G.R. No.

L-57848 June 19, 1982

RAFAEL E. MANINANG and SOLEDAD L. MANINANG, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO L. PRONOVE, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and BERNARDO S.
ASENETA, respondents.
Case Doctrine:
Generally, the probate of a will does not look into its intrinsic validity. In a proceeding for the probate of a will, the Court’s area of inquiry
is limited to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary
capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. However, where practical considerations demand that
the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the Court should meet that issue.
Facts:
Clemencia Aseneta, unmarried, died in 1981. She had been under the care of the petitioners for 30 years. She left a holographic will
stating that all her real and personal properties shall be inherited by petitioner Dr. Soledad Maninang and that she doesn’t consider the
respondent Bernardo Aseneta as her adopted son.
Petitoner Soledad then filed a Petition for Probate of the Will of the decedent with CFI QC. A month later, respondent instituted
intestate proceedings before CFI Pasig Rizal claiming to be the sole heir of the decedent. The respondent Judge ordered the
consolidation of the testate and intestate cases.
Respondent Aseneta filed a Motion to Dismiss the Testate case claiming that the will was null and void because, as the compulsory
heir, he was preterited, and hence intestacy should ensue. Petitioner Soledad, however, opposed, claiming that in a case for probate of
a Will, the Court’s area of inquiry is limited to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will; that the respondent
was effectively disinherited by the decedent.
The Lower court ordered the dismissal of the Testate case and appointed the respondent as the administrator of the intestate estate,
being the forced compulsory heir of the decedent. Petitioner filed a certiorari petition before CA alleging that the lower court exceeded
its jurisdiction in dismissing the case. CA denied her petition stating that appeal was the proper remedy and not certiorari petition since
the Order of dismissal was already final.
Issue: W/N the respondent court acted in excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the Testate Case.
Ruling: YES.
By virtue of the dismissal of the Testate case, the determination of the issue regarding the preterition or disinheritance raised by the
parties has not been thoroughly considered. A crucial issue that calls for resolution in the instant case is whether under the terms of the
decedent's Will, private respondent had been preterited or disinherited, and if the latter, whether it was a valid disinheritance. But due
to the dismissal, such issue cannot be determined.
Generally, the probate of a will is mandatory and it doesn’t necessarily look into its intrinsic validity. The law enjoins the probate of the
Will and public policy requires it, because unless the Will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person
to dispose of his property by Will may be rendered nugatory. However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity
of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the Court should meet that issue.
Respondent Aseneta relied on the pronouncement in the case of Nuguid v. Nuguid wherein the meat of the controversy is the intrinsic
validity of the will. The intrinsic validity of the will in such case was passed upon before probate because practical considerations so
demanded. While in the case at bar, the probate of the Will is insisted on by petitioners and a resolution on the extrinsic validity of the
Will demanded. Thus, the ruling in the Nuguid case provided the exception rather than the rule.

G.R. No. 176943 October 17, 2008

DANILO ALUAD, LEONORA ALUAD, DIVINA ALUAD, PROSPERO ALUAD, and CONNIE ALUAD, petitioners, vs.
ZENAIDO ALUAD, respondent.
Case Doctrines:
1. The characteristics of Donation mortis causa are as follows:
 (a) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what amounts to the same thing,
that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;
(b) That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability
may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and
(c) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
2. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.
Facts:
Petitioners’ mother, Maria and respondent were raised by the childless spouses Matilde and Crispin. Crispin died in 1975, leaving the
six lots (Lot Nos. 674 to 677, 680, and 682) to his wife.
In 1981, Matilde executed a Deed of Donation Inter-Vivos in favor of Maria covering all the six lots. The Deed of Donation provided that
the transfer and conveyance will be effected upon the death of the donor. But anytime, during the lifetime of the donor or anyone of
them who should survive, they could use, encumber or even dispose of any or all of the parcels of land donated.
In 1991, Matilde sold the Lot 676 to respondent by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property. The following year, Matilde executed a
last will and testament allotting the lots 675, 677, 680 and 682 to Maria and her remaining properties to the respondent, including Lot
674. Matilde died on January 25 1994 while Maria died in September of that year.
Petitioners then filed a complaint for the declaration and recovery of ownership and possession of Lots 674 and 676 and damages
against the respondent claiming that their mother Maria, is the sole heir of Matilde Aluad. Respondent, however, alleged that the two
lots are in his possession as the true owner of the same. Petitioners then amended their complaint and cited the Deed of Donation
executed in favor of their mother. Respondent filed an amended answer claiming that if ever such deed exists, the same was already
revoked by Matilde when she exercised all acts of dominion over said properties until she sold Lot 676 and until her death with respect
to the other lots without any opposition from Maria.
RTC Roxas ruled in favor of the petitioners since Matilde could not have validly transferred such lots to the respondent due to the Deed
of Donation executed in favor of Maria. CA, however, reversed the decision, holding that the Deed of Donation was actually a Donation
mortis causa and not inter-vivos. It also didn’t comply with the formalities of a will. CA declared the respondent as the rightful owner of
Lot 676 but it didn’t so declare with respect to Lot 674 as the last will and testament had not yet been probated.
Issues:
- W/N the Deed of Donation is a Donation Mortis Causa
- W/N the Deed of Donation was valid.
Ruling:
1. YES.
As did the appellate court, the Court finds the donation to petitioners mother one of mortis causa, it having the following characteristics:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that
the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;
(2) That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability
may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
Since the deed of donation provides that the transfer and conveyance be effective upon the death of the donor, Matilde didn’t intend to
transfer the lots to Maria during her lifetime. The statement in the Deed of Donation reading anytime during the lifetime of the DONOR
or anyone of them who should survive, they could use, encumber or even dispose of any or even all the parcels of land herein donated
means that Matilde retained ownership of the lots and reserved in her the right to dispose them. For the right to dispose of a thing
without other limitations than those established by law is an attribute of ownership.
2. NO.
The Deed of Donation which is, one of mortis causa, not having followed the formalities of a will as per Arts. 805 and 806 of the NCC, is
void and transmitted no right to petitioners’ mother.
But even assuming arguendo that the formalities were observed, since it was not probated, no right to Lot Nos. 674 and 676 was
transmitted to Maria. Matilde thus validly disposed of Lot No. 674 to respondent by her last will and testament, subject of course to the
qualification that her will must be probated.

