G.R. No.

93833 September 28, 1995 nakapasok dito "Do you think that on your own makakapasok ka kung hindi ako.
Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).
SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,
vs. CHUCHI — Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.
ESG — Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic) ko.

KAPUNAN, J.: ESG — Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel, kung on

your own merit alam ko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami ang nag-aaply
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial alam kong hindi ka papasa.
Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a
confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a CHUCHI — Kumuha kami ng exam noon.
"hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and
personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy."1 ESG — Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and CHUCHI — Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo
sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount
of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial ESG — Kukunin ka kasi ako.
court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a
tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.2 The transcript reads as CHUCHI — Eh, di sana —
follows:
ESG — Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang utak. Akala
Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) — Good Afternoon M'am. mo ba makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.

Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) — Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot ka CHUCHI — Mag-eexplain ako.
na kung paano ka napunta rito, porke member ka na, magsumbong ka kung ano ang
gagawin ko sa 'yo. ESG — Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka kung
paano ka puma-rito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak ng nanay at tatay mo
CHUCHI — Kasi, naka duty ako noon. ang mga magulang ko.

ESG — Tapos iniwan no. (Sic) ESG — Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas ka
puwede ka ng hindi pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.
CHUCHI — Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan, sabing ganoon
— CHUCHI — Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.

ESG — Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag explain ka, ESG — Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka
kasi hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako ang babalik makakapasok kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa akin, dahil
sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka sa review mo, kung kakailanganin ang tapos ka na.
certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka sa akin makakahingi.
CHUCHI — Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.
CHUCHI — Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko up to
10:00 p.m. ESG — Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa no, nilapastangan
mo ako.
ESG — Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok dito sa hotel.
Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka CHUCHI — Paano kita nilapastanganan?
 [T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of R.A.
ESG — Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa 'yo. 4200. In thus quashing the information based on the ground that the facts alleged do
Lumabas ka na. Magsumbong ka.3 not constitute an offense, the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion
correctible by certiorari.5
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of
secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, which respondent Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution6 dated June 19, 1990.
entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of Hence, the instant petition.
private communication, and other purposes." An information charging petitioner of
violation of the said Act, dated October 6, 1988 is quoted herewith: Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue"7 that the applicable
provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation
INFORMATION by one of the parties to the conversation. She contends that the provision merely refers
to the unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a party other than those
The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of Violation of involved in the communication.8 In relation to this, petitioner avers that the substance
Republic Act No. 4200, committed as follows: or content of the conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts
charged would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200.9 Finally, petitioner agues that
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro Manila, R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a "private
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the above-named conversation" and that consequently, her act of secretly taping her conversation with
accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not being authorized by Ester S. Garcia to record the private respondent was not illegal under the said act. 10
latter's conversation with said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with the use of a tape recorder secretly record the said conversation and We disagree.
thereafter communicate in writing the contents of the said recording to other person.
First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where
Contrary to law. the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its
express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal
Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988. interpretation would be either impossible 11 or absurb or would lead to an injustice.
12
MARIANO M. CUNETA
Asst. City Fiscal Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and
Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information
on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the
violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the trial court granted the Motion to parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable,
Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or
under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known
taping of a communication by a person other than a participant to the communication. as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder,
4 or however otherwise described.

From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not
Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such
a Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19, 1989. communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to
whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than
On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to
declaring the trial court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding that: penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of
the qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded,
"even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with
another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.
provision of R.A. 4200.
Senator Tañada: That is why when we take statements of persons, we say: "Please be
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent informed that whatever you say here may be used against you." That is fairness and
court's conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to that is what we demand. Now, in spite of that warning, he makes damaging statements
make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications against his own interest, well, he cannot complain any more. But if you are going to
taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons. Thus: take a recording of the observations and remarks of a person without him knowing
that it is being taped or recorded, without him knowing that what is being recorded
xxx xxx xxx may be used against him, I think it is unfair.

Senator Tañada: That qualified only "overhear". xxx xxx xxx

Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element of secrecy (Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)
would not appear to be material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the recording is not made
by all the parties but by some parties and involved not criminal cases that would be Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the bill as
mentioned under section 3 but would cover, for example civil cases or special now worded, if a party secretly records a public speech, he would be penalized under
proceedings whereby a recording is made not necessarily by all the parties but perhaps Section 1? Because the speech is public, but the recording is done secretly.
by some in an effort to show the intent of the parties because the actuation of the
parties prior, simultaneous even subsequent to the contract or the act may be Senator Tañada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It is the
indicative of their intention. Suppose there is such a recording, would you say, Your communication between one person and another person — not between a speaker and
Honor, that the intention is to cover it within the purview of this bill or outside? a public.

Senator Tañada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your Honor. xxx xxx xxx

Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of offense but (Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)
as evidence to be used in Civil Cases or special proceedings?
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Tañada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape recorded conversations
taken without the authorization of all the parties. The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-
quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the
Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor? view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy
to the private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not
Senator Tañada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to record the distinguish.
observation of one without his knowing it and then using it against him. It is not fair, it
is not sportsmanlike. If the purpose; Your honor, is to record the intention of the Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The
parties. I believe that all the parties should know that the observations are being substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A.
recorded. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private
communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation
Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders. that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a
tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As
Senator Tañada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings of the board of the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court:
directors where a tape recording is taken, there is no objection to this if all the parties "Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator,
know. It is but fair that the people whose remarks and observations are being made the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should
should know that the observations are being recorded. be professed." 14
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA, July 26, 2016
R.A. 4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of
the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from RE: LETTER OF COURT OF APPEALS JUSTICE VICENTE S.E. VELOSO FOR
the latin word communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary ENTITLEMENT TO LONGEVITY PAY FOR HIS SERVICES AS COMMISSION
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, MEMBER III OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, 15 or
signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals A.M. NO. 12-9-5-SC
through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)" 16 These
definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive RE: COMPUTATION OF LONGEVITY PAY OF COURT OF APPEALS JUSTICE
communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally- ANGELITA A, GACUTAN
charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent,
in the privacy of the latter's office. Any doubts about the legislative body's meaning of A.M. NO. 13-02-07-SC
the phrase "private communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the
terms "conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably used by Senator RE: REQUEST OF COURT OF APPEALS JUSTICE REMEDIOS A. SALAZAR-
Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below: FERNANDO THAT HER SERVICES AS MTC JUDGE AND AS COMELEC
COMMISSIONER BE CONSIDERED AS PART OF HER JUDICIAL SERVICE AND
It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from their conversations INCLUDED IN THE COMPUTATION/ADJUSTMENT OF HER LONGEVITY PAY.,
being overheard. But this statement ignores the usual nature of conversations as well Respondent.
the undeniable fact that most, if not all, civilized people have some aspects of their
lives they do not wish to expose. Free conversations are often characterized by RESOLUTION
exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and the expression of anti-social
desires of views not intended to be taken seriously. The right to the privacy of LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
communication, among others, has expressly been assured by our Constitution.
Needless to state here, the framers of our Constitution must have recognized the The Resolution dated June 16, 2015, penned by Honorable Justice Arturo D. Brion
nature of conversations between individuals and the significance of man's spiritual (Brion), in A.M. Nos. 12-8-07-CA, 12-9-5-SC, and 13-02-07-SC, resolved, among other
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They must have known that part of the matters, to deny the request of Court of Appeals (CA) Justice Angelita A. Gacutan
pleasures and satisfactions of life are to be found in the unaudited, and free exchange (Gacutan) to include her services as Commissioner of the National Labor Relations
of communication between individuals — free from every unjustifiable intrusion by Commission (NLRC) in the computation of her longevity pay.
whatever means.17
CA Justice Gacutan filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said ruling, praying that
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with the issue of herein ponente's dissent to the Resolution dated June 16, 2015, joined by five other
telephone wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone extension for the purpose Justices, prevails. In addition, CA Justice Gacutan submitted that the grant by the
of overhearing a private conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 Court of her request that her services in the NLRC (as of 2006) be included in
because a telephone extension devise was neither among those "device(s) or computing her longevity pay would be a reward for her past continuous services as a
arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, 19 following the principle that "penal statutes lifelong public servant who eventually retired from the judiciary, and that "by granting
must be construed strictly in favor of the accused."20 The instant case turns on a her request, there is no judicial legislation - there is only the recognition of justice and
different note, because the applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a violation equity to which we in the judiciary stand for."
of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the
unauthorized "recording" of private communications with the use of tape-recorders as After conscientious review, the Court resolves to grant CA Justice Gacutan's Motion for
among the acts punishable. Reconsideration. CA Justice Gacutan's services as NLRC Commissioner should be
included in the computation of her longevity pay, but only from August 26, 2006,
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and when Republic Act No. 9347, which amended Section 216 of the Labor Code, took
unambiguous and leaves us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. effect.
The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Herein ponente had already thoroughly and extensively discussed in her Concurring roles of those public officers and of the members of the Judiciary in the promotion of
and Dissenting Opinion to the Resolution dated June 16, 2015 the bases for her justice and the proper functioning of our legal and judicial systems.
position - now adopted by the Court - that longevity pay under Section 42 of Batas
Pambansa Big. 129 is treated as part of salary and extended to certain officials in the Thus, the laws operate under the principle of "equal in qualifications and equal in
Executive Department who are, by law, granted the same salary as their counterparts rank, equal in salaries and benefits received." The reasonable and logical implication of
in the Judiciary. Pertinent parts of said Concurring and Dissenting Opinion are worth this principle is that, in the context of the dispute resolution mechanism in particular
reproducing below: and of the justice system in general, the services rendered by the public officers
concerned and the members of the Judiciary are equal in importance.
The Literal Language of the Law
I respectfully submit the following arguments:
Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Big. 129, otherwise known as "The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980," as amended, provides: (1) The law is clear: the term "salary" covers basic monthly pay plus longevity
pay.
SEC. 42. Longevity pay. - A monthly longevity pay equivalent to [five percent] 5% of
the monthly basic pay shall be paid to the Justices and Judges of the courts herein (2) The concept of longevity pay as "salary" should not be confused with "rank."
created for each five years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in
the judiciary: Provided, That in no case shall the total salary of each Justice or Judge (3) The legislative intent of salary increases for certain Executive officials accords
concerned, after this longevity pay is added,exceed the salary of the Justice or Judge with "salary" as inclusive of longevity pay.
next in rank. (Emphasis supplied.)
(4) The Court's long-standing interpretation of the term "longevity pay" as part of
As a rule, therefore, the grant of longevity pay under Section 42 of Batas Pambansa "salary" is correct.
Big. 129 is premised on the rendition of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service
in the Judiciary, That is the express language of the law. (5) The executive contemporaneous construction of longevity pay is consistent
with the law, as interpreted by the Supreme Court.
Nonetheless, there are existing laws which expressly require the qualifications for
appointment, confer the rank, and grant the salaries, privileges, and benefits of (6) Longevity pay is not a mere "benefit."
members of the Judiciary on other public officers in the Executive Department, such as
the following; Each of these arguments is discussed in detail below.

(a) the Solicitor General and Assistant Solicitor Generals of the Office of the Solicitor The law is clear: the term “salary"
General (OSG); and covers basic monthly pay plus longevity pay.

(b) the Chief Legal Counsel and the Assistant Chief Legal Counsel, the Chief State That the language of the law itself, in this case, Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Big.
Prosecutor, and the members of the National Prosecution Service (NPS) in the 129, is the starting and referential point of discussion of longevity pay under that law
Department of Justice. is not in dispute. It provides:

The intention of the above laws is to establish a parity in qualifications required, the SEC. 42. Longevity pay. - A monthly longevity pay equivalent to [five percent] 5% of the
rank conferred, and the salaries and benefits given to members of the Judiciary and monthly basic pay shall be paid to the Justices and Judges of the courts herein created for
the public officers covered by the said laws, The said laws seek to give equal treatment each five years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the judiciary:
to the specific public officers in the executive department and the Judges and Justices Provided, That in no case shall the total salary of each Justice or Judge concerned, after
who are covered by Batas Pambansa Big. 129, as amended, and other relevant laws. In this longevity pay is added, exceed the salary of the Justice or Judge next in rank.
effect, these laws recognize that public officers who are expressly identified in the laws (Emphases supplied.)
by the special nature of their official functions render services which are as important
as the services rendered by the Judges and Justices. They acknowledge the respective There is disagreement, however, on the construction of the above-quoted provision
with other relevant laws, such as Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9417, Article 216 of the
Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9347, and Section 16 of Republic Act No. officials accords with "salary" as
10071, which require the qualifications for appointment, confer the rank, and grant inclusive of longevity pay.
the same salaries, privileges, and benefits of members of the Judiciary on other public
officers in the Executive Department. In conferring upon certain officials in the Executive the same salaries, aside from their
rank, as those of their respective judicial counterparts, Congress intended to make the
For Justice Brion, "salary" used in the aforesaid other laws should not include longevity salaries of the former at par with the latter. The legislative records support this.
pay. He insists that Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Big. 129 is clear and unequivocal,
that longevity pay is granted to a Judge or Justice who has rendered five years of In particular, the following portion of the interpellations in connection with Senate Bill
continuous, efficient, and meritorious service in the Judiciary. Service in the Judiciary No. 2035, which became Republic Act No. 9347, is enlightening:
within the required period is the only condition for entitlement to longevity pay under
Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Big. 129. Asked by the Chair whether the proposed amendment (Section 4) to Article 216 of the
Labor Code means an increase in salaries, Senator Ejercito Estrada (J) clarified that
The approach of Justice Brion on the matter is novel. It is, however, negated by the the section proposes that the arbiters be at par with the judges of the regional trial
language and intent of relevant laws, as well as by the long-standing interpretation of courts, and the commissioners at par with the justices of the Court of Appeals.
the Court and the Executive Branch on the matter. (Emphases supplied.)

The concept of longevity pay as In his sponsorship speech of Senate Bill No. 2659, which became Republic Act No,
"salary" should not to be confused 10071, Senator Francis Joseph Escudero adopted as part of his sponsorship speech
with "rank." several explanatory notes of related bills, including the explanatory note of Senator
Edgardo Angara for Senate Bill No. 213. The relevant portion of the explanatory note
Under Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Big. 129, longevity pay is an amount equivalent reads:
to 5% of the monthly basic pay given to Judges and Justices for each five years of
continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the Judiciary, It is not only At the heart of a strong justice system is the indispensable and complementary role of
an amount given as an addition to the basic monthly pay but, more importantly, it the State's prosecutorial and counselling arm. The National Prosecution Service [NPS]
forms part of the salary of the recipient thereof. and the Office of the Chief State Counsel [OCSC] are mandated to uphold the rule of
law as a component of the justice system.
In other words, longevity pay is "salary" and it should not be confused with "rank."
It is sad to note, however, that our prosecutors and state counselors earn less than
That is how this Court has treated the longevity pay under Section 42 of Batas those in the Judiciary. Such situation has produced a migratory effect. After spending a
Pambansa Big. 129 since 1986, particularly in Re: Longevity Pay of the Associate few years in the NPS or the OCSC, they resign and join the ranks of the judiciary, x x x.
Justices of the Sandiganbayan, It is a treatment which reflects the Court's reading of
the text of the law and its understanding of the law's legislative intent, This bill seeks to correct the aforementioned inequities, The increase in salaries and
the granting of additional services and privileges to the members of the National
x x xx Prosecution Service and the Office of the Chief State Counsel, will place them at par
with those in the Judiciary [and] would deter the current practice of migration, x x x.
xxx [T]he settled meaning of "rank," particularly that it does not include the privilege (Emphases supplied.)
to use the title of Judge or Justice should not be used to determine the import of the
term "salary" as used in the different laws. Otherwise, there would be no point in This legislative intent to grant certain officials of the Executive Department the same
mentioning in the laws "rank" separately from "salary." "Rank" unquestionably has salaries as that of their respective judicial counterparts should be read in conjunction
nothing to do with the amount of compensation or pay an official is entitled to under with how salary is defined in the law and treated vis-a-vis longevity pay in prevailing
the law. The said term pertains only to the "class" or "standing" in an organization or case law. In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to have been aware of, and
societal structure. have taken into account, prior laws and jurisprudence on the subject of legislation.
Manila Lodge No. 761 v. Court of Appeals instructs:
The legislative intent of salary
increases for certain Executive
[I]t is presumed that when the lawmaking body enacted the statute, it had full which they may be entitled by virtue of their continuous, efficient, and meritorious
knowledge of prior and existing laws and legislation on the subject of the statute and service in the Judiciary. That should also be the definition of the "salary" of the
acted in accordance or with respect thereto. (Citation omitted.) concerned public officers who enjoy the same rank and salary as Judges or Justices, if
the word "same" employed in the laws pertaining to executive officials is to be
Thus, Congress knew, or is presumed to have known, the concept of longevity pay understood in its plain and ordinary meaning.
under Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Big. 129 as part of the total salary of members of
the Judiciary when it enacted Republic Act Nos. 9417, 9347, and 10071, which A narrow and restrictive approach which limits the longevity pay under Section 42 of
granted certain officials of the OSG, the NLRC, and the NPS, respectively, the same Batas Pambansa Big. 129, as amended, to service rendered in the Judiciary only is to
salary as their respective counterparts in the Judiciary. Moreover, armed with that unduly restrict the definition of salary, fixing it to the basic pay. To depart from the
knowledge, Congress is presumed to have intended to adopt the definition of meaning expressed by the words, is to alter the statute, to legislate and not to
"salary" (as constituting basic monthly salary plus longevity pay) when it enacted interpret. It is to amend the laws by judicial fiat, x x x,
Republic Act Nos. 9417, 9347, and 10071, which will be in keeping with the legislative
intent to equalize the salary of certain executive officials with members of the
Judiciary. To do otherwise will negate the express legislative intent. The Court's long-standing
interpretation of the term "longevity
As it is part of the salary of a member of the Judiciary, it should perforce be part of the pay" as part of "salary" is correct.
salary of the public officers granted by law with the same rank and salary as their
counterparts in the Judiciary. Accordingly, the increase in the salary of Judges and This Court has long recognized that the longevity pay under Section 42 of Batas
Justices by virtue of the longevity pay should also result in the corresponding increase Pambansa Big. 129 is among the salaries and benefits enjoyed by members of the
in the salary of the public officers who, under relevant laws, enjoy the same rank and Judiciary that are extended to the public officers conferred by law with the rank of
salary as their judicial counterparts. Otherwise, the law's express language and its Judges of the lower courts or Justices of the Court of Appeals.
intention to grant the same rank and salary of a member of the Judiciary to the said
public officers will be defeated, The Court's Resolution dated September 12, 1985 in Request of Judge Fernando
Santiago for the Inclusion of His Services as Agrarian Counsel in the Computation of
xxxx His Longevity Pay granted Judge Santiago's request and his longevity pay was
computed "from the date of his assumption of office as Agrarian Counsel on August 9,
In other words, by enacting Republic Act Nos. 9417, 9347, and 10071, which granted 1963 and not from the date he assumed office as Judge of the Court of First Instance
certain officials of the Executive Department the same salary as their respective on June 1, 1970," The basis of this is Section 160 of Republic Act No. 3844 which
counterparts in the Judiciary, Congress manifested its intent to treat "salary" the way it provides;
has been treated in Batas Pambansa Big, 129 as interpreted by this Court, that is, basic Section 160. Creation of Office of Agrarian Counsel. - To strengthen the legal
monthly pay plus longevity pay. assistance to agricultural lessees and agricultural owner-cultivators referred to in this
Code, the Tenancy Mediation Commission is hereby expanded and shall hereafter be
Since the above-mentioned laws do not make any distinction with respect to the term known as the Office of the Agrarian Counsel. The head of the Office shall hereafter be
"salary" as it is expressly provided for in Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Big. 129, we known as Agrarian Counsel and shall have the rank, qualifications and salary of First
should not make any distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit nee nos distinguere debemus. Assistant Solicitor General. He shall be assisted by a Deputy. Agrarian Counsel, who
shall have the rank, qualifications and salary of Assistant Solicitor General. The
It is in light of the legislative intent that the insistence of Justice Brion to strictly Agrarian Counsel and Deputy Agrarian Counsel shall be appointed by the President
adhere to the sentence structure of Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Big. 129, without with the consent of the Commission on Appointments of Congress and shall be under
regard to other laws on the matter, contradicts such legislative intent and constitutes the direct supervision of the Secretary of Justice, (Emphasis supplied.)
judicial legislation, which will in effect treat "salary" in a way that is not borne out by
the language of the law and the established Court rulings on the matter. Under Republic Act No. 335, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 478, the Assistant
Solicitor General has the "same rank, qualifications for appointment, and salary as a
The longevity pay forms part of the salary of a Judge or Justice, since Section 42 of Judge of the Court of First Instance," now Regional Trial Court.
Batas Pambansa Big. 129 says it is "added" to the said salary. Thus, the salary of the
members of the Judiciary refers to their respective basic pay plus the longevity pay to
In the Resolution dated July 25, 1991 in In Re: Adjustment of Longevity Pay of Hon. Sec. 16. Qualifications, Ranks and Appointments of Prosecutors and Other Prosecution
Justice Emilio A. Gancayco, this Court said: Officers. - x x x.

The Court approved the request of Justice Emilio A. Gancayco for the adjustment of Prosecutors with the rank of Prosecutor IV shall have the same qualifications for
his longevity pay not only for purposes of his retirement but also for his entire judicial appointment, rank, category, prerogatives, salary grade and salaries, allowances,
service by including as part thereof his period of service from August 9, 1963 to emoluments and other privileges, shall be subject to the same inhibitions and
September 1, 1972 as Chief Prosecuting Attorney (Chief State Prosecutor) considering disqualifications, and shall enjoy the same retirement and other benefits as those of a
that under Republic Act No. 4140, the Chief State Prosecutor is given the same rank, judge of the Regional Trial Court.
qualification and salary of a Judge of the Court of First Instance. (Emphasis supplied.)
Prosecutors with the rank of Prosecutor III shall have the same qualifications for
In the Resolution dated November 19, 1992 in Re: Adjustment of Longevity Pay of appointment, rank, category, prerogatives, salary grade and salaries, allowances,
former Associate Justice Buenaventura S. dela Fuente, this Court adverted to the emoluments and other privileges, shall be subject to the same inhibitions and
Santiago and Gancayco Resolutions and said: disqualifications, and shall enjoy the same retirement and other benefits as those of a
Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court.
This refers to the letter of former Associate Justice Buenaventura S. dela Fuente, dated
September 27, 1992, requesting a recomputation of his longevity pay. It appears that Prosecutors with the rank of Prosecutor II shall have the same qualifications for
former Justice dela Fuente had been the Chief Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, appointment, rank, category, prerogatives, salary grade and salaries, allowances,
since June 22, 1963 until his promotion to the Court of Appeals in 1974, the emoluments and other privileges, shall be subject to the same inhibitions and
qualifications for the appointment to which position aswell as its rank and salary, disqualifications, and shall enjoy the same retirement and other benefits as those of a
pursuant to R.A. 2705, as amended by R.A. 4152, shall be the same as those Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in cities.
prescribed for the first and next ranking assistant solicitors general, Accordingly, in line
with the rulings of this Court in Re: Adjustment of Longevity Pay of Hon. Justice Prosecutors with the rank of Prosecutor I shall have the same qualifications for
Emilio A. Gancayco, dated July 25, 1991 and Administrative Matter No. 85-8-8334- appointment, rank, category, prerogatives, salary grade and salaries, allowances,
RTC. - Re: Request of Judge Fernando Santiago for the inclusion of his services as emoluments and other privileges, shall be subject to the same inhibitions and
Agrarian Counsel in the computation of his longevity pay, dated September 12, 1985, disqualifications, and shall enjoy the same retirement and other benefits as those of a
the Court Resolved to (a) APPROVE the aforesaid request of former Associate Justice Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Municipalities.
Buenaventura S, dela Fuente[,] and (b) AUTHORIZE the recomputation of his
longevity pay from June 22, 1963, when he assumed office and began discharging the Sec. 24. Retroactivity. - The benefits mentioned in Sections 14 and 16 hereof shall be
functions of Chief Legal Counsel. granted to all those who retired prior to the effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis supplied;)
In Re: Request of Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga, Court of Appeals, that Her
Services as Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Laguna be Credited as Part of Her Services in The Resolutions in Santiago, Gancayco, Dela Fuente, and Guevara-Salonga reveal that
the Judiciary for Purposes of Her Retirement, this Court stated: this Court has consistently approached and applied the longevity pay provision under
Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Big. 129 liberally, that is, as applicable by statutory
[Republic Act No. 10071] validates the recognition of the services of Justice Emilio A. extension to those covered by the same qualifications and given the same rank and
Gancayco, whom we credited for his service as Chief Prosecuting Attorney (Chief State salary as the members of the Judiciary. They evince the view that the services rendered
Prosecutor), based on Republic Act No. 4140 which likewise grants his office (as Chief in their respective offices by the public officers required by law to have the same
Prosecuting Attorney) the rank, qualification and salary of a Judge of the Court of First qualifications, rank, and salary of their counterparts in the Judiciary are considered to
Instance. In the same manner, the current law also validates the crediting of past be substantially the same as service in the Judiciary for purposes of the said public
service to Justice Buenaventura dela Fuente who was the Chief Legal Counsel of the officers' enjoyment of the longevity pay under Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Big. 129.
Department of Justice. (Citations omitted.)
Also, in Guevara-Salonga, this Court granted the request of Court of Appeals Justice xxxx
Guevara-Salonga for the crediting of her services as Assistant Provincial Fiscal of
Laguna as part of her services in the Judiciary for purposes of her retirement pursuant That the said laws manifest a liberal attitude towards the public officers they
to Sections 16 and 24 of Republic Act No. 10071 which respectively provide: respectively cover is reinforced by this Court's treatment in Re: Longevity Pay of the
Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan of the longevity pay under Section 42 of Batas
Pambansa Big. 129 as something that "forms part of the salary of the recipient thereof."
In particular, the Court adopted a liberal stance and ruled: In this connection, the contemporaneous construction by the Department of Justice
and other offices in the executive branch disclose a similar treatment of the longevity
[L]ongevity pay once earned and enjoyed becomes a vested right and forms part of the pay provision of Batas Pambansa Big. 129 as shown by the following pertinent
salary of the recipient thereof which may not be reduced, despite the subsequent portions of the 2nd Indorsement dated November 21, 1988 by the then Secretary of
appointment of a justice or judge next higher in rank who is not entitled to longevity Justice, Sedfrey, A. Ordonez:
pay for being new and not having acquired any longevity in the government service. Longevity pay forms part of the salary of the recipient (Resolution of the Supreme
Furthermore, diminution or decrease of the salary of an incumbent justice or judge is Court in Adm. Matter No. 86-9-2394-0, Re: Longevity Pay of the Associate Justices of
prohibited by Section 10 of Article X of the Constitution; hence, such recipient may the Sandiganbayan). Thus, when the law grants to certain officials of the executive
continue to earn and receive additional longevity pay as may be warranted by department the "rank and salary" of a member of the Judiciary, it should be deemed to
subsequent services in the judiciary, because the purpose of .the Longevity Pay Law is include longevity pay, which is part of salary; otherwise, the law's intention to grant
to reward justices and judges for their long and dedicated service as such. The the same rank and salary of a justice/judge to executive officials would be defeated or
provision of the law that the total salary of each justice or judge concerned, after nullified.
adding his longevity pay, should not exceed the salary plus longevity pay of the justice
or judge next higher in rank, refers only to the initial implementation of the law and The statement x x x that those executive officials who were granted longevity pay
does not proscribe a justice or judge who is already entitled to longevity pay, from "were either justice or judge of the court at the time of the grant" is not entirely
continuing to earn and receive longevity pay for services rendered in the judiciary correct. Former Chief State Counsel, now Court of Appeals Justice Minerva P.G, Reyes,
subsequent to such implementation, by the mere accident of a newcomer being was granted longevity pay in 1985 when she was the incumbent Chief State Counsel.
appointee to the position next higher in rank, x x x, (Emphasis supplied.) Assistant Solicitors General Ramon Barcelona, Romeo dela Cruz, Zoilo Andin and
Amado Aquino are presently receiving longevity pay for their length of service as
Justice Brion, however, claims that the said cases are not controlling herein, as they Assistant Solicitors General.
are allegedly a strained and erroneous application of Section 42 of Batas Pambansa
Big. 129 that should be abandoned. The Supreme Court computed the longevity pay of Judge Fernando Santiago "from the
date of his assumption of office as Agrarian Counsel [which was an executive office]
Such claim of grave mistake should be premised on a clear finding that prior rulings on August 9, 1963 and not from the date he assumed office as Judge of the Court of
were wrong. In this case, I do not find Justice Brion's characterization of Santiago, First Instance on June 1, 1970" (Adm. Matter No. 85-8-8384-RTC). The same thing
Gancayco, Dela Fuente, and Guevara-Salonga as "erroneous" and mere "aberrations" as was done in the case of Justices Vicente Mendoza, Santiago Kapunan, Jose Racela,
proper. Lorna L. de la Fuente and Minerva P,G. Reyes, whose respective services in the
Executive Department were credited in their favor for purposes of the longevity pay.
xxx While certain members of the Judiciary may feel an exclusive franchise to the
rank, salary, and benefits accorded to them by law, we cannot impose our own views It bears reiterating that in the case of Justice Reyes, she has been receiving longevity
on Congress which has ample power to enact laws as it sees fit, absent any grave abuse pay since before her appointment in the Judiciary, that is, while she was, and on the
of discretion or constitutional infraction on its part. basis of her being, Chief State Counsel x x x. The inclusion by the Supreme Court of
her services as Assistant Chief State Counsel and[,] later, as Chief State Counsel in the
xxx x computation of her longevity pay as a member of the Judiciary constitutes a judicial
affirmance by the highest court of the land of the validity of the grant of longevity pay
The executive contemporaneous to her way back in 1985 while she was still an official of the Executive Department.
construction of longevity pay is (Emphasis supplied.)
consistent with the law, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court. To reiterate, the above opinion of then Justice Secretary Ordonez constitutes
contemporaneous construction of the issue at hand.
Contemporaneous construction is the interpretation or construction placed upon the
statute by an executive or administrative officer called upon to execute or administer Justice Brion asserts that administrative construction is merely advisory and is not
the statute. It includes the construction by the Secretary of Justice in his capacity as binding upon the courts. He is absolutely correct. That is the rule. In the same vein,
the chief legal adviser of the government. that rule also means that courts should respect the contemporaneous construction
placed upon a statute by the executive officers whose duty is to enforce it, and unless Article 216. Salaries, Benefits and Emoluments. -The Chairman and Members of the
such interpretation is clearly erroneous will ordinarily be controlled thereby. Commission shall have the same rank, receive an annual salary equivalent to, and be
entitled to the same allowances, retirement and benefits as those of the Presiding Justice
As I have shown above, the contemporaneous construction of the then Justice and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, respectively. Labor Arbiters shall have the
Secretary is in accordance with both statutory law and case law, same rank, receive an annual salary equivalent to and be entitled to the same allowances,
retirement and other benefits and privileges as those of the Judges of the Regional Trial
Longevity pay is not a mere Courts. In no case, however, shall the provision of this Article result in the diminution of
"benefit." the existing salaries, allowances and benefits of the aforementioned officials. (Emphases
supplied.)
xxxx
Republic Act No. 9347 took effect on August 26, 2006. Prior to its amendment by
xxx [LJongevity pay is not a mere benefit, but is salary, as it is a component of the Republic Act No. 9347, Article 216 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
"total salary." That is how this Court treated longevity pay as a contemporaneous 6715, provides:
interpretation of Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Big, 129. That is also how Congress
presumably intended to treat longevity pay when it granted a salary which is the same Article 216. Salaries, benefits and other emoluments. - The Chairman and members of the
as that of members of the Judiciary to certain officials in the Executive Department Commission shall receive an annual salary at least equivalent to, and be entitled to the
under relevant laws, including Republic Act Nos. 9417, 9347, and 10071, as Congress same allowances and benefits as, those of the Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of
did not qualify or limit the term "salary" in these laws. the Court of Appeals, respectively. The Executive Labor Arbiters shall receive an annual
salary at least equivalent to that of an Assistant Regional Director of the Department of
Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Big, 129 clearly states that the longevity pay is "added" Labor and Employment and shall be entitled to the same allowances and benefits as that
to the basic monthly salary and forms part of the "total salary" of a Judge or Justice. of a Regional Director of said department. The Labor Arbiters shall receive an annual
Thus, the salary of the members of the Judiciary refers to their respective basic pay salary at least equivalent to, and be entitled to the same allowances and benefits as, that
plus the longevity pay to which they may be entitled by virtue of their continuous, of an Assistant Regional Director of the Department of Labor and Employment. In no case,
efficient, and meritorious service in the Judiciary, That should also be the definition of however, shall the provision of this Article result in the diminution of existing salaries,
the "salary" of the concerned public officers who enjoy the same salary as Judges or allowances and benefits of the aforementioned officials. (Emphases supplied.)
Justices, if the word "same" employed in the laws pertaining to executive officials is to
be understood in its plain and ordinary meaning. xx x x
II. A.M. No. 12-9-5-SC
xxxx
Justice Gacutan was still a Commissioner of the NLRC when Republic Act No. 9347
Therefore, longevity pay under Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Big. 129 must be treated took effect. From the date of effectivity of the law onwards, her services as NLRC
as salary and to extend it to certain officials in the Executive Department who are, by Commissioner are therefore covered by the beneficial effect of the amendment of
law, granted the same salary as their counterparts in the Judiciary. That is, after all, Article 216 of the Labor Code by Republic Act No. 9347, which gave the NLRC
how Congress intended it to be. That is how it was interpreted in Santiago, Gancayco, Commissioners the same rank and salary as Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals.
Dela Fuente, and Guevara-Salonga. (Citations omitted.) As Republic Act No. 9347 expresses the intent to place the NLRC Commissioners in
exactly the same footing as their counterparts in the Court of Appeals, and "salary"
CONCLUSION includes longevity pay, then Justice Gacutan's longevity pay should be reckoned from
August 26, 2006, the date Republic Act No. 9347 took effect, at which time she was
xxxx still NLRC Commissioner. Thus, five years after that date, or on August 26, 2011, she
became entitled to receive longevity pay equivalent to 5% of her monthly basic pay at
The Instant Requests Considered that time; and, she is now entitled to adjustment of salary, allowances, and benefits
only as of that date.
Justices Veloso and Gacutan anchor their claim on Article 216 of the Labor Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 9347, which reads: As regards her request that her entire services as NLRC Commissioner be credited as
part of her government service for the purpose of retirement under Republic Act No.
910, as amended by Republic Act No. 9946, the same may be allowed as it is in (2) GRANT the request of Associate Justice Remedios A, Salazar- Fernando that her
accordance with Section 1 of Republic Act No. 910, as amended by Republic Act No. services as Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Rita, Pampanga, be included in
9946, which requires fifteen (15) years service in the Judiciary or in any other branch the computation of her longevity pay;
of the Government as a condition for coverage of the said law.
Clearly, the foregoing ratiocination does not constitute judicial legislation. It is firmly (3) DENY the request of Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar- Fernando that her
grounded on existing laws, jurisprudence, and executive contemporaneous services as COMELEC Commissioner be included in the computation of her longevity
construction. It was Congress which enacted Republic Act Nos. 9417, 9347, and pay;
10071, granting certain officials of the Executive Department the same salary as their
respective counterparts in the Judiciary, and "salary" refers to basic monthly pay plus (4) DENY the request of Associate Justice Angelita Gacutan that her services as NLR€
longevity pay per the plain language of Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Big. 129. Justice Commissioner be included in the computation of her longevity pay from the time she
Brion opines that the grant of longevity pay to executive officials would effectively be started her judicial service;
a misplaced exercise of liberality at the expense of public funds and to the prejudice of
sectors who are more in need of these funds. It bears to stress though that it is (5) DENY with finality the motion for reconsideration of Associate Justice Vicente S.E.
irrefragably within the legislative power of Congress to enact Republic Act Nos. 9417, Veloso for lack of merit; and
9347, and 10071, and it is beyond the judicial power of the Court to question the
wisdom behind said legislations. (6) DIRECT the Clerk of this Court to proceed with the handling of granted longevity
pay benefits under Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Big. 129, pursuant to the guidelines
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to GRANT the Motion for and declarations outlined in the Moving On portion of this Resolution, [Emphasis
Reconsideration of CA Justice Gacutan and MODIFY the Resolution dated June 16, supplied]
2015 in A.M. Nos. 12-8-07-CA, 12-9-5-SC, and 13-02-07^SC, insofar as to GRANT CA
Justice Gacutan's request that her services as NLRC Commissioner be included in the Justice Gacutan now asks the Court to reconsider the denial we decreed by including
computation of her longevity pay, but reckoned only from August 26, 2006, when in the computation of her longevity pay. She noted in her motion that two members of
Republic Act No, 9347 took effect. the Court (Justice Teresita J> Leonardo-De Castro - the ponente of the present
Resolution - and Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.) issued Opinions that grant her
SO ORDERED. request, and likewise adopted the arguments of these dissenting justices.

