SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 183952, August 05, 2015 ]

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that the Court, Special First Division, issued a Resolution dated August 5, 2015 which
reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 183952 - CZARINA T. MALVAR, Petitioner, v. KRAFT FOODS PHILS., INC., and/or BIENVENIDO
BAUTISTA, and KRAFT FOODS, INTERNATIONAL, Respondents. - The reply of intervenor Dasal Llasos
and Associates to petitioner's comment on the notice of withdrawal as counsel and entry of appearance
as counsel for the intervenor is NOTED, and the petitioner's reply to the intervenor's consolidated
comment on the separate motions for reconsideration of the Decision dated September 9, 2013 as
required in the Resolution dated April 15, 2015 and the petitioner's comment on respondents' motion
for reconsideration of the said decision as required in the Resolution dated February 19, 2014
are DISPENSED WITH.

For consideration are the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration [1] vis-a-vis the decision promulgated
on September 9, 2013,[2] and the respondents' Comment dated May 28, 2014 on the Motion for
Reconsideration.

To recall, decision promulgated on September 9, 2013 disposed as follows:

SO ORDERED.[3]

Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration

The petitioner seeks to reverse the award of contingent fees in favor of intervenor Law Firm of Dasal,
Llasos and Associates because the latter's involvement in her case had been confined to proofreading
and editing of the pleadings filed in the Court of Appeals (CA) and in this Court. She posits that such
pleadings had been prepared by her counsel, Atty. Dante A. Carandang, while the pleadings filed in the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) had been prepared and signed only by Atty. Richard B.
Dasal and Atty. Marwil N. Llasos;[4] that, accordingly, the intervenor should recover attorney's fees based
only on quantum  meruit; and that the Motion to Intervene to Protect Attorney's Rights filed by the
intervenor should have been denied for lack of the required verification.

We DENY the Motion for Reconsideration.

The recovery of attorney's fees on the basis of quantum  meruit[5] is authorized only when: (1) there is no
express contract for the payment of attorney's fees agreed upon between the attorney and the client;
(2) when although there is a formal contract for attorney's fees, the fees stipulated are found
unconscionable or unreasonable by the court; (3) when the written contract for attorney's fees is void
due to purely formal defects of execution; (4) when the counsel, for justifiable cause, was not able to
finish the engagement to its conclusion; and (5) when the attorney and the client disregard the contract
for attorney's fees.[6]

None of these circumstances applies herein. In the decision of September 9, 2013, we declared that the
engagement agreement between the petitioner and the intervenor was a valid contingent fee
agreement; hence, we declared to be reasonable the contingent fee of 10% of the P41,627,593.75 and
10% of the value of the stock option. Consequently, there being an express written agreement, there is
no reason to fix the intervenor's attorney's fees based on quantum  meruit.[7]

The petitioner's earlier submission that the intervenor's participation was limited to the preparation,
fmalization and submission of the petition in the Court, as noted in our decision of September 9, 2013,
[8]
 belied her insistence that the intervenor had only proofread and edited the pleadings. Even assuming
that such was true, We have underscored in the decision of September 9, 2013 that the practice of law
was not limited to the conduct of cases or litigations but embraces also the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incidental thereto, as well as the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf
of the clients.[9]

Neither can we allow the petitioner to renege on her obligation to pay the intervenor the rightful
compensation on account of the resignation of the handling attorney or the latter's appointment to
some public office. A client who retains a law firm engages the services of the entire law firm, and the
assignment of a member of the law firm to personally handle the case or matter subject of the
engagement does not exclude the rest of the law firm. Once the attorney thus assigned to handle the
case resigns or disengages from the law firm the engagement is not severed, for the law firm is bound to
replace him.[10] Consequently, Atty. Dasal's appointment to the public service, and Atty. Llasos'
resignation from the Law Firm of Dasal, Llasos and Associates did not terminate the law firm as the
petitioner's counsel of record.

The petitioner's contention that the motion for intervention of the law firm should be verified is
unmeritorious. In general, a pleading or motion need not be verified, unless a law or rule specifically
requires its verification.[11] With the petitioner not having told us of such a law or rule, we state that the
intervenor's motion for intervention need not be verified. In any event, a verification is a formal
requirement that is not jurisdictional, and is mainly designed to secure an assurance that the matters
averred in pleading or motion are averred in good faith, or are true and correct and do not arise from
speculation.[12]

In the attempt to sway the Court to the petitioner's side, Atty. Carandang has stated the following:
1. Retired   Justice   Josue   N.   Bellosillo   seemed   to   be   like   the proverbial Juan Tamad who
merely waited for the ripe guava to fall into his mouth,[13]
2. If there was ever any fault in this case, it was the egregious fault of    Retired    Justice    Josue   
N. Bellosillo    who    was    so unprofessional, unethical and immoral in his dealings, with his
clients such as the petitioner in the case at bar. Retired Justice Josue N. Bellosillo only had
himself to blame for his voracious quest for money which he does not deserve.[14]
3. No hands, it seems can be dirtier that Retired Justice Associate Josue N. Bellosillo. He is
nothing but an influence peddler, or a high-class fixer in the Supreme Court, in the manner
that he represented himself to the petitioner that he had the power or influence as a retired
 Associate Justice of the Supreme Court to make the ponente and other members of the
Honorable Court to decide in favor of the petitioner.[15]
4. Retired Justice Josue N. Bellosillo did not act in good faith and honesty. He is the paragon of
the opposite.[16]
5. The service provided by Retired Justice Josue N. Bellosillo was limited   to   merely   editing   or
proofreading   the   Motion   for Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals and the Petition
before the Honorable   Court  for  which  he   was   already  more  than compensated. To ask
more is tantamount to unjust enrichment if not unbridled greed.[17]
6. Accusing  the   Intervenor   for  being   guilty   of  Tax   Evasion, Influence Peddling, Estafa and
not remitting to the Intervenor the latter's fee in causing the release of a partial award in favor
of the petitioner in the amount of P14,252,192.12 and not issuing a receipt or declaring the
same to the BIR for Income Tax purpose.[18]

There is no question that Atty. Carandang's statements against Justice Bellosillo are harsh and offensive
towards a fellow attorney. We do not tolerate the harshness and offensiveness, for such harshness and
offensiveness definitely deserve no place in an attorney's forensic arsenal to argue the side of his client.
We have always reminded attorneys about their basic duty to observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts of justice and judicial officers,[19] and to their brethren in the Law Profession.[20] Language,
though forceful, must still be dignified, and, though emphatic, must remain respectful as befitting
advocates and in keeping with the dignity of the Law Profession.[21] As an officer of the Court, Atty.
Carandang should temper his language, exercise utmost prudence in his choice of words in fashioning
his statements to support his client's side, and practice self-restraint; otherwise, the dawning of the day
when wrangling attorneys will frequently forsake their bonds of brotherhood and mutual respect will
not be far. If that happens, the people's high esteem and regard for the institution of justice of which
the courts and attorneys have been essential pillars will be destroyed.[22]

Atty. Carandang is required to show cause in writing within 10 days from notice why he should not be
administratively sanctioned for his harshness and offensiveness towards a fellow attorney.
Respondents' Comment on
the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration

The respondents filed their Comment dated May 28, 2014 on the petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration,[23] stating:
1. There was no evidence showing that a conspiracy existed between them and the petitioner
considering that: (a) it was she, not them, who had initiated and worked for the re-opening of
settlement talks; (b) it was she who had accepted the P54 Million at a time when her money
claims were still unsettled, in doubt and at risk of being nullified by the Court; and (c) in entering
into their compromise agreement, they and the petitioner only exercised the right of all litigants
to amicably settle their disputes;
2. There was no evidence showing that the respondents had connived with the petitioner in
entering into the compromise agreement with the intention of depriving the intervenor of the
attorney's fees. In fact, the intervenor's Motion for Intervention contained only internal
documents exchanged between the intervenor and the petitioner, and the respondents were
not privy to such exchange, or informed about it. The intervenor did not present clear and
persuasive evidence to prove that the respondents committed bad faith and fraud in respect of
its attorney's fees.
3. The ruling is based on a misapprehension of the facts because: (a) there was nothing unusual
about the timing of the intervenor's termination as the petitioner's counsel and of the execution
 of the compromise agreement; (b) the petitioner was not legally entitled to the value of the
stock option, and was already awarded to her; and (c) that the silence of the compromise
agreement about the intervenor's contingent fees bolstered the respondents' lack of knowledge
about the fee arrangement between her and the intervenor.
4. The decision finding them liable for the contingent fees along with the petitioner was premised
on suspicions and conjectures, as borne out by the intervenor's failure to present evidence to
prove their liability. The fact that the intervenor was not included in the compromise   
agreement    did    not    necessarily    mean that   the compromise agreement was entered into
in bad faith. Rather, the intervenor's non-inclusion in the compromise agreement was due to
the respondents' lack of knowledge the internal arrangement between her and the intervenor.
Thus, her counsel of record then and now remained to be Atty. Carandang.

We FIND the respondents' submissions devoid of merit.

The Comment to the Motion for Reconsideration brings up matters already passed upon and fully
considered in the decision promulgated on September 9, 2013. Worthy to reiterate are the findings of
bad faith and fraud on the part of the respondents and their conspiracy with the petitioner to defraud
the intervenor of its lawful attorney's fees, to wit:
Were the respondents also liable?

