38 IPRI Journal XIV,

New no. 1 (Winter

Great Game and2014):
Limits38-65
of American Power

New Great Game and Limits of American Power

Air Cdre. (R) Naveed Khaliq Ansaree

Abstract

The „New Great Game‟ is the global rivalry between the US-
NATO bloc and its allies and their Counter-Alliance Camp. In
the grand strategic calculus of Russia-China-Pakistan-
Afghanistan-India entanglement, the US Camp seems to be
losing its strategic foothold, particularly in Eurasia. The US‟
„Pivot to Asia‟ may also suffer serious setbacks. The deals on
Syria‟s chemical weapons and Iran‟s nuclear programme have
brought the Middle East under a „Strategic Pause‟ but have
also exposed the limits of American power. Afghanistan is on
the tipping-point of proving or disproving to be the „graveyard
of empires‟. The danger of Saudi Arabia becoming the victim
of a fresh „Arab Spring‟ as well as destabilization of Pakistan
has increased manifold. The US‟ latest offer for full-spectrum
revival of strategic alliance could merely be a „Strategic
Deception‟ for Pakistan. The US-Iran nuclear deal may also
manifest into additional space for US strategy and lines of
operations for Afghanistan-Pakistan. Iran and Syria could be
re-visited in the next cycle. Strategic wisdom is hoped to
prevail amongst regional stake-holders. Any strategic failure
of the US strategy could further expose the limits of American
power. The dynamics could roll the ball for a new balance of
power; thus shrinking the area of US imperialism and opening
up spaces for the manifestation of „Chi-Merica‟ (China-
America) or a multi-polar world.

Keywords: Great Game, China, America, Russia, Asia.

Introduction
he term „Great Game‟ was used to describe the military and

T diplomatic rivalry and secret war between the empires of Britain and
Russia in the 19th century which was fought in Afghanistan, deserted
passes and deserts of Central Asia1. Victorian Britain wanted to prevent


The author is a PhD scholar at the Department of International Relations,
University of Karachi.
Naveed Khaliq Ansaree 39

Tsarist Russia from making inroads into Afghanistan and posing any threat
to its prize possession, „The British Raj in India‟.2 However, the New Great
Game of the 21st century is the global rivalry in several regions between the
US-NATO and its allies in one Camp and its Counter-Alliance Camp on the
other for control of energy and critical resources and/ or the conquest of
areas of economic and strategic import, primarily of the „triple entente of
Eurasia: Russia, China and Iran‟.3 Eurasia is a continental landmass that
primarily reflects the socio-political notion of Europe.4 However, in
geographical reference Eurasia is taken to be the contiguous landmasses as
well as their proximate islands and regions. Generally, Arctic Ocean is
taken to be Eurasia‟s extent to the north; Atlantic Ocean to the west; Pacific
Ocean to the east; and in the south Eurasia‟s extent is taken to be the
Mediterranean Sea, Suez Canal, Sinai Peninsula, Red Sea and the Indian
Ocean.5
The Great Game rivalry is taking place in several theatres which can
be categorized into main, secondary and tertiary theatres.
 The main theatres of the New Great Game are the regions or
areas of geo-political, geo-strategic or geo-economic
significance which are contiguous or are in the geographical
proximity of the Eurasian powers; where the rivalry has a direct
bearing on the core interests of the rival camps; and where there
is a great likelihood of an „armed conflict‟ between the rival
camps or their proxies. These regions appear to be the
Caucasus; Central Asia; Middle East (inclusive of Eastern
Mediterranean); South Asia and Indian Ocean; and Asia-Pacific
region, particularly South China Sea.

1
Peter Hopkirk, The New Great Game: On Secret Service in High Asia (London:
Oxford University Press, 2001), 1&7. The term „Great Game‟ was first coined by
Captain Arthur Conolly who was in Russian Captivity in Bokhara but it was
Kipling who was to immortalize the term in his novel „Kim‟. Modern Soviet
Scholars do not have a term of their own; they call the Great Game as „Bolshaya
Igra’.
2
Ibid., 5. In the beginning of 19 th Century when the play first began, Britain and
Russia were 2000 miles apart. By the end of it, some Russian outposts at Pamir
were within 20 miles of India.
3
Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya, “The US-NATO March to War and the 21st Century
Great Game,” Global Research, December 5, 2010, (accessed April 11, 2013),
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=22170.
4
Ibid.
5
Wikipedia, s.v., “Eurasia,” (accessed April 11, 2013),
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurasia
40 New Great Game and Limits of American Power

 The secondary theatres of the New Great Game are the regions/
areas of geo-strategic or geo-economic significance which may
be in the geographical proximity of the Eurasian powers but
where the rivalry tends to offer advantage to the rival camps to
position their forces to support the New Great Game and helps
them further their core national interests. These are the areas
where the direct armed conflict or military confrontation is less
likely to take place between the rival camps, such as the
Balkans and East Africa.
 The tertiary theatres are the regions where there is minimal
danger of an armed conflict or direct military confrontation
between the rival camps, and where the rivalry or competition
is primarily for reaching out to the untapped hydrocarbon and
natural resources before the rival can do; and secure them for
one‟s own future generations. The tertiary theatres of the Great-
Game appear to be the Latin America, Caribbean and Arctic.
The rivalry and race for hydrocarbon riches in such regions is
poised to get into top notch amongst the US, China, Russia,
India, UK and others.
These theatres may appear distinct but are interlinked in a template of
„Cause & Effect‟. The time-frame, dimension and the intensity of the Great
Game rivalry in a theatre primarily depend upon the geo-strategic and
economic interests of the rival camps as well as the resource-richness of a
particular region. The dynamics of rivalry are drawing the camps towards a
security paradigm that is fraught with serious threat to global peace and
security and is accentuating the danger of a wider conflict.
The article aims to highlight the broad strategic contours of rivalry in
the main theatres of the New Great Game which have tremendous impact
on the entanglement that has shaped up in the regions proximate to Russia,
China, Pakistan, Afghanistan and India as well as to indicate the limits of
American power in the said entanglement.

Rivalry in the Caucasus

The Caucasus is defined as the territory that is bestriding the Caucasus
Mountains and is situated between the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea. The
North Caucasus generally includes the republics of Russian Federation; and
the South Caucasus includes Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia.6 The South
Caucasus also includes Northern-Iran as well as the eastern areas of Turkey

6
Nazemroaya, “The US-NATO March to War…,”
Naveed Khaliq Ansaree 41

which were taken from Georgia and Armenia under the Treaty of Kars signed
in 1921.7 The Caucasus has been a theatre of war where the proxy
involvement of the US and NATO has been encouraging the ethnic conflicts
to marginalize Russian influence in the region. According to Nazemroaya,
these conflicts are amongst Georgia, Russia and the breakaway states of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia; and also amongst Azerbaijan, Armenia and
Nagorno-Karabakh. Additionally, the discords and hostilities between the
Russian Federation and its separatist movements in Chechnya and Dagestan
have added more complexity to the security landscape of the Caucasus
region.
The Russo-Georgian War of 2008 has been the most critical
conflict in the Caucasus over the breakaway states of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia. It was a proxy war in which Georgia was furthering the US
agenda in Eurasia. Notwithstanding the reality that Georgia was not a
member of the NATO alliance and Russia was very sensitive about
Georgia, NATO started to integrate the Georgian air defence system, and
provide intelligence and reconnaissance support to Georgia regarding
Russian war preparations.8 The US had also planned to use Georgian bases
to strike Iran.9 The Russian position in South Ossetia and Abkhazia was
essentially aimed at preventing Georgia from joining NATO alliance as this
move could have caused serious implications for the security of the Russian
Federation. The Russian military attacked the same military bases to give a
strong message to Georgia.10 In August 2010, Russia concluded a military-
agreement with Armenia in August 2010 which extended Russia the
capability of using Armenia as a launching-pad for its military operations
against Georgia and Azerbaijan; thus making the Caucasus front susceptible
to many future crises.11
Similarly Russia considered the creation of GUUAM (Georgia,
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova) as a „Trojan Horse‟ within
the Commonwealth of Independent States. The inclusion of Ukraine by the
UN Security Council in a group of countries to help solve the Abkhazian