Justice Gacutan specifically responded to the June 16, 2015 ponencia's ruling that the
DISSENTING OPINION judiciary is not in a position to recognize past services in the Executive, a different
branch of government, and cannot thus determine the continuous, efficient, and
BRION, J.: meritorious service that the grant of longevity pay requires.

According to Justice Gacutan, the determination of efficiency and meritorious service

I dissent from the ponencia's grant of the Motion for Reconsideration filed by former in her case may not be solely determined by the judiciary. She then proceeded to
Court of Appeals (CA) Associate Justice Angelita Alberto-Gacutan (Justice Gacutan) enumerate her illustrious career in the Executive, in the NLRC, and in the CA, and
asking the Court to reconsider the portion of the Court's Resolution1 in A.M. Nos. noted that the Judicial and Bar Council would not have nominated her for the position
12-8-07-CA,2 12-9-5-SC,3 and 13-02-07-SC4 affecting her longevity pay. of CA Justice if its members had not favorably considered her intelligence, integrity,
character, and experience.7chanrobleslaw
On June 16, 2015, the Court had previously issued a Resolution, penned by Justice
Arturo D, Brion, addressing the letter-requests of several retired CA justices asking for Reasons for my Dissent
the re-computation of their longevity pay. These letter-requests had been consolidated,
and the Court held in the Resolution's disposition:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary I vote to DENY with finality Justice Gacutan's Motion for Reconsideration as it does
(1) NOTE the Memorandum dated February 18, 2013 of Atty. Eden T, Candelaria and not present any new or compelling argument to justify the Court's reversal of its
the Report and Recommendation dated February 15, 2013 of Atty, Corazon G. Ferrer- Decision. The arguments Justice de Castro and Justice Velasco raised in their dissents
Flores; to the June 16, 2015 Resolution have been thoroughly deliberated upon by the Court
in its main ruling, and thus have already been sufficiently addressed.
 In other words, all judges and justices are entitled to the salary prescribed for them
The Petitioner's Past Service in the Executive is not a Material Issue, under Section 41 of BP 129, but only those who have complied with the requisites of
Section 42 are entitled to receive the additional longevity pay benefit.
When the Court, in the June 16, 2015 Resolution, said that the judiciary is not in a
position to determine past continuous, efficient, and meritorious service in the Thus, when Section 42 of BP 129 required that the total salary of judges and justices
Executive, it was not a personal attack on Justice Gacutan's illustrious career in receiving longevity pay should not exceed the salary of those next in rank, it simply
Government, The observation was meant to expound on the concept that longevity pay meant that the addition of longevity pay cannot result in judges and justices of lower
for members of the judiciary is confined to services rendered within the judiciary. In rank receiving a bigger total compensation than those with higher rank.
other words, the character of her past executive service is not a material issue in the
Court's denial of her request. The salary of judges and justices depend on the salary grade (and subsequent step
increments) of their positions under the Compensation and Classification System
The grant of longevity pay in the judiciary is based on Section 42 of Batas Pambansa referred to in Section 41 of BP 129. The proviso in Section 42 of the same law operates
Big, No. 129 (BP 129)8 which provides: to limit the amount of longevity pay granted when it disrupts the compensation system
referred to in Section 41. It does not integrate longevity pay in the salary due to judges
Section 42. Longevity pay. - A monthly longevity pay equivalent to 5% of the monthly and justices under the compensation system, as not all of them are entitled to receive
basic pay shall be paid to the Justices and Judges of the courts herein created for each five longevity pay in the first place.
years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the judiciary; Provided,
That in no case shall the total salary of each Justice or Judge concerned, after this 2. Justice Gacutan's Request has no Basis in Law.
longevity pay is added, exceed the salary of the Justice or Judge next in rank.
The inclusion of past services in another branch of government in the computation of
Laws subsequent to BP 129 conferred the same salaries and benefits granted to longevity pay in the judiciary has no express basis in law.
members of the judiciary, and to certain public officials in the executive who had been
given ranks equivalent to those granted in the judiciary. The Court clarified in the June None of the laws that grant similarity of salaries and benefits between executive
16, 2015 Resolution that these laws do not expand the concept of longevity pay as officials and their counterparts in the judiciary mention that services in these executive
provided in Section 42 of BP 129, and do not operate to include services in executive positions would be included in the computation of longevity pay in the judiciary.
positions in determining the grant of longevity pay. In Justice Gacutan's case, her services as past National Labor Relations Commission
Commissioner (NLRC) places her under the operation of Republic Act No. 934710 (RA
The Court reached this conclusion for the following reasons: No. 9347), which amended Article 216 of the Labor Code to read:
1. The Grant of Longevity Pay is only for Judges and Justices for Service in
the Judiciary. ART. 216. Salaries, benefits and other emoluments. The Chairman and members of the
The language and terms of Section 42 ofBP 129 are very clear and unambiguous, A Commission shall have the same rank, receive an annual salary equivalent to, and be
plain reading of Section 42 shows that it grants longevity pay to a judge or justice (and entitled to the same allowances, retirement and benefits as those of the Presiding Justice
to none other) who has rendered five years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, respectively. Labor Arbiters shall have the
service in the Judiciary, The granted monthly longevity pay is equivalent to 5% of the same rank, receive an annual salary equivalent to and be entitled to the same allowances,
monthly basic pay. retirement and other benefits and privileges as those of the judges of the regional trial
courts. In no case, however, shall the provision of this Article result in the diminution of
Notably, Section 42 ofBP 129 on longevity pay is separate from the provision on the the existing salaries, allowances and benefits of the aforementioned officials.
salary of members of the judiciary found in Section 41 of BP 1299 This separate
placement reflects the longevity pay's status as a separate benefit for members of the The "salary" that Article 216 of the Labor Code speaks of pertains to the "compensation
judiciary who have rendered "continuous, efficient and meritorious service in the and allowances" under Section 41 of BP 129, as found in the salary schedule of the
judiciary;" longevity pay is not part of the salary that judges and justices are granted government's Compensation and Position Classification System, Thus, Article 216
under Section 41. provided NLRC commissioners with the same salary received by Associate Justices of
the Court of Appeals as prescribed in the salary schedule found in the government's
Compensation and Position Classification System,
The Compensation and Position Classification System prescribes the salary to be RA No. 9347, in particular, did not specifically provide that the services in the NLRC
received by government employees depending on the salary grade their positions are may be tacked with the length of judicial service for purposes of computing longevity
classified in. pay in the judiciary. Neither can the tackmg of these periods be implied from the
language of Article 216 of the Labor Code, as amended, as the provision merely uses
Viewed in this light, the provision of the same rank as CA Associate Justices to NLRC the salary and benefits of CA Associate justices as a yardstick for determining the
Commissioners in Article 216 of the Labor Code simply meant that the latter shall have salary and benefits of NLRC commissioners.
the same salary grade as the former.
It must be pointed out that the grant of the requested longevity pay can be a blow
As an additional benefit, NLRC commissioners may be granted the longevity pay that disastrous to the reputation of the judiciary and to this Court's role as the final
judges and justices receive under Section 42 of BP 129, for the commissioners' authority in interpreting the Constitution, when the public realizes that this Court
meritorious, efficient, and continuous service in the NLRC. But this is for CONGRESS, engaged in judicial legislation, through interpretation, to undeservedly favor its own
NOT FOR THIS COURT, to decide upon and grant. The grant to the members of the judges and justices.
Executive Department of this kind of benefit is an act that the Constitution exclusively 4. A Grant would effectively be a Misplaced Exercise of Liberality at the Expense
assigns to Congress. This is an authority and prerogative that the Constitution of Public Funds and to the Prejudice of Sectors who are More in Need of these Funds.
exclusively grants to Congress. - The liberal approach does not allow the inclusion of the period of services in the NLRC
(or any executive office) to the period of judicial service to grant longevity pay in the
To recapitulate, RA No. 9347 merely used the salary, allowances, and benefits received judiciary, The law is clear and unequivocal in its requirements for the grant of
by CA Justices as a yardstick for the salary, allowances, and benefits to be received by longevity pay, and cannot thus be amended through a claimed liberal approach.
NLRC commissioners. This is what RA No. 9347 meant when it granted NLRC
commissioners the same salary, allowances, and benefits as CA Associate Justices. The Court should not forget that liberality is not a magic wand that can ward off the
clear terms and import of express legal provisions; it has a place only when, between
The grant of an equivalent judicial rank does not (and cannot) make an official in the two positions that the law can both accommodate, the Court chooses the more
executive a member of the judiciary; thus, benefits that accrue only to members of the expansive or more generous option. It has no place where no choice is available at all
judiciary cannot be granted to executive officials. This is a consequence of the because the terms of the law are clear and do not at all leave room for discretion, 12
separation of powers principle that underlies the Constitution.
In terms of the longevity pay's purpose, liberality has no place where service is not to
In more concrete terms, incumbent judges and justices who had previous government the judiciary, as the element of loyalty - the virtue that longevity pay rewards - is not at
service outside the judiciary and who had been granted equivalent judicial rank under all present.
these previous positions, cannot credit their past non-judicial service as service in the
judiciary for purposes of securing benefits applicable only and earned while a member I cannot overemphasize too that the policy of liberal construction cannot and should
of the judiciary, unless Congress by law says otherwise and only for purposes of not be to the point of engaging in judicial legislation -an act that the Constitution
entitlement to salaries and benefits. absolutely forbids this Court to do. The Court may not, in the guise of interpretation,
enlarge the scope of a statute or include, under its terms, situations that were not
3. The Grant of Longevity Pay Prayed for is an Act of Judicial Legislation. provided nor intended by the lawmakers. The Court cannot rewrite the law to conform
to what it or certain of its Members think should be the law.
The grant of longevity pay for past services in the NLRC, based on the grant of
longevity pay to judges and justices of the judiciary, amounts to prohibited judicial Not to be forgotten is the effect of this Court's grant on the use of public funds; funds
legislation. granted to other than the legitimate beneficiaries are misdirected funds that may be
put to better use by those sectors of society who need them more.
Section 42 of BP 129 is clear in requiring five years of meritorious, efficient, and
continuous services in the judiciary subsequent legislation conferring the same salary For these reasons, I vote DENY with FINALITY the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
and benefits that judges and justices enjoy to designated counterparts in the executive former Court of Appeals Associate Justice Angelita Alberto-Gacutan.
did not amend this requirement, expressly or impliedly.
 G.R. No. 82511 March 3, 1992 After due hearing, the Labor Arbiter in a decision dated July 16, 1985, ordered
petitioner company to reinstate private respondent to her former or equivalent
GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION, petitioner, position and to pay her full backwages and other benefits she would have received
vs. were it not for the illegal dismissal. Petitioner was also ordered to pay private
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and IMELDA SALAZAR, respondent moral damages of P50,000.00.
respondents.
On appeal, public respondent National Labor Relations, Commission in the questioned
resolution dated December 29, 1987 affirmed the aforesaid decision with respect to
ROMERO, J.: the reinstatement of private respondent but limited the backwages to a period of two
(2) years and deleted the award for moral damages. 4
For private respondent Imelda L. Salazar, it would seem that her close association with
Delfin Saldivar would mean the loss of her job. In May 1982, private respondent was Hence, this petition assailing the Labor Tribunal for having committed grave abuse of
employed by Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation (GMCR) as general systems discretion in holding that the suspension and subsequent dismissal of private
analyst. Also employed by petitioner as manager for technical operations' support was respondent were illegal and in ordering her reinstatement with two (2) years'
Delfin Saldivar with whom private respondent was allegedly very close. backwages.

Sometime in 1984, petitioner GMCR, prompted by reports that company equipment On the matter of preventive suspension, we find for petitioner GMCR.
and spare parts worth thousands of dollars under the custody of Saldivar were
missing, caused the investigation of the latter's activities. The report dated September The investigative findings of Mr. Maramara, which pointed to Delfin Saldivar's acts in
25, 1984 prepared by the company's internal auditor, Mr. Agustin Maramara, indicated conflict with his position as technical operations manager, necessitated immediate and
that Saldivar had entered into a partnership styled Concave Commercial and Industrial decisive action on any employee closely, associated with Saldivar. The suspension of
Company with Richard A. Yambao, owner and manager of Elecon Engineering Services Salazar was further impelled by th.e discovery of the missing Fedders airconditioning
(Elecon), a supplier of petitioner often recommended by Saldivar. The report also unit inside the apartment private respondent shared with Saldivar. Under such
disclosed that Saldivar had taken petitioner's missing Fedders airconditioning unit for circumstances, preventive suspension was the proper remedial recourse available to
his own personal use without authorization and also connived with Yambao to defraud the company pending Salazar's investigation. By itself, preventive suspension does, not
petitioner of its property. The airconditioner was recovered only after petitioner GMCR signify that the company has adjudged the employee guilty of the charges she was
filed an action for replevin against Saldivar.1 asked to answer and explain. Such disciplinary measure is resorted to for the
protection of the company's property pending investigation any alleged malfeasance or
It likewise appeared in the course of Maramara's investigation that Imelda Salazar misfeasance committed by the employee.5
violated company reglations by involving herself in transactions conflicting with the
company's interests. Evidence showed that she signed as a witness to the articles of Thus, it is not correct to conclude that petitioner GMCR had violated Salazar's right to
partnership between Yambao and Saldivar. It also appeared that she had full due process when she was promptly suspended. If at all, the fault, lay with private
knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of the Fedders airconditioner but failed to respondent when she ignored petitioner's memorandum of October 8, 1984 "giving her
inform her employer. ample opportunity to present (her) side to the Management." Instead, she went
directly to the Labor Department and filed her complaint for illegal suspension without
Consequently, in a letter dated October 8, 1984, petitioner company placed private giving her employer a chance to evaluate her side of the controversy.
respondent Salazar under preventive suspension for one (1) month, effective October
9, 1984, thus giving her thirty (30) days within which to, explain her side. But instead But while we agree with the propriety of Salazar's preventive suspension, we hold that
of submitting an explanations three (3) days later or on October 12, 1984 private her eventual separation from employment was not for cause.
respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for illegal suspension, which she
subsequently amended to include illegal dismissal, vacation and sick leave benefits, What is the remedy in law to rectify an unlawful dismissal so as to "make whole" the
13th month pay and damages, after petitioner notified her in writing that effective victim who has not merely lost her job which, under settled Jurisprudence, is a
November 8, 1984, she was considered dismissed "in view of (her) inability to refute property right of which a person is not to be deprived without due process, but also
and disprove these findings. 2
the compensation that should have accrued to her during the period when she was right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure,
unemployed? humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in
policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits is may be
Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides: provided by law.10 (Emphasis supplied)

Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not Compare this with the sole.provision on Labor in the 1973 Constitution under the
terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized Article an Declaration of Principles and State Policies that provides:
by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled
to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his Sec. 9. The state shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and
full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their equality in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race,
monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employers. The State
from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. 6 (Emphasis supplied) shall ensure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective baegaining,
security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. The State may
Corollary thereto are the following provisions of the Implementing Rules and provide for compulsory arbitration. 11
Regulations of the Labor Code:
To be sure, both Charters recognize "security of tenure" as one of the rights of labor
Sec. 2. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employments, the employer which the State is mandated to protect. But there is no gainsaying the fact that the
shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause as provided intent of the framers of the present Constitution was to give primacy to the rights of
in the Labor Code or when authorized by existing laws. labor and afford the sector "full protection," at least greater protection than heretofore
accorded them, regardless of the geographical location of the workers and whether
Sec. 3. Reinstatement. — An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work they are organized or not.
shall by entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to
backwages."7 (Emphasis supplied) It was then CONCOM Commissioner, now Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., who
substantially contributed to the present formulation of the protection to labor
Before proceeding any furthers, it needs must be recalled that the present Constitution provision and proposed that the same be incorporated in the Article on Social Justice
has gone further than the 1973 Charter in guaranteeing vital social and economic and not just in the Article on Declaration of Principles and State Policies "in the light of
rights to marginalized groups of society, including labor. Given the pro-poor the special importance that we are giving now to social justice and the necessity of
orientation of several articulate Commissioners of the Constitutional Commission of emphasizing the scope and role of social justice in national development." 12
1986, it was not surprising that a whole new Article emerged on Social Justice and
Human Rights designed, among other things, to "protect and enhance the right of all If we have taken pains to delve into the background of the labor provisions in our
the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic and political inequalities, and Constitution and the Labor Code, it is but to stress that the right of an employee not to
remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the be dismissed from his job except for a just or authorized cause provided by law has
common good." 8 Proof of the priority accorded to labor is that it leads the other areas assumed greater importance under the 1987 Constitution with the singular
of concern in the Article on Social Justice, viz., Labor ranks ahead of such topics as prominence labor enjoys under the article on Social Justice. And this transcendent
Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform, Urban Land Roform and Housing, Health, policy has been translated into law in the Labor Code. Under its terms, where a case of
Women, Role and Rights of Poople's Organizations and Human Rights.9 unlawful or unauthorized dismissal has been proved by the aggrieved employee, or on
the other hand, the employer whose duty it is to prove the lawfulness or justness of his
The opening paragraphs on Labor states: act of dismissal has failed to do so, then the remedies provided in Article 279 should
find, application. Consonant with this liberalized stance vis-a-vis labor, the legislature
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and even went further by enacting Republic Act No. 6715 which took effect on March 2,
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment 1989 that amended said Article to remove any possible ambiguity that jurisprudence
opportunities for all. may have generated which watered down the constitutional intent to grant to labor
"full protection." 13
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the
To go back to the instant case, there being no evidence to show an authorized, much by way of exception, such as when the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to
less a legal, cause for the dismissal of private respondent, she had every right, not only ensuing strained relations between the employer and the employee.
to be entitled to reinstatement, but ay well, to full backwages." 14
In such cases, it should be proved that the employee concerned occupies a position
The intendment of the law in prescribing the twin remedies of reinstatement and where he enjoys the trust and confidence of his employer; and that it is likely that if
payment of backwages is, in the former, to restore the dismissed employee to her reinstated, an atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism may be generated as to
status before she lost her job, for the dictionary meaning of the word "reinstate" is "to adversely affect the efficiency and productivity of the employee concerned.
restore to a state, conditione positions etc. from which one had been removed"15 and
in the latter, to give her back the income lost during the period of unemployment. Both A few examples, will suffice to illustrate the Court's application of the above principles:
remedies, looking to the past, would perforce make her "whole." where the employee is a Vice-President for Marketing and as such, enjoys the full trust
and confidence of top management; 28 or is the Officer-In-Charge of the extension
Sadly, the avowed intent of the law has at times been thwarted when reinstatement office of the bank where he works; 29 or is an organizer of a union who was in a
has not been forthcoming and the hapless dismissed employee finds himself on the position to sabotage the union's efforts to organize the workers in commercial and
outside looking in. industrial establishments; 30 or is a warehouseman of a non-profit organization whose
primary purpose is to facilitate and maximize voluntary gifts. by foreign individuals
Over time, the following reasons have been advanced by the Court for denying and organizations to the Philippines; 31 or is a manager of its Energy Equipment
reinstatement under the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto; that Sales. 32
reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the long passage of time (22 years
of litigation) or because of the realities of the situation; 16 or that it would be Obviously, the principle of "strained relations" cannot be applied indiscriminately.
"inimical to the employer's interest; " 17 or that reinstatement may no longer be Otherwise reinstatement can never be possible simply because some hostility is
feasible; 18 or, that it will not serve the best interests of the parties involved; 19 or invariably engendered between the parties as a result of litigation. That is human
that the company would be prejudiced by the workers' continued employment; 20 or nature. 33
that it will not serve any prudent purpose as when supervening facts have transpired
which make execution on that score unjust or inequitable 21 or, to an increasing Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid and legal act of asserting one's
extent, due to the resultant atmosphere of "antipathy and antagonism" or "strained right; otherwise an employee who shall assert his right could be easily separated from
relations" or "irretrievable estrangement" between the employer and the employee. 22 the service, by merely paying his separation pay on the pretext that his relationship
with his employer had already become strained. 34
In lieu of reinstatement, the Court has variously ordered the payment of backwages
and separation pay 23 or solely separation pay. 24 Here, it has not been proved that the position of private respondent as systems analyst
is one that may be characterized as a position of trust and confidence such that if
In the case at bar, the law is on the side of private respondent. In the first place the reinstated, it may well lead to strained relations between employer and employee.
wording of the Labor Code is clear and unambiguous: "An employee who is unjustly Hence, this does not constitute an exception to the general rule mandating
dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement. . . . and to his full backwages. . reinstatement for an employee who has been unlawfully dismissed.
. ." 25 Under the principlesof statutory construction, if a statute is clears plain and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted On the other hand, has she betrayed any confidence reposed in her by engaging in
interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or verba legis derived from the maxim index transactions that may have created conflict of interest situations? Petitioner GMCR
animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that points out that as a matter of company policy, it prohibits its employees from involving
the words employed by, the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will themselves with any company that has business dealings with GMCR. Consequently,
and preclude the court from construing it differently. 26 The legislature is presumed to when private respondent Salazar signed as a witness to the partnership papers of
know the meaning of the words, to:have used words advisedly, and to have expressed Concave (a supplier of Ultra which in turn is also a supplier of GMCR), she was
its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute.27 Verba legis non est deemed to have placed. herself in an untenable position as far as petitioner was
recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure. Neither concerned.
does the provision admit of any qualification. If in the wisdom of the Court, there may
be a ground or grounds for non-application of the above-cited provision, this should be
However, on close scrutiny, we agree with public respondent that such a circumstance
did not create a conflict of interests situation. As a systems analyst, Salazar was very G.R. No. 109445 November 7, 1994
far removed from operations involving the procurement of supplies. Salazar's duties
revolved around the development of systems and analysis of designs on a continuing FELICITO BASBACIO, petitioner,
basis. In other words, Salazar did not occupy a position of trust relative to the vs.
approval and purchase of supplies and company assets. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FRANKLIN DRILON in
his capacity as Secretary of Justice, respondent.
In the instant case, petitioner has predicated its dismissal of Salazar on loss of
confidence. As we have held countless times, while loss of confidence or breach of
trust is a valid ground for terminations it must rest an some basis which must be MENDOZA, J.:
convincingly established. 35 An employee who not be dismissed on mere presumptions
and suppositions. Petitioner's allegation that since Salazar and Saldivar lived together This case presents for determination the scope of the State's liability under Rep. Act
in the same apartment, it "presumed reasonably that complainant's sympathy would be No. 7309, which among other things provides compensation for persons who are
with Saldivar" and its averment that Saldivar's investigation although unverified, was unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned but on appeal are acquitted and ordered
probably true, do not pass this Court's test. 36 While we should not condone the acts released.
of disloyalty of an employee, neither should we dismiss him on the basis of suspicion
derived from speculative inferences. Petitioner Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law, Wilfredo Balderrama, were convicted of
frustrated murder and of two counts of frustrated murder for the killing of Federico
To rely on the Maramara report as a basis for Salazar's dismissal would be most Boyon and the wounding of the latter's wife Florida and his son Tirso, at Palo,
inequitous because the bulk of the findings centered principally oh her friend's alleged Calanuga, Rapu-Rapu, Albay, on the night of June 26, 1988. The motive for the killing
thievery and anomalous transactions as technical operations' support manager. Said was apparently a land dispute between the Boyons and petitioner. Petitioner and his
report merely insinuated that in view of Salazar's special relationship with Saldivar, son-in-law were sentenced to imprisonment and ordered immediately detained after
Salazar might have had direct knowledge of Saldivar's questionable activities. Direct their bonds had been cancelled.
evidence implicating private respondent is wanting from the records.
Petitioner and his son-in-law appealed. Only petitioner's appeal proceeded to
It is also worth emphasizing that the Maramara report came out after Saldivar had judgment, however, as the appeal of the other accused was dismissed for failure to file
already resigned from GMCR on May 31, 1984. Since Saldivar did not have the his brief.
opportunity to refute management's findings, the report remained obviously one-sided.
Since the main evidence obtained by petitioner dealt principally on the alleged On June 22, 1992 the Court of Appeals rendered a decision acquitting petitioner on
culpability of Saldivar, without his having had a chance to voice his side in view of his the ground that the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy between him and his son-
prior resignation, stringent examination should have been carried out to ascertain in-law. He had been pointed to by a daughter of Federico Boyon as the companion of
whether or not there existed independent legal grounds to hold Salatar answerable as Balderrama when the latter barged into their hut and without warning started
well and, thereby, justify her dismissal. Finding none, from the records, we find her to shooting, but the appellate court ruled that because petitioner did nothing more,
have been unlawfully dismissed. petitioner's presence at the scene of the crime was insufficient to show conspiracy.

WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of public respondent National Labor Relations Based on his acquittal, petitioner filed a claim under Rep. Act No. 7309, sec. 3(a),
Commission dated December 29, 1987 is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner GMCR is which provides for the payment of compensation to "any person who was unjustly
ordered to REINSTATE private respondent Imelda Salazar and to pay her backwages accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of
equivalent to her salary for a period of two (2) years only. acquittal."1 The claim was filed with the Board of Claims of the Department of Justice,
but the claim was denied on the ground that while petitioner's presence at the scene of
This decision is immediately executory. the killing was not sufficient to find him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, yet,
considering that there was bad blood between him and the deceased as a result of a
SO ORDERED land dispute and the fact that the convicted murderer is his son-in-law, there was basis
for finding that he was "probably guilty."
On appeal, respondent Secretary of Justice affirmed the Board's ruling. Said the quantum of proof required for conviction, it may nonetheless be sufficient to sustain a
Secretary of Justice in his resolution dated March 11, 1993: civil action for damages.2 In one case the accused, an alien, was acquitted of statutory
rape with homicide because of doubt as to the ages of the offended parties who
It is believed therefore that the phrase "any person . . . unjustly accused, convicted and consented to have sex with him. Nonetheless the accused was ordered to pay moral
imprisoned" in Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7309 refers to an individual who was wrongly and exemplary damages and ordered deported.3 In such a case to pay the accused
accused and imprisoned for a crime he did not commit, thereby making him "a victim compensation for having been "unjustly convicted" by the trial court would be utterly
of unjust imprisonment." In the instant case, however, Claimant/Appellant cannot be inconsistent with his liability to the complainant. Yet to follow petitioner's theory such
deemed such a victim since a reading of the decision of his acquittal shows that his an accused would be entitled to compensation under sec. 3(a).
exculpation is not based on his innocence, but upon, in effect, a finding of reasonable
doubt. The truth is that the presumption of innocence has never been intended as evidence of
innocence of the accused but only to shift the burden of proof that he is guilty to the
Petitioner brought this petition for review on certiorari. Neither Rule 45 nor Rep. Act prosecution. If "accusation is not synonymous with guilt,"4 so is the presumption of
No. 7309, however, provides for review by certiorari of the decisions of the Secretary innocence not a proof thereof. It is one thing to say that the accused is presumed to be
of Justice. Nonetheless, in view of the importance of the question tendered, the Court innocent in order to place on the prosecution the burden of proving beyond reasonable
resolved to treat the petition as a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. doubt that the accused is guilty. It is quite another thing to say that he is innocent and
if he is convicted that he has been "unjustly convicted." As this Court held in a case:
Petitioner questions the basis of the respondent's ruling that to be able to recover
under sec. 3(a) of the law the claimant must on appeal be found to be innocent of the Though we are acquitting the appellant for the crime of rape with homicide, we
crimes of which he was convicted in the trial court. Through counsel he contends that emphasize that we are not ruling that he is innocent or blameless. It is only the
the language of sec. 3(a) is clear and does not call for interpretation. The "mere fact constitutional presumption of innocence and the failure of the prosecution to build an
that the claimant was imprisoned for a crime which he was subsequently acquitted of airtight case for conviction which saved him, not that the facts of unlawful conduct do
is already unjust in itself," he contends. To deny his claim because he was not declared not exist.5
innocent would be to say that his imprisonment for two years while his appeal was
pending was justified. Petitioner argues that there is only one requirement for To say then that an accused has been "unjustly convicted" has to do with the manner of
conviction in criminal cases and that is proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the his conviction rather than with his innocence. An accused may on appeal be acquitted
prosecution fails to present such proof, the presumption that the accused is innocent because he did not commit the crime, but that does
stands and, therefore, there is no reason for requiring that he be declared innocent of not necessarily mean that he is entitled to compensation for having been the victim of
the crime before he can recover compensation for his imprisonment. an "unjust conviction." If his conviction was due to an error in the appreciation of the
evidence the conviction while erroneous is not unjust. That is why it is not, on the
Petitioner's contention has no merit. It would require that every time an accused is other hand, correct to say as does respondent, that under the law liability for
acquitted on appeal he must be given compensation on the theory that he was compensation depends entirely on the innocence of the accused.
"unjustly convicted" by the trial court. Such a reading of sec. 3(a) is contrary to
petitioner's professed canon of construction that when the language of the statute is The phrase "unjustly convicted" has the same meaning as "knowingly rendering an
clear it should be given its natural meaning. It leaves out of the provision in question unjust judgment" in art. 204 of the Revised Penal Code. What this Court held in In re
the qualifying word "unjustly" so that the provision would simply read: "The following Rafael C. Climaco 6 applies:
may file claims for compensation before the Board: (a) any person who was accused,
convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal." In order that a judge may be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment,
it must be shown beyond doubt that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or is
But sec. 3(a) requires that the claimant be "unjustly accused, convicted [and] not supported by the evidence, and the same was made with conscious and deliberate
imprisoned." The fact that his conviction is reversed and the accused is acquitted is not intent to do an injustice . . . .
itself proof that the previous conviction was "unjust." An accused may be acquitted for
a number of reasons and his conviction by the trial court may, for any of these reasons, To hold a judge liable for the rendition of manifestly unjust judgment by reason of
be set aside. For example, he may be acquitted not because he is innocent of the crime inexcusable negligence or ignorance, it must be shown, according to Groizard, that
charged but because of reasonable doubt, in which case he may be found civilly liable although he has acted without malice, he failed to observe in the performance of his
to the complainant, because while the evidence against him does not satisfy the duty, that diligence, prudence and care which the law is entitled to exact in the
rendering of any public service. Negligence and ignorance are inexcusable if they commission of the said crimes? Basbacio was — as the record shows — nothing but
imply a manifest injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation. part of the dark shadows of that night. . . .
Inexcusable mistake only exists in the legal concept when it implies a manifest
injustice, that is to say, such injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable One may take issue with this ruling because precisely conspiracy may be shown by
interpretation, even though there is a misunderstanding or error of the law applied, concert of action and other circumstances. Why was petitioner with his son-in-law?
yet in the contrary it results, logically and reasonably, and in a very clear and Why did they apparently flee together? And what about the fact that there was bad
indisputable manner, in the notorious violation of the legal precept. blood between petitioner and the victim Federico Boyon? These questions may no
longer be passed upon in view of the acquittal of petitioner but they are relevant in
Indeed, sec. 3(a) does not refer solely to an unjust conviction as a result of which the evaluating his claim that he had been unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned
accused is unjustly imprisoned, but, in addition, to an unjust accusation. The accused before he was released because of his acquittal on appeal. We hold that in view of
must have been "unjustly accused, in consequence of which he is unjustly convicted these circumstances respondent Secretary of Justice and the Board of Claims did not
and then imprisoned. It is important to note this because if from its inception the commit a grave abuse of its discretion in disallowing petitioner's claim for
prosecution of the accused has been wrongful, his conviction by the court is, in all compensation under Rep. Act No. 7309.
probability, also wrongful. Conversely, if the prosecution is not malicious any
conviction even though based on less than the required quantum of proof in criminal WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
cases may be erroneous but not necessarily unjust.
SO ORDERED.
The reason is that under Rule 112, sec. 4, the question for the prosecutor in filing a
case in court is not whether the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt but only
whether "there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and
the accused is probably guilty thereof." Hence, an accusation which is based on
"probable guilt" is not an unjust accusation and a conviction based on such degree of
proof is not necessarily an unjust judgment but only an erroneous one. The remedy for
such error is appeal.

In the case at bar there is absolutely no evidence to show that petitioner's conviction
by the trial court was wrongful or that it was the product of malice or gross ignorance
or gross negligence. To the contrary, the court had reason to believe that petitioner and
his co-accused were in league, because petitioner is the father-in-law of Wilfredo
Balderrama and it was petitioner who bore the victim a grudge because of a land
dispute. Not only that. Petitioner and his coaccused arrived together in the hut of the
victims and forced their way into it.

The Court of Appeals ruled there was no conspiracy only because there was no proof
that he did or say anything on the occasion. Said the appellate court.

