Want a Nuke Wargame? I’ve Got One for You

 

The last few weeks have been filled with discussions about possible Russian use of tactical nuclear weapons – probably in a demonstration first – because of their collapsing conventional war in Ukraine.

There are lots of different scenarios/vignettes you can go through and could spend all day or more on each one, but I’d like to pull one out for you today that brings together a few threads we’ve seen the last nine months.

Here are the threads we are going to pull in to the primary subject of this wargame: the Russian Federation decides to demonstrate their willingness to use tactical nuclear weapons.

Threads common to this war so far: 

• Russian “gun decking” of material readiness.
• Russian culture of not delivering bad news and hoping for the best.
• Ineffectiveness and lack of trust in Russian Air Force manned aircraft capabilities.
• Reliance on rocket forces.
• Russian leadership has no option but victory.

Facts:

• Due to the test ban treaty, the Russians have not been able to test their nuclear warheads in decades. 
• The two parts of the nuclear triad most visible to Western eyes – submarines and manned aircraft – have all demonstrated spotty levels of performance and maintenance in the post-Soviet era. One can assume the missile forces have comparable, if not worse, records.
• Open source reporting reflects that even the most basic of Russian weapons, like HE artillery rounds, have a higher than acceptable failure rate.

Assumptions:

• Russians decide for an air-burst demonstration shot vice a tactical use on the front lines. 
• The Russian’s relatively benign high altitude airburst will not mirror Western ideas of a demonstration shot over water, but will instead drive the point home by doing it over Ukraine between Kyiv and the Donbass.
• The 448th Rocket Brigade of the 20th Guards Combined Army based out of Kursk was the last Russian Army unit to be equipped with the SS-21 (Tochka-U) and in 2019 converted to the SS-26 (Iskander-M). However, we know that SS-21 have been used by the Russians in Ukraine, so we can assume that the last unit to convert would be the first to bring them back.
• The SS-26 transition has been a slow one with substantial SS-21s remaining with the brigade that enabled them to quickly use the SS-21 from the start of the war.
• We can assume that the SS-26 coming in to use are mostly conventional to save money and trouble. They need to keep the nuclear capability on the books, so they will have their special weapons crews remain in Kursk with their few remaining nuclear armed SS-21. 

That sets the table, and here is what I would like wargamed…and what I think will be different.

I’m not interested in flash-bangs etc … no … I want something much more difficult. I want something that will stress the diplomatic and political structures of the USA, EU, and NATO.

Before Turn-1, here is what happens (I attempted to be exceptionally abbreviated but I can’t help myself).

• President Putin orders a demonstration shot, but specifically states that he wants it overhead Ukraine as outlined above. 
• Putin does not trust the ability of cruise missiles or manned aircraft to successfully deliver a weapon where and how he wants it, and absolutely no strategic forces are to be used (so the Russian Navy good idea fairies can stow their wings).
• Colonel Dmitry Nikolayevich Martynov, Commander of the 448th is forward deployed in theater with his forces and all of a sudden has his Deputy Commander Lieutenant Colonel Igor Ivanovich Karamyshev showing up in his command vehicle telling him that he is ordered by Moscow to get on the Mi-17 he arrived in and return to Kursk.
• Upon arrival, Martynov is walked in to a briefing led by Shoigu himself and is given his orders; he has 72-hrs.
• Martynov leaves and contemplates that, yes, they have three nuclear certified crews in Kursk, but they are not his best. His best crews are forward deployed. These are the sick, old, or otherwise best left home crews. Yes, they can launch, but … he's keeping the details to himself.
• Also, the Transport Erector Launchers (TEL) are not his best, his best are forward deployed.
• His nuclear certified ordnance crews … well, they are specialists. They never deploy and when he last walked through the nuclear magazine, all seemed in order. All paperwork is in order. As long as the TEL’s can drive 5-km, the 448th should be good to go.
• D-3: Shoigu insists that they have a “Primary,” “Back-up,” and “Ready Spare” for the strike (as is expected), which is great as they only have three nuclear warheads good to go.
• D-2: some low-level USA Joint Staff J2 types received notice of Shoigu’s movement to Kursk and even saw in another report Martynov’s unusual return to Kursk – but this is not of great concern - just another Colonel. Shoigu’s movements are worth briefing – but not Martynov.
• D-1: a separate NATO CJ2 shop notices some unusual, but not unheard of, movements around the 448th’s magazines in Kursk, but in a sea of data, is barely acknowledged. In DC and Brussels, a series of high-level short notice briefings are taking place that has the staff curious, but that is not unusual so far this year. However, some pasty looking officers are going in to brief no one really sees around often. Huh.
• D+0 (early): TELs are set to move, but TEL-2’s transmission shit-the-bed halfway out the shelter, so the “Ready Spare” of TEL-3 is now the “Backup.”
• D+0 (mid-day): Final launch orders received. "Dial-a-Yield" was set earlier to .5-kilotons with airburst at 10km. “We’re here to make a point, not destroy resources we want later.” The Colonel mumbles to himself as he attempts to remain calm as he slowly realized what he is about to do. Target 320-km away; the Voloshanska Dacha Ornithological Reserve in the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.  
• TEL-1 launch successful. However, word is received 10 very sober minutes later, no detonation. Orders are clear; TEL-3 begins checklist and 2-minutes later TEL-2 has another successful launch.
• The crews remain in place. Martynov steps out of his command vehicle, gets in a staff car and drives over to TEL-1. He’s a hands-on leader and wants to thank them for a job well done, duty, etc. He then gets back in the staff car to visit TEL-3 when he gets a call on the radio from Major Aleksey Aleksandrovich Kondratev who he left in charge of the command vehicle. "Return immediately."
• As he pulls up, he see’s a GRU truck full of security pulling in, “дерьмо.”