7
Ibid.
8
Michael Evans, “Georgia Linked to NATO Early Warning System,” Times (UK),
September 5, 2008.
9
“US to Deploy Army Bases in Georgia to Rearm Nation‟s Army,” Pravda (Moscow),
September 24, 2009.
10
Arnaud de Borchgrave, September 9, 2008 “Commentary: Israel of the
Caucasus,” United Press International, (accessed April 13, 2013),
http://www.upi.com/Emerging_Threats/2008/09/09/Commentary-Israel-of-the-
Caucasus/UPI-91561220360400/
11
Ibid.
42 New Great Game and Limits of American Power

conflict, and EU‟s attempt for a fast-track economic and political

integration of Ukraine with EU accentuated Russia‟s security concern in the
Caucasus. On the face value Russia may not appear to be too opposed to
Ukraine‟s sovereign choice of closer relations with the EU but the former
would detest and attempt to frustrate any design that could lead to Ukraine
becoming a NATO member or a part of the „Silk Route Strategy‟ or forging
economic integration with the EU at the cost of Russian economy;
particularly oil and gas sector.12 That explains why the Ukraine government
under President Viktor F. Yanukovich (now deposed) has ditched the plans
to sign a number of far-reaching political and trade accords with EU,
embarrassing the German Chancellor and others at the Summit held on
November 28, 2013 at Vilnius, Lithuania.13 Such scuttling of accords
resulted in civil riots in the Ukrainian Capital that spoke of pro-EU
sentiments of the general public but it also unambiguously reflected the
leverages that Russia still exercises over Ukraine‟s sovereign choices.
Coincident to the Ukraine‟s scuttling of accords with EU, Russia‟s
declaration of deployment of its nuclear short range ballistic missile on its
western border with NATO has probably poised Russia as an „Old New
Adversary‟ in the calculus of European security.14

Rivalry in Central Asia

Central Asia is a core-region of Asia whose northern-extent is generally
taken up to Russia; western-extent to the Caspian Sea; eastern-extent up to
China; and Afghanistan in the South. There is not a single definition of
Central Asia that is universally accepted. The modern definition includes:
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and in
still broader sense: Afghanistan, Northeast Iran, Northern Pakistan,
Mongolia; and sometimes Xinjiang and Tibet in Western part of China, and
Southern Siberia in Eastern Russia are also included in Central Asia.15
Central Asia also has huge reserves of oil, natural-gas and minerals
which are comparable to those of the Middle East. Central Asia is situated

12
“Ukraine Parliament Rejects Tymoshenko Laws, Putting EU Deal at Stake,”
Voice of Russia UK, November 29, 2013, (accessed December 18, 2013),
http://voiceofrussia.com/uk/news/2013_11_21/Ukraine-parliament-rejects-
Tymoshenko-laws-putting-EU-deal-at-stake-4714/
13
David M. Herszenhorn, Ukraine Faces EU‟s Dismay on Turnabout on Accords,
New York Times, November 29, 2013.
14
Andrew Roth, “Deployment of Missiles Is Confirmed by Russia,” The New York
Times Europe Ed, December 16, 2013.
15
Encyclopaedia Britannica, (2013) ed., s.v. “Central Asia.”
Naveed Khaliq Ansaree 43

at the heart and geo-strategic fulcrum of Eurasia which is next to China,

Russia, Iran, the Caspian Sea and the South Asian Subcontinent. Central
Asia is a strategic-region which could be adroitly used to create a wedge
between the major Eurasian powers, and also to set up a launching platform
for undertaking military operations in Eurasia.16 The control over Central
Asia would have serious security implications for the US-EU contention
with Russia over the security of energy routes, particularly for the security
of the trans-Eurasian energy corridor that extends from the Caspian Sea
Basin and Persian Gulf to China; and also for the project of „New Silk
Road‟ that promises to connect East Asia, Middle East and Eastern part of
Europe.17
Although the US invaded Afghanistan on the pre-text of 9/11
terrorist attack but a number of strategic thinkers consider that the US was
mainly interested to establish a military foothold and a base of operations in
Central Asia which would have extended several strategic advantages to the
US, such as: isolation of Iran, prevention of building of pipelines from Iran,
controlling the flow of energy from Central Asia, creating a wedge amongst
the Eurasians and also weakening their strategic dependence and linkage
with Russia and, above all, the strategic containment of China.18 Any US
military adventurism in the Middle East, such as strike against Iran or any
Libya-style military intervention in Syria is fraught with danger of
spreading the conflict to Central Asia.19
However, with the announced withdrawal of US and NATO forces
from Afghanistan in 2014, the danger of a wider conflict has lessened to an
extent but the danger of an intra-state conflict has increased when viewed in
the context of the „Blackwill Plan‟ that advocated a „nation-building
approach‟ in Northern Afghanistan and „counterterrorism-approach‟ in
Southern/Eastern Afghanistan. Such dichotomy and discrimination in the
two strategic-approaches meant „partitioning of Afghanistan‟ and creating
heart-burns amongst regional stake-holders, especially Pakistan.20

16
Nazemroaya, “The US-NATO March to War...,”
17
MK Bhadrakumar, “Pakistan Gets a Cuddle and a Hug,” Daily Times (Karachi),
June 2, 2012.
18
Zbigniew Brzezinski, quoted in Bates Gill and Matthew Oresman, China’s New
Journey to the West: China’s Emergence in Central Asia and Implications for US
Interests (Washington: Centre for Strategic and International Studies Press,
August 2003), v.
19
Ibid.
20
Alexei Pilko, August 4, 2011, “The Afghanistan Factor and the Debt Ceiling
Crisis,” Global Research Canada, (accessed April 13, 2013),
44 New Great Game and Limits of American Power

Additionally, the impact of 12-14 years of strong US-NATO military

presence in Afghanistan and the creation of a pro-western elite — a
powerful segment of Afghan society and Afghan National Army — would
continue to accentuate north-south divide in Afghanistan to the strategic
advantage of the US at least in the near future.
With the conclusion of the nuclear deal with Iran in the third week of
November, 2013 and endorsement of US-Afghanistan Security Agreement by
the Afghan Loya Jirga on November 25, 2013 (almost concurrent time-frame),
the security implications for the region (particularly for Pakistan and
Afghanistan) have increased substantially. There seems to be some tacit
understanding or conclusion of a „secret-deal‟ between Iran and the US for the
accommodation/facilitation of US-NATO‟s security interests in Afghanistan to
the disadvantage of Pakistan, China and Russia. The timing of the two strategic
developments suggests that Iran, in the bargain of the said nuclear deal, might
have used its influence over the Loya Jirga delegates (those sympathetic to
Iran) in favour of the US, and might also have agreed to provide an alternate
safe exit route to US-NATO forces scheduled to be withdrawn in 2014
onwards. US-NATO were desperately looking for an alternative route,
especially in the face of growing uncertainty about the availability of safe exit
through Pakistan after the killing of Hakim-ullah Mahsood (head of Tehreek-e-
Taliban Pakistan), differences with Pakistan over drone-strikes and closure of
NATO supplies by the provincial government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
Similarly, the danger of GWOT turning into a Drug War or US-NATO led
anti-narcotics operation is still looming large over the region; an emerging
security concern, particularly for the Russian Federation.

