that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she

CONFLICT OF LAWS obtains the highest number of votes. 

LEGEND: Laws | Commentaries | Doctrines | Notes from reviewers |

In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that
Discussion & PPT
she was the overwhelming winner of the elections for the
congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held May 8, 1995.
1. Domicile Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she obtained a total of
70,471 votes compared to the 36,833 votes received by Respondent
Montejo.
CIVIL CODE, ARTS. 50 AND 51

On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for

TITLE II the congressional seat of the First District of Leyte and the public
CITIZENSHIP AND DOMICILE respondent's Resolution suspending her proclamation, petitioner
comes to this court for relief.
Article 50. For the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil
obligations, the domicile of natural persons is the place of their habitual ISSUES:
residence. (40a)

(1) WON the word domicile is synonymous to residence for election

Article 51. When the law creating or recognizing them, or any other law purposes [YES]
provision does not fix the domicile of juridical persons, the same shall (2) WON petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the residency
be understood to be the place where their legal representation is requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987
established or where they exercise their principal functions. (41a) Constitution [YES]

RULING:
ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS VS. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300 (1995)
(1)
FACTS: Petitioner IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS filed her
Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First
As the concept of residence and domicile have evolved in our
District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8,
election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the
1995, providing that she has resided in Leyte for seven months.
fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously
with domicile.
Private respondent CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, filed a "Petition for
Cancellation and Disqualification" with the COMELEC alleging that Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil
petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. In rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural
his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong vs. Republic this
Constitution's one year residency requirement. court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent
home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for
pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and
Petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy,
circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent."  Based on the
changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood". On the same
foregoing, domicile includes the TWIN ELEMENTS of (1) "the fact of
day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that
residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and (2) animus
it cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy
manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
on the ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline for the filing of the
same having already lapsed on March 20, 1995.
RESIDENCE, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship
of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a
Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of
person in a given area, community or country. The essential distinction
Candidacy with the COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros, Manila. In
between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the
her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009,
intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up
petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her original
his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure,
Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest
business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his
misinterpretation" which she sought to rectify by adding the words
domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established
"since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy
it is residence. It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to
and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or
have different residences in various places. However, a person can
residence. 
only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he
successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile
COMELEC SECOND DIVISION: came up with a Resolution 1) finding of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic,  we laid this distinction quite
private respondent's Petition for Disqualification in SPA 95-009 clearly:
meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's Corrected/Amended Certificate of
Candidacy of March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate
There is a difference between domicile and residence.
of Candidacy. 
"Residence" is used to indicate a place of abode, whether
permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed
COMELEC EN BANC: denied petitioner's Motion for permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the
Reconsideration of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring her not intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one
qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile,
Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte.  but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain
for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for
the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing
places of residence. His place of residence is generally his
petitioner's proclamation should the results of the canvass show that
place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so
she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional
since no length of residence without intention of remaining
elections in the First District of Leyte. On the same day, however, the
will constitute domicile.
COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing

MICHAELA GARCIA | CONFLICT OF LAWS | ATTY. MARK DEL ROSARIO

1
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are entry for which she could be disqualified. This honest mistake should
dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First
have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally District if such fact were established by means more convincing than a
emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used mere entry on a piece of paper.
synonymously with domicile.
ARGUMENT: “except for the time when (petitioner) studied and worked
In Nuval vs.  Guray,  the Court held that "the term residence. . . is for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously
synonymous with domicile which imports not only intention to reside in lived in Manila”
a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention."  Larena vs. Teves reiterated the
The Resolution additionally cites certain facts as indicative of the fact
same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the respondent
that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where she lived in the
therein to the post of Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros
last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the
Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino,  held that the absence from residence
Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan, Metro Manila
to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter
where she was also registered voter. Then, in 1965, following the
other than in the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of
election of her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San
residence.  So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election
Miguel, Manila where she was a voter. In 1978 and thereafter, she
law that in these and other election law cases, this Court has
served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of
stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent
Metro Manila. "She could not, have served these positions if she
residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a
had not been a resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed.
loss or change of domicile.
Here is where the confusion lies.

The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence

We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not
qualification for certain elective positions have placed beyond doubt
lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences
the principle that when the Constitution speaks of "residence" in
in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual
election law, it actually means only "domicile". In Co vs. Electoral
relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from
Tribunal of the House of Representatives,  this Court concluded that
legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to
the framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition
do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does
given to the term residence in election law, regarding it as having the
not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the
same meaning as domicile. 
COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City
since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy
(2) because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of
settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions
between (actual) residence and domicile for election law purposes.
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos has satisfied the residency In Larena vs.  Teves,  supra, we stressed:
requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987
Constitution.
[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who
has his own house wherein he lives with his family in a
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of municipality without having ever had the intention of
candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or abandoning it, and without having lived either alone or with
not and individual has satisfied the constitution's residency his family in another municipality, has his residence in the
qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only former municipality, notwithstanding his having registered as
when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, an elector in the other municipality in question and having
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate been a candidate for various insular and provincial positions,
ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately stating every time that he is a resident of the latter
and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which municipality.
would lead to his or her disqualification.

More significantly, in Faypon vs.  Quirino,  We explained that:

Petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the word
"seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification
requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener
questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion pastures," as the saying goes, to improve his lot, and that, of
which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual course includes study in other places, practice of his
stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in the avocation, or engaging in business. When an election is to
First district, which was "since childhood" in the space provided. be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot
These circumstances and events are amply detailed in the may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot but
COMELEC's Second Division's questioned resolution, albeit with for professional or business reasons, or for any other reason,
a different interpretation. For instance, when herein petitioner he may not absent himself from his professional or business
announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City to make her activities; so there he registers himself as voter as he has
eligible to run in the First District, private respondent Montejo opposed the qualifications to be one and is not willing to give up or
the same, claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the
Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual government especially in national elections. Despite such
residence in the First District, which is Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she registration, the animus revertendi  to his home, to his
subsequently noted down in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close look domicile or residence of origin has not forsaken him.
at said certificate would reveal the possible source of the confusion: This may be the explanation why the registration of a voter in
the entry for residence (Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the a place other than his residence of origin has not been
entry for residence in the constituency where a candidate seeks deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such
election. residence. It finds justification in the natural desire and
longing of every person to return to his place of birth. This
strong feeling of attachment to the place of one's birth must
Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of be overcome by positive proof of abandonment for another.
actual residence in Leyte instead of petitioner's claimed domicile, it
appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her legal
residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited
— the first requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile statements supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to
— coupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioner's registration run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the
as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an unintended COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's various places of

MICHAELA GARCIA | CONFLICT OF LAWS | ATTY. MARK DEL ROSARIO

2
(actual) residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored 1) An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
settled jurisprudence on residence in election law and the 2) A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence
deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the and establishing a new one; and
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881).  3) Acts which correspond with the purpose.

What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the
establish the fact of petitioner's domicile, which we lift verbatim from residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence
the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed Resolution:  showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of
continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires
an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years
residences at the same time. In the case at bench, the evidence
old, she established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte
adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of
(Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in
persuasiveness required to convince this court that an
Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she graduated from high
abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice
school. She pursued her college studies in St. Paul's
indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the
College, now Divine Word University in Tacloban, where she
voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with
earned her degree in Education. Thereafter, she taught in
an intent  to supplant the former domicile with one of her own
the Leyte Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she
choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late speaker
Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of
Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-President ARGUMENT: Petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law
Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still a congressman of as a result of her marriage to the late President Marcos
Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When her
husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she
In this connection, it CANNOT be correctly argued that petitioner
and her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she
lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her
registered as a voter. In 1965, when her husband was
marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For
elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, she
there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code
lived with him in Malacanang Palace and registered as a
concepts of "domicile" and "residence."  The presumption that the
voter in San Miguel, Manila.
wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation of
law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code
were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In is one area where the two concepts are well delineated.
November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992,
respondent ran for election as President of the Philippines
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of
and filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated
domicile or residence as they affect the female spouse upon marriage
that she is a resident and registered voter of San Juan,
yields nothing which would suggest that the female spouse
Metro Manila.
automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the
husband's choice of residence upon marriage.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC,
what is inescapable is that petitioner held various residences for
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil
different purposes during the last four decades. None of these
Code of 1889 which states:
purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her
domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was
born in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of her La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde
parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and quiera que fije su residencia. Los Tribunales, sin
eventually established residence in different parts of the country for embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla de esta
various reasons. Even during her husband's presidency, at the height obligacion cuando el marido transende su
of the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties to her residencia a ultramar o' a pais extranjero.
domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating
her birthdays and other important personal milestones in her home
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the
province, instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit of her
aforequoted article, which means wherever (the husband) wishes to
province and hometown, and establishing a political power base where
establish residence. This part of the article clearly contemplates only
her siblings and close relatives held positions of power either through
actual residence because it refers to a positive act of fixing a family
the ballot or by appointment, always with either her influence or
home or residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further
consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are
strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido translade su residencia"
part of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power
in the same provision which means, "when the husband shall
in our country. Either they were entirely ignored in the
transfer his residence," referring to another positive act of relocating
COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did not
the family to another home or place of actual residence. The article
know what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of
obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile which is a fixed,
petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of
transferring from one place to another not only once, but as often as
ARGUMENT: “Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of origin because the husband may deem fit to move his family, a circumstance more
she did not live there until she was eight years old” consistent with the concept of actual residence.

The Supreme Court does not agree. The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with
the intention of the law to strengthen and unify the family, recognizing
the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the marriage different
First - minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once
domiciles (of origin). This difference could, for the sake of family unity,
acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of
be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of
the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her
actual residence.
domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not
established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte
contrary to private respondent's averments. Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V
under the heading: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN
HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article
Second - domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect
109 which obliges the husband and wife to live together, thus:
a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: 

MICHAELA GARCIA | CONFLICT OF LAWS | ATTY. MARK DEL ROSARIO

3
 Art. 109. — The husband and wife are obligated to house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make them livable for
live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland."  Furthermore,
and render mutual help and support. petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte,
while living in her brother's house, an act which supports the
domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife
Chairman. She could not have gone straight to her home in San Juan,
are physically together. This takes into account the situations where
as it was in a state of disrepair, having been previously looted by
the couple has many residences (as in the case of the petitioner). If the
vandals. Her "homes" and "residences" following her arrival in
husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the
various parts of Metro Manila merely qualified as temporary or
wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may "live
"actual residences," not domicile. Moreover, and proceeding from
together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to
our discussion pointing out specific situations where the female
"domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced
spouse either reverts to her domicile of origin or chooses a new
with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile while the
one during the subsistence of the marriage, it would be highly
husband, for professional or other reasons, stays in one of their
illogical for us to assume that she cannot regain her original
(various) residences.
domicile upon the death of her husband absent a positive act of
selecting a new one where situations exist within the subsistence
In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband of the marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile different
and the wife during the marriage is not an iron-clad principle; In cases from her husband.
applying the Civil Code on the question of a common matrimonial
residence, our jurisprudence has recognized certain situations where
In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile
the spouses could not be compelled to live with each other such that
enunciated by this court up to this point, we are persuaded that the
the wife is either allowed to maintain a residence different from
facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a
that of her husband or, for obviously practical reasons, revert to
conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of legal residence or
her original domicile (apart from being allowed to opt for a new
domicile in the First District of Leyte.
one). In De la Vina vs.  Villareal  this Court held that "[a] married
woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her
husband during the existence of the marriage where the husband has JALOSJOS VS. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 191970, APRIL 24, 2012
given cause for divorce."  Note that the Court allowed the wife either to
obtain new residence or to choose a new domicile in such an event. In
instances where the wife actually opts under the Civil Code, to FACTS: Petitioner ROMMEL JALOSJOS was born in Quezon City on
live separately from her husband either by taking new residence October 26, 1973. He migrated to Australia in 1981 when he was eight
or reverting to her domicile of origin, the Court has held that the years old and there acquired Australian citizenship. On November 22,
wife could not be compelled to live with her husband on pain of 2008, at age 35, he decided to return to the Philippines and lived with
contempt. his brother, ROMEO, JR., in Barangay Veteran’s Village, Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay. Four days upon his return, he took an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the
Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged — by virtue of Article 110 of Bureau of Immigration. On September 1, 2009 he renounced his
the Civil Code — to follow her husband's actual place of residence Australian citizenship, executing a sworn renunciation of the same in
fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had compliance with RA 9225.
several places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and
Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these places Mr.
Marcos did fix as his family's residence. But assuming that Mr. From the time of his return, Jalosjos acquired a residential property in
Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, the same village where he lived and a fishpond in San Isidro, Naga,
what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She Zamboanga Sibugay. He applied for registration as a voter in the
did not lose her domicile of origin. Municipality of Ipil but respondent DAN ERASMO, SR., the Barangay
Captain of Barangay Veteran’s Village, opposed the same. Acting on
the application, the Election Registration Board approved it and
On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" included Jalosjos’ name in the COMELEC’s voters list for Precinct
appears to have been incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential 0051F of Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New
Family Code. To underscore the difference between the intentions of
the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence has Undaunted, Erasmo filed before the 1st MCTC of Ipil-Tungawan-R.T.
been supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. Lim in Ipil a petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos’ name from the official
69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in Article voters list.
110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of
women's rights in the intervening years by making the choice of MCTC: rendered a decision, denying the petition
domicile a product of mutual agreement between the spouses. 

RTC: affirmed the MCTC decision. The RTC decision became final and
Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean executory.
one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing
in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is
concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife — On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
the term residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay Province for the May 10, 2010
residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this elections. Erasmo promptly filed a petition to deny due course or to
unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner cancel Jalosjos’ COC on the ground that the latter made material
married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of misrepresentation in the same since he failed to comply with (1)
origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium the requirements of R.A. 9225 and (2) the one-year residency
necessarium. requirement of the Local Government Code.

Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new SECOND DIVISION OF THE COMELEC: ruled that, while Jalosjos
"domicile" after her marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new had regained Philippine citizenship by complying with the requirements
one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her return to of R.A. 9225, he failed to prove the residency requirement for a
the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but gubernatorial candidate. He failed to present ample proof of a bona
expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally
expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when
petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral

MICHAELA GARCIA | CONFLICT OF LAWS | ATTY. MARK DEL ROSARIO

4
COMELEC EN BANC: affirmed the Second Division’s decision, ruling are no doubt more credible since they have a better chance of
that Jalosjos had been a mere guest or transient visitor in his brother’s noting his presence or absence than his other neighbors, whose
house and, for this reason, he cannot claim Ipil as his domicile. affidavits Erasmo presented, who just sporadically passed by the
subject residence. Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a
residential lot in the same village where he lived and a fish pond in San
Meanwhile, Jolosjos won the election and was proclaimed winner of
Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He showed correspondences with
the 2010 gubernatorial race in the Province of Zamboanga Sibugay.
political leaders, including local and national party-mates, from where
he lived. Moreover, Jalosjos is a registered voter of Ipil by final
ISSUE: WON the COMELEC erred in ruling that Jalosjos failed to judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga Sibugay.
present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in
Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay [YES]
THREE. While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of
administrative bodies like the COMELEC, this does not prevent it
RULING: There is no hard and fast rule to determine a candidate’s from exercising its review powers to correct palpable
compliance with residency requirement since the question of residence misappreciation of evidence or wrong or irrelevant
is a question of intention. Still, jurisprudence has laid down the considerations. The evidence Jalosjos presented is sufficient to
following guidelines: establish Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, as his domicile. The COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion in holding otherwise.
a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere;
b) where once established, that domicile remains until he FOUR. Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010
acquires a new one; and gubernatorial race for Zamboanga Sibugay. The Court will respect
c) a person can have but one domicile at a time. the decision of the people of that province and resolve all doubts
regarding his qualification in his favor to breathe life to their
manifest will.
It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents
applying them that Jalosjos has met the residency requirement
for provincial governor of Zamboanga Sibugay. CABALLERO VS. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 209835, SEPTEMBER 22,
2015
ONE. The COMELEC appears hasty in concluding that Jalosjos failed
to prove that he successfully changed his domicile to Zamboanga FACTS: Petitioner ROGELIO CABALLERO and private respondent
Sibugay. The COMELEC points out that, since he was unable to JONATHAN ENRIQUE V. NANUD, JR, were both candidates for the
discharge the burden of proving Zamboanga Sibugay to be his rightful mayoralty position of the Municipality of Uyugan, Province of Batanes
domicile, it must be assumed that his domicile is either Quezon City or in the May 13, 2013 elections. Private respondent filed a Petition to
Australia. deny due course to or cancellation of petitioner's certificate of
candidacy alleging that the latter made a false representation when he
But it is clear from the facts that Quezon City was Jalosjos’ declared in his COC that he was eligible to run for Mayor of Uyugan,
domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It may be taken for granted Batanes despite being a Canadian citizen and a nonresident thereof.
that he effectively changed his domicile from Quezon City to Australia
when he migrated there at the age of eight, acquired Australian Petitioner manifested that he was not properly served with a copy of
citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years. Australia became his the petition and the petition was served by registered mail not in his
domicile by operation of law and by choice. address in Barangay Imnajbu, Uyugan, Batanes. He, however,
received a copy of the petition during the conference. Petitioner did not
On the other hand, when he came to the Philippines in November file an Answer but filed a Memorandum controverting private
2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident respondent's substantial allegations in his petition.
that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good.
He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and Petitioner argued that prior to the filing of his COC on October 3, 2012,
renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he he took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before
reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Philippine Consul General in Toronto, Canada on September 13,
the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a 2012 and became a dual Filipino and Canadian citizen pursuant to RA
Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the No. 9225. Thereafter, he renounced his Canadian citizenship and
Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal executed an Affidavit of Renunciation before a Notary Public in
right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his Batanes on October 1, 2012 to conform with Section 5(2) of RA No.
domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, 9225. He claimed that he did not lose his domicile of origin in Uyugan,
Zamboanga Sibugay. Batanes despite becoming a Canadian citizen as he merely left
Uyugan temporarily to pursue a brighter future for him and his family;
To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in and that he went back to Uyugan during his vacation while working in
Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his domicile of origin Nigeria, California, and finally in Canada.
(Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of law
(Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a man must have COMELEC FIRST DIVISION: issued a Resolution finding that
a domicile or residence somewhere. petitioner made a material misrepresentation in his COC when he
declared that he is a resident of Barangay Imnajbu, Uyugan, Batanes
TWO. The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle within one year prior to the election.
his domicile in Ipil since he has merely been staying at his brother’s
house. But this circumstance alone cannot support such conclusion. A Elections were subsequently held on May 13, 2013 and the election
candidate is not required to have a house in a community to returns showed that petitioner won over private respondent. Private
establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is respondent filed an Urgent Ex-parte Motion to Defer Proclamation.
sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a rented house On May 14, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed Mayor of Uyugan,
or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate Batanes.
own the house where he lives would make property a qualification
for public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has proved TWO On May 16, 2013, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the
THINGS: (1) actual physical presence in Ipil and (2) an intention of COMELEC En Banc. On May 17, 2013, private respondent filed a
making it his domicile. Petition to Annul Proclamation.

Jalosjos presented the affidavits of next-door neighbors, attesting to his COMELEC EN BANC: issued its assailed Resolution denying
physical presence at his residence in Ipil. These adjoining neighbors petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

MICHAELA GARCIA | CONFLICT OF LAWS | ATTY. MARK DEL ROSARIO

5
Petitioner filed with us the instant petition for certiorari with prayer for or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where
the issuance of a temporary restraining order. he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and
remain (animus manendi)." A domicile of origin is acquired by every
person at birth. It is usually the place where the child's parents reside
In the meantime, private respondent filed a Motion for Execution of the
and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new
May 3, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division as affirmed by
domicile (domicile of choice). It consists not only in the intention to
the En Banc and prayed for the cancellation of petitioner's COC, the
reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place,
appropriate correction of the certificate of canvas to reflect that all
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
votes in favor of petitioner are stray votes, declaration of nullity of
petitioner's proclamation and proclamation of private respondent as the
Petitioner was a natural born Filipino who was born and raised in
duly-elected Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes in the May 13, 2013 elections.
Uyugan, Batanes. Thus, it could be said that he had his domicile
of origin in Uyugan, Batanes. However, he later worked in Canada
On December 12, 2013, COMELEC Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.
and became a Canadian citizen. In Coquilla v. COMELEC we ruled
issued a Writ of Execution. Private respondent took his Oath of
that naturalization in a foreign country may result in an
Office on December 20, 2013.
abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. This holds true in
petitioner's case as permanent resident status in Canada is
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Petitioner next claims that he did not required for the acquisition of Canadian citizenship. Hence,
abandon his Philippine domicile. He argues that he was born and petitioner had effectively abandoned his domicile in the
baptized in Uyugan, Batanes; studied and had worked therein for a Philippines and transferred his domicile of choice in Canada. His
couple of years, and had paid his community tax certificate; and, that frequent visits to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacation from work
he was a registered voter and had exercised his right of suffrage and in Canada cannot be considered as waiver of such abandonment.
even built his house therein. He also contends that he usually comes
back to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacations from work abroad, thus, (2)
his domicile had not been lost.
In Japzon v. COMELEC, the Court held that reacquisition of
Petitioner avers that the requirement of the law in fixing the residence Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 had no
qualification of a candidate running for public office is not strictly on the automatic impact or effect on his residence/domicile .
period of residence in the place where he seeks to be elected but on
the acquaintance by the candidate on his constituents' vital needs for
Hence, petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under
their common welfare; and that his nine months of actual stay in
RA No. 9225 did not automatically make him regain his residence
Uyugan, Batanes prior to his election is a substantial compliance with
in Uyugan, Batanes. He must still prove that after becoming a
the law. Petitioner insists that the COMELEC gravely abused its
Philippine citizen on September 13, 2012, he had reestablished
discretion in canceling his COC.
Uyugan, Batanes as his new domicile of choice which is reckoned
from the time he made it as such.
ISSUES:
The COMELEC found that petitioner failed to present competent
(1) WON petitioner abandoned his Philippine domicile [YES] evidence to prove that he was able to reestablish his residence in
(2) What is the effect of petitioner's retention of his Philippine Uyugan within a period of one year immediately preceding the
citizenship under RA No. 9225 on his residence or domicile? May 13, 2013 elections. It found that it was only after reacquiring his
Filipino citizenship by virtue of RA No. 9225 on September 13, 2012
that petitioner can rightfully claim that he re-established his domicile in
RULING: Uyugan, Batanes, if such was accompanied by physical presence
thereat, coupled with an actual intent to reestablish his domicile there.
(1) However, the period from September 13, 2012 to May 12, 2013 was
even less than the one year residency required by law.
RA No. 9225, which is known as the Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003, declares that natural-born citizens of the
Records indeed showed that petitioner failed to prove that he had been
Philippines, who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
a resident of Uyugan, Batanes for at least one year immediately
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country, can re-acquire or retain
preceding the day of elections as required under Section 39 of the
his Philippine citizenship under the conditions of the law. The law does
Local Government Code.
not provide for residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention
of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such
reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current Petitioner's argument that his nine (9) months of actual stay in Uyugan,
residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. Batanes, prior to the May 13, 2013 local elections is a substantial
compliance with the law, is not persuasive. In Aquino v. Commission
on Elections, we held:
RA No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. This is only
logical and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual
citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, x x x A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In
both Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may establish residence a republican government those laws are themselves ordained by the
either in the Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also a people. Through their representatives, they dictate the qualifications
citizen. However, when a natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship necessary for service in government positions. And as petitioner clearly
seeks for an elective public office, residency in the Philippines lacks one of the essential qualifications for running for membership in
becomes material. the House of Representatives, not even the will of a majority or plurality
of the voters of the Second District of Makati City would substitute for a
requirement mandated by the fundamental law itself.
Clearly, the Local Government Code requires that the candidate must
be a resident of the place where he seeks to be elected at least one
Petitioner had made a material misrepresentation by stating in his COC
year immediately preceding the election day. Respondent filed the
that he is a resident of Uyugan, Batanes for at least one (1) year
petition for cancellation of petitioner's COC on the ground that the latter
immediately proceeding the day of the election, thus, a ground for a
made material misrepresentation when he declared therein that he is a
petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Section 74, in
resident of Uyugan, Batanes for at least one year immediately
relation to Section 78, of the OEC governs the cancellation of, and
preceeding the day of elections.
grant or denial of due course to COCs.

The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common

We have held that in order to justify the cancellation of COC under
acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or "habitation," but rather to
Section 78, it is essential that the false representation mentioned
"domicile" or legal residence, that is, "the place where a party actually
therein pertains to a material matter for the sanction imposed by this

MICHAELA GARCIA | CONFLICT OF LAWS | ATTY. MARK DEL ROSARIO

6
provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate - the right to (2) WON respondent Miguel had waived his status as a permanent
run for the elective post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. resident of or immigrant to the U.S.A. prior to the local elections
We concluded that material representation contemplated by Section 78 on January 18, 1988 [NO]
refers to qualifications for elective office, such as the requisite
residency, age, citizenship or any other legal qualification necessary to
RULING:
run for a local elective office as provided for in the Local Government
Code. Furthermore, aside from the requirement of materiality, the
misrepresentation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, (1)
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible. We, therefore, find no grave abuse of discretion committed
by the COMELEC in canceling petitioner's COC for material In the case of Merito Miguel, the Court deems it significant that in the
misrepresentation. "Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration" (Optional Form
No. 230, Department of State) which Miguel filled up in his own
handwriting and submitted to the US Embassy in Manila before his
CAASI VS. CA, 191 SCRA 229 (1990) departure for the United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question
No. 21 therein regarding his "Length of intended stay (if
permanently, so state)," Miguel's answer was,  "Permanently."
FACTS: This case is a consolidation of the two cases with the same
objective; the disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code of the private respondent, Merito Miguel for the position of On its face, the green card that was subsequently issued by the United
municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, to which he was elected in States Department of Justice and Immigration and Registration Service
the local elections of January 18, 1988, on the ground that he is a to the respondent Merito C. Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as
green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the United a RESIDENT ALIEN. On the back of the card, the upper portion, the
States of America, not of Bolinao. following information is printed:

Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him by the US Alien Registration Receipt Card.
Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of
the United States. He allegedly obtained the green card for Person identified by this card is entitled to reside
convenience in order that he may freely enter the United States for his permanently and work in the United States."
periodic medical examination and to visit his children there. He alleged
that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan, that he voted
in all previous elections, including the plebiscite on February 2,1987 for Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the
the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, and the congressional United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile
elections on May 18,1987. and residence in the Philippines. For he did not go to the United
States merely to visit his children or his doctor there; he entered the
limited States with the intention to have there permanently as
COMELEC: the possession of a green card by Miguel does not evidenced by his application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or
sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the tourist's) visa. Based on that application of his, he was issued by
Philippines. On the contrary, respondent has sufficiently indicated his the U.S. Government the requisite green card or authority to
intention to continuously reside in Bolinao as shown by his having reside there permanently.
voted in successive elections in said municipality. As the respondent
meets the basic requirements of citizenship and residence for
candidates to elective local officials (sic) as provided for in Section 42 Immigration is the removing into one place from another; the
of the Local Government Code, there is no legal obstacle to his act of immigrating the entering into a country with the
candidacy for mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan. intention of residing in it.

In his dissenting opinion, Commissioner Badoy, Jr. opined that: An immigrant is a person who removes into a country for the
purpose of permanent residence. As shown infra 84,
however, statutes sometimes give a broader meaning to the
A green card holder being a permanent resident of or an term "immigrant."
immigrant of a foreign country and respondent having
admitted that he is a green card holder, it is incumbent
upon him, under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election As a resident alien in the U.S., Miguel owes temporary and local
Code, to prove that he "has waived his status as a allegiance to the U.S., the country in which he resides. This is in
permanent resident or immigrant" to be qualified to run return for the protection given to him during the period of his
for elected office. This respondent has not done. residence therein.

G.R. No. 88831 (2)

RTC: denied Miguel's motion to dismiss the petition for quo Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that
warranto filed by Caasi "any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or
acquire the status of an immigrant of another country DURING his
CA: ordered the regional trial court to dismiss and desist from further tenure shall be dealt with by law" is not applicable to Merito Miguel
proceeding in the quo warranto case for he acquired the status of an immigrant of the United
States before he was elected to public office, not "during his
tenure" as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan.
ISSUES:

The law applicable to him is Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code

(1) WON a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent (B.P. Blg. 881), which provides:
resident of the United States [YES]

x x x           x x x          x x x

MICHAELA GARCIA | CONFLICT OF LAWS | ATTY. MARK DEL ROSARIO

7
 Any person who is a permanent resident of or an under R.A. No. 8171 to the Special Committee on Naturalization. His
immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to application was approved on November 7, 2000, and, on November
run for any elective office under this Code, unless such 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines. Petitioner was
person has waived his status as permanent resident or issued Certificate of Repatriation No. 000737 on November 10, 2000
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the and Bureau of Immigration Identification Certificate No. 115123 on
residence requirement provided for in the election laws.' November 13, 2000.

To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law On November 21, 2000, petitioner applied for registration as a voter of
requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar. His application was approved by the
"waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a Election Registration Board on January 12, 2001. On February 27,
foreign country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating therein that he
candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for "two (2) years."
constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or
immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his green card
On March 5, 2001, respondent NEIL M. ALVAREZ, who was the
should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and
incumbent mayor of Oras and who was running for reelection, sought
done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this
the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy on the ground
country. Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any
that the latter had made a material misrepresentation in his certificate
elective office".
of candidacy by stating that he had been a resident of Oras for two
years when in truth he had resided therein for only about six months
Respondent Merito Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which since November 10, 2000, when he took his oath as a citizen of the
proves that he is a permanent resident or immigrant it of the United Philippines.
States, but the records of this case are starkly bare of proof that
he had waived his status as such  before he ran for election as
Meanwhile, petitioner was voted for and received the highest number
municipal mayor of Bolinao on January 18, 1988. We, therefore,
of votes (6,131) against private respondent’s 5,752 votes, or a margin
hold that he was disqualified to become a candidate for that
of 379 votes. On May 17, 2001, petitioner was proclaimed mayor of
office.
Oras by the Municipal Board of Canvassers. He subsequently took his
oath of office.
The reason for Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is not hard to
find. Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective
SECOND DIVISION OF THE COMELEC: granted private respondent’s
office for at least one (1) year at the time of filing his certificate of
petition and ordered the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of
candidacy, is one of the qualifications that a candidate for elective
candidacy
public office must possess. Miguel did not possess that
qualification because he was a permanent resident of the United
States and he resided in Bolinao for a period of only three (3) Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but his motion was denied
months (not one year) after his return to the Philippines in by the COMELEC en banc on January 30, 2002. Hence this petition.
November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that municipality
on January 18, 1988.
ISSUE: WON petitioner had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at
least one (1) year before the elections held on May 14, 2001 as he
Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in represented in his certificate of candidacy [NO]
the U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status
are conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S. despite
RULING: FIRST, §39(a) of the Local Government Code provides:
his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant
status should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent
clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen
or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay,
authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of
elections on January 18, 1988, our conclusion is that he was the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or
disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his election sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be
thereto was null and void. elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to
read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
(Emphasis added)

The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common

acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or "habitation," but rather to
"domicile" or legal residence, that is, "the place where a party actually
or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where
he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and
remain (animus manendi)." A domicile of origin is acquired by every
person at birth. It is usually the place where the child’s parents reside
COQUILLA VS. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 151914, JULY 31, 2002 and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new
domicile (domicile of choice).

FACTS: Petitioner TEODULO COQUILLA was born on February 17,

1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by
resided there until 1965, when he joined the United States Navy. He becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S. Navy in 1965.
was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen. From 1970 to 1973, From then on and until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired
petitioner thrice visited the Philippines while on leave from the U.S. Philippine citizenship, petitioner was an alien without any right to
Navy. Otherwise, even after his retirement from the U.S. Navy in 1985, reside in the Philippines save as our immigration laws may have
he remained in the United States. allowed him to stay as a visitor or as a resident alien.

On October 15, 1998, petitioner came to the Philippines and took out a Indeed, residence in the United States is a requirement for
residence certificate, although he continued making several trips to the naturalization as a U.S. citizen. Title 8, §1427(a) of the United States
United States, the last of which took place on July 6, 2000 and lasted Code provides:
until August 5, 2000. Subsequently, petitioner applied for repatriation

MICHAELA GARCIA | CONFLICT OF LAWS | ATTY. MARK DEL ROSARIO

8
Requirements of naturalization. – Residence requisite residency to qualify him for the mayorship of Oras, Eastern,
Samar.
(a) No person, except as otherwise provided in this
subchapter, shall be naturalized unless such applicant, (1) THIRD, petitioner nonetheless says that his registration as a voter of
immediately preceding the date of filing his application for Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar in January 2001 is conclusive of his
naturalization has resided continuously, after being lawfully residency as a candidate because §117 of the Omnibus Election Code
admitted for permanent residence, within the United States requires that a voter must have resided in the Philippines for at least
for at least five years and during the five years immediately one year and in the city or municipality wherein he proposes to vote for
preceding the date of filing his petition has been physically at least six months immediately preceding the election. As held
present therein for periods totaling at least half of that time, in Nuval v. Guray, however, registration as a voter does not bar the
and who has resided within the State or within the district of filing of a subsequent case questioning a candidate’s lack of
the Service in the United States in which the applicant filed residency.
the application for at least three months, (2) has resided
continuously within the United States from the date of the
FOURTH, petitioner was not denied due process because the
application up to the time of admission to citizenship, and (3)
COMELEC failed to act on his motion to be allowed to present
during all the period referred to in this subsection has been
evidence. Under §5(d), in relation to §7, of R.A. No. 6646 (Electoral
and still is a person of good moral character, attached to the
Reforms Law of 1987), proceedings for denial or cancellation of a
principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well
certificate of candidacy are summary in nature. The holding of a formal
disposed to the good order and happiness of the United
hearing is thus not de rigeur. In any event, petitioner cannot claim
States. (Emphasis added)
denial of the right to be heard since he filed a Verified Answer, a
Memorandum and a Manifestation, all dated March 19, 2001, before
In Caasi v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that immigration to the the COMELEC in which he submitted documents relied by him in this
United States by virtue of a "greencard," which entitles one to reside petition, which, contrary to petitioner’s claim, are complete and intact in
permanently in that country, constitutes abandonment of domicile in the records.
the Philippines. With more reason then does naturalization in a
foreign country result in an abandonment of domicile in the
2. Personal Status and Capacity
Philippines.

Nor can petitioner contend that he was "compelled to adopt American CIVIL CODE, ARTS. 40 AND 41
citizenship" only by reason of his service in the U.S. armed forces. It is
noteworthy that petitioner was repatriated not under R.A. No. 2630, CHAPTER 2
which applies to the repatriation of those who lost their Philippine Natural Persons
citizenship by accepting commission in the Armed Forces of the United
States, but under R.A. No. 8171, which, as earlier mentioned, provides
for the repatriation of, among others, natural-born Filipinos who lost Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall
their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. In any be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it
event, the fact is that, by having been naturalized abroad, he lost be born later with the conditions specified in the following article. (29a)
his Philippine citizenship and with it his residence in the
Philippines. Until his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship on Article 41. For civil purposes, the foetus is considered born if it is alive
November 10, 2000, petitioner did not reacquire his legal at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb.
residence in this country. However, if the foetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven
months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its
SECOND, it is not true, as petitioner contends, that he reestablished complete delivery from the maternal womb. (30a)
residence in this country in 1998 when he came back to prepare for the
mayoralty elections of Oras by securing a Community Tax Certificate in ii. Corporations
that year and by "constantly declaring" to his townmates of his intention
to seek repatriation and run for mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections.
The status of being an alien and a non-resident can be waived either CORPORATION CODE, SECS. 2, 123, 127-129, 133
separately, when one acquires the status of a resident alien before
acquiring Philippine citizenship, or at the same time when one acquires
Philippine citizenship. As an alien, an individual may obtain an TITLE I
immigrant visa under §13 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1948 and GENERAL PROVISIONS
an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) and thus waive his status DEFINITIONS AND CLASSIFICATIONS
as a non-resident. On the other hand, he may acquire Philippine
citizenship by naturalization under C.A. No. 473, as amended, or, if he Section 2. Corporation defined. – A corporation is an artificial being
is a former Philippine national, he may reacquire Philippine citizenship created by operation of law, having the right of succession and the
by repatriation or by an act of Congress, in which case he waives not powers, attributes and properties expressly authorized by law or
only his status as an alien but also his status as a non-resident alien. incident to its existence.

In the case at bar, the only evidence of petitioner’s status when he TITLE XV
entered the country on October 15, 1998, December 20, 1998, October FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
16, 1999, and June 23, 2000 is the statement "Philippine Immigration
[–] Balikbayan" in his 1998-2008 U.S. passport. As for his entry on
August 5, 2000, the stamp bore the added inscription "good for one Section 123. Definition and rights of foreign corporations. – For the
year stay." Under §2 of R.A. No. 6768 (An Act Instituting purposes of this Code, a foreign corporation is one formed, organized
a Balikbayan Program), the term balikbayan includes a former Filipino or existing under any laws other than those of the Philippines and
citizen who had been naturalized in a foreign country and comes or whose laws allow Filipino citizens and corporations to do business in
returns to the Philippines and, if so, he is entitled, among others, to a its own country or state. It shall have the right to transact business in
"visa-free entry to the Philippines for a period of one (1) year" (§3(c)). It the Philippines after it shall have obtained a license to transact
would appear then that when petitioner entered the country on the business in this country in accordance with this Code and a certificate
dates in question, he did so as a visa-free  balikbayan  visitor of authority from the appropriate government agency.
whose stay as such was valid for one year only. Hence, petitioner
can only be held to have waived his status as an alien and as a Section 127. Who may be a resident agent. – A resident agent may be
non-resident only on November 10, 2000 upon taking his oath as a either an individual residing in the Philippines or a domestic corporation
citizen of the Philippines under R.A. No. 8171. He lacked the lawfully transacting business in the Philippines: Provided, That in the

MICHAELA GARCIA | CONFLICT OF LAWS | ATTY. MARK DEL ROSARIO

9
case of an individual, he must be of good moral character and of sound JOSE OIL) which has 14 petroleum exploration concessions covering
financial standing. an area of a little less than 1,000,000 hectares, located in the
provinces of Pangasinan, Tarlac, Nueva Ecija, La Union, Iloilo,
Cotabato, Davao and Agusan. It was the express condition of the sale
Section 128. Resident agent; service of process. – The Securities and that every purchaser of the securities shall not receive a stock
Exchange Commission shall require as a condition precedent to the certificate, but a registered or bearer-voting-trust certificate from the
issuance of the license to transact business in the Philippines by any voting trustees named therein JAMES L. BUCKLEY and AUSTIN G.E.
foreign corporation that such corporation file with the Securities and TAYLOR, the first residing in Connecticut, U.S.A., and the second in
Exchange Commission a written power of attorney designating some New York City.
person who must be a resident of the Philippines, on whom any
summons and other legal processes may be served in all actions or
other legal proceedings against such corporation, and consenting that While this application for registration was pending consideration by the
service upon such resident agent shall be admitted and held as valid Securities and Exchange Commission, SAN JOSE PETROLEUM filed
as if served upon the duly authorized officers of the foreign corporation an amended Statement on June 20, 1958, for registration of the sale in
at its home office. Any such foreign corporation shall likewise execute the Philippines of its shares of capital stock, which was increased from
and file with the Securities and Exchange Commission an agreement 2,000,000 to 5,000,000, at a reduced offering price of from P1.00 to
or stipulation, executed by the proper authorities of said corporation, in P0.70 per share. At this time the par value of the shares has also been
form and substance as follows: reduced from $.35 to $.01 per share

"The (name of foreign corporation) does hereby stipulate and agree, in PEDRO R. PALTING AND OTHERS, allegedly prospective investors
consideration of its being granted by the Securities and Exchange in the shares of SAN JOSE PETROLEUM, filed with the SEC an
Commission a license to transact business in the Philippines, that if at opposition to registration and licensing of the securities on the grounds
any time said corporation shall cease to transact business in the that:
Philippines, or shall be without any resident agent in the Philippines on
whom any summons or other legal processes may be served, then in 1) the tie-up between the issuer, SAN JOSE PETROLEUM, a
any action or proceeding arising out of any business or transaction Panamanian corporation and SAN JOSE OIL, a domestic
which occurred in the Philippines, service of any summons or other corporation, violates the Constitution of the Philippines, the
legal process may be made upon the Securities and Exchange Corporation Law and the Petroleum Act of 1949;
Commission and that such service shall have the same force and 2) the issuer has not been licensed to transact business in the
effect as if made upon the duly-authorized officers of the corporation at Philippines;
its home office." 3) the sale of the shares of the issuer is fraudulent, and works
or tends to work a fraud upon Philippine purchasers; and
Whenever such service of summons or other process shall be made 4) the issuer as an enterprise, as well as its business, is based
upon the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commission shall, upon unsound business principles.
within ten (10) days thereafter, transmit by mail a copy of such
summons or other legal process to the corporation at its home or The registrant SAN JOSE PETROLEUM claimed that it was a
principal office. The sending of such copy by the Commission shall be "business enterprise" enjoying parity rights under the Ordinance
necessary part of and shall complete such service. All expenses appended to the Constitution, which parity right, with respect to
incurred by the Commission for such service shall be paid in advance mineral resources in the Philippines, may be exercised, pursuant
by the party at whose instance the service is made. to the Laurel-Langley Agreement, only through the medium of a
corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines. Thus,
In case of a change of address of the resident agent, it shall be his or registrant which is allegedly qualified to exercise rights under the
its duty to immediately notify in writing the Securities and Exchange Parity Amendment, had to do so through the medium of a
Commission of the new address. domestic corporation, which is the SAN JOSE OIL. It refused the
contention that the Corporation Law was being violated, by alleging
that Section 13 thereof applies only to foreign corporations doing
Section 129. Law applicable. – Any foreign corporation lawfully doing business in the Philippines, and registrant was not doing business
business in the Philippines shall be bound by all laws, rules and here. The mere fact that it was a holding company of SAN JOSE OIL
regulations applicable to domestic corporations of the same class, and that registrant undertook the financing of and giving technical
except such only as provide for the creation, formation, organization or assistance to said corporation did not constitute transaction of
dissolution of corporations or those which fix the relations, liabilities, business in the Philippines. Registrant also denied that the offering for
responsibilities, or duties of stockholders, members, or officers of sale in the Philippines of its shares of capital stock was fraudulent or
corporations to each other or to the corporation. would work or tend to work fraud on the investors. On August 29, 1958,
and on September 9, 1958 the Securities and Exchange Commissioner
Section 133. Doing business without a license. – No foreign issued the orders object of the present appeal.
corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a license, or
its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in ISSUE: WON respondent SAN JOSE PETROLEUM an American
any action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of business enterprise is entitled to parity rights in the Philippines [NO]
the Philippines; but such corporation may be sued or proceeded
against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any valid
cause of action recognized under Philippine laws. RULING: The privilege to utilize, exploit, and develop the natural
resources of this country was granted, by Article XIII of the
Constitution, to Filipino citizens or to corporations or associations 60%
of the capital of which is owned by such citizens. With the Parity
PALTING V. SAN JOSE PETROLEUM, INC., 18 SCRA 924 (1966) Amendment to the Constitution, the same right was extended to
citizens of the United States and business enterprises owned or
controlled directly or indirectly, by citizens of the United States.
FACTS: On September 7, 1956, SAN JOSE PETROLEUM filed with
the Philippine Securities and Exchange Commission a sworn
registration statement, for the registration and licensing for sale in the There could be no serious doubt as to the meaning of the word
Philippines Voting Trust Certificates representing 2,000,000 shares of "citizens" used in the aforementioned provisions of the Constitution.
its capital stock of a par value of $0.35 a share, at P1.00 per share. The right was granted to 2 types of persons: natural persons (Filipino
or American citizens) and juridical persons (corporations 60% of
which capital is owned by Filipinos and business enterprises owned or
The entire proceeds of the sale of said securities will be devoted or controlled directly or indirectly, by citizens of the United States). In
used exclusively to finance the operations of San Jose Oil Company, American law, "citizen" has been defined as "one who, under the
Inc. (a domestic mining corporation hereafter to be referred to as SAN constitution and laws of the United States, has a right to vote for

MICHAELA GARCIA | CONFLICT OF LAWS | ATTY. MARK DEL ROSARIO

10
representatives in congress and other public officers, and who is instituted actions for collection of sums of money and damages in the
qualified to fill offices in the gift of the people.” A citizen is — CFI of Rizal against CMI; and that on application of said plaintiffs, writs
of preliminary attachment had been issued which were executed on
"the royalty/profit sharing payments due CMI from Benguet
One of the sovereign people. A constituent member of the
Consolidated Mining, Inc;" and
sovereignty, synonymous with the people."

3) that CMI had "committed specific acts of insolvency as provided in

A member of the civil state entitled to all its privileges.
Section 20 of the Insolvency Law.

Hence, respondent is nor entitled to parity rights for the following

The petition was opposed by State Investment House, Inc. (SIHI) and
reasons:
State Financing Center, Inc. (SFCI).  It claimed among others that:

Firstly — It is not owned or controlled directly by citizens of the United

xxx
States, because it is owned and controlled by a corporation, the OIL
INVESTMENTS, another foreign (Panamanian) corporation.
3) the Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for
insolvency because petitioners are not resident creditors of CMI in
Secondly — Neither can it be said that it is indirectly owned and
contemplation of the Insolvency Law.
controlled by American citizens through the OIL INVESTMENTS, for
this latter corporation is in turn owned and controlled, not by citizens of
the United States, but still by two foreign (Venezuelan) corporations, CMI filed its Answer to the petition for insolvency, asserting in the main
the PANTEPEC OIL COMPANY and PANCOASTAL PETROLEUM. that it was not insolvent,  and later filed a "Motion to Dismiss Based
on Affirmative Defense of Petitioner's Lack of Capacity to Sue,"
echoing the theory of SIHI and SFCI that the petitioner banks are
Thirdly — Although it is claimed that these two last corporations are
not "Philippine residents."  
owned and controlled respectively by 12,373 and 9,979 stockholders
residing in the different American states, there is no showing in the
certification furnished by respondent that the stockholders of SIHI and SFCI filed their own Answer-in-Intervention,  and served on
PANCOASTAL or those of them holding the controlling stock, are the three petitioner banks requests for admission of certain facts in
citizens of the United States. accordance with Rule 26 of the Rules of Court,  receiving a response
only from Hongkong & Shanghai Bank. 
Fourthly — Granting that these individual stockholders are American
citizens, it is yet necessary to establish that the different states of SIHI and SFCI then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment dated May
which they are citizens, allow Filipino citizens or corporations or 23, 1983 "on the ground that, based on the pleadings and admissions
associations owned or controlled by Filipino citizens, to engage in the on record, the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate CMI
exploitation, etc. of the natural resources of these states. Respondent insolvent since the petitioners (respondent foreign banks) are not
has presented no proof to this effect. "resident creditors" of CMI as required under the Insolvency
Law."  Oppositions to the motion were filed,  to which a reply was
submitted. 
Fifthly — But even if the requirements mentioned in the two
immediately preceding paragraphs are satisfied, nevertheless to hold
that the set-up disclosed in this case, with a long chain of intervening RTC: found merit in the motion for summary judgment. It rendered
foreign corporations, comes within the purview of the Parity "summary judgment dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction over
Amendment regarding business enterprises indirectly owned or the subject matter, with costs against petitioners."  It ruled that an
controlled by citizens of the United States, is to unduly stretch and insolvency court could "not acquire jurisdiction to adjudicate the debtor
strain the language and intent of the law. For, to what extent must the as insolvent if the creditors petitioning for adjudication of insolvency are
word "indirectly" be carried? Must we trace the ownership or control of not "residents" of the Philippines" — citing a decision of the California
these various corporations ad infinitum for the purpose of determining Supreme Court which it declared "squarely applicable especially
whether the American ownership-control-requirement is satisfied? Add considering that one of the sources of our Insolvency Law is the
to this the admitted fact that the shares of stock of the PANTEPEC and Insolvency Act of California of 1895 . . . " And it declared that since
PANCOASTAL which are allegedly owned or controlled directly by petitioners had been merely licensed to do business in the Philippines,
citizens of the United States, are traded in the stock exchange in New they could not be deemed residents thereof.
York, and you have a situation where it becomes a practical
impossibility to determine at any given time, the citizenship of the
CA: reversed the Trial Court's Order of October 10, 1983 and
controlling stock required by the law. In the circumstances, we have to
remanded the case to it for further proceedings.
hold that the respondent SAN JOSE PETROLEUM, as presently
constituted, is not a business enterprise that is authorized to exercise
the parity privileges under the Parity Ordinance, the Laurel-Langley SIHI and SFCI moved for reconsideration and then, when rebuffed,
Agreement and the Petroleum Law. Its tie-up with SAN JOSE OIL is, took an appeal to this Court.
consequently, illegal.
ISSUE: WON foreign banks licensed to do business in the Philippines,
STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC. V. CITIBANK, N.A., 203 SCRA 9 may be considered "residents of the Philippine Islands" within the
(1991) meaning of Section 20 of the Insolvency Law [YES]

Facts: The foreign banks involved are BANK OF AMERICA NT AND RULING: The National Internal Revenue Code declares that the
SA CITIBANK N.A. and HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING term" ‘resident foreign corporation’ applies to a foreign corporation
CORPORATION, who jointly filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for engaged in trade or business within the Philippines," as distinguished
involuntary insolvency alleging: from a" ‘non-resident foreign corporation’ . . (which is one) not engaged
in trade or business within the Philippines."

1) that CMI had obtained loans from the three petitioning banks, and The Offshore Banking Law, Presidential Decree No. 1034, states "that
that as of November/December, 1981, it still has outstanding branches, subsidiaries, affiliation, extension offices or any other units
obligations. of corporation or juridical person organized under the laws of any
foreign country operating in the Philippines shall be considered
2) that in November, 1981, STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC. (SIHI) residents of the Philippines."
and STATE FINANCING CENTER, INC. (SFCI) had separately

MICHAELA GARCIA | CONFLICT OF LAWS | ATTY. MARK DEL ROSARIO

11
The General Banking Act, Republic Act No. 337, places "branches and corporation in the Philippines is its actually being in the Philippines and
agencies in the Philippines of foreign banks . . (which are) called licitly doing business here, "locality of existence" being, to repeat, the
Philippine branches," in the same category as "commercial banks, "necessary element in . . (the) signification" of the term, resident
savings associations, mortgage banks, development banks, rural corporation.
banks, stock savings and loan associations" (which have been formed
and organized under Philippine laws), making no distinction between Neither can the Court accept the theory that the omission by the banks
the former and the latter in so far as the terms banking institutions" and in their petition for involuntary insolvency of an explicit and categorical
bank" are used in the Act, 23 declaring on the contrary that in "all statement that they are "residents of the Philippine Islands," is fatal to
matters not specifically covered by special provisions applicable only to their cause. In truth, in light of the concept of resident foreign
foreign banks, or their branches and agencies in the Philippines, said corporations just expounded, when they alleged in that petition that
foreign banks or their branches and agencies lawfully doing business they are foreign banking corporations, licensed to do business in the
in the Philippines "shall be bound by all laws, rules, and regulations Philippines, and actually doing business in this country through branch
applicable to domestic banking corporations of the same class, except offices or agencies, they were in effect stating that they are resident
such laws, rules and regulations as provided for the creation, foreign corporations in the Philippines.
formation, organization, or dissolution of corporations or as fix the
relation, liabilities, responsibilities, or duties of members, stockholders
or officers of corporation." STEELCASE, INC. V. DESIGN INTERNATIONAL SELECTIONS,
INC., G.R. NO. 171995, APRIL 18, 2012
This Court itself has already had occasion to hold that a foreign
corporation licitly doing business in the Philippines, which is a FACTS: PETITIONER STEELCASE, INC. is a foreign corporation
defendant in a civil suit, may not be considered a non-resident within existing under the laws of Michigan, U.S.A. and engaged in the
the scope of the legal provision authorizing attachment against a manufacture of office furniture with dealers worldwide. RESPONDENT
defendant not residing in the Philippine Islands;" in other words, a DESIGN INTERNATIONAL SELECTIONS, INC. (DISI) is a corporation
preliminary attachment may not be applied for and granted solely on existing under Philippine Laws and engaged in the furniture business,
the asserted fact that the defendant is a foreign corporation authorized including the distribution of furniture.
to do business in the Philippines — and is consequently and
necessarily, "a party who resides out of the Philippines."
Parenthetically, if it may not be considered as a party not residing in Sometime in 1986 or 1987, Steelcase and DISI orally entered into a
the Philippines, or as a party who resides out of the country, then, dealership agreement whereby Steelcase granted DISI the right to
logically, it must be considered a party who does reside in the market, sell, distribute, install, and service its products to end-user
Philippines, who is a resident of the country. Be this as it may, this customers within the Philippines. The business relationship continued
Court pointed out that: smoothly until it was terminated sometime in January 1999 after the
agreement was breached with neither party admitting any fault.
"Our laws and jurisprudence indicate a purpose to assimilate foreign
corporations, duly licensed to do business here, to the status of On January 18, 1999, Steelcase filed a complaint for sum of money
domestic corporations. We think it would be entirely out of line with this against DISI alleging, among others, that DISI had an unpaid account
policy should we make a discrimination against a foreign corporation, of US$600,000.00. Steelcase prayed that DISI be ordered to pay
like the petitioner, and subject its property to the harsh writ of seizure actual or compensatory damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s
by attachment when it has complied not only with every requirement of fees, and costs of suit.
law made specially of foreign corporations, but in addition with every
requirement of law made of domestic corporations. . . ."
In its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaims dated February 4, 1999,
Obviously, the assimilation of foreign corporations authorized to do DISI sought the following: (1) the issuance of a temporary restraining
business in the Philippines "to the status of domestic corporations," order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Steelcase
subsumes their being found and operating as corporations, hence, from selling its products in the Philippines except through DISI; (2) the
residing, in the country. dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit; and (3) the payment of
actual, moral and exemplary damages together with attorney’s fees
The same principle is recognized in American law: that the "residence and expenses of litigation. DISI alleged that the complaint failed to
of a corporation, if it can be said to have a residence, is necessarily state a cause of action and to contain the required allegations on
where it exercises corporate functions . .;" that it is considered as Steelcase’s capacity to sue in the Philippines despite the fact that
dwelling "in the place where its business is done," as being "located it (Steelcase) was doing business in the Philippines without the
where its franchises are exercised, and as being "present where it is required license to do so. Consequently, it posited that the complaint
engaged in the prosecution of the corporate enterprise;" that a "foreign should be dismissed because of Steelcase’s lack of legal capacity to
corporation licensed to do business in a state is a resident of any sue in Philippine courts.
country where it maintains an office or agent for transaction of its usual
and customary business for venue purposes;" and that the "necessary
RTC: concluded that Steelcase was "doing business" in the
element in its signification is locality of existence." Courts have held
Philippines, as contemplated by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7042 (The
that "a domestic corporation is regarded as having a residence within
Foreign Investments Act of 1991), and since it did not have the license
the state at any place where it is engaged in the particulars of the
to do business in the country, it was barred from seeking redress from
corporate enterprise, and not only at its chief place or home office;"
our courts until it obtained the requisite license to do so. Its
that "a corporation may be domiciled in one state and resident in
determination was further bolstered by the appointment by Steelcase
another; its legal domicile in the state of its creation presents no
of a representative in the Philippines. Finally, despite a showing that
impediment to its residence in a real and practical sense in the state of
DISI transacted with the local customers in its own name and for its
its business activities."
own account, it was of the opinion that any doubt in the factual
environment should be resolved in favor of a pronouncement that a
The foregoing propositions are in accord with the dictionary concept of
foreign corporation was doing business in the Philippines, considering
residence as applied to juridical persons, a term which appears to
the twelve-year period that DISI had been distributing Steelcase
comprehend permanent as well as temporary residence.
products in the Philippines.
The Court cannot thus accept the petitioners’ theory that corporations
may not have a residence (i.e., the place where they operate and CA: rendered its Decision affirming the RTC orders, ruling that
transact business) separate from their domicile (i.e., the state of their Steelcase was a foreign corporation doing or transacting business in
formation or organization), and that they may be considered by other the Philippines without a license.
states as residents only for limited and exclusive purposes. Of course,
as petitioners correctly aver, it is not really the grant of a license to a
Steelcase filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the
foreign corporation to do business in this country that makes it a
CA in its Resolution dated March 23, 2006. Hence, this petition.
resident; the license merely gives legitimacy to its doing business here.
What effectively makes such a foreign corporation a resident

MICHAELA GARCIA | CONFLICT OF LAWS | ATTY. MARK DEL ROSARIO

12
ISSUE: WON Steelcase is an unlicensed foreign corporation NOT between Steelcase and DISI had been described by the owner himself
doing business in the Philippines [YES] as:

RULING: The rule that an unlicensed foreign corporations doing xxx basically a buy and sell arrangement whereby we
business in the Philippine do not have the capacity to sue before the would inform Steelcase of the volume of the products
local courts is well-established. This is provided for under Section 133 needed for a particular project and Steelcase would, in turn,
of the Corporation Code of the Philippines. give ‘special quotations’ or discounts after considering the
value of the entire package. In making the bid of the project,
we would then add out profit margin over Steelcase’s prices.
The phrase "doing business" is clearly defined in Section 3(d) of R.A.
After the approval of the bid by the client, we would
No. 7042 (Foreign Investments Act of 1991), to wit:
thereafter place the orders to Steelcase. The latter, upon our
payment, would then ship the goods to the Philippines, with
d) The phrase "doing business" shall include soliciting orders, service us shouldering the freight charges and taxes. [Emphasis
contracts, opening offices, whether called "liaison" offices or branches; supplied]
appointing representatives or distributors domiciled in the Philippines
or who in any calendar year stay in the country for a period or periods
This clearly belies DISI’s assertion that it was a mere conduit through
totalling one hundred eighty (180) days or more; participating in the
which Steelcase conducted its business in the country. From the
management, supervision or control of any domestic business, firm,
preceding facts, the only reasonable conclusion that can be reached is
entity or corporation in the Philippines; and any other act or acts that
that DISI was an independent contractor, distributing various products
imply a continuity of commercial dealings or arrangements, and
of Steelcase and of other companies, acting in its own name and for its
contemplate to that extent the performance of acts or works, or the
own account.
exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, and in
progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the purpose and
object of the business organization: Provided, however, That the The CA, in finding Steelcase to be unlawfully engaged in business in
phrase "doing business" shall not be deemed to include mere the Philippines, took into consideration the delivery by Steelcase of a
investment as a shareholder by a foreign entity in domestic letter to Phinma informing the latter that the distribution rights for its
corporations duly registered to do business, and/or the exercise of products would be established in the near future, and also its
rights as such investor; nor having a nominee director or officer to cancellation of orders placed by Visteon. The foregoing acts were
represent its interests in such corporation; nor appointing a apparently misinterpreted by the CA. Instead of supporting the claim
representative or distributor domiciled in the Philippines which that Steelcase was doing business in the country, the said acts prove
transacts business in its own name and for its own account; otherwise. It should be pointed out that no sale was concluded as a
(Emphases supplied) result of these communications. Had Steelcase indeed been doing
business in the Philippines, it would have readily accepted and
serviced the orders from the abovementioned Philippine companies. Its
This definition is supplemented by its IRR, Rule I, Section 1(f).
decision to voluntarily cease to sell its products in the absence of a
local distributor indicates its refusal to engage in activities which might
The following acts shall not be deemed "doing business" in the be construed as "doing business."
Philippines:
Another point being raised by DISI is the delivery and sale of Steelcase
1) Mere investment as a shareholder by a foreign entity in domestic products to a Philippine client by Modernform allegedly an agent of
corporations duly registered to do business, and/or the exercise of Steelcase. Basic is the rule in corporation law that a corporation has a
rights as such investor; separate and distinct personality from its stockholders and from other
2) Having a nominee director or officer to represent its interest in corporations with which it may be connected. Thus, despite the
such corporation; admission by Steelcase that it owns 25% of Modernform, with the
3) Appointing a representative or distributor domiciled in the remaining 75% being owned and controlled by Thai stockholders,  it is
Philippines which transacts business in the representative's or grossly insufficient to justify piercing the veil of corporate fiction and
distributor's own name and account; declare that Modernform acted as the alter ego of Steelcase to enable
4) The publication of a general advertisement through any print or it to improperly conduct business in the Philippines. The records are
broadcast media; bereft of any evidence which might lend even a hint of credence to
5) Maintaining a stock of goods in the Philippines solely for the DISI’s assertions. As such, Steelcase cannot be deemed to have been
purpose of having the same processed by another entity in the doing business in the Philippines through Modernform.
Philippines;
6) Consignment by a foreign entity of equipment with a local
Finally, both the CA and DISI rely heavily on the Dealer Performance
company to be used in the processing of products for export;
Expectation required by Steelcase of its distributors to prove that DISI
7) Collecting information in the Philippines; and
was not functioning independently from Steelcase because the same
8) Performing services auxiliary to an existing isolated contract of
imposed certain conditions pertaining to business planning,
sale which are not on a continuing basis, such as installing in the
organizational structure, operational effectiveness and efficiency, and
Philippines machinery it has manufactured or exported to the
financial stability. It is actually logical to expect that Steelcase, being
Philippines, servicing the same, training domestic workers to
one of the major manufacturers of office systems furniture, would
operate it, and similar incidental services.
require its dealers to meet several conditions for the grant and
continuation of a distributorship agreement. The imposition of minimum
From the preceding citations, the appointment of a distributor in the standards concerning sales, marketing, finance and operations is
Philippines is not sufficient to constitute "doing business" unless it is nothing more than an exercise of sound business practice to increase
under the full control of the foreign corporation. On the other hand, if sales and maximize profits for the benefit of both Steelcase and its
the distributor is an independent entity which buys and distributes distributors. For as long as these requirements do not impinge on a
products, other than those of the foreign corporation, for its own name distributor’s independence, then there is nothing wrong with placing
and its own account, the latter cannot be considered to be doing reasonable expectations on them.
business in the Philippines.  It should be kept in mind that the
determination of whether a foreign corporation is doing business in the
All things considered, it has been sufficiently demonstrated that DISI
Philippines must be judged in light of the attendant circumstances.
was an independent contractor which sold Steelcase products in its
own name and for its own account. As a result, Steelcase cannot be
In the case at bench, it is undisputed that DISI was founded in 1979 considered to be doing business in the Philippines by its act of
and is independently owned and managed by the spouses Leandro appointing a distributor as it falls under one of the exceptions under
and Josephine Bantug. In addition to Steelcase products, DISI also R.A. No. 7042.
distributed products of other companies including carpet tiles,
relocatable walls and theater settings. The dealership agreement

MICHAELA GARCIA | CONFLICT OF LAWS | ATTY. MARK DEL ROSARIO

13
 WANG LABORATORIES, INC. V. MENDOZA, 156 SCRA 44 (1987) ISSUE: WON respondent Court has acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioner, a foreign corporation [YES]

FACTS: Petitioner WANG LABORATORIES INC. is a corporation duly

organized under the laws of the United States engaged in the business RULING: There are three modes of effecting service of summons upon
of manufacturing and selling computers worldwide. In the Philippines, private foreign corporations as provided for in Section 14, Rule 7 of the
petitioner sells its products to EXXBYTE TECHNOLOGIES Rules of Court, to wit:
CORPORATION, its exclusive distributor. EXXBYTE is a domestic
corporation engaged in the business of selling computer products to 1) by serving upon the agent designated in accordance with law to
the public in its own name for its own account. accept service of summons;
2) if there is no resident agent, by service on the government official
ANGARA, CONCEPCION, REGALA & CRUZ LAW OFFICES is a designated by law to that office; and
duly registered professional partnership and it entered into a contract 3) by serving on any officer or agent of said corporation within the
with EXXBYTE for acquisition and installation of a Wang 2200 US Philippines.
Integrated Information System at the former's office. As stipulated in
the above-said contract, a letter of credit for US$ 86,142.55 was Summons intended for the petitioner was served on EXXBYTE at its
thereafter opened by ACCRALAW in favor of petitioner herein to pay office in Makati, Metro Manila as its duly authorized and exclusive
for the Wang 2200 US System. Sometime in May 1981, the hardware representative and distributor in the Philippines. Petitioner opposed
was delivered and installed by EXXBYTE in ACCRALAW's office. such service and filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction on its person, being a foreign corporation not engaged in
ACCRALAW and EXXBYTE entered into another contract for the business in the Philippines. Evidence presented by private respondent
development of a data processing software program needed to however, shows that contrary to petitioner's allegations, the various
computerize the ACCRALAW office. public advertisements of WANG and EXXBYTE clearly show that
Wang has appointed EXXBYTE, which is domiciled in the Philippines,
as its authorized exclusive representative in this country. In fact,
Subsequent thereto and for one reason or the other, the contract for WANG represents that its office in the Philippines is EXXBYTE, while
the development of a data processing software program or ISLA was the letterhead of EXXBYTE and its invoices show that it is WANG's
not implemented. representative. Moreover, in its Reply to Opposition to Motion to
Dismiss, WANG itself admitted that it deals exclusively with EXXBYTE
ACCRALAW filed a complaint for breach of contract with damages, in the sale of its products in the Philippines.
replevin and attachment against herein petitioner in the RTC of Makati.
In any event, as previously stated, private respondent moved
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground that further, ex abundante cautela, for leave to effect extraterritorial service
there was improper service of summons, hence, the court below had of summons on petitioner WANG. Private respondent presented to the
not obtained jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. Court documentary evidence proving that the defendant Wang has
properties in the Philippines consisting of trademarks registered with
the Philippine Patent Office and that WANG designated Rafael E.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Deposition by Oral Examination for the Evangelists of 638 Philippine Banking Building, Ayala Avenue, Makati,
purpose of presenting testimonial evidence in support of its motion to Metro Manila as its Resident Agent upon whom notice or process
dismiss. The respondent court thereafter ordered the taking of the affecting the mark may be served. The same counsel represented
deposition by way of oral examination. petitioner in the oral deposition of Mr. Yeoh Asia Controller for Wang
Laboratories. Private respondent further showed that said trademarks
On February 21, 1985, petitioner filed its reply to the opposition to have been judicially attached. Petitioner in its Rejoinder to
motion to dismiss. On March 29, 1985, ACCRALAW filed an Ex- ACCRALAW's Reply, prays for the issuance of an order holding in
Abundante Cautela Motion for leave to Effect Extraterritorial Service of abeyance any and all proceedings relative to ACCRALAW's motion for
Summons on petitioner. leave of court to effect extraterritorial service of summons.

In an order dated April 24, 1985, respondent Judge Mendoza, among Petitioner insists on its argument that extra-judicial summons or any
others, granted the Ex-Abundante Cautela Motion to Effect kind thereof cannot bind the petitioner inasmuch as it is not doing
Extraterritorial Service of Summons, denied the petitioner's motion to business in the Philippines nor is it licensed to do business in the
dismiss on the ground that it had voluntarily submitted itself to the country.
jurisdiction of the court, and thus declined to consider the legal and
factual issues raised in the Motion to Dismiss. In the cases of Mentholatum Co., Inc. v. Mangaliman and Topweld
Manufacturing, Inc. v. Eced S.A. et al., it was held that no general
In its Motion to Dismiss, petitioner interposed that the court has no rule or governing principle can be laid down as to what constitutes
jurisdiction over its person primarily because it is a United States doing or "engaging" or "trading" in business. Indeed each case must be
corporation with principal address at One Industrial Avenue, Lowell, judged in the light of its peculiar environmental circumstances; upon
Massachusetts, U.S.A., is not domiciled in the Philippines, does not peculiar facts and upon the language of the Statute applicable.
have any office or place of business in the Philippines, is not licensed
to engage and is not engaging in business here. EXXBYTE upon Under the circumstances; petitioner cannot unilaterally declare that it is
whom summons was served on behalf of this defendant is a local not doing business in the Philippines. In fact, it has installed, at least 26
company entirely separate and distinct from and is not the different products in several corporations in the Philippines since 1976.
representative of the defendant. It has registered its trade name with the Philippine Patents Office (ibid)
and Mr. Yeoh who is petitioner's controller in Asia has visited the office
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: The court has no jurisdiction over its of its distributor for at least four times where he conducted training
person primarily because it is a United States corporation and is not programs in the Philippines. Wang has allowed its registered logo and
domiciled in the Philippines, does not have any office or place of trademark to be used by EXXBYTE and made it known that there
business in the Philippines, is not licensed to engage and is not exists a designated distributor in the Philippines as published in its
engaging in business here. advertisements.

EXXBYTE upon whom summons was served on behalf of this

defendant is a local company entirely separate and distinct from and is
not the representative of the defendant.

MICHAELA GARCIA | CONFLICT OF LAWS | ATTY. MARK DEL ROSARIO

14
Indeed it has been held that "where a single act or transaction of a Manufacturing Co., Inc. had been exported to the Philippines since
foreign corporation is not merely incidental or casual but is of such 1954.
character as distinctly to indicate a purpose to do other business in the
State, such act constitutes doing business within the meaning of
Due to the superior quality and widespread use of its products by the
statutes prescribing the conditions under which a foreign corporation
public, the same are well known to Filipino consumers under the trade
may be served with summons.
name Leviton Manufacturing Co., Inc. and trademark Leviton; that long
subsequent to the use of plaintiff's trademark and trade name in the
Be that as it may, the issue on the suability of foreign corporation Philippines, defendants began manufacturing and selling electrical
whether or not doing business in the Philippines has already been laid ballast, fuse and oval buzzer under the trademark Leviton and trade
to rest. The Court has categorically stated that although a foreign name Leviton Industries Co.; that Domingo Go, partner and general
corporation is not doing business in the Philippines, it may be sued for manager of defendant partnership, had registered with the Philippine
acts done against persons in the Philippines. Patent Office the trademarks Leviton Label and Leviton with respect to
ballast and fuse under Certificate of Registration Nos. SR-1132 and
15517, respectively, which registration was contrary to paragraphs (d)
Furthermore, even though petitioner objects to the jurisdiction of the
and (e) of Section 4 of RA 166, as amended, and violative of plaintiff's
Court over its person, the fact that it alleged non-jurisdictional grounds
right over the trademark Leviton; that defendants not only used the
in its pleadings indicates that it has waived lack of jurisdiction of the
trademark Leviton but likewise copied the design used by plaintiff in
court.
distinguishing its trademark; and that the use thereof by defendants of
its products would cause confusion in the minds of the consumers and
Petitioner Wang in its Motion to Dismiss sought affirmative reliefs likely to deceive them as to the source of origin, thereby enabling
requiring the exercise of jurisdiction, by praying: (1) for authority to take defendants to pass off their products as those of plaintiff's. Invoking the
testimony by way of deposition upon oral examination; (2) for extension provisions of Section 21-A of Republic Act No. 166, plaintiff prayed for
of time to file opposition to plaintiffs' motion to effect Extraterritorial damages. It also sought the issuance of a writ of injunction to prohibit
Service of Summons; (3) to hold in abeyance any and all proceedings defendants from using the trade name Leviton Industries, Co. and the
relative to plaintiffs' foregoing motion and (4) to consider as a mere trademark Leviton.
scrap of paper plaintiff's motion to strike out Deposition.
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause
In addition, the records show that petitioner also prayed for: (1) of action, drawing attention to the plaintiff's failure to allege therein its
authority to reset date of taking of deposition; (2) admission of the capacity to sue under Section 21-A of Republic Act No. 166, as
formal stenographic notes and (3) suspension of time to file responsive amended. After the filing of the plaintiff's opposition and the
pleadings, not to mention its various participation in the proceedings in defendant's reply, the respondent judge denied the motion on the
the court other than for the purpose of objecting to lack of jurisdiction. ground that the same did not appear to be indubitable. On September
21, 1973, defendants filed their answer, reiterating the ground
supporting their motion to dismiss. Thereafter, defendants served upon
In fact, it is well settled that "A voluntary appearance is a waiver of the plaintiff a request for admission under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, of
necessity of formal notice." Thus, it has been held that when the the following matters of fact, among others:
appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction
of the court over the person it must be for the sole and separate
purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the Court. If the appearance (3) That plaintiff has no license to do business in the
is for any other purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted Philippines under and by virtue of the provision of Act
himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance gives the No. 1459, better known as the Philippine Corporation
court jurisdiction over the person. Clarifying further, the Court has Law, at the time it filed the complaint.
likewise ruled that even though the defendant objects to the jurisdiction
of the Court, if at the same time he alleges any non-jurisdictional
Complying with the said request, plaintiff admitted:
ground for dismissing the action, the Court acquires jurisdiction over
him.
That it does not manufacture ballasts; that it has not registered its
trademark in the Philippine Patent Office, but has filed with the same
office an application of its trade mark on April 16, 1971; and that it has
no license to do business in the Philippines.

