i | ee a 6 adContributors to this volume Itis the policy of WARSHIP to acquire the services of some of the world’s best-known ‘warship historians. Therefore most of the contributors to this volume are established authors and recognised authorities in their fields. Some of these are listed below. DK Brown isa prominent British naval architect, with a particular interest in Victorian warship design, TA Buxton lectures in naval architecture at the University of Newcastle, and has recently published a definitive work on British big-gun monitors, NJM Campbell has written on a wide range of technical and historical subjects; he has also made major contributions to the two volumes so far published of Conway's All the World’s Fighting Ships. Robert Dumas is a French naval researcher, currently working on a technical history of French battleships. Norman Friedman works for the Hudson Institute in New York, His many publications include Modern Warship Design and Development. Peter Hodges is a retired Royal Navy officer and an expert on weapon systems. With Norman Friedman he wrote Destroyer Weapons of World War I and his history of battleship main armament will be published shortly. John Jordan, a teacher by profession, has ‘made a particular study of contemporary warship design, including ships of the Warsaw Pact navies John Lambert is well-known for his detailed drawings of smaller warships and ‘gun mountings. John Roberts has published many articles, monographs and warship drawings. He is the co-author of British Battleships of World War 2, and has been editor of Warship since 1979, Robert L Scheina is the official historian of the US Coast Guard. He is also an authority on South American naval affairs, about which he has written extensively. Adam Smigielski is a young Polish naval architect who has written a number of articles for magazines in Poland and the West. He is also a fine draughtsman and contributed line drawings to Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships 1922-46. Edwin Sieche is an Austrian naval historian, author and translator. Larry Sowinski is an American modelmaker and an authority on camouflage, about which he has written two books.WARSHIP VOLUME III Edited by John Roberts Conway Maritime Press Naval Institute PressWARSHIP Volume III Managing Editor Robert Gardiner Editor John Roberts Art Editor Geoff Hunt © Conway Maritime Press Ltd 1979 Second Impression 1984 Allartiles published ln WARSIMIP are strictly copyright and may not be reproduced without the written consent ofthe publisher Published inthe UK by Conway Maritime Press Limited 24Bride Lane, Feet Sect, London ECIY 8DR, Published and distributed nthe United States of ‘America by The Naval Instiute Press Annapolis, Maryland 21402 Library of Congress Catalog No 7855455 UK ISBN 085177 208 8 [USA ISBN 0-87021-977-4 Manufactured inthe United KingdomContents Editorial (No 9) Frigate Design in the 18th Century Part 1 by ROBERT GARDINER THE KING GEORGE V class Part 1 by ROBERT DUMAS ‘TROMP by JOHN JORDAN HMS COCHRANE by JOHN ROBERTS Project Guppy by NORMAN FRIEDMAN A’sand A’s ‘TRIBAL class Frigates by PETER HODGES Warship Pictorial: PRINZ EUGEN British Super-Heavy Guns Part | by NJ MCAMPBELL Editorial (No 10) Shells at Sevastopol by D K BROWN Frigate Design in the 18th Century Part 2 by ROBERT GARDINER Warship Pictorial: LUPO ‘The US Fleet Carrier Design of 1945 by NORMAN FRIEDMAN VON DER TANN by JOHN ROBERTS ‘The KING GEORGE V class Part 2 by ROBERT DUMAS, T class Submarines Part 1 by JOHN LAMBERT British Super-Heavy Guns Part 2 by NJ MCAMPBELL Editorial (No 11) ‘The NEW ORLEANS class by NORMAN FRIEDMAN Imperial Russian Navy Cruiser VARYAG by ADAMSMIGIELSKI ‘The Helicopter Goes to War by ROBERT L SCHEINA Warship Pictorial: The German Navy in the 1870s MILNE by JOHN ROBERTS ‘The KING GEORGE V class Part 3 by ROBERT DUMAS British Super-Heavy Guns Part 3 by NJ MCAMPBELL T class Submarines Part 2. by JOHN LAMBERT. ‘The Padale Frigate GUADALOUPE by D K BROWN Book Reviews Editorial (No 12) ‘The First of the Super Carriers: USS UNITED STATES by NORMAN FRIEDMAN ‘The 18inch Gun in British Monitors by | A BUXTON ‘The KING GEORGE V class Part 4 by ROBERT DUMAS A’sand A’s P49 by JOHN ROBERTS U48— Germany’s Top-Scoring Submarine by PIERRE HERVIEUX Warship Pictorial: Guns of the Ironclads Frigate Design in the 18th Century Part 3 by ROBERT GARDINER British Super-Heavy Guns Part 4 by NJ MCAMPBELL, ‘Technical Topics: Roughness and Fouling by DK BROWN 107 110 123 135 145 146 154 168 174 180 182 196 202 21 213 217 218meatAfter guiding Warship through its carly years and seeing the magazine established as a leading journal Antony Preston has retired as editor of the magazine to follow up his many other interests in the field of aval journalism. Myself, as the new editor, and the other members of che staff of Warship wish him well with all his future projects. This edition of Warship sees the sstroduction of a letters page; although this is not strictly a correct, Gescription. We have called it A’s end A’s, the abbreviation of Alterations and Additions, which was used by the Admiralty’s design separtments to describe general modifications carried out to ‘warships during refit. This title is particularly appropriate as the column is intended primarily asa platform to provide additions and corrections to previously published material together with any information which is considered to be of general interest to our readers. in of this information is not restricted and may come from a reader's letter, an author (as emonstrated in this issue with Friedrich Prasky’s additions to his article in Warship 6), the staff of Warship or any other source. Friedrich Prasky’s list of the faults of the Viribus Unitis class brought to mind the fact that adverse criticism ‘of warship design, both past and present, has generally and often unfairly been directed at thei designers. The first British battlecruisers of the Invincible and Indefatigable classes for example have been described as ‘bad designs’ which sives the impression that the DNC’s Editorial department was in some way incompetent. In fact the main faults of these ships were the result of a bad specification for which Admiral Fisher and the other members of the Board of Admiralty were responsible. The design department produced exactly what was asked of them and in this respect the ships, can only be described as good designs. Many other factors outside the warship designer's control can also affect the quality of the finished product, principally financial restrictions and the competence of the shipyard which constructs the ship. Both these latter combined to reduce the quality of the Austro-Hungarian dreadnought Scent Istvan which might otherwise have been a first class vessel. The Viribus Unitis class, to which she belonged, were smaller ships than the designer would have wished which, combined with a heavy main armament,meant their stability and speed were less than might have been provided. Limited funds also prevented the setting up of a programme of underwater protection experiments, as were carried out by the majority of the other naval powers, and the torpedo defence system of the class suffered in consequence. These faults together with poor quality riveting ‘were major contributory factors in the loss of the Szent Istvan which capsized and sank after being. torpedoed in 1918 (see Warship 6) Asa result the designer, Siegfried Popper, was severely reprimanded which, considering the difficulties he had to overcome, was hardly fair. It is always best to consider all the possible origins of faults before hanging the designer from the nearest tree. ‘Amore recent example of financial restriction can be found in this issue in Peter Hodges description of the Tribal class frigates, although in this case the author does not direct his criticisms at Bath — which says much for the author and makes a pleasant change. John RobertsFIGURE 1: THE PARTS OF A WOODEN SHIP 1. HANGING KNEE (when positioned diagonally —to SosSeenme frre they were nown a cries 2. LODGING KNEE 3 DECK CLAMP (in French practice this was often more santa) 4. WATERWAY TIMBER (in French practice his was Suully mere substantial and often eated down onto eben 5. BECEIBAM (romed otto inbesurhed together 6. CARLINGS &: LepGes & KEEL, 5. KEELSON 10) FALSE REEL. TI, ATRAME (or Framed Bend, made up of to sets of fatto timbers bolted side by sie) The individual parts aressfolows hat toor i: floorimber (The two floor-tibers ofa fame, and thespace betwesn them and the nex pai, s known a {Poomrand space" ands crucl measurement of the lightness heaviness of construction in any vessel) Ist fttock Si, Dado ©: dndnumoce f, Athtuttck (obscured by the beam knees, but above the 2nd futock) shiek Top timbers iY Ghdek (Ihe French used a simple buttoint without a Chock to connet the fttock timbers this was no as sturdy) 12, FLOOR RIDERS (There were also riders igher up the hulfsides known asuttock riders" and Yop riers) FIGURE 2: INTERIOR CONSTRUCTIONAL DETAILS UPPER DECK BEAM HANGING KNEE. CHOCK IN THE THROAT OF KNEE, INTERCOSTAL PACKING AIRSPACE TO VENTILATE TIMBERS, DECK CLAMP OR BEAM SHELF INNER PLANKING. | SPIRKETTING WATERWAY 40, SECTION OF FRAME, AL. LODGING KNEE 12, VENTILATION SPACE 13, DECK CLAMP. 14, CEILING OR INNER PLANKING 16 SPIRKETTING 18, vw. 20, 21 INTERCOSTAL PACKING, REVERSE HANGING KNFE OR STANDARD ORLOP DECK BEAM (note no waterway on this deck) FLOOR RIDER BEAM CHOCK COMBINED WITH IRON BEAM KNEE BRACKET. 22, IRON WEDGES TO TAKE UP TRANSVERSE MOVEMENT (ie racking stresses) INTERCOSTAL PACKING GUN DECK BEAMS PART OF FRAME EXPOSED AT GUNPORT (note that not al small ships had ports on this deck) MAINWALE OUTER PLANKING: ‘This drawing was based on Keith Hobbs’ illustration in Model Shipwright 35 and was tedrawn with his permission. 1-12 represents standard English practice inthe period under {iseussion: 13 onwards Was practice adopted in the Royal Navy towards the end ofthe eighteenth century. but in some sways compares with mid-century French practice. In both teasesit was the result of shortages ofthe expensive ‘grown’ timer for prope knees, whichafeted the French NavyItmay come asa surprise to many to find that sailing warships can be treated in the same fashion as modem vessels ~ certainly very little of technical nature has ever been published. However, ships-of- the-line and frigates were built in classes, the vessels of which differed very little from one another, just ike modern warships, and their particulars, performance and development can be described in similar detail. The one major difference is that little of the design discussion has survived, if indeed it was ever written down. This is not to say that eighteenth century warships were not designed for specific functions, it was simply that what modern navies call ‘staff requirements’ did not change, were perfectly understood by all, and consequently were rarely even mentioned. This leaves the present-day historian with the difficult task of reconstructing the staff requirements’ from an analysis of the characteristics of the vessels themselves. While it would be possible to write about classes and their particulars, the ships themselves are ot well-known to modern readers, and the following general study of the differences between British and French frigate design is felt to be of more interest. Everybody who has read any naval history knows that jghteenth century French design is FRIGATE DESIGN INTHE 18th CENTURY PARTI BY ROBERT GARDINER supposed to be far superior, and that the chief means of improvement in the Royal Navy was copying captured vessels. The truth is very different, and as wi contemporary ships, it only proves how misleading comparisons can be, and how meaningless are terms like ‘better’ and ‘best’ when applied to ship design, Ultimately itis a question of what requirements and restraints were placed on the designer and how well he overcame them. Part I of this article covers the period of the 1744-48 war and is, concerned principally with constructional practices; Part 2 deals with the Seven Years War (1756-63) and design differences, and comparative sailing performances; while Part 3 is devoted to later vessels and the staff requirements of the two navies. ENGLISH CRUISER DESIGN 1700-1744 After the innovations of the late seventeenth century when the English had adopted long, low hulls and fine lines, supposedly inspired by Dunkirk privateers, there was a reversal of