EN BANC

[ B. M. No. 1036, June 10, 2003 ]

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, COMPLAINANT, VS. EDWIN L. RANA,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION

FACTS:
It appears from the records that this case stemmed from the letter,
[2]
 dated June 11, 2008, submitted by Atty. Aurelio C. Angeles, Jr. (Atty.
Angeles, Jr.), the Provincial Legal Officer of Bataan, to Hon. Remigio M.
Escalada, Jr. (Executive Judge), Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Bataan against Atty. Renato C. Bagay (respondent), for his alleged
notarization of 18 documents at the time he was out of the country from
March 13, 2008 to April 8, 2008.

In his comment,[7] dated 27 March 2009, respondent claimed that he

was not aware that those were documents notarized using his name while
he was out of the country. Upon his own inquiry, he found out that the
notarizations were done by his secretary and without his knowledge and
authority. The said secretary notarized the documents without realizing the
import of the notarization act. Respondent apologized to the Court for his
lapses and averred that he had terminated the employment of his secretary
from his office.

ISSUE: WON A lawyer can be held liable for illegal acts of his secretary.

RULING:

The Court answers in the affirmative. Respondent admitted in his

comment and motion for reconsideration that the 18 documents were
notarized under his notarial seal by his office secretary while he was out of
the country. This clearly constitutes negligence considering that respondent
is responsible for the acts of his secretary. Section 9 of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice provides that a "Notary Public" refers to any person
commissioned to perform official acts under these Rules. A notary public's
secretary is obviously not commissioned to perform the official acts of a
notary public.

Respondent cannot take refuge in his claim that it was his secretary's
act which he did not authorize. He is responsible for the acts of the
secretary which he employed. He left his office open to the public while
leaving his secretary in charge. He kept his notarial seal and register within
the reach of his secretary, fully aware that his secretary could use these
items to notarize documents and copy his signature. Such blatant
negligence cannot be countenanced by this Court and it is far from being a
simple negligence. There is an inescapable likelihood that respondent's
flimsy excuse was a mere afterthought and such carelessness exhibited by
him could be a conscious act of what his secretary did.

Because of the negligence of respondent, the Court also holds him

liable for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). His
failure to solemnly perform his duty as a notary public not only damaged
those directly affected by the notarized documents but also undermined the
integrity of a notary public and degraded the function of notarization. He
should, thus, be held liable for such negligence not only as a notary public
but also as a lawyer.[15] Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver
responsibility is placed upon his shoulder by reason of his solemn oath to
obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any.[16]

Respondent violated Canon 9 of the CPR which requires lawyers not

to directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law. Due to his
negligence that allowed his secretary to sign on his behalf as notary public,
he allowed an unauthorized person to practice law. By leaving his office
open despite his absence in the country and with his secretary in charge, he
virtually allowed his secretary to notarize documents without any restraint.

Respondent also violated his obligation under Canon 7 of the CPR,

which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession. The people who came into his office while he was away,
were clueless as to the illegality of the activity being conducted therein.
They expected that their documents would be converted into public
documents. Instead, they later found out that the notarization of their
documents was a mere sham and without any force and effect. By
prejudicing the persons whose documents were notarized by an
unauthorized person, their faith in the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession was eroded.

EN BANC
[ B. M. No. 1036, June 10, 2003 ]
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, COMPLAINANT, VS. EDWIN L. RANA,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION

FACTS:
As alleged in the Complaint, Umaguing ran for the position of SK
Chairman in the SK Elections for the year 2007 but lost to her rival Jose
Gabriel Bungag by one (1) vote.[3] Because of this, complainants lodged an
election protest and enlisted the services of Atty. De Vera. On November 7,
2007, complainants were asked by Atty. De Vera to pay his acceptance fee
of P30,000.00, plus various court appearance fees and miscellaneous
expenses in the amount of P30,000.00.[4] According to the complainants,
Atty. De Vera had more than enough time to prepare and file the case but
the former moved at a glacial pace and only took action when the
November 8, 2008 deadline was looming.[5] Atty. De Vera then rushed the
preparation of the necessary documents and attachments for the election
protest. Two (2) of these attachments are the Affidavits[6] of material
witnesses Mark Anthony Lachica (Lachica) and Angela Almera (Almera),
which was personally prepared by Atty. De Vera. At the time that the
aforesaid affidavits were needed to be signed by Lachica and Almera, they
were unfortunately unavailable. To remedy this, Atty. De Vera allegedly
instructed AbethLalong-Isip (Lalong-Isip) and Hendricson Fielding
(Fielding) to look for the nearest kin or relatives of Lachica and Almera and
ask them to sign over the names.[7] The signing over of Lachica's and
Almera's names were done by Christina Papin (Papin) and Elsa Almera-
Almacen, respectively. Atty. De Vera then had all the documents notarized
before one Atty. DonatoManguiat (Atty. Manguiat).[8]

Later, however, Lachica discovered the falsification and immediately

disowned the signature affixed in the affidavit and submitted his own
Affidavit,[9] declaring that he did not authorize Papin to sign the document
on his behalf. Lachica's affidavit was presented to the MeTC and drew the
ire of Presiding Judge Edgardo Belosillo (Judge Belosillo), who ruled that
the affidavits filed by Atty. De Vera were falsified. Judge Belosillo pointed
out that while Atty. De Vera filed a pleading to rectify this error (i.e., an
Answer to Counterclaim with Omnibus Motion,[10] seeking, among others,
the withdrawal of Lachica's and Almera's affidavits), it was observed that
such was a mere flimsy excuse since Atty. De Vera had ample amount of
time to have the affidavits personally signed by the affiants but still hastily
filed the election protest with full knowledge that the affidavits at hand
were falsified.[11]

ISSUE: WON Atty. De Vera should be held administratively liable.

RULING: YES. Fundamental is the rule that in his dealings with his client
and with the courts, every lawyer is expected to be honest, imbued with
integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations, though high and
demanding, are the professional and ethical burdens of every member of
the Philippine Bar, for they have been given full expression in the Lawyer's
Oath that every lawyer of this country has taken upon admission as a bona
fide member of the Law Profession, thus:[28]

I, ___________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain

allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution
and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same. I
will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity
as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this
voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
So help me God.[29] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Lawyer's Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the
land but also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from
consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself according to
the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts
as well as to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and has to
observe and maintain the rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of
emulation by others. It is by no means a coincidence, therefore, that the
core values of honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness are emphatically
reiterated by the Code of Professional Responsibility.[30] In this light, Rule
10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that
"[a] lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice."
EN BANC
[ B. M. No. 1036, June 10, 2003 ]
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, COMPLAINANT, VS. EDWIN L. RANA,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION

FACTS:
During the period July 8-10, 1987, respondent in G.R. No. 75029,
Union of Filipro Employees, and petitioner in G.R. No. 78791, Kimberly
Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia,
intensified the intermittent pickets they had been conducting since June 17,
1987 in front of the Padre Faura gate of the Supreme Court building.  They
set up pickets' quarters on the pavement in front of the Supreme Court
building, at times obstructing access to and egress from the Court's
premises and offices of justices, officials and employees.  They constructed
provisional shelters along the sidewalks, set up a kitchen and littered the
place with food containers and trash in utter disregard of proper hygiene
and sanitation.  They waved their red streamers and placards with slogans,
and took turns haranguing the court all day long with the use of
loudspeakers.

ISSUE: WON legal counsels be administratively charged for picketing.

RULING: YES. The Court will not hesitate in future similar situations to
apply the full force of the law and punish for contempt those who attempt
to pressure the Court into acting one way or the other in any case pending
before it.  Grievances, if any, must be ventilated through the proper
channels, i.e., through appropriate petitions, motions or other pleadings in
keeping with the respect due to the Courts as impartial administrators of
justice entitled to "proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly
manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and
tending to embarrass the administration of justice."[3]

The right of petition is conceded to be an inherent right of the citizen

under all free governments.  However, such right, natural and inherent
though it may be, has never been invoked to shatter the
standards of propriety entertained for the conduct of courts.  For
"it is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and
juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from
every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence
produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be
uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies."[4]
Moreover, "parties have a constitutional right to have their causes
tried fairly in court by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publication or
public clamor.  Every citizen has a profound personal interest in the
enforcement of the fundamental right to have justice administered by the
courts, under the protection and forms of law free from outside coercion or
interference."[5] The aforecited acts of the respondents are therefore not
only an affront to the dignity of this Court, but equally a violation
of the above-stated right of the adverse parties and the citizenry at large.
EN BANC
[ B. M. No. 1036, June 10, 2003 ]
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, COMPLAINANT, VS. EDWIN L. RANA,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION

FACTS:
Found guilty of direct contempt by the First Division of the Court of
Tax Appeals (CTA First Division), and sanctioned with imprisonment for a
period of ten days and a fine of P2,000.00, the petitioners have come to the
Court for relief through certiorari, claiming that the CTA First Division's 
finding and sentence were made in grave abuse of its discretion because the
language they used in their motion for reconsideration as the attorneys for
a party was contumacious.
CTAfinds the statements of petitioner's counsel that "it is gross
ignorance of the law for the Honorable Court to have held that it has no
jurisdiction over this instant petition; the grossness of this Honorable
Court's ignorance of the law is matched only by the unequivocal expression
of this Honorable Court's jurisdiction over the instant case" and "this Court
lacked the understanding and respect for the doctrine of "stare decisis" as
derogatory, offensive and disrespectful. Lawyers are charged with the basic
duty to "observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and
judicial officers;" they vow solemnly to conduct themselves "with all good
fidelity...to the courts." As a matter of fact, the first canon of legal ethics
enjoins them "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for
the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its superior importance."

ISSUE:WON the CTA was right in charging petitioners with direct

contempt.

RULING: YES The Court concurs with the offended court's treatment of the
offensive language as direct contempt.

Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all

attorneys to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and to insist on similar conduct by others. Rule 11.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility specifically enjoins all attorneys
thus:

Rule 11.03. - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing

language or behavior before the Courts.

It is conceded that an attorney or any other person may be critical of

the courts and their judges provided the criticism is made in respectful
terms and through legitimate channels. In that regard, we have long
adhered to the sentiment aptly given expression to in the leading case of In
re: Almacen:[25]

xxx every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the
actuations of public officers. This right is not diminished by the
fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority, or that it is
articulated by a lawyer.  Such right is especially recognized
where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation, because
then the court's actuation are thrown open to public
consumption.

xxx

Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and expect
critical evaluation of their performance.  For like the executive
and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of
democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the
citizens whom it is expected to serve.

Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an

officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly
respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of
courts and judges.xxx

xxx

Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is

expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his
duty to avail of such right.No law may abridge this right.Nor is he
"professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official
conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal
animadversion as a citizen." xxx

xxx

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall

be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand,
and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the
other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the
duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a
lawyer to disciplinary action. (emphasis supplied)[26]

EN BANC
[ B. M. No. 1036, June 10, 2003 ]
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, COMPLAINANT, VS. EDWIN L. RANA,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION

FACTS:
Before us is a letter-complaint[1] for disbarment filed before the Office
of the Bar Confidant (OBC) by Teodulo[2] Enriquez against Atty. Edilberto
B. Lavadia, Jr. for gross negligence and inefficiency in the performance of
his duties as a lawyer.

On January 7, 1997, Mr. Ernesto Ouano, Sr. filed a complaint [3] for

forcible entry against complainant Teodulo Enriquez before the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Talibon, Bohol. To defend his interests,
Enriquez engaged[4] the services of the law office of Attys. Joselito M. Alo,
R. L. C. Agapay, and Edilberto B. Lavadia, Jr. with Atty. Lavadia as the
assigned attorney.[5]

On March 18, 2000, in open court, Atty. Lavadia agreed to submit

their position papers and affidavits within 30 days from the receipt of the
pre-trial order after which, the case would be submitted for decision.
However, Atty. Lavadia failed to file the position paper resulting in the
defendants being declared in default. The MCTC rendered a decision [6] in
favor of the plaintiffs.[7] Atty. Lavadia filed a notice of appeal[8] with
sufficient bond.

In its April 26, 2001 Order,[9] the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of

Talibon, Bohol dismissed the appeal based on Section 7(b),[10] Rule 40 of
the Rules of Court. The RTC stated that Atty. Lavadia failed to file the
appeal memorandum after more than 71 days. Atty. Lavadia moved for
reconsideration but the same was denied by the RTC in its June 26, 2001
Order[11] pointing out that it had granted four motions for extension and
still no appeal memorandum was filed.

