BELLIS vs BELLIS 20 SCRA 358
G.R. No. L-23678, June 6, 1967
     FACTS:
     Amos Bellis, a US citizen, died a resident of Texas. He left two wills -- one devising a
5    certain amount of money to his first wife and three illegitimate children and another,
     leaving the rest of his estate to his seven legitimate children. Before partition, the
     illegitimate children who are Filipinos opposed on the ground that they are deprived of
     their legitimes.
10   ISSUE:
     Whether the applicable law is Texas law or Philippine laws
     HELD:
15   Applying the nationality rule, the law of Texas should govern the intrinsic validity of the
     will
     and therefore answer the question on entitlement to legitimes. But since the law of Texas
     was never proven, the doctrine of processual presumption was applied. Hence, SC
     assumed that Texas law is the same as Philippine laws, which upholds the nationality
20   rule. Renvoi doctrine is not applicable because there is no conflict as to the nationality
     and domicile of Bellis. He is both a citizen and a resident of Texas. So even if assuming
     the law of Texas applies the domiciliary rule, it is still Texas law that governs because his
     domicile is Texas.
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                                     Vda de Perez vs Tolete
                                  G. R. No. 76714, June 2, 1994
     FACTS:
5    Dr. Jose Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American
     citizens and residents of New York, each executed a will also in New York, containing
     provisions on presumption of survivorship (in the event that it is not known which one of
     the spouses died first, the husband shall be presumed to have predeceased his wife).
     Later, the entire family perished in a fire that gutted their home. Thus, Rafael, who was
10   named trustee in Jose’s will, filed for separate probate proceedings of the wills. Later,
     Evelyn’s mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for reprobate in Bulacan. Rafael opposed,
     arguing that Salud was not an heir according to New York law. He contended that since
     the wills were executed in New York, New York law should govern. He further argued
     that, by New York law, he and his brothers and sisters were Jose’s heirs and as such
15   entitled to notice of the reprobate proceedings, which Salud failed to give. For her part,
     Salud said she was the sole heir of her daughter, Evelyn, and that the two wills were in
     accordance with New York law. But before she could present evidence to prove the law
     of New York, the reprobate court already issued an order, disallowing the wills.
20   ISSUE: Whether or not the reprobate of the wills should be allowed.
     HELD:
     Extrinsic Validity of Wills of Non-Resident Aliens The respective wills of the Cunanan
     spouses, who were American citizens, will only be effective in this country upon
25   compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines: Art. 816. The
     will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the
     formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the
     formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code
     prescribes. Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New
30   York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative. Evidence for Reprobate of Wills Probated
     outside the Philippines. The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills
     which have been probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due
     execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile
     in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate
35   in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws
     of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills (III Moran Commentaries on the
     Rules of Court, 1970 ed., pp. 419-429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954]; Fluemer v.
     Hix, 54 Phil. 610 [1930]). Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner
     submitted all the needed evidencE. The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign
40   laws upon which the probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that
     our courts cannot take judicial notice of them.
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                     B.E. Johannes, et al v. Honorable George R. Harvey, et al
     FACTS:
     Mrs. Carmen Theodora Johannes nee Carmen D’ Almeida, died intestate in Singapore,
5    Straits Settlements, on August 31, 1921. Of her immediate family there remained the
     husband, B.E. Johannes, the brothers, Frederick Charles D’ Almeida and Alfred D’
     Almeida, and the sister, Ida D’ Almeida Johannes. Of these, the Husband, the brother
     Frederick, and the sister Ida, were residents of Singapore, while the brother Alfred was
     in Manila. The Singapore heirs apparently joined in asking that the letters of the
10   administration be granted by the Supreme Court of the Straits Settlements to B.E.
     Johannes, the lawful husband of the deceased. At least, on September 19, 1921, the
     husband was named the administrator of the property of the deceased wife, which was
     locally situate within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the Straits Settlements.
     (Under the British law [ 22 & 23 Charles II c 10, 29 Charles II c 3, and James II c 17 ], it
15   would seem that the husband is entitled to the whole of the state of his wife if she die
     intestate, to the exclusion of any other of kin.) On October 1, 1921, the brother Alfred D’
     Almeida was, on his petition, appointed administrator of the Manila estate of the
     deceased consisting of P109,732.55. This sum, it appears, was on deposit in the Manila
     banks under and by virtue of guardianship proceedings for the late Carmen Theodora
20   Johannes, which were finally terminated by the discharge of the guardian, the Philippine
     Trust Company, on January 16, 1922.
