Quinto vs.
COMELEC
G.R. No. 189698, 1 December 2009
Facts:
This is a motion for reconsideration filed by the Commission on Elections. The latter moved to
question an earlier decision of the Supreme Court declaring the second proviso in the third
paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the COMELEC resolution, and Section
4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 unconstitutional. The resolution provides that, Any
person holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned
or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon
the filing of his certificate of candidacy. RA 9369 provides that
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of
candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who
files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the
start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That,
unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the
aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive
office or position, including active members of the armed forces, and officers and
employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the
filing of his/her certificate of candidacy.
Issue:
whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section
4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause
Ruling:
To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws
to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and
yonder is that of reasonableness, which has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
The court acknowledged that the provisions satisfy the first, third and fourth requisites of
reasonableness. It, however, proffers the dubious conclusion that the differential treatment of
appointive officials vis--vis elected officials is not germane to the purpose of the law, because
"whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by
the measure remain."