ISSUE: WON Atty. Lavadia is administratively liable.

RULING: In the present case, the duties transgressed by Atty. Lavadia fall
under those duties to his client and to the court. This Court notes Atty.
Lavadia's propensity for filing motions for extension of time to file
pleadings but failing to file the same, in violation of Rule 12.03 of the CPR
which states:

Rule 12.03. - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of

time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse
without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure
to do so. (Emphasis supplied)
In fact, such proclivity on the part of Atty. Lavadia to file such motions
precisely led to the filing of this complaint. In the course of this
administrative proceeding, he continued to flaunt to this Court his willful
defiance and disregard for court orders.

LAWYER AND CLIENT: RULE 12.03 AND CANON 18 AND RULE 18.03

A lawyer is expected to serve his client with competence and diligence.

[41]
 Lawyers are reminded to note Rules 12.03 and 18.03 of the CPR:

Rule 18.03. - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and
his negligence in connection there with shall render him liable.
In Solidon v. Macalalad,[42] we stated that receiving money as acceptance
fee for legal services and failing to render the services is a violation of
Canon 18 of the CPR. In that case, we also stated that a lawyer's failure to
file the position paper is a per se violation of Rule 18.03 of the CPR.[43] We
pointed to the fiduciary nature of a lawyer's duty to his client. We stated:

x x x A lawyer so engaged to represent a client bears the responsibility of

protecting the latter's interest with utmost diligence. The lawyer bears
the duty to serve his client with competence and diligence, and to exert his
best efforts to protect, within the bounds of the law, the interest of his or
her client. Accordingly, competence, not only in the knowledge of law, but
also in the management of the cases by giving these cases appropriate
attention and due preparation, is expected from a lawyer. [44] (Citations
omitted)
In Mariveles v. Mallari,[45] we disbarred Atty. Mallari for violating Rules
12.03 and 18.03 of the CPR. There, Atty. Mallari, after being granted a total
of 245 days to file his client's appellant's brief failed to file the same,
resulting in the dismissal of the appeal. The Court considered Atty.
Mallari's act a shameless disregard of his duties as a lawyer and found him
to be unfit for membership in the noble profession.[46]  In the recent case
of Figueras v. Jimenez,[47] Atty. Jimenez was found administratively liable
for failing to file the appellant's brief on behalf of his client.

Here, Enriquez paid a total of P29,750.00 as acceptance fee and other fees
relating to the preparation of pleadings for the case including the appeal.
Atty. Lavadia however failed to discharge his duties. He failed to file his
client's position paper rendering his client in default. While he filed a notice
of appeal and several motions for extension of time to file the appeal
memorandum, all of which were granted by the lower court, he ultimately
neglected to file the appeal memorandum. Thus, following our
pronouncement in Solidon, Atty. Lavadia has clearly transgressed Canon 18
and Rule 18.03 of the CPR thereby making him administratively liable.

As in Mariveles, Atty. Lavadia requested and was granted extensions of

time to file the appeal memorandum after he filed the notice of appeal with
sufficient bond. The lower court granted him four extensions totaling 71
days after which time he still failed to file the appeal memorandum. His
failure adversely affected the cause of Enriquez, his client. In repeatedly
asking for extensions of time without actually filing the appeal
memorandum, Atty. Lavadia is liable under Rule 12.03 of the CPR.

LAWYER AND THE COURTS: RULE 12.03 IN RELATION TO CANON 11

Under Canon 11[48] of the CPR a lawyer is required to observe and maintain
due respect to the court and its judicial officers. We read this provision in
relation to Rules 10.03[49] and 12.03 of the CPR for this rule does not merely
affect the client but the judicial process.

In Vaflor-Fabroa v. Paguinto,[50] this Court reiterated its previous ruling

in Sebastian v. Bajar[51] where we stated that:

xxx Respondent's cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of

the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial
institution. Respondent's conduct indicates a high degree of
irresponsibility. A Court's Resolution is "not to be construed as a
mere request, nor should it be complied with partially,
inadequately, or selectively". Respondent's obstinate refusal to comply
with the Court's orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her
character; it also underscores her disrespect of the Court's lawful orders
which is only too deserving of reproof."

Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and
respondent's deference is underscored by the fact that willful disregard
thereof will subject the lawyer not only to punishment for contempt but to
disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver responsibility is imposed upon
a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show
respect to their processes. (Citations omitted).

EN BANC
[ B. M. No. 1036, June 10, 2003 ]
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, COMPLAINANT, VS. EDWIN L. RANA,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION

FACTS:
On February 21, 2005, complainants jointly filed the present
administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Nazareno, claiming
that in the certifications against forum shopping attached to the complaints
for rescission and ejectment of Rudex filed while Atty. Nazareno was its
counsel, the latter made false declarations therein that no similar actions or
proceedings have been commenced by Rudex or remained pending before
any other court, tribunal or agency when, in fact, similar actions or
proceedings for rescission had been filed by herein complainants before the
HLURB against Rudex and Atty. Nazareno, and an ejectment complaint
was filed by Rudex, represented by Atty. Nazareno, against Sps. Sioting. In
addition, complainants asserted that Atty. Nazareno committed
malpractice as a notary public since he only assigned one (1) document
number (i.e., Doc. No. 1968) in all the certifications against forum shopping
that were separately attached to the six (6) April 1, 2004 complaints for
rescission and ejectment.[22] In a Report and Recommendation[27] dated
March 8, 2012, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating
Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero recommended the suspension of Atty.
Nazareno for a period of six (6) months for his administrative violations.
The Investigating Commissioner found, among others, that there were
unassailable proofs that the certification against forum shopping attached
to Rudex's ejectment complaint against Sps. Sioting had been erroneously
declared, considering that at the time Rudex filed the said complaint
in September 2002, Sps. Sioting's rescission complaint against Rudex,
filed on May 24, 2002, was already pending. Hence, it was incumbent
upon Rudex to have declared its existence, more so, since both complaints 
involve the same transaction and essential facts, and a decision on the
rescission complaint would amount to res judicata on the ejectment
complaint.[28]  In this relation, the Investigating Commissioner observed
that Atty. Nazareno cannot claim innocence of his omission since he was
not only Rudex's counsel but the notarizing officer as well. Having
knowingly made false entries in the subject certifications against forum
shopping, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty.
Nazareno be held administratively liable and thereby penalized with six (6)
months suspension

ISSUE: WON Atty. Nazareno should be held administratively liable

RULING: Separate from the proscription against forum shopping [31] is the
violation of the certification requirement against forum shopping, which
was distinguished in the case of Sps. Ong v. CA[32] as follows:

The distinction between the prohibition against forum shopping and the
certification requirement should by now be too elementary to be
misunderstood. To reiterate, compliance with the certification against
forum shopping is separate from and independent of the avoidance of the
act of forum shopping itself. There is a difference in the treatment between
failure to comply with the certification requirement and violation of the
prohibition against forum shopping not only in terms of imposable
sanctions but also in the manner of enforcing them. The former constitutes
sufficient cause for the dismissal without prejudice to the filing of the
complaint or initiatory pleading upon motion and after hearing, while the
latter is a ground for summary dismissal thereof and for direct contempt.  x
x x.[33]
Under Section 5,  Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the submission of false
entries in a certification against forum shopping constitutes indirect or
direct contempt of court, and subjects the erring counsel to the
corresponding administrative and criminal actions, viz.:

Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal

party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading
asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced
any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court,
tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b)
if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the
present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or
similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact
within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint
or initiatory pleading has been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by

mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be
cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise
provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false
certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings
therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without
prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal
actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and
deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary
dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a
cause for administrative sanctions. (Emphases supplied)

In the realm of legal ethics, said infraction may be considered as a violation

of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (Code) which read as follows:

CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE

LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.

x x x x

CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH

TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice.

Separately, the Court further finds Atty. Nazareno guilty of malpractice as a

notary public, considering that he assigned only one document number
(i.e., Doc. No. 1968) to the certifications against forum shopping attached
to the six (6) April 1, 2004 complaints for rescission and ejectment despite
the fact that each of them should have been treated as a separate notarial
act. It is a standing rule that for every notarial act, the notary shall record in
the notarial register at the time of the notarization, among others, the entry
and page number of the document notarized, and that he shall give to each
instrument or document executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a
number corresponding to the one in his register.[35] Evidently, Atty.
Nazareno did not comply with the foregoing rule.