---

Four and a half a kilometers west of the woods of Volvoshanka at the bus stop in the village of Orlivs’ke, a farmer’s sister hears the high-pitched screech of what is to her, ten months in to the war clearly a missile. 

At the end of the street she sees something hit the ground. She walks to the southeast 50-meters towards the crossroad at the edge of her brother’s field and there it is in her neighbor’s yard.

A small crowd gathers to look at it and about 10 minutes later a few guys from the Territorial Army arrive to shoosh everyone away. Once they finish that, everyone looks to the southeast again over the field where one of the kids is pointing. Something else just fell at what looks like 500 meters away the field. Another dud. 

Everyone looks at each other. What a lucky little village. The war hasn’t reached them yet, and when for some reason it did, nothing blew up.

---

So, there is a bit more story than I wanted to do, but it was fun – for me at least.

Here is where the wargame starts. No one knows it but the Russians right now, but at D+0 the Russians just tried to do an airburst over Ukraine between Kyiv and the Donbass – they actually tried twice – but neither missile detonated.

We have a few things to play out:

Red (Russia): What are your possible COAs from here?

Blue (USA/NATO): What will it take for you to know exactly what happened here without inside sources? (judge will determine how many turns Red gets before Blue/Green/White know)

Green (UKR): How long will it take for Ukrainian EOD to get there and realize that is no normal warhead on that SS-21?

White (International Organizations/neutral nations/Pope/etc): Possible reactions and timelines.

---

…and no – in what I consider the infinitesimally small chance the Russians would ever use tactical nuclear weapons in UKR (non-zero, but close to it) – I don’t think this scenario is outside a half-standard deviation either side from the centerline.

Also, I may have some technical details incorrect here. If you feel the need to be pedantic, roll in the comments, I can take it.

Russia's Nuclear Option?

As winter arrives in Eastern Europe and the Russo-Ukrainian war approaches the end of its first year, a very serious war will become even more serious.

Both nations are increasingly fully invested in to seeing this to the end. Though on paper stronger, cracks in national resolve in Russia are showing much more than in Ukraine. Wars of choice for conquest – which is what Russia is engaged in – has a much different impact on a nation’s people than an existential war for national survival, which is the war Ukraine is in.

As Russia’s problems in trying to achieve something that looks like victory manifests itself in to the Russian people’s waning support for the war, the rulers of Russia will increasingly find their legitimacy and hold on power under threat. They know this war should have been over months ago. They clearly did not know their enemy well. 

Desperate times can force desperate measures. If the present Russian leadership’s hold on power is seen as weak, what measures might they take to try to hold on to power by forcing a quick end to the war on favorable terms?

Some are looking closer at the nuclear option that Russia has. I think they are looking too hard. A good example of this line of concern was in yesterday’s WaPo by Joseph Cirincione. 

NB: Before the pull quotes, a fair warning – Cirincione is selling a book titled, Nuclear Nightmares: Securing the World Before it is Too Late, so keep that in consideration;

Russian President Vladimir Putin is losing his war. If the Ukrainians continue to liberate areas of their country from his invading army, would he actually use nuclear weapons as he has threatened? If so, how? And what would the U.S. response be?

It is difficult to put percentages on risk. Nor does it really matter. Given the stakes, if the chances are 10 percent or 40 percent, the response would be the same: Minimize the possibility of nuclear use, and prepare responses in advance.

This is when I remind everyone that "we" are horrible at predicting the next war early enough to prevent them. The track record is simply not very good. However, Cirincione has invested a lot of time and effort in looking at this - so we should give his ideas some consideration;

The next quote reminded me of a little reminder a peer gave me back when I was a NATO staff weenie at the other end of the HQ p-way from him. As a JO, he was on the other side of the wire as an JO in the Warsaw Pact. "Americans may not follow their doctrine very well, but Russians do."

Russian military writings describe in detail how, if Russia is losing a conflict, it could use nuclear weapons to force its enemy to retreat. This “escalate to de-escalate” or “escalate to win” strategy is somewhat controversial, but it is not dissimilar to various U.S. plans for using nuclear weapons first.

Well, sometimes we follow our doctrine. Sometimes the Russians don't...but if you are playing odds... 

I still stand by my belief - and that is a weak thread, I know - that in the next war, nuclear weapons will be what chemical weapons were during WWII. Everyone had them; no one used them.

If nuclear weapons were to appear on the Ukrainian stage, Cirincione does not have this COA as his most likely ... but it is my most likely if one must choose from the "Nuke" basket;

Demonstration shot. One option is for Russia to fire a nuclear weapon over an uninhabited area — say, part of the Black Sea — as a demonstration of its seriousness in hopes that the West will back down. Some scientists involved in the Manhattan Project urged just such a demonstration shot as an alternative to bombing Japanese cities at the end of World War II. While no one would be killed and there would not be physical damage, the explosion would stop the world in its tracks. There has not been a nuclear weapon used in combat in 77 years. No one has even seen a nuclear explosion above ground since 1980.

This is their neighborhood and fallout will drift to their lands if nukes are used. Is anyone going to buy grain downwind? No. Next to underground explosions, explosions high over the water or in the atmosphere create the least secondary radiation effects. Don't underestimate the lingering memory of Chernobyl. I see "Demonstration Shot" of the most likely COA of the least likely Nuke COAs.

As shocking as this would be, Russia would likely reject this option for the same reason U.S. military leaders did in 1945: It is not shocking enough.

Don't agree. Russia believes their own FITREPs, so to speak. The arrogance of their initial OPLAN speaks to this. They hold most of Central and especially Western Europe in contempt. I am sure a nuke over the Black Sea would be shocking enough (and they're right).

This is the author's "Most Likely COA:"

Low-yield weapon. Russia could fire a “low-yield” nuclear weapon on a Ukrainian military target. The explosion would kill hundreds or thousands and cause significant damage. Russia could use one of the 10-kiloton warheads it deploys on some of its ground-launched cruise missiles, including the Iskander that has been used extensively in the war with conventional warheads. Although this would be a massive explosion — equal to 10,000 tons of TNT — it would be small by nuclear standards. The bomb that destroyed Hiroshima was 15 kilotons; most U.S. and Russian nuclear warheads range from 100 to 1,000 kilotons. Some believe that Russia has even smaller-yield warheads, in the one-kiloton range.

I'm sorry, a nuke is a nuke. Any use, however slight, breaks the seal. As mentioned earlier, why go right away with something that will blow fallout your direction and ruin a major cash crop for who knows how many years? No one would want hot-wheat. You'd win nothing but a poisoned challis.  

Once this seal is broken, beyond that line be dragons. I would see a hard split between Western and Central European NATO on a response. Lots of marches with large paper mache puppets, etc. I don't think the author is correct at all in his assumptions.

... it would not require a “response in kind” by the United States, though some would urge that. The likely response, in addition to those in scenario one, would be massive increases in military aid to Ukraine and possibly concerted NATO or U.S. strikes on the Russian units that launched the attack.

As per the split in NATO, there will be no NATO strikes anywhere after such a use. I do not see the USA using nukes either when two European NATO members, France and the UK, have nukes of their own. NATO will not do it, and especially the Biden Administration won't go alone in such a step unilaterally.

In his next two COAs, he treats them as individual events, I don't. Once "Low Yield" goes, unless there is an immediate capitulation to Russian actions, the next two steps will follow rather quickly. This isn't a ladder, this is a chute.

Large-yield weapon. Putin could dial up the explosive force of the attack to the 50- or 100-kiloton range, or about three to six times the Hiroshima bomb. Tens of thousands would die with massive damage and radiation plumes. If the target were Kyiv, it would decapitate Ukraine’s leadership. This would almost certainly trigger a direct U.S. or NATO response, though not likely nuclear. The United States and NATO have sufficient precise, powerful conventional weapons that they could use to devastate Russian forces in Ukraine and command headquarters, including those units responsible for the attack. This would likely be accompanied by large-scale cyber operations.

Nuclear attack on NATO. This is the least likely scenario. Russian first-use doctrine includes the option of striking NATO targets. The attack could be by long-range missiles or air-launched cruise missiles on Central European states. If the yield of the weapon was similar to the previous scenario, it would inflict a level of destruction on a NATO state not seen since World War II. This could trigger a nuclear response. Some would argue a limited nuclear counterstrike was necessary to preserve nuclear deterrence. More likely is an all-out conventional assault to try to eliminate either Putin himself or the weapons he commands before he strikes again.

There is a certain arrogance in thinking that you can control the nuclear genie once it is out of the bottle. I am firmly of the school that you can't ... unless one side buckles. That is why one must be firm. The weaker you are, the more attractive the chute of nuclear use seems.

There is also a Rumsfeldian Known-Known in play here; the US President Joe Biden. He has a history going back decades. As former SECDEF Gates noted, he has a tendency to pick the wrong action on the international stage. He also shows a desire to - at whatever cost to foreign nationals - get the USA out of foreign entanglements involving our forces.

Should the Russians in desperation pull the nuclear card, would the USA do nothing and let the Russians get her way? What precedent does that set? Does anyone think that will stop the Russians from pulling this card again?

Does anyone really think there is a way to control nuclear escalation, that the same people who on the USA side who never saw Kabul collapsing like it did or on the Russians side who didn't see Kyiv standing like it did - that these two groups - have the insight and nuance to steer around and control each step in the "nuclear escalation ladder?" 

If the Russians do an airburst high over the Black Sea, would NATO/USA do a similar airburst over the Arctic? I don't know. No one does. Do you think the Biden natsec team has run this game yet and has a pre-planned response approved and ready to go?

I don't. 

Even with the best of teams on both sides, these are the "B" and "C" teams, not the "A" teams. Neither side has that record. There is no ladder to escalate on, to pause on each step and ponder. No, once the seal is broken, we have a steep and well greased chute. 

Pray for cooler heads, humility, and well secured genies. 

China Rings the Nuclear Bell

Did China pop off low yield nukes?

I&W says it may have.

Reports and links over at USNIBlog today.

I don't like 2020. Not at all.

Sir John, You Should Have Copywrited That Nuke COA

Either we are playing a clunky game of "build a little of something to entice the Russians to come to the negotiating table" or we are doing some highly questionable thinking about nuclear war.

If the later, then there is so much wrong here, I'm not sure where to start.

Russia fires a nuclear weapon at a U.S. installation overseas. The U.S. retaliates in kind. How does it all play out?

U.S. Strategic Command simulated that scenario for Defense Secretary Mark Esper during a visit this week to Offutt Air Force Base, Neb. The exercise is part of the Pentagon’s routine slate of wargames and other events that it uses to consider its steps if nuclear war erupts, and comes as the U.S. is pursuing so-called “tactical” nuclear weapons to counter similar assets in Russia’s stockpile.

Of all the possible uses of nuclear weapons that I can ponder, sure this is one of them, but it stands somewhere down around #45 in all likelihood.

Why did they pick this one? What it lacks in probability, it makes up for with illogic.

Does anyone really see the most pressing thing SECDEF needs to ponder when it comes to nuclear weapons something as stupid as the Russians dropping one - 1 - nuke on ... where exactly?

They are not going to drop (1) nuke on a place where we have nukes stored, as anyone with 5-minutes to think about it would know that would trigger a massive "use it or lose it" response.

Where, exactly, would the Russians send (1) nuke as a signaling device?

A google search will tell you which bases we have nukes at in Europe with a NATO stamp on them. Take those off your list. 