The respondents would be liable if they were shown to have connived with Malvar in the execution of
the compromise agreement, with the intention of depriving the Intervenor of its attorney's fees.
Thereby, they would be solidarity liable with her for the attorney's fees as stipulated in the written
agreement under the theory that they unfairly and unjustly interfered with the Intervenor's professional
relationship with Malvar.

The respondents insist that they were not bound by the written agreement, and should not be held
liable under it.

We disagree with the respondents' insistence. The respondents were complicit in Malvar's move to
deprive the Intervenor of its duly earned contingent fees.

First of all, the unusual timing of Malvar's letter terminating the Intervenor's legal representation of her,
of her Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw Case, and of the execution of compromise agreement manifested
her desire to evade her legal obligation to pay to the Intervenor its attorney's fees for the legal services
rendered. The objective of her withdrawal of the case was to release the respondents from all her claims
and causes of action in consideration of the settlement in the stated amount of P40,000.000.00, a sum
that was measly compared to what she was legally entitled to, which, to begin with, already included the
P41,627,593.75 and the value of the stock option already awarded to her. In other words, she thereby
waived more than what she was lawfully expected to receive from the respondents.

Secondly, the respondents suddenly turned around from their strong stance of berating her demand as
offensive to all precepts of justice and fair play and as a form of unjust enrichment for her to a
surprisingly generous surrender to her demand, allowing to her through their compromise agreement
the additional amount of P40,000,000.00 on top of the P14,252,192.12 already received by her in
August 2008. The softening unavoidably gives the impression that they were now categorically
conceding that Malvar deserved much more. Under those circumstances, it is plausible to conclude that
her termination of the Intervenor's services was instigated by their prodding in order to remove the
Intervenor from the picture for being a solid obstruction to the settlement for a much lower liability, and
thereby save for themselves and for her some more amount.

Thirdly, the compromise agreement was silent on the Intervenor's contingent fee, indicating that the
objective of the compromise agreement was to secure a huge discount from its liability towards Malvar.

Finally, contrary to the stipulation in the compromise agreement, only Malvar, minus the respondents,
filed the Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw Case.

At this juncture, the Court notes that the compromise agreement would have Malvar waive even the
substantial stock options already awarded by the NLRC's decision, which ordered the respondents to pay
to her, among others, the value of the stock options and all other bonuses she was entitled to or would
have been entitled to had she not been illegally dismissed from her employment. This ruling was
affirmed by the CA. But the waiver could not negate the Intervenor's right to 10% of the value of the
stock options she was legally entitled to under the decisions of the NLRC and the CA, for that right was
expressly stated in the written agreement between her and the Intervenor. Thus, the Intervenor should
be declared entitled to recover full compensation in accordance with the written agreement because it
did not assent to the waiver of the stock options, and did not waive its right to that part of its
compensation.

These circumstances show that Malvar and the respondents needed an escape from greater liability
towards the Intervenor, and from the possible obstacle to their plan to settle to pay. It cannot be simply
assumed that only Malvar would be liable towards the Intervenor at that point, considering that the
Intervenor, had it joined the negotiations as her lawyer, would have tenaciously fought all the way for
her to receive literally everything that she was entitled to, especially the benefits from the stock option.
Her rush to settle because of her financial concerns could have led her to accept the respondents' offer,
which offer could be further reduced by the Intervenor's expected demand for compensation. Thereby,
she and the respondents became joint tort-feasors who acted adversely against the interests of the
Intervenor. Joint tort-feasors are those who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise,
countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if
done for their benefit. They are also referred to as those who act together in committing wrong or
whose acts, if independent of each other, unite in causing a single injury. Under Article 2194 of the Civil
Code, joint tort-feasors are solidarily liable for the resulting damage. As regards the extent of their
respective liabilities, the Court said in Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals:
xxx. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without
which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and
recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of
the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the
injured person was not same. No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it
does not exceed the negligence of other acts. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is
liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.

There is no contribution between joint tort-feasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are
liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or
more persons, although acting independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a
single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the
injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury.        x x x.[24]
The Court concluded that the respondents were liable as joint tort-feasors, thus:
Joint tortfeasors are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if they had
performed the wrongful act themselves. It is likewise not an excuse for any of the joint tort-feasors that
individual participation in the tort was insignificant as compared to that of the other. To stress, joint
tort-feasors are not liable pro rata. The damages cannot be apportioned among them, except by
themselves. They cannot insist upon an apportionment, for the purpose of each paying an aliquot part.
They are jointly and severally liable for the whole amount. Thus, as joint tortfeasors, Malvar and the
respondents should be held solidarity liable to the Intervenor. There is no way of appreciating these
circumstances except in this light.[25]

The respondents contend that the compromise agreement was not a badge or indication of their bad
faith or fraud, and of their connivance with the petitioner to deprive the intervenor of its attorney's fees,
but was simply their exercise of the right ordinarily given to litigants, and actually encouraged by no less
than the Court.

