Pelaez vs Auditor General

undue delegation of legislative power

G.R. No. L-23825 15 SCRA 569 December 24, 1965

Facts:
The President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129;
creating thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin. Petitioner Emmanuel
Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present
special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor
General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit
any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any
disbursement by said municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said
Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 effective January 1,
1960 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. The third paragraph of
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads: “Barrios shall not be created or their
boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the provisions of this Act or
by Act of Congress.”

Issues:
Whether or not Section 68 of Revised Administrative Code constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power.

Discussions:
Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices,
exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and
take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in
the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of
such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local
governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits him
to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local governments or the
officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the
President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act
within the scope of their authority.

Rulings:
Yes. It did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers. The alleged power of the
President to create municipal corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by
him of an authority even greater than that of control which he has over the executive
departments, bureaus or offices. In other words, Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate.
Instead of giving the President less power over local governments than that vested in
him over the executive departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and
does the exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power over municipal
corporations than that which he has over said executive departments, bureaus or offices.

Macias vs COMELEC
principle of proportional representation
G.R. No. L-18684 32 SCRA 1 September 14, 1961

Facts:
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives from Negros Oriental, Misamis
Oriental and Bulacan and the provincial Governor of Negros Oriental. They are
requesting that the respondent officials be prevented to implement RA 3040, an act that
apportions representative districts in the country. They alleged that their respective
provinces were discriminated because they were given less representation.
Furthermore, they allege that RA 3040 is unconstitutional and void because:

1. It was passed without printed final copies which must be furnished to the members
of the HOR at least 3 calendar days prior to passage.
2. It was approved more than 3 years after the return of the last census of the
population.
3. It apportioned districts without regard to the number of inhabitants of the several
provinces.

Issues:
Whether or not the apportionment of representative districts under Republic Act 3040 is
in accordance with the constitution.
Discussions:
The Constitution directs that the one hundred twenty Members of the House of
Representatives “shall be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be
according to the member of their respective inhabitants.” A law giving provinces with less
number of inhabitants more representative districts than those with bigger population is
invalid because it violates the principle of proportional representation prescribed by the
Constitution. Inequality of apportionment law is “arbitrary and capricious and against the
vital principle of equality.” as held in Houghton County v. Blacker.
Rulings:
No. The Court concluded that the statute be declared invalid. Republic Act 3040 clearly
violates the said constitutional provision in several ways namely:
 It gave Cebu seven members, while Rizal with a bigger number of inhabitants got
four only.
 It gave Manila four members, while Cotabato with a bigger population got three only
 Pangasinan with less inhabitants than both Manila and Cotabato got more than both,
five members having been assigned to it.
 Samar (with 871,857) was allotted four members while Davao with 903,224 got three
only.
 Bulacan with 557,691 got two only, while Albay with less inhabitants (515,691) got
three.
 Misamis Oriental with 387,839 was given one member only, while Cavite with less
inhabitants (379,904) got two. These were not the only instances of unequal
apportionment.
 Mountain Province has 3 whereas Isabela, Laguna and Cagayan with more
inhabitants have 2 each. And then, Capiz, La Union and Ilocos Norte got 2 each,
whereas Sulu that has more inhabitants got 1 only. And Leyte with 967,323
inhabitants got 4 only, whereas Iloilo with less inhabitants (966,145) was given 5.

Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC

[G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000]

Facts:
COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 13 parties which obtained at
least 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system as members of the
House of Representatives. Upon petition for respondents, who were party-list
organizations, it proclaimed 38 additional party-list representatives although they
obtained less than 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system on the
ground that under the Constitution, it is mandatory that at least 20% of the members of
the House of Representatives come from the party-list representatives.

Issue:
Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should
the twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up completely and all the time?

Held:
It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of
Representatives. The Constitution vested Congress with the broad power to define and
prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representatives. In the exercise of its
constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed it necessary to require parties participating
in the system to obtain at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party list system to be
entitled to a party-list seat. Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties having a
sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in
Congress.

FORMULA FOR

determination of total number of party-list representatives = #district

representatives/.80 x .20
additional representatives of first party = # of votes of first party/ # of votes of party
list system

additional seats for concerned party = # of votes of concerned party/ # votes of first
party x additional seats for concerned party

Issue:
Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section
11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

Held:
Yes. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those
parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving
of representation are actually represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from
the deliberations on the proposed bill. The two percent threshold is consistent not only
with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence
of "representation." Under a republican or representative state, all government authority
emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. But to
have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a
sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list
system, the result might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of
contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of
Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to
ensure meaningful local representation.

