Explaining the predictions of opaque machine learning algorithms is an important and
challenging task, especially as complex models are increasingly used to assist in high-stakes …

… Von Neumann and Morgenstern's interpretation of this multiplicity of solutions was that each
represented a particular "standard of behavior" that might be exhibited by rational players of …

… game theory was focused on games in which the players could reach binding agreements,
and the primary focus of the theory was to discern what kinds of agreements rational players …

… The group rationality property states that any rational group of users would expect to distribute
the full yield of their coalition. The fairness property requires that the names of the users …

This chapter surveys some of the literature in game theory that has emerged from Shapley's
seminal paper on the Value. The survey includes both contributions which offer different …

… The outcome of a bargaining process is uncertain because it depends on the strategic
interaction of rational managers. Although considerable literature has been devoted to the study …

… the same line, Donald Gillies proposed in 1953 [5] another set solution, the core C(v), that
can be viewed as a refinement of the imputation set, considering only the coalitionally rational …

… That is, S(M, q) is the Shapley value of the … Shapley values with respect to arbitrary partitions
of N rather than just the finest partition, we call the function S the generalized Shapley value. …

… Shapley value by Shapley (1953b) and we present in Sect. 4 an axiomatization which is close
to the axiomatization of the Shapley value … or are all negative rational numbers, we obtain …

… Nonsymmetric Shapley values for coalitional form games with transferable utility are studied…
The intersection of these two families consists essentially of the symmetric Shapley value. …