte, and prayed -
FIRST DIVISION
1) that a restraining order be immediately issued enjoining the respondents from
[G.R. No. 152845. August 5, 2003] enforcing the notice of termination addressed individually to the petitioners and/or
from committing further acts of dispossession and/or ousting the petitioners from their
DRIANITA BAGAOISAN, FELY MADRIAGA, SHIRLY TAGABAN, RICARDO respective offices;
SARANDI, SUSAN IMPERIAL, BENJAMIN DEMDEM, RODOLFO DAGA,
EDGARDO BACLIG, GREGORIO LABAYAN, HILARIO JEREZ, and 2) that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued against the respondents,
MARIA CORAZON CUANANG, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL TOBACCO commanding them to maintain the status quo to protect the rights of the petitioners
ADMINISTRATION, represented by ANTONIO DE GUZMAN and pending the determination of the validity of the implementation of their dismissal from
PERLITA BAULA, respondents. the service; and

DECISION 3) that, after trial on the merits, judgment be rendered declaring the notice of
termination of the petitioners illegal and the reorganization null and void and ordering
VITUG, J.: their reinstatement with backwages, if applicable, commanding the respondents to
desist from further terminating their services, and making the injunction permanent. [1]
President Joseph Estrada issued on 30 September 1998 Executive Order No.
29, entitled Mandating the Streamlining of the National Tobacco Administration The RTC, on 09 September 2000, ordered the NTA to appoint petitioners in the
(NTA), a government agency under the Department of Agriculture. The order was new OSSP to positions similar or comparable to their respective former
followed by another issuance, on 27 October 1998, by President Estrada of Executive assignments. A motion for reconsideration filed by the NTA was denied by the trial
Order No. 36, amending Executive Order No. 29, insofar as the new staffing pattern court in its order of 28 February 2001. Thereupon, the NTA filed an appeal with the
was concerned, by increasing from four hundred (400) to not exceeding seven Court of Appeals, raising the following issues:
hundred fifty (750) the positions affected thereby. In compliance therewith, the NTA
prepared and adopted a new Organization Structure and Staffing Pattern (OSSP) I. Whether or not respondents submitted evidence as proof that petitioners,
which, on 29 October 1998, was submitted to the Office of the President. individually, were not the best qualified and most deserving among
the incumbent applicant-employees.

58 | P a g e
 II. Whether or not incumbent permanent employees, including herein In its resolution of 10 July 2002, the Court required the NTA to file its comment on the
petitioners, automatically enjoy a preferential right and the right of petition. On 18 November 2002, after the NTA had filed its comment of 23 September
first refusal to appointments/reappointments in the new 2002, the Court issued its resolution denying the petition for failure of petitioners to
Organization Structure And Staffing Pattern (OSSP) of respondent sufficiently show any reversible error on the part of the appellate court in its
NTA. challenged decision so as to warrant the exercise by this Court of its discretionary
appellate jurisdiction. A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied in
III. Whether or not respondent NTA in implementing the mandated the Courts resolution of 20 January 2002.
reorganization pursuant to E.O. No. 29, as amended by E.O. No.
36, strictly adhere to the implementing rules on reorganization, On 21 February 2003, petitioners submitted a Motion to Admit Petition For En
particularly RA 6656 and of the Civil Service Commission Rules on Banc Resolution of the case allegedly to address a basic question, i.e., the legal and
Government Reorganization. constitutional issue on whether the NTA may be reorganized by an executive fiat, not
by legislative action.[4] In their Petition for an En Banc Resolution petitioners would
IV. Whether or not the validity of E.O. Nos. 29 and 36 can be put in issue have it that -
in the instant case/appeal.[2]
1. The Court of Appeals decision upholding the reorganization of the National
On 20 February 2002, the appellate court rendered a decision reversing and setting Tobacco Administration sets a dangerous precedent in that:
aside the assailed orders of the trial court.
a) A mere Executive Order issued by the Office of the President and procured by a
Petitioners went to this Court to assail the decision of the Court of Appeals, government functionary would have the effect of a blanket authority to reorganize a
contending that - bureau, office or agency attached to the various executive departments;

I. The Court of Appeals erred in making a finding that went beyond the b) The President of the Philippines would have the plenary power to reorganize the
issues of the case and which are contrary to those of the trial court entire government Bureaucracy through the issuance of an Executive Order, an
and that it overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the administrative issuance without the benefit of due deliberation, debate and discussion
parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different of members of both chambers of the Congress of the Philippines;
conclusion;
c) The right to security of tenure to a career position created by law or statute would
II. The Court of Appeals erred in upholding Executive Order Nos. 29 and be defeated by the mere adoption of an Organizational Structure and Staffing Pattern
36 of the Office of the President which are mere administrative issued pursuant to an Executive Order which is not a law and could thus not abolish
issuances which do not have the force and effect of a law to an office created by law;
warrant abolition of positions and/or effecting total reorganization;
2. The case law on abolition of an office would be disregarded, ignored and
III. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioners removal from the abandoned if the Court of Appeals decision subject matter of this Petition would
service is in accordance with law; remain undisturbed and untouched.In other words, previous doctrines and precedents
of this Highest Court would in effect be reversed and/or modified with the Court of
IV. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent NTA was not Appeals judgment, should it remain unchallenged.
guilty of bad faith in the termination of the services of petitioners;
(and) 3. Section 4 of Executive Order No. 245 dated July 24, 1987 (Annex D, Petition),
issued by the Revolutionary government of former President Corazon Aquino, and the
V. The Court of Appeals erred in ignoring case law/jurisprudence in the law creating NTA, which provides that the governing body of NTA is the Board of
abolition of an office.[3] Directors, would be rendered meaningless, ineffective and a dead letter law because
the challenged NTA reorganization which was erroneously upheld by the Court of
Appeals was adopted and implemented by then NTA Administrator Antonio de
59 | P a g e
Guzman without the corresponding authority from the Board of Directors as mandated empowers the President to reorganize the BIR. In decreeing otherwise, this Court
therein. In brief, the reorganization is an ultra vires act of the NTA Administrator. sustained the following legal basis, thus:

4. The challenged Executive Order No. 29 issued by former President Joseph `Initially, it is argued that there is no law yet which empowers the President to issue
Estrada but unsigned by then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora would in effect be E.O. No. 132 or to reorganize the BIR.
erroneously upheld and given legal effect as to supersede, amend and/or modify
Executive Order No. 245, a law issued during the Freedom Constitution of President `We do not agree.
Corazon Aquino. In brief, a mere executive order would amend, supersede and/or
render ineffective a law or statute.[5] `x x x x x x

In order to allow the parties a full opportunity to ventilate their views on the `Section 48 of R.A. 7645 provides that:
matter, the Court ultimately resolved to hear the parties in oral argument. Essentially,
the core question raised by them is whether or not the President, through the ``Sec. 48. Scaling Down and Phase Out of Activities of Agencies Within the Executive
issuance of an executive order, can validly carry out the reorganization of the NTA. Branch. The heads of departments, bureaus and offices and agencies are hereby
directed to identify their respective activities which are no longer essential in the
Notwithstanding the apparent procedural lapse on the part of petitioner to delivery of public services and which may be scaled down, phased out or
implead the Office of the President as party respondent pursuant to Section 7, Rule 3, abolished, subject to civil service rules and regulations. x x x.Actual scaling down,
of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, [6] this Court resolved to rule on the phasing out or abolition of the activities shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or
merits of the petition. Orders issued for the purpose by the Office of the President.

Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora[7] ruled that the President, based on `Said provision clearly mentions the acts of `scaling down, phasing out and
existing laws, had the authority to carry out a reorganization in any branch or agency abolition of offices only and does not cover the creation of offices or transfer of
of the executive department. In said case, Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB challenged the functions. Nevertheless, the act of creating and decentralizing is included in the
issuance, and sought the nullification, of Executive Order No. 191 (Deactivation of the subsequent provision of Section 62 which provides that:
Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau) and Executive Order No. 223
(Supplementary Executive Order No. 191 on the Deactivation of the Economic ``Sec. 62. Unauthorized organizational changes. Unless otherwise created by law or
Intelligence and Investigation Bureau and for Other Matters) on the ground that they directed by the President of the Philippines, no organizational unit or changes in key
were issued by the President with grave abuse of discretion and in violation of their positions in any department or agency shall be authorized in their respective
constitutional right to security of tenure. The Court explained: organization structures and be funded from appropriations by this Act.

