POLITICAL LAW definition

G.R. No. L-18463             October 4, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, 

vs.
GREGORIO PERFECTOR, defendant-appellant.

Alfonso E. Mendoza and the appellant in behalf of the latter. 

Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

The important question is here squarely presented of whether article 256 of the
Spanish Penal Code, punishing "Any person who, by . . . writing, shall defame,
abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority . . .," is still
in force.

About August 20, 1920, the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando M.
Guerrero, discovered that certain documents which constituted the records of
testimony given by witnesses in the investigation of oil companies, had
disappeared from his office. Shortly thereafter, the Philippine Senate, having
been called into special session by the Governor-General, the Secretary for the
Senate informed that body of the loss of the documents and of the steps taken by
him to discover the guilty party. The day following the convening of the Senate,
September 7, 1920, the newspaper La Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto,
published an article reading as follows:

Half a month has elapsed since the discovery, for the first time, of the
scandalous robbery of records which were kept and preserved in the iron
safe of the Senate, yet up to this time there is not the slightest indication
that the author or authors of the crime will ever be discovered.

To find them, it would not, perhaps, be necessary to go out of the Sente

itself, and the persons in charge of the investigation of the case would not
have to display great skill in order to succeed in their undertaking, unless
they should encounter the insuperable obstacle of offical concealment.

In that case, every investigation to be made would be but a mere comedy

and nothing more.
 After all, the perpetration of the robbery, especially under the
circumstances that have surrounded it, does not surprise us at all.

The execution of the crime was but the natural effect of the environment of
the place in which it was committed.

How many of the present Senators can say without remorse in their
conscience and with serenity of mind, that they do not owe their victory to
electoral robbery? How may?

The author or authors of the robbery of the records from the said iron safe
of the Senate have, perhaps, but followed the example of certain Senators
who secured their election through fraud and robbery.

The Philippine Senate, in its session of September 9, 1920, adopted a resolution

authorizing its committee on elections and privileges to report as to the action
which should be taken with reference to the article published in La Nacion. On
September 15, 1920, the Senate adopted a resolution authorizing the President
of the Senate to indorse to the Attorney-General, for his study and corresponding
action, all the papers referring to the case of the newspaper La Nacion and its
editor, Mr. Gregorio Perfecto. As a result, an information was filed in the
municipal court of the City of Manila by an assistant city fiscal, in which the
editorial in question was set out and in which it was alleged that the same
constituted a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. The defendant Gregorio
Perfecto was found guilty in the municipal court and again in the Court of First
Instance of Manila.

During the course of the trial in the Court of First Instance, after the prosecution
had rested, the defense moved for the dismissal of the case. On the subject of
whether or not article 256 of the Penal Code, under which the information was
presented, is in force, the trial judge, the Honorable George R. Harvey, said:

This antiquated provision was doubtless incorporated into the Penal Code
of Spain for the protection of the Ministers of the Crown and other
representatives of the King against free speech and action by Spanish
subjects. A severe punishment was prescribed because it was doubtless
considered a much more serious offense to insult the King's representative
than to insult an ordinary individual. This provision, with almost all the other
articles of that Code, was extended to the Philippine Islands when under
the dominion of Spain because the King's subject in the Philippines might
defame, abuse or insult the Ministers of the Crown or other representatives
of His Majesty. We now have no Ministers of the Crown or other persons in
authority in the Philippines representing the King of Spain, and said
 provision, with other articles of the Penal Code, had apparently passed into
"innocuous desuetude," but the Supreme Corut of the Philippine Islands
has, by a majority decision, held that said article 256 is the law of the land
to-day. . . .

The Helbig case is a precedent which, by the rule of stare decisis, is

binding upon this court until otherwise determined by proper authority.

In the decision rendered by the same judge, he concluded with the following
language:

In the United States such publications are usually not punishable as

criminal offense, and little importance is attached to them, because they
are generally the result of political controversy and are usually regarded as
more or less colored or exaggerated. Attacks of this character upon a
legislative body are not punishable, under the Libel Law. Although such
publications are reprehensible, yet this court feels some aversion to the
application of the provision of law under which this case was filed. Our
Penal Code has come to us from the Spanish regime. Article 256 of that
Code prescribes punishment for persons who use insulting language about
Ministers of the Crown or other "authority." The King of Spain doubtless left
the need of such protection to his ministers and others in authority in the
Philippines as well as in Spain. Hence, the article referred to was made
applicable here. Notwithstanding the change of sovereignty, our Supreme
Court, in a majority decision, has held that this provision is still in force,
and that one who made an insulting remark about the President of the
United States was punishable under it. (U.S. vs. Helbig, supra.) If it
applicable in that case, it would appear to be applicable in this case.
Hence, said article 256 must be enforced, without fear or favor, until it shall
be repealed or superseded by other legislation, or until the Supreme Court
shall otherwise determine.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the court finds the defendant guilty
as charged in the information and under article 256 of their Penal Code
sentences him to suffer two months and one day of arresto mayor and the
accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay the costs of both
instances.

The fifteen errors assigned by the defendant and appellant, reenforced by an

extensive brief, and eloquent oral argument made in his own behalf and by his
learned counsel, all reduce themselves to the pertinent and decisive question
which was announced in the beginning of this decision.
It will be noted in the first place that the trial judge considered himself bound to
follow the rule announced in the case of United States vs. Helbig (R. G. No.
14705, 1 not published). In that case, the accused was charged with having said,
"To hell with the President and his proclamations, or words to that effect," in
violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. He was found guilty in a judgment
rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila and again on appeal to the
Supreme Court, with the writer of the instant decision dissenting on two principal
grounds: (1) That the accused was deprived of the constitutional right of cross-
examination, and (2) that article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is no longer in
force. Subsequently, on a motion of reconsideration, the court, being of the
opinion that the Court of First Instance had committed a prejudicial error in
depriving the accused of his right to cross-examine a principal witness, set aside
the judgment affirming the judgment appealed from and ordered the return of the
record to the court of origin for the celebration of a new trial. Whether such a trial
was actually had, is not known, but at least, the record in the Helbig case has
never again been elevated to this court.

There may perchance exist some doubt as to the authority of the decision in the
Helbig case, in view of the circumstances above described. This much, however,
is certain: The facts of the Helbig case and the case before us, which we may
term the Perfecto case, are different, for in the first case there was an oral
defamation, while in the second there is a written defamation. Not only this, but a
new point which, under the facts, could not have been considered in the Helbig
case, is, in the Perfecto case, urged upon the court. And, finally, as is apparent to
all, the appellate court is not restrained, as was the trial court, by strict adherence
to a former decision. We much prefer to resolve the question before us
unhindered by references to the Helbig decision.

This is one of those cases on which a variety of opinions all leading to the same
result can be had. A majority of the court are of the opinion that the Philippine
Libel Law, Act No. 277, has had the effect of repealing so much of article 256 of
the Penal Code as relates to written defamation, abuse, or insult, and that under
the information and the facts, the defendant is neither guilty of a violation of
article 256 of the Penal Code, nor of the Libel Law. The view of the Chief Justice
is that the accused should be acquitted for the reason that the facts alleged in the
information do not constitute a violation of article 156 of the Penal Code. Three
members of the court believe that article 256 was abrogated completely by the
change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines and is
inconsistent with democratic principles of government.

Without prejudice to the right of any member of the court to explain his position,
we will discuss the two main points just mentioned.
 1. Effect of the Philippine Libel Law, Act No. 277, on article 256 of the
Spanish Penal Code. — The Libel Law, Act No. 277, was enacted by the
Philippine Commission shortly after organization of this legislative body.
Section 1 defines libel as a "malicious defamation, expressed either in
writing, printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, or public theatrical
exhibitions, tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead or to
impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation, or publish the alleged or natural
deffects of one who is alive, and thereby expose him to public hatred,
contempt or ridicule." Section 13 provides that "All laws and parts of laws
now in force, so far as the same may be in conflict herewith, are hereby
repealed. . . ."

That parts of laws in force in 1901 when the Libel Law took effect, were in conflict
therewith, and that the Libel Law abrogated certain portion of the Spanish Penal
Code, cannot be gainsaid. Title X of Book II of the Penal Code, covering the
subjects of calumny and insults, must have been particularly affected by the Libel
Law. Indeed, in the early case of Pardo de Tavera vs. Garcia Valdez ([1902], 1.
Phil., 468), the Supreme Court spoke of the Libel Law as "reforming the
preexisting Spanish law on the subject of calumnia and injuria." Recently,
specific attention was given to the effect of the Libel Law on the provisions of the
Penal Code, dealing with calumny and insults, and it was found that those
provisions of the Penal Code on the subject of calumny and insults in which the
elements of writing an publicity entered, were abrogated by the Libel Law.
(People vs. Castro [1922], p. 842, ante.)

The Libel Law must have had the same result on other provisions of the Penal
Code, as for instance article 256.

The facts here are that the editor of a newspaper published an article, naturally in
writing, which may have had the tendency to impeach the honesty, virtue, or
reputation of members of the Philippine Senate, thereby possibly exposing them
to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, which is exactly libel, as defined by the
Libel Law. Sir J. F. Stephen is authority for the statement that a libel is indictable
when defaming a "body of persons definite and small enough for individual
members to be recognized as such, in or by means of anything capable of being
a libel." (Digest of Criminal Law, art. 267.) But in the United States, while it may
be proper to prosecute criminally the author of a libel charging a legislator with
corruption, criticisms, no matter how severe, on a legislature, are within the range
of the liberty of the press, unless the intention and effect be seditious. (3
Wharton's Criminal Law, p. 2131.) With these facts and legal principles in mind,
recall that article 256 begins: Any person who, by . . . writing, shall defame,
abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority," etc.
The Libel Law is a complete and comprehensive law on the subject of libel. The
well-known rule of statutory construction is, that where the later statute clearly
covers the old subject-matter of antecedent acts, and it plainly appears to have
been the purpose of the legislature to give expression in it to the whole law on
the subject, previous laws are held to be repealed by necessary implication. (1
Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction, p. 465.) For identical reasons, it is
evident that Act No. 277 had the effect so much of this article as punishes
defamation, abuse, or insults by writing.

Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, the Treason and Sedition Law, may
also have affected article 256, but as to this point, it is not necessary to make a
pronouncement.

2. Effect of the change from Spanish to Amercian sevoreignty over the

Philippine son article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code. — Appellant's main
proposition in the lower court and again energetically pressed in the
appellate court was that article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is not now
in force because abrogated by the change from Spanish to American
sovereignty over the Philippines and because inconsistent with democratic
principles of government. This view was indirectly favored by the trial
judge, and, as before stated, is the opinion of three members of this court.

Article 256 is found in Chapter V of title III of Book II of the Spanish Penal Code.
Title I of Book II punishes the crimes of treason, crimes that endanger the peace
or independence of the state, crimes against international law, and the crime of
piracy. Title II of the same book punishes the crimes of lese majeste, crimes
against the Cortes and its members and against the council of ministers, crimes
against the form of government, and crimes committed on the occasion of the
exercise of rights guaranteed by the fundamental laws of the state, including
crime against religion and worship. Title III of the same Book, in which article 256
is found, punishes the crimes of rebellion, sedition, assaults upon persons in
authority, and their agents, and contempts, insults, injurias, and threats against
persons in authority, and insults, injurias, and threats against their agents and
other public officers, the last being the title to Chapter V. The first two articles in
Chapter V define and punish the offense of contempt committed by any one who
shall be word or deed defame, abuse, insult, or threathen a minister of the crown,
or any person in authority. The with an article condemning challenges to fight
duels intervening, comes article 256, now being weighed in the balance. It reads
as follows: "Any person who, by word, deed, or writing, shall defame, abuse, or
insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority, while engaged in the
performance of official duties, or by reason of such performance, provided that
the offensive minister or person, or the offensive writing be not addressed to him,
shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor," — that is, the defamation, abuse, or
insult of any Minister of the Crown of the Monarchy of Spain (for there could not
be a Minister of the Crown in the United States of America), or other person in
authority in the Monarchy of Spain.

It cannot admit of doubt that all those provisions of the Spanish Penal Code
having to do with such subjects as treason, lese majeste, religion and worship,
rebellion, sedition, and contempts of ministers of the crown, are not longer in
force. Our present task, therefore, is a determination of whether article 256 has
met the same fate, or, more specifically stated, whether it is in the nature of a
municipal law or political law, and is consistent with the Constitution and laws of
the United States and the characteristics and institutions of the American
Government.

It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the

previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. "Political" is
here used to denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained by the
inhabitants to the sovereign. (American Insurance Co. vs. Canter [1828], 1 Pet.,
511; Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S.,
542; Roa vs. Collector of Customs [1912], 23 Phil., 315.) Mr. Justice Field of the
United States Supreme Court stated the obvious when in the course of his
opinion in the case of Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. vs. McGlinn,
supra, he said: "As a matter of course, all laws, ordinances and regulations in
conflict with the political character, institutions and Constitution of the new
government are at once displaced. Thus, upon a cession of political jurisdiction
and legislative power — and the latter is involved in the former — to the United
States, the laws of the country in support of an established religion or abridging
the freedom of the press, or authorizing cruel and unusual punishments, and he
like, would at once cease to be of obligatory force without any declaration to that
effect." To quote again from the United States Supreme Court: "It cannot be
admitted that the King of Spain could, by treaty or otherwise, impart to the United
States any of his royal prerogatives; and much less can it be admitted that they
have capacity to receive or power to exercise them. Every nation acquiring
territory, by treaty or otherwise, must hold it subject to the Constitution and laws
of its own government, and not according to those of the government ceding it."
(Pollard vs. Hagan [1845], 3 Hos., 210.)

On American occupation of the Philippines, by instructions of the President to the

Military Commander dated May 28, 1898, and by proclamation of the latter, the
municipal laws of the conquered territory affecting private rights of person and
property and providing for the punishment of crime were nominally continued in
force in so far as they were compatible with the new order of things. But
President McKinley, in his instructions to General Merritt, was careful to say:
"The first effect of the military occupation of the enemy's territory is the
severance of the former political relation of the inhabitants and the establishment
of a new political power." From that day to this, the ordinarily it has been taken
for granted that the provisions under consideration were still effective. To
paraphrase the language of the United States Supreme Court in
Weems vs. United States ([1910], 217 U. S., 349), there was not and could not
be, except as precise questions were presented, a careful consideration of the
codal provisions and a determination of the extent to which they accorded with or
were repugnant to the "'great principles of liberty and law' which had been 'made
the basis of our governmental system.' " But when the question has been
squarely raised, the appellate court has been forced on occasion to hold certain
portions of the Spanish codes repugnant t democratic institutions and American
constitutional principles. (U.S. vs. Sweet [1901], 1 Phil., 18; U.S. vs. Balcorta
[1913], 25 Phil., 273; U.S. vs. Balcorta [1913], 25 Phil., 533;
Weems vs. U.S., supra.)

The nature of the government which has been set up in the Philippines under
American sovereignty was outlined by President McKinley in that Magna Charta
of Philippine liberty, his instructions to the Commission, of April 7, 1900. In part,
the President said:

In all the forms of government and administrative provisions which they are
authorized to prescribe, the Commission should bear in mind that he
government which they are establishing is designed not for our satisfaction
or for the expression of our theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace,
and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands, and the measures
adopted should be made to conform to their customs, their habits, and
even their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the
accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of just and effective
government. At the same time the Commission should bear in mind,
and the people of the Islands should be made plainly to understand, that
there are certain great principles of government which have been made
the basis of our governmental system, which we deem essential to the rule
of law and the maintenance of individual freedom, and of which they have,
unfortunately, been denied the experience possessed by us; that there are
also certain practical rules of government which we have found to be
essential to the preservation of these great principles of liberty and law,
and that these principles and these rules of government must be
established and maintained in their islands for the sake of their liberty and
happiness, however much they may conflict with the customs or laws of
procedure with which they are familiar. It is evident that the most
enligthened thought of the Philippine Islands fully appreciates the
importance of these principles and rules, and they will inevitably within a
short time command universal assent.
The courts have naturally taken the same view. Mr. Justice Elliott, speaking for
our Supreme Court, in the case of United States vs. Bull ([1910], 15 Phil., 7),
said: "The President and Congress framed the government on the model with
which American are familiar, and which has proven best adapted for the
advancement of the public interests and the protection of individual rights and
privileges."

Therefore, it has come with somewhat of a shock to hear the statement made
that the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands
and their customs, habits, and prejudices, to follow the language of President
McKinley, demand obeisance to authority, and royal protection for that authority.

According to our view, article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was enacted by the
Government of Spain to protect Spanish officials who were the representatives of
the King. With the change of sovereignty, a new government, and a new theory
of government, as set up in the Philippines. It was in no sense a continuation of
the old, although merely for convenience certain of the existing institutions and
laws were continued. The demands which the new government made, and
makes, on the individual citizen are likewise different. No longer is there a
Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted position that the
citizen must speak of him only with bated breath. "In the eye of our Constitution
and laws, every man is a sovereign, a ruler and a freeman, and has equal rights
with every other man. We have no rank or station, except that of respectability
and intelligence as opposed to indecency and ignorance, and the door to this
rank stands open to every man to freely enter and abide therein, if he is qualified,
and whether he is qualified or not depends upon the life and character and
attainments and conduct of each person for himself. Every man may lawfully do
what he will, so long as it is not malum in se or malum prohibitum or does not
infringe upon the qually sacred rights of others." (State vs. Shepherd [1903], 177
Mo., 205; 99 A. S. R., 624.)

It is true that in England, from which so many of the laws and institutions of the
United States are derived, there were once statutes of scandalum magnatum,
under which words which would not be actionable if spoken of an ordinary
subject were made actionable if spoken of a peer of the realm or of any of the
great officers of the Crown, without proof of any special damage. The Crown of
England, unfortunately, took a view less tolerant that that of other sovereigns, as
for instance, the Emperors Augustus, Caesar, and Tiberius. These English
statutes have, however, long since, become obsolete, while in the United States,
the offense of scandalum magnatum is not known. In the early days of the
American Republic, a sedition law was enacted, making it an offense to libel the
Government, the Congress, or the President of the United States, but the law
met with so much popular disapproval, that it was soon repealed. "In this country
no distinction as to persons is recognized, and in practice a person holding a
high office is regarded as a target at whom any person may let fly his poisonous
words. High official position, instead of affording immunity from slanderous and
libelous charges, seems rather to be regarded as making his character free
plunder for any one who desires to create a senation by attacking it." (Newell,
Slander and Libel, 3d ed., p. 245; Sillars vs. Collier [1890], 151 Mass., 50; 6
L.R.A., 680.)

Article 256 of the Penal Code is contrary to the genius and fundamental
principles of the American character and system of government. The gulf which
separates this article from the spirit which inspires all penal legislation of
American origin, is as wide as that which separates a monarchy from a
democratic Republic like that of the United States. This article was crowded out
by implication as soon as the United States established its authority in the
Philippine Islands. Penalties out of all proportion to the gravity of the offense,
grounded in a distorted monarchical conception of the nature of political
authority, as opposed to the American conception of the protection of the
interests of the public, have been obliterated by the present system of
government in the Islands.  1awph!l.net

From an entirely different point of view, it must be noted that this article punishes
contempts against executive officials, although its terms are broad enough to
cover the entire official class. Punishment for contempt of non-judicial officers
has no place in a government based upon American principles. Our official class
is not, as in monarchies, an agent of some authority greater than the people but it
is an agent and servant of the people themselves. These officials are only
entitled to respect and obedience when they are acting within the scope of their
authority and jurisdiction. The American system of government is calculated to
enforce respect and obedience where such respect and obedience is due, but
never does it place around the individual who happens to occupy an official
position by mandate of the people any official halo, which calls for drastic
punishment for contemptuous remarks.

The crime of lese majeste disappeared in the Philippines with the ratification of

the Treaty of Paris. Ministers of the Crown have no place under the American
flag.

To summarize, the result is, that all the members of the court are of the opinion,
although for different reasons, that the judgment should be reversed and the
defendant and appellant acquitted, with costs de officio. So ordered.
Date of Effectivity

G.R. No. 78059 August 31, 1987

ALFREDO M. DE LEON, ANGEL S. SALAMAT, MARIO C. STA. ANA, JOSE

C. TOLENTINO, ROGELIO J. DE LA ROSA and JOSE M.
RESURRECCION, petitioners, 
vs.
HON. BENJAMIN B. ESGUERRA, in his capacity as OIC Governor of the
Province of Rizal, HON. ROMEO C. DE LEON, in his capacity as OIC Mayor
of the Municipality of Taytay, Rizal, FLORENTINO G. MAGNO, REMIGIO M.
TIGAS, RICARDO Z. LACANIENTA, TEODORO V. MEDINA, ROSENDO S.
PAZ, and TERESITA L. TOLENTINO, respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

An original action for Prohibition instituted by petitioners seeking to enjoin

respondents from replacing them from their respective positions as Barangay
Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Municipality of Taytay,
Province of Rizal.

As required by the Court, respondents submitted their Comment on the Petition,

and petitioner's their Reply to respondents' Comment.

In the Barangay elections held on May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon
was elected Barangay Captain and the other petitioners Angel S. Salamat, Mario
C. Sta. Ana, Jose C. Tolentino, Rogelio J. de la Rosa and Jose M. Resurreccion,
as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as the Barangay Election Act of 1982.

On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M, de Leon received a Memorandum

antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin
Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as
Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The designation made by
the OIC Governor was "by authority of the Minister of Local Government."

Also on February 8, 1987, respondent OIC Governor signed a Memorandum,

antedated December 1, 1986 designating respondents Remigio M. Tigas,
Ricardo Z. Lacanienta Teodoro V. Medina, Roberto S. Paz and Teresita L.
Tolentino as members of the Barangay Council of the same Barangay and
Municipality.
That the Memoranda had been antedated is evidenced by the Affidavit of
respondent OIC Governor, the pertinent portions of which read:

xxx xxx xxx

That I am the OIC Governor of Rizal having been appointed as such

on March 20, 1986;

That as being OIC Governor of the Province of Rizal and in the

performance of my duties thereof, I among others, have signed as I
did sign the unnumbered memorandum ordering the replacement of
all the barangay officials of all the barangay(s) in the Municipality of
Taytay, Rizal;

That the above cited memorandum dated December 1, 1986 was

signed by me personally on February 8,1987;

That said memorandum was further deciminated (sic) to all

concerned the following day, February 9. 1987.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NONE.

Pasig, Metro Manila, March 23, 1987.

Before us now, petitioners pray that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987
be declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited from taking over
their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen, respectively.
Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of
1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office "shall be six (6) years which shall
commence on June 7, 1982 and shall continue until their successors shall have
elected and shall have qualified," or up to June 7, 1988. It is also their position
that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no
longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors.

On the other hand, respondents rely on Section 2, Article III of the Provisional
Constitution, promulgated on March 25, 1986, which provided:

SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees

under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise
provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation
or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such
appointment is made within a period of one year from February
25,1986.
By reason of the foregoing provision, respondents contend that the terms of
office of elective and appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners
continued in office by virtue of the aforequoted provision and not because their
term of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay
Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six (6) years must be
deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with the aforequoted
provision of the Provisional Constitution.

Examining the said provision, there should be no question that petitioners, as

elective officials under the 1973 Constitution, may continue in office but should
vacate their positions upon the occurrence of any of the events mentioned. 1

Since the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution, there has been no

proclamation or executive order terminating the term of elective Barangay
officials. Thus, the issue for resolution is whether or not the designation of
respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the one-year period
which ended on February 25, 1987.

Considering the candid Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, we hold that

February 8, 1977, should be considered as the effective date of replacement and
not December 1,1986 to which it was ante dated, in keeping with the dictates of
justice.

But while February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one-year deadline, the
aforequoted provision in the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have
been overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution reading.

SECTION 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its
ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the
purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions.

The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that

date, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been
superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Governor could no
longer rely on Section 2, Article III, thereof to designate respondents to the
elective positions occupied by petitioners.

Petitioners must now be held to have acquired security of tenure specially

considering that the Barangay Election Act of 1982 declares it "a policy of the
State to guarantee and promote the autonomy of the barangays to ensure their
fullest development as self-reliant communities.  Similarly, the 1987 Constitution
2

ensures the autonomy of local governments and of political subdivisions of which

the barangays form a part,   and limits the President's power to "general
3
supervision" over local governments.   Relevantly, Section 8, Article X of the
4

same 1987 Constitution further provides in part:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay

officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years ...

Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law,
therefore, the term of office of six (6) years provided for in the Barangay Election
Act of 1982   should still govern.
5

Contrary to the stand of respondents, we find nothing inconsistent between the

term of six (6) years for elective Barangay officials and the 1987 Constitution,
and the same should, therefore, be considered as still operative, pursuant to
Section 3, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, reading:

Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations

letters of instructions, and other executive issuances not
inconsistent, with this Constitution shall remain operative until
amended, repealed or revoked.

WHEREFORE, (1) The Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Governor on

February 8, 1987 designating respondents as the Barangay Captain and
Barangay Councilmen, respectively, of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal, are both
declared to be of no legal force and effect; and (2) the Writ of Prohibition is
granted enjoining respondents perpetually from proceeding with the ouster/take-
over of petitioners' positions subject of this Petition. Without costs.

SO ORDERED.

Facts: On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain
together with the other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores,
Muncipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal in a Barangay election held under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as Barangay Election Act of 1982.

On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a Memorandum antedated December

1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987
designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores
and the other respondents as members of Barangay Council of the same Barangay and
Municipality.

Petitoners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject Memoranda of February 8,
1987 be declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited by taking over their
positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen.

Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP
Blg. 222), their terms of office shall be six years which shall commence on June 7, 1988
and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified. It
was also their position that with the ratification of the 1987 Philippine Constitution,
respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and to designate
their successors.

On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and
appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of
Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution and not because their term of six years had
not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of
office of Barangay officials to six years must be deemed to have been repealed for being
inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly

made during the one-year period which ended on Feb 25, 1987.

Ruling: Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Gov on
Feb 8, 1987 designating respondents as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of
Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal has no legal force and effect.

The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore, the
Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have superseded. Having become
inoperative, respondent OIC Gov could no longer rely on Sec 2, Art 3, thereof to
designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners. Relevantly, Sec
8, Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution further provides in part:

"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall
be determined by law, shall be three years x x x."

Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by aw, therefore, the
term of office of 6 years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still
govern.

UT MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PERREAT (Interpretation of the Constitution)

G.R. No. 160261             November 10, 2003

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner, 
NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA
MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND
MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention, 
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE
G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR.
AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003

SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA

RAZON-ABAD, petitioners,
ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO
QUADRA, petitioners-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention, 
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR
ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTA-TIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M. CAGAMPANG, petitioners,

WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioners-in-intervention, 
vs.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, AND
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention, 
vs.
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
GILBERT TEODORO, JR., FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIO
LEDESMA IV, HENRY LANOT, KIM BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO
LIBANAN, EMMYLOU TALIÑO-SANTOS, DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN
GATCHALIAN, LUIS BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO
NIEVA, EDGAR ERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL DANGWA, ALFREDO
MARAÑON, JR., CECILIA CARREON-JALOSJOS, AGAPITO AQUINO,
FAUSTO SEACHON, JR., GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS
LACSON, MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR,
WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL DE GUZMAN,
ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO BACULIO, FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO
SYJUCO, ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERIC
SINGSON, JACINTO PARAS, JOSE SOLIS, RENATO MATUBO, HERMINO
TEVES, AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO MACIAS, ARTHUR PINGOY, JR.,
FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO, CONRADO ESTRELLA III, ELIAS BULUT, JR.,
JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO BONDOC, GENEROSO TULAGAN,
PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAEL DUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI LAPUS,
CARLOS COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS ESCUDERRO,
RENE VELARDE, CELSO LOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES, DIDAGEN
DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM MITRA, JOSEPH SANTIAGO, DARLENE
ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETA SUAREZ, RODOLF PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA,
GREGORIO IPONG, GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO, CELIA LAYUS,
JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI, BENASING MACARAMBON, JR., JOSEFINA JOSON,
MARK COJUANGCO, MAURICIO DOMOGAN, RONALDO ZAMORA,
ANGELO MONTILLA, ROSELLER BARINAGA, JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA
NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO, JOAQUIN CHIPECO, JR., AND RUY ELIAS
LOPEZ, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003

HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA

PAPA, NAPOLEON C. REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., ALFREDO C.
LIGON, JOAN P. SERRANO AND GARY S. MALLARI, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention, 
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P. NAZARENO,
IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES,respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003

SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M.

GONZALES, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR
ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003

LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN
MATIBAG, RAMON MIQUIBAS, RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO
MALASAGA, EDUARDO SARMIENTO, EDGARDO NAOE, LEONARDO
GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIO MENDIOLA, MARIO TOREJA,
GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON A. LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR.,
RONNIE TOQUILLO, KATE ANN VITAL, ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICO
PABLES, JR., JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA A. AQUINO, MILA P. GABITO,
JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG, ERNA LAHUZ, HOMER CALIBAG,
DR. BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE, WILLIE RIVERO,
DANTE DIAZ, ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO BUENAVISTA, EMILY
SENERIS, ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA, SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER
QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH LEANDRO LOYOLA, ANTONIO LIBREA, FILEMON
SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U. SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND
NOEL ISORENA, MAU RESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER, AND EDILBERTO
GALLOR, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention, 
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKER
JOSE C. DE VENECIA, JR., THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY HON.
SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. FELIX FUENTEBELLA, ET
AL., respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003

PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners, 

vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON,
AND ALL MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE SENATE, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003

ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND ENGR. MAXIMO
N. MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A TAXPAYER AND MEMBER OF THE
ENGINEERING PROFESSION, petitioners, 
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES REPRESENTED BY THE 83
HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE LED BY HON. REPRESENTATIVE
WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, 

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR
ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF
THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003

CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner, 
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATE
PRESIDENT, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003

U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C. PADERANGA,

DANILO V. ORTIZ, GLORIA C. ESTENZO-RAMOS, LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS V.
DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON, ROLANDO P. NONATO, DANTE T.
RAMOS, ELSA R. DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B. CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO,
SYLVA G. AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF
OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners, 
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN
DRILON, HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES FELIX FUENTEBELLA AND
GILBERTO TEODORO, BY THEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE GROUP OF MORE THAN 80 HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES WHO
SIGNED AND FILED THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST SUPREME
COURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003

FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner, 

vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE HONORABLE
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003

NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN
REPRESENTATION OF THE 86 SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF
IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. AND
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003

VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEÑA, petitioners, 

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003

IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST CHIEF

JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS,
JR., petitioner.

x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner, 

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR
PRESIDING OFFICER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE
GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.
FUENTEBELA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE
PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003

DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY CHAPTER,

MANUEL M. MONZON, PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU PROVINCE, VICTOR A.
MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN
OF THE COLLEG EOF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS
ASSOCAITION OF CEBU, INC. [YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY ATTY. MANUEL
LEGASPI, CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. [CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R. POCA,
MANDAUE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW], REPRESENTED BY
FELIPE VELASQUEZ, FEDERACION INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS
[FIDA], REPRESENTED BY THELMA L. JORDAN, CARLOS G. CO,
PRESIENT OF CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND
CEBU LADY LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INC. [CELLA, INC.], MARIBELLE
NAVARRO AND BERNARDITO FLORIDO, PAST PRESIDENT CEBU
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES,
CEBU CHAPTER, petitioners, 
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G.
DE VENECIA, AS HOUSE SPEAKER AND THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY
SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, AS SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how

passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it may appear to be, over the
determination by the independent branches of government of the nature, scope
and extent of their respective constitutional powers where the Constitution itself
provides for the means and bases for its resolution.
Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at times
turbulent, dynamics of the relationship among these co-equal branches. This
Court is confronted with one such today involving the legislature and the judiciary
which has drawn legal luminaries to chart antipodal courses and not a few of our
countrymen to vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.

There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present
controversy subject of the instant petitions – whether the filing of the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the
House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the
Constitution, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has
resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps even more truth to the view that it was
brought upon by a political crisis of conscience.

In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to
address all the issues which this controversy spawns that this Court
unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort to extra-
constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary nor legally permissible.
Both its resolution and protection of the public interest lie in adherence to, not
departure from, the Constitution.

In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is
ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of
powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no
means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of
the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.

At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been
carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these
three branches must be given effect without destroying their indispensable co-
equality.

Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government,

intended as they are to insure that governmental power is wielded only for the
good of the people, mandate a relationship of interdependence and coordination
among these branches where the delicate functions of enacting, interpreting and
enforcing laws are harmonized to achieve a unity of governance, guided only by
what is in the greater interest and well-being of the people. Verily, salus populi
est suprema lex.

Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:

ARTICLE XI
 Accountability of Public Officers

SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees

must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives.

SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the

Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft
and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other
public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by
law, but not by impeachment.

SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have

the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of

the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order
of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee
within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by
a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House
within sixty session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of
Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The
vote of each Member shall be recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at

least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute
the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith
proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same

official more than once within a period of one year.

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath
 or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person
shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members
of the Senate.

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than

removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the
Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be
liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.

(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively

carry out the purpose of this section. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th

Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on
November 28, 2001, superseding the previous House Impeachment
Rules1 approved by the 11th Congress. The relevant distinctions between these
two Congresses' House Impeachment Rules are shown in the following
tabulation:

11TH CONGRESS RULES 12TH CONGRESS NEW

RULES
RULE II RULE V

INITIATING IMPEACHMENT BAR AGAINST INITIATION

OF IMPEACHMENT
Section 2. Mode of PROCEEDINGS AGAINST
Initiating Impeachment. – THE SAME OFFICIAL
Impeachment shall be
initiated only by a verified Section 16.
complaint for impeachment – Impeachment
filed by any Member of the Proceedings Deemed
House of Representatives or Initiated. – In cases where
by any citizen upon a a Member of the House files
resolution of endorsement by a verified complaint of
any Member thereof or by a impeachment or a citizen
verified complaint or files a verified complaint
resolution of impeachment that is endorsed by a
filed by at least one-third Member of the House
(1/3) of all the Members of through a resolution of
the House. endorsement against an
impeachable officer,
impeachment proceedings
against such official are
deemed initiated on the day
the Committee on Justice
finds that the verified
complaint and/or resolution
against such official, as the
case may be, is sufficient in
substance, or on the date
the House votes to overturn
or affirm the finding of the
said Committee that the
verified complaint and/or
resolution, as the case may
be, is not sufficient in
substance.

In cases where a verified

complaint or a resolution of
impeachment is filed or
endorsed, as the case may
be, by at least one-third
(1/3) of the Members of the
House, impeachment
proceedings are deemed
initiated at the time of the
filing of such verified
complaint or resolution of
impeachment with the
Secretary General.

 
RULE V Section 17. Bar Against
Initiation Of Impeachment
BAR AGAINST Proceedings. – Within a
IMPEACHMENT period of one (1) year from
the date impeachment
Section 14. Scope of Bar. – proceedings are deemed
No impeachment initiated as provided in
 Section 16 hereof, no
proceedings shall be initiated impeachment proceedings,
against the same official as such, can be initiated
more than once within the against the same official.
period of one (1) year. (Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a

Resolution,2 sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which
directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."3

On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment

complaint4 (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide
Jr. and seven Associate Justices5 of this Court for "culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes."6 The complaint
was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and
Didagen Piang Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the House Committee on Justice
on August 5, 20038 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution which reads:

Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any

Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a
resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included
in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the
proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee,
after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together
with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form,"9 but voted to dismiss the same
on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.10 To date, the Committee
Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance
with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.

Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first
complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice
voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint11 was filed with the
Secretary General of the House12 by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr.
(First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines
Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of
the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This
second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members
of the House of Representatives.13

Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et.

al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment
complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI
of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against
the same official more than once within a period of one year."

In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he
has a duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use all
available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment, that the issues
raised in his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of
transcendental importance, and that he "himself was a victim of the capricious
and arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings
introduced by the 12th Congress,"14 posits that his right to bring an impeachment
complaint against then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been violated due to
the capricious and arbitrary changes in the House Impeachment Rules adopted
and approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of Representatives and
prays that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9
thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of mandamus
directing respondents House of Representatives et. al. to comply with Article IX,
Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the Constitution, to return the second impeachment
complaint and/or strike it off the records of the House of Representatives, and to
promulgate rules which are consistent with the Constitution; and (3) this Court
permanently enjoin respondent House of Representatives from proceeding with
the second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens and

taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the case are of transcendental importance,
pray, in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ "perpetually"
prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from filing any Articles of
Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the Senate; and for the issuance of a
writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin
Drilon from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or,
in the event that the Senate has accepted the same, from proceeding with the
impeachment trial.
In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad Cagampang,
as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and members of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, alleging that their petition for Prohibition involves public interest as it
involves the use of public funds necessary to conduct the impeachment trial on
the second impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibition
enjoining Congress from conducting further proceedings on said second
impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court has
recognized that he has locus standi to bring petitions of this nature in the cases
of Chavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development
Corporation,16 prays in his petition for Injunction that the second impeachment
complaint be declared unconstitutional.

In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers and
members of the legal profession, pray in their petition for Prohibition for an order
prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from drafting, adopting,
approving and transmitting to the Senate the second impeachment complaint,
and respondents De Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment to the Senate.

In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and

Deputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of the House of
Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring that only constitutional
impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment complaint and any act
proceeding therefrom be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they have

a right to be protected against all forms of senseless spending of taxpayers'
money and that they have an obligation to protect the Supreme Court, the Chief
Justice, and the integrity of the Judiciary, allege in their petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition that it is instituted as "a class suit" and pray that (1) the House
Resolution endorsing the second impeachment complaint as well as all
issuances emanating therefrom be declared null and void; and (2) this Court
enjoin the Senate and the Senate President from taking cognizance of, hearing,
trying and deciding the second impeachment complaint, and issue a writ of
prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and agents to desist from
conducting any proceedings or to act on the impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members are
citizens and taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer
and a member of the Philippine Bar, both allege in their petition, which does not
state what its nature is, that the filing of the second impeachment complaint
involves paramount public interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the
House Impeachment Rules and the second impeachment complaint/Articles of
Impeachment be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a

member of the Philippine Bar Association and of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in
their petition for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent
Injunction to enjoin the House of Representatives from proceeding with the
second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it is

mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility to uphold the Constitution,
prays in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule
V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the House Impeachment Rules be
declared unconstitutional and that the House of Representatives be permanently
enjoined from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition that the House Impeachment Rules be declared
unconstitutional.

In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et. al., in
their petition for Prohibition and Injunction which they claim is a class suit filed in
behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran17 which was filed in behalf of
succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a writ prohibiting
respondents House of Representatives and the Senate from conducting further
proceedings on the second impeachment complaint and that this Court declare
as unconstitutional the second impeachment complaint and the acts of
respondent House of Representatives in interfering with the fiscal matters of the
Judiciary.

In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino,

alleging that the issues in his petition for Prohibition are of national and
transcendental significance and that as an official of the Philippine Judicial
Academy, he has a direct and substantial interest in the unhampered operation
of the Supreme Court and its officials in discharging their duties in accordance
with the Constitution, prays for the issuance of a writ prohibiting the House of
Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate and
the Senate from receiving the same or giving the impeachment complaint due
course.
In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his
petition for Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at the time they
filed the second impeachment complaint, were "absolutely without any legal
power to do so, as they acted without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of
Impeachment assail the alleged abuse of powers of the Chief Justice to disburse
the (JDF)."

In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L.

Hofileña, alleging that as professors of law they have an abiding interest in the
subject matter of their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains to a
constitutional issue "which they are trying to inculcate in the minds of their
students," pray that the House of Representatives be enjoined from endorsing
and the Senate from trying the Articles of Impeachment and that the second
impeachment complaint be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging

his locus standi, but alleging that the second impeachment complaint is founded
on the issue of whether or not the Judicial Development Fund (JDF) was spent in
accordance with law and that the House of Representatives does not have
exclusive jurisdiction in the examination and audit thereof, prays in his petition
"To Declare Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Action and
Jurisdiction" that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the issues
raised in the filing of the second impeachment complaint involve matters of
transcendental importance, prays in its petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1)
the second impeachment complaint and all proceedings arising therefrom be
declared null and void; (2) respondent House of Representatives be prohibited
from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate; and (3) respondent
Senate be prohibited from accepting the Articles of Impeachment and from
conducting any proceedings thereon.

In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens and

taxpayers, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second
impeachment complaint as well as the resolution of endorsement and
impeachment by the respondent House of Representatives be declared null and
void and (2) respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon be
prohibited from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice
or, in the event that they have accepted the same, that they be prohibited from
proceeding with the impeachment trial.

Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263, the
first three of the eighteen which were filed before this Court,18 prayed for the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or preliminary injunction to
prevent the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment arising from the second impeachment complaint to the Senate.
Petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed for the
declaration of the November 28, 2001 House Impeachment Rules as null and
void for being unconstitutional.

Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295, which
were filed on October 28, 2003, sought similar relief. In addition, petition bearing
docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that House Resolution No. 260 (calling
for a legislative inquiry into the administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF)
infringes on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and is a direct
violation of the constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.

On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of

Representatives, a motion was put forth that the second impeachment complaint
be formally transmitted to the Senate, but it was not carried because the House
of Representatives adjourned for lack of quorum,19 and as reflected above, to
date, the Articles of Impeachment have yet to be forwarded to the Senate.

Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction which were filed on or before October 28, 2003,
Justices Puno and Vitug offered to recuse themselves, but the Court rejected
their offer. Justice Panganiban inhibited himself, but the Court directed him to
participate.

Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its Resolution of
October 28, 2003, resolved to (a) consolidate the petitions; (b) require
respondent House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as the Solicitor
General, to comment on the petitions not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3,
2003; (c) set the petitions for oral arguments on November 5, 2003, at 10:00
a.m.; and (d) appointed distinguished legal experts as amici curiae.20 In addition,
this Court called on petitioners and respondents to maintain the status quo,
enjoining all the parties and others acting for and in their behalf to refrain from
committing acts that would render the petitions moot.

Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives through

Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-respondents, by way of special
appearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court has no
jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives,
which is an independent and co-equal branch of government under the
Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate
impeachment cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own
behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela)21 and Comment,
praying that "the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the
Court over the issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and that the sole
power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court to try
and decide impeachment cases, including the one where the Chief Justice is the
respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of
the Constitution."22

Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court resolved to
(a) consolidate them with the earlier consolidated petitions; (b) require
respondents to file their comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003;
and (c) include them for oral arguments on November 5, 2003.

On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President
Franklin M. Drilon, filed a Manifestation stating that insofar as it is concerned, the
petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding that as
of the time of the filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before
it since (1) its constitutional duty to constitute itself as an impeachment court
commences only upon its receipt of the Articles of Impeachment, which it had
not, and (2) the principal issues raised by the petitions pertain exclusively to the
proceedings in the House of Representatives.

On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to Intervene"
in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, and 160295,
questioning the status quo Resolution issued by this Court on October 28, 2003
on the ground that it would unnecessarily put Congress and this Court in a
"constitutional deadlock" and praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as the
matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial determination.

On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra

filed in G.R. No. 160262 a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit
the Herein Incorporated Petition in Intervention."

On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga

Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion for Intervention in G.R. No. 160261.
On November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines,
Inc. also filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos.
160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310.

The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's Comment
and Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra's Petition in Intervention were admitted.
On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and the
arguments of petitioners, intervenors Senator Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal,
and Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in an
Advisory issued by this Court on November 3, 2003, to wit:

Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked;

who can invoke it; on what issues and at what time; and whether it should
be exercised by this Court at this time.

In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:

a) locus standi of petitioners;

b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);

c) political question/justiciability;

d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of impeachment;

e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of impeachment;

f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-

vis Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution; and

g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)

In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising

from the instant petitions as well as the myriad arguments and opinions
presented for and against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted
and determined them to be as follows: (1) the threshold and novel issue of
whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from
impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or not the essential pre-requisites for the
exercise of the power of judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3) the
substantive issues yet remaining. These matters shall now be discussed in
seriatim.

Judicial Review

As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of
judicial review to determine the validity of the second impeachment complaint.

This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the
government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution:
 SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and
in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. (Emphasis
supplied)

Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by

Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral
Commission23 after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose provisions,
unlike the present Constitution, did not contain the present provision in Article
VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel
discoursed:

x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great

landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not
entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the
only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the
proper allocation of powers between the several departments and
among the integral or constituent units thereof.

As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection

and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our people,
acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the
expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a
republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious
whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject to specific
limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The
Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and
limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these
restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable
if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to
direct the course of government along constitutional channels,for
then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights
mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government
mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions
embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living
constitution. In the United States where no express constitutional grant is
found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating power of
the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has
 been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one
and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not
expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our
Constitution.

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to

determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The
Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary
as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the
other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is
termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial
review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is
limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt
at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and
to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in
this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice
or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption
of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the
legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the
judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must
reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government.24 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the

proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "to
direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all
courts25 as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the
power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable."26

Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not explicitly
conferred upon the courts by its Constitution, such power has "been set at rest by
popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries." To be
sure, it was in the 1803 leading case of Marbury v. Madison27 that the power of
judicial review was first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to wit:

It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall

be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned;
and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall
be made in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank.

Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United

States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential
to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is
void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that
instrument.28(Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)

In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in the
1935 Constitution, the power of judicial review was exercised by our courts to
invalidate constitutionally infirm acts.29 And as pointed out by noted political law
professor and former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,30 the executive
and legislative branches of our government in fact effectively acknowledged this
power of judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil Code, to wit:

Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation
or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice
to the contrary.

When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the

Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be

valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)

As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is indeed an

integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which,
together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of
our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are utilized
only for the benefit of the people for which it serves.

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of

government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual
division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme
within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three
 powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended
them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The
Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and
balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with
the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other
departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and
hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the
Constitution.32 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano,

"x x x judicial review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the
separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great
departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the
boundaries of authority and control between them."33 To him, "[j]udicial review is
the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation – or instrument of intervention
– of the judiciary in that balancing operation."34

To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of
discretion by "any branch or instrumentalities of government," the afore-
quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for the first time into its
history, into block letter law the so-called "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this
Court, the nature of and rationale for which are mirrored in the following excerpt
from the sponsorship speech of its proponent, former Chief Justice Constitutional
Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:

xxx

The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.

I suppose nobody can question it.

The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and
explain.

Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual

controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
or instrumentality of the government.
 Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our
experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some
antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed
regime was marred considerably by the circumstance that in a
number of cases against the government, which then had no legal
defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political
questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles
concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of
courts to order the release of political detainees, and other matters related
to the operation and effect of martial law failed because the government
set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said:
"Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The
Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution
of the questions involved. It did not merely request an encroachment
upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further
violations thereof during the martial law regime. x x x

xxx

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the

agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its
officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials
has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial
power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the

courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this
nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political
question.35 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court
must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled
principles of constitutional construction.

First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution
must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,36 this
Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:
 We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its
meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where we
begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained.
They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to
them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it
being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in
the people's consciousness, its language as much as possible should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says
according to the text of the provision to be construed compels
acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the
postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these
are the cases where the need for construction is reduced to a
minimum.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the
Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers.
And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary38 in this wise:

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention

underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that
the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object
sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to
be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the
light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under
which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason
which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular
provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in
order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that
reason and calculated to effect that purpose.39 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40 where, speaking

through Madame Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared:

x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the

fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of
the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be
given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain
and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of
the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely
 assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided
mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.41 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a

whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this Court, through Chief Justice
Manuel Moran declared:

x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have

dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of
one person without considering that it could also affect others.When
they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said
provision should function to the full extent of its substance and its
terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions
of that great document.43 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court affirmed

that:

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one

provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to
be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a
particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted
as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections
bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted
together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and
one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any
reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must
lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative,
rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.45 (Emphasis
supplied)

If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other
aids is available. In still the same case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary, this Court expounded:

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and

proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the
reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be
had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to
vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates
 in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the
individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they
give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much
less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that
instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe
the constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper
interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by
the people adopting it than in the framers's understanding
thereof.46 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and

jurisprudential application of the power of judicial review that respondents
Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel
argument that the Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from the
coverage of judicial review.

Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that

impeachment is a political action which cannot assume a judicial character.
Hence, any question, issue or incident arising at any stage of the impeachment
proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review.47

For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole power
to try" impeachment cases48 (1) entirely excludes the application of judicial review
over it; and (2) necessarily includes the Senate's power to determine
constitutional questions relative to impeachment proceedings.49

In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment proceedings

are outside the scope of judicial review, respondents Speaker De Venecia, et.
al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily on American authorities,
principally the majority opinion in the case of Nixon v. United States.50 Thus, they
contend that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings is
inappropriate since it runs counter to the framers' decision to allocate to different
fora the powers to try impeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs the system of
checks and balances, under which impeachment is the only legislative check on
the judiciary; and it would create a lack of finality and difficulty in fashioning
relief.51 Respondents likewise point to deliberations on the US Constitution to
show the intent to isolate judicial power of review in cases of impeachment.

Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the

American Constitution and American authorities cannot be credited to support
the proposition that the Senate's "sole power to try and decide impeachment
cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment
to the legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial review to check
and restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably
support the interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the
inherently judicial power to determine constitutional questions incident to
impeachment proceedings.

Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American

Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no longer controlling within
our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine
constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case of Garcia vs.
COMELEC,52 "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be
beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because
they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and needs."53 Indeed,
although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United
States, their paths of development have long since diverged. In the colorful
words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord."

The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court
and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is
only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature,
that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly
provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it
was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave
abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.

There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the
Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of Representatives
over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power
of impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation,54 our
Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power
to initiate impeachment cases,55 provides for several limitations to the exercise of
such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof.
These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the
one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.

Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments

undermines their finality and may also lead to conflicts between Congress and
the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on
the principle that "whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of
the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of judicial
willfulness and pride."56
But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-
mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did
not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress.
Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v.
Carr,57"judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the
exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.

The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon,59 cited by

respondents in support of the argument that the impeachment power is beyond
the scope of judicial review, are not in point. These cases concern the denial of
petitions for writs of mandamus to compel the legislature to perform non-
ministerial acts, and do not concern the exercise of the power of judicial review.

There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of
judicial review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona,
Jr.,60 this Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to
inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the
Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions and
prerogatives. In Tanada v. Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine
Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition
raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch
is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the
right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v.
Pineda,62 this Court declared null and void a resolution of the House of
Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a
congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,63 it held that the
resolution of whether the House representation in the Commission on
Appointments was based on proportional representation of the political parties as
provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review.
In Daza v. Singson,64 it held that the act of the House of Representatives in
removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject to
judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held that although under the
Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does
not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts
of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission,66 it ruled that confirmation by
the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whether his
election is contested, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge
the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.

Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of
judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks
and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one
section is not to be allowed to defeat another."67 Both are integral components of
the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no
branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

Essential Requisites for Judicial Review

As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of judicial

review, like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several
limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to
challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3)
the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.

x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the
parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the
very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated
to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does
not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.
More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to
legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to
abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the
determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom
and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the
executive and legislative departments of the government.68 (Italics in the
original)

Standing

Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury
as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the
question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.69

Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that

petitioners do not have standing since only the Chief Justice has sustained and
will sustain direct personal injury. Amicus curiae former Justice Minister and
Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza similarly contends.

Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing
since this Court had, in the past, accorded standing to taxpayers, voters,
concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving paramount public interest70 and
transcendental importance,71 and that procedural matters are subordinate to the
need to determine whether or not the other branches of the government have
kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they
have not abused the discretion given to them.72 Amicus curiae Dean Raul
Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is of the same opinion, citing
transcendental importance and the well-entrenched rule exception that, when the
real party in interest is unable to vindicate his rights by seeking the same
remedies, as in the case of the Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot
himself invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the courts will grant petitioners
standing.

There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the
rule on standing, for the former is a concept of civil procedure73 while the latter
has constitutional underpinnings.74 In view of the arguments set forth regarding
standing, it behooves the Court to reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v.
Morato75 to clarify what is meant by locus standi and to distinguish it from real
party-in-interest.

The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest has
been noted by authorities thus: "It is important to note . . . that standing
because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very
different from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real
party in interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three requirements are
directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action,
standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as
broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain
areas.

Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases

suits are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the
operation of a law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens,
taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Hence the
question in standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions."
 xxx

On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether he

is "the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the
'party entitled to the avails of the suit.'"76 (Citations omitted)

While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged
unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, none of the petitioners
before us asserts a violation of the personal rights of the Chief Justice. On the
contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of their own rights – as taxpayers;
members of Congress; citizens, individually or in a class suit; and members of
the bar and of the legal profession – which were supposedly violated by the
alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives.

In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators

when specific requirements have been met have been given standing by this
Court.

When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the

constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to
show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he
sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of
its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It
must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some
right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected
to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.77 In
fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right,78 the mere fact
that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.

In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public
funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any
improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.79 Before he can invoke the
power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has
sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of
the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general
interest common to all members of the public.80

At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's
suit should be entertained.81 This Court opts to grant standing to most of the
petitioners, given their allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of
the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will
necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.

As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official

action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator.82 Indeed, a
member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the
prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.83

While an association has legal personality to represent its members,84 especially

when it is composed of substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their
vital interests,85 the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or
any member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and
nothing more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with
standing. Its interest is too general. It is shared by other groups and the whole
citizenry. However, a reading of the petitions shows that it has advanced
constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.86 It, therefore, behooves this
Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issues presented by it.

In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens,
persons intervening must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of
all concerned87 to enable the court to deal properly with all interests involved in
the suit,88 for a judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the
class, is, under the res judicata principle, binding on all members of the class
whether or not they were before the court.89 Where it clearly appears that not all
interests can be sufficiently represented as shown by the divergent issues raised
in the numerous petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit
ought to fail. Since petitioners additionallyallege standing as citizens and
taxpayers, however, their petition will stand.

The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole ground of
transcendental importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397,
is mum on his standing.

There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following

instructive determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino
P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved
in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or
statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the
government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific
interest in raising the questions being raised.90 Applying these determinants, this
Court is satisfied that the issues raised herein are indeed of transcendental
importance.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus
standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of
transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of
paramount importance to the public.91 Such liberality does not, however, mean
that the requirement that a party should have an interest in the matter is totally
eliminated. A party must, at the very least, still plead the existence of such
interest, it not being one of which courts can take judicial notice. In petitioner
Vallejos' case, he failed to allege any interest in the case. He does not thus have
standing.

With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of
Court requires an intervenor to possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation,
or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of
property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. While intervention is
not a matter of right, it may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows
facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention.92

In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra's case,

they seek to join petitioners Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262. Since, save
for one additional issue, they raise the same issues and the same standing, and
no objection on the part of petitioners Candelaria, et. al. has been interposed,
this Court as earlier stated, granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene
and Petition-in-Intervention.

Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et.

al. sought to join petitioner Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking their right as
citizens to intervene, alleging that "they will suffer if this insidious scheme of the
minority members of the House of Representatives is successful," this Court
found the requisites for intervention had been complied with.

Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262,
160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310 were of transcendental
importance, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a
"Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" to raise the additional issue of
whether or not the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice is
valid and based on any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution.

Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang

Pilipino, Inc., et al. and World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines,
Inc. possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation the respective motions to
intervene were hereby granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the limited
purpose of making of record and arguing a point of view that differs with Senate
President Drilon's. He alleges that submitting to this Court's jurisdiction as the
Senate President does will undermine the independence of the Senate which will
sit as an impeachment court once the Articles of Impeachment are transmitted to
it from the House of Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a
legal interest in the matter in litigation, he being a member of Congress against
which the herein petitions are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate all
substantial issues relating to the matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene was
granted and he was, as earlier stated, allowed to argue.

Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be denied

for, while he asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing
requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v.
Comelec,93 to wit:

x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of

public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their
tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation of specific
constitutional protection against abuses of legislative power," or that there
is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC, or that public
money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners
seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.94 (Citations omitted)

In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the
act of petitioners will result in illegal disbursement of public funds or in public
money being deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally, his mere interest
as a member of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him with standing.

Ripeness and Prematurity

In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a
case to be considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something
had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court
may come into the picture."96 Only then may the courts pass on the validity of
what was done, if and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal
proceeding.

The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the
second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice in accordance with the
House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the constitutionality of
which is questioned. The questioned acts having been carried out, i.e., the
second impeachment complaint had been filed with the House of
Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been already promulgated
and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged unconstitutional act should be
accomplished and performed before suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been
complied with.

Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant petitions
are premature. Amicus curiae former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga opines
that there may be no urgent need for this Court to render a decision at this time,
it being the final arbiter on questions of constitutionality anyway. He thus
recommends that all remedies in the House and Senate should first be
exhausted.

Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law who
suggests to this Court to take judicial notice of on-going attempts to encourage
signatories to the second impeachment complaint to withdraw their signatures
and opines that the House Impeachment Rules provide for an opportunity for
members to raise constitutional questions themselves when the Articles of
Impeachment are presented on a motion to transmit to the same to the Senate.
The dean maintains that even assuming that the Articles are transmitted to the
Senate, the Chief Justice can raise the issue of their constitutional infirmity by
way of a motion to dismiss.

The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the
Representatives of their signatures would not, by itself, cure the House
Impeachment Rules of their constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a
withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the questioned second impeachment complaint
since it would only place it under the ambit of Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI
of the Constitution97 and, therefore, petitioners would continue to suffer their
injuries.

Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or both
Houses of Congress before coming to this Court is shown by the fact that, as
previously discussed, neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate is
clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness on the issue of constitutionality,
whether concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as said power is
exclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I, Article VIII of
the Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought from a body which is bereft of power
to grant it.

Justiciability
In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion
defined the term "political question," viz:

[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in

ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the
language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those questions which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure.99(Italics in the original)

Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any
rhyme or reason, this Court vacillated on its stance of taking cognizance of cases
which involved political questions. In some cases, this Court hid behind the cover
of the political question doctrine and refused to exercise its power of judicial
review.100 In other cases, however, despite the seeming political nature of the
therein issues involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction whenever it found
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political
bodies.101 Even in the landmark 1988 case of Javellana v. Executive
Secretary102 which raised the issue of whether the 1973 Constitution was ratified,
hence, in force, this Court shunted the political question doctrine and took
cognizance thereof. Ratification by the people of a Constitution is a political
question, it being a question decided by the people in their sovereign capacity.

The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine to
refuse to take jurisdiction over certain cases during the Marcos regime motivated
Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional Commissioner, to
clarify this Court's power of judicial review and its application on issues involving
political questions, viz:

MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.

I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the
usual comment that the judiciary is the weakest among the three major branches
of the service. Since the legislature holds the purse and the executive the sword,
the judiciary has nothing with which to enforce its decisions or commands except
the power of reason and appeal to conscience which, after all, reflects the will of
God, and is the most powerful of all other powers without exception. x x x And
so, with the body's indulgence, I will proceed to read the provisions drafted by the
Committee on the Judiciary.

The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.

I suppose nobody can question it.

The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and
explain.

Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual

controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
or instrumentality of the government.

Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our

experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents
in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was
marred considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases
against the government, which then had no legal defense at all, the
solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and got
away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning
particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts
to order the release of political detainees, and other matters related to
the operation and effect of martial law failed because the government
set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said:
"Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The
Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution
of the questions involved. It did not merely request an encroachment
upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further
violations thereof during the martial law regime. I am sure the
members of the Bar are familiar with this situation. But for the benefit of the
Members of the Commission who are not lawyers, allow me to explain. I
will start with a decision of the Supreme Court in 1973 on the case
of Javellana vs. the Secretary of Justice, if I am not mistaken. Martial law
was announced on September 22, although the proclamation was dated
September 21. The obvious reason for the delay in its publication was that
the administration had apprehended and detained prominent newsmen on
September 21. So that when martial law was announced on September
22, the media hardly published anything about it. In fact, the media could
not publish any story not only because our main writers were already
incarcerated, but also because those who succeeded them in their jobs
were under mortal threat of being the object of wrath of the ruling party.
The 1971 Constitutional Convention had begun on June 1, 1971 and by
September 21 or 22 had not finished the Constitution; it had barely agreed
in the fundamentals of the Constitution. I forgot to say that upon the
proclamation of martial law, some delegates to that 1971 Constitutional
Convention, dozens of them, were picked up. One of them was our very
own colleague, Commissioner Calderon. So, the unfinished draft of the
Constitution was taken over by representatives of Malacañang. In 17 days,
they finished what the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention had
been unable to accomplish for about 14 months. The draft of the 1973
Constitution was presented to the President around December 1, 1972,
whereupon the President issued a decree calling a plebiscite which
suspended the operation of some provisions in the martial law decree
which prohibited discussions, much less public discussions of certain
matters of public concern. The purpose was presumably to allow a free
discussion on the draft of the Constitution on which a plebiscite was to be
held sometime in January 1973. If I may use a word famous by our
colleague, Commissioner Ople, during the interregnum, however, the draft
of the Constitution was analyzed and criticized with such a telling effect
that Malacañang felt the danger of its approval. So, the President
suspended indefinitely the holding of the plebiscite and announced that he
would consult the people in a referendum to be held from January 10 to
January 15. But the questions to be submitted in the referendum were not
announced until the eve of its scheduled beginning, under the supposed
supervision not of the Commission on Elections, but of what was then
designated as "citizens assemblies or barangays." Thus the barangays
came into existence. The questions to be propounded were released with
proposed answers thereto, suggesting that it was unnecessary to hold a
plebiscite because the answers given in the referendum should be
regarded as the votes cast in the plebiscite. Thereupon, a motion was filed
with the Supreme Court praying that the holding of the referendum be
suspended. When the motion was being heard before the Supreme Court,
the Minister of Justice delivered to the Court a proclamation of the
President declaring that the new Constitution was already in force because
the overwhelming majority of the votes cast in the referendum favored the
Constitution. Immediately after the departure of the Minister of Justice, I
proceeded to the session room where the case was being heard. I then
informed the Court and the parties the presidential proclamation declaring
that the 1973 Constitution had been ratified by the people and is now in
force.

A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential proclamation

null and void. The main defense put up by the government was that the
issue was a political question and that the court had no jurisdiction to
entertain the case.
 xxx

The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to

January 15, the vast majority ratified the draft of the Constitution. Note that
all members of the Supreme Court were residents of Manila, but none of
them had been notified of any referendum in their respective places of
residence, much less did they participate in the alleged referendum. None
of them saw any referendum proceeding.

In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a majority of
the members of the Court felt that there had been no referendum.

Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a big

difference between a referendum and a plebiscite. But another group
of justices upheld the defense that the issue was a political question.
Whereupon, they dismissed the case. This is not the only major case
in which the plea of "political question" was set up. There have been
a number of other cases in the past.

x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because the

issue was clearly justiciable.

xxx

x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its

functions, it faced the following questions: What is judicial power? What is
a political question?

The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle
actual controversies involving conflicts of rights which are demandable and
enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be
enforced by a judiciary party. In a decided case, a husband complained
that his wife was unwilling to perform her duties as a wife. The Court said:
"We can tell your wife what her duties as such are and that she is bound to
comply with them, but we cannot force her physically to discharge her
main marital duty to her husband. There are some rights guaranteed by
law, but they are so personal that to enforce them by actual compulsion
would be highly derogatory to human dignity."

This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that:

Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies

involving rights which are legally demandable or enforceable . . .
 The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical
questions. In a presidential system of government, the Supreme Court
has, also another important function. The powers of government are
generally considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the
Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own
sphere and independent of the others. Because of that supremacy
power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in
courts of justice.

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the

agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its
officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials
has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial
power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that

the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this
nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.

I have made these extended remarks to the end that the Commissioners
may have an initial food for thought on the subject of the judiciary.103 (Italics
in the original; emphasis supplied)

During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice

Concepcion further clarified the concept of judicial power, thus:

MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but
judicial power is not vested in the Supreme Court alone but also in
other lower courts as may be created by law.

MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.

MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?

MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to

identify political questions with jurisdictional questions. But there is
a difference.

MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?

 MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary
cases but where there is a question as to whether the government
had authority or had abused its authority to the extent of lacking
jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction, that is not a political question.
Therefore, the court has the duty to decide.

xxx

FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided by

the Supreme Court according to the new numerical need for votes.

On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with the

political question doctrine?

MR. CONCEPCION. No.

FR. BERNAS. It is not.

MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of

discretion, amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. . .

FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not intended
to do away with the political question doctrine.

MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.

When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define what is

judicial power. But the Gentleman will notice it says, "judicial power
includes" and the reason being that the definition that we might make
may not cover all possible areas.

FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems arising
from the political question doctrine.

MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that truly
political questions are beyond the pale of judicial power.104 (Emphasis
supplied)

From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional

Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty,
a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the
political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify,
however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly
political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species
of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not
truly political questions."

Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of
the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by
virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions
which are not truly political in nature.

As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP College
of Law, this Court has in fact in a number of cases taken jurisdiction over
questions which are not truly political following the effectivity of the present
Constitution.

In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene

Cortes, held:

The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and
broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under
previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments
to decide.106 x x x

In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,107 through Justice Teodoro

Padilla, this Court declared:

The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must

perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent case, "(t)he
political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial
determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit
constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot
abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although
said provision by no means does away with the applicability of the
principle in appropriate cases."108 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court

ruled:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less
tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that
the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be
precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon
us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question.110 x x x
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable political
questions and non-justiciable political questions, however. Identification of these
two species of political questions may be problematic. There has been no clear
standard. The American case of Baker v. Carr111 attempts to provide some:

x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political

question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
questioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question.112(Underscoring supplied)

Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. These standards are
not separate and distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in that the
presence of one strengthens the conclusion that the others are also present.

The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American concept of
judicial review is radically different from our current concept, for Section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution provides our courts with far less discretion in determining
whether they should pass upon a constitutional issue.

In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-

justiciable political question lies in the answer to the question of whether there
are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political
bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the
branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.
This Court shall thus now apply this standard to the present controversy.

These petitions raise five substantial issues:

I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint

constitute valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
 II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance
with Section 3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.

III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into
the Judicial Development Fund is an unconstitutional infringement of the
constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.

IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment

adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the
provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.

V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section

3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.

The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint
over which this Court has no jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion
of this issue would require this Court to make a determination of what
constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely
political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of
the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission.113

Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for

impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public
trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the 1986
Constitutional Commission shows that the framers could find no better way to
approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than
by alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without arriving at
their clear cut definition or even a standard therefor.114 Clearly, the issue calls
upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the
scope of its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII.

Lis Mota

It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the

constitutionality of a governmental act should be avoided whenever possible.
Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission on Elections,115 this Court held:

x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a

constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid,
unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if
the record also presents some other ground upon which the court
may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the
 constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case
arises in which a decision upon such question will be
unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian

Reform,117 where this Court invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No.
6657 for being confiscatory and violative of due process, to wit:

It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a

constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites
of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there
must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights
susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have
been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the
question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case
itself.118 [Emphasis supplied]

Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly
unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.

As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the invalidity
of the second impeachment complaint, collectively raise several constitutional
issues upon which the outcome of this controversy could possibly be made to
rest. In determining whether one, some or all of the remaining substantial issues
should be passed upon, this Court is guided by the related cannon of
adjudication that "the court should not form a rule of constitutional law broader
than is required by the precise facts to which it is applied."119

In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among other
reasons, the second impeachment complaint is invalid since it directly resulted
from a Resolution120 calling for a legislative inquiry into the JDF, which Resolution
and legislative inquiry petitioners claim to likewise be unconstitutional for being:
(a) a violation of the rules and jurisprudence on investigations in aid of legislation;
(b) an open breach of the doctrine of separation of powers; (c) a violation of the
constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an assault on
the independence of the judiciary.121

Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims, it is the
studied opinion of this Court that the issue of the constitutionality of the said
Resolution and resulting legislative inquiry is too far removed from the issue of
the validity of the second impeachment complaint. Moreover, the resolution of
said issue would, in the Court's opinion, require it to form a rule of constitutional
law touching on the separate and distinct matter of legislative inquiries in general,
which would thus be broader than is required by the facts of these consolidated
cases. This opinion is further strengthened by the fact that said petitioners have
raised other grounds in support of their petition which would not be adversely
affected by the Court's ruling.

En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative

inquiries has already been enunciated by this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate
Blue Ribbon Commttee,122 viz:

The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of

Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article
VI thereof provides:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective

committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with
its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of

legislation is not, therefore absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is
circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as
provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights
of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It
follows then that the right rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be
respected, including the right to due process and the right not be
compelled to testify against one's self.123

In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra,
while joining the original petition of petitioners Candelaria, et. al., introduce the
new argument that since the second impeachment complaint was verified and
filed only by Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella,
the same does not fall under the provisions of Section 3 (4), Article XI of the
Constitution which reads:

Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is

filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall
constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall
forthwith proceed.

They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives

signed a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy the
requisites for the application of the afore-mentioned section in that the "verified
complaint or resolution of impeachment" was not filed "by at least one-third of all
the Members of the House." With the exception of Representatives Teodoro and
Fuentebella, the signatories to said Resolution are alleged to have verified the
same merely as a "Resolution of Endorsement." Intervenors point to the
"Verification" of the Resolution of Endorsement which states that:

"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of the

abovementioned Complaint of Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix
William B. Fuentebella x x x"124

Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution
requires in order for said second impeachment complaint to automatically
become the Articles of Impeachment and for trial in the Senate to begin
"forthwith," is that the verified complaint be "filed," not merely endorsed, by at
least one-third of the Members of the House of Representatives. Not having
complied with this requirement, they concede that the second impeachment
complaint should have been calendared and referred to the House Committee on
Justice under Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution, viz:

Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any

Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a
resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included
in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the
proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee,
after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together
with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined that

for Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution to apply, there should be 76 or
more representatives who signed and verified the second impeachment
complaint as complainants, signed and verified the signatories to a resolution of
impeachment. Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of the members of the
House of Representatives as endorsers is not the resolution of impeachment
contemplated by the Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being
necessary only from at least one Member whenever a citizen files a verified
impeachment complaint.

While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra, does
indeed limit the scope of the constitutional issues to the provisions on
impeachment, more compelling considerations militate against its adoption as
the lis mota or crux of the present controversy. Chief among this is the fact
that only Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No. 160262, have
raised this issue as a ground for invalidating the second impeachment complaint.
Thus, to adopt this additional ground as the basis for deciding the instant
consolidated petitions would not only render for naught the efforts of the original
petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but the efforts presented by the other petitioners
as well.

Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for the
determination of the instant cases is made easier by the fact that said intervenors
Macalintal and Quadra have joined in the petition of Candelaria, et. al., adopting
the latter's arguments and issues as their own. Consequently, they are not
unduly prejudiced by this Court's decision.

In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as they
are, constitute the very lis mota of the instant controversy: (1) whether Sections
15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th
Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI
of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second impeachment
complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.

Judicial Restraint

Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that
the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power to try and
decide all cases of impeachment. Again, this Court reiterates that the power of
judicial review includes the power of review over justiciable issues in
impeachment proceedings.

On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that "[t]here is
a moral compulsion for the Court to not assume jurisdiction over the
impeachment because all the Members thereof are subject to
impeachment."125But this argument is very much like saying the Legislature has a
moral compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses because Members of the
House of Representatives are subject to them.

The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before
this Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is not legally
disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to
which the controversy may be referred."126 Otherwise, this Court would be
shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More
than being clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take
cognizance of the instant petitions.127 In the august words of amicus curiae Father
Bernas, "jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not be
renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty."

Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of
government cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge because no
other office has the authority to do so.128 On the occasion that this Court had
been an interested party to the controversy before it, it has acted upon the matter
"not with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as
always, with detachment and fairness."129 After all, "by [his] appointment to the
office, the public has laid on [a member of the judiciary] their confidence that [he]
is mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied contentions. For
this reason, they expect [him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice, to be
unafraid to displease any person, interest or power and to be equipped with a
moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations lurking in [his] office."130

The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had already
been settled in the case of Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal.131 In that case, the
petitioners filed with the respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal a Motion for
Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing
and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them were
interested parties to said case as respondents therein. This would have reduced
the Tribunal's membership to only its three Justices-Members whose
disqualification was not sought, leaving them to decide the matter. This Court
held:

Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of

any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the
Senate without inviting the same objections to the substitute's competence,
the proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave
the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or
body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the
participation of its entire membership of Senators.

To our mind, this is the overriding consideration — that the Tribunal be not
prevented from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform,
the performance of which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by
its being expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law.

It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of
the Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility of an
election contest that would involve all Senators—elect, six of whom would
inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might
surface again in the wake of the 1992 elections when once more, but for
 the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the
Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual
situations or for the substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal
whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such situations must
simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense
of justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly
and collectively.

Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the

Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in
judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal
may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution
of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases
would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What we
are merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate
Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire
membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer
on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a
senatorial election contest.

More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held that:

Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a

majority of them, is nothing short of pro tanto depriving the Court itself of
its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a
judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. And if that judge is the one
designated by the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is
the case with the Justices of this Court, the deprivation of his or their
judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of the
court itself. It affects the very heart of judicial independence. The proposed
mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Court no
alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn
of the participation of its entire membership of Justices.133 (Italics in the
original)

Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it
exercises its power of judicial review.

In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the

"seven pillars" of limitations of the power of judicial review, enunciated by US
Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA135 as follows:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a
friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining because to decide such
questions 'is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the
determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between individuals. It
never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in
the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the
constitutionality of the legislative act.'

2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance

of the necessity of deciding it.' . . . 'It is not the habit of the Court to decide
questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a
decision of the case.'

3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is
required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.'

4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon
which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found most varied
application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one
involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory
construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter. Appeals
from the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a question
under the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed because the
judgment can be sustained on an independent state ground.

5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of
one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. Among the many
applications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of the right of
challenge to one who lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the
challenge by a public official interested only in the performance of his
official duty will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the Court
affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to have the
Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v.
Mellon, the challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not entertained
although made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.

6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the
instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.

7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and

even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle
 that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is
fairly possible by which the question may be avoided (citations omitted).

The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander

v. TVA from different decisions of the United States Supreme Court, can be
encapsulated into the following categories:

1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case

2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by

the facts of the case

3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground

4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the

operation of the statute

5. that the parties are not in estoppel

6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.

As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the
exercise of judicial review:

1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power

2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he

must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement

3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible

opportunity

4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.136

Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial

restraint the possibility that "judicial review of impeachments might also lead to
embarrassing conflicts between the Congress and the [J]udiciary." They stress
the need to avoid the appearance of impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial
hearings, and the scenario that it would be confusing and humiliating and risk
serious political instability at home and abroad if the judiciary countermanded the
vote of Congress to remove an impeachable official.137 Intervenor Soriano echoes
this argument by alleging that failure of this Court to enforce its Resolution
against Congress would result in the diminution of its judicial authority and erode
public confidence and faith in the judiciary.

Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated by

the Solicitor General, the possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is
not a reason for this Court to refrain from upholding the Constitution in all
impeachment cases. Justices cannot abandon their constitutional duties just
because their action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.

Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act.

x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive act is

not regarded as settled until the Supreme Court has passed upon the
constitutionality of the act involved, the judgment has not only juridical
effects but also political consequences. Those political consequences may
follow even where the Court fails to grant the petitioner's prayer to nullify
an act for lack of the necessary number of votes. Frequently, failure to act
explicitly, one way or the other, itself constitutes a decision for the
respondent and validation, or at least quasi-validation, follows." 138

Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this Court was split and "in the
end there were not enough votes either to grant the petitions, or to sustain
respondent's claims,"140 the pre-existing constitutional order was disrupted which
paved the way for the establishment of the martial law regime.

Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the

coordinate branches of the government would behave in a lawless manner and
not do their duty under the law to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of
the land. Yet there is no reason to believe that any of the branches of
government will behave in a precipitate manner and risk social upheaval,
violence, chaos and anarchy by encouraging disrespect for the fundamental law
of the land.

Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by the
doctrine in People v. Veneracion, to wit:141

Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If
[public officers], under the guise of religious or political beliefs were
allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are
required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes
meaningless. A government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of
broad discretionary powers by those acting under its authority. Under this
system, [public officers] are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to
 protect and enforce it without fear or favor," resist encroachments by
governments, political parties, or even the interference of their own
personal beliefs.142

Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure

for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress

Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues

that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not
violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present Constitution, contending that the
term "initiate" does not mean "to file;" that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the
House of Representatives, as a collective body, which has the exclusive power to
initiate all cases of impeachment; that initiate could not possibly mean "to file"
because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of the Constitution provides, only
be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by
any member of the House of Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a
resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the
members of the House. Respondent House of Representatives concludes that
the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against
the same officials could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated
as the House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on
it.

The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate."
Resort to statutory construction is, therefore, in order.

That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution,

Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who eventually became an Associate Justice
of this Court, agreed on the meaning of "initiate" as "to file," as proffered and
explained by Constitutional Commissioner Maambong during the Constitutional
Commission proceedings, which he (Commissioner Regalado) as amicus
curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the instant petitions held on
November 5, 2003 at which he added that the act of "initiating" included the act
of taking initial action on the complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word
"initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means to
file the complaint and take initial action on it.

"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to

begin, to commence, or set going. As Webster's Third New International
Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it means "to perform
or facilitate the first action," which jibes with Justice Regalado's position, and that
of Father Bernas, who elucidated during the oral arguments of the instant
petitions on November 5, 2003 in this wise:

Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a

comlexus of acts consisting of a beginning, a middle and an end. The end
is the transmittal of the articles of impeachment to the Senate. The middle
consists of those deliberative moments leading to the formulation of the
articles of impeachment. The beginning or the initiation is the filing of the
complaint and its referral to the Committee on Justice.

Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by

Representatives Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that impeachment is
"deemed initiated" when the Justice Committee votes in favor of
impeachment or when the House reverses a contrary vote of the
Committee. Note that the Rule does not say "impeachment proceedings"
are initiated but rather are "deemed initiated." The language is recognition
that initiation happened earlier, but by legal fiction there is an attempt to
postpone it to a time after actual initiation. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into
the intent of the law. Fortunately, the intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution can be pried from its records:

MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the procedure

and the substantive provisions on impeachment, I understand there have
been many proposals and, I think, these would need some time for
Committee action.

However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the Committee a

resolution on impeachment proceedings, copies of which have been
furnished the Members of this body. This is borne out of my experience as
a member of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good
Government which took charge of the last impeachment resolution filed
before the First Batasang Pambansa. For the information of the
Committee, the resolution covers several steps in the impeachment
proceedings starting with initiation, action of the Speaker committee
action, calendaring of report, voting on the report, transmittal referral
to the Senate, trial and judgment by the Senate.

xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a
reconsideration of the approval of the amendment submitted by
Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking that we
do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of Impeachment on the
floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that the
initiation starts with the filing of the complaint. And what is actually
done on the floor is that the committee resolution containing the
Articles of Impeachment is the one approved by the body.

As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee

on Style, it appears that the initiation starts on the floor. If we only have
time, I could cite examples in the case of the impeachment proceedings of
President Richard Nixon wherein the Committee on the Judiciary
submitted the recommendation, the resolution, and the Articles of
Impeachment to the body, and it was the body who approved the
resolution. It is not the body which initiates it. It only approves or
disapproves the resolution. So, on that score, probably the Committee
on Style could help in rearranging these words because we have to be
very technical about this. I have been bringing with me The Rules of the
House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are
with me. The proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I
have submitted my proposal, but the Committee has already decided.
Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.

xxx

MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the

approval of Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at all affect the
substance, but it is only in keeping with the exact formulation of the Rules
of the House of Representatives of the United States regarding
impeachment.

I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of this

provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete the
words which read: "to initiate impeachment proceedings" and the
comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word "resolution" the phrase
WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter "i" in "impeachment"
and replace the word "by" with OF, so that the whole section will now read:
"A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary either to affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of
Impeachment OF the Committee or to override its contrary resolution. The
vote of each Member shall be recorded."
 I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the
House of Representatives of the United States is concerned, really starts
from the filing of the verified complaint and every resolution to impeach
always carries with it the Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the
words "Articles of Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in the case of
the direct filing of a verified compliant of one-third of all the Members of the
House. I will mention again, Madam President, that my amendment will not
vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform
procedure of the House of Representatives of the United States Congress.
Thank you, Madam President.143 (Italics in the original; emphasis and
udnerscoring supplied)

This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and

accepted by the Committee on the Accountability of Public Officers.144

It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the
complaint. In his amicus curiae brief, Commissioner Maambong explained that
"the obvious reason in deleting the phrase "to initiate impeachment
proceedings" as contained in the text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to
settle and make it understood once and for all that the initiation of
impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the complaint, and the
vote of one-third of the House in a resolution of impeachment does not
initiate the impeachment proceedings which was already initiated by the filing
of a verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the
Constitution."145

Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is

Father Bernas, who was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
that the word "initiate" as used in Article XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both
adding, however, that the filing must be accompanied by an action to set the
complaint moving.

During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the word
"initiate," appearing in the constitutional provision on impeachment, viz:

Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive

power to initiate all cases of impeachment.

xxx

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same

official more than once within a period of one year, (Emphasis supplied)
refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding."

Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to
initiate." The object in the first sentence is "impeachment case." The object in the
second sentence is "impeachment proceeding." Following the principle
of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be distinguished from the
term "proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be
decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that the House, by
a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that
sense that the House has "exclusive power" to initiate all cases of impeachment.
No other body can do it. However, before a decision is made to initiate a case in
the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to arrive at a conclusion. A
proceeding must be "initiated." To initiate, which comes from the Latin
word initium, means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a progressive
noun. It has a beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not in the Senate
but in the House and consists of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified
complaint either by a Member of the House of Representatives or by a private
citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the Representatives; (2) there is
the processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which may either reject
the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or
upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the House for further
processing; and (4) there is the processing of the same complaint by the House
of Representatives which either affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee
or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If at
least one third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of
Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that
the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at this point that an impeachable
public official is successfully impeached. That is, he or she is successfully
charged with an impeachment "case" before the Senate as impeachment court.

Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated

when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end
of the House proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the
trial. Neither is the "impeachment proceeding" initiated when the House
deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because
something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is
already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the
proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to
the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the
series of steps that follow.

The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning.
Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-
third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary… to initiate
impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the
ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but
rather the filing of a complaint does.146 Thus the line was deleted and is not found
in the present Constitution.

Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment
proceeding shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of one year," it means that no second verified complaint may be accepted
and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. By his explanation, this
interpretation is founded on the common understanding of the meaning of "to
initiate" which means to begin. He reminds that the Constitution is ratified by the
people, both ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand it; and that ordinary
people read ordinary meaning into ordinary words and not abstruse meaning,
they ratify words as they understand it and not as sophisticated lawyers confuse
it.

To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate
impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of
Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the
principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with
"impeachment proceeding."

From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of

two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to
initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress'
taking initial action of said complaint.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or
endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice
or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of
Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of
Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has
been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period.

Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules,

impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the
House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is
sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the
finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution
is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the
Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a
resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These
rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the term
"initiate" a meaning different meaning from filing and referral.

In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court could not
use contemporaneous construction as an aid in the interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of
Article XI, citing Vera v. Avelino147 wherein this Court stated that "their personal
opinions (referring to Justices who were delegates to the Constitution
Convention) on the matter at issue expressed during this Court's our
deliberations stand on a different footing from the properly recorded utterances of
debates and proceedings." Further citing said case, he states that this Court
likened the former members of the Constitutional Convention to actors who are
so absorbed in their emotional roles that intelligent spectators may know more
about the real meaning because of the latter's balanced perspectives and
disinterestedness.148

Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present petitions. There

are at present only two members of this Court who participated in the 1986
Constitutional Commission – Chief Justice Davide and Justice Adolf Azcuna.
Chief Justice Davide has not taken part in these proceedings for obvious
reasons. Moreover, this Court has not simply relied on the personal opinions now
given by members of the Constitutional Commission, but has examined the
records of the deliberations and proceedings thereof.

Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of

Article XI, it is clear and unequivocal that it and only it has the power to make and
interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its argument is premised on the
assumption that Congress has absolute power to promulgate its rules. This
assumption, however, is misplaced.

Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its rules
on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Clearly, its
power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase "to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Hence, these rules cannot
contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended
to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other
specific limitations on its power to make rules, viz:

Section 3. (1) x x x

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of

the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of
 endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order
of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee
within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by
a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House
within sixty session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary to either affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of
Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The
vote of each Member shall be recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at

least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute
the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith
proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same

official more than once within a period of one year.

It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the
fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it
would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of
the Constitution without need of referendum.

In Osmeña v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within the province of either

House of Congress to interpret its rules and that it was the best judge of what
constituted "disorderly behavior" of its members. However, in Paceta v.
Secretary of the Commission on Appointments,150 Justice (later Chief Justice)
Enrique Fernando, speaking for this Court and quoting Justice Brandeis
in United States v. Smith,151 declared that where the construction to be given to
a rule affects persons other than members of the Legislature, the question
becomes judicial in nature. In Arroyo v. De Venecia,152 quoting United States v.
Ballin, Joseph & Co.,153 Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held
that while the Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of
proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate
fundamental rights, and further that there should be a reasonable relation
between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result
which is sought to be attained. It is only within these limitations that all matters of
method are open to the determination of the Legislature. In the same case
of Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his Concurring and
Dissenting Opinion, was even more emphatic as he stressed that in the
Philippine setting there is even more reason for courts to inquire into the validity
of the Rules of Congress, viz:

With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the
petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the
principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over he
case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of separation of power
is no longer an impregnable impediment against the interposition of judicial
power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.

Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as a

window to view the issues before the Court. It is in Ballin where the US
Supreme Court first defined the boundaries of the power of the judiciary to
review congressional rules. It held:

"x x x

"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may
determine the rules of its proceedings." It appears that in pursuance of this
authority the House had, prior to that day, passed this as one of its rules:

Rule XV

3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the

names of members sufficient to make a quorum in the hall of the House
who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and recorded in the journal,
and reported to the Speaker with the names of the members voting, and
be counted and announced in determining the presence of a quorum to do
business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)

The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question,
therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and not what methods the
Speaker may of his own motion resort to for determining the presence of a
quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or clerk may of their own volition
place upon the journal. Neither do the advantages or disadvantages, the
wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any matters for judicial
consideration. With the courts the question is only one of power. The
Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of
proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or
violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation
between the mode or method of proceedings established by the rule
and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these
limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the
House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way
would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the
validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a
length of time. The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is
exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the
House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the
challenge of any other body or tribunal."

Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the

validity of congressional rules, i.e, whether they are
constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was found to
satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any constitutional restraint; (2) it
did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its method had a reasonable
relationship with the result sought to be attained. By examining Rule XV,
the Court did not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere
invocation of the principle of separation of powers.154

xxx

In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts

to categorically reject the political question defense when its
interposition will cover up abuse of power. For section 1, Article VIII
of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower courts "x x
x to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the government." This power is new
and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It
was not also xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state
constitution. The CONCOM granted this enormous power to our
courts in view of our experience under martial law where abusive
exercises of state power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the
misuse of the political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and
sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis-à-vis the Executive and
the Legislative departments of government.155

xxx

The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is

not a mere power which it can decline to exercise. Precisely to deter
this disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court
to strike down any act of a branch or instrumentality of government
or any of its officials done with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has
elongated the checking powers of this Court against the other branches of
government despite their more democratic character, the President and
the legislators being elected by the people.156

xxx

The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the courts of
justice. . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government' constitutes the capstone of
the efforts of the Constitutional Commission to upgrade the powers of this
court vis-à-vis the other branches of government. This provision was
dictated by our experience under martial law which taught us that a
stronger and more independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in
government. x x x

xxx

In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of
government committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new
Constitution transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This
transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as nation, is not merely
evolutionary but revolutionary.Under the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions,
this Court approached constitutional violations by initially determining what
it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress –
this Court is mandated to approach constitutional violations not by
finding out what it should not do but what it must do. The Court must
discharge this solemn duty by not resuscitating a past that petrifies the
present.

I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to

this new constitutional provision as the case at bar once more calls us to
define the parameters of our power to review violations of the rules of the
House. We will not be true to our trust as the last bulwark against
government abuses if we refuse to exercise this new power or if we
wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding timidity to
unsheathe the judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened other
branches of government to denigrate, if not defy, orders of our
courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga that
this novel provision stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly
Filipino and its interpretation should not be depreciated by undue reliance
on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the
 lessons of our own history should provide us the light and not the
experience of foreigners.157 (Italics in the original emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant petitions.
Here, the third parties alleging the violation of private rights and the Constitution
are involved.

Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v. US158 as

basis for arguing that this Court may not decide on the constitutionality of
Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules. As already observed, the
U.S. Federal Constitution simply provides that "the House of Representatives
shall have the sole power of impeachment." It adds nothing more. It gives no clue
whatsoever as to how this "sole power" is to be exercised. No limitation
whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme Court concluded that there was a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of a constitutional power to the
House of Representatives. This reasoning does not hold with regard to
impeachment power of the Philippine House of Representatives since our
Constitution, as earlier enumerated, furnishes several provisions articulating how
that "exclusive power" is to be exercised.

The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules

which state that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a
finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or
resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or
overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint
and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement
before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified
complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the
House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term
"initiate" a meaning different from "filing."

Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the
initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes
clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing
manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year
period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former
President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven
associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint
filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella
against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional
prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same
impeachable officer within a one-year period.

Conclusion

If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a

phenomenon that takes the center stage of our individual and collective
consciousness as a people with our characteristic flair for human drama, conflict
or tragedy. Of course this is not to demean the seriousness of the controversy
over the Davide impeachment. For many of us, the past two weeks have proven
to be an exasperating, mentally and emotionally exhausting experience. Both
sides have fought bitterly a dialectical struggle to articulate what they respectively
believe to be the correct position or view on the issues involved. Passions had
ran high as demonstrators, whether for or against the impeachment of the Chief
Justice, took to the streets armed with their familiar slogans and chants to air
their voice on the matter. Various sectors of society - from the business, retired
military, to the academe and denominations of faith – offered suggestions for a
return to a state of normalcy in the official relations of the governmental branches
affected to obviate any perceived resulting instability upon areas of national life.

Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of Impeachment had
been constituted, this Court was specifically asked, told, urged and argued to
take no action of any kind and form with respect to the prosecution by the House
of Representatives of the impeachment complaint against the subject respondent
public official. When the present petitions were knocking so to speak at the
doorsteps of this Court, the same clamor for non-interference was made through
what are now the arguments of "lack of jurisdiction," "non-justiciability," and
"judicial self-restraint" aimed at halting the Court from any move that may have a
bearing on the impeachment proceedings.

This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the
question of the constitutionality of initiating the impeachment complaint against
Chief Justice Davide is concerned. To reiterate what has been already explained,
the Court found the existence in full of all the requisite conditions for its exercise
of its constitutionally vested power and duty of judicial review over an issue
whose resolution precisely called for the construction or interpretation of a
provision of the fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an issue of a
genuine constitutional material which only this Court can properly and
competently address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation of
powers under our system of government. Face-to-face thus with a matter or
problem that squarely falls under the Court's jurisdiction, no other course of
action can be had but for it to pass upon that problem head on.

The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the process
of impeachment has effectively set up a regime of judicial supremacy, is patently
without basis in fact and in law.

This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on
the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated
against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time
bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none,
nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions.
Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance
over the other two great branches of the government. Rather, the raison d'etre of
the judiciary is to complement the discharge by the executive and legislative of
their own powers to bring about ultimately the beneficent effects of having
founded and ordered our society upon the rule of law.

It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of constitutionality of

the impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice, the members of this
Court have actually closed ranks to protect a brethren. That the members'
interests in ruling on said issue is as much at stake as is that of the Chief Justice.
Nothing could be farther from the truth.

The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has long
held and been entrusted with the judicial power to resolve conflicting legal rights
regardless of the personalities involved in the suits or actions. This Court has
dispensed justice over the course of time, unaffected by whomsoever stood to
benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid by whatever imputations or speculations could
be made to it, so long as it rendered judgment according to the law and the facts.
Why can it not now be trusted to wield judicial power in these petitions just
because it is the highest ranking magistrate who is involved when it is an
incontrovertible fact that the fundamental issue is not him but the validity of a
government branch's official act as tested by the limits set by the Constitution? Of
course, there are rules on the inhibition of any member of the judiciary from
taking part in a case in specified instances. But to disqualify this entire institution
now from the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as likely incapable of
impartiality when one of its members is a party to a case, which is simply a non
sequitur.

No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal
system which recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential to the
law's moral authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and obedience to
its commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch or instrumentality
that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal equality other than the
Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning and ramifications through
its application to numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind in the annals
of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is any other
member of this Court. But just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply
that he gets to have less in law than anybody else. The law is solicitous of every
individual's rights irrespective of his station in life.

The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put to test
once again by this impeachment case against Chief Justice Hilario Davide.
Accordingly, this Court has resorted to no other than the Constitution in search
for a solution to what many feared would ripen to a crisis in government. But
though it is indeed immensely a blessing for this Court to have found answers in
our bedrock of legal principles, it is equally important that it went through this
crucible of a democratic process, if only to discover that it can resolve differences
without the use of force and aggression upon each other.

WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in

Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of
Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the
second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which
was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B.
Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of
Article XI of the Constitution.

SO ORDERED.

Facts:
1. On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of
Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House
Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress.
2. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,
which directed the Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in
aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund
(JDF).
3. On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief
 Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust
and other high crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by House
Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on
5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003
that the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,” but voted to
dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance.
4. The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment
complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by House
Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on
the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned
House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied
by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least 1/3 of
all the Members of the House of Representatives.
5. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with
the Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of
which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment
complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of
Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one
year.”
Issues:
1. Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint
constitute valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
2. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment
adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the
provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
3. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5)
of Article XI of the Constitution.
Rulings:
1. This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope
of the judicial power of the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution.
1. Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a
determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a
determination is a purely political question which the Constitution
 has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is
clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
2. Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly
unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
2. The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is
unconstitutional.
1. Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall promulgate
its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this
section.” Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment
is limited by the phrase “to effectively carry out the purpose of this
section.” Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of
the Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry
out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other
specific limitations on its power to make rules.
2. It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is
the fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule
making power, then it would by necessary implication have the
power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without
need of referendum.
3. It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of
the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on
Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5)
of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has
been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed
against the same official within a one year period following Article
XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
2. Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by
former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2,
2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5,
2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the
Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional
prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings
against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
 
Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on
November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was
filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella
with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on
October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the
Constitution.

G.R. No. 202242               April 16, 2013

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner, 
vs.
JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS
JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C.
TUPAS, JR.,Respondents.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration1 filed
by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on
behalf of the respondents, Senator Francis
Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C.
Tupas, Jr. (respondents), duly opposed2 by the
petitioner, former Solicitor General Francisco I.
Chavez (petitioner).
By way of recapitulation, the present action
stemmed from the unexpected departure of
former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona on May
29, 2012, and the nomination of petitioner, as his
potential successor. In his initiatory pleading,
petitioner asked the Court to determine 1] whether
the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution allows more than one (1)
member of Congress to sit in the JBC; and 2] if
the practice of having two (2) representatives from
each House of Congress with one (1) vote each is
sanctioned by the Constitution.
On July 17, 2012, the Court handed down the
assailed subject decision, disposing the same in
the following manner:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
current numerical composition of the Judicial and
Bar Council is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to
reconstitute itself so that only one (1) member of
Congress will sit as a representative in its
proceedings, in accordance with Section 8(1),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
This disposition is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
On July 31, 2012, following respondents’ motion
for reconsideration and with due regard to Senate
Resolution Nos. 111,3 112,4 113,5 and 114,6 the
Court set the subject motion for oral arguments on
August 2, 2012.7 On August 3, 2012, the Court
discussed the merits of the arguments and
agreed, in the meantime, to suspend the effects of
the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of
the July 17, 2012 Decision which decreed that it
was immediately executory. The decretal portion
of the August 3, 2012 Resolution8 reads:
WHEREFORE, the parties are hereby directed to
submit their respective MEMORANDA within ten
(10) days from notice. Until further orders, the
Court hereby SUSPENDS the effect of the second
paragraph of the dispositive portion of the Court’s
July 17, 2012 Decision, which reads: "This
disposition is immediately executory."9
Pursuant to the same resolution, petitioner and
respondents filed their respective memoranda.10
Brief Statement of the Antecedents
In this disposition, it bears reiterating that from the
birth of the Philippine Republic, the exercise of
appointing members of the Judiciary has always
been the exclusive prerogative of the executive
and legislative branches of the government. Like
their progenitor of American origins, both the
Malolos Constitution11 and the 1935
Constitution12vested the power to appoint the
members of the Judiciary in the President, subject
to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. It was during these times that the
country became witness to the deplorable practice
of aspirants seeking confirmation of their
appointment in the Judiciary to ingratiate
themselves with the members of the legislative
body.13
Then, under the 1973 Constitution,14 with the
fusion of the executive and legislative powers in
one body, the appointment of judges and justices
ceased to be subject of scrutiny by another body.
The power became exclusive and absolute to the
Executive, subject only to the condition that the
appointees must have all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications.
Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of
appointments to the Judiciary of the evils of
political pressure and partisan activities,15 the
members of the Constitutional Commission saw it
wise to create a separate, competent and
independent body to recommend nominees to the
President.
Thus, it conceived of a body, representative of all
the stakeholders in the judicial appointment
process, and called it the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC). The Framers carefully worded Section 8,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution in this wise:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby
created under the supervision of the Supreme
Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio
Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex officio
Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar,
a professor of law, a retired Member of the
Supreme Court, and a representative of the
private sector.
From the moment of the creation of the JBC,
Congress designated one (1) representative to sit
in the JBC to act as one of the ex-officio
members.16 Pursuant to the constitutional
provision that Congress is entitled to one (1)
representative, each House sent a representative
to the JBC, not together, but alternately or by
rotation.
In 1994, the seven-member composition of the
JBC was substantially altered.  An eighth member
1âwphi1

was added to the JBC as the two (2)

representatives from Congress began sitting
simultaneously in the JBC, with each having one-
half (1/2) of a vote.17
In 2001, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the
representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each.18 It has been
the situation since then.
Grounds relied upon by Respondents
Through the subject motion, respondents pray
that the Court reconsider its decision and dismiss
the petition on the following grounds: 1] that
allowing only one representative from Congress in
the JBC would lead to absurdity considering its
bicameral nature; 2] that the failure of the Framers
to make the proper adjustment when there was a
shift from unilateralism to bicameralism was a
plain oversight; 3] that two representatives from
Congress would not subvert the intention of the
Framers to insulate the JBC from political
partisanship; and 4] that the rationale of the Court
in declaring a seven-member composition would
provide a solution should there be a stalemate is
not exactly correct.
While the Court may find some sense in the
reasoning in amplification of the third and fourth
grounds listed by respondents, still, it finds itself
unable to reverse the assailed decision on the
principal issues covered by the first and second
grounds for lack of merit. Significantly, the
conclusion arrived at, with respect to the first and
second grounds, carries greater bearing in the
final resolution of this case.
As these two issues are interrelated, the Court
shall discuss them jointly.
Ruling of the Court
The Constitution evinces the direct action of the
Filipino people by which the fundamental powers
of government are established, limited and
defined and by which those powers are distributed
among the several departments for their safe and
useful exercise for the benefit of the body
politic.19 The Framers reposed their wisdom and
vision on one suprema lex to be the ultimate
expression of the principles and the framework
upon which government and society were to
operate. Thus, in the interpretation of the
constitutional provisions, the Court firmly relies on
the basic postulate that the Framers mean what
they say. The language used in the Constitution
must be taken to have been deliberately chosen
for a definite purpose. Every word employed in
the Constitution must be interpreted to exude its
deliberate intent which must be maintained
inviolate against disobedience and defiance. What
the Constitution clearly says, according to its text,
compels acceptance and bars modification even
by the branch tasked to interpret it.
For this reason, the Court cannot accede to the
argument of plain oversight in order to justify
constitutional construction. As stated in the July
17, 2012 Decision, in opting to use the singular
letter "a" to describe "representative of Congress,"
the Filipino people through the Framers intended
that Congress be entitled to only one (1) seat in
the JBC. Had the intention been otherwise, the
Constitution could have, in no uncertain terms, so
provided, as can be read in its other provisions.
A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal
that several provisions were indeed adjusted as to
be in tune with the shift to bicameralism. One
example is Section 4, Article VII, which provides
that a tie in the presidential election shall be
broken "by a majority of all the Members of both
Houses of the Congress, voting
separately."20 Another is Section 8 thereof which
requires the nominee to replace the Vice-
President to be confirmed "by a majority of all the
Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting
separately."21 Similarly, under Section 18, the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be
revoked or continued by the Congress, voting
separately, by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Members."22 In all these provisions, the bicameral
nature of Congress was recognized and, clearly,
the corresponding adjustments were made as to
how a matter would be handled and voted upon
by its two Houses.
Thus, to say that the Framers simply failed to
adjust Section 8, Article VIII, by sheer
inadvertence, to their decision to shift to a
bicameral form of the legislature, is not
persuasive enough. Respondents cannot just lean
on plain oversight to justify a conclusion favorable
to them. It is very clear that the Framers were not
keen on adjusting the provision on congressional
representation in the JBC because it was not in
the exercise of its primary function – to legislate.
JBC was created to support the executive power
to appoint, and Congress, as one whole body,
was merely assigned a contributory non-
legislative function.
The underlying reason for such a limited
participation can easily be discerned. Congress
has two (2) Houses. The need to recognize the
existence and the role of each House is essential
considering that the Constitution employs precise
language in laying down the functions which
particular House plays, regardless of whether the
two Houses consummate an official act by voting
jointly or separately. Whether in the exercise of its
legislative23 or its non-legislative functions such
as inter alia, the power of appropriation,24 the
declaration of an existence of a state of
war,25 canvassing of electoral returns for the
President and Vice-President,26 and
impeachment,27 the dichotomy of each House
must be acknowledged and recognized
considering the interplay between these two
Houses. In all these instances, each House is
constitutionally granted with powers and functions
peculiar to its nature and with keen consideration
to 1) its relationship with the other chamber; and
2) in consonance with the principle of checks and
balances, as to the other branches of
government.
In checkered contrast, there is essentially no
interaction between the two Houses in their
participation in the JBC. No mechanism is
required between the Senate and the House of
Representatives in the screening and nomination
of judicial officers. Rather, in the creation of the
JBC, the Framers arrived at a unique system by
adding to the four (4) regular members, three (3)
representatives from the major branches of
government - the Chief Justice as ex-officio
Chairman (representing the Judicial Department),
the Secretary of Justice (representing the
Executive Department), and a representative of
the Congress (representing the Legislative
Department). The total is seven (7), not eight. In
so providing, the Framers simply gave recognition
to the Legislature, not because it was in the
interest of a certain constituency, but in reverence
to it as a major branch of government.
On this score, a Member of Congress, Hon.
Simeon A. Datumanong, from the Second District
of Maguindanao, submitted his well-considered
position28 to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno:
I humbly reiterate my position that there should be
only one representative of Congress in the JBC in
accordance with Article VIII, Section 8 (1) of the
1987 Constitution x x x.
The aforesaid provision is clear and unambiguous
and does not need any further interpretation.
Perhaps, it is apt to mention that the oft-repeated
doctrine that "construction and interpretation
come only after it has been demonstrated that
application is impossible or inadequate without
them."
Further, to allow Congress to have two
representatives in the Council, with one vote
each, is to negate the principle of equality among
the three branches of government which is
enshrined in the Constitution.
In view of the foregoing, I vote for the proposition
that the Council should adopt the rule of single
representation of Congress in the JBC in order to
respect and give the right meaning to the above-
quoted provision of the Constitution. (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)
On March 14, 2007, then Associate Justice
Leonardo A. Quisumbing, also a JBC Consultant,
submitted to the Chief Justice and ex-officio JBC
Chairman his opinion,29 which reads:
8. Two things can be gleaned from the excerpts
and citations above: the creation of the JBC is
intended to curtail the influence of politics in
Congress in the appointment of judges, and the
understanding is that seven (7) persons will
compose the JBC. As such, the interpretation of
two votes for Congress runs counter to the
intendment of the framers. Such interpretation
actually gives Congress more influence in the
appointment of judges. Also, two votes for
Congress would increase the number of JBC
members to eight, which could lead to voting
deadlock by reason of even-numbered
membership, and a clear violation of 7
enumerated members in the Constitution.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In an undated position paper,30 then Secretary of
Justice Agnes VST Devanadera opined:
As can be gleaned from the above constitutional
provision, the JBC is composed of seven (7)
representatives coming from different sectors.
From the enumeration it is patent that each
category of members pertained to a single
individual only. Thus, while we do not lose sight of
the bicameral nature of our legislative department,
it is beyond dispute that Art. VIII, Section 8 (1) of
the 1987 Constitution is explicit and specific that
"Congress" shall have only "xxx a representative."
Thus, two (2) representatives from Congress
would increase the number of JBC members to
eight (8), a number beyond what the Constitution
has contemplated. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
In this regard, the scholarly dissection on the
matter by retired Justice Consuelo Ynares-
Santiago, a former JBC consultant, is worth
reiterating.31 Thus:
A perusal of the records of the Constitutional
Commission reveals that the composition of the
JBC reflects the Commission’s desire "to have in
the Council a representation for the major
elements of the community." xxx The ex-officio
members of the Council consist of representatives
from the three main branches of government
while the regular members are composed of
various stakeholders in the judiciary. The
unmistakeable tenor of Article VIII, Section 8(1)
was to treat each ex-officio member as
representing one co-equal branch of government.
xxx Thus, the JBC was designed to have seven
voting members with the three ex-officio members
having equal say in the choice of judicial
nominees.
xxx
No parallelism can be drawn between the
representative of Congress in the JBC and the
exercise by Congress of its legislative powers
under Article VI and constituent powers under
Article XVII of the Constitution. Congress, in
relation to the executive and judicial branches of
government, is constitutionally treated as another
co-equal branch in the matter of its representative
in the JBC. On the other hand, the exercise of
legislative and constituent powers requires the
Senate and the House of Representatives to
coordinate and act as distinct bodies in
furtherance of Congress’ role under our
constitutional scheme. While the latter justifies
and, in fact, necessitates the separateness of the
two Houses of Congress as they relate inter se,
no such dichotomy need be made when Congress
interacts with the other two co-equal branches of
government.
It is more in keeping with the co-equal nature of
the three governmental branches to assign the
same weight to considerations that any of its
representatives may have regarding aspiring
nominees to the judiciary. The representatives of
the Senate and the House of Representatives act
as such for one branch and should not have any
more quantitative influence as the other branches
in the exercise of prerogatives evenly bestowed
upon the three. Sound reason and principle of
equality among the three branches support this
conclusion. [Emphases and underscoring
supplied]
The argument that a senator cannot represent a
member of the House of Representatives in the
JBC and vice-versa is, thus, misplaced. In the
JBC, any member of Congress, whether from the
Senate or the House of Representatives, is
constitutionally empowered to represent the entire
Congress. It may be a constricted constitutional
authority, but it is not an absurdity.
From this score stems the conclusion that the
lone representative of Congress is entitled to one
full vote. This pronouncement effectively disallows
the scheme of splitting the said vote into half
(1/2), between two representatives of Congress.
Not only can this unsanctioned practice cause
disorder in the voting process, it is clearly against
the essence of what the Constitution authorized.
After all, basic and reasonable is the rule that
what cannot be legally done directly cannot be
done indirectly. To permit or tolerate the splitting
of one vote into two or more is clearly a
constitutional circumvention that cannot be
countenanced by the Court. Succinctly put, when
the Constitution envisioned one member of
Congress sitting in the JBC, it is sensible to
presume that this representation carries with him
one full vote.
It is also an error for respondents to argue that the
President, in effect, has more influence over the
JBC simply because all of the regular members of
the JBC are his appointees. The principle of
checks and balances is still safeguarded because
the appointment of all the regular members of the
JBC is subject to a stringent process of
confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, which is composed of members of
Congress.
Respondents’ contention that the current irregular
composition of the JBC should be accepted,
simply because it was only questioned for the first
time through the present action, deserves scant
consideration. Well-settled is the rule that acts
done in violation of the Constitution no matter how
frequent, usual or notorious cannot develop or
gain acceptance under the doctrine of estoppel or
laches, because once an act is considered as an
infringement of the Constitution it is void from the
very beginning and cannot be the source of any
power or authority.
It would not be amiss to point out, however, that
as a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a
law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it
affords no protection; it creates no office; it is
inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. This
rule, however, is not absolute. Under the doctrine
of operative facts, actions previous to the
declaration of unconstitutionality are legally
recognized. They are not nullified. This is
essential in the interest of fair play. To reiterate
the doctrine enunciated in Planters Products, Inc.
v. Fertiphil Corporation:32
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to
the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity
and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an
unconstitutional law by recognizing that the
existence of a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may
have consequences which cannot always be
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a
new judicial declaration. The doctrine is applicable
when a declaration of unconstitutionality will
impose an undue burden on those who have
relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a
criminal case when a declaration of
unconstitutionality would put the accused in
double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts
done by a municipality in reliance upon a law
creating it.33
Under the circumstances, the Court finds the
exception applicable in this case and holds that
notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in
the current composition of the JBC, all its prior
official actions are nonetheless valid.
Considering that the Court is duty bound to
protect the Constitution which was ratified by the
direct action of the Filipino people, it cannot
correct what respondents perceive as a mistake in
its mandate. Neither can the Court, in the exercise
of its power to interpret the spirit of the
Constitution, read into the law something that is
contrary to its express provisions and justify the
same as correcting a perceived inadvertence. To
do so would otherwise sanction the Court action
of making amendment to the Constitution through
a judicial pronouncement.
In other words, the Court cannot supply the
legislative omission. According to the rule of
casus omissus "a case omitted is to be held as
intentionally omitted."34 "The principle proceeds
from a reasonable certainty that a particular
person, object or thing has been omitted from a
legislative enumeration."35 Pursuant to this, "the
Court cannot under its power of interpretation
supply the omission even though the omission
may have resulted from inadvertence or because
the case in question was not foreseen or
contemplated."36 "The Court cannot supply what it
thinks the legislature would have supplied had its
attention been called to the omission, as that
would be judicial legislation."37
Stated differently, the Court has no power to add
another member by judicial construction.
The call for judicial activism fails to stir the
sensibilities of the Court tasked to guard the
Constitution against usurpation. The Court
remains steadfast in confining its powers in the
sphere granted by the Constitution itself. Judicial
activism should never be allowed to become
judicial exuberance.38 In cases like this, no
amount of practical logic or convenience can
convince the Court to perform either an excision
or an insertion that will change the manifest intent
of the Framers. To broaden the scope of
congressional representation in the JBC is
tantamount to the inclusion of a subject matter
which was not included in the provision as
enacted. True to its constitutional mandate, the
Court cannot craft and tailor constitutional
provisions in order to accommodate all of
situations no matter how ideal or reasonable the
proposed solution may sound. To the exercise of
this intrusion, the Court declines.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration
filed by respondents is hereby DENIED.
The suspension of the effects of the second
paragraph of the dispositive portion of the July 17,
2012 Decision of the Court, which reads, "This
disposition is immediately executory," is hereby
LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Facts: 

In 1994, instead of having only 7 members,

an eighth member was added to the JBC as
two representatives from Congress began
sitting in the JBC – one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate,
with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.
Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate
meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to
allow the representatives from the Senate
and the House of Representatives one full
vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G.
Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas,
Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the
JBC as representatives of the legislature. It
is this practice that petitioner has
questioned in this petition. Respondents
argued that the crux of the controversy is
the phrase “a representative of Congress.”
It is their theory that the two houses, the
Senate and the House of Representatives,
are permanent and mandatory components
of “Congress,” such that the absence of
either divests the term of its substantive
meaning as expressed under the
Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system
of choice by the Framers, requires that both
houses exercise their respective powers in
the performance of its mandated duty which
is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1),
Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of “a
representative from Congress,” it should
mean one representative each from both
Houses which comprise the entire
Congress.

Issue:
1.  Are the conditions sine qua non for the
exercise of the power of judicial review
have been met in this case?

2. Is the JBC’s practice of having members

from the Senate and the House of
Representatives making 8 instead of 7
sitting members unconstitutional?

3. What is the effect of the Court's finding

that the current composition of the JBC is
unconstitutional?

Held: 

1. Yes. The Courts’ power of judicial review

is subject to several limitations, namely: (a)
there must be an actual case or controversy
calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b)
the person challenging the act must have
“standing” to challenge; he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the
case, such that he has sustained or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity; and (d) the
issue of constitutionality must be the very lis
mota of the case. Generally, a party will be
allowed to litigate only when these
conditions sine qua non are present,
especially when the constitutionality of an
act by a co-equal branch of government is
put in issue.

The Court disagrees with the respondents’

contention that petitioner lost his standing
to sue because he is not an official nominee
for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true
that a “personal stake” on the case is
imperative to have locus standi, this is not
to say that only official nominees for the
post of Chief Justice can come to the Court
and question the JBC composition for being
unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens
and nominates other members of the
Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this
regard, the JBC’s duty is not at all limited to
the nominations for the highest magistrate
in the land. A vast number of aspirants to
judicial posts all over the country may be
affected by the Court’s ruling. More
importantly, the legality of the very process
of nominations to the positions in the
Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy.
The claim that the composition of the JBC
is illegal and unconstitutional is an object of
concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial
post, but for all citizens who have the right
to seek judicial intervention for rectification
of legal blunders.

2.  Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987

Constitution provides:

Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is

hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief
Justice as ex officio Chairman, the
Secretary of Justice, and a representative
of the Congress as ex officio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired Member of the
Supreme Court, and a representative of the
private sector.
From a simple reading of the above-quoted
provision, it can readily be discerned that
the provision is clear and unambiguous.
The first paragraph calls for the creation of
a JBC and places the same under the
supervision of the Court. Then it goes to its
composition where the regular members
are enumerated: a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
member of the Court and a representative
from the private sector. On the second part
lies the crux of the present controversy. It
enumerates the ex officio or special
members of the JBC composed of the Chief
Justice, who shall be its Chairman, the
Secretary of Justice and “a representative
of Congress.”

The use of the singular letter “a” preceding

“representative of Congress” is unequivocal
and leaves no room for any other
construction. It is indicative of what the
members of the Constitutional Commission
had in mind, that is, Congress may
designate only one (1) representative to the
JBC. Had it been the intention that more
than one (1) representative from the
legislature would sit in the JBC, the
Framers could have, in no uncertain terms,
so provided.

One of the primary and basic rules in

statutory construction is that where the
words of a statute are clear, plain, and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of
constitutional construction that the
language employed in the Constitution must
be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed. As
much as possible, the words of the
Constitution should be understood in the
sense they have in common use. What it
says according to the text of the provision
to be construed compels acceptance and
negates the power of the courts to alter it,
based on the postulate that the framers and
the people mean what they say. Verba legis
non est recedendum – from the words of a
statute there should be no departure.

Applying the foregoing principle to this

case, it becomes apparent that the word
“Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1)
of the Constitution is used in its generic
sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is
made on whether the Senate or the House
of Representatives is being referred to, but
that, in either case, only a singular
representative may be allowed to sit in the
JBC.

It is worthy to note that the seven-member

composition of the JBC serves a practical
purpose, that is, to provide a solution
should there be a stalemate in voting. This
underlying reason leads the Court to
conclude that a single vote may not be
divided into half (1/2), between two
representatives of Congress, or among any
of the sitting members of the JBC for that
matter. This unsanctioned practice can
possibly cause disorder and eventually
muddle the JBC’s voting process,
especially in the event a tie is reached. The
aforesaid purpose would then be rendered
illusory, defeating the precise mechanism
which the Constitution itself createdWhile it
would be unreasonable to expect that the
Framers provide for every possible
scenario, it is sensible to presume that they
knew that an odd composition is the best
means to break a voting deadlock.

The respondents insist that owing to the

bicameral nature of Congress, the word
“Congress” in Section 8(1), Article VIII of
the Constitution should be read as including
both the Senate and the House of
Representatives. They theorize that it was
so worded because at the time the said
provision was being drafted, the Framers
initially intended a unicameral form of
Congress. Then, when the Constitutional
Commission eventually adopted a
bicameral form of Congress, the Framers,
through oversight, failed to amend Article
VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution.

It is evident that the definition of “Congress”

as a bicameral body refers to its primary
function in government – to legislate. In the
passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit
in the distinction of the role of each house
in the process. The same holds true in
Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-
play between the two houses is necessary
in the realization of these powers causing a
vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot
simply discount. This, however, cannot be
said in the case of JBC representation
because no liaison between the two houses
exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence,
the term “Congress” must be taken to mean
the entire legislative department.