We also know they won't nuke the UK - they have their own nuclear weapons and attack there doubles the response-risk to the Russians.

Naples? That packed coastal town next to an active volcano? No.

Sigonella? Sure, nuking the side of another active volcano sounds like winner. No.

The heart of Bavaria? Really? Anyone review fallout patterns recently?

There is no such thing in the 21st Century as a "tactical" nuke. You don't nuke densely populated modern nations just once and expect it to end there. You will lose control of everything within 36-hrs.

Do we really have our best and brightest in the loop here?

A recent Slate article noted that, in a different scenario, Obama-era National Security Council members looked at how the U.S. might react if Russia invaded a Baltic state and fired a low-yield nuke at NATO troops or at a base in Germany.

“The principals decided we had to respond with nuclear weapons, to maintain credibility among our allies and adversaries,” according to Slate. “They decided to fire a few nuclear weapons at the former Soviet republic of Belarus, even though, in the game, it had no involvement in the Russian attacks—and then they ended the game, without playing the next few steps.”

I appears not. I hope they actually stopped the game because they realized their wargame is being played by idiots.

Belarus? Really? It isn't even Russia. Besides that, all they did was steal a plot twist from General Sir John Hackett's, 1982 novel, The Third World War: The Untold Story.

I'm sorry, but that is frankly bullsh1t, a waste of time, talent, & intellect.

Unless ... this is just a ploy to bluff the Russians to come to the negotiating table.

“We have no intention to field a new low-yield system in Europe,” the defense official added. “Our response to the Russian violation [of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty] is a conventional response. We’ll respond with conventional cruise missiles and conventional ballistic missiles of the range that’s captured by the INF Treaty, but we have no intention to make it nuclear-capable, nor have we actually spoken to the allies about basing it on their territory at this time.”

DOD is developing other nuclear weapons to counter foreign stockpiles as well, including ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles. The INF Treaty banned deployment of ground-based ballistic and cruise missiles, nuclear or conventional, built to strike targets between 500 and 5,500 kilometers away. The U.S. left the treaty last August in protest that Russia was flouting the pact.

Esper told reporters Feb. 19 he believes the Russians should count both strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons under a renegotiated version of the New START Treaty, which dictates stockpile sizes and expires next year.

Let's hope that is the case. If so, then it is a clunckingly transparent one ... and will probably work.

Maybe if we were not being clever, we may stumble in to an opportunity.

Finally, I'm going to bring one of my hobby horses out of the bunker. Feast on this pic;

We have a Navy Admiral wearing camo utilities in a bunker in Nebraska while SECDEF is visiting while wearing a tie.

Your boss in your guest and you make him look overdressed.

Rude.

I'm sorry, this habit - you see it in DC every day - is insulting and narcissistically unprofessional. On top of that ... you are a Navy Admiral. If you wanted to be a ground guy, you are a few decades too late in making that call. This isn't COSPLAY for the wannabe, this is the US Navy. Dress the part or go home.

That is the minor point, but I will tell you this; not matching the attire of a guest of honor, and especially if that guest is your boss, is the height of rudeness. 

Manners matter.

Nuclear Nations at Total War with Each Other - but Don't Use Nukes?

Of all the bloodshed and slaughter of WWII - though all sides had chemical weapons - they were not used at all. Not even at the very end.

What about nuclear armed nations today? If two nuclear powers go to war, is going nuclear inevitable? Does having nukes help you avoid war?

Maybe not. An interesting theory is that MAD is something that works until it doesn't.

Over at Small Wars Journal, Mangesh Sawant has a few observations about one flash-point many think has the greatest odds of going nuclear; India and Pakistan.

What if conventional wisdom, as it often can be, is wrong?

MAD is ineffectual in the sub-continent. Deterrence worked during the cold war as both the adversaries were armed in terms of nuclear weapons and delivery platforms. Soviet Union and the US had advanced military capability to destroy each other in a nuclear conflict. The arms buildup between the Soviet Union and the US led to the realization of nuclear annihilation having ramifications across the world. This threat led to both the nations signing the START and SALT agreements.

Nuclear deterrence theory and MAD will not work in South Asia due to the following:

The quality of weapons delivery platforms is important for the delivery of nuclear weapons. Technologically Pakistan’s weapons are antiquated and inferior. Most of its weapons systems are imported from China which reverse engineers them from Russian weapon systems.[iv] The Chinese weapons systems are not tested in any battles or wars. In an era of 4th and 5th generation warfare Pakistan still operates the 1st and the 2nd generation of combat aircrafts, naval ships and army weapons systems. India has inducted state of the art 4th generation weapons systems like SU 30 MK1, T 90 tanks, Vikramaditya aircraft carrier, nuclear attack submarine INS Arihant and ICBMs. Technologically advanced weapons will be used by India in conventional warfare to wipe out Pakistan’s military establishments and nuclear facilities in a preemptive strike. The quantity and lethality of conventional weapons in the arsenal is crucial to project the destructive capabilities on the adversary. Pakistan lacks in this aspect as its weapon systems are antiquated and this is the reason it has resorted to the strategy of unconventional warfare through terrorism. Therefore, in South Asia the conventional superiority of India outweighs the nuclear weapons systems capability and empty threats of Pakistan.

MAD is only possible if there is parity in nuclear bombs and weapon systems. MAD is not possible in South Asia due to the overwhelming Indian nuclear second-strike capability and superior conventional weapon systems.

So, like in WWII with chemical weapons - does it become a conventional slugfest?

Small nuclear powers like Pakistan and North Korea resort to belligerent posturing and blackmailing the international community by threatening to use nuclear weapons under the doctrine of first nuclear strike. But there is a tacit understanding between the politicians and the military in both countries about the power of conventional war, preemptive strikes and total nuclear annihilation by India and the US. It’s the age of unrestricted warfare for technologically advanced militaries in conventional warfare environment with nuclear armed adversaries. This is the new normal.

