he essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be administratively sanctioned for

the acts complained of.

Once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, he is required by the CPR to undertake the task with zeal, care,
and utmost devotion. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and
gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client's cause. Every case which a  lawyer accepts deserves full
attention, diligence, skill, and competence, regardless of its importance. [19] To this end, Canons 15, 17,
18, and Rule 18.03 of the CPR respectively state:
CANON 15 – A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness[,] and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions
with his clients.

CANON 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust reposed
in him.

CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.

"Clients are led to expect that lawyers would always be mindful of their cause and, accordingly, exercise
the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. On the other hand, the  lawyer is expected to
maintain, at all times, a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and
competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether or not he accepts it for a fee. To this
end, he is enjoined to employ only fair and honest means to attain lawful objectives." [20]

In this case, records show that sometime in January 2014, complainant secured respondent's services in
order to assist him in filing his Nullity Case, and in connection therewith, paid the latter the amount of
P120,000.00. Initially, respondent followed through with his undertaking by filing the necessary petition
before the RTC. However, after such filing, respondent unduly neglected the Nullity Case, as evinced not
only by the RTC Order[21] dated July 2, 2015 which dismissed the case for respondent's failure to comply
with the trial court's directives, but also by the RTC Order [22] dated January 22, 2016 which ordered the
archival of the case due to his non-filing of any pleadings in furtherance of the case after its
reinstatement.[23]

In an attempt to exculpate himself from any liability, respondent offered the excuse that his inaction
was because he got "depressed" when the Court suspended him from engaging in legal practice in the
case of Baens,  and that in any case, he had met with complainant and already advised him to look for a
replacement counsel. However, and as aptly pointed out by the IC, respondent's reasons are untenable,
considering that: (a)  there was a considerable period, i.e.,  seven (7) months, between the filing of the
petition and the time he learned of his suspension, and that it was never shown that he took steps to
move forward with the Nullity Case during that time; and (b)  assuming that he indeed gave such advice
to complainant, he did not take positive steps to ensure his timely replacement.

Accordingly, respondent's neglect of the legal matter entrusted to him by complainant constitutes
flagrant violations of the afore-cited tenets of the CPR. It is settled that "once a  lawyer takes up the
cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter with competence, and to attend to such client's
cause with diligence, care, and devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to
such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him. Therefore,
a lawyer's neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for
which he must be held administratively liable x x x," [24] as in this case.

Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on respondent, case law provides that in instances where
the lawyer commits similar acts against their respective clients, the Court imposed on them the penalty
of suspension from the practice of law. In Segovia-Ribaya v. Lawsin,[25] the delinquent lawyer was
suspended for a period of one (1) year for failing to perform his undertaking under his retainership
agreement with his client.[26] In Jinon v. Jiz,[27] the derelict lawyer was suspended for two (2) years for his
failure to perform what was needed from him by his client. [28] In Go v. Buri,[29] the Court suspended the
erring lawyer for a period of two (2) years for, inter alia,  neglecting her client's affairs. In view of the
foregoing – as well as the fact that respondent was earlier suspended in the case of  Baens  for
committing similar negligent acts to the prejudice of his client – the Court deems it proper to impose on
him the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, as recommended by
the IBP Board of Governors.

Finally, the Court notes that complainant paid respondent the total amount of P120,000.00 representing
the latter's legal fees "inclusive of all the necessary and incidental expenses for the [Nullity Case] x x x up
to the release of the decision [in connection thereto]." [30] However, since it appears from the records
that the only things that respondent did for petitioner in the Nullity Case were: (a)  the filing of the
initiatory pleading, i.e.,  the petition;"[31] and (b)  the filing of a motion for reconsideration [32] which led to
the reinstatement of the said petition,[33] the Court finds it appropriate to order respondent to
return[34] to complainant within ten (10) days from receipt of this Decision, the legal fees of
P120,000.00 he received less the amount commensurate to the works that he had done in the Nullity
Case, which the Court pegs at about P20,000.00 [35] – or a total of P100,000.00. Furthermore, interest at
the rate of six percent (6%) per annum is imposed on the said amount, which shall accrue from the time
of respondent's receipt of this Decision until full payment. To be sure, since the obligation to return
arose – and thus, became due and demandable – only from the time of the Court's resolution of
respondent's administrative liability, interest on the said monetary amount should begin to accrue once
respondent has been duly notified of his administrative liability – that is, upon receipt of the Court's
Decision herein.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jonathan T. Sempio (respondent) is found guilty of violating Canons 15,
17, 18, and Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, effective immediately upon
his receipt of this Decision. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely.

Further, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainant Alfredo San Gabriel within ten (10) days from
receipt of this Decision, part of the legal fees he received from the latter in the amount of P100,000.00,
which shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from his receipt of this Decision
until full payment. Respondent shall submit to the Court proof of restitution within ten (10) days from
payment. Failure to comply with this directive shall warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.

Finally, respondent is DIRECTED to report to this Court the date of his receipt of this Decision to enable
it to determine when his suspension from the practice of law shall take effect.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to: (1) the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent's personal record as an attorney; (2) the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its information
and guidance; and (3) the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

Bersamin, C.J., Carpio, Peralta, Del Castillo, A. Reyes, Jr., Gesmundo, J. Reyes, Jr., Hernando,
Carandang, and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.
Leonen, J., on official leave.
Jardeleza, J., on official business.
Caguioa, J., on leave.

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on March 26, 2019 a Decision, copy attached herewith, was rendered by the
Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on July 15,
2019 at 8:44 a.m.
Very truly yours,

(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETA

[1]
 Rollo,  pp. 2-5.

[2]
 Id. at 22.

[3]
 See Acknowledgement Receipt signed by respondent; id. at 23.

[4]
 Dated January 28, 2014; id. at 6-12.

[5]
 See id. at 2-3. See also id. at 92-93.

[6]
 Id. at 20. Penned by Presiding Judge Carlos M. Flores.

[7]
 Dated April 29, 2015. Not attached to the rollo.  See also id. at 20.

[8]
 See Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Publish Summons dated August 17, 2015; id. at 15-18.

[9]
 See Order dated August 24, 2015; id. at 19.
[10]
 See Order dated January 22, 2016 signed by Acting Presiding Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr.; id. at 21.

[11]
 735 Phil. 492 (2014).

[12]
 See rollo,  pp. 3-4. See also id. at 92-93.

[13]
 See respondent's Answer dated December 4, 2016; id. at 37-47.

[14]
 See id. at 41-44. See also id. at 93.

[15]
 Id. at 92-95. Penned by Commissioner Ricardo M. Espina.

[16]
 Id. at 95.

[17]
 Id. at 93-95.

[18]
 See Notice of Resolution in CBD Case No. 16-4927 signed by National Secretary Doroteo B. Aguila; id.
at 90-91.

[19]
 See Padilla v. Samson,  A.C. No. 10253. August 22, 2017, 837 SCRA 352, 357
citing Rollon  v. Naraval,  493 Phil. 24, 29 (2005).

[20]
 Id. at 358-359, citing Pitcher v. Gagate,719 Phil. 82, 91 (2013).

[21]
 Rollo,  p. 20.

[22]
 Id. at 21.

[23]
 See Order dated August 24, 2015; id. at 19.

[24]
 See Go v. Buri,  A.C. No. 12296, December 4, 2018, citing Dongga-As v. Cruz-Angeles,  792 Phil. 611,
619 (2016).

[25]
 721 Phil. 44 (2013).

[26]
 See id. at 52.

[27]
 705 Phil. 321 (2013).

[28]
 See id. at 330.

[29]
 Supra note 27.

[30]
 See Contract of Legal Services; rollo,  p. 22.

[31]
  Id. at 6-12.

[32]
 Id. at 15-18.
[33]
 See Order dated August 24, 2015; id. at 19.

[34]
 "It is well to note that while the Court has previously held that disciplinary proceedings should only
revolve around the determination of the respondent-lawyer's administrative and not his civil liability, it
must be clarified that this rule remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil in
nature – for instance, when the claim involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a
transaction separate and distinct and not intrinsically linked to his professional engagement. Hence,
since respondent received the aforesaid amount as part of her legal fees, the Court finds the return
thereof to be in order." (See Go v. Buri,  supra note 24.)

[35]
 "The recovery of attorney's fees on the basis of quantum  meruit  is a device that prevents an
unscrupulous client from running away with the fruits of the legal services of counsel without paying for
it and also avoids unjust enrichment on the part of the attorney himself. An attorney must show that he
is entitled to reasonable compensation for the effort in pursuing the client's cause, taking into account
certain factors in fixing the amount of legal fees." (See Villarama  v. De Jesus,  G.R. No. 217004, April 17,
2017, 823 SCRA 1, 14, citing National Power Corporation v. Heirs of Sangkay  671 Phil. 569,605 [2011].)

Source: Supreme Court E-Library | Date created: July 25, 2019

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