Tan v.

Director of Forestry
G.R. No. L-24548, Oct. 27, 1983
Makasiar J.

FACTS:

1. The case at bar bears an appeal from the order on the 20 th of January 1965 of the Court
of First Instance of Manila, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary prohibitory injunction which dismissed the petition of petitioner-appellant
Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, verily, on the ground that it does not state a sufficient cause of
action. The same is upon the respondents-appellees' (Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural resources and the Director of Forestry) motion to dismiss
2. In April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry advertised for public bidding of certain tract of
public forest land Olongapo, Zambales. Such public forest land, consisted of 6,420
hectares. The same is located within the former U.S. Naval Reservation comprising
7,252 hectares of timberland, which was turned over by the United States Government
to the Philippine Government.
3. On May 5, 1961, Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, herein petitioner-appellant, submitted his
application in due form after paying the necessary fees and posting tile required bond.
4. On June 7, 1961, President Carlos P. Garcia issued a directive to the Director of the
Bureau of Forestry which provided that the area formerly covered by the Naval
Reservation be made a forest reserve for watershed purposes; and that the bids
received by the Bureau of Forestry for the issuance of the timber license in the area
during the public bidding conducted on the 22 nd of May, 1961 be rejected in order that
the area may be reserved.
5. On August 3, 1961, Secretary Cesar M. Fortich of Agriculture and Natural Resources
sustained the findings and recommendations of the Director of Forestry stating that "it
would be beneficial to the public interest if the area is made available for
exploitation under certain conditions
6. On April 15, 1963, Tan won the bidding for the license of logging operations on a public
forest land in the province of Olongapo.
7. On May 30, 1963, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Benjamin M.
Gozon promulgated Order no. 46 which gives the power to the Director of Forestry to
grant (a) new ordinary timber licenses where the area covered thereby is not more
than 3,000 hectares each; and (b) the extension of ordinary timber licenses for
areas not exceeding 3,000 hectares.
8. Jose Y. Feliciano was appointed as Acting secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, replacing Secretary Benjamin M. Gozon. Upon assumption of office he
immediately promulgate General Memorandum Order No. 60, revoking the authority
delegated to the Director of Forestry pursuant to General Memorandum order No.
46, to grant ordinary timber licenses, which order took effect on December 19,
1963, that was, incidentally the same date the license for petitioner was signed.
9. On February 12, 1964, Ravago Commercial Company wrote a letter to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources praying that the pending resolution of the appeal filed
by the same, along with Jorge Lao Happick from the order of the Director of Forestry
denying their motion for reconsideration, in the name of Wenceslao V. Tan, be cancelled
or revoked on the ground that the grant thereof was irregular, anomalous and
contrary to existing forestry laws, rules and regulations.
10. On March 9, 1964, thereafter, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
promulgated an order declaring Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64 issued in the name
 of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, as having been issued by the Director of Forestry without
authority, and is therefore void ab initio.
11. The RTC dismissed the instituted complaint, hence the petition.

Contentions:

WENCESLAO VlNZONS TAN et. al

[THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, APOLONIO THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND
NATURAL RESOURCES JOSE Y. FELICIANO]

1. Petitioner-appellant averred that the respondents-appellees "unlawfully, illegally

whimsically, capriciously and arbitrarily acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction,
and/or with grave abuse of discretion by revoking a valid and existing timber license
without just cause, by denying him of the equal protection of the laws, by depriving him
of his constitutional right to property without due process of law, and in effect, by
impairing the obligation of contracts
2. Herein issue is whether or not the facts in the petition constitute a sufficient cause of
action. He contended that the three essential elements — namely, the legal right of the
plaintiff, the correlative obligation of the defendants and the act or omission of the
defendant in violation of that right — are satisfied in the averments of this petition and;
3. That when the ground for dismissal is that the complaint states no cause of action, such
fact can be determined only from the facts alleged in the complaint and from no other,
and the court cannot consider other matters;
4. That he has exhausted all his administrative remedies to no avail as respondents-
appellees have failed, neglected, refused and continue to refuse to allow petitioner-
appellant to continue operation in the area covered by his timber license.
5. That he has neither recourse by way of appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate;
remedy in the ordinary course of law except thru this special civil action, as the last
official act of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (respondent-appellee)
in declaring void the timber license referred to above after denying petitioner-
appellant's motion for reconsideration, is the last administrative act.

THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, et. al

[APOLONIO RIVERA, THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND N ATURAL
RESOURCES JOSE Y. FELICIANO, respondents-appellees]

1. Director of Forestry alleged that (1) that the court has no jurisdiction; (2) that the
respondents may not be sued without their consent; (3) that the petitioner has not
exhausted all available administrative remedies; (4) that the petition does not state a
cause of action; and (5) that purely administrative and discretionary functions of
administrative officials may not be interfered with by the courts.
2. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources avers the following special and
affirmative defenses: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction to entertain the action for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus; (2) that the petitioner has no cause of action; (3)
that venue is improperly laid; (4) that the State is immune from suit without its consent;
(5) that the court has no power to interfere in purely administrative functions; and (6) that
the cancellation of petitioner's license was dictated by public policy
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the subject license is void ab initio
2) Whether or not the Director of Forestry gravely abused its discretion in revoking the
aforementioned license

HELD:

1. (A) Yes. The release of the license on the 6 th of January 1964 gives rise to the very
impression that it was ante-dated to December 19, 1963 on which date the authority
of the Director of Forestry was revoked. Thereby, the timber license might have been
signed on the 19th of December 1963 however, it was released only on January 6, 1964.
As such, no right was ever acquiesced by the licensee before the release of the same.
(B) The Director of Forestry, as the trial court averred, had no longer any authority to
release the license on January 6, 1964. Hence, herein petitioner-appellant had not
acquired any legal right under such void license.

2. No. A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization
and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A
timber license is not a contract within the ambit of the due process clause. The
same is only a license or privilege, as to which, it could be validly withdrawn
whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare. The Court held that the
granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property
rights. It was cited in the case at bar that the court held in Pedro vs. Provincial Board of
Rizal to wit;

A license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit is not property of

which the holder may not be deprived without due process of law, but a mere
privilege which may be revoked when public interests so require. xxx

In the case at bar, several significant doctrines were cited viz;

The welfare of the people is the supreme law. No franchise or right can be availed of
to defeat the proper exercise of police power (Surigao Electric Co., Inc. vs.
Municipality of Surigao, 24 SCRA 898, Aug. 30, 1968). The State has inherent power
enabling it to prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety, and welfare of society
(Edu vs. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, Oct. 24,1970).

A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber
license is not a contract within the ambit of the due process clause. The same is only a
license or privilege, as to which, it could be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by
public interest or public welfare