Rivalry in Wider Middle East

The Middle East, according to the most conservative definition, is a region
that is generally considered to be bounded by Egypt in the West, Arab
Peninsula in the South and Iran in the East.21 However, an extended view of
the Middle East would include the region up to Mauritania in West-Africa
as well as the North-African member countries of the Arab League and to

http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-afghanistan-factor-and-the-debt-ceiling-
crisis/25895
21
“What is Middle East?” Teach Mideast, Middle East Policy Council (US),
http://www.teachmideast.org/essays/27-geography/51-what-is-the-middle-east
Middle East is a geographical point of reference coined by British Foreign
Service at the end 19th century.
Naveed Khaliq Ansaree 45

the East it could go as far as Pakistan.22 There are wide disagreements as to

the geographical boundaries of the Middle East but there is general
consensus that the Middle East includes the following states: Saudi Arabia,
United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Syria, Iraq, Iran,
Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Palestinian Territories, Egypt and Yemen.23
It is the energy hub of world-economy and the most important
region due to strategically vital choke points of the Straits of Hurmuz, Suez
Canal and Bab al-Mandeb. According to Tristam, the Middle East is the
birth-place of major religions; such as Islam, Christianity and Judaism;
therefore, religion is at the very heart of turmoil in the region, particularly
the long outstanding Palestine-Israeli conflict. The Middle East is also a
fundamental pillar of US strategy in the world. Its control extends strategic
leverages to the US and its allies to contain and manage China which is
considered to be the main architect of the opposition and resistance to the
US and NATO efforts.24
The Middle East has been marred by continuous conflicts and wars
involving extra-regional players for the last four decades, particularly after
the Gulf War of 1990. The Palestinian Territories, Iraq, Lebanon and
Yemen have become the festering fault lines. After the failed Israeli
adventure in Lebanon of 2006, the US and NATO started supplying
massive arms and attempted to shape a „Coalition of the Moderate‟ (a
NATO-like military alliance) against Iran and Syria.25 Support was also
extended to the Palestinian groups that were under control of Mohammed
Dahlan in the Gaza-Strip and Mahmood Abbas in West-Bank. Israel or its
lobbyists did not object to the weapons-deals that the US concluded with
Saudi Arabia against Iran and Syria.26 That also explains as to why Iran,
Syria and the Middle East have become the crucial elements of Russia and
China‟s counter-strategy to frustrate US-NATO designs for the trans-
continental encirclement of Russia and China.

22
Pierre Tristam, “What is Middle East,” About.com Middle East Issues, (accessed
April 22, 2012), http://middleeast.about.com/od/middleeast101/f/me080208.htm.
23
Ibid. A number of experts also consider Turkey in the Middle East; along with
Morocco, Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia; and also Sudan mainly due to its
significant Arabic-speaking and Muslim population.
24
Nazemroaya, “The US-NATO March to War...,”
25
William M. Arkin, “A New Mideast Military Alliance,” Washington Post, July 31,
2007. The Coalition of the Moderate meant: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain,
Oman, Qatar, UAE, Egypt and Jordan.
26
Anthony H. Cordesman, The Saudi Arms Sale: Reinforcing a Strategic
Partnership in the Gulf (Washington DC: Centre for Strategic and International
Studies Press, November 3, 2010), 3.
46 New Great Game and Limits of American Power

Israel used to consider its relations with Egypt as a „cornerstone‟ in its

calculus of national security. However, Egyptian geo-political posture and
orientation had undergone substantial transformation under President
Mohammed Morsi (Muslim Brotherhood Party) who was trying to carve a
wider but more independent role for Egypt as evident from his refusal to the
US to strike the Iranian warship carrying weapons through Suez and his
visit to Iran to attend the NAM meeting on August 30, 2012.27 He also
surprised the world by condemning Syria‟s oppressive measures and calling
for effective intervention.28 Egypt‟s strategic leaning and changed foreign
policy were likely to create serious challenges for the US, EU and
particularly, Israel. Within a span of a year, Morsi Government (though
democratically elected) became unacceptable to the US, EU and Israel, and
therefore it was toppled in a coup by the Egyptian Army on July 03, 2013
supposedly with the tacit support and acceptance by the US, UK and Israel
etc.29
Yemen had been a new frontline in the New Great Game rivalry. It is
geo-strategically situated at the Red Sea and the southern-most edge of the
Arabian Peninsula, overseeing the most vital sea lines of communication for
international shipping and trade. However, Qatar and Oman have been
following flexible foreign policies. The two states have been acting as
mediators between the Resistance-Bloc and Iran as well as between the
Coalition-of-the-Moderate and the US.30 According to Nazemroaya, Turkey
has also made accords with Syria, Lebanon, Iran as well as Russia which
appear to be an attempt on the part of Turkey to draw the region towards the
formation of a common-market and political-community. Iran has been
making determined efforts with its regional allies and sympathizer groups to
shape a “Resistance Bloc” in the Middle East to oppose US-NATO-Israeli
nexus, which has instituted a layer of insulation for China and Russia and
slowed down US-NATO‟s advance into Eurasia.31
The events of the last few years in Yemen, Sudan, Somalia, East
African Community and Libya are also reflective of the New Great Game

27
“Egypt Allows Iranian Warship through Suez Despite US Objection,” World Tribune
(US), August 27, 2012.
28
Brian Whitaker and Haroon Siddique, “Syria Crisis: Assad Regime Oppressive,
Says Morsi,” Guardian (UK), August 30, 2012.
29
Toby Helm and Martin Chulov, “Egyptian Army Had No Choice Over Move to
Topple Morsi, Says Tony Blair,” Guardian (UK), July 6, 2013.
30
Nazemroaya, “The US-NATO March to War...,”
31
Ibid. Resistance Block is a loose grouping of Iran, Syria, Iraq, Sudan, and like-
minded resistance groups in Yemen, Gaza and Lebanon; particularly Hezbollah,
Shiites and those resisting Israel, US & allies.
Naveed Khaliq Ansaree 47

being played on the chessboard of the global energy rivalry, strategic choke
points and waterways in the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa.
Therefore, the geo-political and geo-strategic developments in East Africa
have tremendous impact on the Middle Eastern situation. East Africa is
usually referred to as a region comprising Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda.32
However; in the broader geo-political view, the countries of Burundi,
Rwanda, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia (including Somaliland) and
South Sudan are also included in East Africa.33 The East African
Community (EAC) is an organization comprising: Kenya, Tanzania,
Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda.34 South Sudan which seceded from Sudan in
2011 is keenly awaited by EAC to become its full member whereas the
mother-Sudan is considered ineligible.35
The East African region has been a theatre of competitions and
colonization between the European nations and has also endured many civil
wars, genocides and bloody conflicts during the period of 19th and 20th
centuries.36 It is once again witnessing a Great-game rivalry between the
opposing camps. Over the period of the last decade, China has developed
vital economic and energy security stakes in Sudan, Libya and elsewhere.
The US-NATO strategy aims to set up a strategic choke point for the sea
lines of communication passing through the Horn of Africa, exercise geo-
strategic or military leverage over the region and thus prevent China from
consolidating any meaningful access to the energy resources of East Africa.
To justify the permanent presence of the US and NATO naval forces in the
Horn of Africa, Yemen and off-East African coast, Western powers seem to
have been fostering/overplaying the piracy issue in the region. Russia,

32
Merriam-Webster's Geographical Dictionary, 3rd ed. (US: Merriam-Webster
Inc., 2001), s. v. “East Africa,” 339. EAC comprises: Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda,
Burundi and Rwanda.
33
Ibid.
34
Susan Sannyiel Pannchol, “East Africa: Parliament Urges Community to Reject
Khartoum Application,” Citizen (Juba), February 29, 2012.
35
Ibid. Sudan‟s membership is opposed by Tanzania and Uganda on the grounds
of human-rights record and its past hostility with South Sudan-a candidate
country. In my view, such opposition is due to opposing geo-political
orientation and difference in religious outlook between Sudan and South Sudan.
36
“East Africa,” Wikipedia, (accessed April 11, 2013),
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/East_Africa, The conflicts in East Africa include:
Zanzibar Revolution (1964), Genocide of Hutus (1972), Uganda-Tanzania War
(1978-1979), Ugandan Bush War (1981-1986), Rwandan Civil War (1990-1993),
Genocide of Tutsis (1993), Burundi Civil War (1993-2005), and Lord's Resistance
Army insurgency in Uganda, South Sudan and Congo and others.
48 New Great Game and Limits of American Power

China and Iran have also positioned their warships in the strategic
waterways to counter or mitigate the strategic ill-effects of US-NATO‟s
military presence, primarily on the pretext of anti-piracy and maritime
security missions.37
The Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006 was not only
synchronized with that of the US but it took place at a time when the
Islamic Courts Union (ICU) was about to strike a lasting peace in the entire
Somalia.38 The peace talks were sabotaged by Ethiopia on the behest of the
US.39 The ICU Government was overthrown and a corrupt, unpopular and
Western puppet government (STG) was installed instead. The ICU invasion
was justified by the US and NATO as well as by Britain, Ethiopia and the
STG on the grounds of war on terror and al Qaeda.40 Now Somalia is a
divided country governed by the gangs of militias, pirates and Islamist
Mujahedeen group (Harkat Al-Shabaab etc) which could be compared to
the pre-2001 Taliban in Afghanistan.41 Besides the US, EU and NATO‟s
adventures, Israel had also been prodding and supporting the separatists
groups in Darfur and Southern Sudan.42 Sudan has been enhancing its
relations with the Middle East, particularly with Iran and Syria — the vital