policy. These so-called “rigate-bul principles had been extended up the battle-order as far as third rates (60-70 gun ships) which started a tradition of complaint about crankness (ie instability) and lack of freeboard to the lower deck guns that lasted — with less and less justification —for more than half a century. It may have been that the English sacrificed other qualities for sheer speed: certainly these ships did not carry their guns well, were accused of decaying rapidly, and probably were less stable and seaworthy than their tactical usage required ‘An attempt was made to remedy these faults with the first proper ‘Establishment’ in 1706. The Establishments were designed to standardise ships and shipbuilding, by fixing the dimensions and scantlings (ie the sizes of structural timbers) for each rate. In 1706, 20 and 30 gun ships were not included but the first full Establishment was promulgated in 1719. England was at war with Spain and this probably provided the impetus towards improved and extended standardisation: it was certainly very thorough in its provisions and no other Establishment was ratified until England was again at war. The 1706 regulations had produced relatively beamier and hence more stable vessels, and the trend was continued in 1719. Judging by the details of the scantlings, robustness and seaworthiness seem to have been the requirements, which should have produced the durable, low-maintenance vessels that a peace-time administration would favour.A model of a 1741 Establishment 20 gun ship, Note te oarpots on the lower deck, the Smal ballast port amiships an the 2 unport aft of amshper The channels ae Felow the upper deck pors Earle 20 gun gushed byte lower ‘deck gnports being uth svey separated on 173 ships and on 1719 Ships there were'nogunports ata on the lower deck. Nua ‘The Establishments are always ctiticised for discouraging innovation, but the real reason for the slow rate of improvement in the 1720s and ’30s was the absence of the incentive of war. Moreover, the Establishments laid down dimensions and scantlings and concerned themselves with the structure of the ships but allowed considerable leeway in designing the bull form. This was exploited particularly for small ships which in eace-time were the rates most ‘equently employed and whose relative cheapness would not discourage experiment. Alterations to the Establishment were proposed in 1733, most ships having their beams increased to give all ships the same length-to-breadth ratio. Although not ratified most new vessels were built to these specifications and these were the newest vessels in service when war with Spain broke out in 1739. It was soon obvious that what had been adequate in 1719 was outclassed twenty years later. Warships of equivalent rates in Continental navies had grown in size and possessed superior sailing qualities and, in the earlier years of the war, English cruisers had little success. Asan interim measure, increased dimensions were proposed in 1741 and, although again not signed by the King in Council, were widely adopted. It was the first general increase in length since 1719 and, for the 60 gun ships since 1691! (Since speed and waterline length are related itis interesting that so many French frigates were captured by 60s or 64s—see Table 1 — relatively, the longest ships in the Navy, Proportionally the 20 gun 8 enjoyed the largest increase, in icating perhaps that they were most in need off. Certainly they ‘were much smaller than the next rate, the 40s, since the 30s proposed in 1719 were not built and thereafter the class lapsed. However, it was not just size that was the problem with the sixth rates, since they were built to a clumsy two-decked design. The lower deck — for historical reasons called the ‘Gun Deck’ ~ only had ports for 2 gunsa side, the remaining space being taken up with oar ports, but this deck had to be far enough above the waterline to allow the guns to be worked when the ship was heeling or rolling in a seaway. This meant that the “Upper Deck’ —in effect, the main gun deck — was even higher out of, the water, with the resulting problems of stability and windage caused by the relatively tall hull sides. This otherwise irrational disposition of armament had one advantage in that it allowed a few larger guns to be carried low down in small ships. The earlier English 24s sometimes carried a pair of 9pdrs on the Gun Deck to supplement their Upper Deck 6pdrs, and the French built a number of demi-batterie frigates of 28 to 36 guns with between 8 and 12 guns of 8 or 12pdr calibre on the Gun Deck beneath an Upper Deck armament of 6pdrs. However, France also built smaller vessels with one gun deck, below which there was sometimes another complete deck clear of any ports. This deck was placed at or below the waterline which resulted ina hull with lower topsides and potentially greater stability. In 1744 France launched the first of these, La Medeée of 26 guns, thus introducing what came to be accepted as the true ‘frigate-form’, twas this type of vessel which opposed the obsolescent and inadequate English 20 and 24 gun ships when France entered the War of Austrian Succession in 1744, FRENCH CRUISERS CAPTURED 1744-1748 During the course of the war a number of French cruisers corresponding in size to English fifth and sixth rates were captured and the more important of these are listed in Table 1. These vessels wereFRENCH FRIGATES CAPTURED 1744-48 TABLE 1 Nene Tonnage Armament Captured ‘A: PRIVATEERS, LEOPARD 438 22x 9par 270 1746by (Margate) 228 9pdr,2.x4pdr Windsor, 60 DUCDECHARTRES 354 32,calibreunknown 18 Jan 1976 by (nverness) 20% 9%pdr2x3pdr— Edinburgh, 64 TYGRE 576 26x 9pdr 23 Feb 1747 by (not brought in) Fatkdand, 44 BELLONE, sat 36,calibre unknown. Feb L747 by (Beliona) 24x 9pdr,6x4pdr Nottingham, 60 DEUX COURONNES 639 24x 9pdr 5 May 1747 by (Ranger) 24x 9%pdr.6x4pdr Gloucester, 50 : NATIONAL FRIGATES MEDEE, 6702 26x 9par 4 April 1744 by (Boscawen, privateer) > Dreadnought, 60 DAUPHIN’ 395 24,calibre unknown Jan 1747 by (Richmond) 2 Admical Townsend's sad FAVORETTE m4 30,calibreunknown Jan 1747 by (Mediay’s Price) ? Medivay, 60 PANTHERE 481 20,calbre unknown ‘July 1747 by (Amazon) 24 6pdr Monmouth, 64 EMBUSCADE 746 40,calbre unknown 21 April 1746 by (Ambuscade) 26x I2pdr, 14 6pdr Defiance, 60 SuBTILE, 2 26,calibre unknown —-19Nov 1746 by (not brougi in) Portland, 50 RENOMMEE, 669 30,calibre unknown 27 Sept 1747 by (Renown) 24x 9pdr,6x-4pdr Dover, 44 CASTOR 6s 26 30 Oct 1747 by (not brougtu in) Hampshire, 0 Name and armament in italics is as borne in the Royal Navy. By way of comparison English 24 gun ships were 498 tons (1741 Exabishment} or 08 fons (1743 Establishment x 3pdr. The earlier sixth rates of the 1733 Establishment measured 429 tons and carried 20 x 6pdr. jand mounted 22 x 9pdr and surveyed in detail and most of the surveys survive, In most cases a combination of the information from this source and from the Progress Books, which detail the extent, cost and duration of repairs and refits, gives a clear picture of the construction of these vessels. ‘The most outstanding feature of the surveys, however, is the repetition of the same criticisms of all vessels. From the consistency of this critique, it becomes obvious that French and English styles of construction were radically different, The surveyors’ basic comments on French ships can be summarised as follows: 1. The internal arrangements were inadequate for Royal Navy warships. They had too few cabins, platforms in the hold, store rooms ‘or magazines; some could not stow enough provisions and others did not have satisfactory messing arrangements. 2. They were too lightly built, with insufficient scantling and deck beams and frame timbers too far apart. 3. They were too lightly fastened, being short on structural members enerally and beam knees Support ig brackets) in particular. Each frame, knee or beam had too few fastenings either bolts, nails or treenails (oak pegs). They were shoddily built of iferior timber and second-rate workmanship, crudely finished. Furthermore, instead of treenails 5 and bolts, too much use was made of iron nails which corroded and to the condition known as il-sickness’, a diagnosis frequently applied to ailing French warships. 5. This gave rise to the final accusation, that French ships were not built to last and consequently were costly to maintain, Each of these assertions is worth alittle more attention. Internal Arrangements. To some extent this simply reflects different practices in the two navies, the Royal Navy, for example, preferring ‘magazines aft where they were considered drier. However, the French Navy seems to have pai less attention to the requirements of Jong periods at sea and in particular the well-being of the crew. Light Building. When taken with the accusation of light fastening, this is a criticism of central importance to the understanding of the French style of construction. All wooden ships’ hulls distorted to some extent during their lives but the more lightly they were built the more rapidly this would occur and the more serious the resulting hogging, sagging or racking (transverse distortion). The essence of ‘light’ or ‘heavy’ building is the scantling of the frame timbers and the distance between them, which in shipwrights’ terminology is known as ‘room- and-space’. This also applied to deck beams and generally the lack of longitudinal strength was considered hall mark of French construction. The speed of many vessels was associated with this light style of building but paradoxically the better sailing qualities of such ships was quickly destroyed when the hull hogged and/or warped. Similarly, the stress on these delicate hulls must have been a major factor in the lack of duration also attributed to French frigates. Light Fastening, Surveying officers were often ordered explicitly to take particular account of the fastening of French prizes and of the ironwork in general. The most fundamental problem was the French system of attaching the beams to the side of the ship, which employed a longitudinal deckclamp6 below the beam, a rebated waterway above and sometimes hanging (ie vertical) knees. The strength of the beam/hull side joint decided much of the ship’s transverse rigidity and also decided the weight of armament a deck could carry and so the Royal Navy felt its system of substantial hanging and lodging (horizontal) knees was eminently superior. French hulls tended to suffer from the effects of their own gunfire and the strains of the masts and rigging, Therefore, French ships had fewer guns and less lofty masts and spars for a given tonnage than equivalent Engli vessels onicaly, because oftheir robust construction which could stand the higher ratio of guns, English vessels have been regarded as over-gunned. Shoddy Building. The Royal Dockyards set very high standards, they frequently criticised the English commercial shipbuilders ~ and there are frequent references in the surveys to the French use of poor materials (mainly softwoods) and inadequate seasoning, or dubious practices such as short scarph-joints, Many common French techniques, such as the butt-jointing of the futtock timbers ina frame (as opposed to the English use of scarphs and chocks) was considered shoddy. Never- theless many of these reviled Gallic shortcomings were little more than further extensions of the desire to build a hull as lightly as possible, which goes to strengthen the feeling that light construction was a response to some officially sanctioned ‘staff requirement’ Lack of Duration. The surveys reiterate that because these ships are lightly built they will soon deteriorate and will either cost a lot to refit or will be very quickly rendered unserviceable. Certainly many of the Freneh prizes enjoyed very short active careers by English standards —indeed, some as short as, 5 years. ‘This, then, was the accepted view of French frigates among the Navy's administrators but itis not the one known to history. This is partly explained by the case of the French 30 gun frigate Favorette. In January 1745 Favorette surrendered to the Medway, 60, and became known as the Medway's Prize, a common if unimaginative way of naming captured vessels. Her captor, Commodore Burmett, wrote to the Navy Board saying that she was a fine ship and although only mounting 30 guns, was a strong, well-built vessel which, with little expense, could be macle into a proper (two-decked) 44 gun ship. Being on a foreign