Central Asian Survey (March, 2003) 22(1), 83–102

The New Great Game and the new

great gamers: disciples of Kipling
and Mackinder
MATTHEW EDWARDS

1. Introduction: concepts, structure, outline

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 one theme that has become
fundamental part of the analysis of the politico-military and economic situations
of the Caucasus and Central Asia has been the question of a New Great Game
within, though not limited to, these regions. Though the idea will be explored
later in greater depth, the concept of a New Great Game has been used as
shorthand for competition in influence, power, hegemony and profits, often
referring to the oil and gas industries and reserves in Central Asia and the
Caucasus.1 It is not limited to these aspects, however, with references being
made to religious, cultural and military competition in areas as far apart as
Turkey and China, Iran and India, Georgia and Siberia with actors at state,
multinational, transnational, local and regional levels. As ‘the romance of
Caspian oil struck Western media, industry and government’2 this concept of a
‘New Great Game’ became such an integral part of reporting on the region,
whether implicitly or explicitly in academic journals, news bulletins, economic
analysis or government reports that its use has gained a world-wide following,
which has not decreased since the events of 11 September 2001 and the
subsequent US-led intervention in Afghanistan.
The growing use of this concept has coincided with—or perhaps been caused
by—a revival of the interest in and use of geopolitics as a tool for politico-
security analysis. The linking of these two ideas has, in some cases, been explicit
and the New Great Game concept can be used to illustrate the contemporary use
of geopolitics in this region.
This paper therefore proposes to undertake a study of the New Great Game
concept, comparing it to the original Great Game by use of historical, thematic
and theoretical comparisons, to see if the term and concept has any value in
analysis and as an analytical tool. It is then intended that the concept will be
Matthew Edwards is at the UK Ministry of Defence, London UK (E-mail: matt@medw.fsnet.co.uk). The views
expressed in this paper are those of the author and not necessarily those of the UK Ministry of Defence.
The author would like to thank Dr Dov Lynch and Dr Shirin Akiner for all their time and valuable advice. This
paper is an amended version of his MA dissertation, undertaken at the War Studies Department of Kings College
London, 2001–2002.

ISSN 0263-4937 print/ISSN 1465-3354 online/03/010083-20  2003 Central Asian Survey

DOI: 10.1080/0263493032000108644
MATTHEW EDWARDS

related to ideas of geopolitical theory to see if there are any similarities between
them. It should be noted that this is a study of one part of geopolitics in one
region at one time; it is not intended that a judgement be made upon the
discipline as a whole or on its value as an analytical tool.

2. The original ‘Great Game’

The term ‘the Great Game’ was coined in the 1830s, although its use was not
to become widespread and popularised until the first years of the 20th century
in the novel Kim by Rudyard Kipling.3 Although fictional, the basis for the
events and occurrences that it described were real, describing the ‘shadowy
struggle for political ascendancy’4 that took place for most of the 19th and early
20th centuries between the British and Russian empires over Central Asia.
The nature of the Great Game was clear. It was a struggle for political
dominance, control and security, conducted by two Imperial powers over land
and populations whose value lay in their location between the Russian and
British Empires. The Great Game, as this was termed, consisted of three phases.5
The first began with the expansion of the Russian Empire into the Caucasus
and Central Asia during the late 18th and early 19th centuries that raised alarm
bells at the East India Company, de facto power in India. Driven by fears about
Russian intentions, the Company sent officers to explore the overland ap-
proaches to the northern borders of India. During the 19th century the involve-
ment of the British government increased, turning the Great Game from a private
venture into part of imperial defence, foreign and colonial policy. The methods
used were those of secret agents, coupled with overt military action upon
occasion.6 The first phase of the Great Game ended in 1907 with the signing of
the Anglo-Russian Convention.
The second phase consisted of the Drang nach Osten undertaken by Wil-
helmine Germany. The operational method—secret agents attempting to manipu-
late local tribes and peoples—were the same as in the first phase, as was the
aim—control of India.
The third phase occurred following the 1917 Russian Revolution when the
Bolsheviks under Lenin set out, ‘by means of armed uprisings, to liberate the
whole of Asia from imperialist domination’.7 The eventual result of this third
round was the consolidation of Bolshevik power over the old Tsarist domains.
Territorial control, or at the least hegemony over territory, was key to the aims
of the Great Game, with the stakes being imperial domination. Irrespective of
the individual aims and fluctuating fortunes of the players, the prime objective—
imperial security and power—remained constant.

3. The New Great Game

‘When every one is dead the Great Game is finished. Not before.’
Rudyard Kipling, Kim (1901)

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It would appear to be a self-evident fact from all the material that has been
written on the New Great Game that the words of Hurree Chunder Mookerjee
to Kim were correct. According to this material, a New Great Game has
emerged, one that is a competition for influence, power, hegemony and profits
in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus. It has been argued that ‘Central Asia,
scene of the Great Game between England and Russia in the nineteenth century,
is once more a key to the security of all Eurasia’,8 as Russia, ‘geostrategically
on the defensive, … is engaged in complex geopolitical manoeuvres and
enmeshed in geo-economic competition into its contiguous “Great Space” ’9
because ‘the West does not want to see any structure in Eurasia that permits
Russian hegemony’.10 ‘Caspian petroleum [has come] to be a focal point of
power in world politics’11 with ‘access to that resource and sharing in its
potential wealth represent[ing] objectives that stir national ambitions, motivate
corporate interests, rekindle historical claims, revive imperial aspirations
and fuel international rivalries’.12 As ‘the struggle for Eurasian oil is a multi-
dimensional security, geopolitical and economic game … this Great Game is
quickly becoming a paramount challenge for American policy making toward
the year 2000 and beyond’.13 The general theme underlying this concept is one
of competition; competition for influence, whether at political, economic or
cultural levels. While the term ‘the New Great Game’ may not be used
explicitly, this competitive element is one that is present in much analysis of the
region, with the New Great Game being summarised thus:

Six new republics, predominantly Islamic but vibrantly distinct, are grouped around the
Caspian Sea, the current landlords of untapped oil and natural gas reserves that rival those
in the Persian Gulf. Pipelines, tanker routes, petroleum consortiums, and contracts are the
prizes of the New Great Game. India and China, each with exponentially growing energy
needs, are vying for access, along with Russians, Europeans, and Americans. Turkey, Iran,
and Pakistan have their own political, economic, and cultural interests in the former Soviet
republics, where slumbering rivalries have abruptly awakened among Azeris, Armenians,
Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmens, and other long-subject peoples … it is a bloody muddle, made
worse as before by outsiders.14

The issue of traditional politico-military hegemony is an aspect of the concept,

focusing especially on Russian attempts to reassert political influence over the
former Soviet states.15 Since 1991 there has been a ‘widespread view … that
most geopolitical issues in the region could be reduced to either favouring or
opposing Russian hegemony’.16 It is an integral part of the New Great Game
concept that the former Soviet states are the subject of competition between
Russia and her opponents, most notably the USA, with each trying to ensure that
they have the greatest influence; an act of what has been termed ‘great-power
chauvinism’.17 The example given of this traditional politico-military game is the
Caucasus where the presence of the Russian military and the role it has played
in the conflicts within the Transcaucasian states has convinced many analysts
that a struggle for influence is taking place, with it being ‘naı̈ve, to say the least,

