Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995

SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner, vs.HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in

the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private
respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's
office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile
and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's
dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and
public policy." 1

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript

of the event and sought moral damages, attorney's fees and
other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in
addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial
court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was
based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made
by petitioner. The transcript reads as follows:
2

Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) — Good Afternoon M'am.

Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) — Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo,

nakalimot ka na kung paano ka napunta rito, porke member ka
na, magsumbong ka kung ano ang gagawin ko sa 'yo.

CHUCHI — Kasi, naka duty ako noon.

ESG — Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)

CHUCHI — Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan,

sabing ganoon —

ESG — Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag
explain ka, kasi hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na
pumasok. Ngayon ako ang babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States,
nag-aaply ka sa review mo, kung kakailanganin ang certification
mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka sa akin makakahingi.

CHUCHI — Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue

ko up to 10:00 p.m.

ESG — Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok

dito sa hotel. Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto mo.
Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka nakapasok dito "Do you think
that on your own makakapasok ka kung hindi ako.
Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).

CHUCHI — Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.

ESG — Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no

(sic) ko.

ESG — Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel,

kung on your own merit alam ko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo"
mo. Marami ang nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka papasa.

CHUCHI — Kumuha kami ng exam noon.

ESG — Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.

CHUCHI — Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo

ESG — Kukunin ka kasi ako.

CHUCHI — Eh, di sana —

ESG — Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang

utak. Akala mo ba makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.

CHUCHI — Mag-eexplain ako.

ESG — Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala
ka kung paano ka puma-rito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo
kamag-anak ng nanay at tatay mo ang mga magulang ko.

ESG — Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa

labas ka puwede ka ng hindi pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka
umalis ka doon.

CHUCHI — Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.

ESG — Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi

ka makakapasok kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey
lang sa akin, dahil tapos ka na.

CHUCHI — Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.

ESG — Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa

no, nilapastangan mo ako.

CHUCHI — Paano kita nilapastanganan?

ESG — Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa

'yo. Lumabas ka na. Magsumbong ka. 3

As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that

the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal,
private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An
Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related
violations of private communication, and other purposes." An
information charging petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated
October 6, 1988 is quoted herewith:

INFORMATION

The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D.

Ramirez of Violation of Republic Act No. 4200, committed as
follows:

That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City

Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
honorable court, the above-named accused, Socorro D. Ramirez
not being authorized by Ester S. Garcia to record the latter's
conversation with said accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a tape recorder
secretly record the said conversation and thereafter communicate
in writing the contents of the said recording to other person.

Contrary to law.

Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.

MARIANO M. CUNETAAsst. City Fiscal

Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to

Quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do
not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In
an order May 3, 1989, the trial court granted the Motion to Quash,
agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not
constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation
punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication
by a person other than a participant to the communication. 4

From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition
for Review on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith referred
the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First
Division) of June 19, 1989.

On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated

its assailed Decision declaring the trial court's order of May 3,
1989 null and void, and holding that:

[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable

under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In thus quashing the information
based on the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute an
offense, the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion
correctible by certiorari.
5

Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for

Reconsideration which respondent Court of Appeals denied in its
Resolution dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant petition.
6
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal
issue" that the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not
7

apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties

to the conversation. She contends that the provision merely refers
to the unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a party
other than those involved in the communication. In relation to
8

this, petitioner avers that the substance or content of the

conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise the
facts charged would not constitute a violation of R.A.
4200. Finally, petitioner agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping
9

of a "private communication," not a "private conversation" and

that consequently, her act of secretly taping her conversation
with private respondent was not illegal under the said act. 10

We disagree.

First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language

of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms,
and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal
interpretation would be either impossible or absurb or would
11

lead to an injustice.
12

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized

Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private
Communication and Other Purposes," provides:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized

by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word,
to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly
known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-
talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it

illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any
private communication to secretly record such communication by
means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to
whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to
be a party other than or different from those involved in the
private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all
persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by
the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court
of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a
communication who records his private conversation with another
without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a
violator" under this provision of R.A. 4200.
13

A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover,

supports the respondent court's conclusion that in enacting R.A.
4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal,
unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or
communications taken either by the parties themselves or by
third persons. Thus:

xxx xxx xxx

Senator Tañada: That qualified only "overhear".

Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the

element of secrecy would not appear to be material. Now,
suppose, Your Honor, the recording is not made by all the parties
but by some parties and involved not criminal cases that would be
mentioned under section 3 but would cover, for example civil
cases or special proceedings whereby a recording is made not
necessarily by all the parties but perhaps by some in an effort to
show the intent of the parties because the actuation of the parties
prior, simultaneous even subsequent to the contract or the act
may be indicative of their intention. Suppose there is such a
recording, would you say, Your Honor, that the intention is to
cover it within the purview of this bill or outside?

Senator Tañada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your

Honor.

Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the

prosecution of offense but as evidence to be used in Civil Cases or
special proceedings?
Senator Tañada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape
recorded conversations taken without the authorization of all the
parties.

Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?

Senator Tañada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not

sporting to record the observation of one without his knowing it
and then using it against him. It is not fair, it is not sportsmanlike.
If the purpose; Your honor, is to record the intention of the parties.
I believe that all the parties should know that the observations are
being recorded.

Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.

Senator Tañada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in

meetings of the board of directors where a tape recording is
taken, there is no objection to this if all the parties know. It is but
fair that the people whose remarks and observations are being
made should know that the observations are being recorded.

Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.

Senator Tañada: That is why when we take statements of persons,

we say: "Please be informed that whatever you say here may be
used against you." That is fairness and that is what we demand.
Now, in spite of that warning, he makes damaging statements
against his own interest, well, he cannot complain any more. But
if you are going to take a recording of the observations and
remarks of a person without him knowing that it is being taped or
recorded, without him knowing that what is being recorded may
be used against him, I think it is unfair.

xxx xxx xxx

(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)

Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under

Section 1 of the bill as now worded, if a party secretly records a
public speech, he would be penalized under Section 1? Because
the speech is public, but the recording is done secretly.
Senator Tañada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated
by the bill. It is the communication between one person and
another person — not between a speaker and a public.

xxx xxx xxx

(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)

xxx xxx xxx

The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken

together with the above-quoted deliberations from the
Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by
the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even
those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes
no distinctions, one does not distinguish.

Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a

violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be
specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes
are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or
recording private communications by means of the devices
enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made
a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape
recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of
R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT
before the respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it
required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature
of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third
person should be professed." 14

Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private

communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include
"private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word
"communication" to a point of absurdity. The word communicate
comes from the latin word communicare, meaning "to share or to
impart." In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the
act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes
the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies
15

the "process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between

individuals through a common system of symbols (as language
signs or gestures)" These definitions are broad enough to
16

include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive

communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to
include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988,
between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the
latter's office. Any doubts about the legislative body's meaning of
the phrase "private communication" are, furthermore, put to rest
by the fact that the terms "conversation" and "communication"
were interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory
Note to the bill quoted below:

It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from
their conversations being overheard. But this statement ignores
the usual nature of conversations as well the undeniable fact that
most, if not all, civilized people have some aspects of their lives
they do not wish to expose. Free conversationsare often
characterized by exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable falsehoods,
and the expression of anti-social desires of views not intended to
be taken seriously. The right to the privacy of communication,
among others, has expressly been assured by our Constitution.
Needless to state here, the framers of our Constitution must have
recognized the nature of conversations between individuals and
the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his
intellect. They must have known that part of the pleasures and
satisfactions of life are to be found in the unaudited, and free
exchange of communication between individuals — free from
every unjustifiable intrusion by whatever means. 17

In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, a case which dealt

18

with the issue of telephone wiretapping, we held that the use of a

telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a private
conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200
because a telephone extension devise was neither among those
"device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, following the
19

principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor

of the accused." The instant case turns on a different note,
20

because the applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a

violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute
itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private
communications with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts
punishable.

WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is

clear and unambiguous and leaves us with no discretion, the
instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Davide, Jr. and Bellosillo JJ., concur.