The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged `The foregoing provision evidently shows that the President is authorized to effect
with the legislature. This proceeds from the legal precept that the power to create organizational changes including the creation of offices in the department or agency
includes the power to destroy. A public office is either created by the Constitution, by concerned.
statute, or by authority of law. Thus, except where the office was created by the
Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same legislature that brought it into `x x x x x x
existence.
`Another legal basis of E.O. No. 132 is Section 20, Book III of E.O. No. 292 which
The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive states:
department are concerned, the Presidents power of control may justify him to
inactivate the functions of a particular office, or certain laws may grant him the broad ``Sec. 20. Residual Powers. Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall
authority to carry out reorganization measures. The case in point is Larin v. Executive exercise such other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided
Secretary [280 SCRA 713]. In this case, it was argued that there is no law which for under the laws and which are not specifically enumerated above or which are not
delegated by the President in accordance with law.
60 | P a g e
`This provision speaks of such other powers vested in the President under the the Administrative Code of 1987), the President, subject to the policy in the Executive
law. What law then gives him the power to reorganize? It is Presidential Decree No. Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the
1772 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416. These decrees expressly grant continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the
the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national President. For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other Departments or
government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, Agencies to the Office of the President. In Canonizado vs. Aguirre [323 SCRA 312],
to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and we ruled that reorganization involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of
activities and to standardize salaries and materials. The validity of these two decrees offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. It takes
are unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearly provides that `all laws, decrees, place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or
executive orders, proclamations, letter of instructions and other executive issuances units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between
not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the Department of Finance. It falls under the
or revoked. So far, there is yet no law amending or repealing said decrees. Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the Presidents continuing authority to
reorganize.
Now, let us take a look at the assailed executive order.
It having been duly established that the President has the authority to carry out
In the whereas clause of E.O. No. 191, former President Estrada anchored his reorganization in any branch or agency of the executive department, what is then left
authority to deactivate EIIB on Section 77 of Republic Act 8745 (FY 1999 General for us to resolve is whether or not the reorganization is valid. In this jurisdiction,
Appropriations Act), a provision similar to Section 62 of R.A. 7645 quoted in Larin, reorganizations have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good
thus: faith. Reorganization is carried out in `good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or
to make bureaucracy more efficient. Pertinently, Republic Act No. 6656 provides for
`Sec. 77. Organized Changes. Unless otherwise provided by law or directed by the the circumstances which may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removal
President of the Philippines, no changes in key positions or organizational units in any of civil service employees made as a result of reorganization, to wit: (a) where there is
department or agency shall be authorized in their respective organizational structures a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the
and funded from appropriations provided by this Act. department or agency concerned; (b) where an office is abolished and another
performing substantially the same functions is created; (c) where incumbents are
We adhere to the x x x ruling in Larin that this provision recognizes the authority of replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and
the President to effect organizational changes in the department or agency under the merit; (d) where there is a classification of offices in the department or agency
executive structure. Such a ruling further finds support in Section 78 of Republic Act concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the
No. 8760. Under this law, the heads of departments, bureaus, offices and agencies original offices, and (e) where the removal violates the order of separation.[8]
and other entities in the Executive Branch are directed (a) to conduct a
comprehensive review of this respective mandates, missions, objectives, functions, The Court of Appeals, in its now assailed decision, has found no evidence of
programs, projects, activities and systems and procedures; (b) identify activities which bad faith on the part of the NTA; thus -
are no longer essential in the delivery of public services and which may be scaled
down, phased-out or abolished; and (c) adopt measures that will result in the In the case at bar, we find no evidence that the respondents committed bad faith in
streamlined organization and improved overall performance of their respective issuing the notices of non-appointment to the petitioners.
agencies. Section 78 ends up with the mandate that the actual streamlining and
productivity improvement in agency organization and operation shall be effected Firstly, the number of positions in the new staffing pattern did not increase. Rather, it
pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the purpose by the Office of the decreased from 1,125 positions to 750. It is thus natural that ones position may be
President. The law has spoken clearly. We are left only with the duty to sustain. lost through the removal or abolition of an office.

But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any Secondly, the petitioners failed to specifically show which offices were abolished and
department or agency in the executive branch does not have to end here. We must the new ones that were created performing substantially the same functions.
not lose sight of the very source of the power that which constitutes an express grant
of power. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as
61 | P a g e
Thirdly, the petitioners likewise failed to prove that less qualified employees were transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to Departments or
appointed to the positions to which they applied. Agencies, and vice versa.

