Agent Chaperone
An MCP proxy and hooks adapter screen agent tool calls and returned content with probability-based Jev judgments.
An MCP proxy and hooks adapter screen agent tool calls and returned content with probability-based Jev judgments.
Screens proposed MCP and Claude Code tool calls before execution, then screens returned tool content before the agent reads it. Jev returns probability judgments; policy thresholds apply those judgments outside the prompt, and the proxy or hooks log the result.
Would this tool call delete, overwrite, or irreversibly change state?
Tool name, optional description and annotations, redacted arguments, and any configured policy or current task. These are source-defined fields, not a captured call.
Would its arguments send private data to an external destination?
Tool name, optional description and annotations, redacted arguments, and any configured policy or current task. These are source-defined fields, not a captured call.
How much damage could the call do if it ran?
Tool name, optional description and annotations, redacted arguments, and any configured policy or current task. These are source-defined fields, not a captured call.
Does a result block try to instruct the AI reader rather than inform it?
Bounded tool metadata and result blocks, with hidden-region markers when present. Large results are split into separate requests; this shows one request shape.
Does the result expose a secret?
Bounded tool metadata and result blocks, with hidden-region markers when present. Large results are split into separate requests; this shows one request shape.
How harmful would following the strongest instruction be?
Bounded tool metadata and result blocks, with hidden-region markers when present. Large results are split into separate requests; this shows one request shape.
Wrap a compatible MCP server in the client configuration or register the Claude Code pre- and post-tool hooks.
Apply deterministic allow/deny and secret rules, then use Jev for the configured semantic checks.
Inspect recorded probabilities and hypothetical actions; tune policy thresholds before changing modes.
In enforce mode hold or block calls and withhold risky results; strict mode also stops when screening cannot run.
Shadow mode records would-block outcomes without blocking, so operators can inspect misses and tune thresholds before enforcement. The README also states where the screening boundary ends and what content is sent to a model backend.