[G.R. No. 113296.
January 16, 1998]
ABC DAVAO AUTO SUPPLY, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, ABUNDIO T. MERCED, doing business under the
name and style of SOUTHERN ENGINEERING
WORKS, respondents.
DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:
On October 6, 1980, a complaint for a sum of money, attorney’s fees and
damages was filed by petitioner before the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
[1]
Court) of Davoa City which was raffled to Branch XVI. The pre-trial was conducted by
Judge Pacita Canizares-Nye and later by Judges Alejandro Siazon and Cristeto
Dinopol.5 During the trial on November 20, 1984, Judge Renato Fuentes heard the
[2]
evidence for petitioner and private respondent, but the latter’s cross examination on
August 28, 1985 and the presentation of the parties’ rebuttal and sur-rebuttal evidences
were heard by Judge Roque Agton, having assumed office on August 1, 1985. When
the judiciary was reorganized under the Aquino administration, Judge Agton was
transferred to another branch of the Regional Trial Court, (RTC) but within the same
[3]
Judicial Region. Meanwhile, Judge Romeo Marasigan, who assumed office on
February 3, 1987, was assigned to Branch XVI.
[4]
Sometime on May 1987, Judge Marasigan acted on private respondent’s motion for
extension of time to file memorandum. On June 9, 1987 a decision penned by Judge
Agton was rendered in favor of petitioner. Private respondent moved to reconsider said
decision, but the same was denied in an order dated March 1, 1988, issued by Judge
Marasigan. Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) which nullified
Judge Agton’s decision on the ground that at the time he rendered the judgment, he
was neither the judge de jure nor the judge de facto of the RTC Branch XVI, and
correspondingly remanded the case to the lower court. Hence, this petition on the sole
[5]
issue of whether or not the decision of Judge Agton is valid.
It is a rule that a case is deemed submitted for decision upon the filing of the last
pleading, brief or memorandum required by the rules, or by the court. Records disclose
that this case was submitted for decision sometime on March 1987 after the parties’
submission of their memoranda as required by the court, at which time Judge
Marasigan was already presiding in Branch XVI. Thus, the case was submitted for
decision to Judge Marasigan and not to Judge Agton who by then was already
transferred to another branch. Judge Agton’s decision, therefore, appears to be tainted
with impropriety. Nevertheless, the subsequent motion for reconsideration of Judge
Agton’s decision was acted upon by Judge Marasigan himself and his denial of the said
motion indicates that he subscribed with the adopted in toto Judge Agton’s
decision. Any incipient defect was cured. Besides, the presumption that both
magistrates (Agton and Marasigan) have regularly performed their official functions,
have not at all been rebutted by contrary evidence.
[6]
Moreover, for a judgment to be binding, it must be duly signed and promulgated
during the incumbency of the judge whose signature appears thereon. This is in line
[7]
with the Court’s En Banc resolution of February 10, 1983 implementing B.P. 129 which [8]
“merely requires that the judge who pens the decision is still an incumbent judge, i.e., in
this case, a judge of the same court, albeit now assigned to a different branch, at the
time the decision is promulgated.” Branches of the trial court are not distinct and
[9]
separate tribunals from each other. Hence, contrary to private respondent’s allegation,
[10]
Judge Agton could not have possibly lost jurisdiction over the case, because jurisdiction
does not attach to the judge but to the court. The continuity of a court and the efficacy
[11]
of its proceedings are not affected by the death, resignation, or cessation from the
service of the judge presiding over it. To remand a validly decided case to the
incumbent Presiding Judge Branch XVI, as what the CA suggest, would only prolong of
the Court to accord a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition for every action [12]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals appealed from is hereby SET
ASIDE and the decision of Judge Agton is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED
