In social-dilemma situations (public-good games) people may
pursue their local, egoistic interests and thereby lower the
global, overall payoff of their group and, paradoxically, even
their own resulting payoff. One may also speak of intra-
individual dilemmas, where people pursue local goals at the
expense of their overall utility. Our current experiments
transfer this idea to the context of personnel evaluation and
personnel selection. In our experiments, participants were put
in the position of a Human Resources manager, who should
for instance select workers who optimize the overall payoff of
the company, rather than those who optimize only their
specific payoffs. The results of the experiments, however,
suggest that most, albeit not all, participants tended to focus
on directly comparing individuals without considering the
overall contribution to a group. Thus employees with the best
overall effects for a company or organization may be
evaluated the most negatively. This possible ‘tragedy of
personnel evaluation’ may be linked to maladaptive incentive
structures (personnel evaluation), advancement of employees
(personnel promotion) and job offers (personnel selection),
and may have a substantial negative impact on the
effectiveness of companies or organizations.