Republic of the Philippines napunta rito, porke member ka na, magsumbong
SUPREME COURT ka kung ano ang gagawin ko sa 'yo.
Manila
CHUCHI — Kasi, naka duty ako noon.
FIRST DIVISION
ESG — Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)
CHUCHI — Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila
G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995 akong binalikan, sabing ganoon —
SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner, ESG — Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw
vs. kung (sic) mag explain ka, kasi hanggang 10:00
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents. p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon
ako ang babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States,
nag-aaply ka sa review mo, kung kakailanganin
ang certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi
KAPUNAN, J.: ka sa akin makakahingi.
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional CHUCHI — Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga
Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, noon i-cocontinue ko up to 10:00 p.m.
in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated
her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's ESG — Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung
dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy."1 paano ka pumasok dito sa hotel. Magsumbong ka
sa Union kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and kung paano ka nakapasok dito "Do you think that
sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the on your own makakapasok ka kung hindi ako.
amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).
at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based
was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.2 The CHUCHI — Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.
transcript reads as follows:
ESG — Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan
Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) — Good doon ng mga no (sic) ko.
Afternoon M'am.
ESG — Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka
Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) — Ano ba ang pumasok sa hotel, kung on your own merit alam
nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot ka na kung paano ka ko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami
ang nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka papasa.
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CHUCHI — Kumuha kami ng exam noon. ESG — Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob,
kasi kung baga sa no, nilapastangan mo ako.
ESG — Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI — Paano kita nilapastanganan?
CHUCHI — Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr.
Tamayo ESG — Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako
makikipagusap sa 'yo. Lumabas ka na.
ESG — Kukunin ka kasi ako. Magsumbong ka.3
CHUCHI — Eh, di sana — As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of
secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal
ESG — Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act
kasi wala kang utak. Akala mo ba makukuha ka 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related
dito kung hindi ako. violations of private communication, and other purposes." An information
charging petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated October 6, 1988 is quoted
herewith:
CHUCHI — Mag-eexplain ako.
INFORMATION
ESG — Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain
sa 'yo, makaalala ka kung paano ka puma-rito.
"Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak ng The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D.
nanay at tatay mo ang mga magulang ko. Ramirez of Violation of Republic Act No. 4200, committed as
follows:
ESG — Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka
sa loob, nasa labas ka puwede ka ng hindi That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988,
pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka doon. in Pasay City Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the
above-named accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not
CHUCHI — Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga
being authorized by Ester S. Garcia to record the
taga Union.
latter's conversation with said accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
ESG — Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong the use of a tape recorder secretly record the said
kalimutan na hindi ka makakapasok kung hindi conversation and thereafter communicate in
ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa writing the contents of the said recording to other
akin, dahil tapos ka na. person.
CHUCHI — Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob. Contrary to law.
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Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988. Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which respondent Court of Appeals denied in its
MA Resolution6 dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant petition.
RIA
NO Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue"7 that the
M. applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a
CU private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. She contends that
NE the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private conversation
TA by a party other than those involved in the communication.8 In relation to this,
Ass petitioner avers that the substance or content of the conversation must be
t. alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged would not constitute a
Cit violation of R.A. 4200.9 Finally, petitioner agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the
y taping of a "private communication," not a "private conversation" and that
Fis consequently, her act of secretly taping her conversation with private respondent
cal was not illegal under the said act. 10
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the We disagree.
Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense,
particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the trial court First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute.
granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts charged Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied
do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation punished according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only
by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a person other than a where a literal interpretation would be either impossible 11 or absurb or would lead
participant to the communication.4 to an injustice. 12
From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping
on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith referred the case to the Court of and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes,"
Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19, 1989. provides:
On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized
Decision declaring the trial court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to
holding that: tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable communication or spoken word by using a device commonly
under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In thus quashing the information known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-
based on the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute an talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
offense, the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion
correctible by certiorari.5
Page 3 of 6
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the
person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly prosecution of offense but as evidence to be used in Civil Cases
record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no or special proceedings?
distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to
be a party other than or different from those involved in the private Senator Tañada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape
communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make recorded conversations taken without the authorization of all the
such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as parties.
respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a
communication who records his private conversation with another without the Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?
knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A.
4200.
