Clothing Laws, State, and Society in the Ottoman Empire, 1720-1829

Author(s): Donald Quataert

Source: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Aug., 1997), pp. 403-
425
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/164587
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Int. J. Middle East Stud. 29 (1997), 403-425. Printed in the United States of America

Donald Quataert

CLOTHING LAWS, STATE, AND SOCIETY IN

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1720-1829

In 1826, Sultan Mahmud II orchestrated the slaughter of 6,000-7,0

in order to incinerate any janissary remnants that had taken refug
Belgrade Forest outside Istanbul.' During his reign (1808-39), t
many of the other bases of the ancien regime, such as the timar sy
tax farms, and the political autonomy of provincial notables. He a
pious foundations, brought them under a special ministry, and ex
revenues. Such stories of Sultan Mahmud's dramatic and violent p
their 18th-century origins and their 19th-century legacies, are fam
man and Middle Eastern history. It is a commonplace that Sultan
dismantle the power of the military and religious classes in favor
cracy of administrators and scribes. And it is also known that his e
impact on the subsequent evolution of the Tanzimat reform progra
19th century.2
This article retells these renowned histories of transformation, el
tralization, and state building in a new way, through the prism of
attire that the state required its servants and subjects to wear. N
cratic reform, fiscal centralization, and military action, clothing r
on an 1829 law-were powerful royal tools in Sultan Mahmud's eff
reshape state and society. The 1829 law specified the clothing
worn by the varying ranks of civil and religious officials. It sough
community and occupational signs of differentiation by dress wi
status marker-the fez-that placed the state at the center of Ottom
remaining arbiter of identity.3 The law, in short, was a quite radic
tempt to eliminate clothing distinctions that long had separated th
subject classes and the various Ottoman religious communities fro
Focusing on clothing legislation not only narrates the familiar st
ernization in a novel way. It also illuminates the less-well-known
that the sultan's policies encountered. The familiar part concerns
on elite rivals: many of the targeted institutions and groups had
stones of an administration that had undergone substantial transfo
century. This old order consisted of Istanbul-based officials and p

Donald Quataert is Professor in the Department of History, State University of

ton, Binghamton, N.Y. 13902-6000, USA.

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( 1997 Cambridge
All University Press 0020-7438/97 $7.50 + .10
use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
404 Donald Quataert

who together enjoyed formidable political, fiscal, economic, and social pr

neglected aspect concerns the Ottoman popular classes and their role
life, for Mahmud's clothing laws sought to demolish not only the elite bu
popular sources of opposition to the consolidation of his personal pow
among the latter were urban workers and their guilds, whose politica
influence, in alliance with the janissaries, was greater in the 18th century
been since perhaps the dawn of Ottoman rule, back in the 13th and 14th
So when Mahmud eradicated the janissaries in 1826, he immediately move
Ottoman workers and their associations, exiling thousands of migrant port
laborers-ethnic Turks and Kurds-to their provincial places of origin.

For more than two millennia, rulers and governments across the globe pr
clothing laws in order to modulate gender, communal, political, and socia
within and among their administrative, military, and subject classes.6 Fo
the history of the Roman republic and empire is studded with such laws,
one that forbade the toga for Roman citizens sentenced to banishment, t
ing the mark that distinguished them from the barbarians.7 In what becam
and Central Europe, there is a continuous tradition of governmental sart
ilance from Charlemagne until the late 18th century.8 There was a "b
clothing regulations in the late 12th and early 13th centuries, attempting
certain distinctive things for the nobility."9 In 13th-century Burgundy, f
the points on the shoes of commoners could reach only six inches, but th
could be 24 inches."' During the 14th and 15th centuries, such regulation
each year" in the areas of modern-day France, England, Spain, and the Low Coun-
tries.1 If the trains of their gowns were too long, Venetian women of the early 15th
century could lose their souls through papal excommunication.'2 In colonial Virginia
and Massachusetts as well as in many European countries, the torrent of laws in the
late 16th century became "a positive flood" in the following century.13
In 18th-century Europe, contemporaries said, "money rules . . . [and] comfortable
artisans and rich merchants rise above their estate."'14 In Paris (and elsewhere in Eu
rope and in the American colonies), an emerging bourgeoisie offered its final chal-
lenge to the aristocracy for economic and political power. The emerging classes of
Europe and America adopted increasingly luxurious lifestyles-ranging from cloth-
ing to horse harnesses to express their new wealth and their social aspirations. In
this accelerating world of fashion, the aristocracy, pressed to affirm its social dom
inance, had become entrapped in fashion wars that the bourgeoisie could best affor
For a time, in places such as France, monarchies propped up their embattled aristo-
cratic allies with clothing laws, limiting the use of furs and other luxury items and
demanding severe and plain dress of the bourgeoisie.15
The significance of clothing legislation is not always self-evident. On the one
hand, the laws frequently may reflect actual changes in fashion. On the other hand
the relationship of laws (clothing and otherwise) to behavior often is more com-
plicated. Promulgation or reiteration of a law may not always mean an increase in
violations. Other factors besides sartorial threats to stability triggered clothing-law
enactments.
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 Clothing Laws in the Ottoman Empire 405

At the broadest level, European historians have understood the clothing laws as
"instruments of political, social, and economic regulation."16 Others have empha-
sized the economic or moral concerns of premodern governments, or a combination
of the desire to restrain extravagance on the one hand and uphold morality on the
other.17 One historian of European clothing laws has argued that clothing laws ac-
tually were not seeking to prevent extravagance and preserve morality-although
the laws themselves avowed these goals. In fact, they were nothing less than a "con-
certed attempt to impose a visible hierarchy on shifting, flexible, and overlapping
social groups."'8 By about 1400, in this argument, status based on birth had given
way to more acquirable and visible markers, such as houses, furnishings, and apparel,
increasing the need for regulation of these material social signifiers.19 The interpre-
tive differences among these scholars seems mainly a matter of emphasis rather than
substance, because there is a general agreement that the goal of the regulations was
to ensure that "distinctions in rank should continue to be visible in dress."20

Aristocratic dress openly performed a sociopolitical function-self-affirmation for some and

subordination for the others-freezing everyone in their places by signaling the place of
everyone.2 1

By the end of the 18th century, however, clothing laws were a spent force in
Western Europe, although they remained on the books in places such as France, the
American colonies, and the German lands until as late as the 1780s.22 Their dis-
appearance is tied to the mounting abundance of consumer goods that made it pos-
sible for the "middling" ranks to obtain the goods and thus blur the status marker
of the elites. In response, elites adopted negative strategies of discretion and under-
statement. They abandoned the consumption of the elaborate and excessive that the
bourgeoisie could better afford and pursued the more difficult to acquire refinement
of taste and discrimination. Turning from an aesthetic of opulence to one of austerit
and subtlety, they embraced the luxury of leisure time to absorb the mounting intri
cacies of taste, grace, and fashion.23
In the Ottoman world, similarly, there were deep roots to the tradition of clothing
laws-extending to the beginning of the empire-that Sultan Mahmud was drawin
upon. Ottoman clothing laws, moreover, gave a particular emphasis to head cover-
ings that, until 1829, endured as the most characteristic manner of officially desig
nating honor and rank. For example, turbans played a key role in mid-18th-century
rituals surrounding the Ottoman coronation ceremonies-the sword-girding at th
Eyiip mosque in Istanbul. In the procession, two horsemen each carried turbans of
the monarch, tilting them to the right and to the left to receive the homage of th
accompanying janissaries.24 The centrality of headgear already was evident in the
early 14th century, when a son of Sultan Orhan (1324-62) designated a particula
headgear for himself, while some colors of headgear were reserved for the Ottoman
court, and other colors belonged to the Greeks and the Franks. Sultan Bayezid
(1389-1402) introduced changes in the late 14th century, and Sultan Fatih Mehmed
the Conqueror (1451-81) made yet others.25 Sultan Yavuz Selim (1512-20) adopte
new headgear for himself because, he allegedly said, the sovereign could not dress
in the same manner as others who came into his court.26
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406 Donald Quataert