Both eyewitness testimonies fail to show the appellant Felicito Basbacio to have
committed any act at all. Both fail to show Felicito Basbacio as having said anything at
all. Both fail to show Felicito Basbacio as having committed anything in furtherance of
a conspiracy to commit the crimes charged against the defendants. It seems to be a
frail and flimsy basis on which to conclude that conspiracy existed between actual
killer Wilfredo Balderrama and Felicito Basbacio to commit murder and two frustrated
murders on that night of June 26, 1988. It may be asked: where was the coming
together of the two defendants to an agreement to commit the crimes of murder and
frustrated murder on two counts? Where was Basbacio's contribution to the
 G.R. No. 109835 November 22, 1993 recruitment and placement, the Rules of the Administration and relevant issuances of
the Department and all liabilities which the Administration may impose. The surety
JMM PROMOTIONS & MANAGEMENT, INC., petitioner, bonds shall include the condition that the notice to the principal is notice to the surety
vs. and that any judgment against the principal in connection with matters falling under
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ULPIANO L. DE LOS SANTOS, POEA's jurisdiction shall be binding and conclusive on the surety. The surety bonds
respondent. shall be co-terminus with the validity period of license. (Emphasis supplied)

CRUZ, J.: In addition, the petitioner claims it has placed in escrow the sum of P200,000 with the
Philippine National Bank in compliance with Section 17, Rule II, Book II of the same
The sole issue submitted in this case is the validity of the order of respondent National Rule, "to primarily answer for valid and legal claims of recruited workers as a result of
Labor Relations Commission dated October 30, 1992, dismissing the petitioner's recruitment violations or money claims."
appeal from a decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration on the
ground of failure to post the required appeal bond.1 Required to comment, the Solicitor General sustains the appeal bond requirement but
suggest that the rules cited by the NLRC are applicable only to decisions of the Labor
The respondent cited the second paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code as Arbiters and not of the POEA. Appeals from decisions of the POEA, he says, are
amended, providing that: governed by the following provisions of Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules:

In the case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the Sec. 5. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. The appeal shall be filed within the
employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued reglementary period as provided in Section 1 of this Rule; shall be under oath
by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in an with proof of payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or
amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from. surety bond as provided in Section 6 of this Rule; shall be accompanied by a
memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon and the
and Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as amended, arguments in support thereof; the relief prayed for; and a statement of the date
reading as follows: when the appellant received the appealed decision and/or award and proof of
service on the other party of such appeal.
Sec. 6. Bond — In case the decision of a Labor Arbiter involves a monetary
award, an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated
cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by shall not stop the running of the period for perfecting an appeal.
the Commission or the Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to the monetary
award. Sec. 6. Bond. In case the decision of the Administration involves a
monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the
The petitioner contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly
applying these rules to decisions rendered by the POEA. It insists that the appeal bond accredited by the Commission in an amount equivalent to the monetary award.
is not necessary in the case of licensed recruiters for overseas employment because (Emphasis supplied)
they are already required under Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules not only
to pay a license fee of P30,000 but also to post a cash bond of P100,000 and a surety The question is, having posted the total bond of P150,000 and placed in escrow the
bond of P50,000, thus: amount of P200,000 as required by the POEA Rules, was the petitioner still required to
post an appeal bond to perfect its appeal from a decision of the POEA to the NLRC?
Upon approval of the application, the applicant shall pay a license fee of P30,000. It
shall also post a cash bond of P100,000 and surety bond of P50,000 from a bonding It was.
company acceptable to the Administration and duly accredited by the Insurance
Commission. The bonds shall answer for all valid and legal claims arising from The POEA Rules are clear. A reading thereof readily shows that in addition to the cash
violations of the conditions for the grant and use of the license, and/or accreditation and surety bonds and the escrow money, an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to
and contracts of employment. The bonds shall likewise guarantee compliance with the the monetary award is required to perfect an appeal from a decision of the POEA.
provisions of the Code and its implementing rules and regulations relating to
Obviously, the appeal bond is intended to further insure the payment of the monetary redundancy; on the contrary, we find that Section 6 complements Section 4 and
award in favor of the employee if it is eventually affirmed on appeal to the NLRC. Section 17. The rule is that a construction that would render a provision inoperative
should be avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled
It is true that the cash and surety bonds and the money placed in escrow are supposed whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.
to guarantee the payment of all valid and legal claims against the employer, but these
claims are not limited to monetary awards to employees whose contracts of Accordingly, we hold that in addition to the monetary obligations of the overseas
employment have been violated. The POEA can go against these bonds also for recruiter prescribed in Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules and the escrow
violations by the recruiter of the conditions of its license, the provisions of the Labor agreement under Section 17 of the same Rule, it is necessary to post the appeal bond
Code and its implementing rules, E.O. 247 (reorganizing POEA) and the POEA Rules, required under Section 6, Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules, as a condition for
as well as the settlement of other liabilities the recruiter may incur. perfecting an appeal from a decision of the POEA.

As for the escrow agreement, it was presumably intended to provide for a standing Every intendment of the law must be interpreted in favor of the working class,
fund, as it were, to be used only as a last resort and not to be reduced with the conformably to the mandate of the Constitution. By sustaining rather than annulling
enforcement against it of every claim of recruited workers that may be adjudged the appeal bond as a further protection to the claimant employee, this Court affirms
against the employer. This amount may not even be enough to cover such claims and, once again its commitment to the interest of labor.
even if it could initially, may eventually be exhausted after satisfying other subsequent
claims. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so
ordered.
As it happens, the decision sought to be appealed grants a monetary award of about
P170,000 to the dismissed employee, the herein private respondent. The standby
guarantees required by the POEA Rules would be depleted if this award were to be
enforced not against the appeal bond but against the bonds and the escrow money,
making them inadequate for the satisfaction of the other obligations the recruiter may
incur.

Indeed, it is possible for the monetary award in favor of the employee to exceed the
amount of P350,000, which is the sum of the bonds and escrow money required of the
recruiter.

It is true that these standby guarantees are not imposed on local employers, as the
petitioner observes, but there is a simple explanation for this distinction. Overseas
recruiters are subject to more stringent requirement because of the special risks to
which our workers abroad are subjected by their foreign employers, against whom
there is usually no direct or effective recourse. The overseas recruiter is solidarily
liable with a foreign employer. The bonds and the escrow money are intended to
insure more care on the part of the local agent in its choice of the foreign principal to
whom our overseas workers are to be sent.

It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as

in this case), care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory
that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting
provisions. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat. 2 Under the petitioner's interpretation,
the appeal bond required by Section 6 of the aforementioned POEA Rule should be
disregarded because of the earlier bonds and escrow money it has posted. The
petitioner would in effect nullify Section 6 as a superfluity but we do not see any such
 Citing Inding v. Sandiganbayan8 and Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,9 he asserted
G.R. No. 191894 July 15, 2015 that under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606, as amended by Section 4 (A) (1) of
R.A No. 8249,10 the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to try and hear the case
DANILO A. DUNCANO, Petitioner, because he is an official of the executive branch occupying the position of a Regional
vs. Director but with a compensation that is classified as below Salary Grade 27.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (2nd DIVISION), and HON. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR, Respondents. In its Opposition,11 the OSP argued that a reading of Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g) of
the subject law would clearly show that the qualification as to Salary Grade 27 and
DECISION higher applies only to officials of the executive branch other than the Regional Director
and those specifically enumerated. This is so since the term "Regional Director" and
PERALTA, J.: "higher" are separated by the conjunction "and," which signifies that these two
positions are different, apart and distinct, words but are conjoined together "relating
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rules) with prayer for one to the other" to give effect to the purpose of the law. The fact that the position of
issuance of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order seeks to reverse Regional Director was specifically mentioned without indication as to its salary grade
and set aside the August 18, 2009 Resolution1 and February 8, 2010 Order2 of signifies the lawmakers’ intention that officials occupying such position, regardless of
respondent Sandiganbayan Second Division in Criminal Case No. SB-09-CRM-0080, salary grade, fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
which denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss on the ground of la9k of jurisdiction. This issue, it is claimed, was already resolved in Inding. Finally, the OSP contended
that the filing of the motion to dismiss is premature considering that the
The facts are plain and undisputed. Sandiganbayan has yet to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

Petitioner Danilo A. Duncano is, at the time material to the case, the Regional Director Still not to be outdone, petitioner invoked the applicability of Cuyco v.
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) with Salary Grade 26 as classified under Sandiganbayan12 and Organo v. Sandiganbayan13 in his rejoinder.
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758.3 On March 24, 2009,4 the Office of the Special
Prosecutor (OSP), Office of the Ombudsman, filed a criminal case against him for On August 18, 2009, the Sandiganbayan Second Division promulgated its Resolution,
violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713,5 allegedly committed disposing: WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES the
as follows: instant Motion to Dismiss for being devoid of merit. Let a Warrant of Arrest be
therefore issued against the accused.
That on or about April 15, 2003, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused DANILO SO ORDERED.14
DUNCANO y ACIDO, a high ranking public officer, being the Regional Director of
Revenue Region No. 7, of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Quezon City, and as such is The respondent court ruled that the position of Regional Director is one of those
under an obligation to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of his assets, exceptions where the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction even if such position is not
liabilities and net worth and financial and business interests, did then and there, Salary Grade 27. It was opined that Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249 unequivocally
wilfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to disclose in his Sworn Statement of Assets and provides that respondent court has jurisdiction over officials of the executive branch of
Liabilities and Networth (SALN) for the year 2002, his financial and business the government occupying the position of regional director and higher, otherwise
interests/connection in Documail Provides Corporation and Don Plus Trading of which classified as Salary Grade 27 and higher, of R.A. No. 6758, including those officials
he and his family are the registered owners thereof, and the 1993 Nissan Patrol motor who are expressly enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (g). In support of the ruling,
vehicle registered in the name of his son VINCENT LOUIS P. DUNCANO which are part this Court’s pronouncements in Indingand Binay v. Sandiganbayan15 were cited.
of his assets, to the damage and prejudice of public interest.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied;16 Hence, this petition.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Instead of issuing a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, the
Prior to his arraignment, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss With Prayer to Defer the Court required respondents to file a comment on the petition without necessarily
Issuance of Warrant of Arrest7 before respondent Sandiganbayan Second Division. As giving due course thereto.17 Upon compliance of the OSP, a Rejoinder (supposedly a
the OSP alleged, he admitted that he is a Regional Director with Salary Grade 26. Reply) was filed by petitioner.
 "(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
At the heart of the controversy is the determination of whether, according to P.D. No. panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
1606, as amended by Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249, only Regional Directors with provincial department heads;
Salary Grade of 27 and higher, as classified under R.A. No. 6758, fall within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Arguing that he is not included among the "(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
public officials specifically enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g) of the law and treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
heavily relying as well on Cuyco, petitioner insists that respondent court lacks
jurisdiction over him, who is merely a Regional Director with Salary Grade 26. On the "(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and
contrary, the OSP maintains that a Regional Director, irrespective of salary grade, falls higher;
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. We find merit in the
petition. "(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of
The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated by Section 5, Article XIII of the higher rank;
1973 Constitution.18 By virtue of the powers vested in him by the Constitution and
pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972, former President "(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of
Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. No. 1486.19 The decree was later amended by P.D. provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
No. 1606,20 Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,21 P.D. No. 1860,22 and P.D. No.
1861.23 "(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, the special court was retained as provided
for in Section 4, Article XI thereof.24 Aside from Executive Order Nos. 1425 and 14-a, "(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
26 and R.A. 7080,27 which expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, P.D. No. controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
1606 was further modified by R.A. No. 7975,28 R.A. No. 8249,29 and just this year, foundations.
R.A. No. 10660.30
"(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade ‘27’ and up
For the purpose of this case, the relevant provision is Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
which states: SEC. 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read
as follows: "(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
"SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.– The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving: "(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to
the provisions of the Constitution; and
"A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, "(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher
Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the "B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
commission of the offense: committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this
section in relation to their office.
"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director
and higher, otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the Compensation "C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive
and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
including:
x x x"
Based on the afore-quoted, those that fall within the original jurisdiction of the ‘27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989."38 As
Sandiganbayan are: (1) officials of the executive branch with Salary Grade 27 or ruled in Inding:
higher, and (2) officials specifically enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g),
regardless of their salary grades.31 While the first part of Section 4 (A) covers only Following this disquisition, the paragraph of Section 4 which provides that if the
officials of the executive branch with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part accused is occupying a position lower than SG 27, the proper trial court has
specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary jurisdiction, can only be properly interpreted as applying to those cases where the
Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the principal accused is occupying a position lower than SG 27 and not among those
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.32 specifically included in the enumeration in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g). Stated
otherwise, except for those officials specifically included in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g),
That the phrase "otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher" qualifies "regional regardless of their salary grades, over whom the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, all
director and higher" is apparent from the Sponsorship Speech of Senator Raul S. Roco other public officials below SG 27 shall be under the jurisdiction of the proper trial
on Senate Bill Nos. 1353and 844, which eventually became R.A. Nos. 7975 and 8249, courts "where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to
respectively: SG 27 or higher." By this construction, the entire Section 4 is given effect. The cardinal
rule, after all, in statutory construction is that the particular words, clauses and
As proposed by the Committee, the Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and
over the cases assigned to it only in instances where one or more of the principal every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts
accused are officials occupying the positions of regional director and higher or are and in order to produce a harmonious whole. And courts should adopt a construction
otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher by the Compensation and Position that will give effect to every part of a statute, if at all possible. Ut magis valeat quam
Classification Act of 1989, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity at the pereat or that construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the
time of the commission of the offense. The jurisdiction, therefore, refers to a certain statute – its every word.39
grade upwards, which shall remain with the Sandiganbayan.33 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, to cite a few, We have held that a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod,40 a
To speed up trial in the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 7975 was enacted for that department manager of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth),41 a
Court to concentrate on the "larger fish" and leave the "small fry" to the lower courts. student regent of the University of the Philippines,42 and a Head of the Legal
This law became effective on May 6, 1995 and it provided a two-pronged solution to Department and Chief of the Documentation with corresponding ranks of Vice-
the clogging of the dockets of that court, to wit: Presidents and Assistant Vice-President of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS)43 fall within the jurisdiction
It divested the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over public officials whose salary grades of the Sandiganbayan.
were at Grade "26" or lower, devolving thereby these cases to the lower courts, and
retaining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan only over public officials whose salary Petitioner is not an executive official with Salary Grade 27 or higher. Neither does he
grades were at Grade "27" or higher and over other specific public officials holding hold any position particularly enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g). As he
important positions in government regardless of salary grade; x x x34 (Emphasis correctly argues, his case is, in fact, on all fours with Cuyco.1avvphi1 Therein, the
supplied) accused was the Regional Director of the Land Transportation Office, Region IX,
Zamboanga City, but at the time of the commission of the crime in 1992, his position
The legislative intent is to allow the Sandiganbayan to devote its time and expertise to was classified as Director II with Salary Grade 26.44 It was opined: Petitioner contends
big-time cases involving the so-called "big fishes" in the government rather than those that at the time of the commission of the offense in 1992, he was occupying the
accused who are of limited means who stand trial for "petty crimes," the so-called position of Director II, Salary Grade 26, hence, jurisdiction over the cases falls with the
"small fry," which, in turn, helps the court decongest its dockets.35 Regional Trial Court.

Yet, those that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall within the We sustain petitioner's contention.
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, provided that they hold the positions enumerated
by the law.36 In this category, it is the position held, not the salary grade, which The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Section 3(a) and (e),
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.37 The specific inclusion constitutes Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, unless committed by public officials and
an exception to the general qualification relating to "officials of the executive branch employees occupying positions of regional director and higher with Salary Grade "27"
occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade
or higher, under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic
Act No. 6758) in relation to their office.

In ruling in favor of its jurisdiction, even though petitioner admittedly occupied the
position of Director II with Salary Grade "26" under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), the Sandiganbayan incurred in
serious error of jurisdiction, and acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in suspending petitioner from office, entitling petitioner to the
reliefs prayed for.45

In the same way, a certification issued by the OIC – Assistant Chief, Personnel Division
of the BIR shows that, although petitioner is a Regional Director of the BIR, his
position is classified as Director II with Salary Grade 26.46

There is no merit in the OSP’s allegation that the petition was prematurely filed on the
ground that respondent court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner. Records disclose that when a warrant of arrest was issued by respondent
court, petitioner voluntarily surrendered and posted a cash bond on September 17,
2009.Also, he was arraigned on April 14, 2010,prior to the filing of the petition on
April 30, 2010.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition for certiorari is

GRANTED. The August 18, 2009 Resolution and February 8, 2010 Order of the
Sandiganbayan Second Division, which denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
 In G.R. No. 93177, which is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, they
are questioning the conduct of the Pre-Trial Investigation PTI Panel constituted to
No. 96948 August 2, 1991 investigate the charges against them and the creation of the General Court Martial
GCM convened to try them.
B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN. MARCELO BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO
PIZARRO PN, CAPT. MANUEL ISON PN, LTC. ROMELINO GOJO PN (M), LTC. In G.R. No. 96948, the petitioners, besides challenging the legality of GCM No. 14,
ARSENIO TECSON PA, LTC. RAFAEL GALVEZ PA, LTC. TIBURCIO FUSILLERO PA, seek certiorari against its ruling denying them the right to peremptory challenge as
LTC. ERICSON AURELIO PA, LTC. JACINTO LIGOT PA, LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER granted by Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408.
PA, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS PA, MAJ. CESAR DE LA PENA PN (M): MAJ.
LEUVINO VALENCIA PA, CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES PA, CAPT. JAIME JUNIO PA, In G.R. No. 95020, the orders of the respondent judge of the Regional Trial Court of
CAPT. DANILO LIM PA, CAPT. ELMER AMON PAF CAPT. VERGEL NACINO, and LT. Quezon City are assailed on certiorari on the ground that he has no jurisdiction over
JOEY SARROZA, petitioners, GCM No. 14 and no authority either to set aside its ruling denying bail to the private
vs. respondents.
B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU,
COL. ROMEO ODI COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT. In G.R. No. 97454, certiorari is also sought against the decision of the Regional Trial
FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN PRESIDENT AND MEMBERS OF GENERAL COURT- Court of Quezon City in a petition for habeas corpus directing the release of the
MARTIAL NO. 14, respondents. private respondents. Jurisdictional objections are likewise raised as in G.R. No. 95020.

No. 97454 August 2, 1991 I

AFP CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. RODOLFO BIAZON, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF Before the charges were referred to GCM No. 14, a Pre-Trial Investigation PTI Panel
MAJOR GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, PNP DIRECTOR GENERAL MAJOR GEN. had been constituted pursuant to Office Order No. 16 dated January 14, 1990, to
CESAR NAZARENO and LT. COL. ALBERTO OLARIO, Commanding Officer of the investigate the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948. The PTI Panel issued a
PNP/INP Detention Center/Jail, petitioners, uniform subpoena dated January 30, 1990, individually addressed to the petitioners,
vs. to wit:
HON. ANTONIO P. SOLANO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City,
Branch 86, CAPTAIN REYNALDO S. RAFAEL, 1 LT SERVANDO A. BAOANAN PN(M), You are hereby directed to appear in person before the undersigned Pre-Trial
1 LT. WILFREDO JIMENEZ PAF 1 LT. ATANACIO T. MACALAN JR PMM 2LT ELISEO Investigating Officers on 12 Feb 90 9:00 a.m. at Kiangan Hall, Camp Crame Quezon
T. RASCO PC, 2LT JONAS CALLEJA PC, 2LT JAIRUS JS GELVEZON III PMM 2LT City, then and there to submit your counter-affidavit and the affidavits of your
JOSELITO CABREROS PMM 2LT MEMEL ROJAS PN(M) and 2LT HERMINIO L. witnesses, if any, in the pre-trial investigation of the charge/charges against you for
CANTACO PC, respondents. violence of AWs _______________. DO NOT SUBMIT A MOTION TO DISMISS.