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to expect that Russia will abandon its ambitions in the Southern Caucasus’18 to
an increasing American or Turkic presence.
Although this aspect has been analysed, the greater focus has been on energy
politics and the competition for the oil and gas of the region, though the
two—political influence and economic influence—are often linked. From 1994
the issue of oil and gas and the potential rewards that it could bring dominated
the analysis of Central Asia.19 The overall impression was of untapped wealth
that would, within a few years, literally come gushing out of the region.20 With
the profit motive, international companies became involved, with one analyst
commentating that ‘a number of energy companies are jumping on the band-
wagon to Central Asia’.21 The question of pipeline access to reserves—what
route should they take, who should be responsible for their construction and
safety, who charges and profits from them—and the composition of the consortia
and firms responsible for this—is seen as a whole subsection of the New Great
Game hypothesis.22 This struggle for influence in the pipeline and oil consortia—
famously the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) and Azerbaijan International
Operating Company (AIOC)—is an integral part of the New Great Game
hypothesis, with both companies and states involved.
With ‘oil remain[ing] a strategic commodity critical in the global balance of
power’23 the issue of secure supplies of oil, gas and other energy sources became
of paramount concern post-Gulf War, with ‘ex-Cold Warriors [being] enamoured
of the idea that vast oil riches could easily be snatched from the former Soviet
empire’.24 Both Russian and American administrations stressed the need to be
involved in the area; a Russian Security Council report emphasising that by 2005
Russia dependence on CIS energy resources would have increased and that it
would be an issue of ‘vital interest’ to have access to these areas.25 Reports under
the Clinton administration stressed the need to be active in the region while the
energy plan of the Bush administration concluded that ‘America twenty years
from now will import nearly two of every three barrels of oil—a condition of
increased dependency on foreign powers that do not always have America’s
interests at heart’,26 recommending that policy makers ‘devote … much effort to
securing additional foreign supplies of energy’,27 referring explicitly to the
Caspian Sea Basin.
The involvement of non-regional governments in the concept is complicated
further by the involvement of China, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and Israel, whose
governments and companies are active in pursuing their own national interests
in a variety of areas. At an economic level it is currently China that receives the
most attention with recent plans for pipelines from Xinjiang province to
Shanghai raising the potential prospect of a Chinese route exporting gas from
Central Asia and another pipeline from eastern Siberia raising the potential for
the export of Siberian oil.28
Economic security and primacy is not the only facet of the New Great Game.
At the beginning of the 1990s it was widely anticipated that there would be a
struggle for cultural influence in Central Asia; ‘by far the most fateful and
fiercest competition on the soul of the emerging Central Asian Muslims is the

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one waged between Iran and Turkey’.29 These two states, it was argued, had
historical, religious and cultural ties with the states of Central Asia and given the
weakness of the new ex-Soviet regimes it was natural that they would gravitate
towards being the junior partners in a region bloc dominated by one of the
regional powers.30 A second subset of this cultural aspect of the New Great
Game was fought by Pakistan and India with both vying for influence in Central
Asia as part of an extension of their own strategic rivalries. This, however, was
perceived to be a sideshow as ‘both are minor players with weak hands. And the
game is picking up as the major players are moving closer.’31 Furthermore, the
New Great Game was argued to spread towards the Persian Gulf32 and South
Asia.33
While economic and cultural competitions were—and are—an integral part of
the New Great Game hypothesis, the question of hard security has gained
importance.34 In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and
the subsequent American-led military action in Afghanistan, the whole question
of a ‘New Great Game’ was revisited.35 With Western troops active in
Afghanistan and the USA being granted basing rights in Central Asia, the
question of the impact on regional political influence was raised. The idea of a
challenge to the perceived Russian hegemony was raised in the press and
academic circles, while the expansion of the ‘war against terror’ into Georgia
was seen as another move into Russia’s geopolitical space.36 The US presence
in Central Asia, however, has in some circles been perceived as less of a military
action, having a different intention; ‘It is an article of faith among old left and
deep green fundamentalists … that the Afghan war is really, somehow, about
maintenance of US access to oil supplies to slake its obscene thirst. Drill deeply
enough through the layers of lies, damned lies and excuses and you’ll eventually
hit the gusher.’37
Further security aspects in the game have also been alluded to. The question
of arms sales to the region is viewed as competitive,38 while the influence of out
of area states becoming involved in regional security situations has not been
confined to Russia and the USA. There have been, for example, reports of Israel
undertaking military co-operation with Uzbekistan.
The above illustrates the type of actors in the New Great Game. Multinational
companies have been present in the oil tendering process, state governments by
the diplomatic positioning of the 1990s and since 11 September, transnational
organisations, both governmental39 and non-governmental organisations,40 and
substate influences, such as local warlords and factions have all allegedly been
part of this New Great Game.41
Therefore the perceived wisdom is that the New Great Game, emerging in the
early 1990s and continuing until the present day, is multifaceted, covering a
range of sectors from economic to social and cultural and questions of hard
security, with a variety of actors playing the game in a number of geographical
areas. The hypothesis is that while the original Great Game has ended, a New
Great Game has taken its place.

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4. The analytical utility of the New Great Game concept

(i) Labelling of ‘the New Great Game’
The use of ‘the New Great Game’ as shorthand for covering some, many or all
of the situations described is well documented. There are two issues, however,
that must be discussed; the first is regarding the applicability of the term and the
second is the accuracy of the concept behind the term. Analysing and comparing
the New Great Game with the original Great Game is a process by which it
would be possible to see the applicability of the term as a label. This analysis
can be conducted at a number of levels, including location, actors, aims and
means.

Location. It is location that provides a continuation between the two Great

Games. Clearly there are geographical similarities over where the games were
and are played, notably in Afghanistan, through the exact space of the area
referred to in much of the New Great Game literature is that of the Caspian
Basin, hundreds of miles to the west. There is no exact match in the geographical
location, though there is enough of a rough similarity to provide a limited frame
of reference. References to the New Great Game have been made at levels from
the very specific—the Pankisi Gorge—to the very general—the Eurasian conti-
nent. This ambiguity means some overlap in the geographic context between the
new and original games is inevitable.

Actors. The contrast between the original Great Game and the new Great Game
in terms of the actors involved is one of the most striking differences in concept.
In the 19th century the Great Game was played by two Imperial powers, the
British and Russian empires. Any actors over whom the game was played
over—such as indigenous populations, local rulers and subjects—were treated as
subservient to the aims of the powers.
The New Great Game contrasts to this, with the type and numbers of actors
involved in the game having transformed and grown. The British Empire has
disappeared and the Russian Empire, emerging via the Soviet Union, has
disintegrated. The British role of sole competitor with Russia has been replaced
by several states including China, Pakistan, Israel, Iran, Turkey and the USA. At
the state level, new actors have appeared in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus.
Five new states in Central Asia and three in the Caucasus, each with their own
aims, objectives and methods, have radically transformed the concept of a New
Great Game. They are not cipher states; they are their own actors who can play
the game for their own advantage and for their own motives and interests, and
‘it is a mistake to treat issues in which third parties are embroiled as if these
countries were pawns in a global balancing game, instead of dealing with the
issues’ intrinsic merits and the nations’ interests’.42
Analytically, the similarities in the typology of politics involved in the two
games has been questioned: ‘The Great Game was a game of high politics—a

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game of colonization and military contest between the two empires … the New
Great Game has nothing to do with high politics of the two imperialist powers.
The New Great Game, if at all it could be described as such, pertains to low
politics. It is about creating niches of influences in Central Asia by neighbouring
countries.’43 It could be argued then that there is a second level of the New Great
Game, one between the regional states ‘seeking to define their roles in their
regions and the world’,44 and not just one between the global competitors.
In addition to these state actors, non-state bodies are active in the game;
NATO, the UN and the OSCE at the supra-state level, while, at sub-state level
multinational companies, corporations and conglomerates, non-governmental
organisations, pressure groups, diasporas, political factions, terrorist groups and
criminal organisations are all involved.

Aims. The objectives of the original Great Game were ones of competing forms
of Imperialism,45 the aim being for geopolitical dominance in the region in the
form of a zero-sum game; a rise in Russian control of the region could only be
accomplished to the detriment of British control and visa versa. Imperial
control—whether direct rule, hegemonic influence or ideological favourable
alliance—was the aim of the Game.
The range of aims of the New Great Game is far more diverse, including; at
state actor level the establishment of a form of neo-imperialist hegemony, the
formation of cultural allegiances and influence and the promotion of state
security concerns; at non-state actor the maximisation of profits, securing of
contracts and dominant shares in consortia and the securing of local influence
and politico-religious aims.

Means and scope. The original Great Game was, in the main, a struggle behind
the scenes, a war of operatives working alone or in small groups, sometimes on
their own initiative, at the very edges of control and supervision by their
superiors. Military force, however, was countenanced upon occasion as an
adjunct to reinforce hegemony and control. The variety of aims in the New Great
Game means that a correspondingly greater variety of methods have been used
to reinforce political influence, ranging from the formation of corporate
alliances, press manipulation and diplomatic negotiation to the stationing of
troops. The concept, however, of secret agents operating alone per se is
laughable, with the New Great Game being conducted as much in business
negotiations in New York, London and Moscow as it is in Central Asia and the
Transcaucasus.
The overt use of ‘power’ within the New Great Game has been more
restrained, though this is difficult to quantify. No longer is it acceptable to use
naked, dominating aggressive power in the international system. While there are
still some demonstrations of force, the degree to which force can be used without
acceptable justification has diminished in the years between the two games.
In the international system, the original game was conducted as a direct

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competition between the two powers with no other interference brooked, or

indeed possible. The international system of the era, with empire building and
expansion, meant that changes in the borders of states, the dissolution of states
and their open manipulation and control was permitted and used as a tool of
policy. The states over whom the game was played had no protection from either
of the Imperial powers and were treated as mere proxies and ciphers.
Within the context of the international system, however, the competition of
the New Great Game is very different. The worldwide dissolution of empires
after the Second World War, coupled with the creation of the United Nations and
the international legal system, put in place a system of protection for states that
meant that their borders, integrity and sovereignty were to be respected under
international law with the equality of states enshrined as part of the United
Nations charter. Given this dramatic change in the international system the
implications for any New Great Game are considerable; states cannot be
violated, controlled, dissolved or destroyed in a manner similar to the past.
It has been said that one of the most interesting and curious features of the
original Great Game was that ‘the game itself was odd. The object was not to
win; but not to lose.’46 Within this context it was recognised by at least some of
the players that there could be no end to the original Game if the geopolitical
situation and international system was not radically altered—as it was ultimately
by the First World War. The New Great Game, however, may have a very
distinct object; to win whatever the specific prize.
The cost–benefit analysis of the Great Games are very different.47 The original
benefit was in the enhanced security and prestige that territorial control gave
while, overall, the costs of gaining that territory were much higher than the
benefits that it realistically could give.48 The payoffs of the new Great Game are
more obvious and plentiful; monetary profit, security of energy supplies, national
economic growth reinforcing state independence, an Islamic cultural revival,
enhanced politico-military position as well as other lesser benefits, while the
costs can correspondingly be measured in billions of dollars in addition to
non-quantifiable security concerns.
Therefore, given the above differences and the limited similarities between the
original Great Game and the New Great Game (assuming that the analysis of the
situation by the commentators and academics promoting the New Great Game
is correct) should the term ‘the New Great Game’ therefore be used to describe
the situation? It could be argued not. The political, cultural, economic and
military situation is radically different. The aims are different as are the means
and methods used. The only real similarities—and these are limited—are in the
geographical location and in the romantic, exotic, obscure and remote perspec-
tive given by some commentators to the events occurring in Central Asia and the
Transcaucasus.
Given the links between the two Games and only limited qualification or
explanation offered when ‘the New Great Game’ term is used, there is the real
danger that the full implications and current meaning of the term will not be
fully understood and appreciated. Given this loose usage it can hinder analysis

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and be detrimental to the understanding of the situation. The analytical value of

the concept, especially when used merely as a label as is often the case, becomes
negative, insignificant and to the detriment of any detailed study at either a
conceptual or a practical level.

(ii) Is the concept valid?

There is a more fundamental issue to be raised; whether the interpretation that
has been placed on events in depicting a New Great Game is correct. Despite
being accepted as perceived wisdom by many academics, commentators and
analysts, the question of whether or not there actually is a New Great Game
(with its disparate meanings as discussed previously) is not one that has been
definitively answered. By implication those who write and use the term without
reservation or qualification are promoting the view that they agree with the
concept. There are those, however, who openly dispute it.
The mix of wildcatters, Western major oil companies and political jockeying bears far more
resemblance to the initial scrambling for concessions in Saudi Arabia nearly 100 years ago
than to the ‘Great Game’ of the nineteenth century that is so commonly cited in the case
of Caspian resources.49
The geo-politics of contemporary Central Asia will thus be qualitatively different from the
nineteenth-century Great Game. …50
Recently it has become popular to see a ‘New Great Game’ shaping up in this region … this
image is misleading. …51

For there to be a discernible situation in the former Soviet Union that can be
called the New Great Game, there has to be a qualitatively different reality in
economic and political commerce to any other situation in contemporary times:
that is, to use the New Great Game meaningfully as a label, it must refer to a
situation that is unique. This is not the case as actors manoeuvring for the
greatest influence is an integral part of the international economic and political
system; actors ‘act according to long standing tenants of realism and realpoli-
tik’,52 and, indeed, real-economics. Many of the measures taken that have been
labelled as tools designed to increase political influence can be traced back to
market economics. While Russia has used access to its oil and gas pipeline
network as a tool of political policy upon occasion, the reality is that the
economics of oil and gas reserves and the costs of the extraction situation are
such that it is, for Russia, a disadvantage to allow the overwhelming export of
oil and gas from Central Asia. Given the gas reserves available in Turkmenistan,
for example, it would be an act of economic folly for Russia to allow
Turkmenistan total access to the gas pipeline exporting network.53
Within Central Asia ‘the idea of “power vacuum” and a scramble for the
increase of influence by countries, other than the former metropolis Russia, is as
irrelevant as it was in the case of other Afro-Asian countries’54 (who went
through decolonisation). The process of the former imperial power trying to

