Coordinated Disclosure Timeline

• 2020-11-30: Issue reported to maintainers
• 2020-12-01: No reply, partial fix made in https://github.com/antvis/G2/pull/3067/files
• 2021-01-22: Attempted to reach maintainers
• 2021-02-23: Attempted to reach maintainers
• 2021-02-24: Issue fixed

Summary

Multiple antvis GitHub workflows are vulnerable to unauthorized modification of the base repository or secrets exfiltration from a Pull Request.

Product

Antvis repositories.

Tested Version

The latest changesets to the date: f1c7b6b, 4111b2b, adf6849, e104920, f586a0a and 96c842f.

Details

Issue: Untrusted code is explicitly checked out and run on a Pull Request from a fork

pull_request_target was introduced to allow triggered workflows to comment on PRs, label them, assign people, etc.. In order to make it possible the triggered action runner has read/write token for the base repository and the access to secrets. In order to prevent untrusted code from execution it runs in a context of the base repository.

By explicitly checking out and running build script from a fork the untrusted code is running in an environment that is able to push to the base repository and to access secrets.

on: pull_request_target

jobs:
  preview:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v2
        with:
          ref: refs/pull/${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}/merge
      - uses: afc163/surge-preview@v1
        with:
          surge_token: ${{ secrets.SURGE_TOKEN }}
          github_token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
          build: |
            npm install
            npm run build
          dist: public

Impact

The vulnerability allows for unauthorized modification of the base repository and secrets exfiltration.

Credit

This issue was discovered and reported by GHSL team member @JarLob (Jaroslav Lobačevski).

Contact

You can contact the GHSL team at securitylab@github.com, please include a reference to GHSL-2020-267 in any communication regarding this issue.