x x x x x x x x x. The provisions of Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10, of Executive Order No. 292
(Administrative Code of 1987), above-referred to, reads thusly:
Fourthly, the preference stated in Section 4 of R.A. 6656, only means that old
employees should be considered first, but it does not necessarily follow that they SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office. The
should then automatically be appointed. This is because the law does not preclude President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve
the infusion of new blood, younger dynamism, or necessary talents into the simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the
government service, provided that the acts of the appointing power are bonafide for administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he may take
the best interest of the public service and the person chosen has the needed any of the following actions:
qualifications.[9]
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper,
These findings of the appellate court are basically factual which this Court must including the immediate Offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System
respect and be held bound. and the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units
thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another;
It is important to emphasize that the questioned Executive Orders No. 29
and No. 36 have not abolished the National Tobacco Administration but merely (2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or
mandated its reorganization through the streamlining or reduction of its Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from other
personnel. Article VII, Section 17,[10] of the Constitution, expressly grants the Departments and Agencies; and
President control of all executive departments, bureaus, agencies and offices which
may justify an executive action to inactivate the functions of a particular office or to (3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or
carry out reorganization measures under a broad authority of law. [11] Section 78 of the agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other
General Provisions of Republic Act No. 8522 (General Appropriations Act of FY 1998) departments and agencies.
has decreed that the President may direct changes in the organization and key
positions in any department, bureau or agency pursuant to Article VI, Section 25, [12] of The first sentence of the law is an express grant to the President of a continuing
the Constitution, which grants to the Executive Department the authority to authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the
recommend the budget necessary for its operation. Evidently, this grant of power President. The succeeding numbered paragraphs are not in the nature
includes the authority to evaluate each and every government agency, including the of provisos that unduly limit the aim and scope of the grant to the President of the
determination of the most economical and efficient staffing pattern, under the power to reorganize but are to be viewed in consonance therewith. Section 31(1) of
Executive Department. Executive Order No. 292 specifically refers to the Presidents power to restructure the
internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, by abolishing,
In the recent case of Rosa Ligaya C. Domingo, et al. vs. Hon. Ronaldo D. consolidating or merging units hereof or transferring functions from one unit to
Zamora, in his capacity as the Executive Secretary, et al.,[13] this Court has had another, while Section 31(2) and (3) concern executive offices outside the Office of
occasion to also delve on the Presidents power to reorganize the Office of the the President Proper allowing the President to transfer any function under the Office
President under Section 31(2) and (3) of Executive Order No. 292 and the power to of the President to any other Department or Agency and vice-versa, and the transfer
reorganize the Office of the President Proper. The Court has there observed: of any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or agency
and vice-versa.[14]
x x x. Under Section 31(1) of EO 292, the President can reorganize the Office of the
President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by transferring In the present instance, involving neither an abolition nor transfer of offices, the
functions from one unit to another. In contrast, under Section 31(2) and (3) of EO 292, assailed action is a mere reorganization under the general provisions of the law
the Presidents power to reorganize offices outside the Office of the consisting mainly of streamlining the NTA in the interest of simplicity, economy and
President Proper but still within the Office of the President is limited to merely efficiency. It is an act well within the authority of President motivated and carried out,
62 | P a g e
according to the findings of the appellate court, in good faith, a factual assessment 1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 649; REORGANIZED LAND
that this Court could only but accept.[15] REGISTRATION COMMISSION TO NALTDRA; EXPRESSLY PROVIDED THE
ABOLITION OF EXISTING POSITIONS. — Executive Order No. 649 authorized the
In passing, relative to petitioners Motion for an En Banc Resolution of the Case, reorganization of the Land Registration Commission (LRC) into the National Land
it may be well to remind counsel, that the Court En Banc is not an appellate tribunal to Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NALTDRA). It abolished all the
which appeals from a Division of the Court may be taken. A Division of the Court is positions in the now defunct LRC and required new appointments to be issued to all
the Supreme Court as fully and veritably as the Court En Banc itself and a decision of employees of the NALTDRA. The question of whether or not a law abolishes an office
its Division is as authoritative and final as a decision of the Court En Banc. Referrals is one of legislative intent about which there can be no controversy whatsoever if
of cases from a Division to the Court En Banc do not take place as just a matter of there is an explicit declaration in the law itself. A closer examination of Executive
routine but only on such specified grounds as the Court in its discretion may allow. [16] Order No. 649 which authorized the reorganization of the Land Registration
Commission (LRC) into the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Admit Petition for En Banc resolution and the Administration (NALTDRA), reveals that said law in express terms, provided for the
Petition for an En Banc Resolution are DENIED for lack of merit. Let entry of abolition of existing positions. Thus, without need of any interpretation, the law
judgment be made in due course. No costs. mandates that from the moment an implementing order is issued, all positions in the
Land Registration Commission are deemed non-existent. This, however, does not
SO ORDERED. mean removal. Abolition of a position does not involve or mean removal for the
reason that removal implies that the post subsists and that one is merely separated
therefrom. (Arao vs. Luspo, 20 SCRA 722 [1967]) After abolition, there is in law no
occupant. Thus, there can be no tenure to speak of. It is in this sense that from the
standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not
Republic of the Philippines arise. (De la Llana vs. Alba, 112 SCRA 294 [1982])
SUPREME COURT
Manila 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REORGANIZATION, VALID WHEN PURSUED IN GOOD FAITH;
CASE AT BAR. — Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an
EN BANC office within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no
infirmity. Two questions therefore arise: (1) was the abolition carried out by a
legitimate body?; and (2) was it done in good faith? There is no dispute over the
authority to carry out a valid reorganization in any branch or agency of the
Government. Under Section 9, Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution. The power to
reorganize is, however; not absolute. We have held in Dario vs. Mison that
G.R. No. 84301. April 7, 1993. reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are
pursued in good faith. This court has pronounced that if the newly created office has
NATIONAL LAND TITLES AND DEEDS REGISTRATION ADMINISTRATION, substantially new, different or additional functions, duties or powers, so that it may be
petitioner, said in fact to create an office different from the one abolished, even though it
vs. embraces all or some of the duties of the old office it will be considered as an
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and VIOLETA L. GARCIA, respondents. abolition of one office and the creation of a new or different one. The same is true if
one office is abolished and its duties, for reasons of economy are given to an existing
The Solicitor General for petitioner. officer or office. Executive Order No. 649 was enacted to improve the services and
better systematize the operation of the Land Registration Commission. A
Raul R. Estrella for private respondent. reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to
make bureaucracy more efficient. To this end, the requirement of Bar membership to
SYLLABUS qualify for key positions in the NALTDRA was imposed to meet the changing
circumstances and new development of the times. Private respondent Garcia who
63 | P a g e
formerly held the position of Deputy Register of Deeds II did not have such therein, petitioner Garcia was issued an appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II
qualification. It is thus clear that she cannot hold any key position in the NALTDRA, on October 1, 1984, under temporary status, for not being a member of the Philippine
The additional qualification was not intended to remove her from office. Rather, it was Bar. She appealed to the Secretary of Justice but her request was denied. Petitioner
a criterion imposed concomitant with a valid reorganization measure. Garcia moved for reconsideration but her motion remained unacted. On October 23,
1984, petitioner Garcia was administratively charged with Conduct Prejudicial to the
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; THERE IS NO VESTED PROPERTY RIGHT TO BE RE-EMPLOYED Best Interest of the Service. While said case was pending decision, her temporary
IN A REORGANIZED OFFICE; CASE AT BAR. — There is no such thing as a vested appointment as such was renewed in 1985. In a Memorandum dated October 30,
interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold it. Except 1986, the then Minister, now Secretary, of Justice notified petitioner Garcia of the
constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, termination of her services as Deputy Register of Deeds II on the ground that she was
no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary. None of the "receiving bribe money". Said Memorandum of Termination which took effect on
exceptions to this rule are obtaining in this case. To reiterate, the position which February 9, 1987, was the subject of an appeal to the Inter-Agency Review
private respondent Garcia would like to occupy anew was abolished pursuant to Committee which in turn referred the appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board
Executive Order No. 649, a valid reorganization measure. There is no vested property (MSPB).
right to be re employed in a reorganized office. Not being a member of the Bar, the
minimum requirement to qualify under the reorganization law for permanent In its Order dated July 6, 1987, the MSPB dropped the appeal of petitioner Garcia on
appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II, she cannot be reinstated to her former the ground that since the termination of her services was due to the expiration of her
position without violating the express mandate of the law. temporary appointment, her separation is in order. Her motion for reconsideration was
denied on similar ground." 1
DECISION
However, in its Resolution 2 dated June 30, 1988, the Civil Service Commission
CAMPOS, JR., J p: directed that private respondent Garcia be restored to her position as Deputy Register
of Deeds II or its equivalent in the NALTDRA. It held that "under the vested right
The sole issue for our consideration in this case is whether or not membership in the theory the new requirement of BAR membership to qualify for permanent appointment
bar, which is the qualification requirement prescribed for appointment to the position as Deputy Register of Deeds II or higher as mandated under said Executive Order,
of Deputy Register of Deeds under Section 4 of Executive Order No. 649 would not apply to her (private respondent Garcia) but only to the filling up of vacant
(Reorganizing the Land Registration Commission (LRC) into the National Land Titles lawyer positions on or after February 9, 1981, the date said Executive Order took
and Deeds Registration Administration or NALTDRA) should be required of and/or effect." 3 A fortiori, since private respondent Garcia had been holding the position of
applied only to new applicants and not to those who were already in the service of the Deputy Register of Deeds II from 1977 to September 1984, she should not be
LRC as deputy register of deeds at the time of the issuance and implementation of affected by the operation on February 1, 1981 of Executive Order No. 649.
the abovesaid Executive Order.
Petitioner NALTDRA filed the present petition to assail the validity of the above
The facts, as succinctly stated in the Resolution ** of the Civil Service Commission, Resolution of the Civil Service Commission. It contends that Sections 8 and 10 of
are as follows: Executive Order No. 649 abolished all existing positions in the LRC and transferred
their functions to the appropriate new offices created by said Executive Order, which
"The records show that in 1977, petitioner Garcia, a Bachelor of Laws graduate and a newly created offices required the issuance of new appointments to qualified office
first grade civil service eligible was appointed Deputy Register of Deeds VII under holders. Verily, Executive Order No. 649 applies to private respondent Garcia, and
permanent status. Said position was later reclassified to Deputy Register of Deeds III not being a member of the Bar, she cannot be reinstated to her former position as
pursuant to PD 1529, to which position, petitioner was also appointed under Deputy Register of Deeds II.
permanent status up to September 1984. She was for two years, more or less,
designated as Acting Branch Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan. By virtue of We find merit in the petition.
Executive Order No. 649 (which took effect on February 9, 1981) which authorized
the restructuring of the Land Registration Commission to National Land Titles and Executive Order No. 649 authorized the reorganization of the Land Registration
Deeds Registration Administration and regionalizing the Offices of the Registers Commission (LRC) into the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
64 | P a g e
Administration (NALTDRA). It abolished all the positions in the now defunct LRC and The power to reorganize is, however; not absolute. We have held in Dario vs. Mison 7
required new appointments to be issued to all employees of the NALTDRA. that reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are
pursued in good faith. This court has pronounced 8 that if the newly created office has
The question of whether or not a law abolishes an office is one of legislative intent substantially new, different or additional functions, duties or powers, so that it may be
about which there can be no controversy whatsoever if there is an explicit declaration said in fact to create an office different from the one abolished, even though it
in the law itself. 4 A closer examination of Executive Order No. 649 which authorized embraces all or some of the duties of the old office it will be considered as an
the reorganization of the Land Registration Commission (LRC) into the National Land abolition of one office and the creation of a new or different one. The same is true if
Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NALTDRA), reveals that said law in one office is abolished and its duties, for reasons of economy are given to an existing
express terms, provided for the abolition of existing positions, to wit: officer or office.

Sec. 8. Abolition of Existing Positions in the Land Registration Commission . . . Executive Order No. 649 was enacted to improve the services and better systematize
the operation of the Land Registration Commission. 9 A reorganization is carried out
All structural units in the Land Registration Commission and in the registries of deeds, in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient.
and all Positions therein shall cease to exist from the date specified in the 10 To this end, the requirement of Bar membership to qualify for key positions in the
implementing order to be issued by the President pursuant to the preceding NALTDRA was imposed to meet the changing circumstances and new development
paragraph. Their pertinent functions, applicable appropriations, records, equipment of the times. 11 Private respondent Garcia who formerly held the position of Deputy
and property shall be transferred to the appropriate staff or offices therein created. Register of Deeds II did not have such qualification. It is thus clear that she cannot
(Emphasis Supplied.) hold any key position in the NALTDRA, The additional qualification was not intended
to remove her from office. Rather, it was a criterion imposed concomitant with a valid
Thus, without need of any interpretation, the law mandates that from the moment an reorganization measure.
implementing order is issued, all positions in the Land Registration Commission are
deemed non-existent. This, however, does not mean removal. Abolition of a position A final word, on the "vested right theory" advanced by respondent Civil Service
does not involve or mean removal for the reason that removal implies that the post Commission. There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or
subsists and that one is merely separated therefrom. 5 After abolition, there is in law even an absolute right to hold it. Except constitutional offices which provide for
no occupant. Thus, there can be no tenure to speak of. It is in this sense that from the special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any
standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not vested right in an office or its salary. 12 None of the exceptions to this rule are
arise. 6 obtaining in this case.

Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the To reiterate, the position which private respondent Garcia would like to occupy anew
competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. Two was abolished pursuant to Executive Order No. 649, a valid reorganization measure.
questions therefore arise: (1) was the abolition carried out by a legitimate body?; and There is no vested property right to be re employed in a reorganized office. Not being
(2) was it done in good faith? a member of the Bar, the minimum requirement to qualify under the reorganization
law for permanent appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II, she cannot be
There is no dispute over the authority to carry out a valid reorganization in any branch reinstated to her former position without violating the express mandate of the law.
or agency of the Government. Under Section 9, Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution,
the applicable law at that time: WHEREFORE, premises considered, We hereby GRANT the petition and SET
ASIDE the questioned Resolution of the Civil Service Commission reinstating private
Sec. 9. All officials and employees in the existing Government of the Republic of the respondent to her former position as Deputy Register of Deeds II or its equivalent in
Philippines shall continue in office until otherwise provided by law or decreed by the the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration.
incumbent President of the Philippines, but all officials whose appointments are by
this Constitution vested in the Prime Minister shall vacate their respective offices SO ORDERED.
upon the appointment and qualifications of their successors.