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retain some influence while disengaging is not one that is unique in world
history; neither is the process of the newly independent states asserting them-
selves or of other states trying to use them in political manoeuvring.
The events depicted in the New Great Game, however, are not confined to
Central Asia, raising issues of whether or not they can be isolated from the
normal process of the international system, market economics and political
realities. Using the most common exemplifier of the New Great Game—the
struggle over oil and gas concessions—it can be argued that situations such as
these take place in all energy producing areas, often with the very same actors
or types of actors as are involved in Central Asia.55 Commercial interactions
similar to those in Central Asia have been seen in Saudi Arabia in the early 20th
century and Venezuela and Nigeria in the last decades; the initial manoeuvring
to gain influence that occurred in the early 1990s can now be seen replicated to
a degree in Iran and Libya. Further to this, the situation described—that of
companies working to gain influence in order to secure contracts and being in
direct competition with each other—is hardly unique to the oil and gas indus-
tries. In every commercial situation where two or more companies compete there
will be a process by which they compete to gain an advantage and to ingratiate
themselves with the client. It could easily be argued, using the model provided
by those promoting the New Great Game, that there are ‘New Great Games’ in
progress throughout most of the world. If this is the case, it cannot be argued that
the situation in Central Asia is unique.
A sub-tenant of the Great Game thesis, sometimes explicit, more often
implicit, is that the actions by private companies, such as oil majors and gas
multinationals, to secure commercial, exploration and extraction rights are in
someway linked to the benefit of the state to which they belong; securing rights
for an American multinational link to American national interest, rights gained
by Russian companies link to Russia’s concerns in the area. While this may be
true of state run companies, the idea that there is an automatic correlation
between the private sector and the national interest is erroneous. Although
multinational companies may be registered in one country, the reality is that they
are owned by shareholders which in the case of multinationals may include
global institutions and foreign owners and that they are run by their directors and
executives, possibly of differing nationalities. Within the sub-question of
pipeline routes, ‘companies are basing their decisions on the most financially
affordable and timely route rather than complying with the geo-strategic con-
cerns of the United States’,56 being more interested in bottom-line profit than
global politics. The stakes companies have in projects are not viewed as being
irrevocably linked to the national interest and can be traded as commercial
realities dictate. LUKoil, for example, announced that it was planning to sell its
10 per cent stake in the Azeri–Chirag–Gunashli project in the Caspian for
US$1.25 billion with the likelihood that the stake would be bought by a
non-Russian company.57 The idea, therefore, of a company being subservient to
a grand strategic design on the part of the Kremlin or the White House is false.58
Within the field, co-operation rather than competition is more often the case.

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The formation of consortia demonstrated that while companies may have been
in competition with each other during the tendering and negotiating process, they
were ready and able to work together for production sharing agreements,
recognising that the financing, resources and political realities in the region
required working together;59 ‘western companies sought to accommodate Russia
since for the success of their projects they depend on good relations with
Russia’.60 Competition remains part of market economics but oil and gas
multinationals are linked to each other through various partnerships and consor-
tiums throughout the world; any argument that there is no co-operation between
them in Central Asia ignores the reality of the evidence and this undermines the
whole concept of the Great Game, based as it is on competition.
It is not just among companies, however, that there is a lack of competition;
at the state level there has been significant co-operation over oil and gas. While
commercial realities, hyped-up as a tool of political influence, have resulted in
Russia being somewhat reticent with regard to access to her pipeline network,
the reality is that oil does flow from Kazakhstan through to the Black Sea ports.
In the Transcaucasus ‘the critical need for commercial and political alignment
between Azerbaijan and Georgia was noted very early on and today is the
fundamental building block on which both countries independence is being
built’.61 The import–export of oil and gas requires co-operation as there is no one
state that is able to dominate the market; alleged competition over pipeline
routes has not prevented co-operation and the construction of pipelines for oil
and gas that cross several states.62 Even states that are supposed to be directly
vying for political influence—Russia and China—work with each other.63
Further interaction between states and companies illustrates that the supposedly
competitive economic dynamic does not preclude co-operation.
Within the inter-state field the absence of a New Great Game can be clearly
demonstrated. Co-operation within Central Asia was encouraged in the early
1990s by the creation of a variety of structures between the newly independent
states including, among others, the Tashkent Collective Security Treaty (1992),
the Central Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (1993) and the Central Asian
Economic Community (1994).64 While these efforts had varying degrees of
success, effective interaction was demonstrated in the security field by the
formation of the Shanghai Five (1996), expanded to the Shanghai Forum in July
2000.65 Intended as a vehicle through which member states could address border
issues its role expanded into the discussion of issues of common security, such
as militant Islam, cross border terrorism—with a regional anti-terrorist centre
being formed in Bishkek—and has become a means ‘to discuss broad proposals
for Central Asian security and to co-ordinate on more detailed needs in the
unstable border regions’66 while allowing itself room for expansion.
The question of a security Great Game raised its head following the events of
11 September and the US-led intervention in Afghanistan against the Taleban. In
this context it was often interpreted as Washington making a move into
Moscow’s backyard and challenging Russian hegemony in the area. The ensuing
events have proved, however, that this is not the case and that any long-term

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challenge to Russian prominence will be much smaller in scale than has been
envisaged. In order for there to be a game there has to be at least two sides
playing; after 11 September, in the context of the New Great Game, there were
not. The coalition put together by diplomatic activity in the ‘war against terror’
included Russia and all of the Central Asian state, bar Turkmenistan (officially
neutral as of 1995), Russia looking with favour on the intervention, linking it to
Chechnya. Whilst it could be argued that Russian acceptance of the American
presence in Afghanistan, Central Asia and Georgia is the result of having few
alternatives, its acceptance by the Russian executive tends to give lie to any
statement of inherent conflict. Russia may still view Central Asia and the
Transcaucasus as lying within her geopolitical space but there seems to be a
willingness to accept that there can be no monopoly of orientation within those
states, either in the security or economic field.
In addition to these arguments, the question of the exact importance of the
supposed New Great Game must also be addressed and its place within the
policy issues of each state examined, with an attempt made to answer a question
that was asked over half-a-century ago; ‘Is the struggle for the control of the
Eurasian Heartland really the one and fundamental issue of world policy …?’67
Simply the answer is no.
While Central Asia retained some importance, the main thrust of Russian
foreign policy under Yeltsin and Putin has been ‘Western orientated’,68 focusing
on NATO expansion and Ballistic Missile Defence. It has been argued that
‘Central and West Asia play a secondary role in China’s foreign policy’ as she
‘does not seek direct political or economic influence’,69 while the economic
potential of Central Asia is of interest, as are the questions of security linked to
Xinjiang province, once again the most important foreign and security policy
issues are not located within Central Asia. Within security the question of
Taiwan remains paramount, while the energy potential of Central Asia is
matched by the South China Seas and Siberia.70 Within the US administration,
until the ramifications of 11 September became clear, in security terms Central
Asia was little more than an adjunct of US Central Command, the attention
being further south on the Persian Gulf. Even now, effective interest in Central
Asia will probably be short-term and that the focus will once again shift—as it
already has done towards Iraq.
One of the largest sub-sections of the New Great Game thesis was the idea
that there would be a cultural, historical and political struggle for influence
by Turkey and Iran, each competing as to which would lead the newly
independent states. However, ‘the Great Game that Turkey and Iran were
expected to play as regional powers never took place’.71 For a combination of
reasons, notably limited economic and financial resources on the part of Turkey
and a lack of political will on the part of Iran, there has been no competition
between the two states. While much has been written by academics and
commentators in both of these countries regarding a desire for a zone of
influence,72 as The Economist summarised, ‘when Soviet Central Asia suddenly

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found itself independent … there was much speculation about whether Turkey or
Iran would win the hearts of the Muslim peoples in a New Great Game in
Central Asia. The answer has been clear for some time: neither.’73
Given these critiques that can be made of the concept of a New Great Game,
the very existence of the concept as something that can stand academic rigour
and examination must be questioned rather than being accepted unquestioningly
as a perceived wisdom.