CRUZ, J.: Failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified
shall be deemed a waiver of your right to submit controverting evidence.
These four cases have been consolidated because they involve practically the same
parties and related issues arising from the same incident. On the same date, the petitioners acknowledged receipt of a copy of the charge sheet,
sworn statements of witnesses, and death and medical certificates of victims of the
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 and the private respondents in G.R. rebellion.
Nos. 95020 and 97454 are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing
prosecution for their alleged participation in the failed coup d' etat that took place on At the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners challenged the proceedings on various
December 1 to 9, 1989. grounds, prompting the PTI Panel to grant them 10 days within which to file their
The charges against them are violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 objections in writing This was done through a Motion for Summary Dismissal dated
(Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in February 21, 1990.
relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (Murder).
In a resolution dated February 27,1990, the PTI Panel denied the motion and gave the
petitioners 5 days from notice to submit their respective counter-affidavits and the On July 28, 1990, Ligot filed an urgent omnibus motion to enforce the order for his
affidavits of their witnesses. release and to declare in contempt the commanding officer of the PC/INP Jail for
disobey 'ng the said order. He later also complained that Generals De Villa and Aguirre
On March 7, 1990, the petitioners verbally moved for reconsideration of the foregoing had refused to release him "pending final resolution of the appeal to be taken" to this
denial and the PTI Panel gave them 7 days within which to reduce their motion to Court.
writing. This was done on March 14,1990.
After hearing, the trial court reiterated its order for the provisional liberty of Ligot, as
The petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as well as of intervenors Ltc Franklin Brawner, Lt/Col. Arsenio Tecson and Maj. Alfredo
mandated by Article of War 71, which provides: Oliveros, and later of additional intervenors Ltc Romelino Gojo and Capt. Manuel Ison.

Art. 71. Charges Action upon. — Charges and specifications must be signed by On August 22, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment inter alia:
a person subject to military law, and under the oath either that he has personal
knowledge of, or has investigated, the matters set forth therein and that the same (a) Declaring, that Section 13, Article III of the Constitution granting the right to bail
are true in fact, to the best of his knowledge and belief. to all persons with the defined exception is applicable and covers all military men
facing court-martial proceedings. Accordingly, the assailed orders of General Court-
No charge will be referred to a general court-martial for trial until after a Martial No. 14 denying bail to petitioner and intervenors on the mistaken assumption
thorough and impartial investigation thereof shall have been made. This that bail does not apply to military men facing court-martial proceedings on the
investigation will include inquiries as to the truth of the matter set forth in said ground that there is no precedent, are hereby set aside and declared null and void.
charges, form of charges, and what disposition of the case should be made in the Respondent General Court-Martial No. 14 is hereby directed to conduct proceedings
interest of justice and discipline. At such investigation full opportunity shall be on the applications of bail of the petitioner, intervenors and which may as well include
given to the accused to cross-examine witnesses against him if they are available other persons facing charges before General Court-Martial No. 14.
and to present anything he may desire in his own behalf, either in defense or
mitigation, and the investigating officer shall examine available witnesses Pending the proceedings on the applications for bail before General Court-Martial No.
requested by the accused. If the charges are forwarded after such investigation, 14, this Court reiterates its orders of release on the provisional liberty of petitioner
they shall be accompanied by a statement of the substance of the testimony taken Jacinto Ligot as well as intervenors Franklin Brawner and Arsenio Tecson.
on both sides. (Emphasis supplied.)
On February 18, 1991, the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with this Court
They also allege that the initial hearing of the charges consisted merely of a roll call a petition for habeas corpus on the ground that they were being detained in Camp
and that no prosecution witnesses were presented to reaffirm their affidavits. while the Crame without charges. The petition was referred to the Regional Trial Court of
motion for summary dismissal was denied, the motion for reconsideration remains Quezon City, where it was raffled to respondent Judge Antonio P. Solano. Finding after
unresolved to date and they have not been able to submit their counter-affidavits. hearing that no formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a
year after their arrest, the trial court ordered their release.
At the hearing of May 15, 1990, the petitioners in G.R. No. 96948 manifested that they
were exercising their right to raise peremptory challenges against the president and II
members of GCM No.14. They invoked Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 for this
purpose. GCM No. 14 ruled, however, that peremptory challenges had been The Court has examined the records of this case and rules as follows.
discontinued under P.D. No. 39.
It appears that the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 were given several
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the opportunities to present their side at the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled
application was denied by GCM No.14. He thereupon filed with the Regional Trial hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again after the denial of their motion of
Court of Quezon City a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for February 21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit their
provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. After considering the petition counter-affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for reconsideration
and the answer thereto filed by the president and members of GCM No.14, Judge which they were again asked to submit in writing. This they did on March 13, 1990.
Maximiano C. Asuncion issued an order granting provisional liberty to Ligot.
The motion was in effect denied when the PTI Panel resolved to recommend that the Shortly after enactment of Article 70 in 1920 the Judge Advocate General of the Army
charges be referred to the General Court Martial for trial. did hold that where there had been no pre-trial investigation, court-martial
proceedings were void ab initio. But this holding has been expressly repudiated in
The said petitioners cannot now claim they have been denied due process because the later holdings of the Judge Advocate General. This later interpretation has been that
investigation was resolved against them owing to their own failure to submit their the pre-trial requirements of Article 70 are directory, not mandatory, and in no way
counter-affidavits. They had been expressly warned In the subpoena sent them that effect the jurisdiction of a court-martial. The War Department's interpretation was
"failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified pointedly called to the attention of Congress in 1947 after which Congress amended
shall be deemed a waiver of (their) right to submit controverting evidence." They Article 70 but left unchanged the language here under consideration. compensable
chose not to heed the warning. As their motions appeared to be dilatory, the PTI Panel pre-requisite to the exercise of Army general court-martial jurisdiction
was justified in referring the charges to GCM No. 14 without waiting for the
petitioners to submit their defense. A trial before a general court-martial convened without any pretrial investigation
under article of war 71 would of course be altogether irregular but the court-martial
Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard. might nevertheless have jurisdiction. Significantly, this rule is similar to the one
1âwphi1 If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violation of the obtaining in criminal procedure in the civil courts to the effect that absence of
Bill of Rights. preliminary investigation does not go into the jurisdiction of the court but merely to
the regularity of the proceedings.
There was in our view substantial compliance with Article of War 71 by the PTI Panel.
Moreover, it is now settled that "even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does As to what law should govern the conduct of the preliminary investigation, that issue
not deprive a general court- martial of jurisdiction." We so held in Arula v. Espino,1 was resolved more than two years ago in Kapunan v. De Villa,2 where we declared:
thus:
xxx xxx xxx The Court finds that, contrary to the contention of petitioners, there was substantial
But even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court- compliance with the requirements of law as provided in the Articles of War and P.D.
martial of jurisdiction. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911. The amended charge sheets, charging petitioners
and their co-respondents with mutiny and conduct unbecoming an officer, were signed
The better accepted concept of pre-trial investigation is that it is directory, not by Maj. Antonio Ruiz, a person subject to military law, after he had investigated the
mandatory, and in no way affects the jurisdiction of a court-martial. In Humphrey v. matter through an evaluation of the pertinent records, including the reports of
Smith, 336 U.S. 695, 93 L ed 986 (1949), the Court said: respondent AFP Board of Officers, and was convinced of the truth of the testimonies
on record. The charge sheets were sworn to by Maj. Ruiz, the "accuser," in accordance
We do not think that the pre-trial investigation procedure by Article 70 (The Philippine with and in the manner provided under Art. 71 of the Articles of War. Considering that
counter-part is article of war 71, Commonwealth Act 408) can properly be construed P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911, is only of suppletory application, the fact that
as an indispensable pre-requisite to the exercise of the Army General court martial the charge sheets were not certified in the manner provided under said decrees, i.e.,
jurisdiction.. The Article does serve important functions in the administration of court- that the officer administering the oath has personally examined the affiant and that he
martial procedures and does provide safeguards to an accused. Its language is clearly is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood its affidavit, does not
such that a defendant could object to trial in the absence of the required investigation. invalidate said charge sheets. Thereafter, a "pretrial investigation" was conducted by
In that event the court-martial could itself postpone trial pending the investigation. respondent Maj. Baldonado, wherein, pursuant to P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No.
And the military reviewing authorities could consider the same contention, reversing a 911, petitioners were subpoenaed and required to file their counter-affidavit. However,
court- martial conviction where failure to comply with Article 70 has substantially instead of doing so, they filed an untitled pleading seeking the dismissal of the charges
injured an accused. But we are not persuaded that Congress intended to make against them. That petitioners were not able to confront the witnesses against them
otherwise valid court-martial judgments wholly void because pre-trial investigations was their own doing, for they never even asked Maj. Baldonado to subpoena said
fall short of the standards prescribed by Article 70. That Congress has not required witnesses so that they may be made to answer clarificatory questions in accordance
analogous pre-trial procedure for Navy court-martial is an indication that the with P. D, No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911.
investigatory plan was not intended to be exalted to the jurisdictional level.
xxx xxx xxx The petitioners also allege that GCM No. 14 has not been constitute in accordance
with Article 8 of the Articles of War because General Order No. M-6, which supposedly
convened the body, was not signed by Gen. Renato de Villa as Chief of Staff.
 and that only challenges for cause, in any number, would be allowed. Thus Article 18
Article of War No. 8 reads: of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408), as worded on September 14,
Art. 8. General Courts-Martial. — The President of the Philippines, the 1938, the date of the approval of the Act, made no mention or reference to any
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Chief of Constabulary peremptory challenge by either the trial judge advocate of a court- martial or by the
and, when empowered by the President, the commanding officer of a major accused. After December 17,1958, when the Manual for Courts-Martial of the
command or task force, the commanding officer of a division, the commanding Philippine Army became effective, the Judge Advocate General's Service of the
officer of a military area, the superintendent of the Military Academy, the Philippine Army conducted a continuing and intensive program of training and
commanding officer of a separate brigade or body of troops may appoint education in military law, encompassing the length and breadth of the Philippines.
general courts-martial; but when any such commander is the accuser or the This program was pursued until the outbreak of World War 11 in the Pacific on
prosecutor of the person or persons to be tried, the court shall be appointed by December 7, 1941. After the formal surrender of Japan to the allies in 1945, the officer
superior competent authority. ... corps of the Armed Forces of the Philippines had expanded to a very large number, and
a great many of the officers had been indoctrinated in military law. It was in these
While it is true that General Order No. M-6 was not signed by Gen. De Villa, there is environmental circumstances that Article of War 18 was amended on June 12,1948 to
no doubt that he authorized it because the order itself said it was issued "By Command entitle "each side" to one peremptory challenge, with the sole proviso that "the law
of General De Villa" and it has not been shown to be spurious. As observed by the member of court shall not be challenged except for cause.
Solicitor General, the Summary Disposition Form showed that Gen. De Villa, as Chief
of Staff, AFP, actually constituted GCM No. 14 and appointed its president and On September 27,1972, President Marcos issued General Order No. 8, empowering the
members. It is significant that General De Villa has not disauthorized or revoked or in Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces to create military tribunals "to try and decide cases
any way disowned the said order, as he would certainly have done if his authority had of military personnel and such other cases as may be referred to them.
been improperly invoked. On the contrary, as the principal respondent in G.R. No.
93177, he sustained General Order No. M 6 in the Comment filed for him and the On November 7,1972, he promulgated P.D. No. 39 (Governing the Creation,
other respondents by the Solicitor General. Composition, Jurisdiction, Procedure, and other matters relevant to military
Tribunals). This decree disallowed the peremptory challenge, thus:
Coming now to the right to peremptory challenge, we note that this was originally
provided for under Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 (Articles of War), as amended by No peremptory challenge shall be allowed. Challenges for cause may be entertained to
Rep. Act No. 242, on June 12, 1948, to wit: insure impartiality and good faith. Challenges shall immediately be heard and
determined by a majority of the members excluding the challenged member. A tie vote
Art. 18. Challenges. — Members of general or special courts-martial may be does not disqualify the challenged member. A successfully challenged member shall be
challenged by the accused or the trial judge advocate for cause stated to the immediately replaced.
court. The court shall determine the relevancy and validity thereof, and shall not
receive a challenge to more than one member at a time. Challenges by the trial On June 11, 1978, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 1498, or the National
judge advocate shall ordinarily be presented and decided before those by the Security Code, which was a compilation and codification of decrees, general orders,
accused are offered. Each side shall be entitled to the peremptory challenge, but LOI and policies intended "to meet the continuing threats to the existence, security and
the law member of the court shall not be challenged except for cause. stability of the State." The modified rule on challenges under P.D. No. 39 was
embodied in this decree.
The history of peremptory challenge was traced in Martelino v. Alejandro,3 thus:
On January 17,1981, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045 proclaiming the
In the early formative years of the infant Philippine Army, after the passage in 1935 of termination of the state of martial law throughout the Philippines. The proclamation
Commonwealth Act No. 1 (otherwise known as the National Defense Act), except for a revoked General Order No. 8 and declared the dissolution of the military tribunals
handful of Philippine Scout officers and graduates of the United States military and created pursuant thereto upon final determination of the cases pending therein.
naval academies who were on duty with the Philippine Army, there was a complete
dearth of officers learned in military law, its aside from the fact that the officer corps P.D. No. 39 was issued to implement General Order No. 8 and the other general orders
of the developing army was numerically made equate for the demands of the strictly mentioned therein. With the termination of martial law and the dissolution of the
military aspects of the national defense program. Because of these considerations it military tribunals created thereunder, the reason for the existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased
was then felt that peremptory challenges should not in the meanwhile be permitted automatically.
It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the It should be noted that the aforecited provision and the case cited refer to ordinary
law itself ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. This principle is also expressed appeals and not to the remedies employed by the accused officers before the
in the maxim ratio legis est anima: the reason of law is its soul. respondent courts.

Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge In Martelino, we observed as follows:
in L P.D. No. 39 became ineffective when the apparatus of martial law was dismantled
with the issuance of Proclamation No. 2045, As a result, the old rule embodied in It is true that civil courts as a rule exercise no supervision or correcting power over the
Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 was automatically revived and now again allows the proceedings of courts-martial, and that mere errors in their proceedings are not open
right to peremptory challenge. to consideration. The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction. But it is equally true that
in the exercise of their undoubted discretion, courts-martial may commit such an
We do not agree with the respondents in G.R. No. 96948 that the right to peremptory abuse of discretion — what in the language of Rule 65 is referred to as "grave abuse of
challenge remains withdrawn under P.D. No. 39. To repeat for emphasis, this decree discretion" — as to give rise to a defect in their jurisdiction. This is precisely the point
was itself withdrawn when martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981. Indeed, even if at issue in this action suggested by its nature as one for certiorari and prohibition ... .
not so withdrawn, it could still be considered no longer operative, having been cast
out under the new dispensation as, in the words of the Freedom Constitution, one of The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the
the "iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime. Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior
courts and other bodies and on petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto.5 In the
The military tribunal was one of the most oppressive instruments of martial law. It is absence of a law providing that the decisions, orders and ruling of a court-martial or
curious that the present government should invoke the rules of that discredited body the Office of the Chief of Staff can be questioned only before the Court of Appeals and
to justify its action against the accused officers. the Supreme Court, we hold that the Regional Trial Court can exercise similar
jurisdiction.
The Court realizes that the recognition of the right to peremptory challenge may be
exploited by a respondent in a court-martial trial to delay the proceedings and defer We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020
his deserved Punishment. It is hoped that the accused officers in the cases at bar will has traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an
not be so motivated. At any rate, the wisdom of Com. Act No. 408, in the light of exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. This much was suggested
present circumstances, is a matter addressed to the law-makers and not to this Court. in Arula, where we observed that "the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in
The judiciary can only interpret and apply the laws without regard to its own the military where the right to bail does not exist.
misgivings on their adverse effects. This is a problem only the political departments
can resolve. The justification for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor General as
follows:
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 question the propriety of the petition
for certiorari and mandamus and the petition for habeas corpus filed by the private The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men
respondents with the Regional Trial Courts of Quezon City. It is argued that since the from the constitutional coverage on the right to bail.
private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accused of violations of the
Articles of War, the respondent courts have no authority to order their release and Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous soldiers operate
otherwise interfere with the court-martial proceedings. within the framework of democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms
by the government for the discharge of their duties and responsibilities and are paid
The petitioners further contend that under Sec. 9(3) of BP 1 29, the Court of Appeals out of revenues collected from the people. All other insurgent elements carry out their
is vested with "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, activities outside of and against the existing political system.
resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, xxx xxx xxx
instrumentalities, boards or commissions." Rather irrelevantly, the petitioners also cite National security considerations should also impress upon this Honorable Court that
the case of Yang v. Court of Appeals4 where this Court held that "appeals from the release on bail of respondents constitutes a damaging precedent. Imagine a scenario of
Professional Regulation Commission are now exclusively cognizable by the Court of say 1,000 putschists roaming the streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed
Appeals. July 25,1990 Order were sustained, on "provisional" bail. The sheer number alone is
already discomforting. But, the truly disquieting thought is that they could freely commission is wanting, it behooves respondent then Major General Rodolfo Biazon
resume their heinous activity which could very well result in the overthrow of duly (now General) to release petitioner. Respondents must also be reminded that even if a
constituted authorities, including this Honorable Court, and replace the same with a military officer is arrested pursuant to Article 70 of then Articles of War, indefinite
system consonant with their own concept of government and justice. confinement is not sanctioned, as Article 71 thereof mandates that immediate steps
must be taken to try the person accused or to dissmiss the charge and release him. Any
The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal officer who is responsible for unnecessary delay in investigating or carrying the case to
protection clause is not acceptable. This guaranty requires equal treatment only of a final conclusion may even be punished as a court martial may direct.6
persons or things similarly situated and does not apply where the subject of the
treatment is substantially different from others. The accused officers can complain if It should be noted, finally, that after the decision was rendered by Judge Solano on
they are denied bail and other members of the military are not. But they cannot say February 26, 1991, the government filed a notice of appeal ad cautelam and a motion
they have been discriminated against because they are not allowed the same right that for reconsideration, the latter was ultimately denied, after hearing, on March 4, 1991.
is extended to civilians. The 48- hour period for appeal under Rule 41, Section 18, of the Rules of Court did
not run until after notice of such denial was received by the petitioners on March 12,
On the contention of the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 that they had not been 1991. Contrary to the private respondents' contention, therefore, the decision had not
charged after more than one year from their arrest, our finding is that there was yet become final and executory when the special civil action in G.R. No. 97454 was
substantial compliance with the requirements of due process and the right to a speedy filed with this Court on March 12, 1991.
trial.
III
The petition for habeas corpus was directly filed with this Court on February 18, 1991,
and was referred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for raffle, hearing and Regarding the propriety of the petitions at bar, it is well to reiterate the following
decision. It was heard on February 26, 1991, by the respondent court, where the observations of the Court in Arula:
petitioners submitted the charge memorandum and specifications against the private
respondents dated January 30, 1991. On February 12, 1991, pursuant to Office Order The referral of charges to a court-martial involves the exercise of judgment and
No. 31-91, the PTI panel was created and initial investigation was scheduled on March discretion (AW 71). A petition for certiorari, in order to prosper, must be based on
12, 1991 at 2:00 p.m. On March 20, 1991, the private respondents received the copies jurisdictional grounds because, as long as the respondent acted with jurisdiction, any
of the charges, charge sheets and specifications and were required to submit their error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than
counter-affidavits on or before April 11, 1991. There was indeed a delay of more than an error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal. Even an
one year in the investigation and preparation of the charges against the private abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ of
respondents. However, this was explained by the Solicitor General thus: certiorari.