The decision was very clear on this issue. The petitioner as the client had the undoubted right to settle
her litigation without the intervention of his attorney, provided that the compromise agreement did not
adversely affect third persons who were not parties to the agreement. That was what transpired herein.
Basing on the circumstances surrounding the execution and the filing of the compromise agreement, it is
not difficult to see that the agreement was deliberately designed to deprive the intervenor, a third party
to the compromise agreement, of its lawful attorney's fees, to say the least, without his consent and
knowledge.

Moreover, our findings support the view that the petitioner clearly abused her "right" to enter into a
compromise agreement with the respondents. The same can be said about the respondents. The
petitioner and the respondents therefore cannot take refuge in their agreement, in the guise of
exercising a right, and trample upon the rights and welfare of the Intervenor. Such clearly runs smack
against the Civil Code provision which mandates that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and
in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good
faith.[26]
Comment on Intervenor's Notice of
Withdrawal of Counsel and Entry of Appearance

On August 5, 2014, the Court received from the petitioner a Comment [27] to the Intervenor's counsel's
Notice of Withdrawal as Counsel[28] (Notice) and Entry of Appearance[29] (Entry) of Intervenor's new
counsel respectively filed on June 18, 2014 and June 25, 2014. She claims that the Notice of Withdrawal
of Counsel and the Entry of Appearance for the Intervenor did not deserve consideration because the
signature was illegible although the Notice contained the conformity of Justice Bellosillo and the Law
Firm of Dasal Llasos & Associates; that she had personal knowledge of the fact that the law partnership
did not anymore exist because the partners had already quit the partnership; and that the validity of the
Entry of Appearance did not bear the conformity and authorization of the intervenor.

The Court finds no need to pass upon the matter considering that the petitioner and her counsel, Atty.
Carandang, lacked the personality and interest to challenge the Notice and the Entry, which concerned
only the client and the attorney concerned. With neither the petitioner nor Atty. Carandang being the
client of the withdrawing counsel and of the new counsel, neither would run the risk of being prejudiced
by the change of counsel. Neither of them would sustain any injury, direct or indirect, from the change
of counsel.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit; and NOTES WITHOUT
ACTION the Comment on the Motion for Reconsideration; and ORDERS Atty. Dante A. Carandang
to SHOW CAUSE in writing, within ten (10) days from notice, why he should not be disciplined for
conduct unbecoming of a lawyer and an officer of the court. MENDOZA, J., acting member
vice REYES, J., per S.O. Nos. 2085 and 2112 dated June 29, 2015 and July 16, 2015, respectively.

SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) EDGAR O. ARICHETA

[1]
 Rollo, pp. 950-962.

[2]
 G.R. No. 183952,705 SCRA 242.

[3]
 Id. at 274.

[4]
 Rollo, p. 960.

[5]
 Literally meaning "as much as he deserves"

[6]
 Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo and Africa v. Eastern Telecommunications Phils., Inc.,    G.R. No. 104600,
July 2, 1999, 309 SCRA 566, 575-576.

[7]
 National Power Corporation v. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay, G.R. No. 165828 August 24 2011 656
SCRA 60, 96.

[8]
 Supra note 2, at 263.

[9]
 Id. at 267.

[10]
 Balgami v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131287, December 9, 2004, 445 SCRA 591,601.

[11]
 Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Evangelista, G.R. No. 146553, November 27 2002  393 SCRA 187,201.

[12]
 Vallacar Transit, Inc. v. Catubig, G.R. No. 175512, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 281, 293.

[13]
 Rollo, p. 954.

[14]
 Id. at 957.

[15]
 Id.

[16]
 Id. at 959.
[17]
 Id. at 961-962.

[18]
 Id. at. 951,957, 958, 960.

[19]
 Section 20(b), Rule 13 8, Rules of Court.

[20]
 Rule 8.01, Canon 8, Code of Professional Responsibility.

[21]
 See, e.g., Re: Conviction of Judge Adoration G. Angeles, RTC Br. 121, Caloocan City in Crim. Cases Nos.
Q-97-69655 to 56 for Child Abuse, A.M. 06-9-545-RTC, January 31, 2008, 543 SCRA 196, 214-215.

[22]
 Habawal v. Court of Tax Appeals, First Division, G.R. No. 174759, September 7 2011  657 SCRA 138,
157. 23 Rollo, pp. 1046-1055.

[24]
 Supra note 2, at 269-272.

[25]
 Id. at 272-273.

[26]
 Article 19, Civil Code.

[27]
 Rollo, pp. 1101-1104.

[28]
 Id. at 1056-1059.

[29]
 Id. at 1060-1065.

Source: Supreme Court E-Library | Date created: December 29, 2015

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