This paper introduces a decentralized and leaderless sealed bid auction model for dynamic pricing of intents across blockchain networks. We leverage Multi-Party Computation (MPC) and Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) to improve pricing while ensuring fairness and decentralization. By addressing the vulnerabilities of current centralized or static pricing mechanisms, our approach fosters transparent, secure, and competitive price discovery. We further enhance the confidentiality of intents...

The decentralized nature of blockchains is touted to provide censorship resistance. However, in reality, the ability of proposers to completely control the contents of a block makes censorship relatively fragile. To combat this, a notion of inclusion lists has been proposed in the blockchain community. This paper presents the first formal study of inclusion lists. Our inclusion list design leverages multiple proposers to propose transactions and improve censorship resistance. The design has...

Today, many auctions are carried out with the help of intermediary platforms like Google and eBay. These platforms serve as a rendezvous point for the buyers and sellers, and charge a fee for its service. We refer to such auctions as platform-assisted auctions. Traditionally, the auction theory literature mainly focuses on designing auctions that incentivize the buyers to bid truthfully, assuming that the platform always faithfully implements the auction. In practice, however, the platforms...

Fully asynchronous multi-party computation (AMPC) has superior robustness in realizing privacy and guaranteed output delivery (G.O.D.) against asynchronous adversaries that can arbitrarily delay communications. However, none of these protocols are truly practical, as they either have sub-optimal resilience, incur cumbersome communication cost, or suffer from an online phase with extra cryptographic overhead. The only attempting implementation---HoneyBadgerMPC (hbMPC)---merely ensures G.O.D....

Blockchain-based auction markets offer stronger fairness and transparency compared to their centralized counterparts. Deposits and sealed bid formats are usually applied to enhance security and privacy. However, to our best knowledge, the formal treatment of deposit-enabled sealed-bid auctions remains lacking in the cryptographic literature. To address this gap, we first propose a decentralized anonymous deposited-bidding (DADB) scheme, providing formal syntax and security definitions....

This work introduces Cryptobazaar, a novel scalable, private, and decentralized sealed-bid auction protocol. In particular, our protocol protects the privacy of losing bidders by preserving the confidentiality of their bids while ensuring public verifiability of the outcome and relying only on a single untrusted auctioneer for coordination. At its core, Cryptobazaar combines an efficient distributed protocol to compute the logical-OR for a list of unary-encoded bids with various novel...

In this work, we construct a second price (Vickrey) auction protocol (SPA), which does not require any auctioneers and ensures total privacy in the presence of rational parties participating in auction. In particular, the confidentiality of the highest bid and the identity of the second highest bidder are protected. We model the bidders participating in the second price auction as rational, computationally bounded and privacy-sensitive parties. These are self-interested agents who care about...

Time-lock puzzles are unique cryptographic primitives that use computational complexity to keep information secret for some period of time, after which security expires. Unfortunately, twenty-five years after their introduction, current analysis techniques of time-lock primitives provide no sound mechanism to build multi-party cryptographic protocols which use expiring security as a building block. As pointed out recently in the peer-reviewed literature, current attempts at this problem...

The incentive-compatibility properties of blockchain transaction fee mechanisms have been investigated with passive block producers that are motivated purely by the net rewards earned at the consensus layer. This paper introduces a model of active block producers that have their own private valuations for blocks (representing, for example, additional value derived from the application layer). The block producer surplus in our model can be interpreted as one of the more common colloquial...

Auctions, a long-standing method of trading goods and services, are a promising use case for decentralized finance. However, due to the inherent transparency property of blockchains, current sealed-bid auction implementations on smart contracts requires a bidder to send at least two transactions to the underlying blockchain: a bidder must first commit their bid in the first transaction during the bidding period and reveal their bid in the second transaction once the revealing period starts....

