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Source changed 2026-11-18 22:51:26 UTC · snapshot created 2026-11-18 22:54:45 UTC · last check 2026-11-18 23:35:10 UTC

ECO.5:4 - Solution

ECO.5:4.1 - Locate the private fact or action

Identify the information or action that matters and who can know or control it. Existing quality, intended use or financial condition may be privately known before agreement. Later maintenance, care or effort may be privately chosen. The same exchange can involve both. Evaluate separately whether changed payment terms affect an action and whether a choice reveals an existing fact.

Identify the choices each party can make under the actual terms. They may disclose or withhold information, select an offer, decline, change effort, manipulate a measure, withdraw or seek new terms. Include the alternatives available to the participant, including ones the designer would prefer them not to take.

ECO.5:4.2 - Construct terms from the choices they must change

Start with terms the parties could carry out. These might include payment after an interpretable test, a refund for a defined failure, a deposit at risk, or a choice of services. Establish how the specified event can be observed and who has the means and authority to deliver the consequence. Relate each available choice or event to its payment or service. Use an existing rule directly when its effects meet the need.

For a private action, compare the participant’s returns under each relevant choice. Include ways to improve the measure while neglecting the result. To design different incentives, change a term that alters these relative returns. Check participation against the outside alternative, including the participant’s exposure. A design that is to induce the intended action needs both participation and the relevant choice after entry.

In a risk-neutral model, let b be the payment received regardless of the test, w the extra payment for passing, p the probability of passing under an action and c its cost. Expected return is b + p × w − c. Compare returns for the intended action and its relevant alternatives. The difference in expected bonus equals w times the difference in passing probabilities. Increasing b by the same amount for every action raises the return to entering without changing their order in this model. If risk aversion, wealth or payment timing matters, compare the relevant distributions and financing needs or use a qualified specialist result.

For a private fact, examine the choices of each relevant type of participant. A seller may know the item’s quality, or a buyer its own need. A model can stipulate possible types without identifying the actual participant’s type. For each type, compare the proposed offer, the other available offers and nonparticipation using its costs, benefits and exposure.

A refund that will be paid costs the more failure-prone seller more in expectation. Different service packages can also have different values to buyers. Use a difference of this kind to construct terms when separation is wanted. Check each type’s available choices. If different types would accept the same offer, acceptance alone leaves their types unresolved. The exchange can still be worthwhile under a supported mixed or conditional account. If later actions can alter the result, compare the incentives for those actions as well.

Find terms that meet the participation and choice conditions together. If designing terms, vary the price, contingent payment or service within actual observation and resource limits. Check the result for the other party as well. Indifference establishes a tie. To predict or attribute one of the tied choices, use additional grounds. When no feasible terms satisfy the requirements, report the limit. A further design may change the service, observation, risk allocation or participant. Raising all payments can leave relative incentives unchanged.

Use supported probabilities and valuations for claims about actual participants. For a conditional calculation, state the assumptions. Where the evidence supports only cases or ranges, report what holds across them and what could change the conclusion. Include verification, enforcement, tied-up capital and unpriced effects. A deposit can discourage an unwanted choice while excluding a capable participant unable to bear the exposure.

For an incentive linked to an observed result, establish what the observation reveals about the desired work. If the provider can improve the measure while neglecting the result, reassess the terms or observation. A signal that mainly adds uncontrollable risk can discourage participation. Staged payment can limit exposure to nondelivery while leaving quality unknown. State which consequence the mechanism supports.

ECO.5:4.3 - Make the terms usable

To establish that the terms are usable, check whether the warranty provider can pay, how the acceptance condition is interpreted, whether the stake remains exposed and which parties can agree. Obtain a qualified legal or specialist mechanism-design result where the claim depends on enforceability or a particular guarantee. A comparison under stipulated terms can be reported with that condition open.

Report what the terms imply for the relevant choices and what remains uncertain. If proposing a change, explain how the new terms would alter the comparison. Keep effective existing terms when they meet the need. Seek additional information when its likely value justifies the burden.