(iii) The New Great Game and geopolitics

While interest in the region has been continuing because of the reasons outlined
above, further attention has been due to the revival of the geopolitics—and the
emergence of geo-economics—in the 1980s and 1990s.74 The exact application
of geopolitics varies from practitioner to practitioner, but as a discipline,

Theoretical Geopolitics studies the relation between physical space and international
politics, develops models for the spatial division of the world into cooperating and
competing parts for historical, economic and political reasons, and analyses how the
participants interpret the political, economic and military consequences of this div-
ision. … The Geopolitics of a state or other territorially defined society means its pursuit
of geographically dimensioned aims that are connected with its economic and political
position, security and culture.75

Many articles on the New Great Game thesis have geopolitical references or
ideas mentioned or alluded to within them, as ‘in the former sphere of influence
of the USSR … geopolitics has indeed become a key concept with respect to the
redefinition of national interests’.76 While a detailed exploration of geopolitics is
not the intention of this paper, the application of aspects of geopolitical theory
to the concept of the New Great Game can be examined.
Theoretical geopolitics has a number of tenants and models that can be used
to provide support for the New Great Game concept. It has been argued that
there are three groups into which geopolitical models can fall—imperialist, state
and universalist.77 While geopolitical theories can belong to any of the three
groups depending upon their particular thesis and tenants, the particular models
illustrated by the three groupings can be placed over and onto the concept of a
New Great Game and the co-existent reality in Central Asia to see if there can
be a basis in geopolitical theory. The model groupings all have some relevance
to the situation, linking to the concept thesis; respective arguments can be put
forward, using selected examples, to fit the theoretical mould.
Imperialist geopolitics, central to the ideas of control of territory, are linked
in part to the concept idea. While the idea of territorial control of the states of
Central Asia and the Transcaucasus by an outside power is, because of the
international system and politico-economic reality, unimaginable, imperialist
geopolitics fit perfectly with the original Great Game concept. Geopolitics of the
state have been reinforced by the break up of the Soviet Union, and regional

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grouping theory can be used to explain several of the events that have occurred.
Universalist ideas, supported by evidence of cultural competition and the spread
of democratic ideals, are also in evidence.
More specifically than these moulds, however, are the geopolitical ideas that
have been proposed by leading theorists in the field such as Mackinder,
Spykman, Haushofer and Savitsky. Often these conceptual references are made
by commentators on the Central (Eur)Asian situation without a detailed explo-
ration of the meaning and intention behind the theories proposed. Mackinder’s
ideas of the ‘geographical pivot of history’ and ‘the heartland’, for example, are
most often used as a tool to demonstrate a supposedly higher level of theoretical
thinking with regard to the concept of a New Great Game, though only part of
Central Asia and the Transcaucasus lie in the 1904 ‘Heartland’ and, proportion-
ally, even less in the 1919 version.78
It is interesting that the continual revisions of Mackinder’s ideas—coupled
with his dislike of the term ‘geopolitics’ and his aversion to geopolitical
determinism79—have been ignored by many analysts who have taken the
‘Heartland’ and applied it to the concept without reservation or detailed examin-
ation. Added to this, the historical limitations of Mackinder’s ideas,80 and the
change in the reality of the political, economic, resource and military situation
since his views were proposed, means that there is a considerable limitation on
how applicable they can be now. A view from 1951 is still valid; ‘It is probably
true that Mackinder’s views on the heartland have been accepted in too uncritical
a spirit’.81
Beyond this, however, the ideas of geopolitics have openly been used in
connection with the Great Game thesis and not just by implication or name
reference. For some commentators Central Asia remains key to world power.
One of the most famous examples of this was propounded by Zbigniew
Brzezinski, presenting ‘a post-modern version of the Mackinder/Haushofer
geopolitical doctrine’.82 Referring to Central Asia—‘the Eurasian Balkans’—as
‘geopolitically significant’83 for reasons of energy, socio-political instability and
potential power domination, Brzezinski argued that ‘it follows that America’s
primary interest is to help ensure that no single power comes to control this
geopolitical space’84 for ‘preponderance over the entire Eurasian continent
serv[es] as the central basis for global primacy’.85 This illustrates, in part, what
has come to be the current use of geopolitics; a merger of economic and political
concerns in a region linking them arbitrarily with geopolitics coupled with policy
recommendations while failing to examine that actual tenants of that theory.
Namely, there has been a failure to conduct ‘a coherent geopolitical analysis that
elucidates the constellation of economic and political forces which exists at
present and the geopolitical field within which strategic and economic leverage
can be exercised’.86
An interesting comparison between the original and new Great Games at
the geopolitical level is the way in which they have been used to relate to the
Cold War. In part due to Heartland—Rimland geopolitics,87 the original Great
Game was seen as a forerunner of the Cold War struggle between the USSR

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and USA. By comparison, the new game is sometimes regarded as the last
remnant of the Cold War—in a way, the last struggle between the USA and
Russia.
The academic use of geopolitics in much of the literature on the New Great
Game is one that fails to do justice to the discipline. As has been said, ‘that
conventional wisdom … has not been subjected to enough scrutiny in the light of
the changed international realities. Many geopolitical “truths” that have passed
into the canon of security by intellectuals rarely get a proper re-examination to
determine their relevance to the constantly evolving nature of the [world]
system.’88
Often the term is bandied around with no actual reference being made to the
techniques of the discipline, its aims, objectives or limitations. Analysts and
commentators use the term without specifying what they intend to do with the
discipline or which elements of the discipline they intend to apply. While the
idea of territorial competition and co-operation is one that, at the most basic
level, is understood to be geopolitics, lack of any further examination of the
discipline with respect to the New Great Game concept is one that undermines
both. There is, in short, a lack in evidence of academic and intellectual rigour
when it comes to the use of geopolitics as a tool for analysis of the situation in
Central Asia.

4. Conclusions on the New Great Game

Since the mid-1990s the use of the term and concept of the New Great Game
has overshadowed the analysis of events in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus.
Much of the analysis that uses this concept, however, does so without any
qualification or reservation. It can be argued that the term—the New Great
Game—is itself inaccurate as much as it portrays a misleading analogy, referring
back to events that were totally dissimilar. As this has mostly been used without
any of the explanation or qualification that is necessary to explain the differences
between the original and new concepts, a false and misleading image of the
events in modern Central Asia has been created.
Furthermore the whole concept can be challenged. Certainly there is no
definitive interpretation of events that can be given, with evidence being
presented on both sides. What is clear, however, is that much of the analysis
that has been conducted is of a dubious standard, with facts being accepted
without question and used without subjecting it to any semblance of an
academic interrogation. The linking of the New Great Game with geopolitics
does neither justice as their contemporary use has often been intellectually
lax and capriciously all-embracing, driven by the obscure romanticism
of a bygone era. Both the New Great Game concept and the discipline of
geopolitics need to be subjected to intellectual and academic rigour—and
the reality is that for much of the past decade this has not taken place
effectively.