37
Atul Aneja, “Iran, China will Begin Counter-Piracy Patrols,” Hindu (New
Delhi), December 22, 2008; “Russia, China Conduct Anti-piracy Exercises in
Gulf of Aden,” September 18, 2009, RIANOVOSTI (accessed April 11, 2013),
http://en.rian.ru/world/20090918/156174185.html
38
Suzanne Goldenberg and Xan Rice, “How the US Forged an Alliance with
Ethiopia over Invasion,” Guardian (UK) January 13, 2007. The ICU
Government was overthrown; and instead a corrupt-puppet Government (STG)
was installed. The invasion was justified by US, Britain, NATO, Ethiopia, and
STG on the grounds of GWOT and al Qaeda. Now Somalia is a divided country
governed by the gangs of militias, pirates and Islamist group which could be
compared to pre-2001 Taliban in Afghanistan.
39
“Ethiopia Destroyed Somalia Peace Talks: Speaker,” January 13, 2007, Garowe
Online News, (accessed April 11, 2013),
http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/
Ethiopia_destroyed_Somalia_peace_talks_Speaker_7068_printer.shtml
40
Goldenberg & Rice, “How the US forged an Alliance...,”
41
Nazemroaya, “The US-NATO March to War...,”
42
“Sudan‟s SPLM Reportedly Opens an Office in Israel: Statement,” Sudan
Tribune, March 5, 2008. Israel had allowed Sudan‟s opposition groups to open
diplomatic offices in Tel Aviv. Israeli weapons had been entering South Sudan in
addition to the ones from Kenyan territories. Sudan People‟s Liberation
Movement (SPLM) in Southern Sudan had also been funnelling weapons to the
militias in Darfur.
Naveed Khaliq Ansaree 49

pillars of the “Resistance Bloc”.43 Therefore, the events in East Africa have
been driven by the global quest for the energy resources of East Africa and
for the control of Eurasia.
Libya, strategically situated on the Mediterranean, oversees the
strategic island of Malta and the proximities of Italy. The Libyan War of
2011 was one of the most shocking events of modern history, viewed in the
backdrop of the „Arab Spring‟ and events in East African Community,
Sudan, Somalia and Yemen. The War has long-term implications for the
entire African continent (54 states) as well as for the geo-strategic
orientation for the part of the Great game being played in Africa and the
Middle East.44 Amongst other reasons, Gaddafi was intending to create an
African Union; nationalize foreign oil companies; invite Russian, Chinese
and Indian oil companies to make up for the loss in Libyan oil production;
and above all carry out trade in oil, raw materials and gold which implied
devastating consequences for the US and Western economies.45 Gaddafi
had been an outspoken critic and supporter of the Palestinian cause.
The holy triumvirate: the US, NATO and EU found in the „Arab
Spring‟ a much awaited opportunity and strategic space for shaping the
international environment needed for the Libya War. According to William
Blum: “Holy Triumvirate, literally can do whatever it wants in the world, to
whomever it wants, for as long as it wants, and call it whatever it wants, like
„humanitarian‟.”46 Blum says, Holy Triumvirate succeeded in getting the UN
mandate for military intervention in Libya after Russia and China chose to
abstain instead of exercising their veto power despite the fact that China had
huge economic and strategic stakes in Libya and Sudan‟s energy and the
construction sectors. The dreadful events that followed the Libya-intervention

43
Mohammed Ali Saeed, “Sudan VP Vows Resistance to UN Peacekeepers,” Agence
France-Presse, September 1, 2006. Sudanese leaders have been admiring
“Hezbollah” as a model of resistance for Sudan and pledged to offer fierce resistance
to US, NATO and other extra-regional forces if they ever entered in Sudan.
44
The US was upset since 1969 as closure of its base by Gaddafi left US to rely
only on Djibouti in East Africa; and when most of the African countries flatly
refused the US to establish its African Command (AFRICOM). US had to
retain AFRICOM HQ in Stuttgart, Germany. Similarly, France was also upset as
its influence had eroded in its former colonies in Africa, partly on Gaddafi‟s
inducement.
45
William Blum, “Real World Motives for Libya War,” Consortium for
Independent Journalism (US, Virginia), September 1, 2011, (accessed April,
2013), http://consortiumnews.com/2011/09/01/real-world-motives-for-libya-
war/A similar adventure by Saddam Hussein led to Gulf War.
46
Ibid. William Blum refers US, NATO and EU as „Holy Triumvirate‟ as he
considers that the Holy Alliance recognizes no higher power and believes.
50 New Great Game and Limits of American Power

proved William Blum was right.47 The cold-blooded murder of Gaddafi and
public humiliation of his dead body came full circle haunting when on the eve of
9/11 anniversary in 2012, US ambassador to Libya, Chris Steven along with
three co-workers was brutally murdered (like Gaddafi). It shocked the US,
proving that the „blow-back‟ of US policies is real and simmering in Libya.48
The Syrian civil war-like situation did open a window of opportunity
for the Western powers to push for overthrowing the Assad-regime or
demand for a „reformed and power-sharing regime‟; which meant a Libyan-
style war was about to be imposed on Damascus.49 Russia and China started
flexing their muscles at the Western powers and sending a political-message
of “an unequivocal „No‟ to the bombing of Iran and an unambiguous „No‟
to a regime-change in Syria through a Libyan-style bombing.”50
Nevertheless, both Russia and China were in great strategic difficulty to
continue supporting the Assad-regime.
However, Russia recently played a trump card with the US and UN.
As the consequence of the Russian initiative, UNSC adopted a Resolution
2118 (2013) on September 27, 2013 on the „Scheduled Destruction of
Syria‟s Chemical Weapons‟51 which does not authorize automatic punitive
military strikes or other measures/ sanctions under Chapter-VII if Syria did
not comply. On the contrary and at Russia‟s insistence, the Resolution
makes it very clear that a second UNSC Resolution would be needed to
authorize punitive military strikes or sanctions.52 The Russian initiative and
the UNSC Resolution have immense strategic implications for the Middle
East. In the short term, it did provide a face-saving option for the US camp

47
Triumvirate supported radical Islamist groups including that of Libyan rebel
leader (Abdel-Hakim al-Hasidi) who had claimed to have fought against the
allied forces in Iraq. Libyan infrastructure and the society were torn apart, and
Libya was literally turned into killing fields for the Triumvirate-funded-
supported-armed rebels and mercenaries that led to cold-blooded murder of
Gaddafi and his family.
48
Pepe Escobar, “Mr Blowback Rising in Benghazi,” Daily Times (Karachi),
September 14, 2012.
49
Patrick Cockburn, “Why War is Marching on the Road to Damascus,” Daily Times
(Karachi), June 4, 2012.
50
Brendan O‟ Reilly, “China and Russia Flex Muscle at the West,” Daily Times
(Karachi), June 7, 2012.
51
UN Security Council, “Scheduled Destruction of Syria‟s Chemical Weapons,”
UNSC Resolution No 2118 (2013), September 27, 2013
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc11135.doc.htm
52
Steve Wilson, “UN Security Council Votes to Adopt Resolution Demanding
Destruction of Syria's Chemical Weapons,” Telegraph (UK), November 28,
2013.
Naveed Khaliq Ansaree 51

to climb down from the brink of imminent Syrian war which the US
economy could have ill-afforded under the on-going „economic shutdown‟.
The deal has yielded to Russia more strategic and dominant space to
manoeuvre in the Syrian situation as well as to influence the future events
in the Middle East besides impinging upon the image and credibility of US
as the sole super power.
For Syria, the use of chemical weapons in any future conflict had
almost become untenable and it could now have them destroyed free of cost
by the US & UN etc. Moreover, in the long term, it would also bring Israel
under tremendous international pressure for dismantling its chemical
programme, if any, and find diminishing international support on the „bogey
of Syrian threat to Israel‟s security‟. So, for the time being at least, a
disastrous conflict getting triggered in the Middle East is under a strategic
pause.
The US reversal over the Syrian situation has also caused (probably
irreversible) fissures and discords with Saudi Arabia over and above the
strategic set-back caused by the US-Iran nuclear deal. The prospects of a
foreign abetted and home grown instability now look like staring the Saudi
monarchy in the face. Iran is likely to fully exploit (beyond anyone‟s
expectation) the window of opportunity just dawned, and revitalize its
decaying elements of national and regional power to secure heightened
influence and mantle in the region. Iran could attempt to trap the US into
the latter‟s strategic dependence on Iran for the safe withdrawal of US-
NATO forces as well as for the cost-effective sustenance of US forces in
Afghanistan beyond 2014. It is not unlikely Iran could spring many surprise
in the space it has recently acquired through the nuclear deal.