65 | P a g e
 Republic of the Philippines However, the reorganization of the MAF into the Department of Agriculture (the "DA"),
SUPREME COURT with the issuance of Executive Order No. 116 dated 30 January 1987, called for the
Manila evaluation of the following employees for twenty nine position of MAO in Region II,
Cagayan. The list as prepared by the Placement Committee included the herein
EN BANC petitioner Sinon but excluded the respondent Banan:

1. Binoya, Vicente 76.20%

G.R. No. 101251 November 5, 1992 2. Cabana, Isidro 75.01%

ELISEO A. SINON, petitioner, 3. Sebastian, Alice 74.18%

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE- 4. Zingapan, Benjamin 70.73%
REORGANIZATION APPEALS BOARD AND JUANA BANAN, respondents.
5. Guzman, Wilhemina de la P. 70.50%

6. Gervacio, Agnes 69.86%

CAMPOS, JR., J.:
7. Somera, Hilario S. 68.13%
This petition for certiorari seeks to annul the following Resolutions of the public
respondents Civil Service Commission (the "CSC") * and Department of Agriculture 8. Tolentino, Julian R. 67.64%
Reorganization Appeals Board (the "DARAB"), ** to wit:
9. Guillermo, Pedro 67.22%
1. Resolution No. 97 dated August 23, 1989, issued by respondent
DARAB which revoked petitioner's permanent appointment as 10. Tambio, Rodolfo 67.00%
Municipal Agriculture Officer (MAO) and appointed, in his stead,
private respondent Juana Banan (Rollo 17); 11. Aquino, Martina 66.94%

2. Resolution dated February 8, 1991 issued by the respondent 12. Bassig, Pio P. 66.84%
CSC affirming the aforementioned Resolution of respondent
DARAB (Rollo 22); 13. Rumpon, Danilo P. 65.61%

3. Resolution dated July 11, 1991 issued by the respondent CSC 14. Zareno, Bernardo 65.57%
which denied petitioner's motion for the reconsideration of the
respondent Commission's Resolution dated February 8, 1991. 1 15. Madrid, Angel S. 65.57%

The antecedent facts are as follows: 16. Callangan, Napoleon 65.45%

Prior to the reorganization of the then Minister of Agriculture and Food (the "MAF"), 17. Fiesta, Felicisimo 65.29%
the private respondent Juana Banan was the incumbent Municipal Agricultural Officer
(MAO) of the aforesaid Minister in Region II, Cagayan, while the petitioner Eliseo 18. Alvarez, Benefranco 64.99%
Sinon occupied the position of Fisheries Extension Specialist (FES) II in the Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) in the same region.
66 | P a g e
 19. Baggayan, Samuel O. 64.42% 7. Somera, Hilario S. 68.13%

20. Umbay, Pedro T. 64.01% 8. Tolentino, Julian Jr. 67.22%

21. De la Cruz, Florencio M. 62.07% 9. Guillermo, Pedro 67.22%

22. Leonador, Ernesto T. 61.88% 10. Tambio, Rodolfo 67.00%

23. Miguel, Jose 61.86% 11. Aquino, Martina D. 66.94%

24. Berlan, Herminia C. 61.76% 12. Bassig, Pio P. 66.84%

25. Soliman, Clemente 61.52% 13. Rumpon, Danilo P. 65.61%

26. Llopis, Lino 61.47% 14. Madrid, Angel 65.57%

27. Baliuag, Felicidad 61.39% 15. Callangan, Napoleon 65.45%

28. Aresta, Leticia 60.67% 16. Fiesta, Felicisimo 65.29%

29. Sinon, Eliseo A. 60.66% 2 17. Alvarez, Benefranco 64.99%

(Emphasis supplied) 18. Baggayan, Samuel O. 64.42%

Thus, respondents Banan filed an appeal with the DARAB for re-evaluation of the 19. Umbay, Pedro T. 64.01%
qualification of all those included in the aforementioned list made by the Placement
Committee. 20. De la Cruz, Florencio M. 62.07%

On August 23, 1989, the DARAB released Resolution No. 97 in which the ranking for 21. Leonador, Ernesto T. 61.88%
29 MAO prepared by the Placement Committee was re-evaluated as follows:
22. Miguel, Jose L. 61.86%
1. Binoya, Vicente 76.20%
23. Berlan, Herminia C. 61.76%
2. Cabana, Isidro 75.01%
24. Soliman, Clemente 61.52%
3. Sebastian, Alice 72.18%
25. Zareno, Bernardo 61.50%
4. Zingapan, Benjamin 70.73%
26. Llopis, Lino 61.47%
5. Guzman, Wilhemina de la P. 70.50%
27. Baliuag, Felicidad 61.39%
6. Gervacio, Agnes 70.04%

67 | P a g e
 28. Aresta, Leticia 60.67% Placement Committee's evaluation, Mr. Sinon garnered 60.66 while
Ms. Juana Banan earned 57.32 after assessing the contending
29. Banan, Juana 59.32% 2 parties qualification in education, relevant experience, eligibility and
other factors. Following the request of several parties for
(Emphasis supplied) reevaluation, the RAB in their decision gave Mr. Sinon 57.66 while
Ms. Banan obtained 59.32. Seemingly the findings of the two
In this re-evaluation, petitioner Sinon was displaced by the respondent Banan and bodies are in conflict. Mr. Sinon argues that the findings of the
this same resolution was duly approved by the Secretary of the Department of Placement Committee should prevail since it is specially mandated
Agriculture, Carlos G. Dominguez, who also affixed his signature on the same date. by RA 6656.

However, on August 30, 1988, Sinon received an appointment as MAO for Region II We disagree. The Placement Committee's function is recommendatory in nature. The
in Cagayan as approved by Regional Director Gumersindo D. Lasam on the basis of agency's Reorganization Appeals Board was specially created by the Circular of the
the first evaluation made by the Placement Committee. Office of the President dated October 2, 1987 and conferred with authority to review
appeals and complaints of officials and employees affected by the reorganization. the
Thus, Sinon filed an appeal docketed as Civil Service Case No. 573 on November 22, decision of the agency RAB has the imprimatur of the Secretary of that agency and is
1989 to the CSC. This appeal was granted mainly for two reasons: first, the therefore controlling in matters of and is therefore controlling in matters of
respondent DARAB failed to file its Comment within the period required; and second, appointment. Under this principle, the decision of the DARAB in this case enjoys
the evaluation of the qualification of the employees is a question of fact which the precedence over the Placement Committee. 5
appointing authority or the Placement Committee assisting him is in a better position
to determine. Hence, the Resolution dated 28 February 1989 of the DARAB was set Hence, this petition was filed with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
aside. 4 restraining order to enjoin the execution of the assailed resolutions.

On March 19, 1990, Banan filed a Motion for Reconsideration in which she pitted her Without giving due course to the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction, the court
qualifications against Sinon for the last slot in the 29 available MAO positions. At the required the parties to file their respective Comments. 6
same time, she pointed out that to allow the findings of the Placement Committee to
supersede the DARAB resolution which the Secretary of Agriculture had approved On 12 November 1991, the Court gave due course to the petition and required the
would be tantamount to giving precedence to the Placement Committee over the parties to submit their respective Memoranda. 7
head of the agency.
The main issue for Our consideration is this: whether or not the CSC committed grave
Finally, on February 8, 1991, CSC, after reviewing the Comment filed by the DARAB abuse discretion in reviewing and re-evaluating the ring or qualification of the
which had not been considered earlier in the Civil Service Case No. 573, the CSC petitioner Sinon.
granted respondent Banan's Motion for Reconsideration and gave due course to her
appointment by the DARAB. The arguments of the petitioner can be summed up as follows:

On March 21, 1991, Sinon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the February 8, 1991 1). In issuing the Resolution of 8 February 1991, the CSC in effect
Resolution which however was denied by the CSC in its assailed Resolution dated revoked the appointment that the petitioner received as early as 30
July 11, 1991. August 1989 and which was deemed permanent by virtue of the
approval of the Regional Director of the Department of Agriculture:
According to the respondent CSC:
2). In giving petitioner a rating of only 57.66%, 8 from his previous
Mr. Sinon strongly argued that the findings of the Placement rating of 60.66% and at the same time according a rating of 59.32%
Committee on the qualifications of the parties should be accorded to private respondent from a rating of only 57.32%, the CSC
deference and greater weight over that of the RAB. Under the departed from its power which is limited only to that of "review", and
68 | P a g e
 hence encroached upon the power of appointment exclusively made known to all officers and employees of the agency who shall
lodged in the appointment authority; be invited to apply for any of the positions authorized therein. Such
application shall be considered by the committee in the placement
3) In giving due course to the appointment of respondent Banan in and selection of personnel. (Emphasis supplied).
its Resolution of 8 February 1991, CSC was directing the
appointment of a substitute of their own choice when the power to To "assist" mean to lend an aid to, 11 or to contribute effort in the complete
appoint was exclusively lodged in the appointing authority. accomplishment of an ultimate purpose intended to be effected by those engaged. 12

We rule as follows. In contrast, to "recommend" 13 is to present one's advice or choice as having one's
approval or to represent or urge as advisable or expedient. It involves the Idea that
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of another has the final decision.
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to Clearly, the Placement Committee was charged with the duty of exercising
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the the same discretionary functions as the appointing authority in the judicious selection
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or and placement of personnel when the law empowered it to "assist" the appointment
hostility.9 authority.