Enhancing privacy on smart contract-enabled blockchains has garnered much attention in recent research. Zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) is one of the most popular approaches, however, they fail to provide full expressiveness and fine-grained privacy. To illustrate this, we underscore an underexplored type of Miner Extractable Value (MEV), called Residual Bids Extractable Value (RBEV). Residual bids highlight the vulnerability where unfulfilled bids inadvertently reveal traders’ unmet demands...

Decentralized Finance (DeFi) has witnessed remarkable growth and innovation, with Decentralized Exchanges (DEXes) playing a pivotal role in shaping this ecosystem. As numerous DEX designs emerge, challenges such as price inefficiency and lack of user privacy continue to prevail. This paper introduces a novel DEX design, termed COMMON, that addresses these two predominant challenges. COMMON operates as an order book, natively integrated with a shielded token pool, thus providing anonymity to...

Auction and voting schemes play a crucial role in the Web3 ecosystem. Yet currently deployed implementations either lack privacy or require at least two rounds, hindering usability and security. We introduce Cicada, a general framework for using linearly homomorphic time-lock puzzles (HTLPs) to enable provably secure, non-interactive private auction and voting protocols. We instantiate our framework with an efficient new HTLP construction and novel packing techniques that enable succinct...

Blockchain auction plays an important role in the price discovery of digital assets (e.g. NFTs). However, despite their importance, implementing auctions directly on blockchains such as Ethereum incurs scalability issues. In particular, the on-chain transactions scale poorly with the number of bidders, leading to network congestion, increased transaction fees, and slower transaction confirmation time. This lack of scalability significantly hampers the ability of the system to handle...

We introduce the first practical protocols for fully decentralized sealed-bid auctions using timed commitments. Timed commitments ensure that the auction is finalized fairly even if all participants drop out after posting bids or if $n-1$ bidders collude to try to learn the $n^{th}$ bidder’s bid value. Our protocols rely on a novel non-malleable timed commitment scheme which efficiently supports range proofs to establish that bidders have sufficient funds to cover a hidden bid value....

The emergence of blockchain technologies as central components of financial frameworks has amplified the extraction of market inefficiencies, such as arbitrage, through Miner Extractable Value (MEV) from Decentralized Finance smart contracts. Exploiting these opportunities often requires fee payment to miners and validators, colloquially termed as bribes. The recent development of centralized MEV relayers has led to these payments shifting from the public transaction pool to private...

We introduce a new data-independent priority queue which supports amortized polylogarithmic-time insertions and constant-time deletions, and crucially, (non-amortized) constant-time \textit{read-front} operations, in contrast with a prior construction of Toft (PODC'11). Moreover, we reduce the number of required comparisons. Data-independent data structures - first identified explicitly by Toft, and further elaborated by Mitchell and Zimmerman (STACS'14) - facilitate computation on encrypted...

In this work, we revisit the severely limited throughput problem of cryptocurrencies and propose a novel rebalancing approach for Payment Channel Networks (PCNs). PCNs are a popular solution for increasing the blockchain throughput, however, their benefit depends on the overall users’ liquidity. Rebalancing mechanisms are the state-of-the-art approach to maintaining high liquidity in PCNs. However, existing opt-in rebalancing mechanisms exclude users that may assist in rebalancing for small...

Online auctions have a steadily growing market size, creating billions of US dollars in sales value every year. To ensure fairness and auditability while preserving the bidder's privacy is the main challenge of an auction scheme. At the same time, utility driven blockchain technology is picking up the pace, offering transparency and data integrity to many applications. In this paper, we present a blockchain-based first price sealed-bid auction scheme. Our scheme offers privacy and public...

Akbarpour and Li (2020) formalized credibility as an auction desideratum where the auctioneer cannot benefit by implementing undetectable deviations from the promised auction and showed that, in the plain model, the ascending price auction with reserves is the only credible, strategyproof, revenue-optimal auction. Ferreira and Weinberg (2020) proposed the Deferred Revelation Auction (DRA) as a communication efficient auction that avoids the uniqueness results from (2020) assuming the...