station (the West Indies) Burnett was not open to contradition but a survey carried out in September 1749 after Medway’s Prize returned to England found her to be a weak ship, particularly in the upper works (she would never have carried the additional topsides necessary to make her a 44); with no plaiforms or storerooms in the fore hold, the beams only rebated into thick pieces of timber and the sheer much broken (ie the hull was bad hogged). Furthermore, the French reputation for poor durability and high maintenance costs led the surveyors to claim that the ship “being a French bottom (ie hull), will require a middling if not a large repair’ This case - which has innumerable parallels clearly demonstrates why historians should be sceptical of claims made by captors about design, construction and sailing qualities. It was in the captor’s interest to exaggerate the prize’s performance, since this ‘magnified his achievement in bringing her to battle and, knowing the Navy Board’s concern with the material aspects of ship design, construction was always said to be strong and in healthy condition. The captor was also a salesman for his prize since he stood to earn far more if bought by the Navy than if sold to a commercial concern. This is also true of the distant commanders-in-chief who took a share of any prize-money made on their station and also had the power to ‘buy in’ any prizes they thought worthy. Whereas in England the surveying officers reported directly toa disinterested Navy Board, on foreign stations the surveyors w responsible to the local commander-in-chief who, consequently, could influence the valuation. Naturally, to allay suspicion, the commanders always reported that the prizes were worth the money. ‘The Navy Board was not fooled and periodically complained to the Admiralty about the practice but there was no easy alternative and nothing was done. Unfortunately, most naval history concerns itself with either biography or the larger issues of tactics and strategy, and in both areas the correspondence of sea-officers is widely used. This tends to give a one-sided view of technical matters to a historian concerned with other aspects and a lack of understanding of the interest behind the sea-officers’ praise has led to the widespread acceptance of the myth of over-whelming French design superiority throughout the eighteenth century. This snot to say that France did not build ships which found favour in England and the Panthére captured in July 1745 is.a case in point. A full survey was not transmitted to the Admiralty but when their Lordships queried the twenty-four 6pdrs suggested by the Navy Board (the Admiralty wanted Spars), the Navy Board quoted the survey assessment that Amazon, as she was renamed, was ‘not so strong built as the English 24 gun ships, her masts being taunter (taller) in proportion’ which would not stand the strain of 9pdrs without damage to the fabric of the hull and her performance under sail. Once again itis a case of the light construction of the French vessel preventing her being armed with the same weight of metal as an English ship of the same tonnage id the Navy Board, realising that the style of construction was an integral feature of the design, was reluctant to alter the balance of the design, The largest frigate captured during the 1744-48 war was the Embuscade, 40 guns, taken by the Defiance, 60,0n 21 April 1746. The survey of this vessel complained of the usual lack of beam knees and fastenings in the spirketting and clamps but, although the deck was planked with fir and the fastenings ‘made too little use of treenails, the surveying officers concluded that “the works are very well wrought’.However, in her state of repair she seemed 2°3 years old whereas she ‘was hardly more than a year from launching. Once again the Navy Board, anxious not to damage the qualities of the French ship, suggested an armament o! ‘owenty-six Opdrs, ten 6pdrs on the quarterdeck and four more on the forecastle, ‘as the said ship is not so strongly built as the English ‘Your gun ships’, the nearest equivalent in rating and tonnage, although not in armament. Consequently the Admiralty insisted on the substitution of 12pdrs for the 9pdrs. Captain Powlett of the Defiance, not enjoying the lax surveying. standards of a foreign station, had his prize valued at less than his own estimate and disputed the price. The ship was resurveyed and the second survey is worth quoting at some length because it is more explicit in its exposition of the differences between English and French practice. ‘The surveyors observed that ‘there isa great difference in the manner of her building to the methods practiced in the English Navy, great deficiencies in the strength, and as we conceive, in the duration of ships built with foreign timber.’ She suffered from the usual deficiencies of too great a distance between frames and insufficient beam knees, breast hooks, transom knees and fastenings. Five lower deck beams were not kneed at all and the rest had only one dagger knee with two bolts in each arm, ‘which although they have a waterway pricked down (rebated), bolted through the sides and beams, itis not equal to our manner of having one hanging and one lodging knee to each end of the beam, bolted with ten bolts through the side and the beam. Spirketting, clamps and works in general are slightly fasteried. The upper deck has not a sufficient number of knees, and bolts. The quarterdeck has no Knees to the beams, trusting to a Gin waterway let down on the beams and bolted through the side and to the beams, which we judge is not sufficient to carry a proper weight of metal as beams kneed in His Majesty's ships.’ Furthermore, the underwater planking was fastened with iron nails and the topsides were lower than HM ships, which would make her wetter in a seaway or on a wind, Apart from shoddy workmanship, all the other standard criticisms are expounded and at length. La Subiile of 26 guns was taken by the Portland, 50, in December 1746. Although she was not very old there was considerable decay in her frames and she could only be fitted for 3-4 years’ service without a Great Repair. Since they estimated that the necessary work would cost £7. 2s, 0d. per ton — more than a new 24 gun ship ~ they did not recomment purchase. However, they made an interesting suggestion: should the Admiralty ‘want ‘the preserving of her body" (that is, hull form) they proposed having 2 merchant yard replace the defective timbers, and keep strictly to the present scantlings, shape of the body, and dimensions of her masts, yards and sails.’ This reveals an awareness that the Admiralty was on the look-out for a new model for a small cruiser-design. ‘The attention to the details of scantling and spar dimensions also demonstrates that the Navy Board regarded a ship design asa physical entity — not just a hull shape but a hull of particular style of construction. Probably the best known of all the small cruisers captured in thi war was the Renomuné, a 669 ton, 30 gun vessel of the new frigate orm, taken on 27 September 1747 by the Dover, 44 guns. The survey, carried out with regard to having t© make the fewest possible alterations, called attention to the lack of lodging knees and fastenings to the beams and to the distance between beams but on the other hand was favourably impressed by the frames: ‘are all framed bends in the French manner, both timbers as joined are from Lit 2in to Ift 6in and in the room between from 4in to Tin’ which was much closer than usual French cruiser practice. Furthermore, they found the ship ‘well built’ and having ‘that appearance, and a very promising body for going, and common fame says she Outsailed everything...” Renown, as she was renamed, became a favourite cruiser having a longer career than any of the other frigates under discussion, finally being broken up in May 1771. This may appear to contradict the French reputation for lack of durability but Renown’s upkeep was in 1751 it was found that she wanted a S-month Great Repair, whereas it only took 9-10 months to build a new frigate of that size, and for awhile breaking her up was strongly considered. After the Great Repair of 1751 she was reported unfit for service again in 1755 but it was not until the beginning of the Seven Years War that she received the necessary attention, which took 12 months and cost as much as a new 32. Even so she required another large (that is, Great) repair in 1764 and a complete 18 month rebuild by 1770 when it was considered that the estimated £7000 might be better spent elsewhere. She was broken up at Woolwich. One other frigate was captured but not purchased during the war. ‘The Castor of 605 tons had been built at Quebec in 1744, with knees, breathooks and so forth’of local timber, haughtily dismissed as “a kind of pine’, However, the surveying officers found her ‘well-built, although they qualified this with the somewhat supercilious ‘in the French taste’. Unfortunately, she was reputed to have become a’ poor sir, which was put down to having been built in North America since ‘ships built in those countries are very uncertain in duration, many of them decaying soon’. Itis rarely realised that a wooden ship's shape can alter considerably during her lifetime which usually affects her sailing performance adversely. Obviously the more slightly built and lightly fastened French ships ‘were more prone to this than their stronger, more durable, English counterparts, Speed could be achieved at the expense of robustness but the design would have to accept a short optimum life for the hull. “THE FRENCH INFLUENCE’ To fully appreciate the significance of the subsequent developments it is8 necessary to digress at this point into naval administration. Essentially the Royal Navy was run by a permanent bureaucracy; the favy Board, which looked after the design, construction, maintenance, victualling and manning of the ships. However, the Admiralty dictated overall policy and took the decisions (often advised by the Navy Board) which the Board was supposed to execute. Theoretically, the Admiralty was superior in authority but it was an ad hoc collection of politicians and senior sea officers appointed by the Government of the day, whereas the Navy Board, containing sea officers and civil servants, was a permanent professional body; and, with the contempt of the professional for the amateur, often set itself against its nominal masters. ‘The ambiguity of the situation made the Navy Board sensitive to ‘uninformed’ criticism (real or imagined) and its dealings with the Admiralty were guarded at best and sometimes openly antagonist. ‘As far as ship design was concerned there was a division of “feed-back’, dockyard officials reporting to the Navy Board but sea-officers to the Admiralty. Bearing in mind that sea-officers often complained about their ships as an excuse for failure or covert praise of achievement, the Admiralty’s view of a design could easily be at odds with that of the Navy Board. Furthermore the junior body had very little access to sea-officers’ opinions, except at second-hand when passed on by the Admiralty, which was usually construed as criticism of the designer and his department, This is possibly the background to the setting up of the Sailing Quality Reports, which would give the Navy Board not only design information but reasonably objective evidence from sea-officers with which to counter complaints to the Admiralty. However, by the mid-1740s the Admiralty had a corpus of opinion that pointed to inadequacies in English ships, despite the 1741 alterations. In February the ‘Admiralty ordered the Navy Board to stop work on a number of recently laid down line-of-battle-ships and the senior body set up a commission to decide ona new Establishment, chaired by a technically minded Admiral, Sir John Nortis. The Navy Board resented the usurpation of its authority and vigorously and suecessfully opposed some of the more radical proposals of the Admiralty. Possibly the Navy Board was kept in ignorance of the scope of Norris’ brief and the minutiae of his findings for, although the Establishment was ratified in August 1745, the Navy Board was not told that the commission had produced its own Establishment draughts until January 1746. ‘Although progress was stopped on ships-of-the-line in the early stages of building, new cruisers were ordered while the commission was still in session. Two 24s were ordered in June 1745 which appear