Senator Tañada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not
sporting to record the observation of one without his knowing it
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the and then using it against him. It is not fair, it is not sportsmanlike.
respondent court's conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed If the purpose; Your honor, is to record the intention of the
contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private parties. I believe that all the parties should know that the
conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by observations are being recorded.
third persons. Thus:
Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Tañada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in
Senator Tañada: That qualified only "overhear". meetings of the board of directors where a tape recording is
taken, there is no objection to this if all the parties know. It is but
Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the fair that the people whose remarks and observations are being
element of secrecy would not appear to be material. Now, made should know that the observations are being recorded.
suppose, Your Honor, the recording is not made by all the parties
but by some parties and involved not criminal cases that would be Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.
mentioned under section 3 but would cover, for example civil
cases or special proceedings whereby a recording is made not
Senator Tañada: That is why when we take statements of
necessarily by all the parties but perhaps by some in an effort to
persons, we say: "Please be informed that whatever you say here
show the intent of the parties because the actuation of the parties
may be used against you." That is fairness and that is what we
prior, simultaneous even subsequent to the contract or the act
demand. Now, in spite of that warning, he makes damaging
may be indicative of their intention. Suppose there is such a
statements against his own interest, well, he cannot complain any
recording, would you say, Your Honor, that the intention is to
more. But if you are going to take a recording of the observations
cover it within the purview of this bill or outside?
and remarks of a person without him knowing that it is being
taped or recorded, without him knowing that what is being
Senator Tañada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your recorded may be used against him, I think it is unfair.
Honor.
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xxx xxx xxx Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section
1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary
(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964) meaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. The word
communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning "to share or to
Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under impart." In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or
Section 1 of the bill as now worded, if a party secretly records a imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting,
public speech, he would be penalized under Section 1? Because as in a conversation, 15 or signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts
the speech is public, but the recording is done secretly. are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as
language signs or gestures)" 16 These definitions are broad enough to include
verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings or
Senator Tañada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated
thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on
by the bill. It is the communication between one person and
February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of
another person — not between a speaker and a public.
the latter's office. Any doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase
"private communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms
xxx xxx xxx "conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably used by Senator
Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below:
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)
It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from
xxx xxx xxx their conversations being overheard. But this statement ignores
the usual nature of conversations as well the undeniable fact that
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the most, if not all, civilized people have some aspects of their lives
above-quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly they do not wish to expose. Free conversationsare often
supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to characterized by exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable falsehoods,
penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes and the expression of anti-social desires of views not intended to
no distinctions, one does not distinguish. be taken seriously. The right to the privacy of communication,
among others, has expressly been assured by our Constitution.
Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. Needless to state here, the framers of our Constitution must have
The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. recognized the nature of conversations between individuals and
What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his
recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. intellect. They must have known that part of the pleasures and
The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private satisfactions of life are to be found in the unaudited, and free
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an exchange of communication between individuals — free from
offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his every unjustifiable intrusion by whatever means.17
COMMENT before the respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it required
that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with the issue
well as its communication to a third person should be professed." 14 of telephone wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone extension for the
purpose of overhearing a private conversation without authorization did not
violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise was neither among
Page 5 of 6
those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, 19 following the principle 9 Rollo, p. 14.
that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused."20 The
instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable facts and 10 Rollo, p. 14-15.
circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and
the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private 11 Pacific Oxygen and Acytelene Co. vs. Central Bank 37
communications with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable. SCRA 685 (1971).
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and 12 Casela v. Court of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 (1970).
unambiguous and leaves us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
13 Rollo, p. 33.
SO ORDERED.
14 Rollo, p. 67.
Padilla, Davide, Jr. and Bellosillo JJ., concur.
15 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 460 (1976).
Hermosisima, Jr., J., is on leave.
16 Id.
Footnotes
17 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. III, No. 31, at 573
1 Docketed as Civil Case No. 88-403, Regional Trial (March 10, 1964).
Court, Makati, Branch 64.
18 145 SCRA 112 (1986). See also, Salcedo-Ortanez v.
2 Rollo, p. 48. CA 235 SCRA 111 (1994).
3 Rollo, pp. 47-48. 19 Id., at 120.
4 Rollo, p. 9. 20 Id., at 121.
5 Rollo, p. 37.
6 Rollo, p. 99, Annex "H".
7 Rollo, p. 13.
8 Id.
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