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Notes and references

1. The labelling of geographical regions is one that has been the subject of debate. For the purposes of this
paper ‘Central Asia’ is used to refer to the five republics to the east of the Caspian Sea—Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The ‘Transcaucasus’ (or ‘South Caucasus’) refers
to Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Some current literature, however, stretches these definitions and there
is no solid consensus on the means of the terms. For example, a further regional distinction of ‘Central
Eurasia’ has emerged and is used to cover the area spreading from the Bosphorus in the West to Xinjiang
province in China, and from the Kazak steppe and Russian border in the north to the Indian Ocean in the
south. See K. Weisbrode, ‘Central Eurasia: prize or quicksand? Contending views of instability in
Karabakh, Ferghana and Afghanistan’, Adelphi Paper 338 (Oxford: International Institute of Strategic
Studies/Oxford University Press, 2001), pp 11–14.
2. A.M. Jaffe and M.B. Olcott, in D. Lynch and Y. Kalyuzhnova, Eds, Euro-Asia: A Period of Transition
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), p 68.
3. The term ‘the Great Game’ was coined by Captain Arthur Conolly (1807–1842), a ‘player’ of the original
Great Game. It is not the intention of this paper to recount the events of the Great Game; for a full
examination see P. Hopkirk, The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia (New York:
Kodansha International, 1994), or K. Meyer and S. Brysac, Tournament of Shadows: The Great Game and
the Race for Empire in Asia (London: Abacus Books, 2001.)
4. Hopkirk, op cit, Ref 3, p 2.
5. From P. Hopkirk, ‘The Great Game revisited?’, Asian Affairs, Vol 33, Part 1, 2002, pp 59–63. Also D.
Fromkin, ‘The Great Game in Asia’, Foreign Affairs, Vol 58, No 4, 1980, pp 936–952.
6. W. Palace, ‘Afghanistan and the Great Game’, Asian Affairs, Vol 33, Part 1, 2002, pp 64–67, and A.
Verrier, ‘Francis Younghusband and the Great Game’, Asian Affairs, Vol 23, Part 1 (Old Series Vol 79),
1992, pp 34–43.
7. Hopkirk, op cit, Ref 5, p 61. For an examination of this period see P. Hopkirk, Setting the East Ablaze:
Lenin’s Dream of an Empire in Asia (London: John Murray, 1984).
8. F.S. Starr, ‘Making Eurasia stable’, Foreign Affairs, Vol 75, No 1, 1996, p 80.
9. J. Erickson, ‘Russia will not be trifled with: geopolitical facts and fantasies’, Journal of Strategic Studies,
Vol 22, No 2/3, 1999, in C.S. Gray and G. Sloan, Geopolitics: Geography and Strategy (London: Frank
Cass, 1999), pp 257–258.
10. V.V. Tsepkalo, ‘The remaking of Eurasia’, Foreign Affairs, Vol 72, No 2, 1998, p 107.
11. N. Sariahmetoglu, ‘A look at the matters of route and security of the Caspian petroleum pipeline’,
Eurasian Studies, No 17, Spring–Summer 2000, p 68.
12. Z. Brezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives (New York:
Basic Books, 1997), p 125.
13. A. Cohen, ‘The “New Great Game”: pipeline politics in Eurasia’, Caspian Crossroads, Vol 2, No 1,
Spring–Summer 1996 (http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/usazerb/213.htm) [Accessed 19 July
2002].
14. K. Meyer and S. Brysac, op cit, Ref 3, p xxiv.
15. G.M. Winrow, ‘A New Great Game in the Transcaucasus?’, in D. Lynch and Y. Kalyuzhnova, op cit,
Ref 2.
16. Weisbrode, op cit, Ref 1, p 11.
17. I. Karimov, Uzbekistan on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century (Curzon Press, 1997), p 29.
18. A. Cohen, ‘Is Russian New Caucasus policy threat to Turkish interests?’, Eurasian Studies, Vol 20, Special
Issue, Summer 2001, pp 115.
19. Weisbrode, op cit, Ref 1, p 23.
20. The question of the exact size of Caspian and Caucasian oil and gas reserves has been a matter of debate
in and of itself with estimates varying from reserves the size of the Persian Gulf to those smaller than the
North Sea.
21. P. Shammas, ‘Energy cooperation in Central Asia and the global perspective’, The Iranian Journal of
International Affairs, Vol 5, No 1, 1993, p 25. Also N. Ghorban, ‘The role of multinational oil companies
in the development of oil and gas resources in Central Asia and the Caucasus’, The Iranian Journal of
International Affairs, Vol 5. No 1, 1993, pp 1–15.
22. Many articles have been written on the routes, problems, solutions and potential of Transcaucasian and
Caspian pipelines. See, for example, J.P Carver and G. Englefield, ‘Oil and gas pipelines from Central
Asia: a new approach’, The World Today, Vol 50, No 6, 1994, pp 119–121; W. Maley, ‘The perils of
pipelines’, The World Today, Vol 54, No 8–9, 1998, pp 231–232; A. Rashid, ‘This way out’, Far Eastern
Economic Review, 18 September 1997, pp 60–61; Sariahmetoglu, op cit, Ref 11, pp 67–80.

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23. J. Stainslaw and D. Yergin, ‘Oil: reopening the door’, Foreign Affairs, Vol 72, No 4, 1993, p 81.
24. A.M. Jaffe and M.B. Olcott, ‘The geopolitics of Caspian energy’, in Lynch and Kalyuzhnova, op cit, Ref
2, p 68.
25. Cited in Erickson, op cit, Ref 9, pp 261–262.
26. United States Department of Energy and The White House, National Energy Report, 17 May 2001. Cited
in M.T. Klare, ‘Global petro-politics: the foreign policy implications of the Bush administration’s energy
plan’, Current History, March 2002, p 100.
27. Ibid, p 100.
28. BBC World Service News Report, 4 July 2002. See also Reuters, ‘China pipeline terms agreed’, The
Moscow Times, 26 July 2002 (http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2002/07/26/045.html) [Accessed
26 July 2002] and Reuters, ‘Source: $1.7bln China pipe deal close’, The Moscow Times, 21 November
2002 (http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2002/11/21/046.html) [Accessed 21 November 2002]. For
further indications of Chinese involvement in the Eurasian area see R.H. Munro, ‘Central Asia and China’,
in M. Mandelbaum, ed., Central Asia and the World: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and
Turkmenistan (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994), pp 225–238 and A. Rashid and T.
Saywell, ‘Beijing gusher’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 26 February 1998.
29. R. Israeli, ‘Return to the source: the republics of Central Asia and the Middle East’, Central Asian Survey,
Vol 13, No 1, 1994, p 22.
30. A. Tarock, ‘Iran’s policy in Central Asia’, Central Asian Survey, Vol 16, No 2, 1997, pp 185–200; S.A.H.
Pasha, ‘Turkey and the republics of Central Asia: emerging relations and dilemmas’, International Studies,
Vol 34, No 3, 1997, pp 343–357; R. Ozey, ‘The geopolitical importance and the main problems of the
Turkic world’, Eurasian Studies, Vol 20, Special Issue, Summer 2001, pp 83–94; Foreign and Common-
wealth Office, ‘Iran’s relations with the states of Central Asia and Transcaucasia’, Background Brief
(London: FCO, August 1998.)
31. G. Dietl, ‘Quest for influence in Central Asia: India and Pakistan’, International Studies, Vol 34, No 2,
1997, p 143.
32. K.R. Singh, ‘Changing geopolitical environment and new South-West Asia’, International Studies, Vol 38,
No 4, 2001, pp 363–364.
33. T. Lansford, ‘The Great Game renewed? US–Russian rivalry in the arms trade of South Asia’, Security
Dialogue, Vol 33, No 2, 2002.
34. Following 1991, there were concerns over the location and existence of nuclear weapons within Central
Asia, but after these issues were dealt with in the years immediately following independence the interest
in security in the region diminished.
35. For example the Royal Society for Asian Affairs ran an edition of Asian Affairs that looked at the
ramifications of the American intervention. Several of the articles made reference to ‘The New Great
Game’ either explicitly or by implication. See Asian Affairs, Vol 33, Part 1, 2002. One commentator said
that the US victory in Afghanistan as part of the war on terrorism was ‘no such thing. It is another move
in the 150-year “Great Game”, pitting colonial powers against each other for control of Central Asia.’
See W.O. Beeman, ‘Op-Ed: “The Great Game” continues’, 15 November 2001 (http://www.brown.edu/
Administration/News Bureau/2001-02/01-057.html) [Accessed 30 May 2002].
36. N. Nougayrède, ‘Moscou veut étendre sa guerre «antiterroriste» à la Géorgie’ and ‘Un pays acculé entre
le jeu de Moscou et les ambitions de Washington’, Le Monde, 24–25 February 2002.
37. G. Prins, ‘Winners and losers in the oil war’, The Guardian, 26 November 2001.
38. Lansford, op cit, Ref 33.
39. Such as the Shanghai Forum, consisting of Russia, China and all the Central Asian states (except
Turkmenistan) J. Page, ‘Analysis—China and Russia kick of new Great Game’, Afghan Info Center, 15
June 2001 (http://www.afghan-info.com/Research Articles/Analysis china Russia.htm) [Accessed 30 May
2002].
40. Many NGOs have operated in Afghanistan during 2001 and 2002, especially since the fall of the Taleban,
including Médecins sans Frontière, Aide Medicale Internationale, CARE International, Oxfam, Global
Relief Foundation, DACAAR and SGAA in addition to UN agencies; (http://www.afghana.com/
Reconstruction/AfghanistanRehabilitation.htm) [Accessed 30 July 2002] and (http://www.careusa.org/
newsroom/specialreports/afghanistan/statement2.doc) [Accessed 30 July 2002]. They have, however, often
operated alongside official state government organisations such as the Russian Emergency Situations
Ministry. See M. Steen, ‘Kalashnikov-toting Russians bewilder Kabul’, The Moscow Times, 28 November
2001 (http://www.themoscowtimes.ru/stories/2001/11/28/003.html) [Accessed 28 November 2001].
41. In post-Taleban Afghanistan, for example, it was reported that the US administration allegedly paid for
certain key warlords to stay ‘on side’. J. Burke and P. Beaumont, ‘West pays warlords to stay in line’,
The Observer, 21 July 2002 (http://www.guardian.co.uk/afghanistan/story/0,1284,759203,00.html)
[Accessed 8 August 2002].