to have been an experiment or at Jeast an interim measure for, although built to 1741 dimensions, their hull form was taken from a merchant shipbuilder’s (Allen, of Deptford) model. However, the first 24 of the 1745 Establishment, the Arundel, was ordered on 3 October 1745 and two more followed during 1746. Possibly the Admiralty was not very hopeful about the qualities of the compromise designs of 1745, for some of the surveys of French prizes around this time mention the ‘preserving of the body’ (Subtile's for example) asif they had been directed to look out for a swift sailing hull, This was how the ‘Admiralty came upon the privateer Tygre. Her survey detailed more than the usual deticiences and recommended not purchasing her but it also stressed her ‘great character for sailing’. The ‘Admiralty decided on 31 March 1747 not to add her to the Navy but, on 29 April, ordered her lines to be taken off ‘in the most exact manner’ and to build to those lines two 24s ‘without the least deviation’ from the draught. The sense of urgency was highly unusual: one was to be built at Plymouth, at speed and ‘in preference to all other new works’. Slade, the Master Shipwright at Plymouth was 2 3 6 Phoenix typical English 20 gunship ofthe 1741 Estabishment With a pai of gunport, ‘ballast port amiahipy snd aro of tarportson the lowe, or Gun Deck, the shi SSinevery respect two decker and very igh Ct ofthe water in consequence Amazon cx Frenc Pantie couldnt a eater contrast to Phoents, being very low Isied. She has complete lower deck bat there sno outward agnof tig even the carports are on te upper deck), and indeed Smkshis the lower deck wel low the wraterine. Athoogh having advantages of Stability this for of ll would ave been wet and the orginal plan shows the tckltonal topside bulwarsthe Royal Navy intend toad Note thatthe ship was steered with til, a feature only found on Shall handy rat nthe Royal Navy Enmbuscade, though much ager, has man fentres in common wth Amazon French frgntes werent onl low bl bua bad Severe tmbichome (cae insars rom the waterline) in section, and therefore carried ther chamels (ih cutward projecting distor to winch the lower taning ging Masset up) below the pper deck porte Tae ve them more leverage but exposed them to damage from heavy sas. Renommée was the finest ofthe French ‘captures. She, ike most French cruisers, certied no broadside guns forward ofthe Foremast, This was because the fineness ofthe lines forward gave litle buoyancy, and also because the long light hull could not stand hheavy weights atthe ship’ extremities Following the Admiraty’sdssatistaction with the 24 gunships ofthe 1745 Establishment, the two Surveyor ofthe Navy were Instructed to produce improved designs. Si Jacob Acworth s ves was Seahorse many ways she was a halsway stage between twordecker nd true fgets with on 8 ballast port on Gun Deck aight Yower in the hull ‘Mermaid was the other design ~by Allin ‘with generally similar features, Neither was tn enliely satisfactory hip. 7. Lyme and her sister Unicom, however, were Highly succesful Based on te lines of the prvalces For ihe todd the genine frigate fom into the Royal Navy and were the prototypes fora cast of 20 vessels bul between 1735 and 1766, They retained certain French features, including the Tetanglarwinov-pots atone the wo aftermostgunports, square hances (lhe fatdoymelfonssscand quarteecs rls) nia tiler onthe quarterdcck although thi was worked bya wheel aft of the mizeen10 TABLE 2: COMPARATIVE SCANTLINGS OF FRENCH AND ENGLISH FRIGATES Incase English surveying offers commens ‘on Frepe Seaniingbe cnslered mere prejce an abjcctve comparison with Fppishcimensonsean be ered. The Adm 1akitertosel Adil contracts contin detailed specteations and of these the earliest fnigate is Lowestoffe of 1760, ‘ih coger sands ‘ne fr the Niger clas (proved by {imenson) witha few modiicatons fora lagers Te Fen ships ere chosen because thet senntings are partly well dete, ard siege Heron nd Coe esis {hey prtalaryimpresed the suveyorsas welt rion, Belone and Comet ‘Nore captured inthe Seven Years Wat over n Part ofthis aie, ut are Std for the ske of completeness ‘These refer to the parts numbered in Figures 1or2, ‘Name ‘Tons Built FIGURE yb ite anid ite wut wah 2124 212 oF 2/21 2m ons 219 mn 22 2m 221 2/9 216 TIMBERS: EMBUSCADE, 746 1745 inches CASTOR, 605 1744 Space between floor timbers floor, sided floor, moulded st futtock, sided Ist futtock, moulded 2nd futtock, sided 2nd futtock moulded 3rd futtock, sided 3rd futtock, moulded 4th futtock, sided 4th futtock, moulded ‘Top timber, sided ‘Top timber, moulded LOWER DECK Beams, sided moulded Distance apart ‘No. of beams Hanging Knees, sided Bolts per arm, and diameter in inches ‘Which beams have knees Dagger knees, sided Bolts per arm Which beams have knees Lodging knees, sided Bolts per arm, and diameter Which beams have knees Clamps, thick broad Waterways, thick seuueses segs 3 10 36-70 16 NONE 2 242 All except 2 457810 NONE 6 28 a let into beams 2 broad UPPER DECK Beams, sided moulded distance apart No. of beams Hanging knees, sided Bolts per arm, ‘and diameter ‘Which beams have knees Lodging knees, sided Bolts per arm, and diameter ‘Which beams have knees Tron hanging knees, which beams Waterways, thick et into beams Clamps, thick broad 14 12 26-72 26 10 342 18 midships 10 342 1st 5, last 3 NONE 10) 34 5 28 pegeenss 12 12 44.64 4 9pine) 443 off All NONE 8h 8h 30-65 26 7U(pine) 443 of All except 1 NONE, NONE RENOMMEE 669 1744 inches inches 47 8 9 8h 9 8 443 of All NONE NONE 4 2 4 1 2ree HERMIONE BELLONE COMET, LOWESTOFFE/NIGER 312 om 647 701/679 1748 1755 1751 1761/1758-63 inches inches inches inches 9 45 6 2u3 2 9 9 B ? n n 10 9 9 z 13 9 8 2 9% 9 9 8 1k 9 n n 8 2 8 1 u 8 a . n 2 8 8 108 6 st 5 8 2 8h 8 104 5 34 3h 4 The English vessels not only have considerably heavier frames but they are also closer together. 101 ot 8 9 9 9h 7 8 2 36-82 2 2730-54 2s 26 2 28 2 (iron) 6 4 2 343 243 64601 {st only every other Al all NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE 7 = = = S44 oft a = = al st 4 5 0 1st 28 7 ; 5 a 2 0 rn 10 8 9 101 9 8 9 i Bre) : pes The its to not that deck bear ; J poinsto not are hat dec beams on A ea 29; Frenh vessels are sligtly heavier bu further 9 8 4 7 apa Te Egil eof cing wh every Bean given coc hanging and ne 444 344 343 T4T of" ios ins toch end ey ane, fe an a fe Cones very favour wih te ren rclorene fot single kc, and sgh 8 NONE NONE 4 Histor camps and rebeted watery. 343 a = 546 of I ‘esame ena ld ne for he ams _ - Toren aed guarterdeek anu the at all [English vessels are, rlatvely somewhat om NONE NONE NONE lighter - which is very wise, considering that they ar lofier than their French 2 2 r ‘ ouierpts and unnecesay weight would 3 2 ; : afte. 5 st 2 4 R 294 2 212 Gun deck ‘Tere L18ft Lin Unicom/Lyme 17h 10in Keelfortonnage Breadth 95te7in 337 8in 96S} 33m 8in Depth in hold Tonnage Lift oin 7624/94" oft 2in 581 50/94" “Because ofthe formula used tonnage was always given in whole tons and fractions of 94. This was known as Builders Measurement. instructed to ‘have a perfect draught drawn thereof, and to take an exact account of all the scantlings, dimensions, form and manner of the framing, scarphs, fastenings, and every particular relating to her hull, ‘masts and yards’, all of which was “to be forwarded with all possible expedition’. ‘The ‘24s’ which became the Unicorn and Lyme, were re-rated 28 gun ships and became the first English true frigates. They were highly successful but the problem is whether they were actually built as “Chinese copies’ like the Admiralty instructions indicate. The Navy Board realised that to maintain the same performance the same scantlings and weight distribution would be necessary but, given the strong antagonism to French building practices in general and the shortcomings of the prototype so thoroughly exposed in the survey, ‘one cannot imagine the ships being built to anything but acceptable Royal Dockyard standards. No draught of Zygre exists fora conclusive check but, since the dimensions as taken off the Tygre differ considerably from the design dimensions for Unicorn and Lyme, it is safe to assume that the design was subily altered during draughting to allow for English standards of scantling and constructi ‘When more vessels of this class were built after 1755, considerable internal and topside alterations further increased the tonnage. By the time Unicorn and Lyme were ready for sea, the war was over. However, the Admiralty had in the meantime ordered more 24s, although they continued to experiment. Despite the fact that the first 1745 Establishment 24 did not go to sea until March 1747, by 13 October 1747 the Admiralty informed the Navy Board that ‘great complaint issmade of the bad qualities of His Majesty's ships of 24 guns, especially with regard to their sailing’ and ordered them to produce two designs for 24s without confining themselves to the Establishment dimensions. The Navy's designers (confusingly called the ‘Surveyors of the Navy’) were put on their mettle but sinice one of them, the old and reactionary Sir Jacob Acworth, had been a successful opponent of the larger dimensions proposed for the 1745 Ships the Admiralty must have felt self-righteous when both designs turned out to be larger than the 1745 vessels, Neither Acworth’s Seahorse, nor Mermaid, designed by the other Surveyor, Joshua Allin, ‘was much better than the Establishment vessels. With the war over the search for a first class cruiser design ceased but after 1749 only one other 24 gun ship was built. The superiority of the larger, faster and more seaworthy 28s was proved in sailing trials, and subsequently they took over as the Royal Navy's standard sixth rate. No other French wars such as the superb Renommee were considered but this is hardly surprising since a replacement was requited for a 500 ton ship, not a 700-tonner. There can be no denying the debt of the Unicorn and the Lyme to the French privateer but Tygre was not only the right ship but also happened to find herself in the right circumstances. Because of the administrative situation the Admiralty was not able to get the improvement in ship design it knew was necessary and used the Tygre as an escape fiom the impasse it had reached with the Surveyors and the old two decked 24s. CONCLUSIONS: Although expressed as criticisms, the consistency of the surveyors’ remarks on French construction clearly demonstrates that English and French shipbuilders were following widely divergent philosophies. There is some indication that the French use of light scantling and fastening was related to the high speeds achieved by their cruisers. This posed a problem for the English Navy Board when ordered to build exact copies of captured French vessels because they strongly disapproved of the French style of construction but realised that it was not possible simply to build a French hull shape on English principles and expect the same performance. However, the problem only arose once during the iod under review, when the new frigate-form was brought into the Royal Navy as part of a wider programme of experimentation pursued by the Admiralty: even though it was ordered, it is doubtful whether Unicom and Lyme were exact copies of Tygre. Perfect imitation was certainly rare in the period of the Seven Years War, to be covered in the following part of this study. It will also be possible to investigate consistent principles French and English cruiser de: as this part has established principles of construction. This article is based on a more detailed series by the author published in French in ‘Le Petit Perroquet (Part 1, No 21, Spring 1977).13 THE KING GEORGE V CLASS PART! BY ROBERT DUMAS By 1930 the British battlefleet for reconstruction, would be sold contemporaries the King George V consisted mainly of old vessels forscrapping class had guns of smaller calibre constructed during or before the ‘The new ships were required to and, in most cases, a lower speed First World War, the only be designed within the current but their well conceived protection exceptions being the two battleships. international Treaty limitations of helped to counterbalance any of the Nelson class. The Admiralty, 35 000 tons standard displacement possible handicap. The Royal Navy therefore, began an extensive and 14in (506mm) maximum gun had not conceived sophisticated programme of reconstruction and calibre. Originally the design was vessels but well built ships with. started