A final note. The author really should have saved this for another article - but I find this something worth a long night's drinking and arguing over. Indian vs. Pakistan would be Clausewitz vs. Sun Tsu?

Classical warfare strategies have been followed by nearly every country. The differentiating factor remains the type of governing systems. Democracies have been practicing Clausewitz while dictatorships and one-party systems have been practicing Sun Tzu. Pakistan has been following Sun Tzu’s art of warfare which is exemplified by concealment, unconventional warfare, unrestricted warfare, deception and manipulation. 

India has been following the Clausewitz strategy which is characterized by restricted and classical conventional warfare. Today Pakistan is the only country in the world which has fused the unconventional and hybrid warfare strategy with a nuclear deterrence doctrine of first strike. Pakistan has been sponsoring and fomenting terrorism in India since the last 3 decades. India has not penalized Pakistan due to the threat of nuclear retaliation to an Indian conventional attack.

SSBN Re-Capitalization Footsteps

We are planning for 12, but I will stick by to what I said almost exactly nine-years ago; we'll be lucky to get 10. (NB: that is in spite of the fact that Obama did not retreat and cut and the (R) unexpectedly took the House for the 8-following years - so the budget got larger. Hey, I'm not Nostradamus.)

The COLUMBIA Class is going to be the hungry-hungry hippo of defense money.

Can you hear it?

The Navy's $115 billion procurement cost estimate is not reliable partly because it is based on overly optimistic assumptions about the labor hours needed to construct the submarines. While the Navy analyzed cost risks, it did not include margin in its estimate for likely cost overruns. The Navy told us it will continue to update its lead submarine cost estimate, but an independent assessment of the estimate may not be complete in time to inform the Navy's 2021 budget request to Congress to purchase the lead submarine. Without these reviews, the cost estimate—and, consequently, the budget—may be unrealistic. A reliable cost estimate is especially important for a program of this size and complexity to help ensure that its budget is sufficient to execute the program as planned.

The Navy is using the congressionally-authorized National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund to construct the Columbia class. The Fund allows the Navy to purchase material and start construction early on multiple submarines prior to receiving congressional authorization and funding for submarine construction. The Navy anticipates achieving savings through use of the Fund, such as buying certain components early and in bulk, but did not include the savings in its cost estimate. The Navy may have overestimated its savings as higher than those historically achieved by other such programs. Without an updated cost estimate and cost risk analysis, including a realistic estimate of savings, the fiscal year 2021 budget request may not reflect funding needed to construct the submarine.

You can get links to the full report and the highlights here.

Part of me would rather see 8 SSBN and 2-4 SSGN from the design, but that is just me. Those SSGN bring a lot of punch forward when needed ... and flexibility.

The world in nine years further down the road will be different than we think it will be. Always keep that in mind.

Hat tip Phil.

No Nukes! (at least deployed USN tactical nukes)

I'm no spring chicken, yet my cohort was the last group of junior officers to live with tactical nukes. They were on the FF I did my MIDN cruise on, they were part of my first sea duty tour. By the time I was a senior LT, they were gone.

Good.

They were an administrative and training nightmare that was only really justified by the M.A.D. Cold War calculus. The OPLANS where they were used were laughable. Their tactical use only marginally better than conventional weapons, and the theory of "limited nuclear war" a pipe dream.

Let's be clear, if nuclear weapons are used again against any peer to near-peer conflict, there will be nothing limited about their use. Everyone will use them or lose them. Any possible use of a nuke in a future war can be well met by ICBM, SLBM and yes - strategic air or lighter strike aircraft.

We do not need them again.

Over at Proceedings, FCCM (SW) Thomas Lohn, USN (Ret.), tries to make the sale, but I'm not buying.

Rearming destroyers, cruisers, and the future frigate with non-strategic nuclear weapons could be accomplished in three phases:

Phase One : Reintroduce the nuclear TLAM-N as part of normal deployment loadout.
...
Phase Two : Manufacture a nuclear version of the RUM-139 Vertical-Launch ASRoc (VL-ASRoc).
...
Phase Three : Produce a nuclear capable SM-2/6 Standard Missile.

1. TLAM-N was highly vulnerable and iffy when it was young - it is even more so now. With the fail-to-launch/transition with conventional TLAM in addition to their habit of not making it to their target and winding up on some hill in the middle of some goat herd, no. By the time it got to its target, the war would be over anyway.

2. Nuclear depth bombs are not as useful as some think they are. I would much rather have all that money spent on a LWT that can actually ________ in ______ and not ________ when faced with _______ and at least has a chance to ______ when _____ is _______ than _______. Not to mention ______ can only _____ when ______ it ______ in an estimated ______ of the expected _______ we will most likely ______ the ______. Oh, and buy _____ more than we already have - because I did the math a decade ago and I don't think it is any better now.

3. Just ... no. Invest that money in better terminal defenses, a fleet defense fighter, and more hulls in the water. If we are in the middle of a nuclear war, any base enemy long range strike aircraft are flying from would have been taken care of by our strategic forces anyway.

From Strangelove to Merkwuerdigeliebe

If you think a nuclear Japan is interesting, what about ....

Head on over to USNIBlog where smart people are contemplating some interesting things.

A NWTI for All my Friends

Good news; you going to command one of our new VIRGINIA Class SSN.

Bad news? 

You have to go over to USNIBlog for the details.

... and the Gipper Did Grin, and the People Did Feast ...

Over the weekend it seemed that decades of hard work once again broke out in to the open,

The US military said Tuesday it had intercepted a mock-up of an intercontinental ballistic missile in a first-of-its-kind test that comes amid concerns over North Korea's weapons program.