Worse, Atty. Nazareno notarized the certifications against forum shopping

attached to all the aforementioned complaints, fully aware that they
identically asserted a material falsehood, i.e., that Rudex had not
commenced any actions or proceedings or was not aware of any pending
actions or proceedings involving the same issues in any other forum. The
administrative liability of an erring notary public in this respect was clearly
delineated as a violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code in the case of
Heirs of the Late Spouses Villanueva v. Atty. Beradio, [36] to wit:

Where admittedly the notary public has personal knowledge of a false

statement or information contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet
proceeds to affix his or her notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to
discipline the notary public accordingly as the circumstances of the case
may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the notarization
process may be undermined and public confidence on notarial documents
diminished. In this case, respondent's conduct amounted to a breach
of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
requires lawyers to obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for the law and legal processes. Respondent also violated
Rule 1.01 of the Code which proscribes lawyers from engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.[37] (Emphasis
supplied

EN BANC
[ B. M. No. 1036, June 10, 2003 ]
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, COMPLAINANT, VS. EDWIN L. RANA,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION

FACTS:
In a Decision dated 19 October 2011, the Court found respondent
Atty. Roy Prule Ediza (Atty. Ediza) administratively liable for violating Rule
1.01 of Canon 1, Canon 15, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The Court upheld the findings of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and suspended Atty. Ediza from the practice of
law for six months. The Court, in its Decision dated 19 October 2011, (1)
suspended Atty. Ediza from the practice of law for six months, effective
upon receipt of the Decision; (2) directed him to return to complainants the
two sets of documents that he misled them and Sartiga Epal into signing;
and (3) ordered Atty. Ediza to pay complainants the amount of
P125,463.38, representing the amount he deceived them into paying him,
with legal interest from 8 September 2000 until fully paid. The Court
further warned Atty. Ediza that a repetition of the same or similar acts in
the future shall be dealt with more severely. More than four years since the
Court promulgated its Decision dated 19 October 2011, Atty. Ediza has yet
to comply with the Court's directives to (1) submit certifications from the
IBP Local Chapter where he is a member and the Office of the Executive
Judge where he practices his profession both stating that he has desisted
from the practice of law from 18 November 2011 to 29 May 2012; (2) pay
complainants the amount of P125,463.38 plus legal interest; and (3) return
the two sets of documents that Atty. Ediza misled complainants and Sartiga
Epal to sign.

The Court issued numerous Resolutions dated 3 September 2012, 25

February 2013, 15 July 2013, 4 June 2014, and 12 November 2014,
requiring Atty. Ediza to comply with the 19 October 2011 Decision and
show cause why he should not be disciplinary dealt with or be held in
contempt for his failure to abide by the Court's orders. However, Atty. Ediza
repeatedly and blatantly disregarded and obstinately defied these orders
from the Court. Instead, Atty. Ediza responded by (1) claiming ignorance
over the documents stated in the Decision, and worse, adjudged that the
documents were fictional; (2) alleging newly discovered evidence; (3)
demanding to stay the execution of the Decision; and (4) reporting that he
has complied with the order of suspension without submitting any required
certifications from the IBP and the Office of the Executive Judge. In the
present case, Atty. Ediza had previously been found guilty of violating the
Code of Professional Responsibility and was suspended from the practice of
law for six months. Despite the suspension, Atty. Ediza is once again
demonstrating to this Court that not only is he unfit to stay in the legal
profession for failing to protect the interests of his clients but is also remiss
in following the dictates of the Court, which has administrative supervision
over him. In Martinez v. Zoleta,[12] we held that the Court should not and
will not tolerate future indifference to administrative complaints and to
resolutions requiring comment on such administrative complaints. It bears
stressing that a disregard of Court directives constitutes grave or serious
misconduct[13] and gross or willful insubordination[14] which warrant
disciplinary sanction by this Court.[15]

ISSUE: WON Atty. Ediza willfully left unheeded all the warnings imposed
upon him, despite the earlier six-month suspension that was meted out to
him for his administrative liability.

RULING: YES. In Tugot v. Judge Coliflores,[11] the Court held that its

resolutions should not be construed as mere requests from the Court. They
should be complied with promptly and completely. The failure of Atty.
Ediza to comply betrays not only a recalcitrant streak in his character, but
also disrespect for the Court's lawful orders and directives.

As a member of the legal profession, Atty. Ediza has the duty to obey the
orders and processes of this Court without delay and resistance. Rule 12.04
of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

CANON 12

A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS

DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE.

x x x x

Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of
a judgment or misuse Court processes.

Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution recognizes the disciplinary

authority of the Court over members of the Bar. Reinforcing the execution
of this constitutional authority is Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
which gives this Court the power to remove or suspend a lawyer from the
practice of law. The provision states:

Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court;

grounds therefor. — A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing
as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice
of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis
supplied)

EN BANC
[ B. M. No. 1036, June 10, 2003 ]
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, COMPLAINANT, VS. EDWIN L. RANA,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION

FACTS:
A complaint for Falsification of Public Document was filed by Melba
D. De Los Santos Rodis (Rodis) against her father, Ricardo D. De Los
Santos, Sr. (De Los Santos, Sr.) and Rosie P. Canaco (Canaco). Rodis
alleged that Canaco made untruthful statements in the certificate of live
birth of her son, Victor Canaco De Los Santos. Canaco indicated in her son's
certificate of live birth that she was married to De Los Santos, Sr. on
September 1, 1974 in San Fernando, Camarines Sur when no such marriage
took place.

On April 24, 2002, an Information[2] was filed against Canaco for

violation of Sections 1 and 2 in relation with Section 9 of Presidential
Decree No. 651.[3] Particularly, Canaco was charged of "willfully, unlawfully
and knowingly making false statements in the Certificate of Live Birth form
for her son Victor P. Delos Santos who was born on June 30, 1982 by
falsely stating that she was married to the father of her son, RICARDO P.
DELOS SANTOS on September 1, 1974."[4]

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 111152 and assigned to
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 43 of Quezon City.

At the preliminary conference held on May 24, 2004, the respondent,

as counsel de parte of Canaco, objected to the Prosecution's offer in
evidence of the photocopy of the birth record of Victor Canaco Delos
Santos. As a result, the MeTC issued an order resetting the preliminary
conference to October 19, 2004 in order to give the prosecution time to file
a certified true copy of the birth certificate.

On May 25, 2004, the respondent sent letters[5] dated May 24, 2004
to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Quezon City, the National Census and
Statistics Office, and St. Luke's Hospital. The pertinent portions of these
letters state:

RE: ALLEGED CERTIFIED TRUE COPY OF CERTIFICATE OF LIVE

BIRTH CODED AS 6826111, COVERED BY REGISTERED NUMBER 2499
LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR, QUEZON CITY.

There is being distributed by unauthorized person/s a purported copy of

Certificate of Live Birth above indicated which refers to one
certain VICTOR CANACO DE LOS SANTOS. In this connection, please
be guided by provisions of our existing laws regarding possible violation of
the secrecy and confidentiality of records.
Assuming without admitting that such facts of birth records exists, please
be guided that my client, VICTOR CANACO DE LOS SANTOS, has never
authorized anybody to secure a copy, Xerox or otherwise, and only upon his
written authority and with undersigned counsel's signature and verification
may a copy be officially reproduced, if any exist.

Under penalty of law. This May 24, 2004.

(signed)
ATTY. NESTOR C. BARBOSA
Counsel for Victor Canaco De Los Santos
Room 402, PNB Building,
City of Naga

Noted by:

(signed)
Victor C. De Los Santos" [Emphasis supplied.]

On October 19, 2004, the MeTC noted the manifestation of the

complainant that they failed to secure a certified true copy of the birth
certificate of the accused's son because of the respondent's letter. Thus, the
MeTC issued an order for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum/ad
testificandum ordering the Civil Registrar of Quezon City to produce a
certified true copy of the live birth of Victor Canaco delos Santos who
alleged to have been born on June 30, 1982 under Registry No. LCR 2499.

Canaco, through the respondent, filed a motion for reconsideration of

the order dated October 19, 2004 directing the issuance of a subpoena
duces tecum/ad testificandum. In its order dated July 8, 2005, the MeTC
denied the motion for reconsideration.