work on the design of the settledonamain armament of —_good staying power. battleships that were to become the twelve gunsin three quadruple King George V class. It was turrets (two forward, one aft) but, in intended that these ships should be _ order to provide more weight for the first vessels of a battleship protection, the turret in B position replacement programme and that was altered to a twin mounting. The 4. june trials inthe Pentland Fith, 21 on their completion the five Royal designed speed was 27.5 knots at in’ tga) ca Sovereign class ships, which were full load displacement. NM the least suitable of the older vessels Compared with foreign14 © KING GEORGE V ‘TECHNICAL, CHARACTERISTICS WHEN COMPLETED Dimensions: Length: 745ft (227.07m) overall, 700ft (213.36m) between perpendiculars; Beam: ‘103ft (31.39m) max; Draught: 29ft (8 84m) at standard depacement, 2ft 6in (9.9m) at full load. ‘Armament: Ten 14in (356mm) 2 x 4 plus 1 x 2; Sixteen 5.25in (132mm) 8x2; Four 8 barrelled 2p pom-pom AA mountings in ing George V and Prince of Wales; Six 8 barrelled 2pdr pom-pom AA ‘mountings in remainder, (the two additional 8 barrelled pom-poms were disposed on B and X turrets); Four UP (Unrotated Projectile rocket launchers) AA mountings in King George V, three UP mountings in Prince of Wales, (in King George V one UP was fitted on B turret, two on X and one on the quarterdeck, in Prince of Wales ‘one UP was fitted on B and two on 1X); One Bofors AA on the quarterdeck on Prince of Wales only; six single 201m Oerikon in Duke of York; eighteen single 20mm Oerlikon in Anson and Howe. AireraftHguipment: Onc catapult amidship (Type DIIIH); three ‘Walrus amphibians Machinery: 8 Admiralty 3 drum boilers (4001 /sq in working pressure), 4 sets Parsons single reduction geared turbines, 110 000 SHP (normal), 125 000 SHP (maximum), 4shafts and one rudder. Note: King George V was engined by Vickers Armstrong (Barrow-in- ‘urness) Anson by Wallsend Slipway and the other three by their builders. Protection: Main belt: 15in (380mm) Slin (140mm) lower edge- abreast magazines, 14in (356mm 4lin (115mm) lower edge ~ abreast ‘machinery; Internal bulge, with outer air space and inner oil /water, tank, torpedo bulkhead 1in (45mm); Main deck: Sin (127mm) ‘over machinery, 6in (152mm) over magazines; Upper deck: lin 25mm); Main turrets: 13in (330mm) face, Yin (228mm) sides, Tin (177mm) fear, 6in (152mm) crowns; Conning tower: 44-2in (114- 50mm). Radar: King George V and Prince of Wales: Type 279 air warning, with aerials on mastheads, and Type ‘The King George V in May 1942 on het return from covering the Russian Convoys POLS and OPI. The extensive damage to ‘the bow, which forced her early retirement from th operation, was ecived when she aceidentaly rammed and sank the destroyer Punjabi. awe eeKING GEORGE VKING GEORGE V > ay 284 for main armament, with aerials on forward main director. Prince of Wales was also fitted with four Type 285 and four Type 282 gunnery sets, with aerials on the HACS Mk IV directors and the pom-pom directors (on the lower e) respectively, shortly after letion. Duke of York: Type 281 air warning, Type 284 for main armament, four Type 285 with ae on HACS Mk V director and six Type 282 for pom-poms (later fedlsed to five). Anson and Howe: As Duke of York except also carried Type 273 surface warning radaron foremast statish, Rangefinders: Two 41ft (12.50m) in ‘Aand X turrets; One 30it (9.10m) in B turret; Six 15ft (4.57m) in main and secondary directors. Speed: Normal sea speed, 27.5 knots; Maximum sea speed, 29.5 knots. Endurance: 14.000 miles at 10 nots, 7000 miles at 14 knots, 4300 miles at 20 knots, 2400 miles at 27 knots, 1 Bunker capacity: Oil fuel, 3700 tons, Petrol for seaplanes, 35 tons. Ships boats: King George V, Prince of Wales and Duke of York; Three 45ft (13.7m) fast motor boats, one 45ft (13.7m) motor launch, three 25ft (7.6m) fast motor boats, two 27fi (8.2m) whalers, one 16ft (4.8m) fast motor dinghy, one ‘Duke of York two) 14ft (4.2m) sailing dinghy, two 32ft (9.76m) cutters (abreast B turret); Anson and Howe: Two 45ft (13.7m) motor boats, one 45ft (13.7m) motor launch, one 36ft (10.9m) motor pinnace, four 32ft (9.75m) cutters, ‘two 25ft (7.6m) fast motor boats, one 16it (4.8m) fast motor dinghy, ‘two 14ft (4.2m) sailing dinghies, one (Howe two) 27K (8.2m) whaler; Note: the majority of the boats were stowed on the after superstructure between the after funnel and mainmast. There were some differences in the positioning of boats between the ships of the class and some of the smaller types G2ft and under) were stowed in various positions —abreast X turret, on the catapult deck, before the fore funnel, ete. ‘The King George Vina heavy cross sen off thenorth western tip of Seotland on 18 February 1985, Nat 2 King George V in the Firth of Clyde on 10 ‘Complement: In peacetime, 1511; Asfleet flagship, 1644; The complement of Prince of Wales when she was sunk was 1612. July 1942. Note the Type 273 radar lantern and office on the foremast and the Type ialon the forward main director. ®18 PRINCE OF WALESPRINCE OF WALES 1. Prince of Wales arrives at Singapore Naval Base on 2 December 1941, six days before se was sunk TWM by courtesy of Roger Chesneat 2 One of the twin 5.25in HA/LA Mit tountings of the Prince of Wales in May 141, The port side ofthe bridge structure is visible in the backgrounds; note the aerial for the Type 284 gunnery radar on the root oof the main director and the HACS MKLV. director (behind the muzzle of the left $22sin gun) whieh had not at this time received the radar aerials of Type 285. MoD, by courtesy of Peter HodgesDUKE OF YORK | DUKE OF YORK © sALTERATIONS AND ADDITIONS BETWEEN COMPLETION AND MAJOR REFITS OF 1944 /45 King George V. Early 1940: pom-pom director platform between forward HACS directors replaced by Type 271 surface warning radar. December 1940: UP mountings removed, Type 271 radar replaced by Type 273 (Lantern on foremast starfish), five ‘Type 282 radars fitted, 18 single 20mm Oerlikons fitted (5 on forecastle, 5 on quarterdeck, 2 on each side of No 1 platform, 4 on boat deck). Early 1942: Four Type 285 radars added. May 1943: Two 32ft cutters abreast forecastle removed, 20 single 20mm Oerlikons added (2 on each side mainmast, 4 on each side catapult deck, 4 abreast B turret and 4/0n quarterdeck), upper bridge extended aft and Admiral’s bridge forward. Prince of Wales: July 1941: UP TABLE 1. CONSTRUCTION mountings removed and two 8 barrel pom-pom mountings fitted (one on B and one on X turrets), ‘Type 271 surface warning radar added between forward HACS directors as in King George V. December 1941: 7 single 20mm Oerlikons added (3 on quarterdeck, 4.0n No 1 platform). Duke of York: November 1941: radar Type 273 fitted on foremast starfish: January 1942: One 20mm erlikon fitted between hawsepipes at extreme forward end of forecastle (the position proved impractical due to the mounting’s susceptibility to the weather and was removed after two or three months). April 1942: 8 single 20mm added (5 on forecastle, 3 on quarterdeck) sheet anchor on starboard side removed. March 1943: 24 single 20mm Oerlikons added (2 on after boiler room vents, 4 abreast B turret, 6 on No 1 platform, 4 on each side catapult deck, 2 on each side of deck forward of X turret) bridge Names Builders Laid Down KING GEORGE ‘Vickers Armstrong (Walker) 01-01-37 PRINCE OF WALES. Came! Lard (Birkenhead) 01-01-37 DUKE OF YORK (ex ANSON) John Brown (Clydebank) 05-05-37, ANSON (ex JELLICOR) Swan Hunter and Wigham 20-07-37 Richardson (Wallsend on Tyne) HOWE (ex BEATTY) Fairfield (Govan) 01-06-37 2 modified as in King George V and cutters abreast B turret removed. June 1944: Two twin 20mm. Oerlikons added on No. 1 platform and 8 single 20mm removed from No | platform. Anson: June 1943: 17 single 20mm Oerlikons (4 on each side of catapult deck, 8 on forecastle around B turret). Cutters abreast B turret removed. Howe; June 1943: 22 single 20mm erlikons added (plus 2 transferred from abreast X turre' each side catapult deck, 2 in wings of Admiral’s bridge, 2 in place of 44in searchlights on after funnel, 2 on No | platform, 10 on forecastle deck around B turret). Launched Completed Pennant No 21-02-39 01-10-4041 03-05-39 31-0340 53 28-02-40 OF1I4L 17 2402-40 22-0642 79 09.0440 200842 32 TABLE 2. DISPLACEMENT Design standard displacement: 35 000 tons Estimated displacements in 1941 (tons) Names Standard Displacement Full Load Displacement KING GEORGE V, 36 730 41815 PRINCE OF WALES 36 750 41 850 DUKE OF YORK 36 820 41930 ANSON 36.970 42.080 HOWE. 36.950 42.050 TABLE 3. BREAKDOWN OF WEIGHTS OF KING GEORGE V (ons) ‘AS DESIGNED ‘AS COMPLETED Standard Full load Standard Full load Hull and ft 13500 13500, 13830 13.830 Machinery 2700 2700 2770 2770 Protection 12500 12500 12410 12410 ‘Armament 6030 6765 6570 7400 Equipment 1150 1.465 1150 1620 TOTAL 35900 36930 36730 38030 Oil fuet 3700 3730 Lubricating oil & petrol 60 60 Reserve feed water 300 255 TOTAL 40990 42.075DUKE OF YORK s march 1 es 2D eZ ANSON 1: sive1 Prince of Wales in the Pentland Firth on 6 ‘October 1951. She now has multiple om poms on B and X turrets, n plac of the UP mountings originally carried, and is equipped with a full radar outfit (Types 249,371, 3s, 285 and 282) Natt 2 The Anson surning to starbourd on $ August 1942. ae Nase1 Howe leaving Fairields yard on completion jin 1942, ‘Authors collection 2 Howe tums to port at speed, March 1943. CPL Wisj00!1 Prince of Wale avg at Argenta Boy, 3 Duke of York in dock at Root Newioundland, in August 1941 ther December 1942-March 1943 re iw mw 2. Duke of York leaving drydock at Rosyth, March 1943, WM e28 By the early 1960s the surface forces of the Netherlands Navy were based on an ageing carrier, the Karel Doorman (ex-HMS Venerable), the cruisers de Ruyter and de Zeven Provincien and twelve large anti-submarine destroyers of the Holland and Friesland classes. ‘One of the cruisers, the de Zeven Provincien, was converted between 1962 and 1964 to carry the ‘Terrier surface-to-air missile. Consideration of cost, however, as well as doubts about the future of these large ships with their complement of about 900 ‘men in a small navy with limited “The large dome above the Tromp's bridge provides weather protection for the acral Efthe Dutch HSA three mensional sr Search an tricking ada. The smaller {Tome forward of the bridge protects the Serial ofthe WM23 fire control radar (aso ‘f Duteh manutactre) which controls the Sex Sparrow system snd the twin 200m fn mounting ERS Taylor resources of manpower, meant that this conversion was not extended to de Ruyter. So, in 1964 the decision was taken to build a limited number of large guided-missile frigates to replace the cruisers as flagships. ATTEMPTS AT STANDARDISATION In view of the inereasin, commitment of the Netherlands Navy to NATO following the break-up of her empire in South-East Asia, efforts were made right from the start to collaborate as closely as possible with other allied countries in the development and adoption of suitable weapons, sensors and a propulsion system. A. major agreement involving the first ‘wo items was made with the Royal Navy, with which the Netherlands Navy/had established particularly close connections since the War. The Dutch would adopt the British Sea Dart missile then under development as the future area-defence weapon of the Fleet. Inreturn the Dutch, with their highly specialised electronics industry, would be responsible for the development of a large three-dimensional radar to provide action-data and automatic tracking for the missile, Besides being installed on the new frigates the radar would be adopted by the new generation of aircraft carriers and ‘escorts that the Royal Navy was planning to build ai that time (a comparison between HMS Bristol as originally designed and Tromp as completed shows a remarkable similarity.) In the event, however, the Dutch became concerned about the amount of ‘ship-space’ that a high-performance system like Sea Dart would take up. As their frigate was a smaller design than the Type 82, they opted for the medium-performance (and cheaper) Tartar missile which the2 Furthermore, the Naval Staff emphasised once again that standardisation was of paramount importance by demanding that all equipment be chosen from that in use or under development —in the Netherlands or other allied NATO navies. Curiously enough this latter BY JOHN JORDAN demand, combined with the all-important aim of economising on manpower, led