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42. S. Hoffman, Primacy or World Order (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978), p 175.
43. Shams-Ud-Din, ‘The New Great Game in Central Asia’, International Studies, Vol 34, No 3, 1997,
pp 339–340.
44. B.Z. Rumer, ‘The gathering storm in Central Asia’, Orbis, Vol 37, No 1, 1993, p 89.
45. For a discussion of the full meaning and range of the terms ‘Imperialism’ and ‘Empire’, see M.W. Doyle,
Empires (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986) and M. Hardt and A. Negri, Empire (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2000). For a view of decolonization in Central Asia, see J. Grant,
‘Decolonization by default: independence in Soviet Central Asia’, Central Asian Survey, Vol 13, No 1,
1994, pp 51–58.
46. E. Ingram, The Beginning of the Great Game in Asia, 1828–1834 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), p 339.
47. W.E. Odom, ‘The Caspian Sea littoral states: the object of a New Great Game?’, Caspian Crossroads, Vol
3, No 3, 1998 (http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/usazerb/332.htm) [Accessed 31 July 2002].
48. From the British side, the actual likelihood that Russian advances into Afghanistan would have resulted
in the threatening of India with hordes of Cossacks has been questioned; ‘not everyone was convinced that
the Russians intended to try and wrest India from Britain’s grasp, or that they were militarily capable of
doing so’. Hopkirk, op cit, Ref 3, p 6. ‘It did seem … that the antagonists in the Great Game were mutually
prone to exaggerating each other’s capacity for mischief, and that it was hard now to discern what
enduring benefit Russia or Britain derived from dominion over so much Asian real estate.’ H.V. Hodson,
editor of the London Sunday Times, and formerly of All Souls College, Oxford, was reported as saying
of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, using it as an analogous situation, that ‘Our greatest nightmare, our
overriding fear, was that the Russians would occupy Afghanistan, with calamitous results. And what
happened? In 1979, they did invade—they crossed the Oxus, they rolled their tanks into Kabul on the very
highway built by Russian foreign aid, just as many of us said they would. And it really didn’t matter.’
‘… dominion over Kabul did not assure the Kremlin mastery of Iran, Pakistan, or the Persian Gulf.’ Meyer
and Brysac, op cit, Ref 3, p 557.
49. A.M. Jaffe and M.B. Olcott, ‘The geopolitics of Caspian energy’, in Lynch and Kalyuzhnova, op cit, Ref
2, p 75.
50. Shams-Ud-Din, op cit, Ref 43, p 339.
51. Odom, op cit, Ref 47.
52. S. Blank, ‘Every shark east of Suez: great power interests, policies and tactics in the Transcaspian energy
wars’, Central Asian Survey, Vol 18, No 2, 1999, p 150.
53. For an article on energy as a Russian political tool, see A. Wendlant, ‘High politics help grease the wheels
of trade’, The Financial Times, 9 April 2001.
54. Shams-Ud-Din, op cit, Ref 43, p 330.
55. In the case of oil concessions, multinational oil companies, often working in tandem, local oil companies,
smaller in size, and governmental officials, are determined that the interests of the state are met. See
Rashid and Saywell, op cit, Ref 28, pp 46–50. The article details the efforts made by the China National
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) to secure energy reserves throughout the world, efforts that, geography
aside, seem very similar to ones detailed in Central Asia as belonging to the New Great Game.
56. C. Miles, ‘The Caspian pipeline debate continues: why not Iran?’, Journal of International Affairs, Vol 53,
No 1, 1999, p 327.
57. Prime-Tass, ‘BP eyes Caspian stake’, The Moscow Times, 25 November 2002 (http://
www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2002/11/25/061.html) [Accessed 25 November 2002].
58. The exception to this rule is state owned companies that can be used as tools of policy, for example the
China National Petroleum Corporation.
59. For example, the Kashgan project in Kazakhstan is operated by the Agip Kazakhstan North Caspian
Operating Company (Agip KCO) (formerly OKIOC) which is owned by: ENI–Agip (Italy) 16.67%; BG
(UK) 16.67%; ExxonMobil (USA) 16.67%; TotalFinaElf (France/Belgium) 16.67%; Royal Dutch/Shell
(UK/Netherlands) 16.67%; Inpex 8.33%; Phillips (USA) 8.33 (http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/kazaproj.html)
[Accessed 6 August 2002].
60. O.F. Tanmisever, ‘Russia and the independent Turkic states: discovering the meaning of independence’,
Eurasian Studies, Vol 20, Special Issue, Summer 2001, p 101.
61. T. Adams, ‘Oil and geopolitical strategy in the Caucasus’, Asian Affairs, Vol 33, Part 1 (Old Series Vol
86), 1999, p 14.
62. The Caspian Pipeline Consortium, often viewed as a macrocosm of the New Great Game, consists of a
sharing agreement between Russia 24%; Kazakhstan 19%; ChevronTexaco (USA) 15%; LukArco
(Russia/USA) 12.5%; Rosneft–Shell (Russia–UK/Netherlands) 7.5%; ExxonMobil (USA) 7.5%; Oman
7%; Agip (Italy) 2%; BG (UK) 2%; Kazakh Pipelines (Kazakhstan) 1.75%; Oryx (U.S.) 1.75%.
(http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/kazaproj.html) [Accessed 6 August 2002].
63. Reuters, ‘China pipeline terms agreed’, The Moscow Times, 26 July 2002 (http://