3. As a general rule, an unconstitutional act

is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes
no duties; it affords no protection; it creates
no office; it is inoperative as if it has not
been passed at all. This rule, however, is
not absolute. Under the doctrine of
operative facts, actions previous to the
declaration of unconstitutionality are legally
recognized. They are not nullified. This is
essential in the interest of fair play.
The doctrine of operative fact, as an
exception to the general rule, only applies
as a matter of equity and fair play. It
nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional
law by recognizing that the existence of a
statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and
may have consequences which cannot
always be ignored. The past cannot always
be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The doctrine is applicable when a
declaration of unconstitutionality will impose
an undue burden on those who have relied
on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a
criminal case when a declaration of
unconstitutionality would put the accused in
double jeopardy or would put in limbo the
acts done by a municipality in reliance upon
a law creating it.3

Under the circumstances, the Court finds

the exception applicable in this case and
holds that notwithstanding its finding of
unconstitutionality in the current
composition of the JBC, all its prior official
actions are nonetheless valid. (Chavez vs.
Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242,
July 17, 2012)
SELF-EXECUTING PROVISIONS

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE

INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION,
COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.

DECISION
BELLOSILLO,  J.:

The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the

grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy
and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos,  is [1]

invoked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila
Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing,
respondents maintain that the provision is not self-executing but requires an
implementing legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the
51% shares form part of the national economy and patrimony covered by the
protective mantle of the Constitution.
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine
Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to
sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares
of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual strategic partner,
is to provide management expertise and/or an international
marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the
profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.  In a close bidding held on
[2]

18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince
Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the
MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of
petitioner.
Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent GSIS
state -

I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC -

1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by October
23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995) or the Highest Bidder will lose the right to
purchase the Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer the Block of Shares to the
other Qualified Bidders:

a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the GSIS/MHC the
Management Contract, International Marketing/Reservation System Contract or other
type of contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for the Manila
Hotel x x x x

b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with
GSIS x x x x

K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER -

The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner after the
following conditions are met:

a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later than October 23,
1995 (reset to November 3, 1995); and

b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP (Committee on Privatization)/

OGCC (Office of the Government Corporate Counsel) are obtained. [3]

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic

partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to
respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00
per share tendered by Renong Berhad.  In a subsequent letter dated 10
[4]

October 1995 petitioner sent a managers check issued by Philtrust Bank for
Thirty-three Million Pesos (P33,000,000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid
of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad x x x x  which respondent
[5]

GSIS refused to accept.

 On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has
disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the
MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong
Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. On 18
October 1995 the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian
firm.
On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En
Banc after it was referred to it by the First Division. The case was then set for
oral arguments with former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Fr.
Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as amici curiae.
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the
Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which
reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of
an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness
of independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the
Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the
national patrimony. Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the
[6]

MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned
by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the
hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is
unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any transaction
involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term
national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution,
applies.[7]

It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the
national patrimony and its business also unquestionably part of the national
economy petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of
the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any reason, the
Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this
to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that
these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price
per share. [8]

Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art.

XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy since
it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s) x x
x x Thus, for the said provision to operate, there must be existing laws to lay
down conditions under which business may be done. [9]
 Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does
not fall under the term national patrimony which only refers to lands of the
public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna
and all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited
in the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987
Constitution. According to respondents, while petitioner speaks of the guests
who have slept in the hotel and the events that have transpired therein which
make the hotel historic, these alone do not make the hotel fall under
the patrimony of the nation. What is more, the mandate of the Constitution is
addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which possesses a
personality of its own separate and distinct from the Philippines as a State.
Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony,
the constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold
is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel building
nor the land upon which the building stands. Certainly, 51% of the equity of
the MHC cannot be considered part of the national patrimony.Moreover, if the
disposition of the shares of the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution,
petitioner should have questioned it right from the beginning and not after it
had lost in the bidding.
Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1., of the bidding
rules which provides that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be
awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified
Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders
are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share, is
misplaced. Respondents postulate that the privilege of submitting a matching
bid has not yet arisen since it only takes place if for any reason, the Highest
Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares. Thus the submission by
petitioner of a matching bid is premature since Renong Berhad could still very
well be awarded the block of shares and the condition giving rise to the
exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken place.
Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion
should fail since respondent GSIS did not exercise its discretion in a
capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse its discretion it was not
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus
should fail as petitioner has no clear legal right to what it demands and
respondents do not have an imperative duty to perform the act required of
them by petitioner.
 We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the
governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute
and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been
defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation.  It prescribes
[10]

the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different

departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed
principles on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in
other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform
and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all
public authority administered.  Under the doctrine of constitutional
[11]

supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law
or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch
or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and
without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental,
paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every
statute and contract.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and
principles. Their provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry
out the purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of
government providing for the different departments of the governmental
machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens.
 A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art.
[12]

II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which

is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary
or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which
the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.Thus a
constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right
conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that
they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and
there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for
action.[13]

As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been

generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect
extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a
manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of
constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative
body.Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary
to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions
of the constitution are self-executing.If the constitutional provisions are treated
as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have
the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.
 This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always
[14]

been, that -

x x x x in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather

than non-self-executing x x x x Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions
of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give
the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These
provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could
make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing
statute. [15]

Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution is clearly not self-executing, as they quote from discussions on
the floor of the 1986 Constitutional Commission -
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am asking this question as the Chairman of the
Committee on Style. If the wording of PREFERENCE is given to QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS, can it be understood as a preference to qualified Filipinos vis-a-
vis Filipinos who are not qualified. So, why do we not make it clear? To qualified
Filipinos as against aliens?
THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove the
word QUALIFIED?
MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS as against
whom? As against aliens or over aliens ?
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is understood. We use the word
QUALIFIED because the existing laws or prospective laws will always lay down
conditions under which business may be done. For example, qualifications on
capital, qualifications on the setting up of other financial structures, et
cetera (underscoring supplied by respondents).
MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes.[16]

Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way
as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of
style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws
to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute
squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature
without impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact
legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the
constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to
be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of
the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable
safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may
supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-
executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective
in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any
express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not
necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule
is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily
exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in
harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and
make it more available.  Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily
[17]

mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully

enforceable.
Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10,
second par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third
paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-executing.
 The argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-
[18]

executing because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the

formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first
paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise
authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third
paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only
be self-executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in order
to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional
provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another.
[19]

Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain constitutional

provisions are merely statements of principles and policies, which are
basically not self-executing and only placed in the Constitution as moral
incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights - are simply not in
point. Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation  speaks of [20]

constitutional provisions on personal dignity,  the sanctity of family life,  the

[21] [22]

vital role of the youth in nation-building,  the promotion of social justice,  and
[23] [24]

the values of education. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance  refers to

[25] [26]

constitutional provisions on social justice and human rights  and on [27]

education.  Lastly, Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato  cites provisions on the

[28] [29]

promotion of general welfare,  the sanctity of family life,  the vital role of the
[30] [31]

youth in nation-building  and the promotion of total human liberation and

[32]

development.  A reading of these provisions indeed clearly shows that they

[33]

are not judicially enforceable constitutional rights but merely guidelines for
legislation. The very terms of the provisions manifest that they are only
principles upon which legislations must be based. Res ipsa loquitur.
On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution
is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs
no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From
its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates
that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national
economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos, it means just that - qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when
our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances
an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the
absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute
especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces
itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all
legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a
remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission  explains -
[34]

The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers
not only to our rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our
race. It also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore,
we should develop not only our lands, forests, mines and other natural
resources but also the mental ability or faculty of our people.

We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains

to heritage.  When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not
[35]

only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have
very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of
the Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark - a living testimonial of Philippine
heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in
1912, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino. Formerly a concourse for the
elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events which
have shaped Philippine history. It was called the Cultural Center of the
1930s. It was the site of the festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine
Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest House of the Philippine
Government it plays host to dignitaries and official visitors who are accorded
the traditional Philippine hospitality. [36]
 The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila Hotel:
The Heart and Memory of a City.  During World War II the hotel was
[37]

converted by the Japanese Military Administration into a military

headquarters. When the American forces returned to recapture Manila the
hotel was selected by the Japanese together with Intramuros as the two (2)
places for their final stand. Thereafter, in the 1950s and 1960s, the hotel
became the center of political activities, playing host to almost every political
convention. In 1970 the hotel reopened after a renovation and reaped
numerous international recognitions, an acknowledgment of the Filipino talent
and ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel was the site of a failed coup d etat where an
aspirant for vice-president was proclaimed President of the Philippine
Republic.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to
the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence
is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our
struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel
has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the
equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it
comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or
owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this
instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the
land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain
respondents claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not
applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of
the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building
stands.[38]

The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used in our

Constitution also includes corporations at least 60% of which is owned by
Filipinos. This is very clear from the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission -
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Dav
ide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. I would like to introduce an amendment to the Nolledo amendment. And
the amendment would consist in substituting the words QUALIFIED FILIPINOS
with the following: CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES OR CORPORATIONS OR
ASSOCIATIONS WHOSE CAPITAL OR CONTROLLING STOCK IS WHOLLY
OWNED BY SUCH CITIZENS.

xxxx
 MR. MONSOD. Madam President, apparently the proponent is agreeable, but we have
to raise a question. Suppose it is a corporation that is 80-percent Filipino, do we
not give it preference?
MR. DAVIDE. The Nolledo amendment would refer to an individual Filipino. What
about a corporation wholly owned by Filipino citizens?
MR. MONSOD. At least 60 percent, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. Is that the intention?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, because, in fact, we would be limiting it if we say that the
preference should only be 100-percent Filipino.
MR. DAVIDE. I want to get that meaning clear because QUALIFIED FILIPINOS may
refer only to individuals and not to juridical personalities or entities.
MR. MONSOD. We agree, Madam President.[39]

xxxx
MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote, may I request that the amendment be read again.
MR. NOLLEDO. The amendment will read: IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES
AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS. And the word Filipinos here, as intended by the proponents, will
include not only individual Filipinos but also Filipino-controlled entities or entities
fully-controlled by Filipinos.[40]

The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus -

MR. FOZ. Madam President, I would like to request Commissioner Nolledo to please
restate his amendment so that I can ask a question.
MR. NOLLEDO. IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS
COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL
GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS.
MR. FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a foreign enterprise is qualified and a
Filipino enterprise is also qualified, will the Filipino enterprise still be given a
preference?
MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.
MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than the Filipino enterprise,
will the Filipino still be preferred?
MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is yes.
MR. FOZ. Thank you.[41]

Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision Commissioner

Nolledo continues
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President. Instead of MUST, it will be SHALL - THE
STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. This embodies
the so-called Filipino First policy.That means that Filipinos should be given
 preference in the grant of concessions, privileges and rights covering the national
patrimony.[42]

The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional Commission

regarding the subject provision was still further clarified by Commissioner
Nolledo  - [43]

Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the Pro-Filipino bias in all economic

concerns. It is better known as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy x x x x This provision
was never found in previous Constitutions x x x x

The term qualified Filipinos simply means that preference shall be given to those
citizens who can make a viable contribution to the common good, because of credible
competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and
preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or
inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would be counterproductive and
inimical to the common good.

In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to
be made between a qualified foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the latter shall be
chosen over the former.

Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so

considered by respondent GSIS and selected as one of the qualified
bidders. It was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in accordance with its own
guidelines so that the sole inference here is that petitioner has been found to
be possessed of proven management expertise in the hotel industry, or it has
significant equity ownership in another hotel company, or it has an overall
management and marketing proficiency to successfully operate the Manila
Hotel.[44]

The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution by

arguing that the subject provision is not self-executory and requires
implementing legislation is quite disturbing.The attempt to violate a clear
constitutional provision - by the government itself - is only too distressing. To
adopt such a line of reasoning is to renounce the duty to ensure faithfulness to
the Constitution. For, even some of the provisions of the Constitution which
evidently need implementing legislation have juridical life of their own and can
be the source of a judicial remedy.We cannot simply afford the government a
defense that arises out of the failure to enact further enabling, implementing or
guiding legislation. In fine, the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., on
constitutional government is apt -
The executive department has a constitutional duty to implement laws, including the
Constitution, even before Congress acts - provided that there are discoverable legal
standards for executive action. When the executive acts, it must be guided by its own
understanding of the constitutional command and of applicable laws. The
responsibility for reading and understanding the Constitution and the laws is not the
sole prerogative of Congress. If it were, the executive would have to ask Congress, or
perhaps the Court, for an interpretation every time the executive is confronted by a
constitutional command. That is not how constitutional government operates. [45]

Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to

the State, not to respondent GSIS which by itself possesses a separate and
distinct personality. This argument again is at best specious. It is undisputed
that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior
approval of the State acting through respondent Committee on
Privatization. As correctly pointed out by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact
alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a state
action. In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the
government are considered state action covered by the Constitution (1) when
the activity it engages in is a public function; (2) when the government is so
significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government
responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government has approved or
authorized the action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling
51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the second and third
categories of state action. Without doubt therefore the transaction, although
entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and
therefore subject to the constitutional command. [46]

When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people
but also to the government as elements of the State. After all, government is
composed of three (3) divisions of power - legislative, executive and
judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State is
correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of government. It is
undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is addressed
among others to the Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a
government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it
is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the
highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated
and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite
approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows
preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an
assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning
bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are
they under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing
the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987
Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the
bidders and other interested parties.
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject
constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules
issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being
violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law that all
laws and contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the land.Those
which violate the Constitution lose their reason for being.
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the
Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this
to other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these
Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per
share.  Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to
[47]

award the block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding

its submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot
conceive of a strongerreason than the constitutional injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public
bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering
the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino,
there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of
the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the
award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and
meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For,
while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding
rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore
it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may
discourage foreign investors. But the Constitution and laws of the Philippines
are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These are given factors
which investors must consider when venturing into business in a foreign
jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or
with any of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights
and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum.
The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from
questioning the sale to Renong Berhad since petitioner was well aware from
the beginning that a foreigner could participate in the bidding is
meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited to the
bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or
if the qualified Filipino fails to match the highest bid tendered by the foreign
entity. In the case before us, while petitioner was already preferred at the
inception of the bidding because of the constitutional mandate, petitioner had
not yet matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have the
right or personality then to compel respondent GSIS to accept its earlier
bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the bid of the foreign firm and the
apparent disregard by respondent GSIS of petitioners matching bid did the
latter have a cause of action.
Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard
unless perhaps the award has been finally made. To insist on selling the
Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match the
bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any other
ordinary market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgment,
regardless of the consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension
of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus we would rather remedy the
indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the government
develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic
conditions and parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong
Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no
alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to
execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in
accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the
Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the
corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after
the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave
abuse of discretion.
The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is
embodied in the 1987 Constitution not merely to be used as a guideline for
future legislation but primarily to be enforced; so must it be enforced. This
Court as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution will never shun, under any
reasonable circumstance, the duty of upholding the majesty of the
Constitution which it is tasked to defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is not
the intention of this Court to impede and diminish, much less undermine, the
influx of foreign investments. Far from it, the Court encourages and welcomes
more business opportunities but avowedly sanctions the preference for
Filipinos whenever such preference is ordained by the Constitution. The
position of the Court on this matter could have not been more appropriately
articulated by Chief Justice Narvasa -

As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its function to substitute its
judgment for that of the legislature or the executive about the wisdom and feasibility
of legislation economic in nature, the Supreme Court has not been spared criticism for
decisions perceived as obstacles to economic progress and development x x x x in
connection with a temporary injunction issued by the Courts First Division against the
sale of the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and its partner, certain statements were
published in a major daily to the effect that that injunction again demonstrates that the
Philippine legal system can be a major obstacle to doing business here.

Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no business of the Court to
intervene in contracts of the kind referred to or set itself up as the judge of whether
they are viable or attainable, it is its bounden duty to make sure that they do not
violate the Constitution or the laws, or are not adopted or implemented with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It will never shirk that
duty, no matter how buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed criticism. [48]

Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business

viability and preventing further losses, regardless of the character of the asset,
should not take precedence over non-material values. A commercial, nay
even a budgetary, objective should not be pursued at the expense of national
pride and dignity. For the Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-
material values. Indeed, the Court will always defer to the Constitution in the
proper governance of a free society; after all, there is nothing so sacrosanct in
any economic policy as to draw itself beyond judicial review when the
Constitution is involved. [49]

Nationalism is inherent in the very concept of the Philippines being a

democratic and republican state, with sovereignty residing in the Filipino
people and from whom all government authority emanates. In nationalism, the
happiness and welfare of the people must be the goal. The nation-state can
have no higher purpose. Any interpretation of any constitutional provision
must adhere to such basic concept. Protection of foreign investments, while
laudible, is merely a policy. It cannot override the demands of nationalism. [50]

The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any
commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of
privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary piece of property in a
commercial district. We are talking about a historic relic that has hosted many
of the most important events in the short history of the Philippines as a
nation. We are talking about a hotel where heads of states would prefer to be
housed as a strong manifestation of their desire to cloak the dignity of the
highest state function to their official visits to the Philippines. Thus the Manila
Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role as an authentic
repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture. In this sense, it
has become truly a reflection of the Filipino soul - a place with a history of
grandeur; a most historical setting that has played a part in the shaping of a
country.[51]

This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts of
respondents to sell the historical landmark - this Grand Old Dame of hotels in
Asia - to a total stranger. For, indeed, the conveyance of this epic exponent of
the Filipino psyche to alien hands cannot be less than mephistophelian for it
is, in whatever manner viewed, a veritable alienation of a nations soul for
some pieces of foreign silver. And so we ask: What advantage, which cannot
be equally drawn from a qualified Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos if
Manila Hotel - and all that it stands for - is sold to a non-Filipino? How much of
national pride will vanish if the nations cultural heritage is entrusted to a
foreign entity? On the other hand, how much dignity will be preserved and
realized if the national patrimony is safekept in the hands of
a qualified, zealous and well-meaning Filipino? This is the plain and simple
meaning of the Filipino First Policyprovision of the Philippine Constitution. And
this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty
of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and
protect the sanctity of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON
PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE
COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to
ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL
CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila
Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the
necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to issue the
necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be
necessary for the purpose.
SO ORDERED.

Facts:
The controversy arose when respondent
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
pursuant to the privatization program of the
Philippine Government, decided to sell through
public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel
Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder, or the
eventual “strategic partner,” will provide
management expertise or an international
marketing/reservation system, and financial
support to strengthen the profitability and
performance of the Manila Hotel.

In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995

only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner
Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC
or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and
Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-
Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the
same number of shares at P44.00 per share,
or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Prior to
the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning
bidder, petitioner Manila Prince Hotel matched the
bid price and sent a manager’s check as bid
security, which GSIS refused to accept.

Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the

tender of the matching bid and that the sale may
be consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner
filed a petition before the Court.

Issues:

1.Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII,

of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing
provision.
2.Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of
the national patrimony.
3.Whether or not the submission of matching
bid is premature
4.Whether or not there was grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the respondents in
refusing the matching bid of the petitioner.
Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:

1.It is a self-executing provision.

1.Since the Constitution is the fundamental,
paramount and supreme law of the nation,
it is deemed written in every statute and
contract. A provision which lays down a
general principle, such as those found in
Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually
not self-executing. But a provision which
is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or
that which supplies sufficient rule by
means of which the right it grants may be
enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
2.A constitutional provision is self-executing
if the nature and extent of the right
conferred and the liability imposed are
fixed by the constitution itself, so that
 they can be determined by an examination
and construction of its terms, and there is
no language indicating that the subject is
referred to the legislature for action.
Unless it is expressly provided that a
legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption
now is that all provisions of the
constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-
executing, the legislature would have the
power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law.
3.10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and
which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation
to put it in operation. It is per sejudicially
enforceable. When our Constitution
mandates that in the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering
national economy and patrimony, the
State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos, it means just that – qualified
Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our
Constitution declares that a right exists in
certain specified circumstances an action
may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any
legislation on the subject; consequently, if
there is no statute especially enacted to
enforce such constitutional right, such
right enforces itself by its own inherent
potency and puissance, and from which all
 legislations must take their bearings.
Where there is a right there is a
remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
2.The Court agree.
1.In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term
patrimony pertains to heritage. When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony,
it refers not only to the natural resources
of the Philippines, as the Constitution
could have very well used the term
natural resources, but also to the cultural
heritage of the Filipinos.
2.It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in
arts, sciences and letters. In the present
case, Manila Hotel has become a
landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine
heritage. While it was restrictively an
American hotel when it first opened in
1912, a concourse for the elite, it has
 since then become the venue of various
significant events which have shaped
Philippine history.
3.Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of
our national economy and patrimony. For
sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes
within the purview of the constitutional
shelter for it comprises the majority and
controlling stock, so that anyone who
acquires or owns the 51% will have actual
control and management of the hotel. In
this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be
disassociated from the hotel and the land
on which the hotel edifice stands.
3.It is not premature.
1.In the instant case, where a foreign firm
submits the highest bid in a public bidding
concerning the grant of rights, privileges
and concessions covering the national
 economy and patrimony, thereby
exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no
question that the Filipino will have to be
allowed to match the bid of the foreign
entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid
of a foreign firm the award should go to
the Filipino. It must be so if the Court is to
give life and meaning to the Filipino First
Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution.
For, while this may neither be expressly
stated nor contemplated in the bidding
rules, the constitutional fiat is
omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To
ignore it would be to sanction a perilous
skirting of the basic law.
2.The Court does not discount the
apprehension that this policy may
discourage foreign investors. But the
Constitution and laws of the Philippines
 are understood to be always open to
public scrutiny. These are given factors
which investors must consider when
venturing into business in a foreign
jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring
to do business in the Philippines or with
any of its agencies or instrumentalities is
presumed to know his rights and
obligations under the Constitution and the
laws of the forum.
4.There was grave abuse of discretion.
1.To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to
foreigners when there is a Filipino group
willing to match the bid of the foreign
group is to insist that government be
treated as any other ordinary market
player, and bound by its mistakes or gross
errors of judgement, regardless of the
consequences to the Filipino people. The
 miscomprehension of the Constitution is
regrettable. Thus, the Court would rather
remedy the indiscretion while there is still
an opportunity to do so than let the
government develop the habit of
forgetting that the Constitution lays down
the basic conditions and parameters for its
actions.
2.Since petitioner has already matched the
bid price tendered by Renong Berhad
pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent
GSIS is left with no alternative but to
award to petitioner the block of shares of
MHC and to execute the necessary
agreements and documents to effect the
sale in accordance not only with the
bidding guidelines and procedures but
with the Constitution as well. The refusal
of respondent GSIS to execute the
 corresponding documents with petitioner
as provided in the bidding rules after the
latter has matched the bid of the
Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave
abuse of discretion.
 

Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE

INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL
CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION
and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE
COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from
selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT
the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE
HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject
51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation
at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the
necessary agreements and documents to effect
the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to
do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary
for the purpose.
NON-SELF EXECUTING PROVISIONS

G.R. No. 161872             April 13, 2004

REV. ELLY CHAVEZ PAMATONG,
ESQUIRE, petitioner, 
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed
his Certificate of Candidacy for President on
December 17, 2003. Respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) refused to give due course
to petitioner’s Certificate of Candidacy in
its Resolution No. 6558 dated January 17, 2004.
The decision, however, was not unanimous since
Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and
Mehol K. Sadain voted to include petitioner as
they believed he had parties or movements to
back up his candidacy.
On January 15, 2004, petitioner moved for
reconsideration of Resolution No.
6558. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was
docketed as SPP (MP) No. 04-001. The
COMELEC, acting on petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration and on similar motions filed by
other aspirants for national elective positions,
denied the same under the aegis of Omnibus
Resolution No. 6604 dated February 11, 2004.
The COMELEC declared petitioner and thirty-five
(35) others nuisance candidates who could not
wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not
nominated by a political party or are not supported
by a registered political party with a national
constituency. Commissioner Sadain maintained
his vote for petitioner. By then, Commissioner
Tancangco had retired.
In this Petition For Writ of Certiorari, petitioner
seeks to reverse the resolutions which were
allegedly rendered in violation of his right to
"equal access to opportunities for public service"
under Section 26, Article II of the 1987
Constitution,1 by limiting the number of qualified
candidates only to those who can afford to wage a
nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by
political parties. In so doing, petitioner argues that
the COMELEC indirectly amended the
constitutional provisions on the electoral process
and limited the power of the sovereign people to
choose their leaders. The COMELEC supposedly
erred in disqualifying him since he is the most
qualified among all the presidential
candidates, i.e., he possesses all the
constitutional and legal qualifications for the office
of the president, he is capable of waging a
national campaign since he has numerous
national organizations under his leadership, he
also has the capacity to wage an international
campaign since he has practiced law in other
countries, and he has a platform of government.
Petitioner likewise attacks the validity of the form
for the Certificate of Candidacy prepared by the
COMELEC. Petitioner claims that the form does
not provide clear and reasonable guidelines for
determining the qualifications of candidates since
it does not ask for the candidate’s bio-data and
his program of government.
First, the constitutional and legal dimensions
involved.
Implicit in the petitioner’s invocation of the
constitutional provision ensuring "equal access to
opportunities for public office" is the claim that
there is a constitutional right to run for or hold
public office and, particularly in his case, to seek
the presidency. There is none. What is recognized
is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed
by law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution
neither bestows such a right nor elevates the
privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There
is nothing in the plain language of the provision
which suggests such a thrust or justifies an
interpretation of the sort.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part
of Article II of the Constitution, entitled
"Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The
provisions under the Article are generally
considered not self-executing,2 and there is no
plausible reason for according a different
treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the
rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the
provision does not contain any judicially
enforceable constitutional right but merely
specifies a guideline for legislative or executive
action.3 The disregard of the provision does not
give rise to any cause of action before the courts.4
An inquiry into the intent of the framers5 produces
the same determination that the provision is not
self-executory. The original wording of the present
Section 26, Article II had read, "The State shall
broaden opportunities to public office and prohibit
public dynasties."6 Commissioner (now Chief
Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr. successfully brought
forth an amendment that changed the word
"broaden" to the phrase "ensure equal access,"
and the substitution of the word "office" to
"service." He explained his proposal in this wise:
I changed the word "broaden" to "ENSURE
EQUAL ACCESS TO" because what is
important would be equal access to the
opportunity. If you broaden, it would
necessarily mean that the government
would be mandated to create as many
offices as are possible to accommodate as
many people as are also possible. That is
the meaning of broadening opportunities to
public service. So, in order that we should
not mandate the State to make the
government the number one employer and
to limit offices only to what may be
necessary and expedient yet offering equal
opportunities to access to it, I change the
word "broaden."7 (emphasis supplied)
Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel
the State to enact positive measures that would
accommodate as many people as possible into
public office. The approval of the "Davide
amendment" indicates the design of the framers
to cast the provision as simply enunciatory of a
desired policy objective and not reflective of the
imposition of a clear State burden.
Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to
be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of
positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause
as operative in the absence of legislation since its
effective means and reach are not properly
defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that
can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be
entirely open-ended.8 Words and phrases such as
"equal access," "opportunities," and "public
service" are susceptible to countless
interpretations owing to their inherent
impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention
of the framers to inflict on the people an operative
but amorphous foundation from which innately
unenforceable rights may be sourced.
As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to
opportunities to public office may be subjected to
limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on
the privilege to seek elective office are found in
the provisions9 of the Omnibus Election Code on
"Nuisance Candidates" and COMELEC
Resolution No. 645210 dated December 10, 2002
outlining the instances wherein the COMELEC
may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or
cancel a Certificate of Candidacy.
As long as the limitations apply to everybody
equally without discrimination, however, the equal
access clause is not violated. Equality is not
sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by
the limitations are meant to be borne by any one
who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In
the case at bar, there is no showing that any
person is exempt from the limitations or the
burdens which they create.
Significantly, petitioner does not challenge the
constitutionality or validity of Section 69 of the
Omnibus Election Code and COMELEC
Resolution No. 6452 dated 10 December 2003.
Thus, their presumed validity stands and has to
be accorded due weight.
Clearly, therefore, petitioner’s reliance on the
equal access clause in Section 26, Article II of the
Constitution is misplaced.
The rationale behind the prohibition against
nuisance candidates and the disqualification of
candidates who have not evinced a bona fide
intention to run for office is easy to divine. The
State has a compelling interest to ensure that its
electoral exercises are rational, objective, and
orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into
account the practical considerations in conducting
elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of
candidates, the greater the opportunities for
logistical confusion, not to mention the increased
allocation of time and resources in preparation for
the election. These practical difficulties should, of
course, never exempt the State from the conduct
of a mandated electoral exercise. At the same
time, remedial actions should be available to
alleviate these logistical hardships, whenever
necessary and proper. Ultimately, a disorderly
election is not merely a textbook example of
inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in our
democratic institutions. As the United States
Supreme Court held:
[T]here is surely an important state interest in
requiring some preliminary showing of a
significant modicum of support before printing
the name of a political organization and its
 candidates on the ballot – the interest, if no
other, in avoiding confusion, deception and
even frustration of the democratic [process].11
The COMELEC itself recognized these practical
considerations when it promulgated Resolution
No. 6558 on 17 January 2004, adopting the study
Memorandum of its Law Department dated 11
January 2004. As observed in the
COMELEC’s Comment:
There is a need to limit the number of
candidates especially in the case of
candidates for national positions because the
election process becomes a mockery even if
those who cannot clearly wage a national
campaign are allowed to run. Their names
would have to be printed in the Certified List of
Candidates, Voters Information Sheet and the
Official Ballots. These would entail additional
costs to the government. For the official
ballots in automated counting and canvassing
of votes, an additional page would amount to
more or less FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY
MILLION PESOS (₱450,000,000.00).
xxx[I]t serves no practical purpose to allow
those candidates to continue if they cannot
 wage a decent campaign enough to project
the prospect of winning, no matter how slim.12
The preparation of ballots is but one aspect that
would be affected by allowance of "nuisance
candidates" to run in the elections. Our election
laws provide various entitlements for candidates
for public office, such as watchers in every polling
place,13 watchers in the board of canvassers,14 or
even the receipt of electoral
contributions.15Moreover, there are election rules
and regulations the formulations of which are
dependent on the number of candidates in a given
election.
Given these considerations, the ignominious
nature of a nuisance candidacy becomes even
more galling. The organization of an election
with bona fide candidates standing is onerous
enough. To add into the mix candidates with no
serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable
campaign would actually impair the electoral
process. This is not to mention the candidacies
which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a
one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by
irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the
electoral process, most probably posed at the
instance of these nuisance candidates. It would
be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.
Owing to the superior interest in ensuring a
credible and orderly election, the State could
exclude nuisance candidates and need not
indulge in, as the song goes, "their trips to the
moon on gossamer wings."
The Omnibus Election Code and COMELEC
Resolution No. 6452 are cognizant of the
compelling State interest to ensure orderly and
credible elections by excising impediments
thereto, such as nuisance candidacies that
distract and detract from the larger purpose. The
COMELEC is mandated by the Constitution with
the administration of elections16 and endowed with
considerable latitude in adopting means and
methods that will ensure the promotion of free,
orderly and honest elections.17 Moreover, the
Constitution guarantees that only bona
fide candidates for public office shall be free from
any form of harassment and discrimination.18 The
determination of bona fidecandidates is governed
by the statutes, and the concept, to our mind is,
satisfactorily defined in the Omnibus Election
Code.
Now, the needed factual premises.
However valid the law and the COMELEC
issuance involved are, their proper application in
the case of the petitioner cannot be tested and
reviewed by this Court on the basis of what is now
before it. The assailed resolutions of the
COMELEC do not direct the Court to the evidence
which it considered in determining that petitioner
was a nuisance candidate. This precludes the
Court from reviewing at this instance whether the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
in disqualifying petitioner, since such a review
would necessarily take into account the matters
which the COMELEC considered in arriving at its
decisions.
Petitioner has submitted to this Court mere
photocopies of various documents purportedly
evincing his credentials as an eligible candidate
for the presidency. Yet this Court, not being a trier
of facts, can not properly pass upon the
reproductions as evidence at this level. Neither
the COMELEC nor the Solicitor General
appended any document to their
respective Comments.
The question of whether a candidate is a
nuisance candidate or not is both legal and
factual. The basis of the factual determination is
not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this
case for the reception of further evidence is in
order.
A word of caution is in order. What is at stake is
petitioner’s aspiration and offer to serve in the
government. It deserves not a cursory treatment
but a hearing which conforms to the requirements
of due process.
As to petitioner’s attacks on the validity of the
form for the certificate of candidacy, suffice it to
say that the form strictly complies with Section 74
of the Omnibus Election Code. This provision
specifically enumerates what a certificate of
candidacy should contain, with the required
information tending to show that the candidate
possesses the minimum qualifications for the
position aspired for as established by the
Constitution and other election laws.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, COMELEC Case
No. SPP (MP) No. 04-001 is hereby remanded to
the COMELEC for the reception of further
evidence, to determine the question on whether
petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance
candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
The COMELEC is directed to hold and complete
the reception of evidence and report its findings to
this Court with deliberate dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
STATE (definition)

G.R. No. L-13250 October 29, 1971

THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, petitioner, 
vs.
ANTONIO CAMPOS RUEDA, respondent..
Assistant Solicitor General Jose P. Alejandro and
Special Attorney Jose G. Azurin, (O.S.G.) for
petitioner.
Ramirez and Ortigas for respondent.

FERNANDO, J.:
The basic issue posed by petitioner Collector of
Internal Revenue in this appeal from a decision of
the Court of Tax Appeals as to whether or not the
requisites of statehood, or at least so much
thereof as may be necessary for the acquisition of
an international personality, must be satisfied for
a "foreign country" to fall within the exemption of
Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue
Code  is now ripe for adjudication. The Court of
1

Tax Appeals answered the question in the

negative, and thus reversed the action taken by
petitioner Collector, who would hold respondent
Antonio Campos Rueda, as administrator of the
estate of the late Estrella Soriano Vda. de
Cerdeira, liable for the sum of P161,874.95 as
deficiency estate and inheritance taxes for the
transfer of intangible personal properties in the
Philippines, the deceased, a Spanish national
having been a resident of Tangier, Morocco from
1931 up to the time of her death in 1955. In an
earlier resolution promulgated May 30, 1962, this
Court on the assumption that the need for
resolving the principal question would be
obviated, referred the matter back to the Court of
Tax Appeals to determine whether the alleged law
of Tangier did grant the reciprocal tax exemption
required by the aforesaid Section 122. Then came
an order from the Court of Tax Appeals submitting
copies of legislation of Tangier that would
manifest that the element of reciprocity was not
lacking. It was not until July 29, 1969 that the
case was deemed submitted for decision. When
the petition for review was filed on January 2,
1958, the basic issue raised was impressed with
an element of novelty. Four days thereafter,
however, on January 6, 1958, it was held by this
Court that the aforesaid provision does not require
that the "foreign country" possess an international
personality to come within its terms.  Accordingly,
2

we have to affirm.
The decision of the Court of Tax Appeals, now
under review, sets forth the background facts as
follows: "This is an appeal interposed by petitioner
Antonio Campos Rueda as administrator of the
estate of the deceased Doña Maria de la Estrella
Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira, from the decision of the
respondent Collector of Internal Revenue,
assessing against and demanding from the former
the sum P161,874.95 as deficiency estate and
inheritance taxes, including interest and penalties,
on the transfer of intangible personal properties
situated in the Philippines and belonging to said
Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira.
Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira
(Maria Cerdeira for short) is a Spanish national,
by reason of her marriage to a Spanish citizen
and was a resident of Tangier, Morocco from
1931 up to her death on January 2, 1955. At the
time of her demise she left, among others,
intangible personal properties in the
Philippines."  Then came this portion: "On
3

September 29, 1955, petitioner filed a provisional

estate and inheritance tax return on all the
properties of the late Maria Cerdeira. On the
same date, respondent, pending investigation,
issued an assessment for state and inheritance
taxes in the respective amounts of P111,592.48
and P157,791.48, or a total of P369,383.96 which
tax liabilities were paid by petitioner ... . On
November 17, 1955, an amended return was
filed ... wherein intangible personal properties with
the value of P396,308.90 were claimed as
exempted from taxes. On November 23, 1955,
respondent, pending investigation, issued another
assessment for estate and inheritance taxes in
the amounts of P202,262.40 and P267,402.84,
respectively, or a total of P469,665.24 ... . In a
letter dated January 11, 1956, respondent denied
the request for exemption on the ground that the
law of Tangier is not reciprocal to Section 122 of
the National Internal Revenue Code. Hence,
respondent demanded the payment of the sums
of P239,439.49 representing deficiency estate
and inheritance taxes including ad
valorem penalties, surcharges, interests and
compromise penalties ... . In a letter dated
February 8, 1956, and received by respondent on
the following day, petitioner requested for the
reconsideration of the decision denying the claim
for tax exemption of the intangible personal
properties and the imposition of the 25% and
5% ad valorem penalties ... . However,
respondent denied request, in his letter dated May
5, 1956 ... and received by petitioner on May 21,
1956. Respondent premised the denial on the
grounds that there was no reciprocity [with
Tangier, which was moreover] a mere principality,
not a foreign country. Consequently, respondent
demanded the payment of the sums of
P73,851.21 and P88,023.74 respectively, or a
total of P161,874.95 as deficiency estate and
inheritance taxes including surcharges, interests
and compromise penalties." 4

The matter was then elevated to the Court of Tax

Appeals. As there was no dispute between the
parties regarding the values of the properties and
the mathematical correctness of the deficiency
assessments, the principal question as noted
dealt with the reciprocity aspect as well as the
insisting by the Collector of Internal Revenue that
Tangier was not a foreign country within the
meaning of Section 122. In ruling against the
contention of the Collector of Internal Revenue,
the appealed decision states: "In fine, we believe,
and so hold, that the expression "foreign country",
used in the last proviso of Section 122 of the
National Internal Revenue Code, refers to a
government of that foreign power which, although
not an international person in the sense of
international law, does not impose transfer or
death upon intangible person properties of our
citizens not residing therein, or whose law allows
a similar exemption from such taxes. It is,
therefore, not necessary that Tangier should have
been recognized by our Government order to
entitle the petitioner to the exemption benefits of
the proviso of Section 122 of our Tax. Code." 5

Hence appeal to this court by petitioner. The

respective briefs of the parties duly submitted, but
as above indicated, instead of ruling definitely on
the question, this Court, on May 30, 1962, resolve
to inquire further into the question of reciprocity
and sent back the case to the Court of Tax
Appeals for the motion of evidence thereon. The
dispositive portion of such resolution reads as
follows: "While section 122 of the Philippine Tax
Code aforequoted speaks of 'intangible personal
property' in both subdivisions (a) and (b); the
alleged laws of Tangier refer to 'bienes muebles
situados en Tanger', 'bienes muebles radicantes
en Tanger', 'movables' and 'movable property'. In
order that this Court may be able to determine
whether the alleged laws of Tangier grant the
reciprocal tax exemptions required by Section 122
of the Tax Code, and without, for the time being,
going into the merits of the issues raised by the
petitioner-appellant, the case is [remanded] to the
Court of Tax Appeals for the reception of
evidence or proof on whether or not the words
`bienes muebles', 'movables' and 'movable
properties as used in the Tangier laws, include or
embrace 'intangible person property', as used in
the Tax Code."  In line with the above resolution,
6

the Court of Tax Appeals admitted evidence

submitted by the administrator petitioner Antonio
Campos Rueda, consisting of exhibits of laws of
Tangier to the effect that "the transfers by reason
of death of movable properties, corporeal or
incorporeal, including furniture and personal
effects as well as of securities, bonds, shares, ...,
were not subject, on that date and in said zone, to
the payment of any death tax, whatever might
have been the nationality of the deceased or his
heirs and legatees." It was further noted in an
order of such Court referring the matter back to us
that such were duly admitted in evidence during
the hearing of the case on September 9, 1963.
Respondent presented no evidence." 7

The controlling legal provision as noted is a

proviso in Section 122 of the National Internal
Revenue Code. It reads thus: "That no tax shall
be collected under this Title in respect of
intangible personal property (a) if the decedent at
the time of his death was a resident of a foreign
country which at the time of his death did not
impose a transfer tax or death tax of any
character in respect of intangible person property
of the Philippines not residing in that foreign
country, or (b) if the laws of the foreign country of
which the decedent was a resident at the time of
his death allow a similar exemption from transfer
taxes or death taxes of every character in respect
of intangible personal property owned by citizens
of the Philippines not residing in that foreign
country."  The only obstacle therefore to a
8

definitive ruling is whether or not as vigorously

insisted upon by petitioner the acquisition of
internal personality is a condition sine qua non to
Tangier being considered a "foreign country".
Deference to the De Lara ruling, as was made
clear in the opening paragraph of this opinion,
calls for an affirmance of the decision of the Court
of Tax Appeals.
It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign country
is to be identified with a state, it is required in line
with Pound's formulation that it be a politically
organized sovereign community independent of
outside control bound by penalties of nationhood,
legally supreme within its territory, acting through
a government functioning under a regime of 
law.  It is thus a sovereign person with the people
9

composing it viewed as an organized corporate

society under a government with the legal
competence to exact obedience to its
commands.   It has been referred to as a body-
10

politic organized by common consent for mutual

defense and mutual safety and to promote the
general welfare. Correctly has it been described
11

by Esmein as "the juridical personification of the

nation."   This is to view it in the light of its
12
historical development. The stress is on its being
a nation, its people occupying a definite territory,
politically organized, exercising by means of its
government its sovereign will over the individuals
within it and maintaining its separate international
personality. Laski could speak of it then as a
territorial society divided into government and
subjects, claiming within its allotted area a
supremacy over all other institutions.  McIver
13

similarly would point to the power entrusted to its

government to maintain within its territory the
conditions of a legal order and to enter into
international relations.   With the latter requisite
14

satisfied, international law do not exact

independence as a condition of statehood. So
Hyde did opine.  15

Even on the assumption then that Tangier is

bereft of international personality, petitioner has
not successfully made out a case. It bears
repeating that four days after the filing of this
petition on January 6, 1958 in Collector of Internal
Revenue v. De Lara,   it was specifically held by
16

us: "Considering the State of California as a

foreign country in relation to section 122 of our
Tax Code we believe and hold, as did the Tax
Court, that the Ancilliary Administrator is entitled
the exemption from the inheritance tax on the
intangible personal property found in the
Philippines."   There can be no doubt that
17

California as a state in the American Union was in

the alleged requisite of international personality.
Nonetheless, it was held to be a foreign country
within the meaning of Section 122 of the National
Internal Revenue Code.  18

What is undeniable is that even prior to the De

Lara ruling, this Court did commit itself to the
doctrine that even a tiny principality, that of
Liechtenstein, hardly an international personality
in the sense, did fall under this exempt category.
So it appears in an opinion of the Court by the
then Acting Chief Justicem Bengson who
thereafter assumed that position in a permanent
capacity, in Kiene v. Collector of Internal
Revenue.   As was therein noted: 'The Board
19

found from the documents submitted to it — proof

of the laws of Liechtenstein — that said country
does not impose estate, inheritance and gift taxes
on intangible property of Filipino citizens not
residing in that country. Wherefore, the Board
declared that pursuant to the exemption above
established, no estate or inheritance taxes were
collectible, Ludwig Kiene being a resident of
Liechtestein when he passed away."   Then came
20

this definitive ruling: "The Collector — hereafter

named the respondent — cites decisions of the
United States Supreme Court and of this Court,
holding that intangible personal property in the
Philippines belonging to a non-resident foreigner,
who died outside of this country is subject to the
estate tax, in disregard of the principle 'mobilia
sequuntur personam'. Such property is admittedly
taxable here. Without the proviso above quoted,
the shares of stock owned here by the Ludwig
Kiene would be concededly subject to estate and
inheritance taxes. Nevertheless our Congress
chose to make an exemption where conditions
are such that demand reciprocity — as in this
case. And the exemption must be honored."  21

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent

Court of Tax Appeals of October 30, 1957 is
affirmed. Without pronouncement as to costs
Facts: This is an appeal interposed by herein respondent
Antonio Campos Rueda as administrator of the estate of the
deceased Doña Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda de
Cedeira, from the decision of the petitioner, collector of
internal revenue, assessing against and demanding from the
former the sum of Php161,874.95 as deficiency estate and
inheritance taxes, including interest therein and penalties,
on the transfer of intangible personal properties situated in
the Philippines and belonging to said Maria Cedeira. She is
a spanish national, by reason of her marriage to a spanish
citizen and was a resident of Tangier, Morocco from 1931
up to her death on January 2, 1955. At the time of her
demise, she left among others, intangible personal
properties in the Philippines. On September 29, 1955,
respondent filed a provisional estate and inheritance tax
return on all the properties of Maria Cedeira. On the same
date, petitioner, pending investigation issued an assessment
for estate and inheritance tax in the respective amounts of
Php111,592.48 and Php 157,791.48 or a total of
Php369,383.96 which tax liabilities were paid by
respondent. On November 27, 1955, an amended return
was filed wherein intangible personal properties with the
value of Php396,308.90 were claimed as exempt from
taxes. On November 23, 1955, petitioner issued another
assessment for estate and inheritance taxes in the amounts
of Php 202,262.40 and Php267,402.84 respectively or a
total of Php469,665.24. In a letter dated January 11, 1956,
respondent denied the request for the exemption on the
ground that the law of Tangier is not reciprocal with section
122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. Hence,
respondent demanded the payment of the sums of
Php239,439.79 representing the deficiency estate and
inheritance taxes including ad valorem penalties,
surcharges, interest and compromise penalties. In a letter
dated February 8, 1956, respondent requested for the
reconsideration of the decision denying the claim for the
tax exemption. However, the same was denied. The denial
was premise on the ground that there was no reciprocity
with Tangier, which was moreover a mere principality, not
a foreign country.
Issue: Whether or not the intangible personal properties of
Maria Cedeira are exempt from estate and inheritance tax.
Held: Yes. The controlling legal provision as noted is a
proviso in section 122 of the NIRC. It reads thus:
that no tax shall be collected under this title in respect of
intangible personal properties
1. if the decedent at the time of his death was a
resident of a foreign country which at the time of
his death did not impose a transfer tax or death
tax of any character in respect of intangible
personal properties of the Philippines not
residing in that foreign country; or
2. if the laws of the foreign country of which the
decedent was a resident at the time of his death
allow a similar exemption from transfer taxes or
death taxes of every character in respect of
intangible personal properties owned by citizens
of the Philippines not residing in that foreign
country.
This court commit itself to the doctrine that even a tiny
principality, hardly an international personality in the sense
did fall under the exempt category.
The expression “foreign country,” was used in the last
proviso of section 122 of NIRC refers to a government of
that foreign power which although not an international
person in the sense of international law does not impose
transfer or death upon intangible person properties of our
citizens not residing therein whose law allow a similar
exemption from such taxes. It is therefore not necessary
that Tangier should have been recognized by our
government in order to entitle the respondent to the
exemption benefits of the proviso of said section 122 of our
tax code.
EFFECT OF REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT

Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Sandiganbayan, Major

General Josephus Q. Ramas and Elizabeth
Dimaano, respondents.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside

the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan (First Division)  dated 18 November
[1]

1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037. The first Resolution
dismissed petitioners Amended Complaint and ordered the return of the
confiscated items to respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, while the second
Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner prays for
the grant of the reliefs sought in its Amended Complaint, or in the alternative,
for the remand of this case to the Sandiganbayan (First Division) for further
proceedings allowing petitioner to complete the presentation of its evidence.

Antecedent Facts

Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful EDSA

Revolution, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1
(EO No. 1) creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG). EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth
of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates. EO No. 1 vested the PCGG with the
power (a) to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to
accomplish and carry out the purposes of this order and the power (h) to
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purpose of this order. Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then Chairman
Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board (AFP Board) tasked to
investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP
personnel, whether in the active service or retired. [2]

Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of

alleged unexplained wealth of respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas
(Ramas). On 27 July 1987, the AFP Board issued a Resolution on its findings
and recommendation on the reported unexplained wealth of Ramas. The
relevant part of the Resolution reads:

III. FINDINGS and EVALUATION:

Evidence in the record showed that respondent is the owner of a house and lot located
at 15-Yakan St., La Vista, Quezon City. He is also the owner of a house and lot
located in Cebu City. The lot has an area of 3,327 square meters.

The value of the property located in Quezon City may be estimated modestly
at P700,000.00.

The equipment/items and communication facilities which were found in the premises
of Elizabeth Dimaano and were confiscated by elements of the PC Command of
Batangas were all covered by invoice receipt in the name of CAPT. EFREN SALIDO,
RSO Command Coy, MSC, PA. These items could not have been in the possession of
Elizabeth Dimaano if not given for her use by respondent Commanding General of the
Philippine Army.
Aside from the military equipment/items and communications equipment, the raiding
team was also able to confiscate money in the amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000
US Dollars in the house of Elizabeth Dimaano on 3 March 1986.

Affidavits of members of the Military Security Unit, Military Security Command,

Philippine Army, stationed at Camp Eldridge, Los Baos, Laguna, disclosed that
Elizabeth Dimaano is the mistress of respondent. That respondent usually goes and
stays and sleeps in the alleged house of Elizabeth Dimaano in Barangay Tengga, Itaas,
Batangas City and when he arrives, Elizabeth Dimaano embraces and kisses
respondent. That on February 25, 1986, a person who rode in a car went to the
residence of Elizabeth Dimaano with four (4) attache cases filled with money and
owned by MGen Ramas.

Sworn statement in the record disclosed also that Elizabeth Dimaano had no visible
means of income and is supported by respondent for she was formerly a mere
secretary.

Taking in toto the evidence, Elizabeth Dimaano could not have used the military
equipment/items seized in her house on March 3, 1986 without the consent of
respondent, he being the Commanding General of the Philippine Army. It is also
impossible for Elizabeth Dimaano to claim that she owns the P2,870,000.00 and
$50,000 US Dollars for she had no visible source of income.

This money was never declared in the Statement of Assets and Liabilities of
respondent. There was an intention to cover the existence of these money because
these are all ill-gotten and unexplained wealth.Were it not for the affidavits of the
members of the Military Security Unit assigned at Camp Eldridge, Los Baos, Laguna,
the existence and ownership of these money would have never been known.

The Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent were also submitted for scrutiny
and analysis by the Boards consultant. Although the amount of P2,870,000.00 and
$50,000 US Dollars were not included, still it was disclosed that respondent has an
unexplained wealth of P104,134. 60.

IV. CONCLUSION:

In view of the foregoing, the Board finds that a prima facie case exists against
respondent for ill-gotten and unexplained wealth in the amount of P2,974,134.00 and
$50,000 US Dollars.

V. RECOMMENDATION:
Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted
and tried for violation of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and RA 1379, as amended, otherwise known as The Act for the
Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property. [3]

Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under
Republic Act No. 1379 (RA No. 1379)   against Ramas.
[4]

Before Ramas could answer the petition, then Solicitor General Francisco
I. Chavez filed an Amended Complaint naming the Republic of the Philippines
(petitioner), represented by the PCGG, as plaintiff and Ramas as
defendant. The Amended Complaint also impleaded Elizabeth Dimaano
(Dimaano) as co-defendant.
The Amended Complaint alleged that Ramas was the Commanding
General of the Philippine Army until 1986. On the other hand, Dimaano was a
confidential agent of the Military Security Unit, Philippine Army, assigned as a
clerk-typist at the office of Ramas from 1 January 1978 to February 1979. The
Amended Complaint further alleged that Ramas acquired funds, assets and
properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as an army officer and his
other income from legitimately acquired property by taking undue advantage
of his public office and/or using his power, authority and influence as such
officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and as a subordinate and close
associate of the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos. [5]

The Amended Complaint also alleged that the AFP Board, after a previous
inquiry, found reasonable ground to believe that respondents have violated
RA No. 1379.  The Amended Complaint prayed for, among others, the
[6]

forfeiture of respondents properties, funds and equipment in favor of the

State.
Ramas filed an Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and
Compulsory Counterclaim to the Amended Complaint. In his Answer, Ramas
contended that his property consisted only of a residential house at La Vista
Subdivision, Quezon City, valued at P700,000, which was not out of
proportion to his salary and other legitimate income. He denied ownership of
any mansion in Cebu City and the cash, communications equipment and other
items confiscated from the house of Dimaano.
Dimaano filed her own Answer to the Amended Complaint. Admitting her
employment as a clerk-typist in the office of Ramas from January-November
1978 only, Dimaano claimed ownership of the monies, communications
equipment, jewelry and land titles taken from her house by the Philippine
Constabulary raiding team.
 After termination of the pre-trial,  the court set the case for trial on the
[7]

merits on 9-11 November 1988.

On 9 November 1988, petitioner asked for a deferment of the hearing due
to its lack of preparation for trial and the absence of witnesses and vital
documents to support its case. The court reset the hearing to 17 and 18 April
1989.
On 13 April 1989, petitioner filed a motion for leave to amend the
complaint in order to charge the delinquent properties with being subject to
forfeiture as having been unlawfully acquired by defendant Dimaano alone x x
x.
[8]

Nevertheless, in an order dated 17 April 1989, the Sandiganbayan

proceeded with petitioners presentation of evidence on the ground that the
motion for leave to amend complaint did not state when petitioner would file
the amended complaint. The Sandiganbayan further stated that the subject
matter of the amended complaint was on its face vague and not related to the
existing complaint. The Sandiganbayan also held that due to the time that the
case had been pending in court, petitioner should proceed to present its
evidence.
After presenting only three witnesses, petitioner asked for a postponement
of the trial.
On 28 September 1989, during the continuation of the trial, petitioner
manifested its inability to proceed to trial because of the absence of other
witnesses or lack of further evidence to present. Instead, petitioner reiterated
its motion to amend the complaint to conform to the evidence already
presented or to change the averments to show that Dimaano alone unlawfully
acquired the monies or properties subject of the forfeiture.
The Sandiganbayan noted that petitioner had already delayed the case for
over a year mainly because of its many postponements. Moreover, petitioner
would want the case to revert to its preliminary stage when in fact the case
had long been ready for trial. The Sandiganbayan ordered petitioner to
prepare for presentation of its additional evidence, if any.
During the trial on 23 March 1990, petitioner again admitted its inability to
present further evidence. Giving petitioner one more chance to present further
evidence or to amend the complaint to conform to its evidence, the
Sandiganbayan reset the trial to 18 May 1990. The Sandiganbayan, however,
hinted that the re-setting was without prejudice to any action that private
respondents might take under the circumstances.
 However, on 18 May 1990, petitioner again expressed its inability to
proceed to trial because it had no further evidence to present. Again, in the
interest of justice, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioner 60 days within which
to file an appropriate pleading. The Sandiganbayan, however, warned
petitioner that failure to act would constrain the court to take drastic action.
Private respondents then filed their motions to dismiss based on Republic
v. Migrino.  The Court held in Migrino that the PCGG does not have
[9]

jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military officers by reason of mere

position held without a showing that they are subordinates of former President
Marcos.
On 18 November 1991, the Sandiganbayan rendered a resolution, the
dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the Amended Complaint,

without pronouncement as to costs. The counterclaims are likewise dismissed for lack
of merit, but the confiscated sum of money, communications equipment, jewelry and
land titles are ordered returned to Elizabeth Dimaano.
The records of this case are hereby remanded and referred to the Hon. Ombudsman,
who has primary jurisdiction over the forfeiture cases under R.A. No. 1379, for such
appropriate action as the evidence warrants. This case is also referred to the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax
liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano in connection herewith.

SO ORDERED.

On 4 December 1991, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration.

In answer to the Motion for Reconsideration, private respondents filed a
Joint Comment/Opposition to which petitioner filed its Reply on 10 January
1992.
On 25 March 1992, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution denying the
Motion for Reconsideration.

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Amended Complaint on the following

grounds:
(1.) The actions taken by the PCGG are not in accordance with the rulings of the
Supreme Court in Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan  and Republic v.
[10]

Migrino  which involve the same issues.

[11]

(2.) No previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases

was conducted against Ramas and Dimaano.

(3.) The evidence adduced against Ramas does not constitute a prima facie case
against him.

(4.) There was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated.

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues:

A. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
PETITIONERS EVIDENCE CANNOT MAKE A CASE FOR
FORFEITURE AND THAT THERE WAS NO SHOWING OF
CONSPIRACY, COLLUSION OR RELATIONSHIP BY
CONSANGUINITY OR AFFINITY BY AND BETWEEN
RESPONDENT RAMAS AND RESPONDENT DIMAANO
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT SUCH CONCLUSIONS
WERE CLEARLY UNFOUNDED AND PREMATURE, HAVING
BEEN RENDERED PRIOR TO THE COMPLETION OF THE
PRESENTATION OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE PETITIONER.
B. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE PETITIONER, INCLUDING THE FILING
OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AND THE AMENDED
COMPLAINT, SHOULD BE STRUCK OUT IN LINE WITH THE
RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN CRUZ, JR. v.
SANDIGANBAYAN, 194 SCRA 474 AND REPUBLIC v. MIGRINO,
189 SCRA 289, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT:

1. The cases of Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra, and Republic v.

Migrino, supra, are clearly not applicable to this case;

2. Any procedural defect in the institution of the complaint in

Civil Case No. 0037 was cured and/or waived by
respondents with the filing of their respective answers with
counterclaim; and

3. The separate motions to dismiss were evidently improper

considering that they were filed after commencement of the
 presentation of the evidence of the petitioner and even
before the latter was allowed to formally offer its evidence
and rest its case;

C. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE

ARTICLES AND THINGS SUCH AS SUMS OF MONEY,
COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, JEWELRY AND LAND TITLES
CONFISCATED FROM THE HOUSE OF RESPONDENT DIMAANO
WERE ILLEGALLY SEIZED AND THEREFORE EXCLUDED AS
EVIDENCE.[12]

The Courts Ruling

First Issue: PCGGs Jurisdiction to Investigate Private Respondents

This case involves a revisiting of an old issue already decided by this

Court in Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan  and Republic v. Migrino.
[13] [14]

The primary issue for resolution is whether the PCGG has the jurisdiction
to investigate and cause the filing of a forfeiture petition against Ramas and
Dimaano for unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379.
We hold that PCGG has no such jurisdiction.
The PCGG created the AFP Board to investigate the unexplained wealth
and corrupt practices of AFP personnel, whether in the active service or
retired.  The PCGG tasked the AFP Board to make the necessary
[15]

recommendations to appropriate government agencies on the action to be

taken based on its findings.  The PCGG gave this task to the AFP Board
[16]

pursuant to the PCGGs power under Section 3 of EO No. 1 to conduct

investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and to carry out the
purposes of this order. EO No. 1 gave the PCGG specific responsibilities, to
wit:

SEC. 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task of assisting the President in
regard to the following matters:

(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President

Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and
close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad,
including the takeover and sequestration of all business enterprises and
entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration,
 directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their
public office and/ or using their powers, authority, influence,
connections or relationship.

(b) The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President

may assign to the Commission from time to time.

x x x.
The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the unexplained
wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel who fall under either of the two
categories mentioned in Section 2 of EO No. 1. These are: (1) AFP personnel
who have accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the administration of former
President Marcos by being the latters immediate family, relative, subordinate
or close associate, taking undue advantage of their public office or using their
powers, influence x x x;  or (2) AFP personnel involved in other cases of graft
[17]

and corruption provided the President assigns their cases to the PCGG. [18]

Petitioner, however, does not claim that the President assigned Ramas
case to the PCGG. Therefore, Ramas case should fall under the first category
of AFP personnel before the PCGG could exercise its jurisdiction over
him. Petitioner argues that Ramas was undoubtedly a subordinate of former
President Marcos because of his position as the Commanding General of the
Philippine Army. Petitioner claims that Ramas position enabled him to receive
orders directly from his commander-in-chief, undeniably making him a
subordinate of former President Marcos.
We hold that Ramas was not a subordinate of former President Marcos in
the sense contemplated under EO No. 1 and its amendments.
Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him a
subordinate as this term is used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a
showing that he enjoyed close association with former President
Marcos. Migrino discussed this issue in this wise:

A close reading of EO No. 1 and related executive orders will readily show what is
contemplated within the term subordinate. The Whereas Clauses of EO No. 1 express
the urgent need to recover the ill-gotten wealth amassed by former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates both here
and abroad.

EO No. 2 freezes all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former President
Marcos and/or his wife, Mrs. Imelda Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates,
business associates, dummies, agents, or nominees have any interest or participation.
Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis that is-

[W]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things by words of a

particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their
widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind
or class as those specifically mentioned [Smith, Bell & Co, Ltd. vs. Register of Deeds
of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 58, citing Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2ndEd., 203].

[T]he term subordinate as used in EO Nos. 1 & 2 refers to one who enjoys a close
association with former President Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate
family member, relative, and close associate in EO No. 1 and the close relative,
business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in EO No. 2.

xxx

It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government official
or employee during the administration of former President Marcos. There must be a
prima facie showing that the respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue
of his close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife.
(Emphasis supplied)

Ramas position alone as Commanding General of the Philippine Army

with the rank of Major General  does not suffice to make him a subordinate of
[19]

former President Marcos for purposes of EO No. 1 and its amendments. The

PCGG has to provide a prima facie showing that Ramas was a close
associate of former President Marcos, in the same manner that business
associates, dummies, agents or nominees of former President Marcos were
close to him. Such close association is manifested either by Ramas complicity
with former President Marcos in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by the
deposed President or by former President Marcos acquiescence in Ramas
own accumulation of ill-gotten wealth if any.
This, the PCGG failed to do.
Petitioners attempt to differentiate the instant case from Migrino does not
convince us. Petitioner argues that unlike in Migrino, the AFP Board
Resolution in the instant case states that the AFP Board conducted the
investigation pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A in relation to RA No.
1379. Petitioner asserts that there is a presumption that the PCGG was acting
within its jurisdiction of investigating crony-related cases of graft and
corruption and that Ramas was truly a subordinate of the former
President. However, the same AFP Board Resolution belies this
contention. Although the Resolution begins with such statement, it ends with
the following recommendation:

V. RECOMMENDATION:

Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted

and tried for violation of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and RA 1379, as amended, otherwise known as The Act for the
Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property.[20]

Thus, although the PCGG sought to investigate and prosecute private

respondents under EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, the result yielded a finding of
violation of Republic Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 without any relation to EO Nos.
1, 2, 14 and 14-A. This absence of relation to EO No. 1 and its amendments
proves fatal to petitioners case. EO No. 1 created the PCGG for a specific and
limited purpose, and necessarily its powers must be construed to
address such specific and limited purpose.
Moreover, the resolution of the AFP Board and even the Amended
Complaint do not show that the properties Ramas allegedly owned were
accumulated by him in his capacity as a subordinate of his commander-in-
chief. Petitioner merely enumerated the properties Ramas allegedly owned
and suggested that these properties were disproportionate to his salary and
other legitimate income without showing that Ramas amassed them because
of his close association with former President Marcos. Petitioner, in
fact, admits that the AFP Board resolution does not contain a finding that
Ramas accumulated his wealth because of his close association with former
President Marcos, thus:

10. While it is true that the resolution of the Anti-Graft Board of the New Armed
Forces of the Philippines did not categorically find a prima facie evidence
showing that respondent Ramas unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his
close association or relation with former President Marcos and/or his wife, it is
submitted that such omission was not fatal. The resolution of the Anti-Graft Board
should be read in the context of the law creating the same and the objective of the
investigation which was, as stated in the above, pursuant to Republic Act Nos. 3019
and 1379 in relation to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-a;  (Emphasis supplied)
[21]

Such omission is fatal. Petitioner forgets that it is precisely a prima

facie showing that the ill-gotten wealth was accumulated by a subordinate of
former President Marcos that vests jurisdiction on PCGG. EO No. 1  clearly [22]

premises the creation of the PCGG on the urgent need to recover all ill-gotten
wealth amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates. Therefore, to say that such omission was
not fatal is clearly contrary to the intent behind the creation of the PCGG.
In Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,  the Court outlined the cases that fall
[23]

under the jurisdiction of the PCGG pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2,  14,  14-A:

[24] [25] [26]

A careful reading of Sections 2(a) and 3 of Executive Order No. 1 in relation with
Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Executive Order No. 14, shows what the authority of the
respondent PCGG to investigate and prosecute covers:

(a) the investigation and prosecution of the civil action for the recovery of ill-
gotten wealth under Republic Act No. 1379, accumulated by former
President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and
close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including
the take-over or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities
owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or
through his nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public
office and/or using their powers, authority and influence,
connections or relationships; and

(b) the investigation and prosecution of such offenses committed in the

acquisition of said ill-gotten wealth as contemplated under Section 2(a)
of Executive Order No. 1.

However, other violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act not

otherwise falling under the foregoing categories, require a previous authority of
the President for the respondent PCGG to investigate and prosecute in
accordance with Section 2 (b) of Executive Order No. 1. Otherwise, jurisdiction
over such cases is vested in the Ombudsman and other duly authorized
investigating agencies such as the provincial and city prosecutors, their
assistants, the Chief State Prosecutor and his assistants and the state
prosecutors. (Emphasis supplied)

The proper government agencies, and not the PCGG, should investigate
and prosecute forfeiture petitions not falling under EO No. 1 and its
amendments. The preliminary investigation of unexplained wealth amassed
on or before 25 February 1986 falls under the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman,
while the authority to file the corresponding forfeiture petition rests with the
Solicitor General.  The Ombudsman Act or Republic Act No. 6770 (RA No.
[27]

6770) vests in the Ombudsman the power to conduct preliminary investigation

and to file forfeiture proceedings involving unexplained wealth amassed after
25 February 1986. [28]

After the pronouncements of the Court in Cruz, the PCGG still pursued
this case despite the absence of a prima facie finding that Ramas was a
subordinate of former President Marcos. The petition for forfeiture filed with
the Sandiganbayan should be dismissed for lack of authority by the PCGG to
investigate respondents since there is no prima facie showing that EO No. 1
and its amendments apply to respondents. The AFP Board Resolution and
even the Amended Complaint state that there are violations of RA Nos. 3019
and 1379. Thus, the PCGG should have recommended Ramas case to the
Ombudsman who has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation of
ordinary unexplained wealth and graft cases. As stated in Migrino:

[But] in view of the patent lack of authority of the PCGG to investigate and cause the
prosecution of private respondent for violation of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, the
PCGG must also be enjoined from proceeding with the case, without prejudice to any
action that may be taken by the proper prosecutory agency. The rule of law mandates
that an agency of government be allowed to exercise only the powers granted to it.

Petitioners argument that private respondents have waived any defect in

the filing of the forfeiture petition by submitting their respective Answers with
counterclaim deserves no merit as well.
Petitioner has no jurisdiction over private respondents. Thus, there is no
jurisdiction to waive in the first place. The PCGG cannot exercise investigative
or prosecutorial powers never granted to it. PCGGs powers are specific and
limited. Unless given additional assignment by the President, PCGGs sole
task is only to recover the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their relatives and
cronies.  Without these elements, the PCGG cannot claim jurisdiction over a
[29]

case.
Private respondents questioned the authority and jurisdiction of the PCGG
to investigate and prosecute their cases by filing their Motion to Dismiss as
soon as they learned of the pronouncement of the Court in Migrino. This case
was decided on 30 August 1990, which explains why private respondents only
filed their Motion to Dismiss on 8 October 1990.Nevertheless, we have held
that the parties may raise lack of jurisdiction at any stage of the proceeding.
 Thus, we hold that there was no waiver of jurisdiction in this case.
[30]

Jurisdiction is vested by law and not by the parties to an action. [31]

Consequently, the petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by

the PCGG to conduct the preliminary investigation. The Ombudsman may still
conduct the proper preliminary investigation for violation of RA No. 1379, and
if warranted, the Solicitor General may file the forfeiture petition with the
Sandiganbayan.  The right of the State to forfeit unexplained wealth under RA
[32]

No. 1379 is not subject to prescription, laches or estoppel. [33]

Second Issue: Propriety of Dismissal of Case

Before Completion of Presentation of Evidence

Petitioner also contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the

case before completion of the presentation of petitioners evidence.
We disagree.
Based on the findings of the Sandiganbayan and the records of this case,
we find that petitioner has only itself to blame for non-completion of the
presentation of its evidence. First, this case has been pending for four years
before the Sandiganbayan dismissed it. Petitioner filed its
Amended Complaint on 11 August 1987, and only began to
present its evidence on 17 April 1989. Petitioner had almost two years to
prepare its evidence. However, despite this sufficient time, petitioner still
delayed the presentation of the rest of its evidence by filing numerous motions
for postponements and extensions. Even before the date set for the
presentation of its evidence, petitioner filed, on 13 April 1989, a Motion for
Leave to Amend the Complaint. The motion sought to charge the delinquent
[34]

properties (which comprise most of petitioners evidence) with being subject to

forfeiture as having been unlawfully acquired by defendant Dimaano alone x x
x.
The Sandiganbayan, however, refused to defer the presentation of
petitioners evidence since petitioner did not state when it would file the
amended complaint. On 18 April 1989, the Sandiganbayan set the
continuation of the presentation of evidence on 28-29 September and 9-11
October 1989, giving petitioner ample time to prepare its evidence. Still, on 28
September 1989, petitioner manifested its inability to proceed with the
presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan issued an Order expressing
its view on the matter, to wit:

The Court has gone through extended inquiry and a narration of the above events
because this case has been ready for trial for over a year and much of the delay hereon
has been due to the inability of the government to produce on scheduled dates for pre-
trial and for trial documents and witnesses, allegedly upon the failure of the military
to supply them for the preparation of the presentation of evidence thereon. Of equal
interest is the fact that this Court has been held to task in public about its alleged
failure to move cases such as this one beyond the preliminary stage, when, in view of
the developments such as those of today, this Court is now faced with a situation
where a case already in progress will revert back to the preliminary stage, despite a
five-month pause where appropriate action could have been undertaken by the
plaintiff Republic.
[35]

On 9 October 1989, the PCGG manifested in court that it was conducting

a preliminary investigation on the unexplained wealth of private respondents
as mandated by RA No. 1379. The PCGG prayed for an additional four
[36]

months to conduct the preliminary investigation. The Sandiganbayan granted

this request and scheduled the presentation of evidence on 26-29 March
1990. However, on the scheduled date, petitioner failed to inform the court of
the result of the preliminary investigation the PCGG supposedly conducted.
Again, the Sandiganbayan gave petitioner until 18 May 1990 to continue with
the presentation of its evidence and to inform the court of what lies ahead
insofar as the status of the case is concerned x x x.  Still on the date set,
[37]

petitioner failed to present its evidence. Finally, on 11 July 1990, petitioner

filed its Re-Amended Complaint.  The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that
[38]

a case already pending for years would revert to its preliminary stage if the
court were to accept the Re-Amended Complaint.
Based on these circumstances, obviously petitioner has only itself to
blame for failure to complete the presentation of its evidence. The
Sandiganbayan gave petitioner more than sufficient time to finish the
presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan overlooked petitioners
delays and yet petitioner ended the long-string of delays with the filing of a
Re-Amended Complaint, which would only prolong even more the disposition
of the case.
Moreover, the pronouncements of the Court
in Migrino and Cruz prompted the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case since
the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the case against
private respondents. This alone would have been sufficient legal basis for the
Sandiganbayan to dismiss the forfeiture case against private respondents.
Thus, we hold that the Sandiganbayan did not err in dismissing the case
before completion of the presentation of petitioners evidence.

Third Issue: Legality of the Search and Seizure

Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the properties

confiscated from Dimaanos house as illegally seized and therefore
inadmissible in evidence. This issue bears a significant effect on petitioners
case since these properties comprise most of petitioners evidence against
private respondents. Petitioner will not have much evidence to support its
case against private respondents if these properties are inadmissible in
evidence.
On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaanos
residence a search warrant captioned Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunition. Dimaano was not present during the raid but Dimaanos cousins
witnessed the raid. The raiding team seized the items detailed in the seizure
receipt together with other items not included in the search warrant. The
raiding team seized these items: one baby armalite rifle with two magazines;
40 rounds of 5.56 ammunition; one pistol, caliber .45; communications
equipment, cash consisting of P2,870,000 and US$50,000, jewelry, and land
titles.
Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team
conducted the search and seizure on March 3, 1986 or five days after the
successful EDSA revolution. Petitioner argues that a revolutionary
[39]

government was operative at that time by virtue of Proclamation No. 1

announcing that President Aquino and Vice President Laurel were taking
power in the name and by the will of the Filipino people.  Petitioner asserts
[40]

that the revolutionary government effectively withheld the operation of the

1973 Constitution which guaranteed private respondents exclusionary right.
Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an
illegal search applies only beginning 2 February 1987, the date of ratification
of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that all rights under the Bill of
Rights had already reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of the search.
Therefore, the government may confiscate the monies and items taken from
Dimaano and use the same in evidence against her since at the time of their
seizure, private respondents did not enjoy any constitutional right.
Petitioner is partly right in its arguments.
The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As succinctly
stated in President Aquinos Proclamation No. 3 dated 25 March 1986, the
EDSA Revolution was done in defiance of the provisions of the 1973
Constitution.  The resulting government was indisputably a revolutionary
[41]

government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty

obligations that the revolutionary government, as the de jure government in
the Philippines, assumed under international law.
 The correct issues are: (1) whether the revolutionary government was
bound by the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution during the interregnum,
that is, after the actual and effective take-over of power by the revolutionary
government following the cessation of resistance by loyalist forces up to 24
March 1986 (immediately before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution);
and (2) whether the protection accorded to individuals under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Covenant) and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration) remained in effect during the
interregnum.
We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not
operative during the interregnum. However, we rule that the protection
accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration remained in
effect during the interregnum.
During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary
government were the supreme law because no constitution limited the extent
and scope of such directives and orders. With the abrogation of the 1973
Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher
than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during
the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill
of Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during
the interregnum. As the Court explained in Letter of Associate Justice
Reynato S. Puno: [42]

A revolution has been defined as the complete overthrow of the established

government in any country or state by those who were previously subject to it or as a
sudden, radical and fundamental change in the government or political system, usually
effected with violence or at least some acts of violence. In Kelsen's book, General
Theory of Law and State, it is defined as that which occurs whenever the legal order
of a community is nullified and replaced by a new order . . . a way not prescribed by
the first order itself.

It was through the February 1986 revolution, a relatively peaceful one, and more
popularly known as the people power revolution that the Filipino people tore
themselves away from an existing regime. This revolution also saw the unprecedented
rise to power of the Aquino government.

From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been defined as an
inherent right of a people to cast out their rulers, change their policy or effect radical
reforms in their system of government or institutions by force or a general uprising
when the legal and constitutional methods of making such change have proved
inadequate or are so obstructed as to be unavailable. It has been said that the locus of
positive law-making power lies with the people of the state and from there is derived
the right of the people to abolish, to reform and to alter any existing form of
government without regard to the existing constitution.

xxx

It is widely known that Mrs. Aquinos rise to the presidency was not due to
constitutional processes; in fact, it was achieved in violation of the provisions of the
1973 Constitution as a Batasang Pambansa resolution had earlier declared Mr.
Marcos as the winner in the 1986 presidential election. Thus it can be said that the
organization of Mrs. Aquinos Government which was met by little resistance and her
control of the state evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet and other key officers
of the administration, the departure of the Marcos Cabinet officials, revamp of the
Judiciary and the Military signaled the point where the legal system then in effect,
had ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino. (Emphasis supplied)

To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained
operative during the interregnum would render void all sequestration orders
issued by the Philippine Commission on Good Government (PCGG) before
the adoption of the Freedom Constitution. The sequestration orders, which
direct the freezing and even the take-over of private property by mere
executive issuance without judicial action, would violate the due process and
search and seizure clauses of the Bill of Rights.
During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a
revolutionary government bound by no constitution. No one could validly
question the sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of Rights because
there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum. However, upon the
adoption of the Freedom Constitution, the sequestered companies assailed
the sequestration orders as contrary to the Bill of Rights of the Freedom
Constitution.
In Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co. Inc. vs. Presidential
Commission on Good Government,  petitioner Baseco, while conceding
[43]

there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum, questioned the continued
validity of the sequestration orders upon adoption of the Freedom Constitution
in view of the due process clause in its Bill of Rights. The Court ruled that the
Freedom Constitution, and later the 1987 Constitution, expressly
recognized the validity of sequestration orders, thus:

If any doubt should still persist in the face of the foregoing considerations as to the
validity and propriety of sequestration, freeze and takeover orders, it should be
dispelled by the fact that these particular remedies and the authority of the PCGG to
issue them have received constitutional approbation and sanction. As already
mentioned, the Provisional or Freedom Constitution recognizes the power and duty of
the President to enact measures to achieve the mandate of the people to . . . (r)ecover
ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime and
protect the interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets
or accounts. And as also already adverted to, Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution treats of, and ratifies the authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders
under Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986.

The framers of both the Freedom Constitution and the 1987 Constitution
were fully aware that the sequestration orders would clash with the Bill of
Rights. Thus, the framers of both constitutions had to include specific
language recognizing the validity of the sequestration orders. The following
discourse by Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission is instructive:

FR. BERNAS: Madam President, there is something schizophrenic about the

arguments in defense of the present amendment.
For instance, I have carefully studied Minister Salongas lecture in the
Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, of which all of us have been given a
copy. On the one hand, he argues that everything the Commission is doing is
traditionally legal. This is repeated by Commissioner Romulo also. Minister
Salonga spends a major portion of his lecture developing that argument. On
the other hand, almost as an afterthought, he says that in the end what matters
are the results and not the legal niceties, thus suggesting that the PCGG
should be allowed to make some legal shortcuts, another word for niceties or
exceptions.
Now, if everything the PCGG is doing is legal, why is it asking the CONCOM
for special protection? The answer is clear. What they are doing will not
stand the test of ordinary due process, hence they are asking for protection,
for exceptions. Grandes malos, grandes remedios, fine, as the saying stands,
but let us not say grandes malos, grande y malos remedios. That is not an
allowable extrapolation. Hence, we should not give the exceptions asked for,
and let me elaborate and give three reasons:
First, the whole point of the February Revolution and of the work of the
CONCOM is to hasten constitutional normalization. Very much at the heart of
the constitutional normalization is the full effectivity of the Bill of Rights. We
cannot, in one breath, ask for constitutional normalization and at the same
time ask for a temporary halt to the full functioning of what is at the heart of
constitutionalism. That would be hypocritical; that would be a repetition of
Marcosian protestation of due process and rule of law. The New Society word
for that is backsliding. It is tragic when we begin to backslide even before we
get there.
Second, this is really a corollary of the first. Habits tend to become ingrained.
The committee report asks for extraordinary exceptions from the Bill of
Rights for six months after the convening of Congress, and Congress may
even extend this longer.
Good deeds repeated ripen into virtue; bad deeds repeated become vice. What
the committee report is asking for is that we should allow the new government
to acquire the vice of disregarding the Bill of Rights.
Vices, once they become ingrained, become difficult to shed. The
practitioners of the vice begin to think that they have a vested right to its
practice, and they will fight tooth and nail to keep the franchise. That would
be an unhealthy way of consolidating the gains of a democratic revolution.
Third, the argument that what matters are the results and not the legal niceties
is an argument that is very disturbing. When it comes from a staunch
Christian like Commissioner Salonga, a Minister, and repeated verbatim by
another staunch Christian like Commissioner Tingson, it becomes doubly
disturbing and even discombobulating. The argument makes the PCGG an
auctioneer, placing the Bill of Rights on the auction block. If the price is right,
the search and seizure clause will be sold. Open your Swiss bank account to
us and we will award you the search and seizure clause. You can keep it in
your private safe.
Alternatively, the argument looks on the present government as hostage to the
hoarders of hidden wealth. The hoarders will release the hidden health if the
ransom price is paid and the ransom price is the Bill of Rights, specifically the
due process in the search and seizure clauses. So, there is something
positively revolving about either argument. The Bill of Rights is not for sale
to the highest bidder nor can it be used to ransom captive dollars. This nation
will survive and grow strong, only if it would become convinced of the values
enshrined in the Constitution of a price that is beyond monetary estimation.
For these reasons, the honorable course for the Constitutional Commission is
to delete all of Section 8 of the committee report and allow the new
Constitution to take effect in full vigor. If Section 8 is deleted, the PCGG has
two options. First, it can pursue the Salonga and the Romulo argument that
what the PCGG has been doing has been completely within the pale of the
law. If sustained, the PCGG can go on and should be able to go on, even
without the support of Section 8. If not sustained, however, the PCGG has
only one honorable option, it must bow to the majesty of the Bill of Rights.
The PCGG extrapolation of the law is defended by staunch Christians. Let me
conclude with what another Christian replied when asked to toy around with
the law. From his prison cell, Thomas More said, "I'll give the devil benefit of
 law for my nations safety sake. I ask the Commission to give the devil benefit
of law for our nations sake. And we should delete Section 8.
Thank you, Madam President. (Emphasis supplied)

Despite the impassioned plea by Commissioner Bernas against the

amendment excepting sequestration orders from the Bill of Rights, the
Constitutional Commission still adopted the amendment as Section 26,
 Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. The framers of the Constitution were
[44]

fully aware that absent Section 26, sequestration orders would not stand the
test of due process under the Bill of Rights.
Thus, to rule that the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution remained in
force during the interregnum, absent a constitutional provision excepting
sequestration orders from such Bill of Rights, would clearly render all
sequestration orders void during the interregnum. Nevertheless, even during
the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant
and the Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the
1973 Constitution.
The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de
jure government, assumed responsibility for the States good faith compliance
with the Covenant to which the Philippines is a signatory. Article 2(1) of the
Covenant requires each signatory State to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rights  recognized in the present Covenant. Under Article 17(1) of the
[45]

Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure that [n]o one
shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family,
home or correspondence.
The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its
Article 17(2) that [n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. Although
the signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as a legally binding
document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the Declaration
as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on
the State.  Thus, the revolutionary government was also obligated under
[46]

international law to observe the rights  of individuals under the Declaration.
[47]

The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the

Declaration during the interregnum. Whether the revolutionary government
could have repudiated all its obligations under the Covenant or the
Declaration is another matter and is not the issue here. Suffice it to say that
the Court considers the Declaration as part of customary international law,
and that Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects of the rules of
international law laid down in the Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary
government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration in the same
way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the de jure government, the
revolutionary government could not escape responsibility for the States good
faith compliance with its treaty obligations under international law.
It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25 March
1986 that the directives and orders of the revolutionary government became
subject to a higher municipal law that, if contravened, rendered such
directives and orders void. The Provisional Constitution adopted verbatim the
Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.  The Provisional Constitution served as
[48]

a self-limitation by the revolutionary government to avoid abuses of the

absolute powers entrusted to it by the people.
During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed,
directives and orders issued by government officers were valid so long as
these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by the revolutionary
government. The directives and orders should not have also violated the
Covenant or the Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary government
presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary government did
not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper application,
specified the items to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with
respect to the items specifically described in the warrant.
However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in the
warrant. As admitted by petitioners witnesses, the raiding team confiscated
items not included in the warrant, thus:

Direct Examination of Capt. Rodolfo Sebastian

AJ AMORES

Q. According to the search warrant, you are supposed to seize only for weapons.
What else, aside from the weapons, were seized from the house of Miss
Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. The communications equipment, money in Philippine currency and US dollars,
some jewelries, land titles, sir.
Q. Now, the search warrant speaks only of weapons to be seized from the house
of Elizabeth Dimaano. Do you know the reason why your team also seized
other properties not mentioned in said search warrant?
A. During the conversation right after the conduct of said raid, I was informed that
the reason why they also brought the other items not included in the search
warrant was because the money and other jewelries were contained in
attach cases and cartons with markings Sony Trinitron, and I think three (3)
vaults or steel safes. Believing that the attach cases and the steel safes
 were containing firearms, they forced open these containers only to find out
that they contained money.

xxx

Q. You said you found money instead of weapons, do you know the reason why
your team seized this money instead of weapons?
A. I think the overall team leader and the other two officers assisting him decided
to bring along also the money because at that time it was already dark and
they felt most secured if they will bring that because they might be
suspected also of taking money out of those items, your Honor.[49]

Cross-examination
Atty. Banaag

Q. Were you present when the search warrant in connection with this case was
applied before the Municipal Trial Court of Batangas, Branch 1?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the search warrant applied for by you was for the search and seizure of
five (5) baby armalite rifles M-16 and five (5) boxes of ammunition?
A. Yes, sir.

xxx

AJ AMORES

Q. Before you applied for a search warrant, did you conduct surveillance in the
house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. The Intelligence Operatives conducted surveillance together with the MSU
elements, your Honor.
Q. And this party believed there were weapons deposited in the house of Miss
Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. Yes, your Honor.
Q. And they so swore before the Municipal Trial Judge?
A. Yes, your Honor.
Q. But they did not mention to you, the applicant for the search warrant, any other
properties or contraband which could be found in the residence of Miss
Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. They just gave us still unconfirmed report about some hidden items, for
instance, the communications equipment and money. However, I did not
include that in the application for search warrant considering that we have
not established concrete evidence about that. So when
Q. So that when you applied for search warrant, you had reason to believe that
only weapons were in the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. Yes, your Honor.[50]
xxx

Q. You stated that a .45 caliber pistol was seized along with one armalite rifle M-
16 and how many ammunition?
A. Forty, sir.
Q. And this became the subject of your complaint with the issuing Court, with the
fiscals office who charged Elizabeth Dimaano for Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunition?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know what happened to that case?
A. I think it was dismissed, sir.
Q. In the fiscals office?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Because the armalite rifle you seized, as well as the .45 caliber pistol had a
Memorandum Receipt in the name of Felino Melegrito, is that not correct?
A. I think that was the reason, sir.
Q. There were other articles seized which were not included in the search warrant,
like for instance, jewelries. Why did you seize the jewelries?
A. I think it was the decision of the overall team leader and his assistant to bring
along also the jewelries and other items, sir. I do not really know where it
was taken but they brought along also these articles. I do not really know
their reason for bringing the same, but I just learned that these were taken
because they might get lost if they will just leave this behind.

xxx

Q. How about the money seized by your raiding team, they were not also included
in the search warrant?
A. Yes sir, but I believe they were also taken considering that the money was
discovered to be contained in attach cases. These attach cases were
suspected to be containing pistols or other high powered firearms, but in the
course of the search the contents turned out to be money. So the team
leader also decided to take this considering that they believed that if they will
just leave the money behind, it might get lost also.
Q. That holds true also with respect to the other articles that were seized by your
raiding team, like Transfer Certificates of Title of lands?
A. Yes, sir. I think they were contained in one of the vaults that were opened.[51]

It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did
not include the monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles
that the raiding team confiscated.The search warrant did not particularly
describe these items and the raiding team confiscated them on its own
authority. The raiding team had no legal basis to seize these items without
showing that these items could be the subject of warrantless search and
seizure.  Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its authority when it seized these
[52]

items.
The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are
contraband per se,  and they are not, they must be returned to the person
[53]

from whom the raiding seized them. However, we do not declare that such
person is the lawful owner of these items, merely that the search and seizure
warrant could not be used as basis to seize and withhold these items from the
possessor. We thus hold that these items should be returned immediately to
Dimaano.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The questioned
Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March
1992 in Civil Case No. 0037, remanding the records of this case to the
Ombudsman for such appropriate action as the evidence may warrant, and
referring this case to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for
a determination of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

The PCGG cannot vote sequestered shares

to elect the ETPI Board of Directors or to
amend the Articles of Incorporation for the
purpose of increasing the authorized
capital stock unless there is a prima facie
evidence showing that said shares are ill-
gotten and there is an imminent danger of
dissipation.
Two sets of board and officers of Eastern
Telecommunications, Philippines, Inc.
(ETPI) were elected, one by the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
and the other by the registered ETPI
stockholders.Victor Africa, a stockholder of
ETPI filed a petition for Certiorari before
the Sandiganbayan alleging that the PCGG
had been “illegally exercising the rights of
stockholders of ETPI,” in the election of the
members of the board of directors. The
Sandiganbayan ruled that only the
registered owners, their duly authorized
representatives or their proxies may vote
their corresponding shares. The PCGG filed
a petition for certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition before the Court which was
granted. The Court referred the PCGG’s
petition to hold the special stockholders’
meeting to the Sandiganbayan for reception
of evidence and resolution. The
Sandiganbayan granted the PCGG
“authority to cause the holding of a special
stockholders’ meeting of ETPI and held that
there was an urgent necessity to increase
ETPI’s authorized capital stock; there
existed a prima facie factual foundation for
the issuance of the writ of sequestration
covering the Class “A” shares of stock; and
the PCGG was entitled to vote the
sequestered shares of stock. The PCGG-
controlled ETPI board of directors held a
meeting and the increase in ETPI’s
authorized capital stock from P250 Million
to P2.6 Billion was “unanimously
approved”. Africa filed a motion to nullify
the stockholders meeting, contending that
only the Court, and not the Sandiganbayan,
has the power to authorize the PCGG to call
a stockholders meeting and vote the
sequestered shares. The Sandiganbayan
denied the motions for reconsideration of
prompting Africa to file before the Court a
second petition, challenging the
Sandiganbayan Resolutions authorizing the
holding of a stockholders meeting and the
one denying the motion for reconsideration.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan
gravely abused its discretion in ordering the
holding of a stockholders meeting to elect
the ETPI board of directors without first
setting in place, through the amendment of
the articles of incorporation and the by-laws
of ETPI 2. Whether the PCGG can vote the
sequestered ETPI Class “A” shares in the
stockholders meeting for the election of the
board of directors.
HELD:
First Issue :
On the PCGG’s imputation of grave abuse of
discretion upon the Sandiganbayan for
ordering the holding of a stockholders
meeting to elect the ETPI board of directors
without first setting in place, through the
amendment of the articles of incorporation
and the by-laws of ETPI, the safeguards
prescribed in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Roxas. The
Court laid down those safeguards because
of the obvious need to reconcile the rights of
the stockholder whose shares have been
sequestered and the duty of the conservator
to preserve what could be ill-gotten wealth.
There is nothing in the Cojuangco case that
would suggest that the above measures
should be incorporated in the articles and
by-laws before a stockholders meeting for
the election of the board of directors is held.
The PCGG nonetheless insists that those
measures should be written in the articles
and by-laws before such meeting,
“otherwise, the {Marcos] cronies will elect
themselves or their representatives, control
the corporation, and for an appreciable
period of time, have every opportunity to
disburse funds, destroy or alter corporate
records, and dissipate assets.” That could be
a possibility, but the peculiar circumstances
of the case require that the election of the
board of directors first be held before the
articles of incorporation are amended.
Section 16 of the Corporation Code requires
the majority vote of the board of directors
to amend the articles of incorporation. At
the time Africa filed his motion for the
holding of the annual stockholders meeting,
there were two sets of ETPI directors, one
controlled by the PCGG and the other by
the registered stockholders. Which of them
is the legitimate board of directors? Which
of them may rightfully vote to amend the
articles of incorporation and integrate the
safeguards laid down in Cojuangco? It is
essential, therefore, to cure the aberration
of two boards of directors sitting in a single
corporation before the articles of
incorporation are amended to set in place
the Cojuangco safeguards. The danger of
the so-called Marcos cronies taking control
of the corporation and dissipating its assets
is, of course, a legitimate concern of the
PCGG, charged as it is with the duties of a
conservator. Nevertheless, such danger may
be averted by the “substantially
contemporaneous” amendment of the
articles after the election of the board.
Second Issue :
The principle laid down in Baseco vs. PCGG
was further enhanced in the subsequent
cases of Cojuangco v. Calpo and
Presidential Commission on Good
Government v. Cojuangco, Jr., where the
Court developed a “two-tiered” test in
determining whether the PCGG may vote
sequestered shares. The issue of whether
PCGG may vote the sequestered shares in
SMC necessitates a determination of at least
two factual matters: a.) whether there is
prima facie evidence showing that the said
shares are ill-gotten and thus belong to the
state; and b.) whether there is an immediate
danger of dissipation thus necessitating
their continued sequestration and voting by
the PCGG while the main issue pends with
the Sandiganbayan. The two-tiered test,
however, does not apply in cases involving
funds of “public character.” In such cases,
the government is granted the authority to
vote said shares, namely: (1) Where
government shares are taken over by
private persons or entities who/which
registered them in their own names, and (2)
Where the capitalization or shares that were
acquired with public funds somehow landed
in private hands. In short, when
sequestered shares registered in the names
of private individuals or entities are alleged
to have been acquired with ill-gotten
wealth, then the two-tiered test is applied.
However, when the sequestered shares in
the name of private individuals or entities
are shown, prima facie, to have been (1)
originally government shares, or (2)
purchased with public funds or those
affected with public interest, then the two-
tiered test does not apply. The rule in the
jurisdiction is, therefore, clear. The PCGG
cannot perform acts of strict ownership of
sequestered property. It is a mere
conservator. It may not vote the shares in a
corporation and elect members of the board
of directors. The only conceivable exception
is in a case of a takeover of a business
belonging to the government or whose
capitalization comes from public funds, but
which landed in private hands as in
BASECO. In short, the Sandiganbayan held
that the public character exception does not
apply, in which case it should have
proceeded to apply the two-tiered test. This
it failed to do. The questions thus remain if
there is prima facie evidence showing that
the subject shares are ill- gotten and if there
is imminent danger of dissipation. The
Court is not, however, a trier of facts, hence,
it is not in a position to rule on the
correctness of the PCGG’s contention.
Consequently, the issue must be remanded
to the Sandiganbayan for resolution.
G.R. No. 146710-15      March 2, 2001
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, 
vs.
ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as
Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES,
VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND
CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES
FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA,
DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., respondent.
----------------------------------------
G.R. No. 146738      March 2, 2001
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, 
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent.
PUNO, J.:
On the line in the cases at bar is the office of the
President. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada
alleges that he is the President on leave while
respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she
is the President. The warring personalities are
important enough but more transcendental are the
constitutional issues embedded on the parties'
dispute. While the significant issues are many, the
jugular issue involves the relationship between
the ruler and the ruled in a democracy, Philippine
style.
First, we take a view of the panorama of events
that precipitated the crisis in the office of the
President.
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph
Ejercito Estrada was elected President while
respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected
Vice-President. Some ten (10) million Filipinos
voted for the petitioner believing he would rescue
them from life's adversity. Both petitioner and the
respondent were to serve a six-year term
commencing on June 30, 1998.
From the beginning of his term, however,
petitioner was plagued by a plethora of problems
that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His
sharp descent from power started on October 4,
2000. Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson,
a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and
accused the petitioner, his family and friends of
receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.1
The exposẻ immediately ignited reactions of rage.
The next day, October 5, 2000, Senator Teofisto
Guingona, Jr., then the Senate Minority Leader,
took the floor and delivered a fiery privilege
speech entitled "I Accuse." He accused the
petitioner of receiving some P220 million
in jueteng money from Governor Singson from
November 1998 to August 2000. He also charged
that the petitioner took from Governor Singson
P70 million on excise tax on cigarettes intended
for Ilocos Sur. The privilege speech was referred
by then Senate President Franklin Drilon, to the
Blue Ribbon Committee (then headed by Senator
Aquilino Pimentel) and the Committee on Justice
(then headed by Senator Renato Cayetano) for
joint investigation.2
The House of Representatives did no less. The
House Committee on Public Order and Security,
then headed by Representative Roilo Golez,
decided to investigate the exposẻ of Governor
Singson. On the other hand, Representatives
Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and Michael
Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach the
petitioner.
Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the
air. On October 11, Archbishop Jaime Cardinal
Sin issued a pastoral statement in behalf of the
Presbyteral Council of the Archdiocese of Manila,
asking petitioner to step down from the
presidency as he had lost the moral authority to
govern.3 Two days later or on October 13, the
Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines
joined the cry for the resignation of the
petitioner.4 Four days later, or on October 17,
former President Corazon C. Aquino also
demanded that the petitioner take the "supreme
self-sacrifice" of resignation.5 Former President
Fidel Ramos also joined the chorus. Early on, or
on October 12, respondent Arroyo resigned as
Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare
and Services6 and later asked for petitioner's
resignation.7 However, petitioner strenuously held
on to his office and refused to resign.
The heat was on. On November 1, four (4) senior
economic advisers, members of the Council of
Senior Economic Advisers, resigned. They were
Jaime Augusto Zobel de Ayala, former Prime
Minister Cesar Virata, former Senator Vicente
Paterno and Washington Sycip.8 On November 2,
Secretary Mar Roxas II also resigned from the
Department of Trade and Industry.9 On November
3, Senate President Franklin Drilon, and House
Speaker Manuel Villar, together with some 47
representatives defected from the ruling coalition,
Lapian ng Masang Pilipino.10
The month of November ended with a big bang. In
a tumultuous session on November 13, House
Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of
Impeachment11 signed by 115 representatives, or
more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of
Representatives to the Senate. This caused
political convulsions in both houses of Congress.
Senator Drilon was replaced by Senator Pimentel
as Senate President. Speaker Villar was unseated
by Representative Fuentebella.12 On November
20, the Senate formally opened the impeachment
trial of the petitioner. Twenty-one (21) senators
took their oath as judges with Supreme Court
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding.13
The political temperature rose despite the cold
December. On December 7, the impeachment
trial started.14 The battle royale was fought by
some of the marquee names in the legal
profession. Standing as prosecutors were then
House Minority Floor Leader Feliciano Belmonte
and Representatives Joker Arroyo, Wigberto
Tañada, Sergio Apostol, Raul Gonzales, Oscar
Moreno, Salacnib Baterina, Roan Libarios, Oscar
Rodriguez, Clavel Martinez and Antonio Nachura.
They were assisted by a battery of private
prosecutors led by now Secretary of Justice
Hernando Perez and now Solicitor General
Simeon Marcelo. Serving as defense counsel
were former Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, former
Solicitor General and Secretary of Justice Estelito
P. Mendoza, former City Fiscal of Manila Jose
Flaminiano, former Deputy Speaker of the House
Raul Daza, Atty. Siegfried Fortun and his brother,
Atty. Raymund Fortun. The day to day trial was
covered by live TV and during its course enjoyed
the highest viewing rating. Its high and low points
were the constant conversational piece of the
chattering classes. The dramatic point of the
December hearings was the testimony of Clarissa
Ocampo, senior vice president of Equitable-PCI
Bank. She testified that she was one foot away
from petitioner Estrada when he affixed the
signature "Jose Velarde" on documents involving
a P500 million investment agreement with their
bank on February 4, 2000.15
After the testimony of Ocampo, the impeachment
trial was adjourned in the spirit of Christmas.
When it resumed on January 2, 2001, more
bombshells were exploded by the prosecution. On
January 11, Atty. Edgardo Espiritu who served as
petitioner's Secretary of Finance took the witness
stand. He alleged that the petitioner jointly owned
BW Resources Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan
who was facing charges of insider trading.16 Then
came the fateful day of January 16, when by a
vote of 11-1017 the senator-judges ruled against
the opening of the second envelope which
allegedly contained evidence showing that
petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank
account under the name "Jose Velarde." The
public and private prosecutors walked out in
protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel
resigned as Senate President.18 The ruling made
at 10:00 p.m. was met by a spontaneous outburst
of anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. By
midnight, thousands had assembled at the EDSA
Shrine and speeches full of sulphur were
delivered against the petitioner and the eleven
(11) senators.
On January 17, the public prosecutors submitted
a letter to Speaker Fuentebella tendering their
collective resignation. They also filed their
Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance with
the impeachment tribunal.19Senator Raul Roco
quickly moved for the indefinite postponement of
the impeachment proceedings until the House of
Representatives shall have resolved the issue of
resignation of the public prosecutors. Chief
Justice Davide granted the motion.20
January 18 saw the high velocity intensification of
the call for petitioner's resignation. A 10-kilometer
line of people holding lighted candles formed a
human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument
on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to the EDSA
Shrine to symbolize the people's solidarity in
demanding petitioner's resignation. Students and
teachers walked out of their classes in Metro
Manila to show their concordance. Speakers in
the continuing rallies at the EDSA Shrine, all
masters of the physics of persuasion, attracted
more and more people.21
On January 19, the fall from power of the
petitioner appeared inevitable. At 1:20 p.m., the
petitioner informed Executive Secretary Edgardo
Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had
defected. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner agreed to the
holding of a snap election for President where he
would not be a candidate. It did not diffuse the
growing crisis. At 3:00 p.m., Secretary of National
Defense Orlando Mercado and General Reyes,
together with the chiefs of all the armed services
went to the EDSA Shrine.22 In the presence of
former Presidents Aquino and Ramos and
hundreds of thousands of cheering
demonstrators, General Reyes declared that "on
behalf of Your Armed Forces, the 130,000 strong
members of the Armed Forces, we wish to
announce that we are withdrawing our support to
this government."23 A little later, PNP Chief,
Director General Panfilo Lacson and the major
service commanders gave a similar stunning
announcement.24 Some Cabinet secretaries,
undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, and
bureau chiefs quickly resigned from their
posts.25 Rallies for the resignation of the petitioner
exploded in various parts of the country. To stem
the tide of rage, petitioner announced he was
ordering his lawyers to agree to the opening of the
highly controversial second envelope.26There was
no turning back the tide. The tide had become a
tsunami.
January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. At
12:20 a.m., the first round of negotiations for the
peaceful and orderly transfer of power started at
Malacañang'' Mabini Hall, Office of the Executive
Secretary. Secretary Edgardo Angara, Senior
Deputy Executive Secretary Ramon Bagatsing,
Political Adviser Angelito Banayo, Asst. Secretary
Boying Remulla, and Atty. Macel Fernandez,
head of the Presidential Management Staff,
negotiated for the petitioner. Respondent Arroyo
was represented by now Executive Secretary
Renato de Villa, now Secretary of Finance Alberto
Romulo and now Secretary of Justice Hernando
Perez.27 Outside the palace, there was a brief
encounter at Mendiola between pro and anti-
Estrada protesters which resulted in stone-
throwing and caused minor injuries. The
negotiations consumed all morning until the news
broke out that Chief Justice Davide would
administer the oath to respondent Arroyo at high
noon at the EDSA Shrine.
At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide
administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as
President of the Philippines.28 At 2:30 p.m.,
petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacañang
Palace.29 He issued the following press
statement:30
"20 January 2001
STATEMENT FROM
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as
President of the Republic of the Philippines.
While along with many other legal minds of
our country, I have strong and serious doubts
about the legality and constitutionality of her
proclamation as President, I do not wish to be
a factor that will prevent the restoration of
unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave
Malacañang Palace, the seat of the
presidency of this country, for the sake of
peace and in order to begin the healing
process of our nation. I leave the Palace of
our people with gratitude for the opportunities
given to me for service to our people. I will not
shirk from any future challenges that may
come ahead in the same service of our
country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join
me in to promotion of a constructive national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and
beloved people.
 MABUHAY!
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"
It also appears that on the same day, January 20,
2001, he signed the following letter:31
"Sir:
By virtue of the provisions of Section 11,
Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby
transmitting this declaration that I am unable
to exercise the powers and duties of my office.
By operation of law and the Constitution, the
Vice-President shall be the Acting President.
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"
A copy of the letter was sent to former Speaker
Fuentebella at 8:30 a.m. on January 20.23 Another
copy was transmitted to Senate President
Pimentel on the same day although it was
received only at 9:00 p.m.33
On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath,
respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the
powers the duties of the Presidency. On the same
day, this Court issued the following Resolution in
Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05-SC, to wit:
 "A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC — In re: Request of
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to
Take her Oath of Office as President of the
Republic of the Philippines before the Chief
Justice — Acting on the urgent request of Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to be
sworn in as President of the Republic of the
Philippines, addressed to the Chief Justice
and confirmed by a letter to the Court, dated
January 20, 2001, which request was treated
as an administrative matter, the court Resolve
unanimously to confirm the authority given by
the twelve (12) members of the Court then
present to the Chief Justice on January 20,
2001 to administer the oath of office of Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as
President of the Philippines, at noon of
January 20, 2001. 1âwphi1.nêt

This resolution is without prejudice to the

disposition of any justiciable case that may be
filed by a proper party."
Respondent Arroyo appointed members of her
Cabinet as well as ambassadors and special
envoys.34 Recognition of respondent Arroyo's
government by foreign governments swiftly
followed. On January 23, in a reception or vin d'
honneur at Malacañang, led by the Dean of the
Diplomatic Corps, Papal Nuncio Antonio Franco,
more than a hundred foreign diplomats
recognized the government of respondent
Arroyo.35 US President George W. Bush gave the
respondent a telephone call from the White House
conveying US recognition of her government.36
On January 24, Representative Feliciano
Belmonte was elected new Speaker of the House
of Representatives.37The House then passed
Resolution No. 175 "expressing the full support of
the House of Representatives to the
administration of Her Excellency, Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the
Philippines."38 It also approved Resolution No. 176
"expressing the support of the House of
Representatives to the assumption into office by
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as
President of the Republic of the Philippines,
extending its congratulations and expressing its
support for her administration as a partner in the
attainment of the nation's goals under the
Constitution."39
On January 26, the respondent signed into law
the Solid Waste Management Act.40 A few days
later, she also signed into law the Political
Advertising ban and Fair Election Practices Act.41
On February 6, respondent Arroyo nominated
Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., as her Vice
President.42 The next day, February 7, the Senate
adopted Resolution No. 82 confirming the
nomination of Senator Guingona, Jr.43Senators
Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Juan Ponce Enrile,
and John Osmena voted "yes" with reservations,
citing as reason therefor the pending challenge on
the legitimacy of respondent Arroyo's presidency
before the Supreme Court. Senators Teresa
Aquino-Oreta and Robert Barbers were
absent.44 The House of Representatives also
approved Senator Guingona's nomination in
Resolution No. 178.45 Senator Guingona, Jr. took
his oath as Vice President two (2) days later.46
On February 7, the Senate passed Resolution No.
83 declaring that the impeachment court
is functus officio and has been
terminated.47 Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago
stated "for the record" that she voted against the
closure of the impeachment court on the grounds
that the Senate had failed to decide on the
impeachment case and that the resolution left
open the question of whether Estrada was still
qualified to run for another elective post.48
Meanwhile, in a survey conducted by Pulse Asia,
President Arroyo's public acceptance rating
jacked up from 16% on January 20, 2001 to 38%
on January 26, 2001.49 In another survey
conducted by the ABS-CBN/SWS from February
2-7, 2001, results showed that 61% of the
Filipinos nationwide accepted President Arroyo as
replacement of petitioner Estrada. The survey
also revealed that President Arroyo is accepted
by 60% in Metro Manila, by also 60% in the
balance of Luzon, by 71% in the Visayas, and
55% in Mindanao. Her trust rating increased to
52%. Her presidency is accepted by majorities in
all social classes: 58% in the ABC or middle-to-
upper classes, 64% in the D or mass class, and
54% among the E's or very poor class.50
After his fall from the pedestal of power, the
petitioner's legal problems appeared in clusters.
Several cases previously filed against him in the
Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.
These are: (1) OMB Case No. 0-00-1629, filed by
Ramon A. Gonzales on October 23, 2000 for
bribery and graft and corruption; (2) OMB Case
No. 0-00-1754 filed by the Volunteers Against
Crime and Corruption on November 17, 2000 for
plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery,
perjury, serious misconduct, violation of the Code
of Conduct for Government Employees, etc; (3)
OMB Case No. 0-00-1755 filed by the Graft Free
Philippines Foundation, Inc. on November 24,
2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption,
bribery, perjury, serious misconduct; (4) OMB
Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by Romeo Capulong, et
al., on November 28, 2000 for malversation of
public funds, illegal use of public funds and
property, plunder, etc.; (5) OMB Case No. 0-00-
1757 filed by Leonard de Vera, et al., on
November 28, 2000 for bribery, plunder, indirect
bribery, violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46,
and RA 7080; and (6) OMB Case No. 0-00-1758
filed by Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. on December 4,
2000 for plunder, graft and corruption.
A special panel of investigators was forthwith
created by the respondent Ombudsman to
investigate the charges against the petitioner. It is
chaired by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito
P. Gervasio with the following as members, viz:
Director Andrew Amuyutan, Prosecutor Pelayo
Apostol, Atty. Jose de Jesus and Atty. Emmanuel
Laureso. On January 22, the panel issued an
Order directing the petitioner to file his counter-
affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses as well
as other supporting documents in answer to the
aforementioned complaints against him.
Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On
February 5, petitioner filed with this Court GR No.
146710-15, a petition for prohibition with a prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to
enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from
"conducting any further proceedings in Case Nos.
OMB 0-00-1629, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1757 and
1758 or in any other criminal complaint that may
be filed in his office, until after the term of
petitioner as President is over and only if legally
warranted." Thru another counsel, petitioner, on
February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for Quo
Warranto. He prayed for judgment "confirming
petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent
President of the Republic of the Philippines
temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his
office, and declaring respondent to have taken her
oath as and to be holding the Office of the
President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to
the provisions of the Constitution." Acting on GR
Nos. 146710-15, the Court, on the same day,
February 6, required the respondents "to
comment thereon within a non-extendible period
expiring on 12 February 2001." On February 13,
the Court ordered the consolidation of GR Nos.
146710-15 and GR No. 146738 and the filing of
the respondents' comments "on or before 8:00
a.m. of February 15."
On February 15, the consolidated cases were
orally argued in a four-hour hearing. Before the
hearing, Chief Justice Davide, Jr.51 and Associate
Justice Artemio Panganiban52 recused themselves
on motion of petitioner's counsel, former Senator
Rene A. Saguisag. They debunked the charge of
counsel Saguisag that they have "compromised
themselves by indicating that they have thrown
their weight on one side" but nonetheless inhibited
themselves. Thereafter, the parties were given the
short period of five (5) days to file their
memoranda and two (2) days to submit their
simultaneous replies.
In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the
urgent motion for copies of resolution and press
statement for "Gag Order" on respondent
Ombudsman filed by counsel for petitioner in G.R.
No. 146738, the Court resolved:
"(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not
issue a resolution on January 20, 2001
declaring the office of the President vacant
and that neither did the Chief Justice issue a
press statement justifying the alleged
resolution;
(2) to order the parties and especially their
counsel who are officers of the Court under
pain of being cited for contempt to refrain from
making any comment or discussing in public
the merits of the cases at bar while they are
still pending decision by the Court, and
(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order
effective immediately enjoining the
respondent Ombudsman from resolving or
deciding the criminal cases pending
investigation in his office against petitioner,
Joseph E. Estrada and subject of the cases at
bar, it appearing from news reports that the
respondent Ombudsman may immediately
resolve the cases against petitioner Joseph E.
Estrada seven (7) days after the hearing held
 on February 15, 2001, which action will make
the cases at bar moot and academic."53
The parties filed their replies on February 24. On
this date, the cases at bar were deemed
submitted for decision.
The bedrock issues for resolution of this Court
are:
I
Whether the petitions present a justiciable
controversy.
II
Assuming that the petitions present a
justiciable controversy, whether petitioner
Estrada is a President on leave while
respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.
III
Whether conviction in the impeachment
proceedings is a condition precedent for the
criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada. In
the negative and on the assumption that
petitioner is still President, whether he is
immune from criminal prosecution.
 IV
Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada
should be enjoined on the ground of
prejudicial publicity.
We shall discuss the issues in seriatim.
I
Whether or not the cases
At bar involve a political question
Private respondents54 raise the threshold issue
that the cases at bar pose a political question, and
hence, are beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to
decide. They contend that shorn of its
embroideries, the cases at bar assail the
"legitimacy of the Arroyo administration." They
stress that respondent Arroyo ascended the
presidency through people power; that she has
already taken her oath as the 14th President of the
Republic; that she has exercised the powers of
the presidency and that she has been recognized
by foreign governments. They submit that these
realities on ground constitute the political thicket,
which the Court cannot enter.
We reject private respondents' submission. To be
sure, courts here and abroad, have tried to lift the
shroud on political question but its exact latitude
still splits the best of legal minds. Developed by
the courts in the 20th century, the political
question doctrine which rests on the principle of
separation of powers and on prudential
considerations, continue to be refined in the mills
of constitutional law.55 In the United States, the
most authoritative guidelines to determine
whether a question is political were spelled out by
Mr. Justice Brennan in the 1962 case or Baker v.
Carr,56 viz:
"x x x Prominent on the surface of any case
held to involve a political question is found a
textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it, or the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for
 unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on
question. Unless one of these formulations is
inextricable from the case at bar, there should
be no dismissal for non justiciability on the
ground of a political question's presence. The
doctrine of which we treat is one of 'political
questions', not of 'political cases'."
In the Philippine setting, this Court has been
continuously confronted with cases calling for a
firmer delineation of the inner and outer
perimeters of a political question.57 Our leading
case is Tanada v. Cuenco,58 where this Court,
through former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion,
held that political questions refer "to those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon
the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."
To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has
narrowed the reach of the political question
doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial
review of this court not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable but also to
determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of
government.59 Heretofore, the judiciary has
focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the
Constitution directed against the exercise of its
jurisdiction.60With the new provision, however,
courts are given a greater prerogative to
determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new
provision did not just grant the Court power of
doing nothing. In sync and symmetry with this
intent are other provisions of the 1987
Constitution trimming the so called political
thicket. Prominent of these provisions is section
18 of Article VII which empowers this Court in
limpid language to "x x x review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of
the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ (of
habeas corpus) or the extension thereof x x x."
Respondents rely on the case of Lawyers
League for a Better Philippines and/or Oliver
A. Lozano v. President Corazon C. Aquino, et
al.61 and related cases62 to support their thesis that
since the cases at bar involve the legitimacy of
the government of respondent Arroyo, ergo,
they present a political question. A more cerebral
reading of the cited cases will show that they are
inapplicable. In the cited cases, we held that the
government of former President Aquino was the
result of a successful revolution by the
sovereign people, albeit a peaceful one. No less
than the Freedom Constitution63 declared that
the Aquino government was installed through a
direct exercise of the power of the Filipino
people "in defiance of the provisions of the
1973 Constitution, as amended." In is familiar
learning that the legitimacy of a government sired
by a successful revolution by people power is
beyond judicial scrutiny for that government
automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop.
In checkered contrast, the government of
respondent Arroyo is not revolutionary in
character. The oath that she took at the EDSA
Shrine is the oath under the 1987
Constitution.64 In her oath, she categorically
swore to preserve and defend the 1987
Constitution. Indeed, she has stressed that she
is discharging the powers of the presidency under
the authority of the 1987 Constitution.
In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA
People Power I EDSA People Power II is
clear. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people
power of revolution which overthrew the whole
government. EDSA II is an exercise of people
power of freedom of speech and freedom of
assembly to petition the government for
redress of grievances which only affected the
office of the President. EDSA I is extra
constitutional and the legitimacy of the new
government that resulted from it cannot be the
subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra
constitutional and the resignation of the sitting
President that it caused and the succession of the
Vice President as President are subject to judicial
review. EDSA I presented a political question;
EDSA II involves legal questions. A brief
discourse on freedom of speech and of the
freedom of assembly to petition the government
for redress of grievance which are the cutting
edge of EDSA People Power II is not
inappropriate.
Freedom of speech and the right of assembly are
treasured by Filipinos. Denial of these rights was
one of the reasons of our 1898 revolution against
Spain. Our national hero, Jose P. Rizal, raised the
clarion call for the recognition of freedom of the
press of the Filipinos and included it as among
"the reforms sine quibus non."65 The Malolos
Constitution, which is the work of the
revolutionary Congress in 1898, provided in its Bill
of Rights that Filipinos shall not be deprived (1) of
the right to freely express his ideas or opinions,
orally or in writing, through the use of the press or
other similar means; (2) of the right of association
for purposes of human life and which are not
contrary to public means; and (3) of the right to
send petitions to the authorities, individually or
collectively." These fundamental rights were
preserved when the United States acquired
jurisdiction over the Philippines. In the
Instruction to the Second Philippine Commission
of April 7, 1900 issued by President McKinley, it is
specifically provided "that no law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or
of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble
and petition the Government for redress of
grievances." The guaranty was carried over in the
Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902
and the Jones Law, the Act of Congress of August
29, 1966.66
Thence on, the guaranty was set in stone in
our 1935 Constitution,67 and
the 197368 Constitution. These rights are now
safely ensconced in section 4, Article III of the
1987 Constitution, viz:
"Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the
freedom of speech, of expression, or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances."
The indispensability of the people's freedom of
speech and of assembly to democracy is now
self-evident. The reasons are well put by
Emerson: first, freedom of expression is essential
as a means of assuring individual fulfillment;
second, it is an essential process for advancing
knowledge and discovering truth; third, it is
essential to provide for participation in decision-
making by all members of society; and fourth, it is
a method of achieving a more adaptable and
hence, a more stable community of maintaining
the precarious balance between healthy cleavage
and necessary consensus."69 In this sense,
freedom of speech and of assembly provides
a framework in which the "conflict necessary
to the progress of a society can take place
without destroying the society."70In Hague v.
Committee for Industrial Organization,71 this
function of free speech and assembly was echoed
in the amicus curiae filed by the Bill of Rights
Committee of the American Bar Association which
emphasized that "the basis of the right of
assembly is the substitution of the expression of
opinion and belief by talk rather than force; and
this means talk for all and by all."72 In the
relatively recent case of Subayco v.
Sandiganbayan,73 this Court similar stressed that
"… it should be clear even to those with
intellectual deficits that when the sovereign
people assemble to petition for redress of
grievances, all should listen. For in a democracy,
it is the people who count; those who are deaf
to their grievances are ciphers."
Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and
not political questions. The principal issues for
resolution require the proper interpretation of
certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution,
notably section 1 of Article II,74 and section 875 of
Article VII, and the allocation of governmental
powers under section 1176 of Article VII. The
issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of
presidential immunity from suit. They also involve
the correct calibration of the right of petitioner
against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803
case of Marbury v. Madison,77 the doctrine has
been laid down that "it is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is . . ." Thus, respondent's in
vocation of the doctrine of political question is but
a foray in the dark.
II
Whether or not the petitioner
Resigned as President
We now slide to the second issue. None of the
parties considered this issue as posing a political
question. Indeed, it involves a legal question
whose factual ingredient is determinable from the
records of the case and by resort to judicial
notice. Petitioner denies he resigned as President
or that he suffers from a permanent disability.
Hence, he submits that the office of the President
was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took her
oath as President.
The issue brings under the microscope the
meaning of section 8, Article VII of the
Constitution which provides:
"Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent
disability, removal from office or resignation of
the President, the Vice President shall
become the President to serve the unexpired
term. In case of death, permanent disability,
removal from office, or resignation of both the
President and Vice President, the President of
the Senate or, in case of his inability, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
shall then act as President until the President
or Vice President shall have been elected and
qualified.
x x x."
The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned
as President or should be considered resigned as
of January 20, 2001 when respondent took her
oath as the 14th President of the Public.
Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It
is a factual question and its elements are beyond
quibble: there must be an intent to resign and
the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment.78 The validity of a resignation is
not government by any formal requirement as to
form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be
express. It can be implied. As long as the
resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner
did not write any formal letter of resignation before
he evacuated Malacañang Palace in the
afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-
taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently,
whether or not petitioner resigned has to be
determined from his act and omissions before,
during and after January 20, 2001 or by
the totality of prior, contemporaneous and
posterior facts and circumstantial evidence
bearing a material relevance on the issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner
resigned as President.
To appreciate the public pressure that led to the
resignation of the petitioner, it is important to
follow the succession of events after the exposẻ
of Governor Singson. The Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee investigated. The more detailed
revelations of petitioner's alleged misgovernance
in the Blue Ribbon investigation spiked the hate
against him. The Articles of Impeachment filed in
the House of Representatives which initially was
given a near cipher chance of succeeding
snowballed. In express speed, it gained the
signatures of 115 representatives or more than
1/3 of the House of Representatives. Soon,
petitioner's powerful political allies began
deserting him. Respondent Arroyo quit as
Secretary of Social Welfare. Senate President
Drilon and former Speaker Villar defected with 47
representatives in tow. Then, his respected senior
economic advisers resigned together with his
Secretary of Trade and Industry.
As the political isolation of the petitioner
worsened, the people's call for his resignation
intensified. The call reached a new crescendo
when the eleven (11) members of the
impeachment tribunal refused to open the second
envelope. It sent the people to paroxysms of
outrage. Before the night of January 16 was over,
the EDSA Shrine was swarming with people
crying for redress of their grievance. Their number
grew exponentially. Rallies and demonstration
quickly spread to the countryside like a brush fire.
As events approached January 20, we can have
an authoritative window on the state of mind of
the petitioner. The window is provided in the
"Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada," the diary
of Executive Secretary Angara serialized in
the Philippine Daily Inquirer.79 The Angara Diary
reveals that in the morning of January 19,
petitioner's loyal advisers were worried about the
swelling of the crowd at EDSA, hence, they
decided to create an ad hoc committee to handle
it. Their worry would worsen. At 1:20 p.m.,
petitioner pulled Secretary Angara into his small
office at the presidential residence and exclaimed:
"Ed, seryoso na ito. Kumalas na si Angelo
(Reyes) (Ed, this is serious. Angelo has
defected.)"80 An hour later or at 2:30 p.m., the
petitioner decided to call for a snap presidential
election and stressed he would not be a
candidate. The proposal for a snap election for
president in May where he would not be a
candidate is an indicium that petitioner had
intended to give up the presidency even at
that time. At 3:00 p.m., General Reyes joined the
sea of EDSA demonstrators demanding the
resignation of the petitioner and dramatically
announced the AFP's withdrawal of support from
the petitioner and their pledge of support to
respondent Arroyo. The seismic shift of support
left petitioner weak as a president. According to
Secretary Angara, he asked Senator Pimentel to
advise petitioner to consider the option
of "dignified exit or resignation."81 Petitioner
did not disagree but listened intently.82 The sky
was falling fast on the petitioner. At 9:30 p.m.,
Senator Pimentel repeated to the petitioner the
urgency of making a graceful and dignified exit.
He gave the proposal a sweetener by saying that
petitioner would be allowed to go abroad with
enough funds to support him and his
family.83 Significantly, the petitioner expressed
no objection to the suggestion for a graceful
and dignified exit but said he would never
leave the country.84 At 10:00 p.m., petitioner
revealed to Secretary Angara, "Ed, Angie (Reyes)
guaranteed that I would have five days to a week
in the palace."85 This is proof that petitioner had reconciled himself to the reality
that he had to resign. His mind was already concerned with the five-day grace period he could
stay in the palace. It was a matter of time.