Rivalry in South Asia and Indian Ocean

The US-NATO scheme of operation in South Asia on the shores of the
Indian Ocean is aimed at controlling the vital sea lines of communication
and preventing the establishment of a secure energy route to China.
Therefore, India and Pakistan are vital pillars of the US-NATO Great Game
but for different reasons. India is being set up as a counterweight to China
and a strategic pillar of the US-NATO‟s „Contain China Strategy‟.53
According to Aiyar, such strategy is evident from the US-India Civilian
Nuclear Cooperation Treaty (2006), NATO Summit (2010) in Lisbon

53
Pallavi Aiyar, “NATO Asks for Dialogue with India,” Business Standard (Delhi),
November 24, 2010. US used the same strategy in the Middle East during the
Iraq-Iran War; and Great Britain employed it between various European powers
in the European continent.
52 New Great Game and Limits of American Power

calling for military and security dialogue with New Delhi, and a fast
growing India‟s strategic nexus with the US, NATO, Japan and Australia.
India's successful launch of a 5000 km-range nuclear capable missile (April
2012) did not invite any criticism from the US.54 The US has also been
accused of stoking disturbances in Xinjiang and Tibet to weaken China and
thus make securing of the “energy corridor” for China untenable.
Pakistan has been the key to the success and sustenance of the US-
NATO mission in Afghanistan and would play the same role in their exit
strategy yet the West by and large has been unhelpful as far as Pakistan‟s
stability is concerned. It has tried to create a wedge between Iran and
Pakistan by aiding certain extremist groups to launch terrorist attacks in
Iran from Pakistani territories. The strategic aim of such activities has been
to paint Pakistan as a failed state, roll back its nuclear programme and
thwart establishment of a secure energy corridor with China. The case in
point is the adoption of a resolution on Balochistan by the US Congress on
February 12, 2012. The resolution stated: “Balochistan is currently divided
between Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan; and that the Balochi nation had a
historic right to self-determination."55 Such security concerns and
destabilization dynamics have pushed Pakistan strategically closer to China
and compelled it to explore strategic partnership with Russia, both at the
same time.56
China, now, is well poised to further its economic interests in
Afghanistan and South Asia at a faster pace. Building of railway in Tibet
and construction of 38-gigawatt dam on the great-bend of River
Brahmaputra in Tibet are the indicators of Chinese strategic mindset for the
region and have also provided impetus to the rivalry between China and
India. Yet another heartburn for India has been the support from Russia and
China to help Sri Lanka decisively defeat the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Elam (LTTE), and also to facilitate its joining of SCO as an „associate
member‟ (like Belarus).

54
Robert D Kaplan, April 25, 2012, “The India-China Rivalry,” Stratfor Global
Intelligence (US, Austin), (accessed April 11, 2013),
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/india-china-rivalry
55
Chidan and Rajghatta, “Balochistan Resolution in US Congress Draws Pakistan
Crazy,” Times of India, February 18, 2012. The resolution on Balochistan was
moved by the US Republican Congressmen Dana Rohrabacher (California), Louie
Gohmert (Texas) and Steve King (Iowa) in US Congress.
56
Bhadrakumar, “Pakistan Gets a Cuddle and a Hug...” Russian and Chinese Foreign
Ministers visited Pakistan in the last week of May 2012 i.e. A Cuddle from China
and a Hug from Russia, both at the same time.
Naveed Khaliq Ansaree 53

China is also developing several ports in Kenya, Myanmar,

Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan to safeguard its energy security and
other maritime interests in the Indian Ocean. Pakistan has recently handed-
over the re-development work and operational control of Gwadar port to
China which has long-term strategic and economic implications as it is
located at the mouth of energy-rich Arabian Gulf.57 Similarly, China has
reportedly signed a deal in February 2013 to sell Pakistan a new nuclear
reactor with the capacity of 1000 MW.58 Such developments have brought
the Great Game counter-struggle in South Asia and Indian Ocean, i.e. to
India‟s backyard.
In the beginning of 2013, there appeared to be some strategic shift in
the US policy towards Pakistan which indicated some accommodation and
acceptance of Pakistan‟s strategic interests in Afghanistan, albeit to the
great distaste of India. Pakistan had also released from its custody some of
the key Taliban leaders to facilitate dialogue between the US and Taliban
etc. It was expected that in the post withdrawal scenario, Pakistan could
have exercised better leverages, a fair accommodation of its interests in
Afghanistan, managed the implications of North-South divide in
Afghanistan and finally secured relative peace for its people.
Similarly, when former Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari and his
Irani Counterpart Mahmoud Ahmedinejad jointly launched the construction
of US$ 7.5 billion Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline on March 11, 2013 in the face
of US opposition and threat of economic sanctions,59 mistrust and
apprehensions between Iran and Pakistan got alleviated to a meaningful
extent. Launching of such project also reflected an element of „strategic
defiance‟ in Pakistan‟s posture towards the US; and above all it had sent a
message to energy-starved India of the advantages of energy independence
from US-dictated solutions.
With the conclusion of US-Iran nuclear deal and consequent lifting of
petroleum related sanctions, Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline has become a
realizable project but contrary to expectations Iran has cancelled the loan of
US$ 500 million that it had earlier committed to Pakistan in 2014 for the

57
Jason Webb, “Pakistan Hands over Management of Strategic Gwadar Port to
China,” Reuters, Feb 18, 2013.
58
Jeff M. Smith, “China and Pakistan‟s Nuclear Collusion,” Wall Street Journal, April
2, 2013.
59
AFP and Reuter, “Pakistan Risks US Sanctions over Iran Pipeline,” Dawn
(Karachi), March 12, 2013.
54 New Great Game and Limits of American Power

construction of the gas pipeline.60 Pakistan has to correctly read the US-Iran
thaw and its implications particularly with reference to the situation in
Balochistan.
In the shifting playing fields of the New Great Game particularly in
the wake of US-NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan could again
find itself relegated to the „part of the problem‟ rather than „part of the
solution‟. The internal security threat to Pakistan from Afghanistan could
increase manifold. Pakistan has to carefully watch the developments in
Afghanistan, and pro-actively put in operation a well orchestrated strategy
to create more diplomatic space, make best use of any window of
opportunity that may open and forge closer relations with China and Russia.

Rivalry in Asia-Pacific and South China Sea

Asia-Pacific is an extremely complex theatre of the new Great Game where
the US doctrine of „Preventive Diplomacy and Strategic Pivot‟61 is seriously
conflicting with China‟s „Peaceful Rise and East Asia Strategy‟. This new
Great-Game rivalry is fast taking dangerous shape in the regions of
Southeast Asia, East Asia and South China Sea; which together with the
flash-points of Taiwan and North Korea are pushing the Asia-Pacific
towards military confrontation and armed conflicts. According to Lee, US‟s
„Return to Asia‟ notion is primarily shaped around a security paradigm that
seeks to frame China as an arrogant, aggressive and destabilizing presence
in the region. In the words of Brzezinski: “China is an unfinished business;
the US and NATO march to war will ultimately lead to East Asia and the
borders of the Chinese.”62
Southeast Asia includes the countries that are located south of China,
north of Australia, east of India and west of New Guinea. The most important
Southeast Asian countries are: Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore,
Brunei, Philippines, Myanmar, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and East Timor etc.
East Asia, geographically, is a sub-region of Asia that comprises China
(including Hong Kong and Macau), Taiwan, Mongolia, Japan, North Korea and
South Korea. However; in economic and business references, East Asia is
usually referred to the ten countries of the ASEAN, China, Taiwan, Japan and

60
“Iran Cancels Pakistan Gas Pipeline Loan,” News International (Karachi),
December 14, 2013.
61
Peter Lee, “May be War with China isn‟t so Far off,” Asia Times (Hong Kong),
December 22, 2011.
62
Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Geo-Strategic Triad: Living with China, Europe, and
Russia. (Washington DC: Centre for Strategic and International Studies Press,
2000), 5.
Naveed Khaliq Ansaree 55