Contrary to the allegations of the petitioner, We do not find any evidence of grave The same law also allows any officer or employee aggrieved by the appointments to
abuse of discretion on the part of the CSC when it issued Resolution dated 8 file an appeal with the appointing authority who shall made a decision within thirty
February 1991 which in effect approved the appointment of respondent Banan over (30) days from the filing thereof. If the same employee is still not satisfied with the
petitioner Sinon. decision of the appointing authority, he may further appeal within ten (10) days from
the receipt thereof the CSC. 14
With the reorganization of the MAF into the DA with Executive order No. 116, it
became imperative to "protect the security of tenure of Civil Service Officers and In the case at bar, the Circular dated October 2, 1987 of the Office of the President
employees in the implementation of government reorganization". Thus, Congress created the agency Reorganization Appeals Board to address the problem of the
passed Republic Act No. 6656. 10 employees affected by the reorganizations.

It was under the same law of R.A. 6656 that the Placement Committee was created: The foregoing legal measures spell out the remedies of aggrieved parties which make
it impossible to give the status of finality to any appointment until all protests or
Section 6. In order that the best qualified and mot deserving oppositions are duly heard.
persons shall be appointed in any reorganization, there shall be
created a Placement Committee in each department or agency to Thus, while it is true that the appointment paper received by petitioner Sinon on 30
assist the appointing authority in the judicious selection and August 1989 for the position of MAO had not conferred any permanent status and
placement of personnel. The Committee shall consist of two (2) was still subject to the following conditions attached to any appointment in the civil
members appointed by the head of the department or agency, a service:
representative of the appointing authority, and two (2) members
duly elected by the employees holding positions in the first and Provided that there is no pending administrative case against the
second levels of the career service: Provided, that if there is a appointee, no pending protest against the appointment, nor any
registered employee association with a majority of the employees decision by competent authority that will adversely affect the
as members, that employee association shall also have a approval of the appointment . 15
representative in the Committee: Provided, Further, that
immediately upon the approval of the staffing pattern of the Hence, for as long as the re-evaluation of the qualification filed by Banan was
department or agency concerned, such staffing pattern shall be pending, the petitioner cannot claim that he had been issued with a "complete"
69 | P a g e
appointment. Neither is there any point in asserting that his appointment had "cured" WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED with costs against the petitioner.
whatever changes was subsequently recommended by the DARAB. 16
SO ORDERED.
The fact that the DARAB is capable of re-evaluating the findings of the Placement
Committed only to find that Sinon is not qualified should no be taken as a grave Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Nocon and
abuse of discretion. Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

We cannot subscribe to petitioner Sinon's insistence that the public respondent CSC Narvasa, C.J. and Medialdea, JJ., is on leave.
had disregarded the findings of the Placement Committee. The truth is, these findings
of the Placement Committee. The truth is, these findings were re-evaluated and the Bidin, concur in the result.
report after such re-evaluation was submitted to and approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture. The CSC affirmed the findings of the DARAB.

Because of all the foregoing circumstances, the jurisprudence cited by the petitioner Republic of the Philippines
Sinon appears to be incorrect. 17 SUPREME COURT
Manila
Neither do we find in the Resolution of 8 February 1991, any statement by the CSC
directing the appointment of the respondent Banan. Hence, there was no directive EN BANC
from the CSC that may be misinterpreted as a usurpation of any appointing power. 18
G.R. No. 93355 April 7, 1992
Besides, in affirming the appointment of Banan as recommended by the DARAB and
approved by the Secretary of Agriculture, the CSC is only being consistent with the LUIS B. DOMINGO, petitioner,
law. Section 4 or R.A. 6656 mandates that officers and employees holding permanent vs.
appointments shall be given preference for appointment to the new positions in the DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and CIVIL SERVICE
approved staffing pattern comparable to their former positions. Also, the term COMMISSION, respondents.
incumbent officer and the privileges generally accorded to them would more aptly
refer to Banan and not to petitioner Sinon whose appointment was never confirmed
completely. 19 There is no dispute that the position of MAO in the old staffing pattern
is most comparable to the MAO in the new staffing pattern. REGALADO, J.:

Finally, the Solicitor General in behalf of the CSC correctly noted that the petitioner This special civil action impugns the resolution 1 of respondent Civil Service
Sinon had conveniently omitted the then Secretary of Agriculture who had affixed his Commission (CSC) promulgated on April 10, 1990 in CSC Case No. 473 setting aside
approval on the findings of the DARAB. Petitioner Sinon knew fully well that as head its earlier resolution of November 27, 1989 and affirming the separation of petitioner
of the agency, the Secretary of Agriculture was the appointing authority. Luis B. Domingo as Senior Training and Career Development Officer of the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP).
It must be recalled that the whole purpose of reorganization is that is it is a "process
of restructuring the bureaucracy's organizational and functional set-up, to make it Petitioner was employed by DBP as Senior Training and Career Development Officer
more viable in terms of the economy, efficiency, effectiveness and make it more on permanent status from February, 1979 to December 1986.
responsive to the needs of its public clientele as authorized by law." 20 For as long as
the CSC confines itself within the limits set out by law and does not encroach upon On December 3, 1986, Executive Order No 81 (The Revised Charter of DBP) was
the prerogatives endowed to other authorities, this Court must sustain the passed authorizing the reorganization of DBP in this wise:
Commission.

70 | P a g e
 Sec. 32. Authority to Reorganize. — In view of the new scope of completed within a period of thirty-six (36) months from the
operations of the Bank, a reorganization of the Bank and a approval of this Charter. In this connection, the plantilla approved
reduction in force are hereby authorized to achieve simplicity and and appointments issued are purely interim and the Bank is
economy in operations, including adopting a new staffing pattern to reserving its right to put in place the permanent structure of the
suit the reduced operations envisioned. The formulation of the Bank as well as the permanent appointments thereto until the end
program of reorganization shall be completed within six months of the 36-month period. 2
after the approval of this Charter, and the full implementation of the
reorganization program within thirty months thereafter. In effect, said resolution authorized the issuance of temporary appointments to all
DBP personnel to allow maximum flexibility in the implementation of the
Further, Sections 33 and 34 thereof provide: reorganization. Such temporary appointments issued had a maximum period of
twelve (12) months during which period the performance of the incumbents were
Sec. 33. Implementing Details; Organization and Staffing of the assessed on the basis of the results of their evaluation.
Bank.
With the passage of Executive Order No. 81 and Board Resolution No. 304 87, DBP
xxx xxx xxx undertook the evaluation and comparative assessment of all its personnel under the
CSC approved New Performance Appraisal System, a peer and control rating
In the implementation of the reorganization of the Bank, as process which served as an assessment tool of DBP's screening process.
authorized under the preceding section, qualified personnel of the
Bank may be appointed to appropriate positions in the new staffing Petitioner Domingo was issued a temporary appointment on January 2, 1987 for a
pattern thereof and those not so appointed are deemed separated period of one (1) year, which was renewed for another period up to November 30,
from the service. No preferential or priority rights shall be given to 1988. Thereafter, in a memorandum 3 dated November 23, 1988 issued by the Final
or enjoyed by any officer or personnel of the Bank for appointment Review Committee, petitioner got a performance rating of "below average," by reason
to any position in the new staffing pattern nor shall any officer or of which his appointment was "made to lapse."
personnel be considered as having prior or vested rights with
respect to retention in the Bank or in any position as may have Consequently, petitioner, together with a certain Evangeline Javier, filed with the CSC
been created in its new staffing pattern, even if he should be the a joint verified complaint 4against DBP for illegal dismissal. The complainants therein
incumbent of a similar position therein. alleged that their dismissal constituted a violation of the Civil Service Law against the
issuance of temporary appointments to permanent employees, as well as of their right
xxx xxx xxx to security of tenure and due process.