Kyber is a key-encapsulation mechanism (KEM) that was recently selected by NIST in its PQC standardization process; it is also the only scheme to be selected in the context of public-key encryption (PKE) and key establishment. The main security target for KEMs, and their associated PKE schemes, in the NIST PQC context has been IND-CCA security. However, some important modern applications also require their underlying KEMs/PKE schemes to provide anonymity (Bellare et al., ASIACRYPT 2001)....

Sealed bid auctions are used to allocate a resource among a set of interested parties. Traditionally, auctions need the presence of a trusted auctioneer to whom the bidders provide their private bid values. Existence of such a trusted party is not an assumption easily realized in practice. Generic secure computation protocols can be used to remove a trusted party. However, generic techniques result in inefficient protocols, and typically do not provide fairness - that is, a corrupt party can...

A double auction system, where buyers and sellers trade through bids, requires a transparent and immutable mechanism to record allocation results. This demand can be met with robust ledgers that ensure persistence and liveness, as exemplified by the Bitcoin blockchain (EuroCrypt {'}15). While existing blockchain-aided auction systems often rely on secure smart contracts or layer-$2$ techniques, this work proposes a more fundamental approach by constructing a provably secure blockchain...

The always-available liquidity of automated market makers (AMMs) has been one of the most important catalysts in early cryptocurrency adoption. However, it has become increasingly evident that AMMs in their current form are not viable investment options for passive liquidity providers. This is because of the cost incurred by AMMs providing stale prices to arbitrageurs against external market prices, formalized as loss-versus-rebalancing (LVR) [Milionis et al., 2022]. In this paper, we...

This paper proposes Addax, a fast, verifiable, and private online ad exchange. When a user visits an ad-supported site, Addax runs an auction similar to those of leading exchanges; Addax requests bids, selects the winner, collects payment, and displays the ad to the user. A key distinction is that bids in Addax’s auctions are kept private and the outcome of the auction is publicly verifiable. Addax achieves these properties by adding public verifiability to the affine aggregatable encodings...

This paper introduces Ibex, an advertising system that reduces the amount of data that is collected on users while still allowing advertisers to bid on real-time ad auctions and measure the effectiveness of their ad campaigns. Specifically, Ibex addresses an issue in recent proposals such as Google’s Privacy Sandbox Topics API in which browsers send information about topics that are of interest to a user to advertisers and demand-side platforms (DSPs). DSPs use this information to (1)...

The stock market has two primary functions, that of providing liquidity and price discovery. While historically, the market micro-structure was mostly ignored or assumed to function ideally for the purpose of asset pricing, O’Hara (Journal of Finance, 2003) established that both liquidity and price discovery affect asset pricing, and consequently asset returns. In this work, we extend the analysis of Easley and O’Hara (Journal of finance, 2004) to study common stock market mechanisms,...

In blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum, users compete in a transaction fee auction to get their transactions confirmed in the next block. A line of recent works set forth the desiderata for a “dream” transaction fee mechanism (TFM), and explored whether such a mechanism existed. A dream TFM should satisfy 1) user incentive compatibility (UIC), i.e., truthful bidding should be a user’s dominant strategy; 2) miner incentive compatibility (MIC), i.e., the miner’s dominant strategy is to...

Vector commitments (VCs), enabling to commit to a vector and locally reveal any of its entries, play a key role in a variety of both classic and recently-evolving applications. However, security notions for VCs have so far focused on passive attacks, and non-malleability notions considering active attacks have not been explored. Moreover, existing frameworks that may enable to capture the non-malleability of VCs seem either too weak (non-malleable non-interactive commitments that do not...

A core goal of the NIST PQC competition is to produce public-key encryption (PKE) schemes which, even if attacked with a large-scale quantum computer, maintain the security guarantees needed by applications. The main security focus in the NIST PQC context has been IND-CCA security, but other applications demand that PKE schemes provide 'anonymity' (Bellare et al., ASIACRYPT 2001), and 'robustness' (Abdalla et al., TCC 2010). Examples of such applications include anonymous communication...