the Netherlands Americans had developed ‘There can be little doubt that the Navy back into collaboration with | Specifically for destroyers and which decision to drop Sea Dart from the the Royal Navy in the one area | ‘was being adopted by several other design, blow that it was to a where this had not been considered European navies. Conversely this commion weapon system between meant that the 3-D radar was now the Royal Navy and the Dutch, rejected by the Royal Navy, leaving resulted in other capabilities being GAS TURBINES the Dutch with considerable enhanced as far as the frigates were The original Dutch frigate design development costs for an end concerned. This certainly fell into. was to be driven by conventional product of just two installations. line with Staff Requirements. steam turbines with fixed-pitch Whether the deal would have gone (agreed in 1968) which included __ propellers. ‘The Royal Navy, through, in view of the subsequent protection of a task force or convoy however, was now developing a ally ~ that of propulsion cancellation of the new generation against aircraft, submarines and" _new generation of aero-derived of carriers and all but one of the surface ships as well as shore as-turbines to be installed in their Type 82s isin any case open to bombardment (je a bit of everything future frigate and destroyer designs. question. rather than a specialised role). The major attraction of gas turbines30 for the Dutch was the reduction in the engine room personne! needed to operate and maintain them but a further factor was undoubtedly the lower noise-signature of gas turbines compared with steam turbines and diesels, making them better suited to anti-submarine operations. The Tromp class finally emerged from the drawing board with basically the same COGOG (Combined Gas or Gas) propulsion system as the British Type 42 class destroyers: one Olympus boost turbine and one Tyne cruise turbine on each shaft driving, controllable-pitch propellers. Y-ARD(Glasgow) acted as consultants for the main machinery installation and controls and the Dutch entered into a joint agreement with the Royal Navy to monitor the performance of the turbines. 1 ‘The forward engine room houses the Olympus turbines, each rated at 22 000 shp, which give the ships their top speed of over 28 knots. ‘The turbines were down-rated from the 27 000 shp version fitted in the Type 42s in order to extend the life of the gas-generators, thereby lowering maintenance costs. Outside the two Olympus modules are two L000kW diesel generators which provide half the electrical power. Diesel rather than gas generators were selected partly ecause of the problems of providing additional air intakes and uptakes to those required by the propulsion machinery but also because of the high fuel-consumption of gas-turbines at low ratings. The after engine room contains the Tynes which, at a rating of 4000shp each, propel the ships at their cruising speed of about 18 knots. The main reduetion gearing is also housed in this engine room, with one Tyne aft and one Olympus forward of each gear box. The Dutch designed their own gearing in preference fo the adoption of British equipment and the gearboxes for the Tromp class were supplied by the shipbuilder, Royal Schelde. An auxiliary machinery room aft of this engine room houses the other pair of diesel generators. The arrangement of propulsion and auxiliary machinery was designed to minimize action damage. Either set of turbines can continue to operate with the other engine room flooded and the gearboxes are designed as watertight units. Furthermore, the separation of the two pairs of generators by two watertight bulkheads lessens the likelihood of Tromp shortly after her launch in 1973 and in the early stages of ‘fitting out’ at the De Schelde shipyard in Flushing. Rolls-Royce, courtesy A Preston Anaerial view of Tromp taken at Spithead Shortly after the ship's completion Photographs 3 and 4 were also taken at this time, The vessel alongside is the British fleet tender Lawlask. C&S Taylorpower failure. Alll machinery is designed for the quietest possible operation:the diesel generators are fully enclosed in noise-absorbing hoods, the cruise freeboard with a wide beam. ‘Top-weight has been kept to a minimum by extensive use of aluminium in the superstructure, steel having been used only beneath turbines are resiliently mounted, the the large 3-D radar. Full advantage gearboxes are exeptionally quiet, has been taken of the great depth and there are silencers housed in the and beam of the ship to improve intakes and uptakes. ‘A push-button Machinery Control Room provides remote control and surveillance of the complete machinery installation. For ease of communication itis located near the Operations Room, with command links to the latter and the bridge. HULL AND SUPERSTRUCTURE, Seaworthiness was naturally a major consideration in a ship whose main area of operations would be the North Sea and Atlantic. It has been achieved by combining high habitability and to provide ‘maximum space for weapons and electronics. ARMAMENT AND SENSORS ‘The armament finally fitted is both comprehensive and well-balanced, with two weapon systems provided for each of the three functions — surface-to-air, surface-to-surface and ASW — demanded by Staff Requirements. ‘The main surface-to-air element is the American Standard SM1 missile (of which 40 are carried). ‘The single-arm Tartar Mk 13 launcher is mounted on a deckhouse which extends forward. of the helicopter hangar, giving good all-round coverage, and the two SPG 51D tracker /iliuminators overlook it from positions just aft of the mainmast. It is a system which has been adopted by a number of NATO navies and has been described in detail in a previous issue (Warship No 6 — California). The Dutch installation differs from all others, however, in that target-tracking information for the SPG 15sis initially provided not by aradar of American manufacture, such as the SPS 52, and 48A planar radars, but by the massive HSA three-dimensional radar specifically designed for these ships. This is an advanced air-search and tracking radar capable of handling simultaneously over one hundred aircraft tracks. The32 This view of Tromp, slighty off the starboard beam aows ery cary the layout of her arisament a sadar aera ‘The contains forthe Harpoon mises hadnt ben ie tee ti otograph was taken but the supportin Framework forthe starboard pai ean be seen jst forwatd ofthe funnel Taylor air-search functions are performed by a pair of parabolic reflectors mounted back-to-back, and the tracking funetions by a'similarly mounted pair of planar, phased-array antennae with integrated IFF. These antennae are mounted on a single platform with ‘common turning gear and are housed within a large fibre-glass dome. The back-to-back arrangement gives a very high data-rate, and high and low cover is provided'by the system. Back-up for Standard is provided by the NATO Sea Sparrow jort-range surface-to-air missile. Developed from the American Basic Point Defense Missile System (BPDMS), it uses a special version Of the Sparrow missile which has folding wings and can therefore be launched from a new lightweight cell launcher (its predecessor used amodified ASROC launcher). With an effective range of about 12km the missile can engage targets down to about 150m. ‘The Sea Sparrow missile has been coupled with various guidance systems. In the Tromp class itis the WM25, which also serves the 120mm mounting. The WM25 is the latest in the popular M20 series of radars which now equip many of the world’s small ships and which, like the 3-D radar, are ‘manufactured by Hollandse Signaal Apparaten. It comprises a tracker filluminator radar above a parabolic search reflector on a common mount, housed in a near-spherical radome. The tracker radar directs the Sea Sparrow missiles. The search radar provides air and surface search as well as automatic tracking for one or two surface targets. The whole system has been designed for quick reaction against medium- and close-range targets, and computer-direction ensures an all-weather capability. In view of the modemity of the rest of Tromp’s equipment itis pethaps surprising that the Dutch should have retained the ageing Bofors twin 120mm /50cal ‘dual-purpose gun rather than opting for the Vickers Mk 8 or the Italian OTO 127mm. It does, however, ‘compare well enough with more modern guns in terms of performance 85° elevation and a rate of fite of 40 rounds per minute ~and the choice was no doubt influenced by the availability of two mountings from the old destroyer Gelderland. The turrets are fully automatic and radar-controlled and have been specially modified for use aboard the new frigates. Tetook the Dutch some time to choose’a surface-to-surface missile to complement the twin Bofors. The main candidates were undoubtedly the French Exocet and the American Harpoon. Eventually a decision was made in favour of the more advanced (and more costly) Harpoon, for which ramps can be seen just forward of the twin uptakes. The missile uses inertial guidance until booster separation, after which a computer in the missile brings it on a course determined by target data inserted before launch, making the missile independent of the ship’s sensors. It then cruises at low altitude under altimeter control. The active radar homing system switches on automatically at a predetermined distance from the position ofthe target at launch, The homing radar, which is frequency-agile to prevent jamming, then seeks out and locks onto the target. In the final phase the missile executes a climb /dive manoeuvre. Ata length of 4.75m (shorter than the horizon-range Exocet) Harpoon is particularly compact for a missile with a range of over 55km. On Tromp and her sister four of the weather-proof canisters will be bolted to each of the two ramps for a total of eight missiles. ‘The principal ASW weapon carried is the Anglo-French Lynx helicopter which is only just coming into service. The Lynx is at present without a rival in the small ASW helicopter bracket and has also been‘ordered by the Dutch for the new Kortenaer class frigates. Over twice the weight of the earlier Wasp it was designed to replace, itis still ess than half the weight of the big-ship Sea King. In its ASW role the Lynx carries two American Mk 46 torpedoes. The latter weapon is also Taunched from the two triple Mk 32 ASW tubes mounted at upper deck level just aft of the mainmast. ASW data is provided by two hull-mounted sonars. The first is the Tong-range EDO(USA)CWE 610, a low-frequency sonar in production since 1969 which is also in servic with the Italian Navy. The second is the even more recent Type 162M developed for the Royal Navy. This, has a sideways-looking scan pattern and is designed to classify mid-water and seabed targets out to about 100m. For navigational purposes and for helicopter contol the Fromp class carry the Decca dual Transar radar for which twin port and starboard antennae. above the bridge, provide 360° coverage. The system appears to have been chosen because of clutter problems posed by the siting of the 3-D radome. ECM sensors are carried on the mainmast, and are backed up by two British-design Corvus chaff dispensers abreast the hangar. All weapons and sensors are linked by a command system designated SEWACO-2 (from the Dutch SEnsoren, WApens and COmmandosysteem). The electronics for this are mainly of Dutch manufacture supplemented by components from other NATO countries. The computer-based command system processes information from all sensors, evaluates threats and designates targets to the weapon systems, The ‘operations room, in which the display sub-system is housed, is located low in the ship, with the Displacement: 4308 tonnes Length: 138.2 metres Beam: 148 metres Draught 4.58 metres Complement: 35 officers,271 men computer and sonar rooms. CONCLUSION Part of the undoubted success of the Tromp class can be attributed to the way in which the Dutch have selected from the best equipment available in NATO to suit their requirements and those who have called for more standardisation in the alliance now have an example to hold up to the sceptics. But the real triumph belongs to the Dutch electronics industry which, in linking up weapons and sonars from a variety of sources and matching them with high-performance above-water sensors of its own manufacture, has without question placed the Netherlands in the ‘first division’ of naval technology.HMS COCHRANE BY JOHN ROBERTS ‘The Cochrane and her three sister ships of the 1903-04 Programme, Achilles, Natal and Warrior, were among the last armoured cruisers to be constructed for the Royal Navy and enjoyed a high reputation as one of the best cruiser classes in the Fleet. This reputation stemmed from the adoption of an all turret armament which, unlike the broadside guns of earlier ships could be worked in any sort of weather. In addition the turrets substantially increased topweight which, by reducing the level of stability, made them very good seaboats and steady ‘gun platforms. In contrast the previous Duke of Edinburgh class, which were virtually identical, apart from having a secondary armament of 6in guns mounted in a broadside central battery, had a very poor reputation; even the Minotaur class, the next and last of the armoured cruisers, were not regarded as highly as the Warriors. Unfortunately the appearance of the battlecruiser type with the Invincible class of 1906 rendered all the later armoured cruisers obsolete before they even entered service. ‘The Cochrane was laid down at Fairfields Yard in Glasgow on 24 March 1904 and launched on 20 May 1905. She was commissioned with a nucieus crew on 18 February 1907, joined the Nore Division of the Home Fleet on 6 March and shortly afterwards was brought to full commission for service in the Sth Cruiser Squadron, On 1 April, 1909 she recommissioned for service with the 2nd Cruiser Squadron with which she remained until September 1917. She spent the majority of the war with the Grand Fleet and in May 1916 took part in the Battle of Jutland. In November 1917 she transferred to the North America and West Indies station but rejoined the 2nd Cruiser squadron early in the following year and was based at ‘Murmansk during May — September 1918. On 14 November 1918 she was stranded in the Mersey Estuary, while under the control of the pilot, and later broke in two becoming a total loss. The wreck had been broken up in site by June 1919. Of Cochrane's sister ships, the Natal blew up and sank in the Cromarty Firth on 30 December 1915 and the Warrior ‘was sunk by gunfire during the Battle of Jutland on 31 May 1916; the sole survivor, Achilles, was sold to T Ward for breaking up in May 1921. PARTICULARS AS COMPLETED Dis 13550 tons (load) 14 $00 tons ee as, a 73ft 6in x 27ft 6in (max at load displacement) Machinery: 2 shal yinder ile xpanson engines, 25680 IHP = 23.3 knots (GEIS) 19 Varo ange tube bor, 6 Sind oles 2080 tons col 0 tons ‘Armour: min bel Gin smishis, in forward, 3inaltuppe belt Gin aisbips closed by 6n end bulkheads forming protce citadel fo bases of beam res fares Thin faces, insides, Ain backs, Sin bases reducing o in on inboard side of Beam turrets, Sn ammenition tubes to And turrets only; conning tower TOin wall 3a ‘communication tbe Protective Piating: bulkheads around engine ying Zin ower deck fn (Hin ver Steting gear)rin deck Lin forward andat ‘telah upper deckin over cael ‘Stam’ -92in BL, oS cal Me Xon Single Mk V mountings 7-Sn BL, 50 cal, MBIT or gunn de ik I moins 3o- Spr Vickers OF guns on single Mi ‘ountingy 2-singe Spr Hotes, 3 Submerged Sin torpedo tubes one stem, wo Scarce 336i o ige wings; 7 3a, | Below foretop, 2 abalt2nd an 2 batt Sthfannel 2 sbreat mainmas Boat stosied forward of mamas, 2. 4S Steam pinnaces, 421 sling lunch, 36 pace, 2= 30k gis (towed on quartrdeck Etuits when in arbour) 274 whale, tte ing, 13 ba rat stowed on davis Ships d= 32 outers “Anchors bower 2-1 ewt Wasteney-Sith; Sheet 113 ew Wastney- Smiths Keg one 17 cotand one 13 et Admiralty Pater (Growed agin starboard side of after SSperstitur);stream 81 ew Ing (slowed agnnst port sie of after Sper) ‘ 12 ALTERATIONS AND ADDITIONS 1908 Topallant mass, for wiles yards, aided 1909 Funnel bands painted up. One white on 2nd and Sd funnel 1010 Search platforms abreast mainmas towed St further and to 3 pe Hots gunsogaly this poston 1912 Pannelsinteaedi eight by Approximately 6 Topealant mess Honened 191213 Torpedo net defence and booms removed, Corel plaform aided on er Seaton of mainmas, Searelighton pafonn Below fore top was removed st about this tine but information on his pots uncertain 1015 6 par AA gun ited on quarterdeck 1918.16 Two searchlight platforms added on tot fore and maint Compas patorm extended at Topgalnt mast nd main {opmas removed and fore topmast ‘Noreened Ga added to matnmast Scarchligh plato abreast mainmast Femoved (these appear the Been replaced by 2 Spar Vickers AA guns on Mic ‘mountings but information on this point is Uncertain). 3 pdr guns on Aand ¥ tare Tooisremoved, Deckhoe aed belo” ‘Sch pio tcc 2nd and 1916 6 pdr HA gun replaced by 3in, 2001, HA gion Mic ft mount 1917 Foremast converted otipod to provide suppor for director Former “Carclght platform enlarged to form director Dlatfor but ecto not actualy ited unl ‘Rugost 1918, Two lower scart Dlaforms on foremast removed. Atermost i of Spar guns on aftr superstar and Spurgurson i and St 9.2hch tuets ieimoved This ft er wih a Spr armament 6120 gas ence of x3 pur AA)-Some ofthese guns were lane at Mem ToLSandat the time of her os sh car toualof 7 butitisnot dear it this neluded ‘AN gun)‘This andthe following photograph was taken in Plymouth Sound on 29 October 1917 shortly after the Cochrane completed a refit in Devonport dockyard. During this refit fer foremast wag conrad toa ped support the weight ofa director. The empty platform below the foretop bears witness to {he fact that the director was not fitted until “August 1918. (MoD) ‘Cochrane from the port quarter, the 3in HA fgun on the quarterdeck is hidden by acanvas | over and most of her 3 pdr guns are barely | Visible among the complexity ofher Superstracture, The lower control position on the mainmast was added before the war but the two searchlight platforms above it were fitted in 1915 of 1916, similar pair of searchlight platforms on her foremast were removed during her 1917 refit. (MoD) £‘This drawing which shows Cochrane as she wasin 1910, based on the offical plans of the ship held bythe National Martine Maseuun By this date very fw modifications had been made tothe sip since completion find te only visbleaerations were the Addition of opgllant masts and the moving ‘ofthe search plattorms abreast the maint St further at, where they replaced top Hoi guns Teale gas ‘were ifferent ype to the main Spee Daitery and tscems likely they wer intended forsalting a umeton presumably trantered tena tery worth ing ttt {nttompedo boat battery of Vekers 3 pale OF {uns tas 26 weapons (10 on amet roots find Son forward and after superstoctre) whl snot feerene Bok Gshing the Ny asi thm wth ny 24 raseye justo be diferent says29). The foureutes mounted on das amihips wwerestoved on te upper deck abreast the Fonels in wartime an the 30K gg, stowed love the afer wing 9.2in caret, were arsed on the quarterdeck dvi when in harbour (boatsshown inthis postion by broken Ine).© va necen mtPROJECT GUPPY BY NORMAN FRIEDMAN ‘The US submarine force ended World War Two in a somewhat paradoxical state. It had just won pethaps the greatest subimarine victory in history, against the Japanese Empire, but with that war over it had lost much of its mission as the next prospective enemy, the Soviet Union, had no large ‘merchant maine susceptible to submarine attack. At the same time the large force of new ‘fleet submarines’ of the Gato, Balao, and Tench classes (of which 158 were in commission on 31 December 1945) had suddenly become obsolescent with the advent of the German Type XI, examples of which the had captured in 1945, Tests with such vessels demonstrated new standards not merely of underwater speed but also of quieting and ruggedness to resist depth-charging. These experiments were extremely discouraging for the US ASW force; in 1945 experienced Pacific submarine commanders had proven very difficult targets for equally experienced Atlantic escort goups in exercises and it was clear that the ‘Type XXI was far more difficult to track than the fleet boat. Meanwhile, within the submarine force, the first evaluations of the ype XX1 led to the abandonment of existing plans for a new variant of the ‘fleet boat’ and to the beginning of the design effort which would lead to the first postwar US submarine, the Tang. However, it was clear that large numbers of such submarines would not be forthcoming in view of the absence of a mission for US general purpose submarines. Thus the submariners’ interest in a range of special purpose types ~ missile firing submarines, troop and cargo carrying types for small scale commando raids and specialized ASW submarines, which might help to counter the threat of the large Soviet submarine force. Indeed, in a sense the ‘Guppy’ was also a specialist type as it was intended initially to provide the ASW forces with a modern ‘tame’ target against which to practice. The US had been allocated two ex-German Type XXIs, U-2513 and U-3008, but neither could be kept operational for very long. PROJECT GUPPY Hence Project GUPPY —for Greater Underwater Propulsive Power which involved the conversion of existing fleet boats to high speed, Early in 1946 the Bureau of Ships proposed to modify fleet boats for high submerged speed by increasing storage battery power and by radical streamlining of both hull and superstructure. Sacrifices would include all of the gun armament and, it was believed, some considerable measure of surfaced sea keeping capability. On the other hand, simply because the original fleet boat had been designed largely for high speed surface operation, the conversion would lose little ofits surfaced speed. Nor was there any way to provide it with the kind of deep diving capability characteristic of the ‘true submersible’ Type XXT Oda ($8-484) was one of two prototype GUE eatontos Se maa beta the atnenee of snorkel note the bulge to house the SV air search radar when fettacted, She is shown here as bul (12 March 1950); later a snorkel was fitted and she was altered to GUPPY Il configuration usw39and the late model fleet boats converted to ‘Guppies’ were limited toa test depth of 412ft. Converted submarines would have four 126 cell Guppy batteries in place of the previous two 126 cell Sargo batteries (named after the submarine in which they had been introduced in 1936). Each cell was about two-thirds the weight of the earlier type but total power from the new batteries would be about twice that of the Sargo. In 1947 it was estimated that the Guy would have 4520 SHP_ aval le underwater at the highest (half-hour) rate as compared to 2688 for an unconverted boat. At the lower six hour rate the Guppy installation would be about 50 per ‘cent more powerful than the Sargo and at the low rate, for maximum underwater endurance, about 40 per cent more powerful, This was a reasonable allocation of priorities, given the short ranges of contemporary sonars and ASW ‘weapons. A submarine attacking a convoy submerged might well be detected only after she had fired and a burst of speed at that point might well enable her to escape entirely. ‘The new batteries had disadvantages. They were more fragile than the Sargo type, their expected peacetime life was only eighteen months (as compared to ive years for the earlier type) and they required twice as much lead. It followed that US lead resources and battery manufacturing capacity might well limit production of Guppies. They also required considerable internal rearrangement. Of the 252 cells of the forward batteries only 184 could be placed in the former forward battery compartment which had held 126 Sargo cells. The others had to be placed under the control room in spaces formerly occupied by fresh ‘water tanks, magazines (for the deck guns now dispensed with) and an ordnance storeroom. The alter battery space had to be extended forward, and some bunks relocated, and four reload torpedoes sacrificed. An auxiliary engine was also removed to provide space for increased air conditioning capacity to deal with the heat generated by the new batteries. Conspicuously absent from the Guppy project was any advance i sonar which might have made the boats particularly effective submarine killers. In 1946-7 the Jong range pasive sonar developed by the Germans was still a matter of experimentation, under the designation GHG; it would appear in late Guppy conversions and in a series of specialized hunter-killer submarines designated SSK. Guppy self was concentrated on high underwater speed and, to a lesser