Issue:
How should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?

Held:
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private
respondents, as well as the members of this Court that the initial step is to rank all the
participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based
on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by
dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the system. All
parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only
 these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party
receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the “first” party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to,
in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based
on proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties
cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining
the most number of votes.
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other
qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation.

ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec

G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN MUNA vs. Comelec

Facts
Petitioners challenged the Comelec’s Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which approved the
participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the
2001 party-list elections. Petitioners sought the disqualification of private respondents,
arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and
underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec acted on their petition,
petitioners elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioner’s recourse to the Court was proper.
2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections.
3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.

RULING:
1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the availability of other
remedies "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved,
and in case of urgency." The facts attendant to the case rendered it justiciable.

2. Political Parties -- even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections
subject to the requirements laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941, which is the
statutory law pertinent to the Party List System.

Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified

from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section
5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representative
may “be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations”. It is however, incumbent upon the COMELEC to determine
proportional representation of the marginalized and underrepresented”, the criteria for
participation in relation to the cause of the party lsit applicants so as to avoid desecration
of the noble purpose of the party-list system.
3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the inclusion of
respondents in the Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, a study of the factual allegations was
necessary which was beyond the pale of the Court. The Court not being a trier of facts.

However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law
and the Consitution, the Court decided to set some guidelines culled from the law and
the Consitution, to assist the Comelec in its work. The Court ordered that the petition be
remanded in the Comelec to determine compliance by the party lists.

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs. COMELEC and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO,

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

KAPUNAN, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte in 1995, providing that her residence in the
place was seven (7) months.

On March 23, 1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First
District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position filed a petition for
cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC charging Marcos as she did not
comply with the constitutional requirement for residency as she lacked the Constitution’s
one-year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representative.

In her Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, the petitioner changed seven

months to since childhood under residency. Thus, the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied.

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner’s proclamation
showing that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in
the First District of Leyte. The COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution
directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains
the highest number of votes.

In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, Marcos claimed that she was the
overwhelming winner of the elections based on the canvass completed by the Provincial
Board of Canvassers.

Issue:
Whether or not Imelda Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte to satisfy the
one year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative.
Held:
Yes. The court is in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal residence
or domicile in the First District of Leyte.

Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake the

concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of
determining a candidate’s qualifications for the election to the House of Representatives
as required by the 1987 Constitution.

An individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained residences
in different places. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by Motejo lacks the
degree of persuasiveness as required to convince the court that an abandonment of
domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed incurred. It cannot be correctly
argued that Marcos lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her
marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos.

It can be concluded that the facts supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible
to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was
obviously referring to petitioner’s various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile.

Having determined that Marcos possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run
for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC’s
questioned resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May11, and May 25 are set aside.
Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to proclaim Marcos as the duly elected
Representative of the First District of Leyte.

AVELINO VS. CUENCO

Political Question; Separation of Power; Legislative Branch
83 PHIL 17, March 4, 1949

Facts:

1. In a session of the Senate, Tanada’s request to deliver a speech in order to

formulate charges against then Senate President Avelino was approved. With the
leadership of the Senate President followed by his supporters, they deliberately tried
to delay and prevent Tanada from delivering his speech. Before Senator Tañada
could deliver his privilege speech to formulate charges against the incumbent
Senate President, the petitioner, motu propio adjourned the session of the Senate
and walked out with his followers.
2. Senator Cabili request to made the following incidents into a record:
 1. The deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the petitioner, made it incumbent
upon Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz and the remaining members of the
Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the functions of the
Senate.
2. Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz suggested that respondent be designated
to preside over the session which suggestion was carried unanimously.
3. The respondent, Senator Mariano Cuenco, thereupon took the Chair.
3. Gregorio Abad was appointed Acting Secretary upon motion of Senator Arranz,
because the Assistance Secretary, who was then acting as Secretary, had followed
the petitioner when the latter abandoned the session.
4. Senator Tañada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to deliver
his privilege speech. Thereafter Senator Sanidad read aloud the complete text of
said Resolution (No. 68), and submitted his motion for approval thereof and the
same was unanimously approved.
5. The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the court
to declare him the rightful Senate President and oust the respondent, Mariano
Cuenco, contending that the latter had not been validly elected because twelve
members did not constitute a quorum – the majority required of the 24-member
Senate.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction on subject matter.

2. Whether or not Resolutions 67 and 68 was validly approved.
3. Whether or not the petitioner be granted to declare him the rightful President of the
Philippines Senate and oust respondent.

Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:

1. The Supreme Court held that they cannot take cognizance of the case. The court will
be against the doctrine of separation of powers.
1. In view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the
constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which
power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary.
2. The court will not interfere in this case because the selection of the presiding
officer affect only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to
choose their officers, change or reinstate them. If, as the petition must imply to
be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his
remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall — not in the Supreme Court.
2. Yes, it was validly constituted, supposing that the Court has jurisdiction.
1. Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was the majority required by
the Constitution for the transaction of the business of the Senate, because,
firstly, the minute say so, secondly, because at the beginning of such session
there were at least fourteen senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez,
and thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of Senator Tomas
Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty-three
senators.
2. When the Constitution declares that a majority of “each House” shall constitute
a quorum, “the House: does not mean “all” the members. Even a majority of all
the members constitute “the House”. There is a difference between a majority of
“the House”, the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute
majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes
constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum.
3. The Court adopts a hands-off policy on this matter.
1. The Court found it injudicious to declare the petitioner as the rightful President of
the Senate, since the office depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of
the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body
being amenable at any time by that majority.
2. At any session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all
controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here about quorum and for
the benefit of all concerned, the said twelve senators who approved the
resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them
beyond the shadow of a doubt.

Hence, by a vote of 6 to 4, The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the ground as it
involved a political question. The Supreme Court should abstain in this case because the
selection of the presiding officer affects only the Senators themselves who are at liberty
at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them.

Osmeña v. Pendatun (G.R. No. L-17144)

Facts:
Congressman Sergio Osmeña Jr., herein petitioner, delivered his privilege speech
before the House making serious imputations of bribery against the President of the
Philippines. Because of this, a Resolution was issued authorizing the creation of special
House Committee to investigate the truth of the charges made against the President, to
summon petitioner to substantiate his charges, and in case petitioner fails to do so, to
require petitioner to show cause why he should not be punished by the House.
Petitioner then resorted to the Court seeking for the annulment of said resolution on the
ground that it infringes his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches
delivered in the House. Meanwhile, the Special Committee continued with its
proceeding, and after giving petitioner a chance to defend himself, found the latter guilty
of seriously disorderly behavior. A House resolution was issued and petitioner was
suspended from office for 15 months.
Thereafter, respondents filed their answer challenging the jurisdiction of this Court to
entertain the petition, and defended the power of Congress to discipline its members
with suspension.
Issue:
Whether the House Resolution violated petitioner’s constitutionally granted
parliamentary immunity for speeches
Ruling: NO.
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that “for any speech or debate” in
Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representative “shall not be
questioned in any other place.” This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of
Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In that country, the provision has always
been understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their
words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be
questioned in Congress itself. Observe that “they shall not be questioned in any other
place” than Congress.
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege
cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English
Parliament, its purpose “is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to
discharge his public trust with firmness and success” for “it is indispensably necessary
that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from
the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom exercise of that liberty may
occasion offense.” It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without
fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other
forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from
responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct
are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes
disorderly conduct for which Osmeña may be discipline, We believe, however, that the
House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the
Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends
mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which cannot be
depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts.
Accordingly, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed.

PEOPLE V JALOSJOS
Feb. 3, 2000

Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress

who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and
acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking
that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance
at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the
first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need
for his constituents to be represented

Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as

member of House of Representatives

Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite
of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be
enlarged or restricted by law.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always
been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special
privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be
extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the
operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot
compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate
one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by
imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional
foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and
committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with
all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates
accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the
purposes of the correction system.

ABAKADA Guro Party List vs. Ermita

G.R. No. 168056 September 1, 2005

Facts:
ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for prohibition o questioning the
constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107
and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).
Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties;
Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods; and
Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties;

These provisions contain a provision which authorizing the President, upon

recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective
January 1, 2006, after specified conditions have been satisfied.

Issues:
Whether or not there is a violation of Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution.

Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI

Sec 28(2) of the Constitution.
Whether or not there is a violation of the due process and equal protection of the
Constitution.

Ruling:
No, the revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of Representatives, the Senate
was acting within its constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill
when it included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes,
percentage, and excise and franchise taxes.

No, there is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the
execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its
functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must
do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently
the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. In this case, it is not a
delegation of legislative power but a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which
enforcement and administration of the increased rate under the law is contingent.

No, the power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications for the
purposes of taxation has long been established. Whether it relates to the subject of
taxation, the kind of property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the
methods of assessment, valuation and collection, the State’s power is entitled to
presumption of validity. As a rule, the judiciary will not interfere with such power absent a
clear showing of unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness.