G.R. No.

189698 February 22, 2010

Facts:
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of
Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and
Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.—a) Any person holding a public appointive office or
position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and
employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of
his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file their CoCs,
petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the
government and who intend to run in the coming elections, filed the instant petition for prohibition and
certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and
void. Petitioners also contend that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the assailed COMELEC
resolution, contains two conflicting provisions. These must be harmonized or reconciled to give effect to
both and to arrive at a declaration that they are not ipso facto resigned from their positions upon the
filing of their CoCs.

Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section 4(a)
of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause

Held: Yes.
In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the
filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones,
the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction
between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such
differential treatment.
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the
constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification
be complied with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences between the classes
treated differently. As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and
Highways, a real and substantial distinction exists between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles
sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Not all motorized
vehicles are created equal—a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a four-
wheel vehicle.
Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the second
requirement—if it is not germane to the purpose of the law.
The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for the present but as
long as the problem sought to be corrected continues to exist. And, under the last requirement, the
classification would be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not treated similarly, both
as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of
persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the
purposes of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to
promote one’s candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. The
measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by
eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations
rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of
civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the
performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office
work.
If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed provision cannot be
constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite that the
classification must be germane to the purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive
office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain. For example, the
Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same influence as
the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the recent past, elected Vice-
Presidents were appointed to take charge of national housing, social welfare development, interior and
local government, and foreign affairs). With the fact that they both head executive offices, there is no
valid justification to treat them differently when both file their CoCs for the elections. Under the present
state of our law, the Vice-President, in the example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains
his position during the entire election period and can still use the resources of his office to support his
campaign.
As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the functions of his
appointive office, the inverse could be just as true and compelling. The public officer who files his
certificate of candidacy would be driven by a greater impetus for excellent performance to show his
fitness for the position aspired for.
There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones. The
classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the law. The
measure encapsulated in the second proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in
Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal protection clause.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second proviso in the third paragraph
of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.