Proxy signature (PS) is a kind of digital signature, in which an entity called original signer can delegate his signing rights to another entity called proxy signer. Designated verifier signature (DVS) is a kind of digital signature where the authenticity of any signature can be verified by only one verifier who is designated by the signer when generating it. Designated verifier proxy signature (DVPS) combines the idea of DVS with the concept of proxy signature (PS) and is suitable for being...

Sealed-bid auctions are a common way of allocating an asset among a set of parties but require trusting an auctioneer who analyses the bids and determines the winner. Many privacy-preserving computation protocols for auctions have been proposed to eliminate the need for a trusted third party. However, they lack fairness, meaning that the adversary learns the outcome of the auction before honest parties and may choose to make the protocol fail without suffering any consequences. In this...

Existing models for non-interactive MPC cannot provide full privacy for inputs, because they inherently leak the residual function (i.e., the output of the function on the honest parties’ input together with all possible values of the adversarial inputs). For example, in any non-interactive sealed-bid auction, the last bidder can figure out what was the highest previous bid. We present a new MPC model which avoids this privacy leak. To achieve this, we utilize a blockchain in a novel way,...

A common primitive in election and auction protocols is plaintext equivalence test (PET) in which two ciphertexts are tested for equality of their plaintexts, and a verifiable proof of the test's outcome is provided. The most commonly-cited PETs require at least one honest party, but many applications claim universal verifiability, at odds with this requirement. If a test that relies on at least one honest participant is mistakenly used in a place where universally verifiable proof is...

In proof-of-work based cryptocurrencies, miners invest computing power to maintain a distributed ledger. The drawback of such a consensus protocol is its immense energy consumption. Bitcoin, for example consumes as much energy as a small nation state. To prevent this waste of energy various consensus mechanism such as proof-of-space or proof-of-stake have been proposed. In proof-of-stake, block creators are selected based on the amounts of money they stake instead of their expanded...

We propose the first auctioneer-free sealed-bid auction protocol with a linear computation and communication complexity $O(c)$, $c$ being the bit length of the bid price. Our protocol, called Self-Enforcing Auction Lot (SEAL), operates in a decentralized setting, where bidders jointly compute the maximum bid while preserving the privacy of losing bids. In our protocol, we do not require any secret channels between participants. All operations are publicly verifiable; everyone including...

Secure Multi-party Computation (MPC) is one of the most influential achievements of modern cryptography: it allows evaluation of an arbitrary function on private inputs from multiple parties without revealing the inputs. A crucial step of utilizing contemporary MPC protocols is to describe the function as a Boolean circuit. While efficient solutions have been proposed for special case of two-party secure computation, the general case of more than two-party is not addressed. This paper...

The wide deployment of tokens for digital assets on top of Ethereum implies the need for powerful trading platforms. Vickrey auctions have been known to determine the real market price of items as bidders are motivated to submit their own monetary valuations without leaking their information to the competitors. Recent constructions have utilized various cryptographic protocols such as ZKP and MPC, however, these approaches either are partially privacy-preserving or require complex...

Permissionless blockchain systems, such as Bitcoin, rely on users using their computational power to solve a puzzle in order to achieve a consensus. To incentivise users in maintaining the system, newly minted coins are assigned to the user who solves this puzzle. A hardware race that has hence ensued among the users, has had a detrimental impact on the environment, with enormous energy consumption and increased global carbon footprint. On the other hand, proof of stake systems incentivise...

We consider the issue of securing dark pools/markets in the financial services sector. These markets currently are executed via trusted third parties, leading to potential fraud being able to be conducted by the market operators. We present a potential solution to this problem by using Multi-Party Computation to enable a trusted third party to be emulated in software. Our experiments show that whilst the standard market clearing mechanism of Continuous Double Auction in lit markets is not...

The success of the Ethereum blockchain as a decentralized application platform with a distributed consensus protocol has made many organizations start to invest into running their business on top of it. Technically, the most impressive feature behind the success of Ethereum is its support for a Turing complete language.On the other hand, the inherent transparency and, consequently, the lack of privacy poses a great challenge for many financial applications. In this paper, we tackle this...

