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#1594 Explore: pull-time signature verification for extensions

Opened by webframp · 8/11/2026

Problem statement

`swamp extension pull`'s `installExtension` currently verifies a downloaded artifact against a checksum fetched from the same registry that served the artifact. If there's no server-provided checksum, it proceeds anyway with an "unverified" integrity status. This is same-party trust — the registry is both the thing being trusted and the thing vouching for itself.

This is one candidate idea, not a proposed requirement

Filing to open discussion, not to commit to an implementation. This issue only makes sense to design in detail once #1592 (signing) and #1593 (transparency log) are decided in principle — pull-side verification has nothing meaningful to verify against otherwise. It also depends on unresolved questions about inter-collective trust (see separate issue/discussion to follow) — namely, what counts as a "trusted" signer for a given collective is a prerequisite design question, not something this issue can answer on its own.

Proposed approach (if pursued, and if signing/log land)

Extend pull-time verification to fetch the signature/certificate alongside the existing checksum, verify against the transparency log independently of the registry, and set integrity status based on that rather than registry-issued-checksum-over-TLS.

Open questions (if pursued)

  • Backward compatibility: extensions published before signing existed have no signature. Does unsigned mean "unverified" (current behavior, preserved) or a harder failure mode? Flag day vs. grace period?
  • See the (forthcoming) inter-collective trust discussion — this issue is intentionally not resolving identity-to-collective binding, third-party collective onboarding, or multi-maintainer identity rotation.

Alternatives considered

  • Keep checksum-over-TLS as-is and rely entirely on publish-time audit gates (OSV/npm) to keep bad artifacts out in the first place — simpler, but doesn't protect against a compromised registry serving a tampered artifact with a matching self-issued checksum.
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8/11/2026, 3:25:43 AM

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