... The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete it pre-charge As in that case, we find that the respondents in G.R. No. 93177 have not acted with
investigation only after one (1) year because hundreds of officers and thousands of grave abuse of discretion or without or in excess of jurisdiction to justify the
enlisted men were involved in the failed coup. All of them, as well as other witnesses, intervention of the Court and the reversal of the acts complained of by the petitioners.
had to be interviewed or investigated, and these inevitably took months to finish. The Such action is indicated, however, in G.R. No. 96948, where we find that the right to
pre-charge investigation was rendered doubly difficult by the fact that those involved peremptory challenge should not have been denied, and in G.R. Nos. 95020 and
were dispersed and scattered throughout the Philippines. In some cases, command 97454, where the private respondents should not have been ordered released.
units, such as the Scout Rangers, have already been disbanded. After the charges were
completed, the same still had to pass review and approval by the AFP Chief of Staff. ACCORDINGLY, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. In G.R.
No. 96948, the petition is GRANTED, and the respondents are DIRECTED to allow the
While accepting this explanation, the Court nevertheless must reiterate the following petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory challenge under Article 18 of the
admonition: Articles of War. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also GRANTED, and
This Court as protector of the rights of the people, must stress the point that if the the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private respondents are
participation of petitioner in several coup attempts for which he is confined on orders hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs. SO ORDERED.
of Adjutant General Jorge Agcaoili cannot be established and no charges can be filed
against him or the existence of a prima facie case warranting trial before a military
 G.R. No. 210164, August 18, 2015 Arnado garnered the highest number of votes for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan. He
was proclaimed the winning candidate.

ROMMEL C. ARNADO, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND 

FLORANTE CAPITAN, Respondents.
 On October 5, 2010, the Comelec First Division issued a Resolution holding that
Arnado's continued use of his US passport effectively negated his April 3, 2009
Affidavit of Renunciation. Thus, he was disqualified to run for public office for failure
DECISION to comply with the requirements of RA 9225. The Comelec First Division accordingly
nullified his proclamation and held that the rule on succession should be followed.

DEL CASTILLO, J.: 

Arnado moved for reconsideration. In the meantime, Casan Macode Maquiling
Only natural-born Filipinos who owe total and undivided allegiance to the Republic of the (Maquiling), another mayoralty candidate who garnered the second highest number of
Philippines could run for and hold elective public office.
 votes, intervened in the case. He argued that the Comelec First Division erred in

 applying the rule on succession.

Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari1 filed under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 

of the Rules of Court assailing the Per Curiam Resolution2 dated December 9, 2013 On February 2, 2011, the Comelec En Banc rendered a Resolution reversing the ruling
of respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec) En Banc in SPA No. 13-309 (DC), of the Comelec First Division. It held that Arnado's use of his US passport did not
which affirmed the Resolution3  dated September 6, 2013 of the Comelec Second operate to revert his status to dual citizenship. The Comelec En Banc found merit in
Division. The Comelec, relying on our ruling in Maquiling v. Commission on Elections, Arnado's explanation that he continued to use his US passport because he did not yet
4  disqualified petitioner Rommel C. Arnado (Arnado) from running in the May 13, know that he had been issued a Philippine passport at the time of the relevant foreign
2013 elections, set aside his proclamation as elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del trips. The Comelec En Banc further noted that, after receiving his Philippine passport,
Norte, and declared respondent Florante T. Capitan (Capitan) as the duly elected Arnado used the same for his subsequent trips.

mayor of said municipality.
 


 Maquiling then sought recourse to this Court by filing a petition docketed as G.R No.
Factual Antecedents
 195649.


 

Petitioner Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship While G.R No. 195649 was pending, the period for the filing of CoCs for local elective
after he was naturalized as citizen of the United States of America (USA). officials for the May 13, 2013 elections officially began. On October 1, 2012, Arnado
Subsequently, and in preparation for his plans to run for public office in the filed his CoC6  for the same position. Respondent Capitan also filed his CoC for the
Philippines, Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act No. 92255 (RA 9225) mayoralty post of Kauswagan.

before the Consul General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA. He took an Oath of 

Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on July 10, 2008 and, on even date, an On April 16, 2013, this Court rendered its Decision in  Maquiling. Voting 10-5, it
Order of Approval of Citizenship Retention and Re acquisition was issued in his favor. annulled and set aside the Comelec  En Banc's February 2, 2011 Resolution,
On April 3, 2009, Arnado executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign disqualified Arnado from running for elective position, and declared Maquiling as the
citizenship.
 duly elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao Del Norte in the May 10, 2010 elections. In

 so ruling, the majority of the Members of the Court opined that in his subsequent use
On November 30, 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the of his US passport, Arnado effectively disavowed or recalled his April 3, 2009 Affidavit
mayoralty post of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte for the May 10, 2010 national and of Renunciation. Thus:
local elections.


 We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that "Arnado's act of
Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, however, filed a petition to consistently using his US passport effectively negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation."
disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his CoC on the ground, among others, that Arnado Tills does not mean that he failed to comply with the twin requirements under R.A.
remained a US citizen because he continued to use his US passport for entry to and No. 9225, for he in fact did. It was after complying with the requirements that he
exit from the Philippines after executing aforesaid Affidavit of Renunciation.
 perfonned positive acts which effectively disqualified him from running for an elective

 public office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991. 
While Balua's petition remained pending, the May 10, 2010 elections proceeded where
The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running
for any elective public office would be thwarted if we were to allow a person who has The Comelec Second Division also noted that Arnado failed to execute another
earlier renounced his foreign citizenship, but who subsequently represents himself as a Affidavit of Renunciation for purposes of the May 13, 2013 elections. While a May 9,
foreign citizen, to hold any public office. 2013 Affidavit Affirming Rommel C. Arnado's "Affidavit of Renunciation dated April 3,
2009" was submitted in evidence, the same would not suffice because it should have
xxxx been executed on or before the filing of the CoC on October 1, 2012.

We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his The dispositive portion of the Comelec Second Division's Resolution reads:
American citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section
40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified not WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is granted. Respondent
only from holding the public office but even from becoming a candidate in the May Rommel Cagoco Arnado is disqualified from running in the 13 May 2013 National and
2010 elections.7 Local Elections.

The issuance of this Court's April 16, 2013 Decision sets the stage for the present SO ORDERED.11
controversy.
Ruling of the Comelec En Banc
On May 9, 2013 or shortly after the Court issued its Decision in  Maquiling, Arnado
executed an Affidavit Affirming Rommel C. Arnado's "Affidavit of Renunciation Dated Aggrieved, Arnado filed a Verified Motion for Reconsideration.12  He argued that the
April3, 2009."8 Comelec Second Division erred in applying  Maquiling  claiming that the said case is
not on all fours with the present controversy; that Capitan's Petition was filed beyond
The following day or on May 10, 2013, Capitan, Arnado's lone rival for the mayoralty the 25-day reglementary period reckoned from the filing of the CoC sought to be
post, filed a Petition9 seeking to disqualify him from running for municipal mayor of cancelled; and, that the Comelec must uphold the sovereign will of the people of
Kauswagan and/or to cancel his CoC based on the ruling of this Court in Maquiling. Kauswagan who expressed, thru the ballots, their overwhelming support for him as
The case was docketed as SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and was raffled to the Comelec's their mayor. Arnado prayed that the Comelec Second Division's September 6, 2013
Second Division. The resolution of said petition was, however, overtaken by the May Resolution be reversed and that he be declared as eligible to run for mayor of
13, 2013 elections where Arnado garnered 8,902 votes (84% of the total votes cast) Kauswagan.
while Capitan obtained 1,707 (16% of the total votes cast) votes only.
On December 9, 2013, the Comelec  En Banc  affirmed the ruling of the Comelec
On May 14, 2013, Arnado was proclaimed as the winning candidate. Second Division. It accordingly annulled the proclamation of Arnado and declared
Capitan as the duly elected mayor of Kauswagan. The dispositive portion of the
Unfazed, Capitan filed another Petition10  this time seeking to nullify Arnado's Comelec En Banc's Resolution reads:
proclamation. He argued that with the April 16, 2013 Decision of this Court
in Maquiling, there is no doubt that Arnado is disqualified from running for any local WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant motion for reconsideration is
elective office. Hence, Arnado's proclamation is void and without any legal effect. hereby DISMISSED. The Proclamation of Private Respondent Rommel C.
Arnado as the duly elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte is hereby
Ruling of the Comelec Second Division ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. FLORANTE T. CAPITAN is hereby DECLARED the
duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte inthe May 13, 2013
On September 6, 2013, the Comelec Second Division promulgated a Resolution Elections. SO ORDERED.13
granting the petition in SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and disqualify Arnado from running in
the May 13, 2013 elections. Following Maquiling, it ratiocinated that at the time he Hence, on December 16, 2013 Arnado filed the instant Petition with ancillary prayer
filed his CoC on October 1, 2012, Arnado still failed to comply with the requirement of for injunctive relief to maintain the status quo ante. On December
RA 9225 of making a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship. While he executed the April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation, the same 26, 2013, Arnado filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Status Quo Ante Order or
was deemed withdrawn or recalled when he subsequently traveled abroad using his Temporary Restraining Order14 in view of the issuance by the Comelec En Banc of a
US passport, as held in Maquiling. Writ of Execution to implement its December 9, 2013 Resolution.
On January 14, 2014, this Court issued a Resolution15  requiring the respondents to Arnado claims that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion and violated his
file their respective comments on the petition. In the same Resolution, this Court right to procedural due process in not dismissing Capitan's Petition in SPA No. 13-309
granted Arnado's ancillary relief for temporary restraining order. (DC). He avers that Capitan is guilty of forum-shopping because the latter
subsequently filed a similar case docketed as SPC No. 13-019. In addition, SPA No.
Capitan thus filed an Urgent Motion to Lift and/or Dissolve Temporary Restraining 13-309 (DC) was filed beyond the 25-day prescriptive period reckoned from the time
Order dated January 14, 2014,16 contending that the acts sought to be restrained by of the filing of his CoC on October 1, 2012.
Arnado are already fait accompli. He alleged that the Comelec En Banc had already
issued a Writ of Execution17  and pursuant thereto a Special Municipal Board of Arnado likewise claims that the proceeding before the Comelec is peppered with
Canvassers was convened. It proclaimed him to be the duly elected mayor of procedural infirmities. He asserts that the Comelec violated its own rules in deciding
Kauswagan and on January 2, 2014 he took his oath of office. Since then, he has SPA No. 13-309 (DC) without first resolving Capitan's motion to consolidate; that SPA
assumed and performed the duties and functions of his office. No. 13-309 (DC) was not set for trial and no hearing for the reception of evidence was
ever conducted; and, that the Comelec did not follow its own rules requiring the
In a Resolution18  dated February 25, 2014, this Court ordered the issuance of a issuance of a notice of promulgation of resolutions.
Status Quo Ante Order directing the parties to allow Arnado to continue performing
his functions as mayor of Kauswagan pending resolution of this case. Arnado further claims that the Comelec En Banc not only committed grave abuse of
discretion but also violated his constitutional right to due process when it allowed
Issues Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph (Commissioner Yusoph) to participate in the review of
the Decision he penned for the Second Division. Furthermore, the Comelec  En
In support of his Petition, Arnado raises the following issues: Banc  committed grave abuse of discretion when it disqualified him from running in
I the May 13, 2013 elections, thereby disenfranchising 84% of the voters of Kauswagan
who all voted for him.
WHETHER x x x THE COMELEC EN BANC AND 2ND  DIVISION VIOLATED
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN Finally, Arnado avers that further inquiry and examination of the notarial register of
FAILING TO DISMISS THE PETITIONS OF RESPONDENT CAPITAN ON THE GROUND his former counsel, Atty. Thomas Dean M. Quijano, revealed that he executed an
OF FORUM-SHOPPING AND/OR LATE FILING, ETC. Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance20 on November 30, 2009. Hence, at
the time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012, he is a citizen of the Philippines who
II does not owe allegiance to any other country and, therefore, is qualified to run for
mayor of Kauswagan in the May 13, 2013 elections.
WHETHER x x x THE COMELEC EN BANC VIOLATED DUE PROCESS AND
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY ALLOWING COM. ELIAS YUSOPH Our Ruling
TO REVIEW THE DECISION HE WROTE FOR THE 2ND DIVISION.
The Petition is devoid of merit.
III
Petition for certiorari is limited to the 
WHETHER x x x THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN determination of whether the respondent
DISENFRANCHISING 84% OF THE VOTERS OF KAUSWAGAN IN THE MAY 2013 tribunal acted with grave abuse of discretion
ELECTIONS. amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

IV In a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,

the primordial issue to be resolved is whether the respondent tribunal committed
WHETHER x x x THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
DISQUALIFYING PETITIONER WHO HAS FULLY COMPLIED WITH THE assailed resolution. And as a matter of policy, this Court will not interfere with the
REQUIREMENTS OF RA 9225 BEFORE THE FILING OF HIS COC ON OCTOBER 1, resolutions of the Comelec unless it is shown that it had committed grave abuse of
2012.19 discretion.21 Thus, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, a Rule 64 petition will
not prosper. Jurisprudence, on the other hand, defines grave abuse of discretion as the
"capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of With regard to the alleged tardiness in the filing of Capitan's Petition in SPA No.
jurisdiction."22  "Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave."23  Grave 13-309 (DC), it appears that Arnado either failed to grasp the import of Capitan's
abuse of discretion has likewise been defined as an act done contrary to the allegations therein or he made a deliberate partial misrepresentation in stating that
Constitution, the law or jurisprudence.24 the same is one for cancellation of CoC. A copy30 thereof annexed to Arnado's herein
petition states that it is a petition "to disqualify and/or cancel the certificate of
In this case, and as will be discussed below, there is no showing that the Comelec En candidacy" of Arnado. The allegations therein state in no uncertain terms that it is one
Banc  acted capriciously or whimsically in issuing its December 9, 2013 Resolution. for disqualification based on Arnado's failure to comply with the requisites of RA 9225
Neither did it act contrary to law or jurisprudence. and on the ruling of this Court in  Maquiling. Thus, the Comelec Second Division
appropriately treated it as a petition for disqualification with the alternative prayer to
Arnado's allegations that Capitan cancel Arnado's CoC. It is elementary that the nature of the action is determined by the
violated the rule against forumshopping  allegations in the petition.31c
and that the latter's petition in
SPA No.13-309(DC) was filed late, Under Section 3, Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure,32  a petition for
unsubstantiated and erroneous. disqualification should be filed "any day after the last day for filing of certificates of
candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation." Here, Arnado was proclaimed
There is forum-shopping when two or more actions or proceedings, founded on the as the winning candidate on May 14, 2013.33  Thus, the petition in SPA No. 13-309
same cause, are instituted by a party on the supposition that one or the other court (DC) was seasonably filed on May 10, 2013.34c
would make a favorable disposition.25cIt exists when the elements of  litis
pendentia  are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to  res The other procedural lapses allegedly
judicata  in the other.26  Thus, there is forum-shopping when in both actions there committed by the Comelec are likewise 
exist: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as would represent the same unsubstantiated. Assuming the allegations of 
interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief Arnado to be true, the Comelec did not commit
being founded on the same facts; and (3) the identity of the two preceding particulars grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party excess of jurisdiction.
is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.27
Arnado's claim that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in deciding SPA No.
Here, Arnado failed to substantiate his claim of forum-shopping. He merely made a 13-309 (DC) without first resolving Capitan's motion to consolidate likewise lacks
general averment that in resolving the petitions of Capitan in SPA No. 13-309 (OC) substantiation. In the first place, Arnado has not attached a copy of said motion to his
and SPC No. 13-019, the Comelec  En Banc, as well as its Second Division, failed to petition. This alone is sufficient ground for the dismissal of his Rule 64 Petition, filed
comply with this Court's Revised Circular No. 28-91,28without demonstrating how in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, for not being accompanied by pleadings
forum-shopping was supposed to be present. He has not shown that the petitions in and documents relevant and pertinent thereto.35  Also, it was Capitan who filed the
SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and SPC No. 13-019 involved the same parties, issues, and motion for consolidation. Not being the movant, Arnado is not in a position to
reliefs. In fact, Arnado did not even bother to submit to this Court a copy of the question the alleged inaction of the Comelec on said motion. And even assuming that
Petition in SPC No. 13-019 (annulment of proclamation case). As the party insisting he has, by filing a Verified Motion for Reconsideration with the Comelec En Banc and
that Capitan committed forum-shopping, Arnado bears the burden of establishing the subsequently appealing to this Court despite the still unresolved motion for
same. After all, it is settled that he who alleges has the burden of proving it; mere consolidation, Arnado effectively abandoned said motion for consolidation. In Cayago
allegation is not sufficient.29 v. Hon. Lina,36it was held that once a party elevates the case before the appellate
Besides, and as correctly observed by the Solicitor General, the parties in SPA No. tribunal, the appellant is deemed to have abandoned the unresolved motion which
13-309 (DC) and SPC No. 13-019 are not the same. In the first case, the parties are remains pending with the tribunal of origin. "[I]t is not right for a party who has
only Capitan and Arnado. In the second case, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte is impleaded as respondent. There is also dissimilitude in affirmative relief, to afterwards make a volte face and deny that same jurisdiction."37
the reliefs sought. The former case sought to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his
CoC while the latter case prayed for the annulment of Arnado's proclamation as mayor In any case, under Section 9, Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, consolidation
of Kauswagan. is only permissive. It is not mandatory. Section 9 reads:
 was the writer or the ponente of said Resolution. The September 6, 2013 Resolution
Sec. 9. Consolidation of Cases.- When an action or proceeding involves a question of law of the Comelec Second Division does not state who the  ponente  is. The same goes
and fact which is similar to or common with that of another action or proceeding, the true with the questioned December 9, 2013  Per Curiam  Resolution43  of the
same may be consolidated with the action or proceeding bearing the lower docket number. Comelec  En Banc. As a  per curiam  resolution, it was arrived at by the Comelec  En
Banc  as a whole and without any particular  ponente.  Hence, we need not belabor
In Muñoz v. Comelec,38 this Court accentuated "that the term 'may' is indicative of a Arnado's claim of denial of due process as his basis therefor lacks factual moorings.
mere possibility, an opportunity or an option. The grantee of that opportunity is vested
with a right or faculty which he has the option to exercise. If he chooses to exercise the Arnado has not yet satisfied the twin 
right, he must comply with the conditions attached thereto, which in this case require requirements of Section 5(2) of RA 9225 at
that the cases to be consolidated must involve similar questions of law and fact."39 In the time he filed his CoC for the May 13, 2013
this case, the consolidation of SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and SPC No. 13-019 does not elections; subsequent compliance does not suffice.
appear to be necessary. As earlier mentioned, said cases do not even involve the same
parties and reliefs sought. Hence, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the Under Section 4(d) of the Local Government Code, a person with "dual citizenship" is
Comelec in not consolidating them. disqualified from running for any elective local position.  In Mercado v. Manzano,44 it
was clarified that the phrase "dual citizenship" in said Section 4(d) must be
Arnado's protestation that the Comelec violated its own rules when it decided SPA No. understood as referring to "dual allegiance.''45 Subsequent, Congress enacted RA 9225
13-309 (DC) without setting it for trial likewise deserves scant consideration.  The allowing natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine
proceedings in a special action for disqualification of candidates under Rule 25 of the citizenship by reason of their naturalization abroad to reacquire Philippine citizenship
Comelec Rules of Procedure are summary in nature where a trial type proceeding may and to enjoy full civil and political rights upon compliance with the requirements of
be dispensed with.40  In Diangka v. Comelec,41 this Court held that: the law. They may now run for public office in the Philippines provided that they: (1)
meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution
Again, our ingrained jurisprudence is that technical rules of evidence should not be and existing laws; and, (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
rigorously applied in administrative proceedings specially where the law calls for the foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath46 prior
proceeding to be summary in character. Pursuant to Section 4, Rule 25 of the 1993 to or at the time of filing of their CoC. Thus:
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, petitions for disqualifications are subject to summary
hearings. In relation thereto, Section 3, Rule 17 of the said Rules provides that it Section 5.  Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities- Those who retain or re-acquire
remains in the sound discretion of the COMELEC whether clarification questions are to Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
be asked the witnesses-affiants, and whether the adverse party is to be granted subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
opportunity to cross-examine said witnesses affiants. Furthermore, when the Philippines and the following conditions:
COMELEC en banc reviews and evaluates a party's petition, or as in the case at bar, a xxxx
party's answer and the supporting papers attached thereto, the same is tantamount to
a fair "hearing" of his case.42 (2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification
for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at
Arnado's claim that the Comelec En Banc the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
committed grave abuse of discretion and violated  renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
his right to due process in allowing Commissioner administer an oath;
Yusoph to participate in the deliberation of the assailed
Comelec En Banc Resolution is likewise bereft of In the case at bench, the Comelec Second Division, as affirmed by the Comelec  En
substantiation. Banc, ruled that Arnado failed to comply with the second requisite of Section 5 (2) of
RA 9225 because, as held in Maquiling v. Commission on Elections,47 his April 3, 2009
Arnado's claim that Commissioner Yusoph penned both the September 6, 2013 Affidavit of Renunciation was deemed withdrawn when he used his US passport after
Resolution of the Comelec Second Division and the December 9, 2013 Resolution of executing said affidavit. Consequently, at the time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012
the Comelec  En Banc  is not correct. While Commissioner Yusoph, together with for purposes of the May 13, 2013 elections, Arnado had yet to comply with said
Commissioners Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca and Luie Tito F. Guia, signed said second requirement. The Comelec also noted that while Arnado submitted an affidavit
Resolution, there is nothing therein which would indicate that Commissioner Yusoph
dated May 9, 2013, affirming his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation, the same to this case following the salutary doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere, which
would not suffice for having been belatedly executed. means to adhere to precedents, and not to unsettle things which are established.
48  Under the doctrine, "[w]hen the court has once laid down a principle of law as

The Comelec  En Banc  did not err, nor did it commit grave abuse of discretion, in applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all
upholding the Resolution of the Comelec Second Division disqualifying Arnado from future cases where facts are substantially the same."49 It enjoins adherence to judicial
running for public office. It is worth noting that the reason for Arnado's precedents and bars relitigation of the same issue.50
disqualification to run for public office during the 2010 elections — being a candidate
without total and undivided allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines - still It may not be amiss to add that as early as 2010, the year when Balua filed a petition
subsisted when he filed his CoC for the 2013 elections on October 1, 2012. The to disqualify him, Arnado has gotten wind that the use of his US passport might pose a
Comelec  En Banc  merely adhered to the ruling of this Court in  Maquiling  lest it problem to his candidacy. In other words, when Arnado filed his CoC on October 1,
would be committing grave abuse of discretion had it departed therefrom. 2012, he was not totally unaware that the use of his US passport after he had executed
the Affidavit of Renunciation might have an impact on his qualification and candidacy.
Moreover, it cannot be validly argued that Arnado should be given the opportunity to In fact, at that time,  Maquiling  had already reached this Court. But despite the
correct the deficiency in his qualification because at the time this Court promulgated petitions filed against him questioning his qualification to run for public office in 2010,
its Decision in  Maquiling  on April 16, 2013, the period for filing the CoC for local Arnado filed his CoC on October 1, 2012 unmindful of any possible legal setbacks in
elective office had already lapsed. Or, as Justice Arturo D. Brion puts it in his his candidacy for the 2013 elections and without executing another Affidavit of
Dissenting Opinion, "[t]o the extent that Arnado was denied the chance to submit a Renunciation. In short, the argument that Arnado should be given the opportunity to
replacement oath of renunciation in 2013, then there was an unfair and abusive denial correct the deficiency in his CoC since Maquiling was promulgated after the lapse of
of opportunity equivalent to grave abuse of discretion." Besides, shortly after learning the period for filing a CoC for the 2013 elections, is totally bereft of merit. Consistent
of the Court's April 16, 2013 ruling in  Maquiling  or on May 9, 2013, Arnado with our April 16, 2013 ruling in  Maquiling, Arnado should be made to face the
substantially complied therewith by executing an affidavit affirming his April3, 2009 consequences of his inaction since he could have remedied it at the time he filed his
Affidavit of Renunciation. CoC on October 1, 2012 or even before that. There is no law prohibiting him from
executing an Affidavit of Renunciation every election period if only to avert possible
The ruling in Maquiling is indeed novel in the sense that it was the first case dealing questions about his qualifications.
with the effect of the use of a foreign passport on the qualification to run for public
office of a natural-born Filipino citizen who was naturalized abroad and subsequently The alleged November 30, 2009
availed of the privileges under RA 9225. It was settled in that case that the use of a Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of
foreign passport amounts to repudiation or recantation of the oath of renunciation. Allegiance cannot be given any
Yet, despite the issue being novel and of first impression, plus the fact that Arnado probative weight.
could not have divined the possible adverse consequences of using his US passport, the
Court in Maquiling did not act with leniency or benevolence towards Arnado. Voting As to the alleged recently discovered November 30, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation
10-5, the Court ruled that matters dealing with qualifications for public elective office with Oath of Allegiance, the same is highly suspect. As correctly pointed out by the
must be strictly complied with. Otherwise stated, the Court in  Maquiling  did not Solicitor General, the original or certified true copy thereof was not presented. In
consider the novelty of the issue as to excuse Arnado from strictly complying with the addition, such crucial evidence sufficient to alter the outcome of the case was never
eligibility requirements to run for public office or to simply allow him to correct the presented before the Comelec much less in the  Maquiling  case.  Curiously, it only
deficiency in his qualification by submitting another oath of renunciation. Thus, it is surfaced for the first time in this petition. In Jacot v. Dal,51 this Court disallowed the
with more reason that in this case, we should similarly require strict compliance with belated presentation of similar evidence on due process considerations. Thus:
the qualifications to run for local elective office. As a rule, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the
proceedings below. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the
The circumstances surrounding the qualification of Arnado to run for public office attention of the lower court, administrative agency or quasi- judicial body need not be
during the May 10, 2010 and May 13, 2013 elections, to reiterate for emphasis, are considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late
the same. Arnado's use of his US passport in 2009 invalidated his oath of renunciation stage. Basic considerations of fairness and due process impel this rule. Courts have
resulting in his disqualification to run for mayor of Kauswagan in the 2010 elections. neither the time nor the resources to accommodate parties who chose to go to trial
Since then and up to the time he filed his CoC for the 2013 elections, Arnado had not haphazardly.
cured the defect in his qualification. Maquiling, therefore, is binding on and applicable
Likewise, this Court does not countenance the late submission of evidence. Petitioner justified by the circumstances at that time. At any rate, Arnado started to use his
should have offered the Affidavit dated 7 February 2007 during the proceedings before Philippine passport in his travels abroad beginning December 11, 2009 and
the COMELEC. thenceforth. This, according to J. Leonen, is borne out by Arnado's Philippine passport.

Section 1 of Rule 43 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that "In the absence With due respect to my esteemed colleague, it appears that J. Leonen is not only
of any applicable provisions of these Rules, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of reviving an issue that had already been settled with finality in the Maquiling case, but
Court in the Philippines shall be applicable by analogy or in suppletory character and he is also going beyond the issues raised in this petition. To reiterate for clarity,
effect." Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court categorically enjoins the Arnado's argument in this case-that he is qualified to run for mayor as he has satisfied
admission of evidence not formally presented: the requirements of Sec. 5(2) of RA 9225 relative to the May 13, 2013 elections- is
premised only on the alleged newly discovered November 30, 2009 Affidavit. Nothing
SEC. 34.  Offer of evidence.- The court shall consider no evidence which has not been more. He does not claim in this case that his use of US passport in his travel abroad in
formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. 2009 is an isolated act, as J. Leonen insists. In Vazquez v. De Borja,54 it was held that
courts do not have jurisdiction over issues neither raised in the pleading nor tried with
Since the said Affidavit was not formally offered before the COMELEC, respondent had the express or implied consent of the parties. They cannot render judgment based on
no opportunity to examine and controvert it. To admit this document would be issues that have never been raised before them. Equally settled is the rule that "points
contrary to due process. Additionally, the piecemeal presentation of evidence is not in of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower
accord with orderly justice.52 [tribunal] need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as
these cannot be raised for the first time at such late stage. Basic considerations of due
Moreover, in  Maquiling  it was mentioned that Arnado used his US passport on process underlie this rule."55 The same goes true with J. Brion's theory that what was
January 12, 2010 and March 23, 2010. Thus: cancelled by virtue of Maquiling was only the April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation
where Arnado expressly renounced any foreign citizenship; not the July 10, 2008 Oath
Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April of Allegiance which carried with it an implied abdication of foreign citizenship. For J.
201 0, certifying that the name "Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available Brion, "[t]he requirement of an express renunciation x x x does not negate the effect
Computer Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April 2010, with of, or make any less real, the prior implicit renunciation of citizenship and allegiance
the following pertinent travel records: made upon taking the oath of allegiance." Again, this was never raised in this petition.
At any rate, the execution of an Oath of Allegiance is required by Section 356  of RA
DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010 9225. For those who avail themselves of RA 9225 and intend to run for public office,
Section 5(2) thereof provides the additional requirement of making a personal and
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships prior to or at the time of filing
of their CoC. Definitely, the provisions of Section 5(2) are not useless or meaningless
PASSPORT : 57782700 surplusage. When the law expressly requires an explicit renunciation, an implicit one
would be insufficient. Furthermore, even assuming that Arnado's 2008 implied
DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010 renunciation is sufficient, the same has also been negated by his use of his US passport
in 2009, following the ruling in Maquiling.
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
Otherwise, we would give more weight to an implied renunciation than to an express
PASSPORT : 05778270053 one specifically required by law.

Despite the existence of such statement in  Maquiling, We are puzzled why Arnado Besides, the Decision of this Court in Maquiling holding that Arnado's use of his US
never bothered to correct or refute it. He neither alleged nor presented evidence in passport effectively recanted his Affidavit of Renunciation has already become final
this petition to prove that he did not travel abroad on those dates using his US and immutable. We can no longer resurrect in this case the issues that have already
passport. been resolved there with fmality.

Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, however, dissents and maintains the same position he In maintaining that Arnado used his Philippine passport in travelling abroad in the
had taken in Maquiling that Arnado's use of his US passport in 2009 is an isolated act first quarter of 2010, J. Leonen relies on the copy thereof attached to the  rollo  of
the  Maquiling  case. But said copy of Arnado's Philippine passport57  is a mere position for his failure to comply with the requirements of Section 5(2) of RA 9225.
"CERTIFIED TRUE COPY  FROM THE MACIDNE COPY ON FILE" as attested to by Thus:
Rosario P. Palacio, Records Officer Ill of the Comelec.58  This is clearly stamped on
aforesaid copy of Arnado's Philippine passport. A machine copy or photocopy is a mere While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began to discharge
secondary evidence.59 As such, it cannot be admitted in evidence until and unless the the functions of Barangay Chairman, his victory cannot cure the defect of his
offeror has proven the due execution and the subsequent loss or unavailability of the candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election of a
original.60  In this case, however, Arnado's Philippine passport is not missing. Thus, disqualified candidate because the application of the constitutional and statutory
said photocopy of Arnado's Philippine passport cannot sway us to depart from the provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity.67
uncontroverted certification of the Bureau ofimmigration that Arnado used his US
passport on January 12, 2010 and March 23, 2010. Consequently, even assuming that In fine, this Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Comelec  En
the recently discovered November 30, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of Banc  in sustaining the Resolution of the Comelec Second Division disqualifying
Allegiance is true and authentic, Arnado once more performed positive acts on Arnado from running in the May 13, 2013 elections and in accordingly setting aside
January 12, 2010 and March 23, 2010, which effectively negated the alleged his proclamation as elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and proclaiming
November 30, 2009 Affidavit resulting in his disqualification to run for an elective Capitan as the duly elected mayor of said municipality.
public office.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby  DISMISSED  and the assailed Comelec
Landslide election victory cannot Resolutions are  AFFIRMED. The Status Quo Ante Order issued by this Court
override eligibility requirements. is LIFTED.

In Maquiling, this Court emphasized that popular vote does not cure the ineligibility of SO ORDERED.
a candidate. Thus, while in this case Arnado won by landslide majority during the
2013 elections, garnering 84% of the total votes cast, the same "cannot override the
constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and
disqualifications."61  In  Velasco v. Comelec,62  this Court pronounced that election
victory cannot be used as a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements;
otherwise, certain provisions of laws pertaining to elections will become toothless. One
of which is Section 39 of the Local Government Code of 1991, which specifies the
basic positive qualifications of local government officials. If in Velasco the Court ruled
that popular vote cannot override the required qualifications under Section 39,63a
fortiori, there is no reason why the Court should not follow the same policy when it
comes to disqualifications enumerated under Section 4064 of the same law. After all,
"[t]he qualifications set out in [Section 39] are roughly half of the requirements for
election to local public offices. The other half is contained in the succeeding section
which lays down the circumstances that disqualify local candidates.”65

Finally, this case is strikingly similar to the case of  Lopez v. Comelec.66  In that case,
petitioner Lopez was also a natural-born Filipino who lost his Philippine citizenship
after he became a naturalized US citizen. He later reacquired his Philippine citizenship
by virtue of RA 9225. Thereafter, Lopez filed his candidacy for Chairman
o f  B a r a n g a y  B a g a c a y , S a n D i o n i s i o , I l o i l o i n t h e
synchronized  Barangay  and  Sangguniang Kabataan  Elections held on October 29,
2007 without first making a personal and sworn renunciation of his foreign
citizenship. In spite of the fact that Lopez won in the elections, this Court still affmned
the Resolution of the Comelec disqualifying Lopez as a candidate for a local elective