The pressure continued piling up. By 11:00 p.m.,

former President Ramos called up Secretary
Angara and requested, "Ed, magtulungan tayo
para magkaroon tayo ng (let's cooperate to
ensure a) peaceful and orderly transfer of
power."86 There was no defiance to the request.
Secretary Angara readily agreed. Again, we note
that at this stage, the problem was already
about a peaceful and orderly transfer of
power. The resignation of the petitioner was
implied.
The first negotiation for a peaceful and orderly
transfer of power immediately started at 12:20
a.m. of January 20, that fateful Saturday.
The negotiation was limited to three (3) points:
(1) the transition period of five days after the
petitioner's resignation; (2) the guarantee of the
safety of the petitioner and his family, and (3) the
agreement to open the second envelope to
vindicate the name of the petitioner.87 Again, we
note that the resignation of petitioner was not
a disputed point. The petitioner cannot feign
ignorance of this fact. According to Secretary
Angara, at 2:30 a.m., he briefed the petitioner on
the three points and the following entry in
the Angara Diary shows the reaction of the
petitioner, viz:
"x x x
I explain what happened during the first round
of negotiations. The President immediately
 stresses that he just wants the five-day
period promised by Reyes, as well as to open
the second envelope to clear his name.
If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he
says, he will leave by Monday.
The President says. "Pagod na pagod na
ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit.
Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy,
intriga. (I am very tired. I don't want any
more of this – it's too painful. I'm tired of
the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.)
I just want to clear my name, then I will
go."88
Again, this is high grade evidence that the
petitioner has resigned. The intent to resign is
clear when he said "x x x Ayoko na masyado
nang masakit." "Ayoko na" are words of
resignation.
The second round of negotiation resumed at
7:30 a.m. According to the Angara Diary, the
following happened:
"Opposition's deal
7:30 a.m. – Rene arrives with Bert Romulo
and (Ms. Macapagal's spokesperson) Rene
Corona. For this round, I am accompanied by
Dondon Bagatsing and Macel.
Rene pulls out a document titled "Negotiating
Points." It reads:
'1. The President shall sign a resignation
document within the day, 20 January 2001,
that will be effective on Wednesday, 24
January 2001, on which day the Vice
President will assume the Presidency of the
Republic of the Philippines.
2. Beginning to day, 20 January 2001, the
transition process for the assumption of the
new administration shall commence, and
persons designated by the Vice President to
various positions and offices of the
government shall start their orientation
activities in coordination with the incumbent
officials concerned.
3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines and
the Philippine National Police shall function
under the Vice President as national military
and police authority effective immediately.
4. The Armed Forced of the Philippines,
through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the
security of the President and his family as
approved by the national military and police
authority (Vice President).
5. It is to be noted that the Senate will open
the second envelope in connection with the
alleged savings account of the President in
the Equitable PCI Bank in accordance with the
rules of the Senate, pursuant to the request to
the Senate President.
Our deal
We bring out, too, our discussion draft which
reads:
The undersigned parties, for and in behalf of
their respective principals, agree and
undertake as follows:
'1. A transition will occur and take place on
Wednesday, 24 January 2001, at which time
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada will turn
over the presidency to Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo.
'2. In return, President Estrada and his
families are guaranteed security and safety of
their person and property throughout their
natural lifetimes. Likewise, President Estrada
and his families are guarantee freedom from
persecution or retaliation from government
and the private sector throughout their natural
lifetimes.
This commitment shall be guaranteed by the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
through the Chief of Staff, as approved by the
national military and police authorities – Vice
President (Macapagal).
'3. Both parties shall endeavor to ensure that
the Senate sitting as an impeachment court
will authorize the opening of the second
envelope in the impeachment trial as proof
that the subject savings account does not
belong to President Estrada.
'4. During the five-day transition period
between 20 January 2001 and 24 January
2001 (the 'Transition Period"), the incoming
Cabinet members shall receive an appropriate
briefing from the outgoing Cabinet officials as
part of the orientation program.
 During the Transition Period, the AFP and the
Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function
Vice President (Macapagal) as national
military and police authorities.
Both parties hereto agree that the AFP chief
of staff and PNP director general shall obtain
all the necessary signatures as affixed to this
agreement and insure faithful implementation
and observance thereof.
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo shall
issue a public statement in the form and tenor
provided for in "Annex A" heretofore attached
to this agreement."89
The second round of negotiation cements the
reading that the petitioner has resigned. It will be
noted that during this second round of negotiation,
the resignation of the petitioner was again treated
as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that
time were the measures to be undertaken by the
parties during and after the transition period.
According to Secretary Angara, the draft
agreement, which was premised on the
resignation of the petitioner was further refined. It
was then, signed by their side and he was ready
to fax it to General Reyes and Senator Pimentel
to await the signature of the United Opposition.
However, the signing by the party of the
respondent Arroyo was aborted by her oath-
taking. The Angara diary narrates the fateful
events, viz;90
"xxx
11:00 a.m. – Between General Reyes and
myself, there is a firm agreement on the five
points to effect a peaceful transition. I can
hear the general clearing all these points with
a group he is with. I hear voices in the
background.
Agreement.
The agreement starts: 1. The President shall
resign today, 20 January 2001, which
resignation shall be effective on 24 January
2001, on which day the Vice President will
assume the presidency of the Republic of the
Philippines.
xxx
The rest of the agreement follows:
2. The transition process for the assumption of
the new administration shall commence on 20
January 2001, wherein persons designated by
the Vice President to various government
positions shall start orientation activities with
incumbent officials.
'3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines
through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the
safety and security of the President and his
families throughout their natural lifetimes as
approved by the national military and police
authority – Vice President.
'4. The AFP and the Philippine National Police
(PNP) shall function under the Vice President
as national military and police authorities.
'5. Both parties request the impeachment
court to open the second envelope in the
impeachment trial, the contents of which shall
be offered as proof that the subject savings
account does not belong to the President.
The Vice President shall issue a public
statement in the form and tenor provided for in
Annex "B" heretofore attached to this
agreement.
11:20 a.m. – I am all set to fax General Reyes
and Nene Pimentel our agreement, signed by
our side and awaiting the signature of the
United opposition.
And then it happens. General Reyes calls me
to say that the Supreme Court has decided
that Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is President and
will be sworn in at 12 noon.
'Bakit hindi naman kayo nakahintay? Paano
na ang agreement (why couldn't you wait?
What about the agreement)?' I asked.
Reyes answered: 'Wala na, sir (it's over, sir).'
I ask him: Di yung transition period, moot and
academic na?'
And General Reyes answers: ' Oo nga,
I delete na natin, sir (yes, we're deleting the
part).'
Contrary to subsequent reports, I do not react
and say that there was a double cross.
But I immediately instruct Macel to delete the
first provision on resignation since this matter
is already moot and academic. Within
moments, Macel erases the first provision and
faxes the documents, which have been signed
by myself, Dondon and Macel, to Nene
Pimentel and General Reyes.
I direct Demaree Ravel to rush the original
document to General Reyes for the signatures
of the other side, as it is important that the
provisions on security, at least, should be
respected.
I then advise the President that the Supreme
Court has ruled that Chief Justice Davide will
administer the oath to Gloria at 12 noon.
The President is too stunned for words:
Final meal
12 noon – Gloria takes her oath as president
of the Republic of the Philippines.
12:20 p.m. – The PSG distributes firearms to
some people inside the compound.
The president is having his final meal at the
presidential Residence with the few friends
and Cabinet members who have gathered.
By this time, demonstrators have already
broken down the first line of defense at
Mendiola. Only the PSG is there to protect the
Palace, since the police and military have
already withdrawn their support for the
President.
1 p.m. – The President's personal staff is
rushing to pack as many of the Estrada
family's personal possessions as they can.
During lunch, Ronnie Puno mentions that the
president needs to release a final statement
before leaving Malacañang.
The statement reads: At twelve o'clock noon
today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo took her oath as President of the
Republic of the Philippines. While along with
many other legal minds of our country, I have
strong and serious doubts about the legality
and constitutionality of her proclamation as
President, I do not wish to be a factor that will
prevent the restoration of unity and order in
our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave
Malacañang Palace, the seat of the
 presidency of this country, for the sake of
peace and in order to begin the healing
process of our nation. I leave the Palace of
our people with gratitude for the opportunities
given to me for service to our people. I will not
shirk from any future challenges that may
come ahead in the same service of our
country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join
me in the promotion of a constructive national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and our
beloved people.
MABUHAY!"'
It was curtain time for the petitioner.
In sum, we hold that the resignation of the
petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by
his leaving Malacañang. In the press release
containing his final statement, (1) he
acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent
as President of the Republic albeit with
reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized
he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the
presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to
begin the healing process of our nation. He did
not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind
inability and that he was going to re-assume the
presidency as soon as the disability disappears:
(3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for
the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he
was referring to the past opportunity given him to
serve the people as President (4) he assured that
he will not shirk from any future challenge that
may come ahead in the same service of our
country. Petitioner's reference is to a future
challenge after occupying the office of the
president which he has given up; and (5) he
called on his supporters to join him in the
promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be
attained if he did not give up the presidency. The
press release was petitioner's valedictory, his final
act of farewell. His presidency is now in the part
tense.
It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not
resign but only took a temporary leave dated
January 20, 2001 of the petitioner sent to Senate
President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella is
cited. Again, we refer to the said letter, viz:
"Sir.
By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article
VII of the Constitution, I am hereby
transmitting this declaration that I am unable
to exercise the powers and duties of my office.
By operation of law and the Constitution, the
Vice President shall be the Acting president.
(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada"
To say the least, the above letter is wrapped in
mystery.91 The pleadings filed by the petitioner in
the cases at bar did not discuss, may even
intimate, the circumstances that led to its
preparation. Neither did the counsel of the
petitioner reveal to the Court these circumstances
during the oral argument. It strikes the Court as
strange that the letter, despite its legal value, was
never referred to by the petitioner during the
week-long crisis. To be sure, there was not the
slightest hint of its existence when he issued his
final press release. It was all too easy for him to
tell the Filipino people in his press release that he
was temporarily unable to govern and that he was
leaving the reins of government to respondent
Arroyo for the time bearing. Under any
circumstance, however, the mysterious letter
cannot negate the resignation of the petitioner. If it
was prepared before the press release of the
petitioner clearly as a later act. If, however, it was
prepared after the press released, still, it
commands scant legal significance. Petitioner's
resignation from the presidency cannot be the
subject of a changing caprice nor of a whimsical
will especially if the resignation is the result of his
reputation by the people. There is another reason
why this Court cannot given any legal significance
to petitioner's letter and this shall be discussed in
issue number III of this Decision.
After petitioner contended that as a matter of fact
he did not resign, he also argues that he could not
resign as a matter of law. He relies on section 12
of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, which allegedly
prohibits his resignation, viz:
"Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to
resign or retire pending an investigation,
criminals or administrative, or pending a
prosecution against him, for any offense under
 this Act or under the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code on bribery."
A reading of the legislative history of RA No. 3019
will hardly provide any comfort to the petitioner.
RA No. 3019 originated form Senate Bill No. 293.
The original draft of the bill, when it was submitted
to the Senate, did not contain a provision similar
to section 12 of the law as it now stands.
However, in his sponsorship speech, Senator
Arturo Tolentino, the author of the bill, "reserved
to propose during the period of amendments the
inclusion of a provision to the effect that no public
official who is under prosecution for any act of
graft or corruption, or is under administrative
investigation, shall be allowed to voluntarily resign
or retire."92 During the period of amendments, the
following provision was inserted as section 15:
"Sec. 15. Termination of office – No public
official shall be allowed to resign or retire
pending an investigation, criminal or
administrative, or pending a prosecution
against him, for any offense under the Act or
under the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code on bribery.
 The separation or cessation of a public official
form office shall not be a bar to his
prosecution under this Act for an offense
committed during his incumbency."93
The bill was vetoed by then President Carlos P.
Garcia who questioned the legality of the second
paragraph of the provision and insisted that the
President's immunity should extend after his
tenure.
Senate Bill No. 571, which was substantially
similar Senate Bill No. 293, was thereafter
passed. Section 15 above became section 13
under the new bill, but the deliberations on this
particular provision mainly focused on the
immunity of the President, which was one of the
reasons for the veto of the original bill. There was
hardly any debate on the prohibition against the
resignation or retirement of a public official with
pending criminal and administrative cases against
him. Be that as it may, the intent of the law ought
to be obvious. It is to prevent the act of
resignation or retirement from being used by a
public official as a protective shield to stop the
investigation of a pending criminal or
administrative case against him and to prevent his
prosecution under the Anti-Graft Law or
prosecution for bribery under the Revised Penal
Code. To be sure, no person can be compelled to
render service for that would be a violation of his
constitutional right.94 A public official has the right
not to serve if he really wants to retire or resign.
Nevertheless, if at the time he resigns or retires, a
public official is facing administrative or criminal
investigation or prosecution, such resignation or
retirement will not cause the dismissal of the
criminal or administrative proceedings against
him. He cannot use his resignation or retirement
to avoid prosecution.
There is another reason why petitioner's
contention should be rejected. In the cases at bar,
the records show that when petitioner resigned on
January 20, 2001, the cases filed against him
before the Ombudsman were OMB Case Nos. 0-
00-1629, 0-00-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-1757 and 0-
00-1758. While these cases have been filed, the
respondent Ombudsman refrained from
conducting the preliminary investigation of the
petitioner for the reason that as the sitting
President then, petitioner was immune from suit.
Technically, the said cases cannot be considered
as pending for the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction
to act on them. Section 12 of RA No. 3019 cannot
therefore be invoked by the petitioner for it
contemplates of cases whose investigation or
prosecution do not suffer from any insuperable
legal obstacle like the immunity from suit of a
sitting President.
Petitioner contends that the impeachment
proceeding is an administrative investigation that,
under section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from
resigning. We hold otherwise. The exact nature of
an impeachment proceeding is debatable. But
even assuming arguendo that it is an
administrative proceeding, it can not be
considered pending at the time petitioner resigned
because the process already broke down when a
majority of the senator-judges voted against the
opening of the second envelope, the public and
private prosecutors walked out, the public
prosecutors filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal
of Appearance, and the proceedings were
postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no
impeachment case pending against petitioner
when he resigned.
III
 Whether or not the petitioner Is only
temporarily unable to Act as President.
We shall now tackle the contention of the
petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to
perform the powers and duties of the presidency,
and hence is a President on leave. As
aforestated, the inability claim is contained in the
January 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent on the
same day to Senate President Pimentel and
Speaker Fuentebella.
Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as
Vice President has no power to adjudge the
inability of the petitioner to discharge the powers
and duties of the presidency. His significant
submittal is that "Congress has the ultimate
authority under the Constitution to determine
whether the President is incapable of performing
his functions in the manner provided for in section
11 of article VII."95 This contention is
the centerpiece of petitioner's stance that he is
a President on leave and respondent Arroyo is
only an Acting President.
An examination of section 11, Article VII is in
order. It provides:
"SEC. 11. Whenever the President transmits
to the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives his
written declaration that he is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office,
and until he transmits to them a written
declaration to the contrary, such powers and
duties shall be discharged by the Vice-
President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the
Cabinet transmit to the President of the
Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives their written declaration that
the President is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, the Vice-
President shall immediately assume the
powers and duties of the office as Acting
President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to
the President of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives his
written declaration that no inability exists, he
shall reassume the powers and duties of his
office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the
Members of the Cabinet transmit within five
 days to the President of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives their
written declaration that the President is unable
to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, the Congress shall decide the issue.
For that purpose, the Congress shall convene,
if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours,
in accordance with its rules and without need
of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt
of the last written declaration, or, if not in
session, within twelve days after it is required
to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote
of both Houses, voting separately, that the
President is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office, the Vice-President
shall act as President; otherwise, the
President shall continue exercising the powers
and duties of his office."
That is the law. Now, the operative facts:
1.Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the
above letter claiming inability to the
Senate President and Speaker of the
House;
 2.Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo
took her oath of office as President on
January 20, 2001 at about 12:30 p.m.;
3.Despite receipt of the letter, the House of
Representatives passed on January 24,
2001 House Resolution No. 175;96
On the same date, the House of the
Representatives passed House Resolution No.
17697 which states:
"RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE
SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ASSUMPTION
INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS
CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING
ITS SUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION
AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF
THE NATION'S GOALS UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS, as a consequence of the people's
loss of confidence on the ability of former
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada to
effectively govern, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, the Philippine National Police and
majority of his cabinet had withdrawn support
from him;
WHEREAS, upon authority of an en
banc resolution of the Supreme Court, Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was
sworn in as President of the Philippines on 20
January 2001 before Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr.;
WHEREAS, immediately thereafter, members
of the international community had extended
their recognition to Her Excellency, Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the
Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo has espoused a policy of
national healing and reconciliation with justice
for the purpose of national unity and
development;
WHEREAS, it is axiomatic that the obligations
of the government cannot be achieved if it is
divided, thus by reason of the constitutional
duty of the House of Representatives as an
institution and that of the individual members
thereof of fealty to the supreme will of the
people, the House of Representatives must
ensure to the people a stable, continuing
government and therefore must remove all
obstacles to the attainment thereof;
WHEREAS, it is a concomitant duty of the
House of Representatives to exert all efforts to
unify the nation, to eliminate fractious tension,
to heal social and political wounds, and to be
an instrument of national reconciliation and
solidarity as it is a direct representative of the
various segments of the whole nation;
WHEREAS, without surrending its
independence, it is vital for the attainment of
all the foregoing, for the House of
Representatives to extend its support and
collaboration to the administration of Her
Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, and to be a constructive partner in
nation-building, the national interest
demanding no less: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives,
To express its support to the assumption into
office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo as President of the Republic of the
 Philippines, to extend its congratulations and
to express its support for her administration as
a partner in the attainment of the Nation's
goals under the Constitution.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
Speaker
This Resolution was adopted by the House of
Representatives on January 24, 2001.
(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary General"
On February 7, 2001, the House of the
Representatives passed House Resolution No.
17898 which states:
"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO'S
NOMINATION OF SENATOR TEOFISTO T.
GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, there is a vacancy in the Office of
the Vice President due to the assumption to
the Presidency of Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9, Article VII
of the Constitution, the President in the event
of such vacancy shall nominate a Vice
President from among the members of the
Senate and the House of Representatives
who shall assume office upon confirmation by
a majority vote of all members of both Houses
voting separately;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate
Minority Leader Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., to
the position of Vice President of the Republic
of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr.,
is a public servant endowed with integrity,
competence and courage; who has served the
Filipino people with dedicated responsibility
and patriotism;
WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.
possesses sterling qualities of true
statesmanship, having served the government
in various capacities, among others, as
Delegate to the Constitutional Convention,
Chairman of the Commission on Audit,
Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice,
Senator of the Philippines – qualities which
merit his nomination to the position of Vice
President of the Republic: Now, therefore, be
it
Resolved as it is hereby resolved by the
House of Representatives, That the House of
Representatives confirms the nomination of
Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as the Vice
President of the Republic of the Philippines.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
Speaker
This Resolution was adopted by the House of
Representatives on February 7, 2001.
(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary General"
(4) Also, despite receipt of petitioner's letter
claiming inability, some twelve (12) members
of the Senate signed the following:
 "RESOLUTION
WHEREAS, the recent transition in
government offers the nation an opportunity
for meaningful change and challenge;
WHEREAS, to attain desired changes and
overcome awesome challenges the nation
needs unity of purpose and resolve cohesive
resolute (sic) will;
WHEREAS, the Senate of the Philippines has
been the forum for vital legislative measures
in unity despite diversities in perspectives;
WHEREFORE, we recognize and express
support to the new government of President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and resolve to
discharge and overcome the nation's
challenges." 99
On February 7, the Senate also
passed Senate Resolution No. 82100 which
states:
"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT
GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO'S
NOMINATION OF SEM. TEOFISTO T.
GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, there is vacancy in the Office of
the Vice President due to the assumption to
the Presidency of Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9 Article VII
of the Constitution, the President in the event
of such vacancy shall nominate a Vice
President from among the members of the
Senate and the House of Representatives
who shall assume office upon confirmation by
a majority vote of all members of both Houses
voting separately;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate
Minority Leader Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. to
the position of Vice President of the Republic
of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. is
a public servant endowed with integrity,
competence and courage; who has served the
Filipino people with dedicated responsibility
and patriotism;
WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.
possesses sterling qualities of true
statemanship, having served the government
in various capacities, among others, as
Delegate to the Constitutional Convention,
Chairman of the Commission on Audit,
Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice,
Senator of the land - which qualities merit his
nomination to the position of Vice President of
the Republic: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, That the
Senate confirm the nomination of Sen.
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as Vice President of
the Republic of the Philippines.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR.
President of the Senate
This Resolution was adopted by the Senate
on February 7, 2001.
(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO
Secretary of the Senate"
On the same date, February 7,
the Senate likewise passed Senate
Resolution No. 83101 which states:
"RESOLUTION RECOGNIZING THAT THE
IMPEACHMENT COURT IS FUNCTUS
OFFICIO
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved. That the
Senate recognize that the Impeachment Court
is functus officioand has been terminated.
Resolved, further, That the Journals of the
Impeachment Court on Monday, January 15,
Tuesday, January 16 and Wednesday,
January 17, 2001 be considered approved.
Resolved, further, That the records of the
Impeachment Court including the "second
envelope" be transferred to the Archives of
the Senate for proper safekeeping and
preservation in accordance with the Rules of
the Senate. Disposition and retrieval thereof
shall be made only upon written approval of
the Senate president.
Resolved, finally. That all parties concerned
be furnished copies of this Resolution.
 Adopted,
(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.
President of the Senate
This Resolution was adopted by the Senate
on February 7, 2001.
(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO
Secretary of the Senate"
(5) On February 8, the Senate also
passed Resolution No. 84 "certifying to the
existence of vacancy in the Senate and calling on
the COMELEC to fill up such vacancy through
election to be held simultaneously with the regular
election on May 14, 2001 and the Senatorial
candidate garnering the thirteenth (13th) highest
number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired
term of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.'
(6) Both houses of Congress started
sending bills to be signed into law by
respondent Arroyo as President.
(7) Despite the lapse of time and still without any
functioning Cabinet, without any recognition from
any sector of government, and without any
support from the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and the Philippine National Police, the petitioner
continues to claim that his inability to govern is
only momentary.
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable
facts is that both houses of Congress have
recognized respondent Arroyo as the
President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is
the premise that the inability of petitioner
Estrada. Is no longer temporary. Congress has
clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability.
The question is whether this Court has
jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary
inability of petitioner Estrada and
thereafter revise the decision of both Houses
of Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as
president of the Philippines. Following Tañada v.
Cuenco,102 we hold that this Court cannot exercise
its judicial power or this is an issue "in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Legislative xxx branch of the
government." Or to use the language in Baker vs.
Carr,103 there is a "textually demonstrable or a lack
of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it." Clearly, the Court
cannot pass upon petitioner's claim of inability to
discharge the power and duties of the
presidency. The question is political in nature
and addressed solely to Congress by
constitutional fiat. It is a political issue, which
cannot be decided by this Court without
transgressing the principle of separation of
powers.
In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he
did not resign, still, he cannot successfully
claim that he is a President on leave on the
ground that he is merely unable to govern
temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest
by Congress and the decision that respondent
Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-
equal branch of government cannot be
reviewed by this Court.
IV
Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity
from suit.
Assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of
the immunity
Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first,
the cases filed against him before the respondent
Ombudsman should be prohibited because he
has not been convicted in the impeachment
proceedings against him; and second, he
enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether
criminal or civil.
Before resolving petitioner's contentions, a revisit
of our legal history executive immunity will be
most enlightening. The doctrine of executive
immunity in this jurisdiction emerged as a case
law. In the 1910 case of Forbes, etc. vs.
Chuoco Tiaco and Crosfield,104 the respondent
Tiaco, a Chinese citizen, sued petitioner W.
Cameron Forbes, Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands. J.E. Harding and C.R.
Trowbridge, Chief of Police and Chief of the
Secret Service of the City of Manila, respectively,
for damages for allegedly conspiring to deport him
to China. In granting a writ of prohibition, this
Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Johnson, held:
" The principle of nonliability, as herein
enunciated, does not mean that the judiciary
has no authority to touch the acts of the
Governor-General; that he may, under cover
of his office, do what he will, unimpeded and
unrestrained. Such a construction would mean
that tyranny, under the guise of the execution
of the law, could walk defiantly abroad,
destroying rights of person and of property,
wholly free from interference of courts or
legislatures. This does not mean, either that a
person injured by the executive authority by
an act unjustifiable under the law has n
remedy, but must submit in silence. On the
contrary, it means, simply, that the governors-
general, like the judges if the courts and the
members of the Legislature, may not be
personally mulcted in civil damages for the
consequences of an act executed in the
performance of his official duties. The judiciary
has full power to, and will, when the mater is
properly presented to it and the occasion
justly warrants it, declare an act of the
Governor-General illegal and void and place
as nearly as possible in status quo any person
who has been deprived his liberty or his
property by such act. This remedy is assured
to every person, however humble or of
whatever country, when his personal or
property rights have been invaded, even by
the highest authority of the state. The thing
which the judiciary can not do is mulct the
Governor-General personally in damages
which result from the performance of his
official duty, any more than it can a member of
the Philippine Commission of the Philippine
Assembly. Public policy forbids it.
Neither does this principle of nonliability mean
that the chief executive may not be personally
sued at all in relation to acts which he claims
to perform as such official. On the contrary, it
clearly appears from the discussion heretofore
had, particularly that portion which touched
the liability of judges and drew an analogy
between such liability and that of the
Governor-General, that the latter is liable
when he acts in a case so plainly outside of
his power and authority that he can not be
said to have exercised discretion in
determining whether or not he had the right to
act. What is held here is that he will be
protected from personal liability for damages
not only when he acts within his authority, but
also when he is without authority, provided he
actually used discretion and judgement, that
is, the judicial faculty, in determining whether
he had authority to act or not. In other words,
in determining the question of his authority. If
 he decide wrongly, he is still protected
provided the question of his authority was one
over which two men, reasonably qualified for
that position, might honestly differ; but he s
not protected if the lack of authority to act is
so plain that two such men could not honestly
differ over its determination. In such case, be
acts, not as Governor-General but as a private
individual, and as such must answer for the
consequences of his act."
Mr. Justice Johnson underscored the
consequences if the Chief Executive was not
granted immunity from suit, viz"xxx. Action upon
important matters of state delayed; the time and
substance of the chief executive spent in
wrangling litigation; disrespect engendered for the
person of one of the highest officials of the state
and for the office he occupies; a tendency to
unrest and disorder resulting in a way, in distrust
as to the integrity of government itself."105
Our 1935 Constitution took effect but it did not
contain any specific provision on executive
immunity. Then came the tumult of the martial law
years under the late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos and the 1973 Constitution was born. In
1981, it was amended and one of the
amendments involved executive immunity.
Section 17, Article VII stated:
"The President shall be immune from suit
during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit
whatsoever shall lie for official acts done by
him or by others pursuant to his specific
orders during his tenure.
The immunities herein provided shall apply to
the incumbent President referred to in Article
XVII of this Constitution.
In his second Vicente G. Sinco professional Chair
lecture entitled, "Presidential Immunity and All
The King's Men: The Law of Privilege As a
Defense To Actions For Damages,"106 petitioner's
learned counsel, former Dean of the UP College
of Law, Atty. Pacificao Agabin, brightened the
modifications effected by this constitutional
amendment on the existing law on executive
privilege. To quote his disquisition:
"In the Philippines, though, we sought to do
the Americans one better by enlarging and
fortifying the absolute immunity concept. First,
we extended it to shield the President not only
 form civil claims but also from criminal cases
and other claims. Second, we enlarged its
scope so that it would cover even acts of the
President outside the scope of official duties.
And third, we broadened its coverage so as to
include not only the President but also other
persons, be they government officials or
private individuals, who acted upon orders of
the President. It can be said that at that point
most of us were suffering from AIDS (or
absolute immunity defense syndrome)."
The Opposition in the then Batasan Pambansa
sought the repeal of this Marcosian concept of
executive immunity in the 1973 Constitution. The
move was led by them Member of Parliament,
now Secretary of Finance, Alberto Romulo, who
argued that the after incumbency immunity
granted to President Marcos violated the principle
that a public office is a public trust. He denounced
the immunity as a return to the anachronism "the
king can do no wrong."107 The effort failed.
The 1973 Constitution ceased to exist when
President Marcos was ousted from office by the
People Power revolution in 1986. When the 1987
Constitution was crafted, its framers did not
reenact the executive immunity provision of the
1973 Constitution. The following explanation was
given by delegate J. Bernas vis:108
"Mr. Suarez. Thank you.
The last question is with reference to the
Committee's omitting in the draft proposal the
immunity provision for the President. I agree
with Commissioner Nolledo that the
Committee did very well in striking out second
sentence, at the very least, of the original
provision on immunity from suit under the
1973 Constitution. But would the Committee
members not agree to a restoration of at least
the first sentence that the President shall be
immune from suit during his tenure,
considering that if we do not provide him that
kind of an immunity, he might be spending all
his time facing litigation's, as the President-in-
exile in Hawaii is now facing litigation's almost
daily?
Fr. Bernas. The reason for the omission is that
we consider it understood in present
jurisprudence that during his tenure he is
immune from suit.
 Mr. Suarez. So there is no need to express it
here.
Fr. Bernas. There is no need. It was that way
before. The only innovation made by the 1973
Constitution was to make that explicit and to
add other things.
Mr. Suarez. On that understanding, I will not
press for any more query, Madam President.
I think the Commissioner for the clarifications."
We shall now rule on the contentions of petitioner
in the light of this history. We reject his argument
that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that
he must first be convicted in the impeachment
proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner
Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the
prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss
of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001,
the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83
"Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is
Functus Officio."109 Since, the Impeachment Court
is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner
to demand that he should first be impeached and
then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The
plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against
his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to
commend itself for it will place him in a better
situation than a non-sitting President who has not
been subjected to impeachment proceedings and
yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To
be sure, the debates in the Constitutional
Commission make it clear that when
impeachment proceedings have become moot
due to the resignation of the President, the proper
criminal and civil cases may already be filed
against him, viz:110
"xxx
Mr. Aquino. On another point, if an
impeachment proceeding has been filed
against the President, for example, and the
President resigns before judgement of
conviction has been rendered by the
impeachment court or by the body, how does
it affect the impeachment proceeding? Will it
be necessarily dropped?
Mr. Romulo. If we decide the purpose of
impeachment to remove one from office, then
his resignation would render the case moot
and academic. However, as the provision
 says, the criminal and civil aspects of it may
continue in the ordinary courts."
This is in accord with our ruling In Re: Saturnino
Bermudez111 that 'incumbent Presidents are
immune from suit or from being brought to court
during the period of their incumbency and tenure"
but not beyond. Considering the peculiar
circumstance that the impeachment process
against the petitioner has been aborted and
thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner
Estrada cannot demand as a condition sine qua
non to his criminal prosecution before the
Ombudsman that he be convicted in the
impeachment proceedings. His reliance on the
case of Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan112 and related
cases113 are inapropos for they have a different
factual milieu.
We now come to the scope of immunity that can
be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting
President. The cases filed against petitioner
Estrada are criminal in character. They involve
plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no
stretch of the imagination can these crimes,
especially plunder which carries the death
penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of
immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner
cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the
President to commit criminal acts and wrapping
him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will
be anomalous to hold that immunity is an
inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and
conditions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public
officials are not acts of the State and the officer
who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands
in the same footing as any trespasser.114
Indeed, critical reading of current literature on
executive immunity will reveal a judicial
disinclination to expand the privilege especially
when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the
vindication of a right. In the 1974 case of US v.
Nixon,115 US President Richard Nixon, a sitting
President, was subpoenaed to produce certain
recordings and documents relating to his
conversations with aids and advisers. Seven
advisers of President Nixon's associates were
facing charges of conspiracy to obstruct Justice
and other offenses, which were committed in a
burglary of the Democratic National Headquarters
in Washington's Watergate Hotel during the 972
presidential campaign. President Nixon himself
was named an unindicted co-conspirator.
President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena on
the ground, among others, that the President was
not subject to judicial process and that he should
first be impeached and removed from office
before he could be made amenable to judicial
proceedings. The claim was rejected by the US
Supreme Court. It concluded that "when the
ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed
materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based
only on the generalized interest in confidentiality,
it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of
due process of law in the fair administration of
criminal justice." In the 1982 case of Nixon v.
Fitzgerald,116 the US Supreme Court further held
that the immunity of the president from civil
damages covers only "official acts." Recently, the
US Supreme Court had the occasion to reiterate
this doctrine in the case of Clinton v.
Jones117 where it held that the US President's
immunity from suits for money damages arising
out of their official acts is inapplicable to unofficial
conduct.
There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to
appeals to stretch the scope of executive
immunity in our jurisdiction. One of the great
themes of the 1987 Constitution is that a public
office is a public trust.118 It declared as a state
policy that "the State shall maintain honesty and
integrity in the public service and take positive
and effective measures against graft and
corruptio."119 it ordained that "public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives."120 It set the
rule that 'the right of the State to recover
properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or
employees, from them or from their nominees or
transferees, shall not be barred by prescription,
latches or estoppel."121 It maintained the
Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft court.122 It created
the office of the Ombudsman and endowed it with
enormous powers, among which is to "investigate
on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act
or omission of any public official, employee, office
or agency, when such act or omission appears to
be illegal, unjust improper or inefficient."123 The
Office of the Ombudsman was also given fiscal
autonomy.124 These constitutional policies will be
devalued if we sustain petitioner's claim that a
non-sitting president enjoys immunity from suit for
criminal acts committed during his incumbency.
 V
Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner
Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial
publicity
Petitioner also contends that the respondent
Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting
the investigation of the cases filed against him
due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his
guilt. He submits that the respondent
Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set file
the criminal cases violation of his right to due
process.
There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical
schools of thought on how to deal with the rain of
unrestrained publicity during the investigation and
trial of high profile cases.125 The British approach
the problem with the presumption that publicity
will prejudice a jury. Thus, English courts readily
stay and stop criminal trials when the right of an
accused to fair trial suffers a threat.126 The
American approach is different. US courts
assume a skeptical approach about the potential
effect of pervasive publicity on the right of an
accused to a fair trial. They have developed
different strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e.,
substantial; probability of irreparable harm, strong
likelihood, clear and present danger, etc.
This is not the first time the issue of trial by
publicity has been raised in this Court to stop the
trials or annul convictions in high profile criminal
cases.127 In People vs. Teehankee, Jr.,128 later
reiterated in the case of Larranaga vs. court of
Appeals, et al.,129 we laid down the doctrine that:
"We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he
was denied the right to impartial trial due to
prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and
broadcast media gave the case at bar
pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and
high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we
rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is
not incompatible to a free press. To be sure,
responsible reporting enhances accused's
right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a
responsible press has always been regarded
as the criminal field xxx. The press does not
simply publish information about trials but
guards against the miscarriage of justice by
subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial
processes to extensive public scrutiny and
criticism.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to
the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere
fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-
to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by
itself prove that the publicity so permeated the
mind of the trial judge and impaired his
impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal
the minds of members of the bench from pre-
trial and other off-court publicity of sensational
criminal cases. The state of the art of our
communication system brings news as they
happen straight to our breakfast tables and
right to our bedrooms. These news form part
of our everyday menu of the facts and fictions
of life. For another, our idea of a fair and
impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is
out of touch with the world. We have not
installed the jury system whose members are
overly protected from publicity lest they lose
there impartially. xxx xxx xxx. Our judges are
learned in the law and trained to disregard off-
court evidence and on-camera performances
of parties to litigation. Their mere exposure to
publications and publicity stunts does not per
se fatally infect their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility
of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due
to the barrage of publicity that characterized
the investigation and trial of the case. In
Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., we
rejected this standard of possibility of
prejudice and adopted the test of actual
prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding
of prejudicial publicity, there must be
allegation and proof that the judges have
been unduly influenced, not simply that they
might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the
case at a bar, the records do not show that
the trial judge developed actual bias against
appellants as a consequence of the extensive
media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his
case. The totality of circumstances of the case
does not prove that the trial judge acquired a
fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity,
which is incapable of change even by
evidence presented during the trial. Appellant
has the burden to prove this actual bias and
he has not discharged the burden.'
We expounded further on this doctrine in the
subsequent case of Webb vs. Hon. Raul de Leon,
etc.130 and its companion cases, viz:
"Again petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial
publicity on their right to due process while
undergoing preliminary investigation. We find
no procedural impediment to its early
invocation considering the substantial risk to
their liberty while undergoing a preliminary
investigation.
xxx
The democratic settings, media coverage of
trials of sensational cases cannot be avoided
and oftentimes, its excessiveness has been
aggravated by kinetic developments in the
telecommunications industry. For sure, few
cases can match the high volume and high
velocity of publicity that attended the
preliminary investigation of the case at bar.
Our daily diet of facts and fiction about the
case continues unabated even today.
Commentators still bombard the public with
views not too many of which are sober and
sublime. Indeed, even the principal actors in
the case – the NBI, the respondents, their
lawyers and their sympathizers have
participated in this media blitz. The possibility
of media abuses and their threat to a fair trial
notwithstanding, criminal trials cannot be
completely closed to the press and public. In
the seminal case of Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia, it was
xxx
a.The historical evidence of the evolution of
the criminal trial in Anglo-American justice
demonstrates conclusively that at the time
this Nation's organic laws were adopted,
criminal trials both here and in England
had long been presumptively open, thus
giving assurance that the proceedings
were conducted fairly to all concerned and
discouraging perjury, the misconduct of
participants, or decisions based on secret
bias or partiality. In addition, the significant
community therapeutic value of public
trials was recognized when a shocking
crime occurs a community reaction of
outrage and public protest often follows,
and thereafter the open processes of
justice serve an important prophylactic
 purpose, providing an outlet for
community concern, hostility and emotion.
To work effectively, it is important that
society's criminal process satisfy the
appearance of justice,' Offutt v. United
States, 348 US 11, 14, 99 L ED 11, 75 S
Ct 11, which can best be provided by
allowing people to observe such process.
From this unbroken, uncontradicted
history, supported by reasons as valid
today as in centuries past, it must be
concluded that a presumption of openness
inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial
under this Nation's system of justice, Cf.,
e,g., Levine v. United States, 362 US 610,
4 L Ed 2d 989, 80 S Ct 1038.
b.The freedoms of speech. Press and
assembly, expressly guaranteed by the
First Amendment, share a common core
purpose of assuring freedom of
communication on matters relating to the
functioning of government. In
guaranteeing freedom such as those of
speech and press, the First Amendment
can be read as protecting the right of
everyone to attend trials so as give
 meaning to those explicit guarantees; the
First Amendment right to receive
information and ideas means, in the
context of trials, that the guarantees of
speech and press, standing alone, prohibit
government from summarily closing
courtroom doors which had long been
open to the public at the time the First
Amendment was adopted. Moreover, the
right of assembly is also relevant, having
been regarded not only as an independent
right but also as a catalyst to augment the
free exercise of the other First
Amendment rights with which the
draftsmen deliberately linked it. A trial
courtroom is a public place where the
people generally and representatives of
the media have a right to be present, and
where their presence historically has been
thought to enhance the integrity and
quality of what takes place.
c.Even though the Constitution contains no
provision which be its terms guarantees to
the public the right to attend criminal trials,
various fundamental rights, not expressly
guaranteed, have been recognized as
 indispensable to the enjoyment of
enumerated rights. The right to attend
criminal trial is implicit in the guarantees of
the First Amendment: without the freedom
to attend such trials, which people have
exercised for centuries, important aspects
of freedom of speech and of the press be
eviscerated.
Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive
and prejudicial publicity under certain
circumstances can deprive an accused of his
due process right to fair trial. Thus,
in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al., we
held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial
publicity there must be allegation and
proof that the judges have been unduly
influenced, not simply that they might be, by
the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, we
find nothing in the records that will prove that
the tone and content of the publicity that
attended the investigation of petitioners fatally
infected the fairness and impartiality of the
DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the
subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of
fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are
basically unbeknown and beyond knowing. To
 be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of an
Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and Senior
State Prosecutors. Their long experience in
criminal investigation is a factor to consider in
determining whether they can easily be
blinded by the klieg lights of publicity. Indeed,
their 26-page Resolution carries no
indubitable indicia of bias for it does not
appear that they considered any extra-record
evidence except evidence properly adduced
by the parties. The length of time the
investigation was conducted despite its
summary nature and the generosity with
which they accommodated the discovery
motions of petitioners speak well of their
fairness. At no instance, we note, did
petitioners seek the disqualification of any
member of the DOJ Panel on the ground of
bias resulting from their bombardment of
prejudicial publicity." (emphasis supplied)
Applying the above ruling, we hold that there is
not enough evidence to warrant this Court to
enjoin the preliminary investigation of the
petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman.
Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile
headlines to discharge his burden of proof.131 He
needs to show more weighty social science
evidence to successfully prove the impaired
capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision.
Well to note, the cases against the petitioner
are still undergoing preliminary investigation by
a special panel of prosecutors in the office of the
respondent Ombudsman. No allegation
whatsoever has been made by the petitioner that
the minds of the members of this special panel
have already been infected by bias because of
the pervasive prejudicial publicity against him.
Indeed, the special panel has yet to come out with
its findings and the Court cannot second guess
whether its recommendation will be unfavorable to
the petitioner.
1âwphi1.nêt

