Don's Reviews > Hamas Contained: The Rise and Pacification of Palestinian Resistance

Suddenly an essential work to understand the current situation in the Israel- Gaza war and indeed the entire Middle East region.

The atrocities perpetrated on 7th October confirmed for many the suspicion that Hamas was another Islamic terror group in the mould of Al-Qaeda and Islamic State. The book was written well before these events and the author concluded that, at the date of publication in 2022, Hamas had been contained within the Gaza strip and the Israeli strategy of managing the predicament of its 2 million habitants at a level just above a humanitarian disaster but well below the hope that the population might prosper. But though prepared to use terrorist tactics against Israel it could not be defined purely and simply as a movement hellbent on mass murder. Hamas has to be understood as both a political movement as well as a militaristic strategy.

The movement has its origins in resistance to the Palestine Liberation Organisation's move away from struggle to reclaim sovereignty over the whole of historic Palestine back in the 1980s. It drew on associations with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood to proclaim a strategy of resistance by drawing on Islamic values, with the notion of Jihad to the forefront. It developed its early work through educational and welfare activities on one hand, with the addition of the militancy which came from identification with Izz al-Din al-Qassam, a fighter who had been active in the campaigns against Zionist settlement in the 1930s. By the time of the first Intifada against occupation which began in late 1987, the proponents of what became Hamas had established a formidable network of supporters prepared to challenge the dominant tradition within the PLO, represented by the Fatah movement of Yasser Arafat.

The split deepened after the Oslo Accords were brokered in 1993, in which the PLO formally renounced terrorism and staked out its claim for a Palestinian state based on 18 percent of historic Palestine. The Accords set out a roadmap towards the establishment of the state which required the Israelis to withdraw from territory occupied in the 1967 war - namely Gaza, The West Bank and East Jerusalem. Israel refused to take measures in line with its commitments under the roadmap and instead embarked on a measures which aimed to contain the activities of the PLO leadership which had been allowed to return to Palestinian territory.

The second Intifada erupted in September 2000 and the upsurge in moods favouring resistance to acts of repression in the occupied territories gave further impetus to Hama's stronger stance. But Baconi argues that it also led to a revaluation of the political stance of its leadership based on the fact the Oslo Accords had been discredited and the Zionist willingness to hold on to territory which was not central to its mission appeared to be diminishing. A Cairo Declaration issued by the Hamas leadership in 2005 indicated agreement on a Palestinian state on the the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem as an immediate goal for the movement, together with a commitment to participate within a reformed PLO. This paved the war for participation in elections to the legislative assembly of the Palestinian Authority in 2006 in which Hamas emerged as the largest party.

International forces supporting Israel, with the US to the forefront, reacted strongly to Hama's advance. The Arab countries fell in line with the US demand to cease funding for Palestinian civic activities and the Israeli government withheld the $55 million a month in taxes and customs duties it was collecting on behalf of the PA. It had withdrawn from direct occupation of the Gaza Strip in 2005 and in favour of a policy of containment at distance and this was double-downed on with the construction of fences and strict border checks at all points of entry. Baconi describes this as maintaining the Strip at a level just above that of humanitarian crisis but below that where development was possible.

Hamas responded by building an economy based up smuggling through an evermore extensive network of tunnels through which all essential goods - everything from medicines, building material and military equipment - were moved. A parallel development involved building a network of diplomatic support for its resistance primarily through its links with Qatar. As this picture builds up we get a stronger sense of Hamas as a sophisticated social and political movement with clear and distinct political and military wings.

The book is very sparse with regard to parallel developments in Israeli politics other than to say that it remained implacable in its refusal to recognise a partner among the Palestinians with whom it could negotiate a peaceful future. We do get a depressing account of military incursions and bombing campaigns over these years: Operation Bronze (2001), Operation Colorful Jersey (2002), Operation Defensive Shield (2002) Operation Determined Path (2002), Operation Continuous Story (2004), Operation Days of Penitence (2004), Operation Cast Lead (2008), Operation Hot Winter, Operation Pillar of Defence (2012), Operation Protective Edge (2014), and on and on. The outcomes of all this action has been death and injury for thousands of Palestinians, the destruction of physical property and relentless downgrading of infrastructure.

In 2022 this got us to the point where Baconi could declare Hamas contained and pacified, suggesting that this represented a stalemate unlikely to be broken anytime soon. And then came 7th October, a shock which showed across an appalling few hours the price that was paid, firstly by murdered and abducted Israelis, and latterly by tens of thousands of Palestinians for the agregious error in believing that the Palestinian situation was being 'managed'. A terrible story which will have consequences for Palestinian and Israeli people in the first instance, and the rest of us in the long haul.