South Korea. South China Sea is a sub-part of the Pacific Ocean; extending
from the Straits of Taiwan to the Malacca Straits.
The US has a number of security alliances in Asia Pacific which have
several axes with competing or confronting dialectics, such as: US-Japan
axis, US-Singapore-India-Japan axis and US-Japan-India-Australia axis etc.
The US has recently strengthened its security affairs with Indonesia,
Malaysia, Brunei, Thailand and Vietnam, and has also reached several
military accords and agreements with the Philippines, Singapore and
Australia.63 The Philippines which is another pillar of the US „Preventive
Diplomacy‟ in Southeast Asia has re-allowed the US in November 2002 to
store military equipment, and also deploy drones to pursue its GWOT.
Similarly, in January 2012, the Philippines has made military agreements
that would allow the US a “rotating” and “frequent” presence. The US-
Taiwan military relations are growing stronger; thus strategically
threatening the Chinese sea lines of communication passing through South
China Sea. But then Taiwan‟s new leadership is opening up to the mainland
and their commerce is growing.
In June 2012, Vietnam sent a strong signal to China by hosting a red-
carpet visit of US Defence Secretary, Leon Panetta, on Cam Ranh Bay
which during the Vietnam War was one of the biggest US military bases
abroad.64 During the visit Panetta while pursuing the US‟s „Return to Asia‟
policy said, “Make no mistake…US military is rebalancing and brings
enhanced capabilities to this vital region.”65 According to Seth, the
enhanced capability would mean: deployment of 50-60 per cent of total US
naval forces including 6 aircraft carriers, Virginia-class submarines and
positioning of joint strike fighters. Therefore, the danger of a major conflict
is looming large in the Asia-Pacific, particularly in the South China Sea.
Similarly, the danger of local wars in South China Sea is also becoming
more real.
ASEAN is a very active forum of 10 members.66 The Treaty of Amity
and Cooperation‟ is a mandatory (but crafty) requirement which has helped

63
Rajan, East Asia Integration — China‟s Reservations.
64
C. Raja Mohan, “Vietnam Welcomes Panetta: US Eyes Cam Ranh Bay,” Daily Times
(Karachi), June 5, 2012.
65
S.P. Seth, “Asia-Pacific‟s Great Power Game,” Daily Times (Karachi), June 13,
2012.
66
“ASEAN,” (accessed April, 2013), http://www.asean.org/2833.htm ASEAN
Members are: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Philippines, Brunei,
Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam with East Timor aspiring to become
11th one. In 2010, ASEAN reached a combined GDP up to US $ 1.8 trillion;
making it the 9th largest economy in the world.
56 New Great Game and Limits of American Power

ASEAN so far in curtailing the liberty of action of those seeking to advance

their interests through conflict and confrontation; thus maintaining a fine
power-balance in the region.67 The term ASEAN+1 refers to the addition of
China; ASEAN+3 refers to a forum comprising 10 ASEAN countries plus
China, South Korea and Japan; whereas ASEAN+6 refers to the addition of
Australia and New Zealand and India to ASEAN+3 grouping. APEC is a
forum or community whose member countries are limited to those that are
situated in the region of the Pacific-rim.68 With the US „Return to Asia‟
strategy, ASEAN would find it difficult to keep the region free of the armed
conflict. However, with diminishing relevance or credibility of the US‟s
new strategy, ASEAN countries would be constrained to look for regional-
cum-self-reliant security arrangements to face China‟s policies, particularly
in the South China Sea.
The East Asia Summit (EAS) is a forum of 18 members; most of
them have joined the forum for the fear of the other or prevent the other
from gaining undue advantage.69 EAS composition reveals that not only the
emerging regional powers (China and India) are now represented in the
EAS but it also includes the treaty-allies of the US, namely: Japan,
Australia, South Korea, Philippines and Thailand. There have been
competing and divergent viewpoints amongst ASEAN, China, India and the
US over the role of the EAS in community building and dealing with the
people-to-people connectivity and security issues.
Australia and New Zealand are the countries though located in the
East but have western orientation by virtue of their geography and colonial
history. They are important pillars of the US Asia-Pacific strategy and offer
great positional advantage to the US and its allies for pre-positioning
weapons and rotational forces to support operations in Asia-Pacific,
particularly in the Southeast Asia, East Asia and South China Sea. While
New Zealand has been trying to hedge or minimize its military
participation, Australia has usually been with US‟ game-plan for Asia-
Pacific.
Australia, despite being separated from mainland UK and
geographically and economically tied to the East, identifies itself more with
the West and maintains constitutional links with the Queen as that extends

67
Ibid. “Charter-Overview,” http://www.asean.org/64.htm
68
“EAS-World Model UN 2012,” (accessed April 11, 2013),
http://worldmun.org/upload/EAS_Update1.pdf
69 th
6 EAS (November, 2011) included: Australia, Brunei, Burma, China, Cambodia,
India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Russia,
Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, Vietnam and also the US.
Naveed Khaliq Ansaree 57

Australia the space and liberty of action needed to pursue its conflicting
national interests in the Asia-Pacific; and also benefit from its polygamous
ties with both Asia and the West:

 China is Australia‟s biggest trading partner whereas the US is

its closest strategic ally. Australia has been trying to balance
its grand strategic orientation by projecting itself as a bridge
between East and the West but actually it has been furthering
US and UK‟s interests in the region as a trusted strategic
partner.
 Australia has recently permitted the US to use the Australian
bases or set up its own in Brisbane, Perth, Darwin and Keeling
(Cocos Islands) in the Indian Ocean, apparently to deal with the
emerging Chinese threat.70
 In Australia, the opposition to China‟s investment in mining
and agricultural sector is growing popular. According to Seth,
such opposition is very dangerous as it could incite China to do
to Australia what Japan did to China and others during WW-II;
like Japan threatened Australia with invasion when the US
imposed a trade embargo on Japan which led to the Pacific
War.

Flash Points in Asia-Pacific

 North Korea is a flash-point that has divergent geo-political
and geo-strategic implications for the new Great Game rivalry
in the Asia-Pacific. North Korea has been a China‟s proxy that
continued to extend China an enhanced role and leverages in
the Six-party talks but apparently now becoming an „Achilles‟
Heel‟. North Korean grand-strategic orientation, its geo-
political character, and nuclear and missile programme have
enabled the United States to strengthen its security alliances
with South Korea and Japan, and also create justification for its
enhanced military foot-print in the Asia-Pacific; thus posing
real challenges to the Chinese strategy of „peaceful rise.‟ The
US is also building a missile-shield in Northeast Asia on the
pretext of shielding South Korea and Japan against the North
Korean nuclear and missile threat. Similarly, the „Sunshine

70
Jacob Zenn, “US Presence Evolves in Southeast Asia,” Asia Times (Hong
Kong), April 4, 2012.
58 New Great Game and Limits of American Power

Policy‟ of South Korea has so far failed to yield the intended

dividends or mitigate its vulnerability to North Korea‟s
brinkmanship due to geographical proximity. Is North Korea
becoming an „Achilles‟ Heel‟ for China or is it still a useful
China‟s proxy that helps keeping the security threat simmering
in the region and provide justification for the enhanced defence
spending? The resultant dynamics obviously calls for higher US
defence allocations for the Asia Pacific from which it can shy
away only at the cost of its credibility in the region.
 Taiwan could be a real flash-point but China has deliberately
been maintaining the status quo and regulating the „security
threat over Taiwan‟ as it provides China the liberty of action and
a sustainable justification for the modernization of its military.
Taiwan is the fruit China would allow to ripen and naturally fall
into its lap and would go to war only when the dialectic of
opposing wills and the grand-strategic dimensions of the conflict
are decisively tilted against China‟s core interests.
 US-Japan Security Alliance is another radix of insecurity for
China and a major thorn in the calculus of Asia-Pacific peace.
US military alliances in the region have formed several axes
with confronting dynamics and dialectics of wills. All such
axes pivot around Japan. Probably, China wants to keep alive
the „burden of history‟ with Japan so as to derive energy from
the Chinese nationalism and continue presenting itself as the
„victim‟. Chinese brinkmanship with Japan would most
probably continue until Chinese military grows to a formidable
strength and/or the US freedom of action and military threat
irreversibly recedes in South China Sea. The burden of history
between China and Japan could then fade away in the annals of
history; and the people could also forget as they have usually
short memories.
 South China Sea is also a fast-emerging flash point in the
region. It is a transit route of about one third of the global
shipping. Spratly and Paracel archipelagos are the two chains of
islands that are disputed amongst six countries of the region,
namely: China, Taiwan, Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and
Brunei; and China has marked nine red-dotted lines, i.e.
claiming around 75 per cent of the South China Sea.71 The Sea