As in many other areas of Ottoman life, Sultan Suleyman the Lawgiver

codified-more rigorously than ever specifying both headgear and dre
ulations concerning the attire of the Ottoman civil and military hierarch
a kind of turban unique to himself, while viziers and other important of
types particular to their rank. The ulema wore special headgear, while imp
and janissary officers had their own. Rank-and-file janissaries wore anoth
head covering, while the "ordinary classes" bore yet other types, such as
turban. An early-18th-century source reported that essentially the same
lations promulgated by the Lawgiver in the late 16th century remained o
to his own day.27
This lack of change in the clothing laws may be significant. Historians
pean clothing laws have noticed a strong correlation between fashion cha
the permeability of the social structure. If they are right, then the many at
recorded in the era between the founding of the empire and the reig
Suleyman indicate a real social mobility.28 Subsequently, there is a relativ
in the sources consulted, of clothing legislation between the late 16th cent
early decades of the 18th century. Although this may indicate social rigidi
sence of laws might be only apparent, and the subject awaits further res
certainly, as will be seen later, the volume of legislation is considerable f
1720 until the end of Sultan Mahmud II's reign, suggesting a period of soci
The regulations for official dress clearly were complex. In an important
of the Ottoman administrative apparatus, J. von Hammer raised the subjec
ing laws for officials, emphasizing that he offered only an "overview" of t
ulations. But this overview went on for some thirteen closely packed pages
the attire prescribed for the various ranks and levels.29
The Ottoman state expected clothing laws to fulfill a host of functions;
complexity is hardly astonishing. Although Ottoman rulers, in common w
contemporaries in many regions of the world, used clothing laws for a hos
nomic, social, moral, and political purposes, this study emphasizes their p
mensions. Hence, the focus is on their nature as regulations to maintain
and the most state control possible over functionaries and subjects. Clothin
ranks within the official hierarchies, acknowledging and rewarding servi
ruler. One glance at the robes informed all-rivals and allies alike-of the precise
rank and place of an official. Clothing laws also reflected the expanding power of
the state. It is no coincidence that they received a definitive form in the reign of
Suleyman the Lawgiver, when the state regularized and deepened its control over it
own servants as well as its rural and urban subjects. Sultan Suleyman's clothing reg-
ulations marked this growing penetration of the state into society just as surely as
did his Kanun-t reaya, a legal code that dictated behavior in many arenas of his sub
jects' lives, ranging from the level of workers' wages, to the use of gold and silver
serving vessels, to the amount of gluten in flour, and fat in butter.30 Clothing laws n
less than wage, price, weights, measures, and criminal regulations all were means of
disciplining behavior.3'
Although clothing regulations originated in state requirements for control, they
were not simply instruments of social discipline from above imposed on those below.
Rather, the laws
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 Clothing Laws in the Ottoman Empire 407

as well as by the various (occupational and religious) communal groups. The laws
usefully demarcated community boundaries for the subject classes, immediately iden-
tifying insiders and outsiders. Clothing and headgear helped give status and a sense
of identity to members of the specific religious, ethnic, and occupational communi-
ties in Ottoman society. Therefore, communities of Ottoman subjects-that is, the
subordinate groups in society-often prompted the state to promulgate or enforce
vestimentary regulations because, for them, clothing laws delineated, maintained, and
reinforced gender, religious, and social distinctions.
Those with power in gender, communal, or political relations, however, especially
benefitted from the laws. In controlling the public dress (and behavior) of their own
(and all) women, men had the power of the state behind them. In the arena of com-
munal relations, regulated street attire daily sought to affirm the superiority of Mus-
lims in Ottoman society. And headgear and clothing visibly reinforced the claims
to privilege by members of the Ottoman political hierarchy vis-a-vis the subject
classes.

CLOTHING LEGISLATION, 1720-1808

The following section does not detail all of the known 18th-ce
stead, it offers samples ranging across the period, from the 17
Further, it presents examples of clothing legislation that respe
religious, and social distinctions.
During most of the long 18th century (1683-1808), the state
military pressure and, in the second half of the period, suffer
These were the days of military defeats, territorial withdraw
traction (after ca. 1763). In such precarious political and ec
the clothing laws sought to assure Ottoman subjects and elites
still an orderly place in which all retained their respective po
tions. They worked to reinforce the existing social markers, st
over women, Muslims over non-Muslims, and elites over subje
The first example dates from the 1720s, when clothing laws
the aftermath of the landmark 1699 Treatv of Karlowitz. For s
mal relinquishing of once-Muslim lands called into question th
the Ottoman state. The post-Karlowitz era was a precarious
state, one of shaky legitimacy. More particularly, the regulatio
text of a disappointingly unsuccessful war, waged between
a supposedly moribund Iran led by the collapsing Safavid dyn
restrictive laws coincide with the so-called Tulip Period (1
by the grand vizier, the highest official outside the royal
openness and experimentation, when leisure time and pleasure
meaning and purpose of public space.34 In sum, the laws ap
shifting social (and moral?) values, combined with the instabi
war that followed close on the heels of epochal defeat.
In describing the Tulip Period, M. Zilfi has insightfully not
theatre of power and piety . . was yielding to a theatre of
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tion."35 Remarkably All use subjectlike the nobles summoned to the court at
to http://about.jstor.org/terms
408 Donald Quataert

aristocrats at Saadabad, the imperial pleasure complex of Sultan Ahme

30), vied with one another for prestige and power, using luxurious displa
spicuous consumption as their weapons.36 The building of palaces, endless
festivals, and extraordinary displays denote an intense competition over c
tion within the court and among the notables for social position-status de
from military derring-do or bureaucratic skills but, rather, from the sophi
one's consumption, whether of tulips or parties.
I believe that it is appropriate to consider that the shift to a theatre of l
consumption applies not merely to the Tulip Period but to the entire 18th
in Europe, Asia, and America, new groups in the Ottoman Empire were ch
the economic, social, and political power of the royal families and aristoc
this Ottoman transformation, the new social groups emerged from outside
the state apparatus, thanks to quickening foreign trade and an increasing
of goods. While many prospered from the European trade, the commerci
the Indian-Iranian East also were important. Because of Ottoman particula
of the new 18th-century merchants dealing with the West and some of th
with Iran came from the Greek and Armenian communities, the so-called O
minorities.38
This Ottoman merchant group also owed much to the "ravenous pattern
sumption" seen at the Istanbul court.39 For a long time, the Ottoman court
as a comparatively vast market for goods and services, necessities and luxu
Lavish spectacles were common, such as the fifty-day fete for Sultan Murat III's
(1574-95) son, on the occasion of his circumcision. Other examples include the
prolonged wedding feasts of the daughter of Sultan Ibrahim (1640-48) and the
cession extravaganza of Sultan Mehmet IV (1648-87).4? Subsequently abandoned
(allegedly because they were too expensive), they were resumed with a vengeance
during the early-18th-century Tulip Period-take, for example, the sixteen-day cir-
cumcision festival, celebrated in 1720 "with the greatest pomp ever," for the sons of
Sultan Ahmet III.41 Supplying such opulence required merchants, some of whom prof
ited mightily, and the rise of the 18th-century Ottoman merchant group certainly w
given a powerful additional impetus by the splendors of the Tulip Period court.42
But it seems unlikely that the consumption competitions in Ottoman Istanbul dur-
ing the Tulip Period are a salvo (as they were in contemporary Europe) in the nota-
bles' wars against the rise of the merchant group an aristocratic use of luxurious
consumption to defend against the increasing wealth of the merchants. A rising
bourgeoisie does not seem to have been present in sufficient numbers to explain the
events of the Tulip Period.
Rather, the Tulip Period competitors emerged from within the state apparatus, and
it is there that we must look in order to understand the consumption competition of
the age. A transfer of power away from the sultan-to others in his court-already
had occurred during the late 16th century, and another shift began at the mid-point
of the 17th century. Political power now shifted away not only from the sultan but
also from his court to bureaucrats. As this happened, the state less frequently im-
posed its will by sheer force or command. Instead, in a pattern that acquired in-
creasing momentum during the 18th century, it adopted other stratagems to exercise
influence. Among
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 Clothing Laws in the Ottoman Empire 409