G.R. Nos. L-63253-54 April 27, 1989

PABLO RALLA, petitioner, vs.
HON. ROMULO P. UNTALAN, HON. DOMINGO CORONEL REYES, AND LEONIE RALLA, PETER RALLA AND
MARINELLA RALLA, respondents.
Case Doctrines:
1. There can be no valid partition among the heirs till after the will has been probated .
2. Where a piece of land has been included in a partition, and there is no allegation that the inclusion was effected through
improper means or without the petitioners' knowledge, the partition barred any further litigation on said title and operated to
bring the property under the control and jurisdiction of the court for proper disposition according to the tenor of the partition . . .
They can not attack the partition collaterally.
Facts:
Petitioner’s father and Private respondents’ grandfather Rosendo Ralla, a widower, filed a petition for the probate of his own will
(Special Proceedings No. 564). In his will, he left his entire estate to the petitioner, leaving nothing to his other son, Pedro, the private
respondents’ father. Pedro then instituted the proceedings for the partition of the estate of their mother (Civil Case No. 2023).
In the course of the proceeding for the probate case, petitioner moved for the dismissal of the probate on the ground that he was no
longer interested in the allowance of the will of his late father, for its probate would no longer be beneficial and advantageous to him.
The motion was denied by both CFI and the CA. CFI then declared Pedro and Pablo the only heirs of Rosendo Ralla who should share
equally upon the division of the latter’s estate and thereupon converted the proceedings in to one of intestacy.
Meanwhile, in the proceedings for Civil Case No. 2023, they agreed to enter in a project of partition whereby 63 parcels of land,
apparently forming the estate of their mother, were divided between them.
11 years later, Joaquin Chancoco filed a petition (Special Proceedings No.1106) for the probate of the same will of Rosendo Ralla on
the ground that the decedent owed him P5000. Petition for Probate was granted and appointed Teodorico Almine, son-in-law of the
petitioner, as the special administrator. However, in taking the possession of properties belonging to Rosendo, Teodorico also took
possession of the 63 parcels of land covered in the project of partition.
Private respondents then moved to exclude from the estate of Rosendo the aforesaid parcels of land. Respondent Judge, however,
denied such motion and ruled that the 63 parcels of land be included in the proceedings for the settlement of estate of Rosendo and
that Special Proceedings 564 and 1106 be consolidated and proceed as probate proceedings.
2 years later, after the private respondents filed a new petition to exclude, Judge Untalan reconsidered his earlier order and ordered the
exclusion of 63 parcels of land on the ground that the Project of Partition must be respected. Petitioner then filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the respondent Judge Reyes who was handling the probate proceedings.
Issue: W/N the extrajudicial partition of 63 parcels of land be considered null and void since it was made before the will was probated
Ruling: NO. Such contention has no merit.
The extrajudicial partition was made in the civil case for the partition of the estate of Paz Escarella (mother), which is distinct from, and
independent of, the special proceedings for the probate of the will of Rosendo Ralla.
Verily, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs till after the will has been probated. This, of course, presupposes
that the properties to be partitioned are the same properties embraced in the win. Thus the rule invoked is inapplicable in this instance
where there are two separate cases (Civil Case No. 2023 for partition, and Special Proceedings No. 564 originally for the probate of a
will), each involving the estate of a different person (Paz Escarella and Rosendo Ralla, respectively) comprising dissimilar properties.
Also, petitioner can no longer question the validity of the exclusion since the partition in Civil Case No. 2023 is valid and binding upon
him and Pedro Ralla, as well as upon their heirs, especially as this was accompanied by delivery of possession to them of their
respective shares in the inheritance from their mother, the late Paz Escarella. They are duty bound to respect the division agreed upon
by them and embodied in the document of partition.
G.R. No. L-23662 October 12, 1967
MARIANO REYES, CESAR REYES, LEONOR REYES and PACIENCIA REYES, petitioners, vs.
ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, respondent.
Case Doctrine:
It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper
execution and witnessing of his last will and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise.
Facts:
Respondent filed a petition for the probate of the purported will of the late Benedicta delos Reyes. The will instituted her as the sole heir
of the estate of the deceased. The petitioners (Fernandez et al), claiming to be the heirs intestate of the decedent, opposed such
petition for probate on the ground of forgery, vices of the consent of testatrix, estoppels by laches and revocation of the will by 2 deed
of conveyance of the major portion of the estate made by testatrix in favor of proponent, but which were already set aside by SC.
CFI ruled that the will was genuine and properly executed but deferred resolution on the questions of estoppel and revocation.
Petitioners then moved for the reconsideration wherein the Court then overruled the claim that the respondent was in estoppel to ask
for the probate of the will, but reserved unto the parties the right to raise the issue of implied revocation at the opportune time.
After 3 years, petitioners appealed after receiving further evidence on the issue whether the execution by the testatrix of deeds of sale
in favor of the testamentary heir revoked the earlier testament. However, the trial court ruled against them and held that the will of the
decedent is unaffected and unrevoked by the deeds of sale. CA affirmed and held that the decree, admitting the will to probate, had
become final for lack of opportune appeal.
Issue: W/N the probate for the will of the decedent became final for lack of appeal
Ruling: YES.
It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper
execution and witnessing of his last will and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise. As
such, the probate order is final and appealable. Hence, they do not have to await the resolution on the other grounds of its other
oppositions since it is so recognized by express provisions of Section 1 of Rule 109, that specifically prescribes that "any interested
person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment . . . where such order or judgment: (a) allows or disallows a will.
XXX
There being no controversy that the probate decree of the Court below was not appealed on time, the same had become final and
conclusive. Hence, the appellate courts may no longer revoke said decree nor review the evidence upon which it is made to rest. Thus,
the appeal belatedly lodged against the decree was correctly dismissed.