On the basis of these admissions, defendants filed an Urgent

Supplemental Motion to Dismiss. This was followed by the plaintiff's
opposition, and the defendant's rejoinder.

CFI: issued the questioned order denying the motion

LEVITON INDUSTRIES V. SALVADOR, 114 SCRA 420 (1982)
ISSUE: WON respondent Leviton Marketing Co., Inc. has capacity to
sue before Philippine courts [NO]
FACTS: On April 17, 1973, private respondent LEVITON
MANUFACTURING CO., INC. filed a complaint for unfair competition
against petitioners LEVITON INDUSTRIES, NENA DE LA CRUZ LIM, RULING: We agree with petitioners that respondent Leviton Marketing
DOMINGO GO AND LIM KIAT before the CFI of Rizal. Co., Inc. had failed to allege the essential facts bearing upon its
capacity to sue before Philippine courts. Private respondent's action is
squarely founded on Section 21-A of Republic Act No. 166, as
The complaint substantially alleges that plaintiff is a foreign corporation amended, which we quote:
organized and existing under the laws of the State of New York, United
States of America; that defendant Leviton Industries is a partnership
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines; while Sec. 21-A. Any foreign corporation or juristic person to which
defendants Nena de la Cruz Lim, Domingo Go and Lim Kiat are the a mark or tradename has been registered or assigned under
partners, with defendant Domingo Go acting as General Manager of this Act may bring an action hereunder for infringement, for
defendant Leviton Industries; that plaintiff, founded in 1906 by Isidor unfair competition, or false designation of origin and false
Leviton, is the largest manufacturer of electrical wiring devices in the description, whether or not it has been licensed to do
United States under the trademark Leviton, which various electrical business in the Philippines under Act numbered Fourteen
wiring devices bearing the trademark Leviton and trade name Leviton Hundred and Fifty-Nine, as amended, otherwise known as
the Corporation Law, at the time it brings the complaint;
Provided, That the country of which the said foreign

MICHAELA GARCIA | CONFLICT OF LAWS | ATTY. MARK DEL ROSARIO

15
 corporation or juristic person is a citizen, or in which it is Register. The Patent Office eventually issued an order dated March 3,
domiciled, by treaty, convention or law, grants a similar 1977 which states that:
privilege to corporate or juristic persons of the Philippines.
(As amended by R.A. No. 638)
xxx xxx xxx

Undoubtedly, the foregoing section grants to a foreign corporation,

... Considering that the mark was already registered in the
whether or not licensed to do business in the Philippines, the right to
Supplemental Register in favor of herein applicant, the Office
seek redress for unfair competition before Philippine courts. But the
has no other recourse but to allow the application, however,
said law is not without qualifications. Its literal tenor indicates as a
Reg. No. SR-2225 is now being contested in a Petition for
condition sine qua non the registration of the trade mark of the suing
Cancellation docketed as IPC No. 1046, still registrant is
foreign corporation with the Philippine Patent Office or, in the least, that
presumed to be the owner of the mark until after the
it be an asignee of such registered trademark. The said section further
registration is declared cancelled.
requires that the country, of which the plaintiff foreign corporation or
juristic person is a citizen or domicilliary, grants to Filipino corporations
or juristic entities the same reciprocal treatment, either thru treaty, Thereafter, Hemandas & Co. assigned to respondent GOBINDRAM
convention or law, HEMANDAS all rights, title, and interest in the trademark "CHEMISE
LACOSTE & DEVICE".
All that is alleged in private respondent's complaint is that it is a
foreign corporation. Such bare averment not only fails to comply On November 21, 1980, the petitioner filed its application for
with the requirements imposed by the aforesaid Section 21-A but registration of the trademark "Crocodile Device" (Application Serial No.
violates as well the directive of Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of 43242) and "Lacoste" (Application Serial No. 43241).The former was
Court that "facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be approved for publication while the latter was opposed by Games and
sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a Garments in Inter Partes Case No. 1658. In 1982, the petitioner filed a
representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized Petition for the Cancellation of Reg. No. SR-2225 (respondent’s).
association of persons that is made a party, must be averred."
On March 21, 1983, the petitioner filed with the NBI a letter-complaint
In the case at bar, private respondent has chosen to anchor its action alleging therein the acts of unfair competition being committed by
under the Trademark Law of the Philippines, a law which, as pointed Hemandas and requesting their assistance in his apprehension and
out, explicitly sets down the conditions precedent for the successful prosecution. The NBI conducted an investigation and search warrants
prosecution thereof. It is therefore incumbent upon private respondent were issued for violation of Article 189 of the RPC, "it appearing to the
to comply with these requirements or aver its exemption therefrom, if satisfaction of the judge after examining under oath applicant and his
such be the case. It may be that private respondent has the right to witnesses that there are good and sufficient reasons to believe that
sue before Philippine courts, but our rules on pleadings require Gobindram Hemandas ... has in his control and possession in his
that the necessary qualifying circumstances which clothe it with premises the ... properties subject of the offense.”
such right be affirmatively pleaded. And the REASON therefor, as
enunciated in "Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co., et al. versus Cebu
Hemandas filed a motion to quash the search warrants alleging that
Stevedoring Co., Inc” is that —
the trademark used by him was different from petitioner's trademark
and that pending the resolution of IPC No. 1658 before the Patent
these are matters peculiarly within the knowledge of Office, any criminal or civil action on the same subject matter and
appellants alone, and it would be unfair to impose upon between the same parties would be premature.
appellees the burden of asserting and proving the contrary. It
is enough that foreign corporations are allowed by law to
The petitioner filed its opposition to the motion arguing that the motion
seek redress in our courts under certain conditions: the
to quash was fatally defective as it cited no valid ground for the
interpretation of the law should not go so far as to include, in
quashal of the search warrants and that the grounds alleged in the
effect, an inference that those conditions had been met from
motion were absolutely without merit. The respondent court was,
the mere fact that the party sued is a foreign corporation.
however, convinced that there was no probable cause to justify the
issuance of the search warrants. Thus, it ordered that the search
It was indeed in the light of this and other considerations that warrants were recalled and set aside and the NBI agents or officers in
this Court has seen fit to amend the former rule by requiring custody of the seized items were ordered to return the same to
in the revised rules (Section 4, Rule 8) that "facts showing Hemandas.
the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a
party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the
HEMANDAS’ CONTENTION: Hemandas argues in his comment on
legal existence of an organized association of persons that is
the petition for certiorari that the petitioner being a foreign corporation
made a party, must be averred.
failed to allege essential facts bearing upon its capacity to sue before
Philippine courts. He states that not only is the petitioner not doing
LA CHEMISE LACOSTE, S.A .V. FERNANDEZ, 129 SCRA 373 business in the Philippines but it also is not licensed to do business in
(1984) the Philippines. He also cites the case of Leviton Industries v.
Salvador (114 SCRA 420) to support his contention.

FACTS: Petitioner LA CHEMISE LACOSTE S.A. is a foreign ISSUE: WON petitioner can sue in Philippine courts, given that is not
corporation, organized and existing under the laws of France and not doing business in the country [YES]
doing business in the Philippines. It is undeniable from the records
that it is the actual owner of the abovementioned trademarks used on
clothing and other goods specifically sporting apparels sold in many RULING: The Leviton  case, involved a complaint for unfair
parts of the world and which have been marketed in the Philippines competition under Section 21-A of Republic Act No. 166. In said case,
since 1964, The main basis of the private respondent's case is its claim it was held that it is therefore, necessary for the foreign
of alleged prior registration. corporation to comply with these requirements or aver why it
should be exempted from them, if such was the case. The foreign
corporation may have the right to sue before Philippine courts,
In 1975, HEMANDAS & CO., a duly licensed domestic firm applied for but our rules on pleadings require that the qualifying
and was issued Reg. No. SR-2225 (SR stands for Supplemental circumstances necessary for the assertion of such right should
Register) for the trademark "CHEMISE LACOSTE & CROCODILE first be affirmatively pleaded.
DEVICE" by the Philippine Patent Office for use on T-shirts,
sportswear and other garment products of the company. 2 years later,
it applied for the registration of the same trademark under the Principal