We present Strain, a new auction protocol running on top of blockchains and guaranteeing bid confidentiality against fully-malicious parties. As our goal is efficiency and low blockchain latency, we abstain from using traditional, highly interactive MPC primitives such as secret shares. We focus on a slightly weaker adversary model than MPC which allows Strain to achieve constant latency in both the number of parties and the bid length. The main idea behind Strain is a...

We study the problem of securely building single-commodity multi-markets auction mechanisms. We introduce a novel greedy algorithm and its corresponding privacy preserving implementation using secure multi-party computation. More specifically, we determine the quantity of supply and demand bids maximizing welfare. Each bid is attached to a specific market, but exchanges between different markets are allowed up to some upper limit. The general goal is for the players to bid their intended...

We study the security of symmetric primitives under the incorrect usage of keys. Roughly speaking, a key-robust scheme does not output ciphertexts/tags that are valid with respect to distinct keys. Key-robustness is a notion that is often tacitly expected/assumed in protocol design — as is the case with anonymous auction, oblivious transfer, or public-key encryption. We formalize simple, yet strong definitions of key robustness for authenticated-encryption, message-authentication codes and...

Concurrent signatures allow two entities to generate two signatures in such a way that both signatures are ambiguous till some information is revealed by one of the parties. This kind of signature is useful in auction protocols and a wide range of scenarios in which involving participants are mutually distrustful. In this paper, to have quantum-attack-resistant concurrent signatures as recommended by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NISTIR 8105), the first concurrent signature...

Auctions and elections are seemingly disjoint. Nevertheless, similar cryptographic primitives are used in both domains. For instance, mixnets, homomorphic encryption and trapdoor bit-commitments have been used by state-of-the-art schemes in both domains. These developments have appeared independently. For example, the adoption of mixnets in elections preceded a similar adoption in auctions by over two decades. In this paper, we demonstrate a relation between auctions and elections: we...

Abstract: This work presents an Adaptively Secure Broadcast Mechanism (ASBM) based on threats analytics. It defines the security intelligence of a broadcast system comprehensively with a novel concept of collective intelligence. The algorithmic mechanism is analyzed from the perspectives of security intelligence, communication complexity and computational intelligence. The security intelligence of ASBM is defined in terms of authentication, authorization, correct identification, privacy:...

Sealed-Bid auction is an efficient and rational method to establish the price in open market. However sealed-bid auctions are sub- ject to bid-rigging attack. Receipt-free mechanisms were proposed to prevent bid-rigging. The prior receipt-free mechanisms are based on two assumptions; firstly, existence of untappable channel between bidders and auction authorities. Secondly, mechanisms assume the authorities to be honest (not colluding). Moreover the bandwidth required to com- municate the...

We present novel security requirements for second price auctions and a simple, efficient and practical protocol that provably maintains these requirements. Novel requirements are needed because commonly used requirements, such as the indistinguishability-based secrecy requirement of encryption schemes presented by \cite{goldwasser1982pep}, do not fit properly in the second price auctions context. Additionally, the presented protocol uses a trustworthy supervisor that checks if the auctioneer...

We revisit the notions of robustness introduced by Abdalla, Bellare, and Neven (TCC 2010). One of the main motivations for the introduction of strong robustness for public-key encryption (PKE) by Abdalla et al. to prevent certain types of attack on Sako's auction protocol. We show, perhaps surprisingly, that Sako's protocol is still vulnerable to attacks exploiting robustness problems in the underlying PKE scheme, even when it is instantiated with a \emph{strongly} robust scheme. This...

Rational secret sharing was proposed by Halpern and Teague in STOC'04. The authors show that, in a setting with rational players, secret sharing and multiparty computation are only possible if the actual secret reconstruction round remains unknown to the players. All the subsequent works use a similar approach with different assumptions. We change the direction by bridging cryptography, game theory, and reputation systems, and propose a social model for repeated rational secret sharing. We...