In the meantime, Victor D. De Los Santos II

[herein complainant (brother of Rodis and son of Delos Santos, Sr.)] filed a
complaint with the prosecutor charging the respondent for obstruction of
justice.[6]

In defense, the respondent argued, among others, that the name of

his client Canaco's son is VICTOR C. DE LOS SANTOS and not VICTOR P.
DE LOS SANTOS as stated in the Information charging Canaco with
violation of Presidential Decree No. 651. Thus, the respondent vehemently
denied that he intentionally intended to delay and obstruct the proceedings
in the MeTC.[7]

The prosecutor dismissed the obstruction of justice complaint for

insufficiency of evidence.[8]
ISSUE: WON Respondent is Administratively liable.
RULING: YES. Unduly Delaying the Proceedings

Under Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers should

uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for
the law and legal processes.

Specifically, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 states that "[a] lawyer shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Rule 1.03
also provides that "[a] lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest,
encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause."

Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility likewise

states that "[a] lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution
of a judgment or misuse Court processes."

As an officer of the court, a lawyer is part of the machinery in the

administration of justice.[21] A lawyer should not only help attain the
speedy, efficient, impartial, correct, and inexpensive adjudication of cases
and prompt satisfaction of final judgments, but should likewise avoid any
unethical or improper practices that may impede, obstruct, or prevent the
realization of a speedy and efficient administration of justice. [22]
Misleading the Court as to the Identity of his Client

Under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers owe

candor, fairness, and good faith to the court. Particularly, Rule 10.01
provides that "[a] lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the
Court to be misled by any artifice."

A lawyer is, first and foremost, an officer of the court. A lawyer's first duty
is not to his client but to the administration of justice.[23]

EN BANC
[ B. M. No. 1036, June 10, 2003 ]
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, COMPLAINANT, VS. EDWIN L. RANA,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION

FACTS:
On 17 March 1988, petitioner PSC Financial Corporation (PSCFC)
filed a complaint against private respondent Banco Filipino Savings and
Mortgage Bank (Banco Filipino) for annulment of foreclosure proceedings
and damages with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila,
docketed as CivilCase No. 88-368. On 21 June 1988, petitioner served upon
Banco Filipino a written request for admission of the truth of certain
matters. On 27 June 1988, petitioner received Banco Filipino's answer to its
request for admission signed by its counsel, Atty. Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun.
Counsel admitted, inter alia, petitioner's mortgage loan as well as the fact
that Banco Filipino was engaged in land development loans. However,
respondent denied that petitioner availed itself of the Home Financing Plan
including the agreement that the maturity of the debt would depend on the
resale of the mortgaged subdivision lots.
On 8 August 1988, petitioner made a second request for admission on
respondent Banco Filipino impliedly objecting to the first reply having been
made by its lawyer, Atty. Fortun, who was not even an attorney yet when
Banco Filipino inaugurated its financing plan in February 1968 and
therefore did not have personal knowledge of the financing scheme. The
second request called on Banco Filipino to admit that it did not send a
formal notice of its intention to foreclose the mortgage and that there was
no publication of the notice of foreclosure in a newspaper of general
circulation.

ISSUE: WON a request for admission directed to an adverse party under

Sec. 1, Rule 26, of the Rules of Court may be answered only by his counsel.

RULING: YES. Section 21 of Rule 138 states-

"SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. - An attorney is presumed to be
properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no
written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for
his client x x x x"[3]
Petitioner has not shown that the case at bar falls under any of the
recognized exceptions as found in Art. 1878 of the Civil Code which
enumerates the instances when special powers of attorney are necessary, or
in Rule 20 of the Rules of Court on pre-trial where the parties and their
attorneys are both directed to appear before the court for a conference; so
that for counsel to appear at the pre-trial in behalf of his client, he must
clothe the former with an adequate authority in the form of a special power
of attorney or corporate resolution.
Section 23 of Rule 138 provides that "(a)ttorneys have authority to bind
their clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in
writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial
procedure x x x x"
Thus, when Rule 26 states that a party shall respond to the request for
admission, it should not be restrictively construed to mean that a party may
????? engage the services of counsel to make the response in his behalf.
Indeed, the theory of petitioner must not be taken seriously; otherwise, it
will negate the principles on agency in the Civil Code, [4] as well as Sec. 23,
Rule 138, of the Rules of Court.[5]