71
Edward Wongs, “Beijing Warns US about South China Sea Disputes,” New York
Times, June 22, 2011.
Naveed Khaliq Ansaree 59

is also estimated to have huge oil and natural gas reserves.72

China calls it „Second Persian Gulf‟ as its crude-oil reserve is
estimated to be around 17.7 billion tons as compared to 13
billion tons of Kuwait; a quantity that is equivalent of China‟s
oil requirement for about 60 years; The Sea is also abundantly
rich in fishing resources.73 In early 2010, China had declared
South China Sea to be a core-interest at par with Taiwan and
Tibet and also made it a non-negotiable national-agenda.74
There have been a number of incidents where China has
asserted its claim by flexing its muscles by intercepting,
harassing or interfering with the rival vessels operating in the
disputed zones of South China Sea.75 An editorial of China‟s
Global Times cautioned the regional countries: “If these
countries do not want to change their ways with China, they
will need to prepare for the sounds of cannons. We need to be
ready for that, as it may be the only way for the disputes in the
sea to be resolved.”76 China has also declared an Air Defence
Identification Zone in East China Sea, particularly over Diaoyu
(Senkaku) islands and declared its intention to enforce it with
„emergency defensive measures‟.77 In the face of past tensions
with China over the said islands, Japan had already started to seek
defence and security relations with ASEAN countries, particularly

72
“South China Sea Oil and Natural Gas,” Global Security.Org (US, Virginia),
(accessed April 11, 2013),
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/spratly-oil.htm, The proven
oil reserves are about 7.5 billion barrels. Spratly and Paracel Islands could
contain 105 billion barrels of oil, and South China Sea could have 213 billion
barrels. US Geological Survey (1993/94) suggests 28 billion barrels. Chinese
estimates of natural gas resources 2,000 Tcf. The USGS estimates are 266 Tcf.
73
Ibid. In 1988, South China Sea accounted for about 8% of the total fishing
catches made in the world.
74
Susan V. Lawrence and Thomas Lum, January 12, 2011, “US-China Relations:
Policy Issues,” US Congressional Research Service, 4, (accessed Apr 11, 2013),
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41108_20110112.pdf
75
These incidents included: Vietnamese survey ships (26 May 2011); Norwegian-
flagged seismic ship hired by Vietnam (June 9, 2011); stand-off with
Philippines war ships (14-16 April 2012).
76
“Don‟t Take Peaceful Approach for Granted,” Global Times (China), October
25, 2011.
77
Tom Phillips (Shanghai) and Julian Ryall (Tokyo), “China Monitored US Flights
over Disputed Islands in East China Sea,” Telegraph (UK), November 27, 2013.
60 New Great Game and Limits of American Power

Vietnam and Philippines.78 Such nervousness in the region

indirectly benefits China both from the military and economic
perspectives. China‟s assertiveness here is pushing the regional
countries into intra-regional security arrangements instead of keep
relying on the US, an extra regional player.

Russia-China-Pakistan-Afghanistan-India Entanglement and the

Limits of American Power
Pursuing the New Great Game, the US had been shaping a global military
alliance and multi-national deployment of combined armed forces of more
than 40 countries for the last two decades; and has also developed the
wherewithal to undertake military operation from a number of military
bases located in more than 63 countries.79 The US-NATO-Israeli alliance
has also undertaken extensive stockpiling of weapons in places that are
strategically and militarily vital for supporting the Great Game. Another 21
members of „Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, ten Arab countries of the
„Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative‟, and several
non-NATO countries such as: South Korea, Japan, India, Singapore, Saudi
Arabia, Indonesia, Australia had been almost on board the US-NATO camp
in one way or the other. The world has been structured as a wide battlefield
to cater for „Pentagon‟s War without Borders or Obama‟s Long Wars‟.80
To undertake military operations across the globe, US military has
been organised in a structure of Unified Command. These commands are
named as USNORTHCOM, USSOUTHCOM, USEUCOM,
USCENTCOM, USPACCOM and their „Areas of Responsibility‟.81 This
structure shows Pentagon‟s ability and design to conduct military
operations across the globe, and also trigger and fight regional wars.
Regional commands are also entrusted with the responsibility to oversee
stockpiling of weapons, impart training and achieve inter-operability with
the allied armed forces. Similarly, Eurasian countries, particularly China,
Russia and Iran are continuing to divert significant resources towards the

78
AFP, “Japan Seeks Defence Ties with ASEAN amid China Rows,” Daily Times
(Karachi), March 14, 2013.
79
Jules Dufour, July 1, 2007, “The Worldwide Network of US Military Bases,”
Global Research, (accessed June 8, 2012),
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=5564).
80
Dufour, “Worldwide Network of US...,”
81
“Unified Command Plan-2011,” April 27, 2011,” US Department of Defence
(Washington), (accessed April 11, 2013),
http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2009/0109_unifiedcommand/
Naveed Khaliq Ansaree 61

development of new weapons, aircraft carriers, space weapons/ projects and

asymmetrical war tactics. China is also developing several ports in Myanmar,
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Kenya to mitigate its energy vulnerability
and vital shipping, particularly in the Straits of Malacca and South China Sea;
and also take its geo-strategic struggle to India‟s backyard.
Shaping of the global environment for a wider conflict was evident
from the themes that the US and Western media had played from time to
time. For quite some time Western media kept hammering Iran as an
„imminent danger to world peace‟. With the signing of US-Iran nuclear
deal, the talk of real and imminent danger has fizzled away. Similarly, in
the case of Syria as discussed above, a catastrophic war was called off from
the brink when Russia brokered a deal for the destruction of Syria‟s
chemical weapons.
At one point in time a major conflict looked so imminent that the
former Chinese Leader Hu Jintao had to warn Russia of the ‘Coming
American Great Event‟, and Russian President Putin had also to comment to
his top generals to „Prepare for Armageddon‟.82 Henry Kissinger (former US
Secretary of State and a renowned realist practitioner) is quoted to have said
in an interview: “If You Can‟t Hear the Drums of War: You May be Deaf.” 83
Although Kissinger‟s remark was only satirical but it was accurate enough to
reflect upon the mindset that had prevailed in his time and continues to
prevail even today amongst the US realist policy-makers and practitioners.
Nevertheless, since the later part of 2013, a major conflict does not
appear to be on the horizon, rather it is held at bay by the unfavourable
dynamics of drained US and Western economies, anti-war deterrence and
dialectics of opposing wills, such as: announced withdrawal of US-NATO
troops from Afghanistan in 2014, conclusion of deals for the destruction of
Syria‟s chemical weapons and also for Iran‟s nuclear programme, toning
down of war mongering by the Western media, less-aggressive US posture

82
Federal Security Services (FSB), “Russian Leader Tells Top Generals: Prepare
for Armageddon,” The European Union Times, October 6, 2011. FSB also cites
that the US plans for „Total Global War‟ were first revealed to China‟s Ministry
of State Security (MSS) by the former Black-Water mercenary Bryan
Underwood who was held by US authorities for spying as reported in EU Times
on October 4, 2011.
83
Alfred Heinz, “Henry Kissinger: If You Can‟t Hear the Drums of War You May
be Deaf,” Daily Squib (UK), November 27, 2011.
http://www.dailysquib.co.uk/world/3089-henry-kissinger-if-you-can-t-hear-the-
drums-of-war-you-must-be-deaf.html (accessed April 16, 2012). Heinz quotes
Kissinger to have said, “Control oil and you control nations; control food and
you control the people.”
62 New Great Game and Limits of American Power

on the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project and handing over of the

operational control of Gwadar port to China; and lately by the US offer for
the „full-spectrum revival of strategic alliance‟ during Pakistan‟s Prime
Minister‟s official visit to US on October 20-23, 2013.84
It may also be noted that the fulcrum of the New Great Game that
has been partly shifted to Asia-Pacific and South China Sea, has limited
prospects of success. The grand-strategic orientation of the US Camp in the
Asia-Pacific seems to be vulnerable especially in the light of North Korea‟s
nuclear test of February 2013 which has turned out to be a litmus test for
the will and capacity of the US war machine in the Korean peninsula. The
event might have been a ploy to create conditions for wearing down the US
military, bleed US, economy and eventually cause a re-coil of US
confrontationist posture in the Asia-Pacific. Similarly, China‟s recent
declaration and enforcement of Air Defence Identification Zone in East
China Sea by sending its war planes just a few days before the
commencement of the US Vice President‟s visit to China, Korea and Japan
starting from December 01, 2013 may turn out to be yet another litmus test
for Japan and the US85 The armed conflict, if any, in the East China Sea,
South China Sea or Korean Peninsula could drag the regional countries into
a wider conflict of varying intensity. China, Russia, Japan, India and
Australia would remain precariously charged, ready to jump-in no sooner
their core-interests are decisively threatened or the conflict reaches their
strategic backyards. Therefore, in the overall analysis, US‟s policy of
„Preventive Diplomacy, Strategic Pivot and Return to Asia‟ appears to be
fast becoming untenable for the following main reasons:
 Firstly, the US only knows how to build alliances, especially in
which it is the leader but it does not understand how to build
relationship and trust which are taken as „the real values‟ and
work best in an Asian mindset.86
 Secondly, the US regional allies are apprehensive of its
capacity to sustain 60 per cent of its naval forces in the region
as declared by Panetta, especially when there is a looming-

84
White House (Office of the Press Secretary), “Joint Statement by President
Obama and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif,” (accessed November 29, 2013),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/10/23/joint-statement-
president-obama-and-prime-minister-nawaz-sharif
85
Spencer Ackerman, “Biden to Press on Air Defence Zone in Bid to Ease China-
Japan Dispute,” Guardian (US), November 27, 2013.
86
Krista Mahr, “Does India Want to be a Part of America‟s Plan for Asia?”
Pakistan Today (Islamabad), 11 June 12.
Naveed Khaliq Ansaree 63

danger of an automatic cut in US defence allocations for the

next 10 years, if the US legislators fail to agree on defence
reduction as mandated under the current US law.87
 Thirdly, without Indian strategic partnership, the US cannot
effectively implement its new „Pivot to Asia‟ policy.
Unfortunately, India could ill-afford to upset China by
becoming a full strategic partner of America‟s new game-plan
for Asia. Moreover, India‟s capacity is also limited to meet the
top ten US expectations, such as:88 “be ready for a conflict with
China; fight fires in the Indian Ocean; help with the transition
in Afghanistan; pressure Iran; build a better bureaucracy; play a
role in Southeast Asia; reform the procurement process; prepare
for the worst with Pakistan; sign cooperation agreements; and
conduct more exercises with the US and its allies.” There are
real reservations as regards to India‟s capacity to meet the US
expectations. Such limitations are evident from the lack of
enthusiasm that India displayed over the „Return to Asia
Policy‟ that Panetta tried to sell during his visit to Delhi on
June 5, 2012. The following day, in the SCO Summit at
Beijing, Indian External Affairs Minister S.M. Karishna made a
„determined case for SCO membership‟ where he was assured
by China‟s Vice Premier Li Keqiang that „China and India‟s
was the real relationship of the century.‟89
 Fourthly, the economies of the regional countries are tied to
that of China. Any major armed conflict would be more
damaging to ASEAN, South Korea and by extension to Japan
than it would be to China.
 Last but not least, regional countries cannot change their
neighbours and would have to live for times to come with the
fall-outs of an armed conflict in the South China Sea,
particularly when their economies are also tied to that of China;

87
Nayan Chanda, “US Pivot towards Asia is Untenable,” Pakistan Today
(Islamabad), June 11, 2012.
88
Christopher Clary, “Will India Ever Be America‟s Partner?: Ten Big Things
Washington is Still Waiting on from New Delhi,” Foreign Policy Magazine,
June 14, 2012, (accessed June 14, 2012),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/06/11/will_india_ever_really_be_a
mericas_partner
89
Mahr, “Does India Want to be a Part of America‟s Plan for Asia?”
64 New Great Game and Limits of American Power

whereas, extra-regional players like US etc., can pull-out if the

cost is not worth it.
It may also be noted that historically, the US has not been good at
winning wars since 1945 except small victories in Panama and Grenada
etc., but the US is too good in fomenting instability and chaos. The US war-
making has also undergone some doctrinal transformation under „Obama‟s
Six-point Plan for Global War.‟90 The new „American way of war‟ now
involves an altered paradigm of warfare and an aura of geo-political
ambiguity and blurriness. The new formula includes everything from
classical precepts of colonial warfare to the cyber-warfare, use of state of
the art military and space technologies, and replacement of large military
foot-print with special ops, drones, civilian soldiers and proxy-fighters.91
The application of „new way of war‟ can be seen in the African continent
which is witnessing the influx of US special forces, CIA spies, secret
prisons, and massive inflow of US arms and dollars to African troops and
other mercenaries. The new American way of war which has been sold as a
„safer and saner brand of warfare‟, and a cheap formula for power
projection and furthering US interests is fraught with great danger of
unforeseen entanglements that could spread beyond borders and fan the
„brushfires into wildfires‟. The wars in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq all
started small before growing large and becoming costly adventures.
Therefore, the new American way of war in reality could turn out to be
anything else but not a panacea for the ills of US national security.92
In the overall analysis and grand strategic calculus of Russia-China-
Pakistan-Afghanistan-India entanglement, the US camp seems to be losing
strategic foot-hold in Eurasia; particularly in the Central Asia and the
Caucasus theatres, and to some extent also in South Asia and the Middle
East theatres. The war in Afghanistan has almost cost $4 trillion to the US
economy but the US Camp has failed to secure its long-term strategic
objectives in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The US‟s „Pivot, Balancing
and Return to Asia‟ Strategy is likely to suffer serious setbacks.
Conclusion of deals on Syria‟s chemical weapons as well as on Iranian
nuclear programme has put the Middle East under a „Strategic Pause‟ but
has also exposed the limits of American power. The danger of Saudi Arabia
becoming a victim of a fresh wave of „Arab Spring‟ as well as
destabilization, denuclearization have increased manifold.

90
Nick Turse, “Obama‟s Six-point Plan for Global War,” Daily Times (Karachi),
June 16, 2012.
91
Ibid.
92
Ibid.
Naveed Khaliq Ansaree 65

Afghanistan is just on the tipping point of proving or disproving to be

a „graveyard of empires‟ and further exposes the limits of American power.
The US‟s latest offer to Pakistan for the full-spectrum revival of strategic
alliance (though caused jitters in India) could merely turn out to be a bait or
„Strategic Deception‟ for Pakistan. Probably, the US wants to keep
Pakistan on the hook for some more time to achieve its minimum objectives
in Afghanistan and Pakistan before scaling down its military-footprint in
Afghanistan. The US-Iran nuclear deal may thus provide additional space
for US strategy and additional lines of operations to achieve its minimum
objectives in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Iran and Syria could be re-visited
later once US forces are free from the Afghanistan-Pakistan mess. It is
hoped that the strategic wisdom would eventually prevail amongst the
regional stake-holders, particularly Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, China,
Russia and India; forcing the US to tone down its confrontationist
approaches in the Middle East, Afghanistan-Pakistan and Asia-Pacific.
Any strategic failure of the US strategy for the region could turn out to be a
deadly-blow to American power. Its implications, when read with the
strategic losses already suffered by the US Camp in Central Asia,
Afghanistan, South Asia and Middle East could be horrendous for the
global economy; particularly for the US, EU, Japan, South Korea and
ASEAN. Such tectonic changes could boomerang at the US and roll the
ball for a new balance of power; thus shrinking the area of US imperialism
and hegemony; and may thus open up spaces for the manifestation of „Chi-
Merica‟ (China-America) or a multi-polar world. However, Russia, though
keen and anxious, would have to wait for the next rung of geo-politics to
dawn new vistas for the re-discovery of Russia‟s lost honour and global
stature.