G.R. No. L-23445 June 23, 1966

REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant, vs.
FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID, oppositors and appellees.
Case Doctrine:
In a proceeding for the probate of a will, the Court’s area of inquiry is limited to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic
validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities
prescribed by law. However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it
is probated, the Court should meet that issue.
Facts:
Rosario Nuguid, unmarried and without descendants, died in 1962. She was survived by her parents and 6 siblings. One of her
siblings, Remedios (petitioner) filed a holographic will allegedly executed by the decedent and prayed for its admission to probate and
that letters of administration with the will annexed be issued to her.
However, her parents opposed such application for probate claiming that they are the compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct
ascending line. They moved to dismiss the petition on the ground of absolute preterition. The court ordered the dismissal of the
application on the ground that the will in question is a complete nullity and perforce create intestacy of the estate of the deceased.
Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
1. W/N the probate court has the capacity to rule on the intrinsic validity of the will in question
2. W/N the will was intrinsically valid.
Ruling:
1. YES, as an exception to the rule.
Generally, the court's area of inquiry is limited — to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The due
execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity, and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities by law prescribed are the
questions solely to be presented, and to be acted upon, by the court. Said court at this stage of the proceedings — is not called upon to
rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy therein. However, where practical
considerations are demanded, the court may pass on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question.
2. NO, it was intrinsically invalid.
Where the deceased left no descendants but left forced heirs in the direct ascending line, and her will does not explicitly disinherit them
but simply omits both of their names, the case is one of preterition. Preterition under Article 854 of NCC annuls the institution of the heir
unless in the will there are testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In the case at bar, since the will instituted the
petitioner as the sole, universal heir and clearly omits her parents’ name and such contains no specific legacies or bequests, the
institution of petitioner, by itself, is void.. Hence, the intestate succession must ensue.