18th century were Istanbul officials who owned lifetime tax farms (malik/ane's) in
the provinces. As early as 1694, the Istanbul regime inaugurated a fiscal system that
exerted control over the provinces in a new way in Ottoman history, so indirect and
subtle that, until recently, it was overlooked by analysts of the period.43 In the new
system, central bureaucrats who also were holders (malikaneci's) of lifetime tax
farms sublet some of them to provincial notables (ayans). This practice created ties
of common financial interest that bound the local magnates to the capital and also
made them prey to its political will. They expressed loyalty to the state by copying
artistic and architectural forms from Istanbul and decorating their provincial palaces
with murals portraying the imperial skyline.44
In Istanbul, at the Saadabad pleasure complex, the Grand Vizier Ibrahim used the
luxuries and new forms of consumption legitimation of the Tulip Period to disci-
pline and control potential rivals such as these emergent malikalneci's. He was taking
the lead in stimulating and trying to direct patterns of consumption to enhance his
own prestige and power and to set himself above rivals within official circles and at
the court.

Passage of restrictive clothing laws during the 1720s-in the middle of this fab-
ulous display of consumption-shows the conflicting currents in Ottoman societ
at the time. Three similar decrees, focusing mainly on gender concerns, date from
the late 1720s, when, according to a respected authority on the history of Ottoman
clothing, the first laws against immodest public display were promulgated.45 Some
"good-for-nothing" women, the decrees stated, had adopted various innovations in
their clothing, imitating Christians in the deliberate effort to lead the public astray
on Istanbul's streets. Moreover, women allegedly were nearly bankrupting their hus-
bands in order to buy these fashions and, in the process, were hurting the artisans
and second-hand-clothes buyers who provided or resold the old styles. To resolve
these problems, the decree specified the precise widths and measurements of the
items used for the outer coats and headgear. Additionally, the 1727 regulation in thi
series of three decrees forbade non-elite men and women from wearing ermine fur.
In focusing on a combination of moral and economic issues and appealing to
forces that opposed the new displays at court and the broader social changes tha
they were generating, the laws (unsuccessfully) sought to relegitimize a governm
shaken by failed foreign wars.47 They also represented the elites' attempts to r
late the spread of the new consumption beyond the groups surrounding the grand
vizier and the Ottoman court. Consumption competition within elite circles and as
legitimation device among privileged persons was one thing, but its percolation
downward to others bore risks. The hazards were hardly imaginary. In 1730, a pop
lar revolt-the so-called Patrona Halil rebellion-toppled the sultan and destroyed
the voluptuary grand vizier and the pleasure palaces around Saadabad.
Even though the grand vizier was dead and the palaces smashed, the genies of po-
litical, economic, and social change were out of the bottle, and clothing laws could
not put them back in again. Elite Muslims, through their control of the malikane
holdings, remained powerful for the rest of the century. Moreover, because many of
their holdings were based on trade, they benefitted from the expanding international
commerce-with Europe and with India-Iran-that characterized the 18th century.48
Hence, two groups
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410 Donald Quataert

Muslim elite group within the government and the predominantly (but not
Muslim and foreign merchant groups outside. The ongoing commercializa
two groups acted as a powerful solvent on Ottoman social markers that t
laws continuously tried to neutralize for the rest of the century.
The clothing laws of Sultan Osman III (1754-57) and Mustafa III (1
illustrate their continuing use as disciplinary tools. Both began their reig
characterized by peace abroad but also by the internal weakness of a polit
tanic center that reigned only through careful negotiation and compromis
power groups. The brief reign of Sultan Osman III, who ascended the thr
he was nearly 56, was noteworthy for little else than his extraordinary co
the sartorial displays of his subjects. In his few years on the throne, this
ilantly prowled the streets of Istanbul in disguise, haranguing men and w
their clothing improprieties. In the same breath, he condemned women f
that was too tight and men for using gold thread on their horses and sad
a manner inappropriate to their rank.49 His successor, Sultan Mustafa III,
reign with a similar outburst of activity on the sartorial front. A son of
Sultan Mustafa reportedly was allowed the throne because the "Great beli
weak, and that he would easily submit to be governed by their directions
powerful Grand Vizier Ragip Pasha caused "his Master inhumanly to
Clothing laws."5' The sultan sent out criers to announce the regulations, aim
serving the existing attire of Greek, Armenian, and Jewish subjects in the
while also reregulating the furs that each Muslim could wear, as well as the
women's headdresses. Several unfortunate violators were immediately execut
included a Christian beggar who, a famous story goes, pitiably was wearing a pair
of used yellow slippers (the color was reserved for Muslims) that he had just received
from a charitable Muslim.52 The point seems clear: the Sultan's justice would be ut
terly merciless, no matter what the mitigating circumstances, in upholding the prop
order of things. The laws of sultans Osman III and Mustafa III can be readily un-
derstood as disciplinary actions needed in the changing times of fiscal crisis and
ongoing commercialization of the economy. More specifically, it also seems clear that
each sultan, lacking military and other direct means, used the clothing laws in an ap-
peal for support when his hold on the throne was most precarious at the moment
of accession.53
Clothing legislation from the era of Sultan Selim III (1789-1807) reflects the
long-term changes that were occurring as well as the immediate crises in the soci
economic, and political order. More disastrous wars and rebellions, notably in the
Egyptian and Serb lands, had led to further territorial losses. Ruinous policies and
extortionate taxation to finance those wars had inflicted serious harm on the econ-
omy.54 Sharp inflation and currency devaluations, for example, had reduced t
content of the main silver coinage by one-half.55 In Selim III's era, there m
been a glaring discrepancy between the prosperity displayed by the malikdne
and international merchants and the more general impoverishment that stalk
man streets.

At a time when his domestic power was very weak and the legitimation gained
from foreign ventures nearly nonexistent, Sultan Selim III endeavored to maintain
social
Thisdiscipline by demanding
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 Clothing Laws in the Ottoman Empire 411

sultan disapprovingly noted that his aristocrats (hanedan) and statesmen were dis-
playing themselves publicly in the latest fashion while their retinues strutted around
in similarly elaborate dress as a means of announcing their attachment to these great
men. Because many officials did not have the requisite incomes, the decree stated, cor-
ruption and bribery increased. Further, he condemned the behavior of those tradesmen
and workers (esnaf) and other common people (halk) who, seeking to emulate their
superiors, had adopted these aristocratic fashions. And so, the sultan formally de-
manded restoration of the sartorial status quo ante.56 In this way, the state imposed
control obliquely, showing itself to be the upholder of public morality and justice. It
sought legitimacy with a general public that daily was living with personal impov-
erishment. While many officials really were living in luxury and ostentatiously dis-
playing their wealth, the sultan's pronouncement aligned the state with the Istanbul
street and demanded frugal, modest public behavior.
In Selim III's reign, clothing laws occasionally had an emphasis that, in several
respects, seems different from earlier times. In the past, the laws primarily expressed
a concern for morality, social discipline, and order, stressing extravagance and waste
on the personal level-including the matter of wives bankrupting their husbands.57
As just seen, these themes are repeated in Selim III's laws: for example, the notion
that personal extravagance beyond one's means leads to corruption and bribery. But
Selim's pronouncements sometimes shift away from disciplinary issues to economic
ones, focusing on profligates who were buying foreign goods and harming the
domestic production of goods and the treasury. While such economic concerns can
be found in earlier Ottoman periods, they seem to appear much more frequently in
the reign of Selim.58

I [said Sultan Selim III] always wear Istanbul-made and Ankara-made cloth. But my states-
men wear Indian-made and Iran-made cloth. If they would wear the cloths of our country,
local goods would be in demand.59

Clothing laws took on economic dimensions as the sultan directly appealed for sup-
port among Ottoman artisans who made the goods that the monarch himself claimed
to wear. The Ottoman artisanal guilds at this time were in disarray; they probably
had suffered more than any other group from the new taxes imposed to finance the
failed wars of the late 18th century. In his bid for artisans' support, the sultan was
addressing a politically potent group, thanks to its ties to the janissaries.60 Thus, the
clothing laws' appeal to the economic concerns of artisans also reached out to the
janissaries, whose political support and military arms he still needed against foreign
enemies.61
Sultan Selim III's clothing laws differed from those of this predecessors in a sec-
ond way. They did not merely seek to maintain legitimacy but more particularly to
(re)concentrate political power around the person of the sultan. His just-quoted state-
ments about the fashionable hanedan and the statesmen, and about those wearing
Indian and Iranian cloth, are notable in this regard, for he was directly criticizing
ranking members of his own government and contrasting their improper behavior with
his own correct demeanor. He pointed out their public over-indulgence and distin-
guished their disloyal consumption of foreign textiles from his own sartorial support
of This
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412 Donald Quataert

In sum, the sultan was appealing for broad popular support in his str
elite rivals. Even though they defeated the monarch, costing him both
life, it seems important to note the role of clothing laws in this rehear
more successful centralization reforms of the 19th century.

THE CLOTHING REVOLUTION OF SULTAN MAHMUD II

From the perspective of internal peace, foreign wars

Sultan Mahmud II was marked by a series of disaste
dismal record of Selim III. A weakened sultanate
with an emboldened group of provincial notables, a
their autonomy. Somewhat later, only Great Power
mad Ali Pasha of Egypt from seizing or overthr
goals are still debated), at about the time that Greek
dependent state, offering a powerful attraction to m
who remained under the sultan's authority. And de
ated, the silver content of the piaster falling by a fu
In this setting, Sultan Mahmud II employed drastic
a strong monarchy with a new legitimation. He beg
for the military, a process that took place in a num
ing to one standard account, the sultan was seeking
Victorious Muslim Soldiers (Asakir-i Mansure-i Muh
connected to the janissaries. He found success in 182
and men came to court wearing the fez, which they
the western Mediterranean. The approving sultan m
army, ordering the men to wrap a cloth around thei
With suitable headgear in place for his navy and a
the new regulations for his civil and religious offic
his drive to reconstitute the state on a new basis. To
sonnel, he ordered his bureaucrats to wear a plain f
at large also would adopt the new headgear.64
This 1829 regulation, whose drama actually match
janissaries, pushed aside a centuries-old Ottoman
provided the crucial and central marker of identity,
legislation, the sultan publicly worried that the sym
undercut: widespread imitation of official costumes,
(seyfiye) and religious classes (ilmiye) of their gran
he added, to prevent squandering and extravagance a
scribed in painstaking detail the clothing (and some
rank. Altogether, he singled out for attention at le
civil and religious officials and noted the clothing an
would wear.65
At first glance, these stipulations of attire for off
sitions appear very similar in form and content to
earlier centuries. A revolutionary notion, however,
This content downloaded from 212.175.32.131 on Sun, 11 Dec 2016 12:14:10 UTC
familiar invocation to differentiation by dress, for
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Clothing Laws in the Ottoman Empire 413

civil official at every single rank (except for a handful at the very top) was to wear
exactly the same headgear, the fez.66 Thus, all fez-wearing officials, be they kay-
makams or clerks, would appear the same.
The law in general sought to reorder a regulatory process that had broken down
and escaped state control. The state's use of clothing regulations to differentiate and
reward as a means of enticing support and service and to demarcate among the many
social and economic groups had foundered in the extraordinary messiness and con-
fusion of the 18th century, when so many different groups had clamored for social
and political position and when the sultan was merely one of many centers of power.
With the 1829 law and its fez provision, Sultan Mahmud attempted to sweep the floor
clean and reset the rules for differentiation. He began again at ground zero and sought
to reimpose the sultanic state's monopoly over this vital social, political, cultural,
and religious sign. The law erased the confused markers of dying elites-the timar
and lifetime tax-farm holders, the provincial notability, the pious foundation admin-
istrators, and the janissary corps-and set up new ones for the emerging central state
bureaucratic cadres that he was creating. But he did not repeat the old practice of
distinguishing each group. When he placed the identical fez on all officials and al-
lowed only a very select few, such as the grand vizier, to wear headgear with a dis-
tinguishing feature, he laid claim to a new kind of sultanic control. Before him, all
officials appeared equal. And to reinforce his monopoly over status making, he be-
gan creating medals and decorations that only he could award as a means of estab-
lishing rank and hierarchy.67
There is an additional, remarkable aspect to this headgear legislation. It was a lev-
eling device that symbolically restructured the Ottoman state on a completely new
footing-one that was no longer religious in its distinctions but nonreligious in its
uniformity. For centuries, the empire had been a multireligious entity based on Mus-
lim supremacy; its military and bureaucratic personnel had been drawn (essentially)
from the ranks of a Muslim populace that enjoyed a position of general social supe-
riority over non-Muslims. The 1829 law removed the visible distinctions between
(most) non-Muslims and Muslims and facilitated the formation of a new elite with-
out the distinctive markings that had long set one community apart from the othe
Wearing the fez, all civil officials would not only appear equal before the sultan;
they would also look the same to one another. This outward sameness of a reli-
giously undifferentiated bureaucracy betokened the effort of this ruler of a Mu
state to remake that state. In using clothing laws to erode distinctions based on r
ligion and create a new base for this regime, Mahmud II offered non-Muslims and
Muslims a common subjecthood/citizenry.68 More specifically, his action came a
the very moment when the success of the rebel Greeks was so gravely challenging
his hold on non-Muslim Ottomans. At this crucial moment, he renegotiated Ottoman
identity, stripping it of its religious component. In this manner, the law anticipate
by a full decade the Tanzimat (1839-76) commitment to the formal equality of all
before the law and the entry of non-Muslims into the military and bureaucracy on
the same legal basis as Muslims.69
Some Ottoman subjects responded positively and quickly to the law. The new head
gear found a ready acceptance among Muslims and non-Muslims seeking careers
in This
the content downloadedcivil
new Ottoman from bureaucracy.
212.175.32.131 onThere
Sun, 11itDec 2016 12:14:10
became
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
UTC
the standard, as countless
414 Donald Quataert

surviving photographs (Figures 1 and 2) of Ottoman ministers, official

ating classes of the various state schools-medical, military, and agri
clear.70 Many non-Muslims-mainly, it seems, the more prosperous ones
ban centers-embraced the fez as a means of escaping discrimination
the new official dress with alacrity."71 Freed now from state-imposed
premised on religious differentiation, non-Muslims more publicly expr
wealth through their clothing.72 Thus, non-Muslim merchants

not only aspired to appear like their Muslim countrymen but also sought to ente
competition with the highest government officials in differentiating themselves
people of all faiths.73

In contrast to this eager acceptance by the upper and upper-midd

Muslims and non-Muslims, Ottoman workers rejected the new headgear

The tradesmen/artisans (kalabalik esnaf kitlesi), who were extremely conserv

fanatical and tied to Janissary traditionalism, persisted in not wearing the s
without a turban. On this, he [the sultan] abolished the turban wrappings on t
army and gave permission to the esnaf class to wind on their fezes things [fab
like yemeni, Cenber, abani, and yazma dulbent. After this, wearing the fez sp
people as it should have.74