MICHAELA GARCIA | CONFLICT OF LAWS | ATTY. MARK DEL ROSARIO

16
In contradistinction, the present case involves a complaint for act in its name but in the name of the foreign firm the latter is
violation of Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code. doing business in the Philippines.
The Leviton case is not applicable.
Applying the above provisions to the facts of this case, we find
In essence: and conclude that the petitioner is not doing business in the
Philippines. Rustan is actually a middleman acting and
transacting business in its own name and or its own account and
LEVITON LA CHEMISE not in the name or for the account of the petitioner.
Complaint for unfair competition Complaint for Unfair
under Section 21-A of RA No. competition, fraudulent
166 registration of trademark, But even assuming the truth of the private respondent's allegation
tradename or service mark, that the petitioner failed to allege material facts in its petition
fraudulent designation of origin, relative to capacity to sue, the petitioner may still maintain the
and false description. present suit against respondent Hemandas. As early as 1927, this
Not a criminal case Criminal case Court was, and it still is, of the view that a foreign corporation not
doing business in the Philippines needs no license to sue before
Philippine courts for infringement of trademark and unfair
Hemandas argued that the petitioner was doing business in the competition. Thus, in Western Equipment and Supply Co. v.
Philippines but was not licensed to do so. To support this argument, he Reyes (51 Phil. 115), this Court held that a foreign corporation which
states that the applicable ruling is the case of Mentholatum Co., Inc. has never done any business in the Philippines and which is
v. Mangaliman: where Mentholatum Co. Inc., a foreign corporation unlicensed and unregistered to do business here, but is widely and
and Philippine-American Drug Co., the former's exclusive distributing favorably known in the Philippines through the use therein of its
agent in the Philippines filed a complaint for infringement of trademark products bearing its corporate and tradename, has a legal right to
and unfair competition against the Mangalimans. maintain an action in the Philippines to restrain the residents and
inhabitants thereof from organizing a corporation therein bearing the
The argument has no merit. The Mentholatum  case is distinct same name as the foreign corporation, when it appears that they have
from and inapplicable to the case at bar. Philippine American Drug personal knowledge of the existence of such a foreign corporation, and
Co., Inc., was admittedly selling products of its principal Mentholatum it is apparent that the purpose of the proposed domestic corporation is
Co., Inc., in the latter's name or for the latter's account. Thus, this to deal and trade in the same goods as those of the foreign
Court held that "whatever transactions the Philippine-American Drug corporation.
Co., Inc. had executed in view of the law, the Mentholatum Co., Inc.,
did it itself. And, the Mentholatum Co., Inc., being a foreign doing Our recognizing the capacity of the petitioner to sue is not by any
business in the Philippines without the license required by means novel or precedent setting. Our jurisprudence is replete with
Section 68 of the Corporation Law, it may not prosecute this cases illustrating instances when foreign corporations not doing
action for violation of trademark and unfair competition." business in the Philippines may nonetheless sue in our courts.
In East Board Navigation Ltd, v. Ysmael and Co., Inc. (102 Phil. 1),
In the present case, however, the petitioner is a foreign we recognized a right of foreign corporation to sue on isolated
corporation not doing business in the Philippines. The marketing transactions. In General Garments Corp. v. Director of Patents (41
of its products in the Philippines is done through an exclusive SCRA 50), we sustained the right of Puritan Sportswear Corp., a
distributor, Rustan Commercial Corporation The latter is an foreign corporation not licensed to do and not doing business in the
independent entity which buys and then markets not only products of Philippines, to file a petition for cancellation of a trademark before the
the petitioner but also many other products bearing equally well-known Patent Office.
and established trademarks and tradenames. in other words, Rustan is
not a mere agent or conduit of the petitioner. More important is the nature of the case which led to this petition.
What preceded this petition for certiorari was a letter complaint
In essence: filed before the NBI charging Hemandas with a criminal offense,
i.e., violation of Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code. If
prosecution follows after the completion of the preliminary
MENTHOLATUM CO. LA CHEMISE investigation being conducted by the Special Prosecutor the
Foreign corporation doing Foreeign corporation NOT doing information shall be in the name of the People of the Philippines
business in the Philippines business in the Philippines and no longer the petitioner which is only an aggrieved party
without a license since a criminal offense is essentially an act against the State. It
is the latter which is principally the injured party although there is
a private right violated. Petitioner's capacity to sue would
The rules and regulations promulgated by the Board of Investments
become, therefore, of not much significance in the main case. We
pursuant to its rule-making power under Presidential Decree No.
cannot snow a possible violator of our criminal statutes to escape
1789, otherwise known as the Omnibus Investment Code, support
prosecution upon a far-fetched contention that the aggrieved
a finding that the petitioner is not doing business in the Philippines.
party or victim of a crime has no standing to sue.
Rule I, Sec. 1 (g) of said rules and regulations defines "doing
business" as one" which includes, inter alia:
In upholding the right of the petitioner to maintain the present suit
before our courts for unfair competition or infringement of trademarks
(1) ... A foreign firm which does business through
of a foreign corporation, we are moreover recognizing our duties and
middlemen acting on their own names, such as indentors,
the rights of foreign states under the PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE
commercial brokers or commission merchants, shall not be
PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY to which the Philippines
deemed doing business in the Philippines. But such
and France are parties. We are simply interpreting and enforcing a
indentors, commercial brokers or commission merchants
solemn international commitment of the Philippines embodied in a
shall be the ones deemed to be doing business in the
multilateral treaty to which we are a party and which we entered into
Philippines.
because it is in our national interest to do so.

(2) Appointing a representative or distributor who is

In Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T Eaton Co. (234 F. 2d 633) the United
domiciled in the Philippines, unless said representative or
States Circuit Court of Appeals had occasion to comment on the
distributor has an independent status, i.e., it transacts
extraterritorial application of the Paris Convention.
business in its name and for its account, and not in the name
or for the account of a principal Thus, where a foreign firm is
represented by a person or local company which does not By the same token, the petitioner should be given the same
treatment in the Philippines as we make available to our own

MICHAELA GARCIA | CONFLICT OF LAWS | ATTY. MARK DEL ROSARIO

17
citizens. We are obligated to assure to nationals of "countries of Thereafter, petitioner through counsel sent a demand letter to Chin
the Union" an effective protection against unfair competition in San at his Philippine address but again, no response was made
the same way that they are obligated to similarly protect Filipino thereto. Hence, on October 18, 1984, petitioner instituted in the court
citizens and firms. below an action seeking "the enforcement of its just and valid claims
against private respondent, who is a local resident, for a sum of money
based on a transaction which was perfected, executed and
Pursuant to this obligation, the Ministry of Trade on November 20,
consummated abroad."
1980 issued a MEMORANDUM addressed to the Director of the
Patents Office directing the latter:
In his answer to the complaint, Chin San raised as affirmative
defenses: lack of cause of action, incapacity to sue and improper
xxx xxx xxx
venue.

... to reject all pending applications for Philippine registration

A day before the latter pre-trial date, Chin San filed a motion to dismiss
of signature and other world famous trademarks by
the case and to set the same for hearing the next day. The motion to
applicants other than its original owners or users.
dismiss was based on the grounds that petitioner had no legal capacity
to sue and that venue was improperly laid.
The conflicting claims over internationally known trademarks
involve such name brands as Lacoste, Jordache, Gloria
LOWER COURT: granted the motion to dismiss and held that Hang
Vanderbilt, Sasson, Fila, Pierre Cardin, Gucci, Christian Dior,
Lung Bank, Ltd. does not do business in the Philippines
Oscar de la Renta, Calvin Klein, Givenchy, Ralph Lauren,
Geoffrey Beene, Lanvin and Ted Lapidus.
Petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of said order but it was
denied for lack of merit
It is further directed that, in cases where warranted,
Philippine registrants of such trademarks should be asked to
surrender their certificates of registration, if any, to avoid ISSUE: WON Section 14 of the General Banking Act precludes
suits for damages and other legal action by the trademarks' petitioner from maintaining a suit before Philippine courts because it is
foreign or local owners or original users. a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines
despite the fact that it does not do business here
The memorandum is a clear manifestation of our avowed adherence to
a policy of cooperation and amity with all nations. It is not, as wrongly RULING: Private respondent correctly contends that since petitioner is
alleged by the private respondent, a personal policy of Minister Luis a bank, its capacity to file an action in this jurisdiction is governed by
Villafuerte which expires once he leaves the Ministry of Trade. For a the General Banking Act (Republic Act No. 337), particularly Section
treaty or convention is not a mere moral obligation to be enforced 14 thereof. In construing this provision, we adhere to the interpretation
or not at the whims of an incumbent head of a Ministry. It creates given by this Court to the almost identical Section 69 of the old
a legally binding obligation on the parties founded on the Corporation Law (Act No. 1459).
generally accepted principle of international law of pacta sunt
servanda  which has been adopted as part of the law of our land.
In a long line of cases, this Court has interpreted this last quoted
(Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 3). The memorandum reminds the
provision as not altogether prohibiting a foreign corporation not
Director of Patents of his legal duty to obey both law and treaty. It
licensed to do business in the Philippines from suing or maintaining an
must also be obeyed.
action in Philippine courts. What it seeks to prevent is a foreign
corporation doing business in the Philippines without a license
MY NOTES FROM IPL: from gaining access to Philippine courts. As elucidated
in Marshall-Wells Co. vs. Elser & Co., 46 Phil. 70:
Atty: What are the basis then since there is no Intellectual
Property Code yet in this case? â Memorandum and Paris The object of the statute was to subject the foreign
Convention corporation doing business in the Philippines to the
jurisdiction of its courts. The object of the statute was not to
prevent it from performing single acts but to prevent it from
Atty: What else is the basis of the case? â It is a criminal case. The
acquiring a domicile for the purpose of business without
State is now the offended or injured party.
taking the steps necessary to render it amenable to suit in
the local courts. The implication of the law is that it was
never the purpose of the Legislature to exclude a foreign
corporation which happens to obtain an isolated order for
business from the Philippines from securing redress from
Philippine courts, and thus, in effect, to permit persons to
avoid their contract made with such foreign corporation. The
HANG LUNG BANK, LTD., V. SAULOG, 201 SCRA 137 (1991) effect of the statute preventing foreign corporations from
doing business and from bringing actions in the local courts,
except on compliance with elaborate requirements, must not
FACTS: On July 18, 1979, petitioner HANG LUNG BANK, LTD., be unduly extended or improperly applied. It should not be
which was not doing business in the Philippines, entered into 2 construed to extend beyond the plain meaning of its terms,
continuing guarantee agreements with Cordova Chin San in Hongkong considered in connection with its object, and in connection
whereby the latter agreed to pay on demand all sums of money which with the spirit of the entire law.
may be due the bank from Worlder Enterprises to the extent of the total
amount of two hundred fifty thousand Hongkong dollars (HK
$250,000). The fairly recent case of Universal Shipping Lines vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, although dealing with the amended version of
Section 69 of the old Corporation Law, Section 133 of the Corporation
Worlder Enterprises having defaulted in its payment, petitioner filed in Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 68), but which is nonetheless apropos,
the Supreme Court of Hongkong a collection suit against Worlder states the rule succinctly: "it is not the lack of the prescribed license
Enterprises and Chin San. Summonses were allegedly served upon (to do business in the Philippines) but doing business without
Worlder Enterprises and Chin San at their addresses in Hongkong but license, which bars a foreign corporation from access to our
they failed to respond thereto. courts."

MICHAELA GARCIA | CONFLICT OF LAWS | ATTY. MARK DEL ROSARIO

18
Thus, we have ruled that a foreign corporation not licensed to do
business in the Philippines may file a suit in this country due to the
collision of two vessels at the harbor of Manilaand for the loss of goods
bound for Hongkong but erroneously discharged in Manila.

Indeed, the phraseologies of Section 14 of the General Banking Act

and its almost identical counterpart Section 69 of the old Corporation
Law are misleading in that they seem to require a foreign corporation,
including a foreign bank or banking corporation, not licensed to do
business and not doing business in the Philippines to secure a license
from the Securities and Exchange Commission before it can bring or
maintain an action in Philippine courts. To avert such misimpression,
Section 133 of the Corporation Code is now more plainly worded thus:

No foreign corporation transacting business in the

Philippines without a license, or its successors or assigns,
shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit
or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the
Philippines.

Under this provision, we have ruled that a foreign corporation may sue
in this jurisdiction for infringement of trademark and unfair competition
although it is not doing business in the Philippines because the
Philippines was a party to the Convention of the Union of Paris for the
Protection of Industrial Property. We even went further to say that a
foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines
may not be denied the right to file an action in our courts for an
isolated transaction in this country.

Since petitioner foreign banking corporation was not doing

business in the Philippines, it may not be denied the privilege of
pursuing its claims against private respondent for a contract
which was entered into and consummated outside the
Philippines. Otherwise we will be hampering the growth and
development of business relations between Filipino citizens and foreign
nationals. Worse, we will be allowing the law to serve as a protective
shield for unscrupulous Filipino citizens who have business
relationships abroad.

In its pleadings before the court, petitioner appears to be in a quandary

as to whether the suit below is one for enforcement or recognition of
the Hongkong judgment.

The complaint appears to be one of the enforcement of the Hongkong

judgment because it prays for the grant of the affirmative relief given by
said foreign judgment. Although petitioner asserts that it is merely
seeking the recognition of its claims based on the contract sued upon
and not the enforcement of the Hongkong judgment it should be noted
that in the prayer of the complaint, petitioner simply copied the
Hongkong judgment with respect to private respondent's liability.

However, a foreign judgment may not be enforced if it is not

recognized in the jurisdiction where affirmative relief is being sought.
Hence, in the interest of justice, the complaint should be considered as
a petition for the recognition of the Hongkong judgment under Section
50 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in order that the defendant,
private respondent herein, may present evidence of lack of jurisdiction,
notice, collusion, fraud or clear mistake of fact and law, if applicable.

MICHAELA GARCIA | CONFLICT OF LAWS | ATTY. MARK DEL ROSARIO

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