Sec. 34. Separation Benefits. — All those who shall retire from the On November 27, 1989, CSC issued a resolution 5 in CSC Case No. 473 directing
service or are separated therefrom on account of the reorganization "the reappointment of Mr. Domingo and Ms. Javier as Senior Training and Career
of the Bank under the provisions of this Charter shall be entitled to Development Officer and Research Analyst or any such equivalent rank under the
all gratuities and benefits provided for under existing laws and/or staffing pattern of DBP." The order for reappointment was premised on the findings of
supplementary retirement plans adopted by and effective in the the CSC that "(t)he action of the DBP to issue temporary appointments to all DBP
Bank: . . . personnel in order to allow for the maximum flexibility in evaluating the performance
of incumbents is not in accord with civil service law rules," in that "(t)o issue a
Pursuant thereto, DBP issued Board Resolution No. 304-87 allowing the issuance of temporary appointment to one who has been on permanent status before will deprive
temporary appointments to all DBP personnel in order to fully implement the the employee of benefits accorded permanent employees and will adversely affect his
reorganization. The resolution states in part: security of tenure," aside from the fact that such an act is contrary to Section 25 (a) of
Presidential Decree No. 807.
It is understood that pursuant to Section 32 of the new DBP Charter
full implementation of the reorganization program shall be
71 | P a g e
DBP filed a motion for reconsideration 6 on December 27, 1989 alleging, inter alia, Javier have indeed got(ten) a below average rating (unsatisfactory)
that the issuance of temporary appointments to all the DBP employees was purely an during the filing of the instant motion for reconsideration. Had DBP
interim arrangement; that in spite of the temporary appointment, they continued to promptly submitted the records/documents supporting its
enjoy the salary, allowances and other benefits corresponding to permanent allegations, this Commission at the outset should have sustained
employees; that there can be no impairment of herein petitioner's security of tenure the separation of the appellants from the service on ground of poor
since the new DBP charter expressly provides that "qualified personnel of the bank performance (below average rating, unsatisfactory) after the
may be appointed to appropriate positions in the new staffing pattern and those not reassessment and re-evaluation by the Bank through the Final
so appointed are deemed separated from the service;" that petitioner was evaluated Review Committee. The CSC could not have guessed that such
and comparatively assessed under a rating system approved by the respondent was the basis of the DBP's termination of Domingo and Javier until
commission; and that petitioner cannot claim that he was denied due process of law the papers were submitted to it. . . .
considering that, although several appeals were received by the Final Review
Committee from other employees similarly situated, herein petitioner never appealed It must be pointed out that appellants' separation from the service
his rating or the extension of his temporary appointment although he was advised to was the lapse of their temporary appointment. The non-extension
do so by his direct supervisor. or non-issuance of permanent appointments were principally based
on their below average rating (unsatisfactory) performance after
On April 10, 1990, CSC rendered the questioned resolution setting aside its previous they were reevaluated and comparatively reassessed by the Final
decision and affirming the separation of herein petitioner. In so ruling, CSC explained Review Committee of the Bank. After all, the 1986 DBP Revised
that: Charter (E.O. No. 81) gives the Bank a wide latitude of discretion in
the reappointment of its personnel, subject to existing civil service
While it is true that this Commission ruled that the issuance of laws, rules and regulations.
temporary appointment to all DBP personnel in order to allow "for
maximum flexibility" in evaluating the performance of incumbents is There is no doubt that the DBP conducted a reevaluation and
not in accord with civil service laws and rules, however it cannot comparative reassessment of its employees for placement/retention
lose sight of the fact that appellants are among those who indeed (for permanent) and for separation from the service and found out
got a below average rating (unsatisfactory) when their performance that appellants are wanting of performance, having been rated as
were reevaluated and comparatively reassessed by the Final "Below Average." 7
Review Committee of the Bank approved by the Vice Chairman.
Hence this petition, whereby petitioner raises the following issues:
xxx xxx xxx
1. Petitioner's tenure of office was violated by respondents;
In effect, the determinative factor for retention and the separation
from the service is the individual performance rating. 2. Petitioner was not afforded a day in court and was denied
procedural due process in the unilateral evaluation by his peers of
While the Commission supports the principle of merit and fitness his efficiency ratings for the years 1987 and 1988;
and strongly protects the security of tenure of civil service officials
and employees which are the essence of careerism in the civil 3. Average and below average efficiency ratings are not valid
service, it does not however, sanction the reappointment of said grounds for termination of the service of petitioner;
officials and employees who have fallen short of the performance
necessary in order to maintain at all times efficiency and 4. Section 5 of the rules implementing Republic Act No. 6656 is
effectiveness in the Office. repugnant to the constitutional mandate that "no officer or
employee of the Civil Service be removed or suspended except for
It bears stressing that the DBP submitted the records and causeprovided by law;" and
documents in support of its allegations that Mr. Domingo and Ms.
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 5. Section 16, Article XVIII, Transitory Provisions of the New Group Heads and representatives from the Career Officials Association and the DBP
Constitution was also violated by respondents. 8 Employees Union. The CPSC was further represented by the DBP Civil Service
Officer, who sat as consultant to help resolve questions on Civil Service rules and
I. Petitioner puts in issue the validity of the reorganization implemented by DBP in that regulations.
the same violates his right to security of tenure. He contends that government
reorganization cannot be a valid ground to terminate the services of government As an assessment tool to the Bank's screening process, a peer and control rating
employees, pursuant to the ruling in the case of Dario vs. Mison, et al.9 process was implemented bank-wide, the results of which were used as a gauge to
determine the suitability of an employee to stay in the Bank. Through this rating, the
This statement of petitioner is incomplete and inaccurate, if not outright erroneous. Bank determines the value of the individual employee to the Bank with the help of his
Either petitioner misunderstood or he totally overlooked what was stated in the peers (peer rating) and his supervisors (control
aforecited decision which held that "reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been rating). 11
regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith." As we said in Dario:
Also, as part of the evaluation process, a Final Review Committee, composed of the
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as group, department or unit head, the heads of the Human Resource Center and of the
valid provided they are pursued in good faith. As a general rule, a Personnel Services, and representatives from the Career Officials Association and
reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of the Employees Union, was created to screen further and to recommend the change in
economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no status of the employee's appointment from temporary to permanent beginning 1988.
dismissal (in case of dismissal) or separation actually occurs For the rank and file level, the committee was chaired by the Vice-Chairman while the
because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case, officer level was presided over by the Chairman of the Bank. 12
security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall.
The performance rating system used and adopted by DBP was duly approved by the
Clearly, from our pronouncements in Dario, reorganization is a recognized valid Civil Service Commission. Herein petitioner was evaluated and comparatively
ground for separation of civil service employees, subject only to the condition that it assessed under this approved rating system. This is shown by the memorandum to
be done in good faith. No less than the Constitution itself in Section 16 of the the Vice-Chairman from the DBP Final Review Committee wherein petitioner, among
Transitory Provisions, together with Sections 33 and 34 of Executive Order No. 81 other DBP employees, was evaluated and rated on his performance, and was shown
and Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6656, support this conclusion with the declaration to have gotten a rating of "below average." 13
that all those not so appointed in the implementation of said reorganization shall be
deemed separated from the service with the concomitant recognition of their In the comment 14 filed by DBP with the CSC, respondent bank explained the
entitlement to appropriate separation benefits and/or retirement plans of the procedure it adopted in the evaluation of herein petitioner, together with one
reorganized government agency. Evangeline Javier, to wit:

The facts of this case, particularly the evaluation process adopted by DBP, bear out xxx xxx xxx
the existence of good faith in the course of reorganization.
4. During the second phase of the screening process, the Bank
As a tool in the assessment process, a bank-wide peer and control rating process used several instruments for determining proficiency or skills on the
was implemented. Under this process, the peers and supervisors rated the DBP job. More than skills, however, the evaluation also covered trait
employees. 10 factors to determine a positive work attitude. The Bank placed a
premium on work attitude because it believes that technical and
To make the reorganization as open, representative and fair as possible, two principal professional skills can easily be acquired by an ordinary normal
groups were formed: (1) the Group Placement Screening Committee (GPSC) and (2) individual as long as he has the right attitude towards learning.
the Central Placement Screening Committee (CPSC), to review all recommendations
(for retention or separation) prior to submissions to the Chairman an the Board of 5. These attitudes are part of the new corporate culture outlined in
Directors. The members of the two screening committees were the Department and the corporate philosophy instituted for the Bank and disseminated
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 thru the various corporate culture seminars, monthly tertulias, efficiency and length of service, and those found to be least
speeches of the Chairman and numerous various internal qualified for the remaining positions shall be laid off.
communications and bulletins. One of the most important values
emphasized was TEAMWORK due to the very lean personnel force Lastly, petitioner failed to invoke the presence of any of the circumstances
that the Bank was left with and the competition it has to contend enumerated under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6656 which would show or tend to
with in the industry. show the existence of bad faith in the implementation of the reorganization.

6. Mr. Domingo and Miss Javier were subjected to this rating Quintessentially, the reorganization having been conducted in accordance with the
process as all other employees of the Bank were. mandate of Dario, it can safely be concluded that indeed the reorganization was
attended by good faith, ergo, valid. The dismissal of herein petitioner is a removal for
xxx xxx xxx cause which, therefore, does not violate his security of tenure.