This narrator may have been partly right in attributing artisans' oppositio
fez to conservatism and religious fanaticism.75 Here, I am postulating t
lim popular classes were insisting on a difference between themselves and
class for religious reasons, because the official class now could and did include non-
Muslims, who wore fezes that disguised their religious affiliation. After all, Mahmud's
law had been against not only the Muslim elites who contested his power. By eroding
the visible distinctions of attire among the religious communities, it also undermined
the particular and superior social place of Muslims in general. Hence, it was an issue
of popular concern. Demanding distinctive headgear, workers rejected the path toward
religious undifferentiation that the sultan was proposing.
There is a second, different hypothesis to explain rejection of the plain fez. Here
I am conjecturing that the action was an expression of a distinctive workers' culture
among both Muslims and non-Muslims. This interpretation fits into a broader picture
of state-worker interaction before and after promulgation of the law. In their actions,
the workers were spurning Mahmud II's economic policies, which reversed the pro-
tectionism of his predecessors, most recently displayed in Sultan Selim III's appeal
to artisanal groups and their janissary allies. The janissaries' massacre reduced the po-
litical power of workers, and Sultan Mahmud began to dismantle Ottoman protection-
ism, replacing it with a laissez-faire economy that subsequently evolved at the expense
of the once-privileged and protected guilds. In 1831, for example, he attacked the
monopolistic privileges of guilds and threatened many workers' livelihoods.76 Then,
in 1838, he signed the Anglo-Turkish Convention, an important step on the road to
a free-trade economy that sided with merchants involved in international trade (who
by this time were mainly non-Muslim or foreign). In this interpretation, the plain fe
worn by the Muslim and non-Muslim bureaucrats and by the non-Muslim merchants
represented
This content support
downloadedfor
fromthe laissez-faire
212.175.32.131 economic
on Sun, policies
11 Dec 2016 of UTC
12:14:10 the sultan (Figure 3).
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Clothing Laws in the Ottoman Empire 415

-:9

FIGURE i. Court functionaries at the Topkapi palace, at ceremony opening the Treasury. Carney E. S.
Gavin et al., ed., "Imperial Self-Portrait: The Ottoman Empire as Revealed in the Sultan
Abdul Hamid II's Photographic Albums," Journal of Turkish Studies, special issue (1988), 98.
Printed with permission of the publisher.

iii i ?i-: I ~ ~ ~ :
-..- - I~_. .

I j. I II
1 .i0"'
6,: f - LI

mma a ; ii

FIGURE 2. Students at the Imperial Med

Hamid II albums.
This content downloaded from 212.175.32.131 on Sun, 11 Dec 2016 12:14:10 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
416 Donald Quataert

FIGURE 3. Aintab, 1898, leaders (presumably Armenians) of the esnafs of cloth maker
Kevorkian and Paul B. Paboudjian, Les Armeniens dans I'Empire Ottoman a
Genocide (Paris, 1992), 321. Note how some of these prosperous esnaf leaders
fez as a measure of their identification with the upper and official classes whi
with the workers. Printed with permission of the authors.

Without their armed janissary allies, the workers nonetheless resisted

the provinces as well as in Istanbul, popular resistance erupted in the f
mud's policies in general and the fez legislation in particular.77 In "the
months after the destruction of the Janizzaries, [the lower classes] bur
houses in Istanbul." Months after passage of the 1829 clothing law, wor
bul who had been dragooned into the Ottoman army defending Edirne th
obnoxious fez." One soldier asked, "How can you expect them to fight .
thing on their heads."78
Sultan Mahmud had intended to extend adoption of a standard fez fr
servants to the subject classes and all of Ottoman society. But in the la
1830s, he had few means available. The state was particularly vulnerabl
Greek state was about to receive formal recognition, Mohammad Ali wa
onThis
thecontent
door of Istanbul,
downloaded and the sultan
from 212.175.32.131 on Sun, 11had not12:14:10
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UTC effective milit
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Clothing Laws in the Ottoman Empire 417

41"

FIGURE 4. Istanbul street vendor of glassware. Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, Istanbul: A Glimpse into the Past
(Istanbul, 1987), 79. Printed with permission of the author.

ments for the vanished janissary battalions. In this environment, artisanal and popu-
lar resistance to the clothing legislation was successful, and the sultan backed down.
By wearing fezes wrapped in a wide variety of fabrics, workers aimed to differen-
tiate themselves from the Ottoman official classes, international merchants, and other
laissez-faire advocates who had so quickly adopted the plain fez.79 They spurned the
path of emulation and pursued that of identity solidarity. And as photographs of Otto-
man workers make clear (Figures 4 and 5), many continued to do so for the remain-
der of the 19th century. These photographs also seem to show that the headgear for
This content downloaded from 212.175.32.131 on Sun, 11 Dec 2016 12:14:10 UTC
Muslims and non-Muslims wassubject
All use the same; their headgear identified them as workers
to http://about.jstor.org/terms
418 Donald Quataert

FIGURE 5. Istanbul boatmen on the Karakoy-Balikpazan route. Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, Istanb

into the Past (Istanbul, 1987), 91. Printed with permission of the author.

FIGURE 6. Eskisehir, meerschaum workers (presumably all Armenian Christians). Raymon

kian downloaded
This content and Paul B. Paboudjian,
from 212.175.32.131 LesonArmeniens dans12:14:10
Sun, 11 Dec 2016 I'Empire Ottoman a la Veille d
UTC
(Paris, 1992), 156.
All use Printed
subject with permission of the authors.
to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Clothing Laws in the Ottoman Empire 419

FIGURE 7. Istanbul, coffeehouse, ca. 1897. Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, Istanbul: A Glimpse into the Past (Istan-
bul, 1987), 73. The decorated war veterans presumably are Muslims. Printed with permission
of the author.

rather than members of a particular religious group80 (compare Figures 3 and 6 w

4, 5, and 7).

CONCLUSION

This examination of Ottoman clothing laws illustrates

broader issues such as wars and political instability; t
the regime's negotiations with the various contendin
and the larger society; the limits on state influence o
ing the subsequent evolution of Ottoman society.
Historically, clothing laws in Europe, America, and t
to create or maintain differences among the social r
rately, to give the impression that the state was try
social change rendered maintenance of these laws dif
they were abandoned outright, and by about 1800 go
the business of seeking to dictate attire. Rather than
the competing social classes, the Ottoman state in 18
society by creating
This content downloaded a uniform,
from 212.175.32.131 on Sun, 11 Dec state-centered
2016 12:14:10 UTC dress co
turned clothing laws
All use subject on their head. For perhaps the
to http://about.jstor.org/terms
420 Donald Quataert

clothing laws to promote homogeneity, uniformity in dress instead of d

In at least this respect, the 1829 law stands out as unique in the annals
American, and Ottoman clothing laws.
After passage of the 1829 law, Ottoman society was demarcated in a
the state sought to sweep away the confusion of the past century and re
over differentiation. On the one hand, the state penetrated more deepl
by eliminating the visible symbols distinguishing the official and nonof
its effort to become the ultimate arbiter of status, it created totally n
of dress, distinction, and identification. Competing forms of demarcatio
ethnicity, or occupation thus became more indistinct than ever before
law, the state sought to take control of a reshaping of Ottoman society
taking place since the 18th century, as non-Muslims dressed like Musli
dinate Muslims dressed like their social superiors. As the state intended
middle-strata Muslims and non-Muslims superficially, sartorially, came
one another in an unprecedented manner. On the other hand, Ottoman
pudiated the spirit and letter of the new law and perpetuated their ow
ness in pursuit of their own economic goals and identity. Taking their id
the workplace, they rejected the state's alternative. The state thus faile
fully the demarcation process. Status markers that resembled signs sep
from class emerged to compete with those originating from the state.
The evolution of a post-1829 Ottoman society in which workers deve
tained a sense of community among themselves should not be overstate
tors continued to weaken the bonds developing among workers as a result
work experiences and common opposition to state policies and merchan
For example, the foreign origins of many 19th-century enterprises (such
utilities, and the Public Debt Administration) meant that hiring policies f
recruiting of non-Muslim over Muslim workers. State policies of divide a
also corroded workers' sense of common identity. To illustrate the impact of state
policies, recall the Turkish and Kurdish porters who were exiled after the janissary
massacre in 1826. As has been detailed elsewhere, Sultan Mahmud immediately re-
placed these banished workers with Armenians from eastern Anatolian villages. In
turn, these Armenian laborers were eliminated from the Istanbul workplace in the
1890s, massacred by angry mobs from the lower classes of the capital. Sultan Abdul
Hamid II then replaced these dead porters with Kurds, drawn from the same eastern
regions.8' In their actions, both sultans were exploiting existing divisions among per-
sons of shared economic status. Their ability to do so obviously meant that religious
and ethnic differences sometimes overrode the bonds of worker solidarity.
The example of the porters also illustrates a fundamental confusion in state efforts
to redefine Ottoman subjecthood and citizenry. On the one hand, Mahmud's policies
and those of his successors demonstrate the move toward a new common identity,
with a more powerful state (sometimes led by a strong monarch) demanding the
allegiance of uniformly dressed servants and subjects. In this vision, all derived a
common identity from their relationship to the state. On the other, the state contin
ued-both in Mahmud's reign and later-to play one group off against the other.
These actions exacerbated rather than submerged differences and worked against the
This content
formation ofdownloaded from 212.175.32.131
a state-centered identity.on Sun, 11 Dec 2016 12:14:10 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Clothing Laws in the Ottoman Empire 421

The confusion in state policies mirrored that in the Ottoman streets and public
spaces of the 19th century. By the 1850s, the area of the Grand Champs du Mort/
Tepeba?i in Istanbul had become perhaps its preeminent place of public display. One
observer, the French flaneur Theophile Gautier, describes the fancy carriages (some-
times from America) that carried rich, non-Muslim Pera families in an area that also
had become the haunt of fashionable Europeans and Muslim gentlemen (Celebis).
These fops and dandies not only followed European fashion but were ahead of it.82
Gautier's description has several points of interest. First, the public spaces of Istan-
bul long dominated by the Muslim elites-such as the Sweet Waters of Europe-
were being overtaken by spaces in which non-Muslims and Europeans prevailed.
Second, it offers additional evidence that the state's 1829 policy of redemarcation
was only partially succeeding. On the one hand, the fez, frock coat, and pantaloons
had become the standard garb of the official and aspiring classes, both Muslim and
non-Muslim. But wealthy non-Muslims were distinguishing themselves from their
Muslim counterparts through extravagance and the up-to-the-minute fashionability of
their attire. Third, the 1829 effort to set a code of (state-centered) modest, simple attire
had foundered. Unlike 19th-century Europe and America, where simplicity and refine-
ment of manner overcame magnificence and became the elite code of fashion and
behavior, sumptuousness endured as the standard in the Ottoman lands. Fourth, Mus-
lims (the qelebi gentlemen) were using non-Muslims as their models. To add to this
confusion, as already noted, many artisans and workers refused to emulate their offi-
cial and merchant superiors and created or maintained their own distinctive markers.
The state was mired between legitimacies. Long-standing religious distinctions
were embroiled in emerging class differentiations that clashed with immature no-
tions of a common subjecthood/citizenry. The Ottoman Empire had no face.

NOTES

Author's note: An earlier version of this paper was presented to the conference on "Istanbul: The
Making of a City," held at the University of Texas at Austin in March 1995. I am indebted to the fol-
lowing for their assistance in preparing this version: Howard Brown, Cengiz Kirli, Walter Denny, Bren-
dan McConville, Jean Quataert, Ariel Salzmann, and the four anonymous readers for IJMES.
'The estimate of the dead is from Ed. Engelhardt, La Turquie et le Tanzimat (Paris, 1882), 11, n. 1.
2For the standard accounts of this process, see Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey
(London, 1961); Stanford Jay Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern
Turkey (Cambridge, 1977), II. See Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal,
1964), 92, for a somewhat different view of Sultan Mahmud's reforms. Also, Murat (izakca, "Cash Waqfs
of Bursa, 1555-1823," Journal of the Social and Economic History of the Orient (August, 1995), 349.
3For the text of the law, dated 6 Uevval 1244, see Ahmet Luitfi, Lutfi Tarihi (Istanbul, 1291 A.H.),
269-73. See also his remarks on p. 148.
4All of the laws discussed here concern behavior in the public sphere only. For an enlightening co
parison of clothing changes in Japan and the Ottoman Empire and the differences between enforcemen
of behavior in the public and private spheres, see Selcuk Esenbel, "The Anguish of Civilized Behavior:
The Use of Western Cultural Forms in the Everyday Lives of the Meijii Japanese and the Ottoman Turks
during the Nineteenth Century," Japan Review 5 (1994): 145-85.
5This argument is sketched out briefly in my "Janissaries, Artisans and the Question of Ottoman
Decline, 1730-1826," Workers, Peasants and Economic Change in the Ottoman Empire, 1730-1914,
This content downloaded from 212.175.32.131 on Sun, 11 Dec 2016 12:14:10 UTC
ed. Donald Quataert (Istanbul, 1993), 197-203, and sources therein.
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
422 Donald Quataert

The connection between guilds and the ahi organizations is still not well understo
interesting insights into this period, see Ahmet Karamustafa, God's Unruly Friends: Derv
the Islamic Later Middle Period, 1200-1550 (Salt Lake City, 1994).
6For an excellent introduction to consumption issues in general, including clothing laws,
ous contributions in Consumption and the World of Goods, ed. John Brewer and Roy Po
1993). See also Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450-1680, I (New
7Michael Batterberry and Ariane Batterberry, Fashion: The Mirror of History (New Yo
50; Max von Boehn, Modes and Manners, trans. from the German (New York, 1932), 1:168-
8For details of the regulations, see Brewer and Porter, Consumption; Von Boehn, Modes a
Batterberry and Batterberry, Fashion; and sources cited later, esp. in n. 16. Also see Lisel
Eisenbart, Kleiderordnungen der deutschen Stddte zwischen 1350 und 1700 (Gottingen, 1
9Von Boehn, Modes and Manners, 1:251-52.
'0Batterberry and Batterberry, Fashion, 88.
1'William Davenport, The Book of Costume (New York, 1948), 1:190. Also, Blanche Pay
of Costume: From the Ancient Egyptians to the Twentieth Century (New York, 1965), 18
12Jacqueline Herald, Renaissance Dress in Italy 1400-1500 (London, 1981), 41.
13Von Boehn, Modes and Manners, III: 170.
14Philippe Perrot, Fashioning the Bourgeoisie: A History of Clothing in the Nineteenth Ce
from the French (Princeton, 1994), 18.
15 See for example, Cissie Fairchilds, "The Production and Marketing of Populuxe Goods in
Century Paris," in Consumption, 228-48; Chandra Mukerji, From Graven Images: Pattern
Materialism (New York, 1983), 186 ff; and Neil McKendrick, John Brewer, and J. H. Plum
a Consumer Society: The Commercialization of Eighteenth Century England (Bloomington, 19
6Perrot, Fashioning the Bourgeoisie, 15.
17Herald, Renaissance Dress in Italy, 39; Frances Elizabeth Baldwin, Sumptuary Legisla
sonal Regulation in England (Baltimore, 1926), 131, 266; Wilfred Mark Webb, The Heritage of Dress
(London, 1912), 260; Von Boehn, Modes and Manners, II: 133.
18Claire Sponsler, "Narrating the Social Order: Medieval Clothing Laws," Clio (Spring
She prefers the term "clothing laws" to "sumptuary laws" because the purpose of the latter is to curb
excess. In this article, I have followed her usage.
'9Ibid., 266.
20Von Boehn, Modes and Manners, 1:251; also ibid., 11:192.
2'Perrot, Fashioning the Bourgeoisie, 10. He discusses the advantages of clothing legislation for the
aristocracy but does not deal with its utility for other social groups.
22Von Boehn, Modes and Manners, IV:249. In England, although James I repealed clothing legisla-
tion in 1604, a 1745 measure prohibited the Scots from wearing the tartan; Webb, Heritage of Dress, 261.
23Karin Calvert, "The Function of Fashion in Eighteenth-Century America," in Of Consuming Inter-
ests: The Style of Life in the Eighteenth Century, ed. Cary Carson, Ronald Hoffman, and Peter J. Albert
(Charlottesville and London, 1994), 259-61. See also Richard L. Bushman, The Refinement of America:
Persons, Houses, Cities (New York, 1992).
24Baron Francois de Tott, Memoirs of Baron de Tott, English ed. (London, 1785), 1:119-20, r
on the accession ceremonies of Sultan Mustafa III (1757-74). I have not determined when this pr
first became part of the procession ceremonies.
25Joseph von Hammer, Das osmanischen Reichs: Staatsverfassung und Staatsverwaltung (Vienna
1:436-49.
26J. de Hammer, Histoire de l'empire ottoman, trans. of his 1834 Geschichte des Osm
(Paris, 1835-43), IV:142-43.
27Hammer, Histoire, V:24-25. Specifically, the "ordinary classes wore either a persha
shemle, one carelessly wrapped around the head."
I must note that elsewhere in his history, Hammer makes an error on the issue of tobac
a subject that I currently am researching. He correctly states that the Kanun-t reaya includ
the payment of taxes called resm-i duhdn, but he erroneously describes this tax to be o
smoking tobacco ("le droit sur l'usage du tabac a fumer"), VI:271, n. 6. Rather, the duhdn
tioned by Hammer is a tax on land use. For example, see, inter alia, Ahmed Akgundtiz, O
nameleri (Istanbul,
This content 1990),
downloaded from11:158, from the
212.175.32.131 era11
on Sun, ofDec
Bayezid II (1481-1512);
2016 12:14:10 UTC ibid. (Istanbul,
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Clothing Laws in the Ottoman Empire 423

418, 466, 494, for examples from Selim I (1512-20); and ibid. (Istanbul, 1992), IV:316, from the era of
the Lawgiver.
Hammer himself points out elsewhere in his history (VIII:90) that tobacco was introduced in the Otto-
man lands only about 1605.
28Perrot, Fashioning the Bourgeoisie, 16. The firmness and rigor that Sultan Suleyman employed in
establishing and codifying dress might suggest an end to this mobility; this conclusion could be in error,
and the point needs further exploration.
29Hammer, Das osmanischen Reichs, 436-49.
30Hammer, Histoire, VI:275-79.
31There is a wide body of literature linking the early modern state to social discipline-for example,
in the workplace and in schools. For a general overview of the research, see R. Po-Chia Hsia, Social Dis-
cipline in the Reformation: Central Europe, 1550-1750 (London and New York, 1989).
32I have found perhaps twenty examples of legislation concerning these gender, religious, and social
distinctions. Madeline Zilfi seems to have found others; see her "Stories from the Mahalle: Urban
Encounters in Eighteenth Century Istanbul" (unpublished paper, 1 March 1995), presented to the
March 1995 conference, "Istanbul: The Making of a City," University of Texas at Austin. For yet
examples, see Fatma Muge Gocek, Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire: Ottoman Westerniz
and Social Change (New York, 1996).
33See Zilfi, "Stories from the Mahalle"; idem., "Women and Society in the Tulip Era," in Wom
Family and Divorce Laws in Islamic Society, ed. A. Sonbol (Syracuse, 1995).
34Zilfi, "Stories from the Mahalle."
35Zilfi, "Women and Society." Here and in "Stories from the Mahalle," Zilfi offers important o
vations about the shift to leisure that characterizes the Tulip Period.
36Berkes, Secularism in Turkey, 30-45; Ahmet Refik Altinay, Ldle Devri (Ankara, 1973); Zilfi, "Wom
and Society."
37Carson et al., Of Consuming Interests; and Bushman, Refinement of America.
38For a discussion of Muslim domination of mercantile activities in earlier centuries, and the b
issue of Muslim and non-Muslim participation in trade, see Halil Inalcik with Donald Quataert, ed.,
An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914 (Cambridge, 1994)-for example,
pp. 188 ff, 474 ff, 695 ff, 837 ff, and sources therein.
39The quotation, from Porter and Brewer, Consumption, refers to European courts.
40Metin And, A History of Theatre and Popular Entertainment in Turkey (Ankara, 1963-64), 17-1
Midhat Sertoglu, "Istanbul, 1520'den Cumhuriyete kadar," in Islam Ansiklopedesi 5, II (Istanbul, 1967),
1214/19.
41Quote from And, History of Theatre, 18; also, see Hammer, Histoire, XIV:41-46, 62-65; and Sura
Faroqhi, Kultur und Alltag im Osmanischen Reich (Munich, 1995), 187 ff.
42A more precise understanding of the role that satisfaction of court needs played in forming the 18t
century Ottoman bourgeoisie requires investigation.
43For the pathbreaking analysis of this phenomenon, see Ariel Salzmann, "Measures of Empire:
Farmers and the Ottoman Ancien Regime, 1695-1807" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1995). See Ham
mer, Histoire, XII:347-49, for a 1693 use of clothing laws as a tool in elite power struggles in Istanbul
44Faroqhi, Kultur und Alltag, and sources therein.
45Resad Ekrem Kocu, Turk Giyim, Kusam ve suiislenme sozliiguii (Ankara, 1967), 86. He dates the
at June 1725. Ahmed Refik, Onikinci asr-i hicrU'de Istanbul Hayati (1689-1785) (Istanbul, 1988, rprn
86-88, says June 1726/Sevval 1138. Hammer, Histoire, XIV:181-82, says September 1727/Muharrem
1140. The law cited in Hammer, Histoire, XI:347-49, dated 1693 and cited earlier, can be seen as one
regulating modesty.
46Hammer, Histoire, XIV:181-82.
47See Zilfi, "Stories from the Mahalle," for a discussion of the enlarged public sphere being crea
as a result.
48Elena Frangakis-Syrett, The Commerce of Smyrna in the Eighteenth Century (1700-1820) (A
1992), shows steady trade increases in late-18th-century Izmir; Inalcik with Quataert, Economic and S
cial History, 736, Table 111:2, shows impressive increases of total trade in Salonica. The rising rev
of mukataas based on trade are amply documented by Mehmet Genc; for example, his "Osmanli Ekon-
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424 Donald Quataert