A ground-based interceptor launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California "successfully intercepted an intercontinental ballistic missile target" fired from the Reagan Test Site in the Marshall Islands, the military said in a statement.

The test saw a rocket from the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system blast into space and then deploy its "exo-atmospheric kill vehicle," which smashed into the dummy ICBM, destroying it in a direct collision.

"This system is vitally important to the defense of our homeland, and this test demonstrates that we have a capable, credible deterrent against a very real threat," Vice Admiral Jim Syring, director of the US Missile Defense Agency, was quoted as saying.

The exercise marked a significant step for the GMD system, which has had a checkered record in previous tests.

An important thing to remember about the emerging reality of an effective and layered ballistic missile defense is that it did not happen overnight. It happened because for decades - often neglected, ignored, shunned and usually underfunded - some of America and her allies’ best engineers and scientists toiled away making steady progress. In some places they failed, in others underperformed, but they kept working on what worked. They left behind what didn’t, improved what could be improved, and embraced new tools as they became available.

Patriot modernization, Iron Dome, evolution of Aegis with/to SM-2ER Block IVA and now SM-3, THAAD, and the Ground Based Interceptor are the better known functioning parts of this system.

There are still those who oppose BMD, but they are drifting in to the past as the more nuanced and complicated security environment of the 21st Century is replacing the previous century’s hold-overs.

Watch the launch, and like the first infantryman’s view of the tank coming in support through the trenchline, smile a bit and know the future will be just a little bit brighter.



Also, know where this all started. 





Speaking of started, you have to love that the test ICBM that was shot down was launched from the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site on Kwajalein.

Strategic Sabotage

It probably won't shock anyone here to know that steps were made in the last half decade that will, in the end, destroy our nuclear deterrent by simple neglect.

Not unlike deciding to put a cat on a vegan diet - it doesn't kill it right away and it looks like you are feeding it - but it is a death sentence.

I have the details are over at USNIBlog, check it out.

Adama is Giving Us Side-eye

Hard to believe, but some very smart people are thinking very dumb things about nuclear weapons.

I'm discussing over at USNIBlog.

The Responsibility of Power

For senior leaders, what responsibility do they have for the truth? Where is the line between supporting your senior civilian leaders, avoiding political entanglements, and also being able to maintain your credibility by telling the truth?

Two recent examples, one that was required and runs right up to the line, and the other somewhere in the middle.

First, over to the UK;

Jeremy Corbyn has accused the chief of the defence staff of political bias after he criticised the Labour leader's anti-nuclear stance.

Gen Sir Nicholas Houghton told the BBC's Andrew Marr that refusing to launch nuclear weapons would "seriously undermine" Britain's "deterrent".

And he said he would be worried if such a view "translated into power".

Mr Corbyn called on the defence secretary to "take action" against Sir Nicholas over his comments.

Watch the full video, and judge for yourself.



General Houghton only spoke truth. He was clear and direct, and knew he was close to the line - but when it comes to the truth in such serious areas, that is a hill worth dying on.

You can also see an example, this time of an American Admiral who, with easier questions and a bit more hedging, does what a senior leader in the military of a representative republic does - answers a question in a relatively honest way that passes the smell test.

I think he went a bit to far and a bit outside his lane by affirming the nuclear deal, (he could have left that out) but I'll give him a pass as the line is fuzzy, and he made the call as he saw fit;

"We're still concerned about Iran's behavior overall. Positive about the nuclear agreement, but concerned ... about some of their malign behavior related to other things unrelated to the nuclear issue," he said.

Aside from the nuclear negotiations, "I don't know that we've seen a change in behavior," he added, speaking aboard a P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol plane on display at the biennial show.
...
"The behavior we've seen is about what we've come to expect," he said. "They'll like to intercept our ships, especially the combatants, as they're going through the straits or in other places in the Gulf. They like to show that they can shoot weapons when they're in proximity."

In the heavily trafficked Strait of Hormuz, Iranian vessels have occasionally approached commercial ships passing through and told them they must fly an Iranian flag to ensure their safe passage, Donegan added.

About the same as the last Strait passage I did in '99. Routine. Anyone who expected Iran to act differently post-agreement, is a fool.

We need General and Flag officers who are willing to engage on the topics that involve our national defense, even if it does upset one political party or another. General Shinseki, USA (Ret) set another honorable example prior to the invasion of Iraq.

Responsibility of power is not just for the civilian leaders who lead our nations. It also applies to people with 3 or 4-stars who might find themselves in a place where they can sell their soul a bit, or just put out the truth in a respectful way and let history judge.

Fullbore Friday

One man can make a difference; a calm professional with perspective and a firm grasp of the larger story around him.

Regardless of which side of the Cold War you were on - everyone on this planet should know the name Vasili Arkhipov, Vice Admiral, Soviet Navy.

Above them, the U.S. navy were 'hunting by exhaustion' - trying to force the Soviet sub to come to the surface to recharge its batteries.
They had no idea that on board the submarines were weapons capable of destroying the entire American fleet.

Gary Slaughter, a signalman on board the USS Cony battleship, said: 'We knew they were probably having trouble breathing. It was hot as hell in there, they were miserable.

'Frankly I don't think we felt any sympathy for them at all. They were the enemy.'
The Americans decided to ratchet up the pressure, and dropped warning grenades into the sea. Inside the sub, the Soviet submariners thought they were under attack. 

Valentin Savitsky, the captain of B59, was convinced the nuclear war had already started.

Savitsky hadn't counted on Arkhipov. As commander of the fleet, Arkhipov had the last veto. And although his men were against him, he insisted that they must not fire - and instead surrender. 

It was a humiliating move - but one that saved the world. The Soviet submariners were forced to return to their native Russia, where they were given the opposite of a hero's welcome. 

Historian Thomas Blanton told the Sun: 'What heroism, what duty, they fulfilled to go halfway across the world and come back, and survive.