The records show that petitioner has instead

charged respondent Ombudsman himself with
bias. To quote petitioner's submission, the
respondent Ombudsman "has been influenced by
the barrage of slanted news reports, and he has
buckled to the threats and pressures directed at
him by the mobs."132 News reports have also been
quoted to establish that the respondent
Ombudsman has already prejudged the cases of
the petitioner133 and it is postulated that the
prosecutors investigating the petitioner will be
influenced by this bias of their superior.
Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by the
petitioner is insubstantial. The accuracy of the
news reports referred to by the petitioner cannot
be the subject of judicial notice by this Court
especially in light of the denials of the respondent
Ombudsman as to his alleged prejudice and the
presumption of good faith and regularity in the
performance of official duty to which he is
entitled. Nor can we adopt the theory of
derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the
prejudice of respondent Ombudsman flows to
his subordinates. In truth, our Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, give investigation
prosecutors the independence to make their own
findings and recommendations albeit they are
reviewable by their superiors.134 They can be
reversed but they can not be compelled cases
which they believe deserve dismissal. In other
words, investigating prosecutors should not be
treated like unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if
the respondent Ombudsman resolves to file the
cases against the petitioner and the latter believes
that the findings of probable cause against him is
the result of bias, he still has the remedy of
assailing it before the proper court.
VI.
Epilogue
A word of caution to the "hooting throng." The
cases against the petitioner will now acquire a
different dimension and then move to a new stage
- - - the Office of the Ombudsman. Predictably,
the call from the majority for instant justice will hit
a higher decibel while the gnashing of teeth of the
minority will be more threatening. It is the sacred
duty of the respondent Ombudsman to balance
the right of the State to prosecute the guilty and
the right of an accused to a fair investigation and
trial which has been categorized as the "most
fundamental of all freedoms."135To be sure, the
duty of a prosecutor is more to do justice and less
to prosecute. His is the obligation to insure that
the preliminary investigation of the petitioner shall
have a circus-free atmosphere. He has to provide
the restraint against what Lord Bryce calls "the
impatient vehemence of the majority." Rights in a
democracy are not decided by the mob whose
judgment is dictated by rage and not by reason.
Nor are rights necessarily resolved by the power
of number for in a democracy, the dogmatism of
the majority is not and should never be the
definition of the rule of law. If democracy has
proved to be the best form of government, it is
because it has respected the right of the minority
to convince the majority that it is wrong. Tolerance
of multiformity of thoughts, however offensive they
may be, is the key to man's progress from the
cave to civilization. Let us not throw away that key
just to pander to some people's prejudice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions of Joseph
Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the de
jure 14th President of the Republic
are DISMISSED.
FACTS:
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings
involving bribe-taking, illegal gambling, and other forms of
corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada
was impeached by the Hor and, on December 7,
impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate during
which more serious allegations of graft and corruption
against Estrada  were made and were only stopped on
January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the
President, succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence
against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was
thrown into an uproar as the entire prosecution panel
walked out and Senate President Pimentel resigned after
casting his vote against Estrada.

On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their

support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.
Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held
concurrently with congressional and local elections on May
14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election. On
January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency was
vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively resigned his
post”. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the
presence of the crowd at EDSA as the 14th President.
Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace. Erap,
after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for
WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from
“conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against
him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for
judgment “confirming Estrada to be the lawful and
incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines
temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office.

ISSUE(S):
1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy.
2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.
3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.
4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.
 5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due
to prejudicial publicity.

RULING:

1. Political questions-  "to those questions which, under the

Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular
measure."
Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA
People Power II:
EDSA I EDSA II
exercise of people power of f
speech and freedom of assem
exercise of the people power of the government for redress of
revolution which overthrew the whole which only affected the office
government. President.
extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the intra constitutional and the r
new government that resulted from it cannot sitting President that it caused
be the subject of judicial review succession of the Vice Preside
are subject to judicial review.
presented a political question; involves legal questions.
The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The
principal issues for resolution require the proper
interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987
Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the
allocation of governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII.
The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of
presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the
correct calibration of the right of petitioner against
prejudicial publicity.

2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and

(b) acts of relinquishment. Both were present when
President Estrada left the Palace.
Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and
circumstantial evidence— bearing material relevant issues
—President Estrada is deemed to have resigned—
constructive resignation.
SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could
not be doubted as confirmed by his leaving Malacañan
Palace. In the press release containing his final statement:
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as
President;
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of
peace and in order to begin the healing process (he did not
say that he was leaving due to any kind of disability and
that he was going to reassume the Presidency as soon as the
disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the
opportunity to serve them as President (without doubt
referring to the past opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future
challenge that may come in the same service of the country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
Intent to resign—must be accompanied by act of
relinquishment—act or omission before, during and after
January 20, 2001.

3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176

expressly stating its support to Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as
President of the Republic of the Philippines and
subsequently passed H.R. 178 confirms the nomination of
Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As Vice President. Senate passed
HR No. 83 declaring the Impeachment Courts as Functius
Officio and has been terminated. It is clear is that both
houses of Congress recognized Arroyo as the President.
Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the
inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as the Congress
has clearly rejected his claim of inability.
The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for
this is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress
by constitutional fiat.  In fine, even if Estrada can prove
that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim
that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is
merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been
laid to rest by Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the
de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of
government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character.
They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By
no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially
plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the
alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. He
cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the
President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with
post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that
unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State
and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but
stands in the same footing as any trespasser.

5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the
free press are incompatible. Also, since our justice system
does not use the jury system, the judge, who is a learned
and legally enlightened individual, cannot be easily
manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said that
Estrada did not present enough evidence to show that the
publicity given the trial has influenced the judge so as to
render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said
that the cases against Estrada were still undergoing
preliminary investigation, so the publicity of the case
would really have no permanent effect on the judge and
that the prosecutor should be more concerned with justice
and less with prosecution.
Categories: Constitutional Law 1, Estrada vs Arroyo Case
Digest, Estrada vs Desierto Case Digest
G.R No. 187167               August 16, 2011

PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, AKBAYAN PARTY-LIST REP. RISA

HONTIVEROS, PROF. HARRY C. ROQUE, JR., AND UNIVERSITY OF THE
PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW STUDENTS, ALITHEA BARBARA ACAS,
VOLTAIRE ALFERES, CZARINA MAY ALTEZ, FRANCIS ALVIN ASILO,
SHERYL BALOT, RUBY AMOR BARRACA, JOSE JAVIER BAUTISTA,
ROMINA BERNARDO, VALERIE PAGASA BUENAVENTURA, EDAN MARRI
CAÑETE, VANN ALLEN DELA CRUZ, RENE DELORINO, PAULYN MAY
DUMAN, SHARON ESCOTO, RODRIGO FAJARDO III, GIRLIE FERRER,
RAOULLE OSEN FERRER, CARLA REGINA GREPO, ANNA MARIE CECILIA
GO, IRISH KAY KALAW, MARY ANN JOY LEE, MARIA LUISA
MANALAYSAY, MIGUEL RAFAEL MUSNGI, MICHAEL OCAMPO, JAKLYN
HANNA PINEDA, WILLIAM RAGAMAT, MARICAR RAMOS, ENRIK FORT
REVILLAS, JAMES MARK TERRY RIDON, JOHANN FRANTZ RIVERA IV,
CHRISTIAN RIVERO, DIANNE MARIE ROA, NICHOLAS SANTIZO, MELISSA
CHRISTINA SANTOS, CRISTINE MAE TABING, VANESSA ANNE TORNO,
MARIA ESTER VANGUARDIA, and MARCELINO VELOSO III, Petitioners, 
vs.
HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HON. ROLANDO ANDAYA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, HON. DIONY VENTURA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATIONAL MAPPING & RESOURCE
INFORMATION AUTHORITY, and HON. HILARIO DAVIDE, JR., IN HIS
CAPACITY AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE UNITED NATIONS,Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 95221(RA 9522) adjusting the country’s
archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories.

The Antecedents

In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046)2 demarcating the
maritime baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic State.3 This law followed
the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in
1958 (UNCLOS I),4 codifying, among others, the sovereign right of States parties
over their "territorial sea," the breadth of which, however, was left undetermined.
Attempts to fill this void during the second round of negotiations in Geneva in
1960 (UNCLOS II) proved futile. Thus, domestically, RA 3046 remained
unchanged for nearly five decades, save for legislation passed in 1968 (Republic
Act No. 5446 [RA 5446]) correcting typographical errors and reserving the
drawing of baselines around Sabah in North Borneo.

In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute

now under scrutiny. The change was prompted by the need to make RA 3046
compliant with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS III),5 which the Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984.6 Among
others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of
baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines7 and sets the deadline for the
filing of application for the extended continental shelf.8 Complying with these
requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some
basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories,
namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as
"regimes of islands" whose islands generate their own applicable maritime
zones.

Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective

capacities as "citizens, taxpayers or x x x legislators,"9 as the case may be, assail
the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522
reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine
state’s sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987
Constitution,10 embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris11 and ancillary
treaties,12 and (2) RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines
to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine
sovereignty and national security, contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy,
and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional
provisions.13

In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522’s treatment of the KIG as "regime of

islands" not only results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices
the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.14 To buttress their argument of territorial
diminution, petitioners facially attack RA 9522 for what it excluded and included –
its failure to reference either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS
III’s framework of regime of islands to determine the maritime zones of the KIG
and the Scarborough Shoal.
Commenting on the petition, respondent officials raised threshold issues
questioning (1) the petition’s compliance with the case or controversy
requirement for judicial review grounded on petitioners’ alleged lack of locus
standi and (2) the propriety of the writs of certiorari and prohibition to assail the
constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, respondents defended RA 9522 as
the country’s compliance with the terms of UNCLOS III, preserving Philippine
territory over the KIG or Scarborough Shoal. Respondents add that RA 9522
does not undermine the country’s security, environment and economic interests
or relinquish the Philippines’ claim over Sabah.

Respondents also question the normative force, under international law, of

petitioners’ assertion that what Spain ceded to the United States under the
Treaty of Paris were the islands and all the waters found within the boundaries of
the rectangular area drawn under the Treaty of Paris.

We left unacted petitioners’ prayer for an injunctive writ.

The Issues

The petition raises the following issues:

1. Preliminarily –

1. Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit; and

2. Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper

remedies to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522.

2. On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.

The Ruling of the Court

On the threshold issues, we hold that (1) petitioners possess locus standi to bring
this suit as citizens and (2) the writs of certiorari and prohibition are proper
remedies to test the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, we find no basis
to declare RA 9522 unconstitutional.

On the Threshold Issues

Petitioners Possess Locus
Standi as Citizens

Petitioners themselves undermine their assertion of locus standi as legislators

and taxpayers because the petition alleges neither infringement of legislative
prerogative15 nor misuse of public funds,16 occasioned by the passage and
implementation of RA 9522. Nonetheless, we recognize petitioners’ locus
standi as citizens with constitutionally sufficient interest in the resolution of the
merits of the case which undoubtedly raises issues of national significance
necessitating urgent resolution. Indeed, owing to the peculiar nature of RA 9522,
it is understandably difficult to find other litigants possessing "a more direct and
specific interest" to bring the suit, thus satisfying one of the requirements for
granting citizenship standing.17

The Writs of Certiorari and Prohibition

Are Proper Remedies to Test
the Constitutionality of Statutes

In praying for the dismissal of the petition on preliminary grounds, respondents

seek a strict observance of the offices of the writs of certiorari and prohibition,
noting that the writs cannot issue absent any showing of grave abuse of
discretion in the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial powers on the
part of respondents and resulting prejudice on the part of petitioners.18

Respondents’ submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings. When this

Court exercises its constitutional power of judicial review, however, we have, by
tradition, viewed the writs of certiorari and prohibition as proper remedial vehicles
to test the constitutionality of statutes,19 and indeed, of acts of other branches of
government.20 Issues of constitutional import are sometimes crafted out of
statutes which, while having no bearing on the personal interests of the
petitioners, carry such relevance in the life of this nation that the Court inevitably
finds itself constrained to take cognizance of the case and pass upon the issues
raised, non-compliance with the letter of procedural rules notwithstanding. The
statute sought to be reviewed here is one such law.

RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional

RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool
to Demarcate the Country’s
Maritime Zones and Continental
Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to
Delineate Philippine Territory

Petitioners submit that RA 9522 "dismembers a large portion of the national

territory"21 because it discards the pre-UNCLOS III demarcation of Philippine
territory under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties, successively encoded in
the definition of national territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
Petitioners theorize that this constitutional definition trumps any treaty or
statutory provision denying the Philippines sovereign control over waters, beyond
the territorial sea recognized at the time of the Treaty of Paris, that Spain
supposedly ceded to the United States. Petitioners argue that from the Treaty of
Paris’ technical description, Philippine sovereignty over territorial waters extends
hundreds of nautical miles around the Philippine archipelago, embracing the
rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris.22

Petitioners’ theory fails to persuade us.

UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a
multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones
(i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone
[24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical
miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III
delimits.23 UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among
United Nations members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the
world’s oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic
States’ graduated authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands
along their coasts.

On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III
States parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from which
baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting
points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. Article
48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer:

Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous

zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf. – The breadth of
the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the
continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic baselines drawn in
accordance with article 47. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III
States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and
continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international
community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which
States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty
over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal,
immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right
to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone
(Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).

Even under petitioners’ theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands
and all the waters within the rectangular area delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the
baselines of the Philippines would still have to be drawn in accordance with RA
9522 because this is the only way to draw the baselines in conformity with
UNCLOS III. The baselines cannot be drawn from the boundaries or other
portions of the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris, but from the
"outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago."24

UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition,
enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional
international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through
occupation, accretion, cession and prescription,25 not by executing multilateral
treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with
the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial
claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the
rules on general international law.26

RA 9522’s Use of the Framework

of Regime of Islands to Determine the
Maritime Zones of the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal, not Inconsistent
with the Philippines’ Claim of Sovereignty
Over these Areas

Petitioners next submit that RA 9522’s use of UNCLOS III’s regime of islands
framework to draw the baselines, and to measure the breadth of the applicable
maritime zones of the KIG, "weakens our territorial claim" over that
area.27Petitioners add that the KIG’s (and Scarborough Shoal’s) exclusion from
the Philippine archipelagic baselines results in the loss of "about 15,000 square
nautical miles of territorial waters," prejudicing the livelihood of subsistence
fishermen.28 A comparison of the configuration of the baselines drawn under RA
3046 and RA 9522 and the extent of maritime space encompassed by each law,
coupled with a reading of the text of RA 9522 and its congressional
deliberations, vis-à-vis the Philippines’ obligations under UNCLOS III, belie this
view.1avvphi1

The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows
that RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046, save for at
least nine basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the location of basepoints
and adjust the length of one baseline (and thus comply with UNCLOS III’s
limitation on the maximum length of baselines). Under RA 3046, as under RA
9522, the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal lie outside of the baselines drawn
around the Philippine archipelago. This undeniable cartographic fact takes the
wind out of petitioners’ argument branding RA 9522 as a statutory renunciation of
the Philippines’ claim over the KIG, assuming that baselines are relevant for this
purpose.
Petitioners’ assertion of loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial
waters" under RA 9522 is similarly unfounded both in fact and law. On the
contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of basepoints, increased the
Philippines’ total maritime space (covering its internal waters, territorial sea and
exclusive economic zone) by 145,216 square nautical miles, as shown in the
table below:29

Extent of
maritime area Extent of
using RA 3046, maritime area
as amended, using RA 9522,
  taking into taking into
account the account
Treaty of Paris’ UNCLOS III (in
delimitation (in square nautical
square nautical miles)
miles)
Internal or
archipelagic
waters 166,858 171,435

Territorial Sea 274,136 32,106

Exclusive
Economic
Zone   382,669

TOTAL 440,994 586,210

Thus, as the map below shows, the reach of the exclusive economic zone drawn
under RA 9522 even extends way beyond the waters covered by the rectangular
demarcation under the Treaty of Paris. Of course, where there are overlapping
exclusive economic zones of opposite or adjacent States, there will have to be a
delineation of maritime boundaries in accordance with UNCLOS III.30
Further, petitioners’ argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory
because the baselines that RA 9522 draws do not enclose the KIG is negated by
RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text the Philippines’ continued
claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal:

SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines

likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as
"Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article
121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):

a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree

No. 1596 and
 b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. (Emphasis
supplied)

Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part
of the Philippine archipelago, adverse legal effects would have ensued. The
Philippines would have committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III.
First, Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that "[t]he drawing of such baselines
shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the
archipelago." Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that "the length of
the baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles," save for three per cent (3%)
of the total number of baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical miles.31

Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG32 and
the Scarborough Shoal for several decades, these outlying areas are located at
an appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine
archipelago,33 such that any straight baseline loped around them from the nearest
basepoint will inevitably "depart to an appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago."

The principal sponsor of RA 9522 in the Senate, Senator Miriam Defensor-

Santiago, took pains to emphasize the foregoing during the Senate deliberations:

What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or what the rest of the world call[] the
Spratlys and the Scarborough Shoal are outside our archipelagic baseline
because if we put them inside our baselines we might be accused of violating the
provision of international law which states: "The drawing of such baseline shall
not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the
archipelago." So sa loob ng ating baseline, dapat magkalapit ang mga islands.
Dahil malayo ang Scarborough Shoal, hindi natin masasabing malapit sila sa atin
although we are still allowed by international law to claim them as our own.

This is called contested islands outside our configuration. We see that our
archipelago is defined by the orange line which [we] call[] archipelagic baseline.
Ngayon, tingnan ninyo ang maliit na circle doon sa itaas, that is Scarborough
Shoal, itong malaking circle sa ibaba, that is Kalayaan Group or the
Spratlys. Malayo na sila sa ating archipelago kaya kung ilihis pa natin ang dating
archipelagic baselines para lamang masama itong dalawang circles, hindi na sila
magkalapit at baka hindi na tatanggapin ng United Nations because of the rule
that it should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.34 (Emphasis
supplied)

Similarly, the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew exceeded UNCLOS III’s
limits.  The need to shorten this baseline, and in addition, to optimize the location
1avvphi1
of basepoints using current maps, became imperative as discussed by
respondents:

[T]he amendment of the baselines law was necessary to enable the Philippines
to draw the outer limits of its maritime zones including the extended continental
shelf in the manner provided by Article 47 of [UNCLOS III]. As defined by R.A.
3046, as amended by R.A. 5446, the baselines suffer from some technical
deficiencies, to wit:

1. The length of the baseline across Moro Gulf (from Middle of 3 Rock
Awash to Tongquil Point) is 140.06 nautical miles x x x. This exceeds the
maximum length allowed under Article 47(2) of the [UNCLOS III], which
states that "The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical
miles, except that up to 3 per cent of the total number of baselines
enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum
length of 125 nautical miles."

2. The selection of basepoints is not optimal. At least 9 basepoints can be

skipped or deleted from the baselines system. This will enclose an
additional 2,195 nautical miles of water.

3. Finally, the basepoints were drawn from maps existing in 1968, and not
established by geodetic survey methods. Accordingly, some of the points,
particularly along the west coasts of Luzon down to Palawan were later
found to be located either inland or on water, not on low-water line and
drying reefs as prescribed by Article 47.35

Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines’ claim over the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal, Congress’ decision to classify the KIG and the Scarborough
Shoal as "‘Regime[s] of Islands’ under the Republic of the Philippines consistent
with Article 121"36 of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine State’s responsible
observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under
Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any "naturally formed area of land, surrounded by
water, which is above water at high tide," such as portions of the KIG, qualifies
under the category of "regime of islands," whose islands generate their own
applicable maritime zones.37

Statutory Claim Over Sabah under

RA 5446 Retained

Petitioners’ argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its failure to textualize the
Philippines’ claim over Sabah in North Borneo is also untenable. Section 2 of RA
5446, which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps open the door for drawing the
baselines of Sabah:

Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine
Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of
the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in
North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired
dominion and sovereignty. (Emphasis supplied)

UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not

Incompatible with the Constitution’s
Delineation of Internal Waters

As their final argument against the validity of RA 9522, petitioners contend that
the law unconstitutionally "converts" internal waters into archipelagic waters,
hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage
under UNCLOS III, including overflight. Petitioners extrapolate that these
passage rights indubitably expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and
maritime pollution hazards, in violation of the Constitution.38

Whether referred to as Philippine "internal waters" under Article I of the

Constitution39 or as "archipelagic waters" under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the
Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the
baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath.
UNCLOS III affirms this:

Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space over archipelagic
waters and of their bed and subsoil. –

1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters

enclosed by the archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article
47, described as archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth or distance
from the coast.

2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic

waters, as well as to their bed and subsoil, and the resources
contained therein.

xxxx

4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this

Part shall not in other respects affect the status of the archipelagic
waters, including the sea lanes, or the exercise by the archipelagic
 State of its sovereignty over such waters and their air space, bed and
subsoil, and the resources contained therein. (Emphasis supplied)

The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal
and international law norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to
necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded,
expeditious international navigation, consistent with the international law principle
of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political branches of the
Philippine government, in the competent discharge of their constitutional powers,
may pass legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate
innocent and sea lanes passage.40 Indeed, bills drawing nautical highways for
sea lanes passage are now pending in Congress.41

In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in

UNCLOS III, operate to grant innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or
archipelagic waters, subject to the treaty’s limitations and conditions for their
exercise.42 Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a customary
international law,43 thus automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine
law.44 No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid
innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international
law without risking retaliatory measures from the international community.

The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both
the right of innocent passage and sea lanes passage45 does not place them in
lesser footing vis-à-vis continental coastal States which are subject, in their
territorial sea, to the right of innocent passage and the right of transit passage
through international straits. The imposition of these passage rights through
archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic States,
in exchange for their right to claim all the waters landward of their
baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as archipelagic
waters subject to their territorial sovereignty. More importantly, the recognition of
archipelagic States’ archipelago and the waters enclosed by their baselines as
one cohesive entity prevents the treatment of their islands as separate islands
under UNCLOS III.46 Separate islands generate their own maritime zones,
placing the waters between islands separated by more than 24 nautical miles
beyond the States’ territorial sovereignty, subjecting these waters to the rights of
other States under UNCLOS III.47

Petitioners’ invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in Article II

(Declaration of Principles and State Policies)48 must also fail. Our present state of
jurisprudence considers the provisions in Article II as mere legislative guides,
which, absent enabling legislation, "do not embody judicially enforceable
constitutional rights x x x."49 Article II provisions serve as guides in formulating
and interpreting implementing legislation, as well as in interpreting executory
provisions of the Constitution. Although Oposa v. Factoran50 treated the right to a
healthful and balanced ecology under Section 16 of Article II as an exception, the
present petition lacks factual basis to substantiate the claimed constitutional
violation. The other provisions petitioners cite, relating to the protection of marine
wealth (Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 251 ) and subsistence fishermen (Article
XIII, Section 752 ), are not violated by RA 9522.

In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its
exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all
living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a maritime delineation
binds the international community since the delineation is in strict observance of
UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the
international community will of course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.

UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS III
creates a sui generis maritime space – the exclusive economic zone – in waters
previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III grants new rights to coastal States
to exclusively exploit the resources found within this zone up to 200 nautical
miles.53 UNCLOS III, however, preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of
other States that attached to this zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS
III.

RA 9522 and the Philippines’ Maritime Zones

Petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text of UNCLOS III,
Congress was not bound to pass RA 9522.54 We have looked at the relevant
provision of UNCLOS III55 and we find petitioners’ reading plausible.
Nevertheless, the prerogative of choosing this option belongs to Congress, not to
this Court. Moreover, the luxury of choosing this option comes at a very steep
price. Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State like
the Philippines will find itself devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from
where the breadth of its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured. This
is recipe for a two-fronted disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the
seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and
submarine areas around our archipelago; and second, it weakens the country’s
case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime space. These are
consequences Congress wisely avoided.

The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine
archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an
internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’ maritime
zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of
the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the
Constitution and our national interest.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 169304               March 13, 2007

THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, SECRETARY MANUEL M. DAYRIT, USEC.

MA. MARGARITA GALON and USEC. ANTONIO M. LOPEZ, Petitioners, 
vs.
PHIL. PHARMAWEALTH, INC., Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Assailed via petition for review are issuances of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 84457, to wit: a) Decision1dated May 12, 2005 which affirmed the order
issued by Judge Leoncio M. Janolo, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 264 denying petitioners’ motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 68208; and b)
Resolution2 dated August 9, 2005 which denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.

Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. (respondent) is a domestic corporation engaged in the

business of manufacturing and supplying pharmaceutical products to government
hospitals in the Philippines.

On December 22, 1998, then Secretary of Health Alberto G. Romualdez, Jr.

issued Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 27,3 Series of 1998, outlining the
guidelines and procedures on the accreditation of government suppliers for
pharmaceutical products.

A.O. No. 27 was later amended by A.O. No. 10,4 Series of 2000, providing for
additional guidelines for accreditation of drug suppliers aimed at ensuring that
only qualified bidders can transact business with petitioner Department of Health
(DOH). Part V of A.O. No. 10 reads, in part:

1. Drug Manufacturer, Drug Trader and Drug Importer shall be allowed to

apply for accreditation.

2. Accreditation shall be done by the Central Office-Department of Health.

 3. A separate accreditation is required for the drug suppliers and for their
specific products.

xxxx

12. Only products accredited by the Committee shall be allowed to be

procured by the DOH and all otherentities under its
jurisdiction.5 (Underscoring supplied)

On May 9, 20006 and May 29, 2000,7 respondent submitted to petitioner DOH a

request for the inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited drug products,
including the antibiotic "Penicillin G Benzathine." Based on the schedule provided
by petitioner DOH, it appears that processing of and release of the result of
respondent’s request were due on September 2000, the last month of the quarter
following the date of its filing.8

Sometime in September 2000, petitioner DOH, through petitioner Antonio M.

Lopez, chairperson of the pre-qualifications, bids and awards committee, issued
an Invitation for Bids9 for the procurement of 1.2 million units vials of Penicillin G
Benzathine (Penicillin G Benzathine contract).

Despite the lack of response from petitioner DOH regarding respondent’s request
for inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited products, respondent
submitted its bid for the Penicillin G Benzathine contract. When the bids were
opened on October 11, 2000, only two companies participated, with respondent
submitting the lower bid at ₱82.24 per unit, compared to Cathay/YSS
Laboratories’ (YSS) bid of ₱95.00 per unit. In view, however, of the non-
accreditation of respondent’s Penicillin G Benzathine product, the contract was
awarded to YSS.

Respondent thus filed a complaint10 for injunction, mandamus and damages with

prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City praying, inter alia,
that the trial court "nullify the award of the Penicillin G Benzathine contract (IFB
No. 2000-10-11 [14]) to YSS Laboratories, Inc. and direct defendant DOH,
defendant Romualdez, defendant Galon and defendant Lopez to declare plaintiff
Pharmawealth as

the lowest complying responsible bidder for the Benzathine contract, and that
they accordingly award the same to plaintiff company" and "adjudge defendants
Romualdez, Galon and Lopez liable, jointly and severally to plaintiff, for [the
therein specified damages]."11
In their Comment,12 petitioner DOH, Secretary Alberto Romualdez, Jr. who was
later succeeded by petitioner Secretary Manuel M. Dayrit, and individual
petitioners Undersecretaries Margarita Galon and Antonio Lopez argued for the
dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit in view of the express reservation
made by petitioner DOH to accept or reject any or all bids without incurring
liability to the bidders, they positing that government agencies have such full
discretion.

Petitioners subsequently filed a Manifestation and Motion13 (motion to dismiss)

praying for the outright dismissal of the complaint based on the doctrine of state
immunity. Additionally, they alleged that respondent’s representative was not
duly authorized by its board of directors to file the complaint.

To petitioners’ motion to dismiss, respondent filed its

comment/opposition14 contending, in the main, that the doctrine of state immunity
is not applicable considering that individual petitioners are being sued both in
their official and personal capacities, hence, they, not the state, would be liable
for damages.

By Order of December 8, 2003, the trial court15 denied petitioners’ motion to

dismiss.

Their motion for reconsideration having been denied,16 petitioners filed a petition

for certiorari17 with the Court of Appeals, before which they maintained that the
suit is against the state.

By the assailed Decision18 of May 12, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court’s Order. And by Resolution of August 9, 2005, it denied petitioners’
motion for reconsideration.

Hence, the instant petition for review which raises the sole issue of whether the
Court of Appeals erred in upholding the denial of petitioners’ motion to dismiss.

The petition fails.

The suability of a government official depends on whether the official concerned

was acting within his official or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts done
in the performance of official functions will result in a charge or financial liability
against the government. In the first case, the Constitution itself assures the
availability of judicial review,19 and it is the official concerned who should be
impleaded as the proper party.20
In its complaint, respondent sufficiently imputes grave abuse of discretion against
petitioners in their official capacity. Since judicial review of acts alleged to have
been tainted with grave abuse of discretion is guaranteed by the Constitution, it
necessarily follows that it is the official concerned who should be impleaded as
defendant or respondent in an appropriate suit.21

Moreover, part of the reliefs prayed for by respondent is the enjoinment of the
implementation, as well as the nullification of the award to YSS, the grant of
which may not be enforced against individual petitioners and their successors
except in their official capacities as officials of the DOH.22

As regards petitioner DOH, the defense of immunity from suit will not avail
despite its being an unincorporated agency of the government, for the only
causes of action directed against it are preliminary injunction and mandamus.
Under Section 1, Rule 5823 of the Rules of Court, preliminary injunction may be
directed against a party or a court, agency or a person. Moreover, the defense of
state immunity from suit does not apply in causes of action which do not seek to
impose a charge or financial liability against the State.24

As regards individual petitioners’ suability for damages, the following discussion

on the applicability of the defense of state immunity from suit is relevant.

The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now embodied in
Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted
principles of international law, which we have now adopted as part of the law of
the land.25

While the doctrine of state immunity appears to prohibit only suits against the
state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials
of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their
duties.26 The suit is regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of the
judgment against the officials will require the state itself to perform a positive act,
such as the appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded
against them.27

The rule, however, is not so all-encompassing as to be applicable under all

circumstances. Shauf v. Court of Appeals28 elucidates:

It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity
as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was
clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of
Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al.,29 ‘ Inasmuch as the State
authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government
officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or
officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the
protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity
of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or
suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the
ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the
personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or
under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against
the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued
without its consent.’ The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state
immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied) 1avvphi1

Hence, the rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official
capacity for acts that are unauthorized or unlawful and injurious to the rights of
others. Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in
his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of
may have been committed while he occupied a public position.30

In the present case, suing individual petitioners in their personal capacities for
damages in connection with their alleged act of "illegal[ly] abus[ing] their official
positions to make sure that plaintiff Pharmawealth would not be awarded the
Benzathine contract [which act was] done in bad faith and with full knowledge of
the limits and breadth of their powers given by law"31 is permissible, in
consonance with the foregoing principles. For an officer who exceeds the power
conferred on him by law cannot hide behind the plea of sovereign immunity and
must bear the liability personally.32

It bears stressing, however, that the statements in the immediately foregoing

paragraph in no way reflect a ruling on the actual liability of petitioners to
respondent. The mere allegation that a government official is being sued in his
personal capacity does not automatically remove the same from the protection of
the doctrine of state immunity. Neither, upon the other hand, does the mere
invocation of official character suffice to insulate such official from suability and
liability for an act committed without or in excess of his or her authority.33 These
are matters of evidence which should be presented and proven at the trial.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated May 12,
2005 and Resolution dated August 9, 2005 issued by the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.