     ISSUE:
     W/N administration in the Philippines is unnecessary.
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     HELD:
     No. Administration in the Philippines is necessary. It is o!ten necessay to have more than
     one administration of an estate when a person dies intestate owning property in the
     county of his domicile as well as in a foreign county, administration is had in both
30   countries. That which is granted in the jurisdiction of decedent’s last domicile is termed
     the principal administration, any other administration is termed the ancillary
     administration. The reason for the latter is because a grant of administration does not ex
     proprio vigore have any effect beyond the limits of the country in which is granted.
     Hence, an administrator appointed in a foreign state has no authority in the United
35   States. The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a
     country other than that of his last domicile, property to be administered in the nature of
     assets of the decedent, liable for his individual debts or to be distributed among his
     heirs. The principal administration in this Instance is that at the domicile of the Carmen
     Theodora Johannes in Singapore, Straits Settlements. What is sought in the Philippine
40   Islands is an ancillary administration subsidiary to the domiciliary administration,
     conformable to the provisions of sections 601, 602, and 603 of the Code of Civil
     Procedure. The proper course of procedure would be for the ancillary administrator to
     pay the claims of creditors, if there be any, settle the accounts, and remit the surplus to
     the domiciliary jurisdiction, for distribution among the next of kin. Such administration
45   appears to be required in this jurisdiction since the provisions of section 596 of the Code
     of Civil Procedure, which permit of the settlement of the certain estates without legal
     proceedings, have not been met. The decision of this court in Baldemor v. Malangyaon
     ([1916], 34 Phil., 368), on which relators rely, is then not in point because predicated
     directly on the provisions of the section last cited. There is still another aspect to the
50   case. This is that pursuant to section 783 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an order of a
     Court of First Instance appointing an administrator of the estate of a deceased person
     constitutes a final determination of the rights of the parties thereunder, within the
     meaning of the statute, and is appealable.
     As we reach the conclusion that the Court of First Instance has not acted in excess of its
55   jurisdiction, and as there is an appeal, certiorari will not lie. Accordingly, the writ prayed
     for cannot be granted. Costs against the relators.
                 Suntay III v. Cojuangco-Suntay, G.R. No. 183053, 16 June 2010
     FACTS:
     Petitioner argues that Article 992 of the Civil Code, the successional bar between the
5    legitimate and illegitimate relatives of a decedent, does not apply in this instance where
     facts indubitably demonstrate the contrary – Emilio III, an illegitimate grandchild of the
     decedent, was actually treated by the decedent and her husband as their own son,
     reared from infancy, educated and trained in their businesses, and eventually legally
     adopted by decedent’s husband, the original oppositor to respondent’s petition for letters
10   of administration.
     ISSUE:
     Whether or not the illegitimate child may inherit from the grandparent, who treated the
     former like his own son, notwithstanding Article 992 of the Civil Code.
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     HELD:
     YES. The factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis of intestate
     succession, i.e., love first descends, for the decedent, Cristina, did not distinguish
     between her legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did her husband,
20   Federico, who, in fact, legally raised the status of Emilio III from an illegitimate
     grandchild to that of a legitimate child. The peculiar circumstances of this case,
     painstakingly pointed out by counsel for petitioner, overthrow the legal presumption in
     Article 992 of the Civil Code that there exist animosity and antagonism between
     legitimate and illegitimate descendants of a deceased.
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                     Cayetano v. Leonidas, G.R. No. L-54919, May 30, 1984.
     FACTS:
     The testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her death and was a permanent
5    resident of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the testatrix died in Manila while temporarily
     residing with her sister; that during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last will and
     testament according to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that after the testatrix death,
     her last will and testament was presented, probated, allowed, and registered with the
     Registry of Wills at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A. An opposition to the reprobate of
10   the will was filed by herein petitioner alleging among other things that the intrinsic
     provisions of the will are null and void. The petitioner maintains that since the
     respondent judge allowed the reprobate of Adoracion’s will, Hermogenes C. Campos
     was divested of his legitime which was reserved by the law for him.
15   ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine law will apply to determine the intrinsic validity of a
     will executed by an undisputed foreigner.
     RULING:
     NO. It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as
20   provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent
     must apply. This was squarely applied in the case of Bellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358).“It I
     therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our
     system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of
     foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of
25   successional rights, to the decedent’s national law. Specific provisions must prevail over
     general ones.”
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                                ANCHETA V. GUERSEY-DALAYGON
     FACTS:
     Spouses Audrey O’Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American
5    citizens who have resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted
     daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). Audrey died in 1979. She left a will wherein she
     bequeathed her
     entire estate to Richard consisting of Audrey’s conjugal share in real estate
     improvements
10   at Forbes Park, current account with cash balance and shares of stock in A/G Interiors.
     Two years after her death, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon. Four years
     thereafter, Richard died and left a will wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to
     respondent, except for his shares in A/G, which he left to his adopted daughter.
     Petitioner, as ancillary administrator in the court where Audrey’s will was admitted to
15   probate, filed a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey and a project of
     partition of Audrey’s estate. The motion and project of partition were granted. Meanwhile,
     the ancillary administrator with regards to Richard’s will also filed a project of partition,
     leaving 2/5 of Richard’s undivided interest in the Forbes property was allocated to
     respondent Candelaria, while 3/5 thereof was allocated to their three children.
20   Respondent opposed on the ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, where
     Richard was a native of, a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator
     in the property subject to the legacy.
     ISSUE:
25   Whether or not the decree of distribution may still be annulled under the circumstances.
     HELD:
     A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of
     the
30   estate in the distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once
     it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem. However, in
     exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of
     jurisdiction or bfraud. Further, in Ramon vs. Ortuzar, the Court ruled that a party
     interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when he is left
35   out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence
     not imputable to negligence. Petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution of
     Audrey’s estate according to the terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable law
     amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTC Orders dated
     February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.
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5                     Miciano v. Brimo G.R. No. L-22595, 1 November 1927
     FACTS:
     Joseph Brimo, an alien testator (Turk) who made his will in the Philippines stated in the
     will thathis property should be distributed in accordance with Philippine law, and not that
     of his nation. The judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased filed a scheme of
10   partition. However, one of the brothers of the deceased opposed the said partition. The
     appellant in the case, who opposed the same, based his opposition on the fact that the
     deceased was a Turkish citizen, which his disposition should be in accordance with the
     laws of his nationality.
15   ISSUE:
     Whether or not the disposition shall be made in accordance with Philippine Laws.
     RULING:
     No, the Turkish law should govern the disposition of his property pursuant to Article 16.
20   According to Article 16 of the Civil Code, suchnational law of the testator is the one to
     governhis testamentary dispositions. The provision in the will is not valid. Said condition
     then is considered unwritten, hence the institution of legatees is unconditional and
     consequently valid and effective.
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5                    Paganas v. Palaganas GR NO. 169144, January 26, 2011
     FACTS:
     On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a
     naturalized United States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and
     testament she executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas
10   (Sergio), as the executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and in
     the U.S. On May 19, 2003 respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another brother
     of Ruperta, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for
     the probate of Ruperta’s will and for his appointment as special administrator of her
     estate. On October 15, 2003, however, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas (Manuel)
15   and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas (Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta, opposed the
     petition on the ground that Ruperta’s will should not be probated in the Philippines but in
     the U.S. where she executed it. Manuel and Benjamin added that, assuming Ruperta’s
     will could be probated in the Philippines, it is invalid nonetheless for having been
     executed under duress and without the testator’s full understanding of the consequences
20   of such act. Ernesto, they claimed, is also not qualified to act as administrator of the
     estate. Meantime, since Ruperta’s foreignbased siblings, Gloria Villaluz and Sergio, were
     on separate occasions in the Philippines for a short visit, respondent Ernesto filed a
     motion with the RTC for leave to take their deposition, which it granted. On June 17,
     2004 the RTC issued an order: (a) admitting to probate Ruperta’s last will; (b) appointing
25   respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.-based
     executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special Administration to
     Ernesto. Aggrieved by the RTC’s order, petitioner nephews Manuel and Benjamin
     appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that an unprobated will executed by an
     American citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for the first time in the Philippines. On
30   July 29, 2005 the CA rendered a decision, affirming the assailed order of the RTC,
     holding that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will, subject to respondent
     Ernesto’s submission of the authenticated copies of the documents specified in the order
     and his posting of required bond.
35   ISSUE: Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the
     Philippines although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the country
     where it was executed.
     HELD:
40   YES. The will may be probated in Philippine court. Article 816 of the Civil Code states
     that
     the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in
     accordance
     with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to
45   the formalities observed in his country. Our rules require merely that the petition for the
     allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional
     facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the
     testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate;
     (d) the name ofn the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been
50   delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts
     refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the
     province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country,
     the estate he left in such province.The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has
     already been allowed and probated in the country of its execution.