Four decades passed before the story of what really happened on the B59 sub was discovered. It was after Arkipov had died in 1998 from radiation poisoning. 

But to his widow Olga, he was always a hero. 

She said: 'He knew that it was madness to fire the nuclear torpedo. In Cuba, in honour of the 40th anniversary of the crisis, people gathered. 

‘They said that the person who prevented a nuclear war was the Russian submariner Vasili Arkhipov. I was proud and I am proud of my husband always.’

Why did he die of radiation poisoining?

Most of you know about the Soviet's first SSBN, the Hotel K-19? Well;

In July 1961, Arkhipov was appointed deputy commander or executive officer of the new Hotel-class ballistic missile submarine K-19. During its nuclear accident, he backed Captain Nikolai Vladimirovich Zateyev during the potential mutiny. While assisting with engineering work to deal with the overheating reactor, he was exposed to a harmful level of radiation. This incident is depicted in the American film K-19: The Widowmaker.

Take some time to give a nod to a professional.

PBS gave him justice in an hour long documentary. Here is the preview:



Watch the full video here.

Russia and the Nuclear Shadow: 2015’s Revivals with Tom Nichols - on Midrats

They never really went away, but for almost 20 years the world had a holiday from an old challenge and a new one; Russia and the prospect of nuclear war.

Some thought, and more hoped that with the end of the Cold War, a newer world order would emerge that would enable an era of stability and peace. In a way, it did – but only in spots and for short periods of time.

While for the last 15 years most of the attention was focused on the expansion of radical Islam, two not unrelated events began to wax. From the ashes of the Soviet Union, fed by a charismatic leader and a resource extraction economy, Russian began to reassert itself in a manner consistent with the last 500 years of its history, and in parallel – the boogyman of the second half of the 20th Century began to grow as well; the proliferation and possible use nuclear weapons.

To discuss this and more for the full hour this Sunday from 5-6pm Eastern will be Dr. Tom Nichols.

Tom is a professor at the Naval War College and at the Harvard Extension School, as well as a Senior Associate of the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs in New York City and a Fellow of the International History Institute at Boston University. Previously he was a Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. Before coming to the War College, he taught international relations and Russian affairs for many years at Dartmouth College and Georgetown University. In Washington, he was personal staff for defense and security affairs in the United States Senate to the late Senator John Heinz of Pennsylvania.

He received his PhD from Georgetown, an MA from Columbia University, and the Certificate of the Harriman Institute at Columbia.

He's also a five-time undefeated Jeopardy! champion. He played in the 1994 Tournament of Champions, is listed in the Jeopardy! Hall of Fame. He played his final match in the 2005 Ultimate Tournament of Champions.

Join us live if you can with the usual suspects in the chat room and offer up your questions for our guest, but if you miss the show you can always listen to the archive at blogtalkradio. 

If you use iTunes, you can add Midrats to your podcast list simply by clicking the iTunes button at the main showpage - or you can just click here.

Listen to internet radio with Midrats on Blog Talk Radio

It's only a little nuke for goodness sake

Since the end of the Cold War, people have not thought holistically about nuclear weapons. Not so much dropping them ... but being on the receiving end of them.

Not to downplay their power - they do speak for themselves - but their most likely use is not, in spite of all the hyperbole, the end of the world.

As a JO, we practiced nuclear war about as often as Sailors go through SAPR training now days. We planned to fight and win, in a fashion.

What we also knew was that if their use was fairly limited, then so were their effects ... if you were smart.

When at home - for those who knew that right off the East and West Coast there were nuclear armed Soviet submarines that would give you 10-15 minute warning until you were hit ... and with their accuracy - odds are they could land anywhere - one could plan to have a fighting chance to survive an attack.

Post nuclear attack isn't and never was a binary thing. Then again, global nuclear war with generous use of some of the fusion weapons - well - that is a different topic altogether.

What is our big threat now? It isn't global nuclear war - it is the less-than-zero chance that at some point our enemies will either get their hands on, or will build a low-yield nuke. If they get one, they will use in most likely in NYC or DC.

Along those lines, Marc Ambinder over at The Week is doing everyone a favor - giving you a chance to live if the thinkable happens. Marc, do you mind if I steal the core of your article for public service? Thanks.

... very few people in Washington, D.C., who work for the government have any idea what they would do if a 10-kiloton nuclear device exploded at the intersection of 16th and K streets.
...
And curiously, and perhaps hearteningly, it turns out that there is quite a lot that you or I can do if we get stuck in Washington when something like that happens. Choices we make could very well make the difference between our imminent death and a relatively full and happy life, assuming the bomb is a one-off.

The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory released a report in 2011 that spells all this out. It hasn't gotten nearly the attention it deserves.

It's called the "National Capital Region Key Response Planning Factors for the Aftermath of Nuclear Terrorism" and it makes for fascinating reading.

Did you know, for example, that:

1. The WORST thing for someone to try to do, in the aftermath of a nuclear explosion that they survive, is to get in a car and drive away.

2. Unless you're within about a third to a half a mile radius of ground zero and the shelter options are poor, the BEST thing for someone to do is to find a stable location inside a well-built apartment or office building — the majority of which will remain standing outside that half mile radius — and stay there for 24 hours.

And if you were very close to ground zero and you did survive — and a lot of folks will — the best thing for you to do is to:

A. Take immediate shelter somewhere, because fallout will rain down on you if you don't.

B. Wait an hour.

C. Then, walk about a half-dozen blocks laterally until you find intact large buildings to shelter you.

3. The electromagnetic pulse from a ground burst will NOT, in fact, knock out all types of communication. Some? Maybe.

4. If you live in a single-family house with thin walls, your chances of surviving in the immediate aftermath of a blast and not getting cancer later are exponentially higher than if you seek shelter in a bigger building, even one that might literally be next door.