49Hammer, Histoire, XV:284. Also, Zilfi "Stories from the Mahalle," and idem, "Women
50De Tott, Memoirs, 115.
5'Ibid., 124-26.
52Sertoglu, "Istanbul," in Islam Ansiklopedesi, 1214/22; and *em'dani-zade Findikllll Siiley
$em'ddni-zdde Findikllll Siileyman Efendi Tarihi. Muir'i't-Telvdrih, modern Turkish rendition b
tepe (Istanbul, 1967), II.A: 12. See *em'dani-zade, Sem'ddni-zdde, II.A:36, 69-70, for addi
tions of Sultan Mustafa III. Also, de Tott, Memoirs, 124-26. And, finally, see Zilfi, "Stori
Mahalle," for a fine analysis of the beggar story.
53How well the clothing laws helped Sultan Osman is unclear, because he died of natur
than three years later, just short of his fifty-ninth birthday. Sultan Mustafa, for his part, reigned
years and died of natural causes just as his empire suffered catastrophic military defeats,
at the end of the 17th century. The 1774 Treaty of Kiicuk Kaynarca registered the consequent
losses, de-Ottomanized the Black Sea, and opened the way for the destruction of the Crim
well as mounting Russian interference in Ottoman internal affairs.
54Inalcik with Quataert, Economic and Social History, 639 ff, where Bruce McGowan su
own work and that of Mehmet Gen9 for the 18th century.
55 evket Pamuk, "Appendix: Money in the Ottoman Empire, 1326-1914," in ibid., 970.
56Enver Ziya Karal, Selim IlI'un Hat-ti Hiiunavunlari-Nizami Cedit, 1789-1807 (Ankara,
102, does not date the decree. For other regulations of Selim III, respectively concerning w
Ottoman minorities, see ibid., 102-3, 136-37; Ahmed Refik, Oniiuiincii asr-i hicri'de Is
(1786-1882), (Istanbul, 1988, rprnt.), 4; and Basbakanlik Osmanli Arsivi (hereafter BOA) H
yun (hereafter HH) 54918. Also Stanford Jay Shaw, Between Old and New: The Ottoman
Sultan Selim III, 1789-1807 (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), 33-34, 76-78, 175.
57Refik, Onikinci, 86-88.
58This was hardly the first reference to the drain on the treasury; there is a long history of fear
bankruptcy as a motive for controlling consumption. See, for example, the fine quotation from th
icler Mustafa Naima (ca. 1665-1716) in Halil Inalcik, "The Ottoman Cotton Market and India: The Role
of Labor Cost in Market Competition," trans. Douglas Howard. in The Middle East and the Balka
der the Ottoman Empire: Essays on Economy and Society, ed. Halil Inalcik (Bloomington, 1993), 272-
73. My thanks to Elizabeth B. Frierson for calling this quote to my attention. See also, for example,
Eem'ddni-zdde, II.A:69-70, for a 1764-75/1178 regulation.
59Karal, Selim III, 102, 136. Notably, as the quotation shows, the competitive assault was not com
from European makers but, rather, from the East.
60See Quataert, Workers, Peasants and Economic Change, 141-57, 197-203.
611 am leaving aside, for further investigation, the question of the precise nature of the janissa
worker relationship.
62Pamuk, "Appendix," in Economic and Social History, 970.
63Kocu, Turk Giyim, 113-14. In the name of the new military unit, Victorious Muslim Soldiers,
sultan appealed for the loyalty of his Muslim subjects, while his 1829 law threatened to jeopardize their
status.

For some of the regulations concerning military attire changes, see BOA HH 17584, 17614, 17647,
17890,18446,18671.
64Kocu, Turk Giyim, 114.
65Lutfl, Lutfi Tarihi, II, 269-73, 148.
66It is widely known that the ilmiye were permitted to continue to wear turbans and
more generally, the religious hierarchies were left outside the clothing-regulation process.
tions of this policy have been analyzed by Berkes, Secularism in Turkey, and others.
67This practice was vastly expanded by Sultan Abdul Mecid. My thanks to Walter Denny for his help-
ful remarks on this matter. See also BOA HH 17594.
68Later, Mahmud allegedly said: "I distinguish among my subjects, Muslims in the mo
tians in the church and Jews in the synagogue, but there is no difference among them in any
Quoted in Avigdor Levy, The Jews in the Ottoman Empire (Princeton, 1994), 103, 145, n. 358
cussion of the dating of the statement.
69The story of the Tanzimat reforms is well known, as is the lack of non-Muslim parti
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and the under-representation UTC
of non-Muslims in the civil bure
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 Clothing Laws in the Ottoman Empire 425

the latter subject, see the excellent article by Carter V. Findley, "The Acid Test of Ottomanism: The
Acceptance of Non-Muslims in the Late Ottoman Bureaucracy," in Jews and Christians in the Ottoman
Empire, ed. Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (New York, 1982), 1:339-68.
70See, i.a., photographs published in Mahmud Kemal Inal, Son Sadriazmlar, 3 vols., 4th printing
(Istanbul, 1969); Carter V. Findley, Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History (Princeton, 1989), for
example, 198, 214, 238; Carney E. S. Gavin, Imperial Self-Portrait: The Ottoman Empire as Revealed in
the Sultan Abdul Hamid II's Photographic Albums (Cambridge, Mass., 1988); Louis Vaczek and Gail
Buckland, Travelers in Ancient Lands (Boston and New York, 1981).
71Berkes, Secularism in Turkey, 125.
72Enver Ziya Karal, Osmanli Tarihi, V, Nizam-i Cedit ve Tanzimat Devirleri (1789-1856) (Ankar
1961), 158.
73Berkes, Secularism in Turkey, 125-26. This is a part of the quotation cited earlier on the "alacrity
74KoSu, Turk Giyim, 114.
75Kocu, Turk Giyim. Despite his own statement, the tale recounted by Kocu also credits the desire for
social differentiation from the official classes as a motive for the popular opposition. Berkes, Secularis
in Turkey, 124, offers a religious explanation: "Shoes, pants, coats, shirts did not encounter resistanc
The real difficulty arose over the question of headgear. It is difficult to explain why. . .. The only cle
explanation appears to be religious."
76Donald Quataert, "The Social History of Labor in the Ottoman Empire, 1800-1914," in The Socia
History of Labor in the Middle East, ed. Ellis Jay Goldberg (Boulder, Colo., 1996), 23, 35, n. 7. The 183
measure removed esnaf masters' right to gain monopolistic access to work sites through the issuance of
new gedik certificates; the action may have helped the rank and file in their struggle with the masters.
77Omer Demirel, II. Mahmud doneminde Sivasta esnaf teskildti ve uiretim-tuketim iliskileri (Ankara,
1989), 57, n. 81, and sources therein document popular resistance to the fez in the Anatolian city of Sivas.
This information, randomly collected, suggests the presence of resistance in other regions, as well.
78Adolphus Slade, Records of Travels in Turkey, Greece, etc., new ed. (London, 1854), 194. For other
examples of opposition to the fez, see ibid., 139-41, 379. Slade, a contemporary, vociferously opposed
Mahmud's programs. The entire subject of popular resistance to Mahmud's anti-janissary actions and to
his overall policies needs further study.
79Kocu, Turk Giyim, 115-16. Obviously, other factors in addition to opposing state policies also he
to explain distinctive worker dress. For an illustrated list of various headgear in the 18th and 19th cen-
turies, see Sebahaddin Doras and Serafeddin Kocaman, OsmanlilarAlbiimui, ikinci kitap (Istanbul, 1983),
129-31.
80The black-and-white photographs are not always clear, but those available do not sugges
ence between Christian and Muslim workers. For photographs of Armenian workers, see Raymond H.
Kevorkian and Paul B. Paboudjian, Les Armeniens dans l'Empire Ottoman a la Veille du Genocide (Paris,
1992). For photographs of Ottoman workers in general, see, for example, Sedad Hakki Eldem, Istanbul
Anilari (Istanbul, 1979); Bahattin Oztuncay, James Robertson: Pioneer of Photography in the Ottoman
Empire (Istanbul, 1992); Carney E. S. Gavin, The Image of the East (Chicago, 1982); Ekmeleddin
Ihsanoglu, Istanbul: A Glimpse into the Past (Istanbul, 1987).
For a discussion of emulation as the cause of changing fashion, see, for example, the articles in
Brewer and Porter, Consumption.
Whether workers' headgear became more or less homogeneous later in the 19th century is not clear.
8tDonald Quataert, Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire (New Yor
1983); idem, "Labor Politics and Policies in the Ottoman Empire: Porters and the Sublime Porte, 1826-
1896," in Humanist and Scholar: Essays in Honor of Andreas Tietze, ed. Heath W. Lowry and Donald
Quataert (Istanbul, 1993), 59-69; idem, "The Employment Policies of the Ottoman Public Debt Admin-
istration, 1881-1909," in Workers, Peasants and Economic Change, 137-40.
82Theophile Gautier, Constantinople (Paris, 1856), 170, 90-91. On spectatorship, see Judith R.
kowitz, City of Dreadful Delight: Narratives of Sexual Danger in Late-Victorian London (Chicago, 1992),
15-24.

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