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Source changed 2026-11-18 22:51:26 UTC · snapshot created 2026-11-18 22:54:45 UTC · last check 2026-11-18 23:25:10 UTC

ECO.5:5 - Archetypal Grounding

ECO.5:5.1 - Care under an outcome-based payment

Suppose a maintenance provider can choose low care, costing €4 with probability 0.5 of passing the test, or high care, costing €12 with probability 0.9. The provider is risk-neutral, has no other relevant costs and could earn €32 from its next best feasible alternative. The test is functionally valid and cannot be cheaply manipulated under these assumptions.

Let the contract pay a nonnegative base b and a nonnegative bonus w for passing. High care strictly beats low care when (0.9 − 0.5) × w > €12 − €4, so w > €20. It strictly beats the outside option when b + 0.9 × w − €12 > €32. With an available €30 bonus this requires b > €17. A €20 base satisfies both. To assess the whole exchange, also compare the result for the buyer with its feasible alternative.

With b = €20 and w = €30, expected payment less effort cost is €31 for low care and €35 for high care. The €12 gain in expected bonus exceeds the €8 extra cost. High care also beats the €32 outside return. Under a flat €35 payment the provider would net €31 for low care and €23 for high care, both below the outside return.

Suppose the risk-neutral buyer values a pass at €80 and a failure at zero. The test and other costs are the same for both offers. Under the conditional contract, expected benefit is €72 and expected payment €47, leaving €25. A second provider offers the same 0.9 pass probability for a fixed €50, leaving €22. The buyer therefore proposes the conditional contract, which also gives the first provider more than its outside option. If a pass were worth only €40 and idle equipment carried no further loss, either contract would give the buyer negative expected net benefit, so the buyer would decline both.

The comparisons establish the modeled direction of the incentives under the given assumptions. An optimality or general behavioral claim needs further grounds. If the provider can pass the test while leaving the equipment unreliable, the terms reward the wrong result. If variable receipts exceed the provider’s tolerance for risk, reassess participation.

With a €15 cap on the bonus, the largest additional expected reward for high care is 0.4 × €15 = €6. That is less than the €8 additional cost. Raising the common base leaves this difference unchanged under the assumptions. If the buyer still needs the work, it can use the other provider if the complete offer remains acceptable or reconsider the observation, the task or the terms.

ECO.5:5.2 - A warranty whose issuer cannot pay

Two sellers offer the same warranty, but one has no resources to honour a claim and can disappear after sale. The same promise therefore has different expected consequences. A deposit, credible guarantor, continuing relationship or different offer may change the comparison. Assess what would make the payment or service available.

ECO.5:5.3 - Construct a quality offer and test who would accept

Suppose a buyer needs one refurbished component. Sellers know whether their own component has a 0.1 or 0.5 chance of failure during a fixed warranty period. The buyer cannot tell which applies. The model specifies the same verifiable failure, fixed probabilities unaffected by later care, a €40 supply cost, and risk-neutral buyer and sellers. The more reliable seller’s alternative yields €50 net and the less reliable seller’s yields €30. Supply, administration and cash are available with no other relevant costs.

Set a price P and a failure refund R. A trusted administrator can hold R from the price throughout the warranty and refund it if the verifiable failure occurs. The seller can finance the amount held. For a seller with failure probability q, expected net return is P − €40 − q × R. Compare that return with the outside option for that seller.

Required choiceComparisonBound on price
More reliable seller prefers this offerP − €40 − 0.1 × R > €50P > €90 + 0.1 × R
Less reliable seller prefers its outside alternativeP − €40 − 0.5 × R < €30P < €70 + 0.5 × R

Both strict comparisons require R > €50. At R = €50 the two price bounds meet at €95, where both types are indifferent between accepting and their outside option. With a feasible €80 refund, strict separation requires €98 < P < €110. At P = €100 the more reliable seller nets €52 against €50 outside. The less reliable seller would net €20 against €30 outside and declines. Under these assumptions the choices separate the types.

The buyer values a working component at €150 and a failed one at zero. Under the separating offer the buyer’s expected value plus refund less price is 0.9 × €150 + 0.1 × €80 − €100 = €43. A verified alternative with the same 0.1 failure probability costs €120 and carries no refund, giving €15 expected net value. These terms make the proposed exchange preferable to the available alternatives for both the buyer and the more reliable seller. The refund changes who bears the loss. In this model it leaves the selected component’s failure probability at 0.1.

Suppose a refund above €20 cannot be secured. With R = €20, strict acceptance by the reliable seller requires P > €92, while strict rejection by the other requires P < €80. No price meets both. A price that strictly attracts the reliable seller also attracts the other, so acceptance no longer supports the old quality inference. The buyer can use the verified alternative, obtain another credible arrangement or assess an offer for both qualities if their mix can be supported. If the mix is unknown, leave the resulting failure probability open.

Reopen the comparison when a seller’s outside option, ability to finance the retained amount, failure observation or competing offer changes. If only one kind can finance the arrangement, acceptance can reflect access to capital as well as quality. Reconsider the claimed inference before using it to procure the component.