Unwinder is a full weaponization of SilentMoonWalk technique, allowing to obtain complete and stable call stack spoofing in Rust.
This crate comes with the following characteristics:
- Support to run any arbitrary function with up to 11 parameters.
- Support to run indirect syscalls (no additional heap allocations) with up to 11 parameters.
- The crate allows to retrieve the value returned by the functions called through it.
- The spoofing process can be concatenated any number of times without increasing the call stack size.
- TLS is used to increase efficiency during the spoofing process.
- dinvoke_rs is used to make any Windows API call required by the crate.
kudos to the creators of the SilentMoonWalk technique:
And of course a huge shoutout to namazso for the Twitter thread that inspired this whole project.
Import this crate into your project by adding the following line to your cargo.toml
:
[dependencies]
unwinder = "0.1.0"
The main functionality of this crate has been wrapped in two macros:
- The
call_function!()
macro allows to run any arbitrary function with a clean call stack. - The
indirect_syscall!()
macro executes the specified (indirect) syscall with a clean call stack.
To use any of these macros it is required to import std::ffi::c_void
data type.
Both macros return a PVOID
that can be used to retrieve the value returned by the function executed. More detailed information in the examples section.
This macro expects the following parameters:
- The first parameter is the memory address to call after spoofing the call stack. This parameter should be passed as a
usize
,isize
or a pointer. - The following parameters are those arguments to send to the final function.
This macro expects the following parameters:
- The first parameter is a string that contains the name of the NT function whose syscall you want to execute.
- The following parameters are those arguments to send to the NT function.
In order to pass arguments of different types to these two macros, the following considerations must be taken into account:
- Any basic data type that can be converted to
usize
(u8-u64, i8-i64, bool, etc.) can be passed directly to the macros. - Structs and unions of size 8, 16, 32, or 64 bits are passed as if they were integers of the same size.
- Structures and unions with a size larger than 64 bits must be passed as a pointer.
- Strings (&str and String) must be passed as a pointer.
- floating-point and double-precision parameter are not currently supported.
- Any other data type must be passed as a pointer.
let k32 = dinvoke_rs::dinvoke::get_module_base_address("kernel32.dll");
let sleep = dinvoke_rs::dinvoke::get_function_address(k32, "Sleep"); // Memory address of kernel32.dll!Sleep()
let miliseconds = 1000i32;
unwinder::call_function!(sleep, seconds);
let k32 = dinvoke_rs::dinvoke::get_module_base_address(&lc!("kernel32.dll"));
let open_process: isize = dinvoke_rs::dinvoke::get_function_address(k32, "Openprocess");
let desired_access: u32 = 0x1000;
let inherit = 0i32;
let pid = 20628i32;
let handle: PVOID = unwinder::call_function!(open_process, desired_access, inherit, pid);
let handle: HANDLE = std::mem::transmute(handle);
println!("Handle id: {:x}", handle.0);
Notice that the macro returns a PVOID
that can be directly converted to a HANDLE
since both data types has the same size. This allows to access to the value returned by OpenProcess
, which is the new handle to the target process.
let large = 0x8000000000000000 as u64; // Sleep indefinitely
let large: *mut i64 = std::mem::transmute(&large);
let alertable = false;
let ntstatus: PVOID = unwinder::indirect_syscall!("NtDelayExecution", alertable, large);
println!("ntstatus: {:x}", ntstatus as usize);
Notice that the macro returns a PVOID
that can be used to retrieve the NTSTATUS
returned by NtDelayExecution
.
The spoofing process can be concatenated any number of times without an abnormal call stack size increment. The execution flow will be preserved as well. The following code is an example of this:
fn main()
{
function_a();
}
fn function_a()
{
unsafe
{
let func_b = function_b as usize;
call_function!(func_b);
println!("function_a done.");
}
}
fn function_b()
{
unsafe
{
let func_c = function_c as usize;
call_function!(func_c);
println!("function_b done.")
}
}
fn function_c()
{
unsafe
{
let large = 0x0000000000000000 as u64; // Don't sleep so we return to function_b, allowing to check the execution flow preservation.
let large: *mut i64 = std::mem::transmute(&large);
let alertable = false;
let ntstatus = indirect_syscall!("NtDelayExecution", alertable, large);
println!("ntstatus: {:x}", (ntstatus as usize) as i32); //NTSTATUS is a i32, although that second casting is not really required in this case.
}
}
By default, the spoofing process will try to keep the thread start address' frame in the call stack to increase legitimacy.
Sometimes, the thread's start function does not perform a call
to a subsequent function (e.g. a jmp
instruction is executed instead), meaning there is not return address pushed to the stack. In that scenario, the spoofed call stack will start at BaseThreadInitThunk's frame.
In order to test the implementation of the technique, PE-sieve has been used with the flag /threads
. The results of the test shows how the inpection of the call stack does not reveal the pressence of the payload when this crate's functionalities are used. As it can be seen in the second image, the payload is detected when unwinder is not used.