8. Mr. Domingo and Miss Javier were recommended for a renewal As a final note on this issue, we quote with approval the statement of Mme. Justice
of temporary status after assessment of their performance because Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera in her dissenting opinion in the above-cited case:
of several indications of lack of skill and their inability to work with
others in the department where they were stationed. In a To be sure, the reorganization could affect the tenure of members
compassionate stance, it was considered in the Central Personnel of the career service as defined in Section 5, Article IV of
Committee to transfer them to another department or unit of the Presidential Decree No. 807, and may even result in the separation
Bank where they may be more effective and productive, but they from office of some meritorious employees. But even then, the
expressed preference to stay in the training unit of the Bank, the greater good of the greatest number and the right of the citizenry to
Human Resource Center. a good government, and as they themselves have mandated
through the vehicle of Proclamation No. 3, provide the justification
9. Along with others whose performance for 1987 was found for the said injury to the individual. In terms of values, the interest of
wanting, Mr. Domingo and Miss Javier were recommended for an employee to security of tenure must yield to the interest of the
reappointment as temporary for another period from January to entire populace and to an efficient and honest government.
November 1988 to give the Bank sufficient time to consider their
cases. However, in an evaluation of performance for all extendees II. Petitioner also maintains that "average" and "below average" efficiency ratings are
in November 1988, Mr. Domingo and Miss Javier were again found not valid grounds for his termination from the service.
wanting having both acquired a rating of "Below Average."
It has become a basic and primordial concern of the State to insure and promote the
In addition, it is not disputed that DBP now has less than 2,000 employees from a constitutional mandate that appointments in the civil service shall be made only
former high level of around 4,000 employees in 1986. And, under Section 27 of according to merit and fitness pursuant to its adopted policy of requiring public
Presidential Decree No. 807, the Government is authorized to lay off employees in officers and employees to serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity,
case of a reduction due to reorganization, thus: loyalty and efficiency. 15 As a matter of fact, the development and retention of a
competent and efficient work force in the public service is considered as a primary
Sec. 27. Reduction in Force. — Whenever it becomes necessary concern of the Government. 16 Hence, employees are selected on the basis of merit
because of lack of work or funds or due to a change in the scope or and fitness to perform the duties and assume the responsibilities of the position to
nature of an agency's program, or as a result of reorganization, to which they are appointed. 17Concomitantly, the government has committed itself to
reduce the staff of any department or agency, those in the same engender a continuing program of career and personnel development for all
group or class of positions in one or more agencies within the government employees, 18 by establishing a performance evaluation system to be
particular department or agency wherein the reduction is to be administered in such manner as to continually foster the improvement of individual
effected shall be reasonably compared in terms of relative fitness, employee efficiency and organizational effectiveness. 19

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All these abundantly show that the State puts a premium on an individual's efficiency, The fact that petitioner made no appeal to the Final Review Committee was duly
merit and fitness before one is accepted into the career service. A civil service considered by respondent commission in resolving said motion for reconsideration
employee's efficiency rating, therefore, is a decisive factor for his continued service and in affirming the separation of petitioner from the service, noting that "appellants
with the Government. The inescapable conclusion is that a "below average" efficiency Mr. Domingo, and Miss Javier did not file or submit their opposition to the motion for
rating is sufficient justification for the termination of a government employee such as reconsideration." Consequently, petitioner cannot, by his own inaction, legally claim
herein petitioner. This is the reason why, painful as it may be, petitioner's separation that he was denied due process of law.
must be affirmed if public good is to be subserved. In the words of respondent
commission in its questioned resolution, it cannot "sanction the reappointment of said Considering petitioner's years of service, despite the unfortunate result of the
officials and employees who have fallen short of the performance necessary in order reorganization insofar as he is concerned, he should be allowed separation and other
to maintain at all times efficiency and effectiveness in the Office." 20 retirement benefits accruing to him by reason of his termination, as provided for in
Section 16, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, as well as in Section 9 of Republic
III. Petitioner finally contends that where the purpose of the evaluation proceeding is Act No. 6656 and Section 34 of Executive Order No. 81.
to ascertain whether he should be retained or separated from the service, it is a
proceeding to determine the existence of a ground for his termination and, therefore, WHEREFORE, no grave abuse of discretion having been committed by respondent
he should be afforded a day in court, pursuant to the requirements of procedural due Civil Service Commission, its challenged resolution of April 10, 1990 is hereby
process, to defend himself against any adverse findings in the process of evaluation AFFIRMED.
of his performance.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner's contention cannot be sustained.

Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6656 provides that "no officer or employee in the career
service shall be removed except for a valid cause and after due notice and hearing."
Thus, there is no question that while dismissal due to a bona fide reorganization is
recognized as a valid cause, this does not justify a detraction from the mandatory
requirement of notice and hearing. However, it is equally true and it is a basic rule of
due process that "what the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but the
absolute absence thereof and the lack of opportunity to be heard." 21 There is no
violation of procedural due process even where no hearing was conducted for as long
as the party was given a chance to present his evidence and defend himself.

The records show that petitioner had the opportunity to present his side and/or to
contest the results of the evaluation proceedings. In DBP's motion for the
reconsideration of the original decision of respondent commission, respondent bank
averred:

It may be stated that although several appeals were received by the

Final Review Committee from other employees similarly situated
(i.e., also given temporary appointments for 1988), Mr. Domingo
and Miss Javier never appealed their ratings or the extension of
their temporary appointments in 1988. Even at this writing, the
Bank has not received any formal appeal from them although they
were advised to do so by their direct supervisor. 22

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 Republic of the Philippines WHEREAS, Section 12 (1), Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the
SUPREME COURT Administrative Code of 1987 grants the Commission the power,
Manila among others, to administer and enforce the constitutional and
statutory provisions on the merit system for all levels and ranks in
EN BANC the Civil Service;

WHEREAS, Section 7, Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the

Administrative Code of 1987 Provides, among others, that The
G.R. No. 115863 March 31, 1995 Career Service shall be characterized by (1) entrance based on
merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by
AIDA D. EUGENIO, petitioner, competitive examination, or based highly technical qualifications;
vs. (2) opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and (3)
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. & HON. security of tenure;
SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, JR., respondents.
WHEREAS, Section 8 (c), Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the
administrative Code of 1987 provides that "The third level shall
cover Positions in the Career Executive Service";
PUNO, J.:
WHEREAS, the Commission recognizes the imperative need to
The power of the Civil Service Commission to abolish the Career Executive Service consolidate, integrate and unify the administration of all levels of
Board is challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. positions in the career service.

First the facts. Petitioner is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research WHEREAS, the provisions of Section 17, Title I, Subtitle A. Book V
Institute. She applied for a Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO of the Administrative Code of 1987 confers on the Commission the
rank on August 2, 1993, she was given a CES eligibility. On September 15, 1993, she power and authority to effect changes in its organization as the
was recommended to the President for a CESO rank by the Career Executive Service need arises.
Board. 1
WHEREAS, Section 5, Article IX-A of the Constitution provides that
All was not to turn well for petitioner. On October 1, 1993, respondent Civil Service the Civil Service Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy and the
Commission2 passed Resolution No. 93-4359, viz: necessary implications thereof;

RESOLUTION NO. 93-4359 NOW THEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Civil
Service Commission hereby resolves to streamline reorganize and
WHEREAS, Section 1(1) of Article IX-B provides that Civil Service effect changes in its organizational structure. Pursuant thereto, the
shall be administered by the Civil Service Commission, . . .; Career Executive Service Board, shall now be known as the Office
for Career Executive Service of the Civil Service Commission.
WHEREAS, Section 3, Article IX-B of the 1987 Philippine Accordingly, the existing personnel, budget, properties and
Constitution provides that "The Civil Service Commission, as the equipment of the Career Executive Service Board shall now form
central personnel agency of the government, is mandated to part of the Office for Career Executive Service.
establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale,
efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progresiveness and courtesy The above resolution became an impediment. to the appointment of petitioner as Civil
in the civil service, . . ."; Service Officer, Rank IV. In a letter to petitioner, dated June 7, 1994, the Honorable
Antonio T. Carpio, Chief Presidential legal Counsel, stated:
76 | P a g e
 xxx xxx xxx Required to file its Comment, the Solicitor General agreed with the contentions of
petitioner. Respondent Commission, however, chose to defend its ground. It posited
On 1 October 1993 the Civil Service Commission issued CSC the following position:
Resolution No. 93-4359 which abolished the Career Executive
Service Board. ARGUMENTS FOR PUBLIC RESPONDENT-CSC

Several legal issues have arisen as a result of the issuance of CSC I. THE INSTANT PETITION STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION
Resolution No. 93-4359, including whether the Civil Service AGAINST THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT-CSC.
Commission has authority to abolish the Career Executive Service
Board. Because these issues remain unresolved, the Office of the II. THE RECOMMENDATION SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT
President has refrained from considering appointments of career FOR APPOINTMENT TO A CESO RANK OF PETITIONER
service eligibles to career executive ranks. EUGENIO WAS A VALID ACT OF THE CAREER EXECUTIVE
SERVICE BOARD OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND
xxx xxx xxx IT DOES NOT HAVE ANY DEFECT.