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www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2002/07/26/045.html) [Accessed 26 July 2002]. A strategic partnership

between Russia and China was formed in 1996, though it has been argued that this is rather more limited
in scope than the title suggests due to pragmatic concerns and economic limitations. J. Anderson, ‘The
limits of Sino–Russian strategic partnership’, Adelphi Paper 315 (Oxford: International Institute for
Strategic Studies/Oxford University Press, 1997.)
64. R. Allison, ‘Structures and frameworks for security policy cooperation in Central Asia’, in R. Allison and
E. Jonson, eds, Central Asian Security: The New International Context (London & Washington D.C.: The
Royal Institute of International Affairs & The Brooking Institution, 2001), pp 219–245.
65. N. Berry, ‘Preventing another ‘Great Game’ in Central Asia: the Shanghai Five plus Six’ (http://
www.cdi.org/asia/fa011201.html) [Accessed 30 May 2002]. M. Mamadshoyev, ‘The Shanghai G-5
becomes the Shanghai Forum’, Eurasia Insight, 7 July 2000 (http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/
insight/articles/eav070700.shtml) [Accessed 7 August 2002].
66. Allison, op cit, Ref 64, p 234.
67. R. Strausz-Hupé, Geopolitics: The Struggle for Power (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1942), p 155.
68. C. Harada, ‘Russia and North-east Asia’, Adelphi Paper 310 (Oxford: International Institute for Strategic
Studies/Oxford University Press, 1997), p 37.
69. C.D. Maass, ‘The Afghanistan conflict: external involvement’, Central Asian Survey, Vol 18, No 1, 1999,
p 77.
70. M.J. Valencia, ‘China and the South China Sea dispute’, Adelphi Paper 298 (Oxford: International
Institute for Strategic Studies/Oxford University Press, 1995).
71. T. Pahlevan, ‘Iran and Central Asia’, in T. Akabaki and J. O’Kane, eds, Post-Soviet Central Asia (London
& Leiden: Tauris Academic Studies & The International Institute for Asia Studies, 1998), p 79.
72. For example, Ozey, op cit, Ref 30, pp 83–94.
73. 73. The Economist, 17 June 1995, p 64.
74. Following the article by Harold Sprout, ‘Geopolitical hypotheses in technological perspective’, World
Politics, Vol 15, No 2, 1963, pp 187–212, geopolitics came to be identified with exploitation of knowledge
to serve the aims of a national regime—associated through the works of Karl Haushofer with the
aggressive actions of Nazi Germany. The term ‘geopolitics’ became value-laden, and despite the discipline
having a heritage that could be traced back to Hippocrates and Aristotle, it became a concept that was
frowned upon. Since the end of the Cold War geopolitics has experienced a revival in defence and military
analysis. However, in contemporary analysis, the realist preoccupation with territorial defence has given
way to neoliberal concerns over interdependence and world politics based on economic considerations.
‘Geoeconomics’ is said to have replaced geopolitics as the guiding motivation for foreign policy
formulation and conduct. Summary taken from G. Evans and J. Newham, The Penguin Dictionary of
International Relations (London: Penguin, 1998). For a further explanation of geopolitics, see D. Weiser,
“ ‘Geopolitics”—renaissance of a controversial concept’, Aussenpolitik, Vol 45, No 4, 1994, pp 402–411.
75. O. Tuomi, ‘The new geopolitics—the world system and Northern Europe seen from a modern geopolitical
perspective’, Finnish Defence Studies, No 11 (Helsinki: National Defence College, 1998), p 28, cited in
B. Ferrari, ‘Some considerations about the methods and the nature of political geography and geopolitics’
(http://www.ciari.org/investigacao/bruno ferrari.htm) [Accessed 8 August 2002].
76. Weiser, op cit, Ref 74, p 402.
77. D. Retaillé, ‘La geopolitique dans l’historie’, Espaces Temps, Nos 68–70, 1998, pp 187–201. Reprinted:
D. Retaillé, ‘Geopolitics in history’, in J. Lévy, ed., From Geopolitics to Global Politics: A French
Connection (London: Frank Cass, 2001), pp 35–51. According to Retaillé the first geopolitical formula is
grouped under the term imperialist as ‘it is the basic principle of colonial conquest and also shows
hegemony taken to extremes in arkhe (sovereignty and its expansion)’ (p 37) using space and area as the
basis of positions. The state model takes territory as its basis with linear frontiers identifying it; ‘These
may emerge from ethnic or political bases from original cores and centres, or be enclosed within limits
inherited from the colonial episode or from different international settlements and treaties. In any event,
national identity is sought and asserted’ (p 39), with the model allowing for zonal centre–perhipery
regional units. The universalist models are not immediately geopolitical; ‘they only become so by virtue
of the paradox on which they are based and the context that they provide both for the imperialist and state
models. The paradox results from the assertion of values of a universal nature … stemming from local
philosophical and political traditions that are in conflict’ (p 40), allowing for the formation of ‘culture
areas’.
78. Mackinder proposed his ideas in H.J. Mackinder, ‘The geographical pivot of history’, Geographical
Journal, Vol 23, 1904, pp 421–437 and in H.J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the
Politics of Reconstruction (London: Constable & Co., 1919). His argument that the Central Eurasian pivot
area was key to the control of world politics was summed up in his famous phrase: ‘Who rules East Europe

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commands the Heartland; Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island; Who rules the World
Island commands the World.’
79. Geographical determinism, a thread that underlies much of the New Great Game literature, ignores one of
Mackinder’s major tenants as ‘the actual balance of political power at any given time is, of course, the
product, on the one hand of geographical conditions, both economic and strategic, and, on the other hand,
of the relative number, virility, equipment and organisation of competing peoples’. H.J. Mackinder, (1904)
op cit, Ref 78, p 437.
80. Mackinder’s 1904 theories, for example, were not intended to be eternal truths in world politics; while they
were written to convey a warning of allowing too large a state to dominate the Eurasian continent, they
were also written to promote the view that a united British Empire was essential for imperial defence,
something that was being heavily debated at the time. See B.W. Blouet, Sir Halford Mackinder,
1861–1947; Some New Perspectives (Research Paper 13, School of Geography, University of Oxford, May
1975.)
81. E.W. Gilbert, ‘Introduction’, in H.J. Mackinder, The Scope and Methods of Geography and The
Geographical Pivot of History (London: The Royal Geographical Society, 1951), p 12.
82. S. Thompson, ‘A lexicon of “Brezezinski-isms” ’, Executive Intelligence Review, 9 April 1999 (http://
www.larouchepub.com/other/1999/thompson brzezinski 2615.html) [Accessed 8 August 2002].
83. Brzezinski, op cit, Ref 12, p 124.
84. Ibid, p 148.
85. Ibid, p 39.
86. G. Sloan, ‘Sir Harold Mackinder: the heartland theory then and now’, in C.S. Gray and G. Sloan,
Geopolitics: Geography and Strategy (London: Frank Cass, 1999), p 32.
87. The heartland–rimland theories were proposed, respectively, by Mackinder and Spykman. Mackinder
argued the heartland would dominate world politics; Spykman argued that the rimland—the circle of land
surrounding the heartland—could be used to contain the heartland and nullify its influence. In reality this
geopolitical theory turned in to the containment policy that was followed by the USA during the Cold War.
For maps of the heartland/rimland concepts in comparison, see M. Hauner, What is Asia to Us? (London:
Taylor & Francis, 1992.)
88. C.J. Fettweis, ‘Sir Halford Mackinder, geopolitics and policymaking in the 21st century’, Parameters,
Summer 2000, pp 58–71. (http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/00summer/fettweis.htm)
[Accessed 8 August 2002].

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