Many cryptographic tasks and protocols, such as non-repudiation, contract-signing, voting, auction, identity-based encryption, and certain forms of secure multi-party computation, involve the use of (semi-)trusted parties, such as notaries and authorities. It is crucial that such parties can be held accountable in case they misbehave as this is a strong incentive for such parties to follow the protocol. Unfortunately, there does not exist a general and convincing definition of accountability...

This paper shows some efficient and provably-secure convertible undeniable signature schemes (with both selective conversion and all conversion), in the standard model and discrete logarithm setting. They further satisfy unambiguity, which is traditionally required for anonymous signatures. Briefly, unambiguity means that it is hard to generate a (message, signature) pair which is valid for two {\em different} public-keys. In other words, our schemes can be viewed as anonymous signature...

We consider enhancing a sealed-bid single-item auction with \emph{privacy} concerns, our assumption being that bidders primarily care about monetary payoff and secondarily worry about exposing information about their type to other players and learning information about other players' types. To treat privacy explicitly within the game theoretic context, we put forward a novel \emph{hybrid utility} model that considers both fiscal and privacy components in the players' payoffs. We show how to...

In this note, we report on the first large-scale and practical application of multiparty computation, which took place in January 2008. We also report on the novel cryptographic protocols that were used.

We present two universally composable and practical protocols by which a dealer can, verifiably and non-interactively, secret-share an integer among a set of players. Moreover, at small extra cost and using a distributed verifier proof, it can be shown in zero-knowledge that three shared integers $a,b,c$ satisfy $ab =c$. This implies by known reductions non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs that a shared integer is in a given interval, or that one secret integer is larger than another. Such...

Bid opening in e-auction is efficient when a homomorphic secret sharing function is employed to seal the bids and homomorphic secret reconstruction is employed to open the bids. However, this high efficiency is based on an assumption: the bids are valid (e.g. within a special range). An undetected invalid bid can compromise correctness and fairness of the auction. Unfortunately, validity verification of the bids is ignored in the auction schemes employing homomorphic secret sharing (called...

Chameleon signatures are non-interactive signatures based on a hash-and-sign para\-digm, and similar in efficiency to regular signatures. The distinguishing characteristic of chameleon signatures is that their are non-transferable, with only the designated recipient capable of asserting its validity. In this paper, we introduce the first identity-based chameleon hash function. The general advantages of identity-based cryptography over conventional schemes relative to key distribution are...

We show how to construct practical honest-verifier statistical zero-knowledge \emph{Diophantine} arguments of knowledge (HVSZK AoK) that a committed tuple of integers belongs to an arbitrary language in bounded arithmetic. While doing this, we propose a new algorithm for computing the Lagrange representation of nonnegative integers and a new efficient representing polynomial for the exponential relation. We apply our results by constructing the most efficient known HVSZK AoK for...

We propose a new cryptographically protected multi-round auction mechanism for online auctions. This auction mechanism is designed to provide (in this order) security, cognitive convenience, and round-effectiveness. One can vary internal parameters of the mechanism to trade off bid privacy and cognitive costs, or cognitive costs and the number of rounds. We are aware of no previous work that interleaves cryptography explicitly with the mechanism design.

In this paper, we introduce a bit-slice approach for auctions and present a more efficient circuit than the normal approach for the highest-price auction. Our circuit can be combined with any auction protocol based on general circuit evaluation. Especially, if we combine with the mix and match technique, then we can obtain a highest-price auction protocol which is at least seven times faster. A second-price auction protocol is also easily constructed from our circuit.

We argue that threshold trust is not an option in most of the real-life electronic auctions. We then propose two new cryptographic Vickrey auction schemes that involve, apart from the bidders and the seller $S$, an auction authority $A$ so that unless $S$ and $A$ collude the outcome of auctions will be correct, and moreover, $S$ will not get any information about the bids, while $A$ will learn bid statistics. Further extensions make it possible to decrease damage that colluding $S$ and $A$...