You may, however, bring a case before the appropriate court to III. THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM
settle the legal issues arising from issuance by the Civil Service QUESTIONING THE VALIDITY OF THE RECOMMENDATION OF
Commission of CSC Resolution No. 93-4359, for guidance of all THE CESB IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER EUGENIO SINCE THE
concerned. PRESIDENT HAS PREVIOUSLY APPOINTED TO CESO RANK
FOUR (4) OFFICIALS SIMILARLY SITUATED AS SAID
Thank You. PETITIONER. FURTHERMORE, LACK OF MEMBERS TO
CONSTITUTE A QUORUM. ASSUMING THERE WAS NO
Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career Executive Service QUORUM, IS NOT THE FAULT OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT CIVIL
Board which recommended her CESO Rank IV has been abolished, petitioner filed SERVICE COMMISSION BUT OF THE PRESIDENT WHO HAS
the petition at bench to annul, among others, resolution No. 93-4359. The petition is THE POWER TO APPOINT THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE
anchored on the following arguments: CESB.

A. IV. THE INTEGRATION OF THE CESB INTO THE COMMISSION

IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW (Sec. 12 (1), Title I, Subtitle A, Book V
IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, RESPONDENT of the Administrative Code of the 1987). THIS PARTICULAR
COMMISSION USURPED THE LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS OF ISSUE HAD ALREADY BEEN SETTLED WHEN THE
CONGRESS WHEN IT ABOLISHED THE CESB, AN OFFICE HONORABLE COURT DISMISSED THE PETITION FILED BY
CREATED BY LAW, THROUGH THE ISSUANCE OF CSC: THE HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
RESOLUTION NO. 93-4359; REPRESENTATIVES, NAMELY: SIMEON A. DATUMANONG,
FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., RENATO V. DIAZ, AND
B. MANUEL M. GARCIA IN G.R. NO. 114380. THE
AFOREMENTIONED PETITIONERS ALSO QUESTIONED THE
ALSO IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, RESPONDENT INTEGRATION OF THE CESB WITH THE COMMISSION.
CSC USURPED THE LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS OF
CONGRESS WHEN IT ILLEGALLY AUTHORIZED THE We find merit in the petition.3
TRANSFER OF PUBLIC MONEY, THROUGH THE ISSUANCE OF
CSC RESOLUTION NO. 93-4359.

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The controlling fact is that the Career Executive Service Board (CESB) was created in body, and it may prescribe the mode of filling the office and the
the Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1 on September 1, 19744 which adopted the powers and duties of the incumbent, and if it sees fit, abolish the
Integrated Plan. Article IV, Chapter I, Part of the III of the said Plan provides: office.

Article IV — Career Executive Service In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the
abolition of the CESB. On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from
1. A Career Executive Service is created to form a continuing pool 1975 to 1993, the legislature has set aside funds for the operation of CESB.
of well-selected and development oriented career administrators Respondent Commission, however, invokes Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I,
who shall provide competent and faithful service. Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of its power to abolish the
CESB. Section 17 provides:
2. A Career Executive Service hereinafter referred to in this
Chapter as the Board, is created to serve as the governing body of Sec. 17. Organizational Structure. — Each office of the
the Career Executive Service. The Board shall consist of the Commission shall be headed by a Director with at least one
Chairman of the Civil Service Commission as presiding officer, the Assistant Director, and may have such divisions as are necessary
Executive Secretary and the Commissioner of the Budget as ex- independent constitutional body, the Commission may effect
officio members and two other members from the private sector changes in the organization as the need arises.
and/or the academic community who are familiar with the principles
and methods of personnel administration. But as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor General, Section 17 must be
read together with Section 16 of the said Code which enumerates the offices under
xxx xxx xxx the respondent Commission, viz:

5. The Board shall promulgate rules, standards and procedures on Sec. 16. Offices in the Commission. — The Commission shall have
the selection, classification, compensation and career development the following offices:
of members of the Career Executive Service. The Board shall set
up the organization and operation of the service. (Emphasis (1) The Office of the Executive Director headed by an Executive
supplied) Director, with a Deputy Executive Director shall implement policies,
standards, rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission;
It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can only be coordinate the programs of the offices of the Commission and
abolished by the legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the render periodic reports on their operations, and perform such other
creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function. As aptly functions as may be assigned by the Commission.
summed up in AM JUR 2d on Public Officers and
Employees, 5 viz: (2) The Merit System Protection Board composed of a Chairman
and two (2) members shall have the following functions:
Except for such offices as are created by the Constitution, the
creation of public offices is primarily a legislative function. In so far xxx xxx xxx
as the legislative power in this respect is not restricted by
constitutional provisions, it supreme, and the legislature may decide (3) The Office of Legal Affairs shall provide the Chairman with legal
for itself what offices are suitable, necessary, or convenient. When advice and assistance; render counselling services; undertake legal
in the exigencies of government it is necessary to create and define studies and researches; prepare opinions and ruling in the
duties, the legislative department has the discretion to determine interpretation and application of the Civil Service law, rules and
whether additional offices shall be created, or whether these duties regulations; prosecute violations of such law, rules and regulations;
shall be attached to and become ex-officio duties of existing offices. and represent the Commission before any court or tribunal.
An office created by the legislature is wholly within the power of that
78 | P a g e
(4) The Office of Planning and Management shall formulate or inspection and audit personnel and personnel management
development plans, programs and projects; undertake research programs and the exercise of delegated authority; provide technical
and studies on the different aspects of public personnel and advisory services to Civil Service Regional Offices and
management; administer management improvement programs; and government agencies in the implementation of their personnel
provide fiscal and budgetary services. programs and evaluation systems.

(5) The Central Administrative Office shall provide the Commission (12) The Office of Personnel Relations shall provide leadership and
with personnel, financial, logistics and other basic support services. assistance in the development and implementation of policies,
standards, rules and regulations in the accreditation of employee
(6) The Office of Central Personnel Records shall formulate and associations or organizations and in the adjustment and settlement
implement policies, standards, rules and regulations pertaining to of employee grievances and management of employee disputes.
personnel records maintenance, security, control and disposal;
provide storage and extension services; and provide and maintain (13) The Office of Corporate Affairs shall formulate and implement
library services. policies, standards, rules and regulations governing corporate
officials and employees in the areas of recruitment, examination,
(7) The Office of Position Classification and Compensation shall placement, career development, merit and awards systems,
formulate and implement policies, standards, rules and regulations position classification and compensation, performing appraisal,
relative to the administration of position classification and employee welfare and benefit, discipline and other aspects of
compensation. personnel management on the basis of comparable industry
practices.
(8) The Office of Recruitment, Examination and Placement shall
provide leadership and assistance in developing and implementing (14) The Office of Retirement Administration shall be responsible
the overall Commission programs relating to recruitment, execution for the enforcement of the constitutional and statutory provisions,
and placement, and formulate policies, standards, rules and relative to retirement and the regulation for the effective
regulations for the proper implementation of the Commission's implementation of the retirement of government officials and
examination and placement programs. employees.

(9) The Office of Career Systems and Standards shall provide (15) The Regional and Field Offices. — The Commission shall have
leadership and assistance in the formulation and evaluation of not less than thirteen (13) Regional offices each to be headed by a
personnel systems and standards relative to performance Director, and such field offices as may be needed, each to be
appraisal, merit promotion, and employee incentive benefit and headed by an official with at least the rank of an Assistant Director.
awards.
As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent
(10) The Office of Human Resource Development shall provide Commission's power to reorganize is limited to offices under its control as
leadership and assistance in the development and retention of enumerated in Section 16, supra. From its inception, the CESB was
qualified and efficient work force in the Civil Service; formulate intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit administratively attached to
standards for training and staff development; administer service- respondent Commission. As conceptualized by the Reorganization
wide scholarship programs; develop training literature and Committee "the CESB shall be autonomous. It is expected to view the
materials; coordinate and integrate all training activities and problem of building up executive manpower in the government with a broad
evaluate training programs. and positive outlook." 6 The essential autonomous character of the CESB is
not negated by its attachment to respondent Commission. By said
(11) The Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit shall develop attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the control of respondent
policies, standards, rules and regulations for the effective conduct Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of
79 | P a g e
 attaching one functionally inter-related government agency to another is to
attain "policy and program coordination." This is clearly etched out in Section
38(3), Chapter 7, Book IV of the aforecited Code, to wit:

(3) Attachment. — (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between

the department or its equivalent and attached agency or
corporation for purposes of policy and program coordination. The
coordination may be accomplished by having the department
represented in the governing board of the attached agency or
corporation, either as chairman or as a member, with or without
voting rights, if this is permitted by the charter; having the attached
corporation or agency comply with a system of periodic reporting
which shall reflect the progress of programs and projects; and
having the department or its equivalent provide general policies
through its representative in the board, which shall serve as the
framework for the internal policies of the attached corporation or
agency.

Respondent Commission also relies on the case of Datumanong, et al., vs. Civil
Service Commission, G. R. No. 114380 where the petition assailing the abolition of
the CESB was dismissed for lack of cause of action. Suffice to state that the reliance
is misplaced considering that the cited case was dismissed for lack of standing of the
petitioner, hence, the lack of cause of action.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Resolution No. 93-4359 of the
respondent Commission is hereby annulled and set aside. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

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