G.R. No. L-23133 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. vs.

ANASTASIO
DAGMAN, ET AL.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23133 August 20, 1925

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ANASTASIO DAGMAN, ET

Valentin J. Alcid for appellants.

MALCOLM, J.:

On the 2nd of May, 1924, Elias Magbual, en employee of the hacienda "La Esperanza," while in the
performance of his duties, was treacherous attacked by a crowd of person, probably about forty in number
and was nearly killed. The motive of the crime was that the persons who harbored enmity against the
Magbual had previously been dispossessed of portions of the land by judicial order. The attack began by the
crowd shouting "Avance" and with Magbual attempting to escape. But a stone thrown by Anastasio Dagman
hit Magbual in the breast, and knocked him down. In this position, he was attacked by Luis Pacunla who
wounded him with a lance. Magbual made another attempt to flee only to fall again and to receive wounds
made by bolos and clubs wielded by the accused. Magbual escaped death from his tormentors by the use of
feigning death.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On these facts, seven persons, Luis Pacunla, Andres Rebollido, Isabelo Rebollido, Juan Olanan, Anastasio
Dagman, Valentin Tabladillo, and Luciano Pacunla, were charged in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija
with the crime of frustrated murder. After trial, each of the accused was found guilty by the Honorable
Eduardo Gutierrez David, Judge of First Instance, of the crime of frustrated homicide and was sentenced
accordingly.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

From the judgment last mentioned, all of the defendants have appealed. In their behalf, two errors are
assigned and argued, namely, (1) that the trial judge erred in finding that the accused had the intention to kill
Elias Magbual, the offended party, and (2) that the trial judge likewise erred in finding that there was an
agreement to kill Elias Magbual and therefore in sentencing all of the accused to the same penalty, without
taking into account the participation of each of one of them in the commission of the crime, if
any.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Neither of these points is well taken. The trial judge found each of the accused to have been proved guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of a crime included in the information. There is ample proof to substantiate this
finding. The murderous intent of the accused and their joint purpose are likewise clearly
demonstrated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The trial judge, it will be recalled, found the defendants guilty of the crime of frustrated homicide. The
Attorney-General, however, recommends that the crime be classified as frustrated murder in view of the
presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, and that the penalty then be placed in the maximum of
that provide by law because of the presence of the aggravating circumstance that prohibited arms were use
by the assailants. A majority of the court agree with the Attorney-General. We believe the felony should be
classified as frustrated rather than attempted, under the law and the local
jurisprudence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The murder should be regarded as frustrated because the offenders performed all of the acts of execution
which should precede the felony as consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of
causes independent of the will of the perpetrators; in this instance, the playing possum by Magbual. (Penal
Code, art. 3, par. 2.) There was an intent upon the part of the assailants to take the life of the person
attacked, which intent may be gathered from the circumstances surrounding the attack; in this instance, the
nature of the wounds, the cry of the accused, "Vamos a matarle," and their fingering the nose of Magbual to
see if respiration continued. (U.S. vs. Mendoza [1918], 38 Phil., 691; U.S. vs. Sanchez [1911], 20 Phil., 427;
U.S. vs. Domingo and Dolor [1911], 18 Phil., 250; U.S. vs. Marasigan [1908], 11 Phil., 27; U.S. vs. Reyes [1906],
6 Phil., 38 U.S. vs. Sabio [1903], 2 Phil., 485; U.S. vs. Taguibao [1901], 1 Phil., 16.) Deadly weapons were used,
blows were directed at the vital parts of the body, the aggressors stated their purpose to kill and thought
they had killed. The subjective phase of the crime was entirely passed, and subjectively speaking, the crime
was complete. (U.S. vs. Eduave [1917], 36 Phil., 209.) The particular parts of the body of the person struck
during the assault, the deadly character of the weapons used, the violence of the attack, and the
accomplishment of the crime with alevosia in such manner as to insure the safety of the assailants while
depriving the victim of the opportunity to make defense, classifies the crime a frustrated murder. (U.S. vs.
Sanchez [1911], 20 Phil., 427, citing decisions of the supreme court of Spain of April 17, 1895, September 29,
1881, and December 31, 1890.) And finally, that the victim did not die, was owing to a chance or accident or
reason independent of the criminal act performed. (U.S. Agoncillo and Admana [1916], 33 Phil., 242.) ( See
also U.S. vs. Bastas and De la Serna [1905], 5 Phil., 251; U.S. vs. Poblete [1908], 10 Phil., 578; U.S. vs.
Domingo and Dolor [1911], 18 Phil., 250; Albert, The Law on Crimes, pp. 31-33; and 30 C.J., 14.)chanrobles
virtual law library

In the decision in the case of United States vs. Lim San ( [1910], 17 Phil., 273, 276), Mr. Justice Moreland
speaking for a unanimous court, in part, said:

The court found the defendant guilty of the crime of attempted murder. We are unable to agree with that
finding. We regard the crime as frustrated murder. The distinction between frustrated murder and attempted
murder is this: In frustrated murder the accused performs all of the acts which he believes necessary to
consummate the crime. Death, fails to follow for causes entirely apart from his will. In attempted  murder the
accused begins the commission of the crime by over acts, but involuntarily desists from performing the
other acts necessary to consummate the crime, he being prevented from so doing by some cause outside of
his own will. In the case at bar it appears clearly that the defendant believed that he had performed all of the
acts necessary to consummate the crime of murder, and, therefore, of his own will, desisted from striking
further blows. He believed that he had killed Keng Kin. Death did not result for reasons entirely apart from
the will of the accused. This surely stamps the crime as frustrated murder. If, after the first blow, some one
had rushed to the assistance of Keng Kin and by his efforts had prevented the accused from proceeding
further in the commission of the crime, the accused not believing that he had performed all of the acts
necessary to cause death, he would have been guilty of attempted murder.

Agreeable to the recommendation of the Attorney-General, the judgment appealed from is modified and
each of the defendants and appellants is sentenced to fourteen years, eight months and one day
imprisonment cadena temporal, with the accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay a one-seventh part
of the costs of each instance, and all of the defendants and appellants jointly and severally are sentenced to
reimburse the offended party in the amount of P65 for medical services. So ordered.

Avance�a, C.J., Johnson, Ostrand, and Johns,  JJ., concur.