BaghJan Well No.
5 Blowout
Introduction:
Baghjan well number 5 was drilled in baghjan oilfield in 2006. The well was completed with 5-
1/2” casing unto a depth of 3876 m. The blow out happened on 27th May 2020 while work over
operations were going on to produce gas from a new sand (oil & gas bearing reservoir) at a depth of
3729 m.
Sequence of events:
       On May 27, the rig crew had Nipple down the BOP and was repairing a well head spool when
        tragedy struck.
        Prior to removing BOP the speculation is that the cement plug was not tested (negative or
        positive) moreover the WOC period was 48 hrs. But the BOP was removed post 12-18 hrs. and
        the well head spool repair work started. It is also suspected that the plug was placed much
        above in the well (somewhere between 0-800 m, instead of somewhere near 3000 m) and the
        height of the plug was also compromised.
       OIL had created a 150 km radius and removed all the villagers into relief camps. The crisis
        management team opened the casing valve and started pumping water through the casing
        valve. Water was pumped continuously through the valve into the Well head.
       OIL contacted Global Expert to control the blowout. Offers with action plan and time line
        received from 3 Global Experts (Boots and Coots, Alert and Wild Well Control)
       Alert Disaster control from Singapore reaches the site on 7 th June.
       The well caught fire on 9th June and spewed uncontrollably, the fear was now a reality.
       On 10th June two fire-fighters of OIL lost their life fighting the flame, also four fire
        fighters were injured during the same. On the same day two OIL employees had been
        suspended in connection with the blowout.
       Since there was limited space and placement of BOP on the well head was a huge challenge, the
        experts (ONGC CMT, OIL, Alert) decided to place the BOP via hydraulically driven mechanical
        transporter. The fabrication of the same was on going on before the well caught fire and it was
        decided to stick to the ‘Capping stack guides rail’ mechanism as a lot of progress had been made
        in that area . Meanwhile OIL kept on arranging for well control equipment, BOP spares, heavy
        discharge water pump etc.
       Two CMT reservoirs (3000 Kl capacity and 12000 KL capacity) were made and filled with water;
        Heat shields were fabricated for protection of equipment against the immense heat. A bailey
        bridge, above 150 m of water body adjacent to the well site for ease of logistics, was
        constructed by the Indian army.
       On 21st June Assam state pollution control board ordered OIL to shut all production
        from Baghjan field.
      While conducting the operation of opening the 7-1/16 well head flange, 3 experts from Alert got
       minor burn injuries
      The 7-1/16” flange was successfully opened and the burnt out nuts of the 13-3/8” spool were
       also changed. The BOP was ready with a modified rises and after all preparations and dummy
       run the first attempt was made.
      On 31st July the BOP stack was hooked up with the Athey Wagon for placing on the well head
       but the wagon toppled over at the last second and the attempt failed.
      On 10th August the next attempt (after making modifications to the Athey Wagon) in OIL’s words
       “The BOP Stack was successfully placed over the Well Head. While BOP stack alignment job was
       underway to insert the studs, one of the two bull lines connected with the Athey Wagon which
       was lifting the BOP stack came out from the socket due to impact of excessive heat. From the
       safety point of view and stability required for alignment of the BOP stack on the well head,
       experts decided to safely remove the BOP stack from the Well head. Operations will resume
       after carrying out necessary rectification jobs”.
      On 17th August the BOP was successfully placed over the well head stack and the 16 studs were
       successfully tightened. The well killing operation was then attempted but due to rupture of the
       casing valve the killing operation had to be suspended. The entire stack is being continuously
       sprayed with water to keep it cool.
      On 3rd September expert from Canada had been bought to attempt to cap the well
       again.
      On September 5th the attempt to divert the gas flow to an EPS was successful and it doused the
       flames but due to an error and opening of BOP Ram the fire started again. (This was done
       because a leak was observed on the well head and for safety reason the BOP was opened)
      On September 9, 25-year-old electrical engineer who was electrocuted while checking
       cables at the site
      OIL is evaluating several options including a relief well. On 13 th September in another press
       release OIL says that in order to reduce the surface level well head pressure of the blowout at
       well no 5 Baghjan, the process for restoration of diversion of flow of gas from the well head to
       Baghjan EPS and two flare pits was successfully implemented.
      The well still remains to be killed in the coming days.
Suggestions:
      The action of removing the BOP was sanctioned in absence of OIL supervisor. The need
       for a specialist for fixing responsibility between Operator and Service Company for
       critical operations is a must.
      The timelines required for setting the cement plug should have been adhered to, if the
       well head repair job was extremely critical. A second mechanical barrier should have
       been placed in the well before the Blow out preventer was nipple down.
      The height and depth of the cement plug needs to be ascertained which would further
       explain the sequence of events leading to the disaster. Due to the plug being placed high
    up in the casing, the gas gradually creates a piston action after it attains the momentum and
    space it had to expand, forcing the plug out of the well and eventually the blow out.
   The crew should be qualified to detect any such leak so that preemptive measures can
    be sought immediately. Well control training is a must.