5. Rescuers should NOT put on radiation protection gear if it will slow them down. So long as the fallout has stopped falling, they're best advised to turn out in their normal gear.

6. Though thousands of people will die from the blast effects, almost all — about 96 percent — of the other potential casualties could be avoided if people understood the basics of what to do in the event of mass radiation exposure.

7. Did I mention that the worst place to be in the immediate aftermath of a nuclear blast is in a car trying to get away? The so-called DFZ — the Dangerous Fallout Zone — will extend out as much as 20 miles, but it is likely to be extremely narrow. (If it's not, that means the concentration of radioactive particles will be lower.) The vector and location of this zone depends on the wind. And its size will shrink with every passing hour.

8. Penetrating trauma from broken glass is probably the largest treatable cadre of blast injuries.

That is good stuff for you and your family to know.

Keep it in your nogg'n.

About that Iranian nuclear deal ...

This is all rather simple. Once again, we were played. We have sent yet another weak signal, pushed hard decisions down the road where they will be harder, punished our friends and rewarded our enemies.

The Iranians will never do what we want them to do - they will do what they want to do, and that is to become nuclear.

The future is still clear, the 2nd and 3rd order effects are predictable. In order to save time, I am simply going to quote myself from 2006, seven years ago.

Nothing. Has. Changed.

The Sunni powers will not let this stand. I would hope that many of you understand the 30-years war and what that was all about. Now picture if the Catholic and Protestant powers had nukes. Well, they were progressive minded people compared to the Jim Jones like cult that is running Iran right now. Though they really want to go Persian Empire on everyone, the Iranian issues is more religious than political. That is where the danger lies. Politicians understand negotiation and compromise. They understand give and take. Religious fundamentalists don't. They were binary before binary existed. If fundamentalists Iran gets nukes. Those who see themselves as the defenders of Sunni Islam and/or share a border with Iran, will not let that stand.
...
When they (the Iranians) go "click-boom" the chain reaction will follow - Saudi Arabia and Egypt will be next. To the Mullahs of Iran you can add the Wahhabi of Saudi Arabia and Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt.

Yes, 2006. I thought the Muslim Brotherhood would have more staying power, but Egypt will react as Egypt needs to, regardless of who is at the levers.

We have a little time here. We have options. Don't ask me which is best; they are all bad.

Well - thanks for a little cyberwar, we have a little more time than we thought ... but the only people who have time in their favor now are the Iranians.

I still don't have the right answer, but I know what is the wrong answer; showing weakness to the Iranians.

Keeping an Eye on the Long Game: Part XLVIII

Come on China, you really don't want to play this game, do you?

Chinese state-run media revealed for the first time this week that Beijing’s nuclear submarines can attack American cities as a means to counterbalance U.S. nuclear deterrence in the Pacific. 

On Monday, leading media outlets including China Central TV, the People’s Daily, the Global Times, the PLA Daily, the China Youth Daily and the Guangmin Daily ran identical, top-headlined reports about the “awesomeness” of the People's Liberation Army navy’s strategic submarine force. 

“This is the first time in 42 years since the establishment of our navy’s strategic submarine force that we reveal on such a large scale the secrets of our first-generation underwater nuclear force,” the Global Times said in a lengthy article titled “China for the First Time Possesses Effective Underwater Nuclear Deterrence against the United States.”
The article features 30 photos and graphics detailing, among other things, damage projections for Seattle and Los Angeles after being hit by Chinese nuclear warheads and the deadly radiation that would spread all the way to Chicago.

In 2010, a new class of missile sub, the Type 094 Jin class, entered the service. It is capable of launching 12 to 16 JL-2 missiles with a range of about 8,700 miles, covering much of the continental U.S. with single or multiple, independently targetable re-entry vehicle warheads. 

Chinese calculations for nuclear attacks on the U.S. are chillingly macabre.
“Because the Midwest states of the U.S. are sparsely populated, in order to increase the lethality, [our] nuclear attacks should mainly target the key cities on the West Coast of the United States, such as Seattle, Los Angeles, San Francisco and San Diego,” the Global Times said. 

“The 12 JL-2 nuclear warheads carried by one single Type 094 SSBN can kill and wound 5 million to 12 million Americans,” the Global Times reported. 

China also has developed land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles — notably the DF-31A, which has a range of 7,000 to 7,500 miles. 

“If we launch our DF 31A ICBMs over the North Pole, we can easily destroy a whole list of metropolises on the East Coast and the New England region of the U.S., including Annapolis, Philadelphia, New York, Boston, Portland, Baltimore and Norfolk, whose population accounts for about one-eighth of America’s total residents,” the Global Times said.

From an ASW perspective, though YG88 and older are the only ones who really had to deal with this type of issue ... that's OK. We have enough institutional knowledge to knock off the cob-webs and work off the flab, we're good with this if you really want to play. I don't think China wants to play this game, just a few writers getting a little full of themselves - but let's pull that thread some more.

As for actual click-boom nuclear war ... yea, we've got that too. If you want to go the human traditional total war body count, well, nuke 12 million Americans? Your population is a lot more concentrated and your economic nodes more centralized, so .... yea. Just move that decimal point over one, and there is our second strike.

Nuke 12 million Americans? The other 305 million will fully support trying to knock your population back below a billion before demanding your surrender before we cut it in half. Even th most passive parts of the nation can get quite bloody minded. The Yankees killed a few hundred thousand of my countrymen on a point of political order - so just be careful.

Then again, if we keep networking all our military computer systems together for "efficiency" and let more and more security holes open for Chinese spies ... maybe we would lose that second strike capability - then we have a different game altogether.

Well, if nothing else, it looks like China isn't interested in nuking Dixie or most of the red states. Deer season is still a go.