extent, underwater endurance at high speed. Readers familiar with the Type XXI design may recall that the latter was far more directed towards battery capacity and had an entire lower pressure hull devoted to batteries. So radical an approach was impossible in a fleet boat conversion, in which the basic form and even most of the internal arrangement of the pressure hull was fixed by considerations of what had now become an obsolete form of submarine warfare in which speed and endurance on the surface was essential. ‘TYPE I GUPPIES The Chief of Naval Operations approved the Guppy proposal i June 1946 assigning a high priority to the conversions of Odax, at the: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, and Pomodon, at Mare Island. It is some indication of the urgency of the conversions that snorkels were. foregone, as none would be available in time. In addition the after periscope was omitted and an air-search radar (SV) installed in its place; at the time it was stated that design changes necessary to provide two periscopes would have delayed completion. In fact in October 1946, even before the first two ‘Type I Guppies were completed, ten more were authorized for which. time was now available to design an enlarged ‘sail incorporating a second periscope and a snorkel. ‘These boats were designated Type Mand a further twelve were approved during 1947. The two ‘Type I prototypes were soon brought up to Type IT standard, Four of the Type Ils were Tench class submarines which had been suspended incomplete at the end of World War Two.Picuda (5-382), a GUPPY IIA conversion in her original configuration, shown here on 23 February 1954. The dark arcasare sloped parts of her superstructure painted to make them less visible from above, USN ‘Trials with the first two boats were extremely encouraging. Off San Francisco, the Pomodon made 18.2 knots submerged (batteries at the half-hour rate), as compared to 17.8 on the surface at full power. Odax made slightly lower speeds which were explained on the basis of hull fouling and a different propeller pitch. Even at high submerged speeds no vibration was noticed forward of the manuevering room and for the rest of the boat vibration was about the same as that ina fleet boat at full power, ie at about 9 knots. Even at maximum underwater speed water noises could not be heard within the hull An unexpected by-product of the streamlining adopted to achieve high speed was that sonar detection range on a Guppy was 10 per cent Jess than sonar range on a fleet boat. This effect was probably analogous to the greater reflectivity by corners of radar pulses. On the other hand ‘Type I was not quite Type XXI. It was far noisier and could not dive as deeply. Moreover, the maximum battery rate for a Type XI had been one hour rate and that had been comparable to the half-hour rate attainable by a Guppy. ‘TYPE 1A GUPPIES As the Guppy program neared completion in the Spring of 1949 the Navy began to evaluate alternatives for future production. The Center for Naval Analysis, the ‘Navys ‘think tank’, compared snorkel installation, streamlining, 41 TYPICAL CHARACTERISTICS FLEET) SNORKEL — GUPPY: «HLTA. A IIL Surfaced 1827 1870 1830 1848 1975 tons 2400 2440 2440 2440 2450. tons Length 312 307 307 307 3265 ft Beam 21 7 om ok Draft 7 7 7 7 Wott Speed: Surfaced 185 180 173 170 172 kis Surfaced (cruise) 135 135 125 135 122 ks Snorkel (engine) 6.5 90 75 80 62 kis Max Submerged (half hour) 100 160 150 141 145 kts Submerged Cruise 3.0 35°30 30 37 ks Engines 4 a eg sg SI 4610 4610 4610 3430 4610 NOTE: Complement was 8 officers, 74 (78 in Guppy 11) enlisted men. ‘Submerged cruise rate was 36-hour rate; typically 2 submarine would follow a cycle of snorkel and bi tery operator ‘Of Guppy Ils, only Tire had three engines the Guppy battery and a variety of combinations. Significantly, the criterion chosen was exchange rate (merchant ships sunk per submarine sunk) in a classical anti-shipping campaign, not submarine vs submarine ASW, as would later become a primary preoccupation of the US submarine force. At periscope depth, over the speed Fange of up to 10 knots, an unmodified fleet boat would require 2.5 times the power required by a treamlined boat such as Odax, 2.25 times the power required by a Guppy II (streamlined with a snorkel), Type IT paying a 10 Percent power penalty over Type I. lowever, at a depth of 100 ft with speeds of 0 to 15 knots both streamlined types would match, At the half-hour battery rate Type I could make 18.5 knots underwater (Type II 16.5) but a streamlined Submarine with Sargo batteries could make 15 (13.2 with snorkel). In view ofthe high cost of the Guppy battery it was a primary question wheiher those 3 knois were worthwhile, It was clear that the snorkel was worthwhile as aircraft contacts would decrease radically and even the best ASW radars would suffer a loss of 80 or 90 percent in range against a snorkelling as opposed to a surfaced submarine. On the other hand, the increased running speed due to a ‘kel seemed less valuable. experience was held to show that only 20 percent of individual ‘merchant ship contaets and only 15 petcent of convoy contacts could not be attacked due to the low speed of the submarine. In fact the study concluded that funds should be used to combine the snorkel with streamlining and that the Guppy battery should be foregone in future conversions. Itis possible that the loss of a new Guppy II, USS Cockino, off Nonway after a battery fire on 26 August 1949 also influenced the decision that there would be no more Guppy II conversions Instead there were two batches of conversions using modified Sargo batteries (Sargo I under the FY 51 and FY 52 programs). In addition the FY 51 program included a series of limited ‘fleet snorkel’ conversions intended to secure some of the essential features of the Guppy at minimum cost. ‘Thus the program for Fiscal Year 1951 (the year beginning 1 July 1950) included ten Guppy 1A conversions whose primary mission was ‘to locate and to destroy enemy ships, surface or submarine, with torpedoes.” By this time ASW training was relegated to last place among secondary tasks, the others being offensive minelaying, reconnaissance and lifeguard duties during air strikes. The Characteristics, or staff requirements, for the conversion noted that ‘this conversion is intended to increase the capabilities of the obsolescent fleet type submarine the maximum amount fora minimum expenditure of42 funds, To this end, it is desired that during the conversion period of this ship, no replacements or additional installation of equipments and machinery be made, other than those described below, unless prior authorization be obtained from the Chief of Naval Operations. This conversion includes the installation of snorkel and streamlining of the superstructure. The installation of snorkel is considered to be an absolute requirement to permit submarines to carry out their mission in combat areas under enemy air patrol. Streamlining the superstructure provides substantial increase in both submerged speed and submerged endurance for a reasonable cost and is therefore very desirable. Present type of storage battery will be retained.’ In fact the 1A conversions received a modified battery (Sargo II) rather larger than that of fleet boats and intermediate in lifetime between a Sargo and a Guppy. One unusual feature of the conversion was that the conning tower was to be designed to permit later installation of along range conformal array listening sonar, a relative of the type then being fitted to the bows of SSKs. Two further Guppy 1A conversions were to be made for the Royal Netherlands Navy, namely Hawkbill and Icefish “FLEET SNORKELS’ Even Guppy IA was not the least expensive Way to rehabilitate a Fleet boat. The FY 51 program also included 19 “fleet snorkel’ conversions, three of which were later cancelled. It was limited to ‘installation of the snorkel plus that streamlining which is an economical part of snorkel installation’ although ‘conversion features shall be designed to facilitate future conversion to Guppy Hor LA."In practice that meant that a ‘fleet snorkel’ conversion could be distinguished from a true Guppy by retention of a ship-type bow in place of the Guppy rounded one. Thus by snorkelling on one engine the ‘fleet snorkel’ could maintain only 6.5 knots to the [As 7.5 (or the ‘Type Tis 9 knots) and at the maximum half-hour battery rate she could make only 10 knots rae (15 for aA, 16 fora 0). ‘The original ‘fleet snorkel” characteristics called for a ‘minimum reduction of gun ‘armament as necessary fo meet stability requirement,’ and at least some of these submarines emerged from their refits retaining a Sin/25 ‘wet gun’ abaft their conning towers. These were soon removed, presumably in the interest of greater underwater speed. TYPE TIA GUPPIES There remained one further series of conversions, 16 more fleet boats became Guppy ITAS under the FY 52 program. Like the IA, the ITA employed the Sargo II battery but was redesigned for improved sonar performance, one main engine being eliminated to allow relocation of auxiliary machinery away from the sonar transducers. There were also habitability improvements which included better air conditioning. Sonar equipment included a new passive sonar called AN/BOR-2, generally in a chin dome under the hull, there was also an active sonar, such as BQS-2, and a precision tracking passive sonar the wartime JT or its replacement, ;QR-3). By 1954 this sonar suit ‘was standard in Guppies. ‘The Guppy IIA program included two boats specifically intended as ASW targets, Thornback and Razorback. Both were modified to allow for impact firings of the new generation of ASW homing torpedoes but the modifications were such that it was relatively easy to convert these boats to the standard ITA. configuration ‘One remaining feature of all of the Guppy and ‘fleet snorkel’ submarines deserves mention: all were fitted with a new underwater fire control system, Mark 106, which permiited them to fire a new generation of electrically (as opposed to mechanically) set torpedoes and all ultimately received the new generation submarine fired ASW homing torpedoes. Guppies were not the only ‘fleet boats’ modernized to extend their useful lives. Seven boats received more extensive SSK modifications, including installation of powerful BOR-4 passive sonar (at the expense of two bow tubes); they were otherwise similar to Guppy TIA conversions. There were also ‘two boats converted to fire Regulus ‘guided missiles which were otherwise comparable to ‘fleet snorkels,’ and nine converted to radar pickets. Other conversions produced cargo carriers and even a submarine oiler. However, the specialist types died out as experience with the converted fleet boats during the 1950s apparently showed that it was possible to build an effective general purpose submarine which would also be an effective SSK. At least that became US policy with nuclear submarines. ‘THE FRAM PROGRAM By the late 1950s many of the US warships built for World War II were beginning to show their age. In 1958 an extensive Fleet Rehabilitation and Modernization (FRAM) program was instituted to buy time until the mass of war construetion could be replaced. It included submarine refits, and ultimately nine Guppy IIs were rebuilt, lengthened 10ft, to allow for a plotting room and a longer conning tower, their hull and machinery overhauled and their fire control systems modified to allow them to fire the new ASTOR, the Mark 45 ASW torpedo with a nuclear warhead. In a sense this paralleled the destroyer modernizations which allowed them to fire ASROC, the new surface ASW weapon contemporary wi ASTOR. The main external mark of the FRAM conversion, which was designated Guppy III, was a nuclear submarine style ‘sail? which replaced the stepped type characteristic of the earlier boats. However, this new superstructure was also applied to Guppies which did not undergo FRAM and even to some ‘fleet snorkels.” ‘Another major modification was the BQG-4 fire control sonar (PUFFS — Passive Underwater Fire-control Feasibility Study), housed in three domes projecting above the hull. Together, they were intended to permit the submarine totriangulate sources of noise and thus to obtain both range and bearing without itself emitting sonar ‘pings’. More conventional passive sonars could not find the range without having the boats they were mounted aboard carry out specialized and precise maneuvers. PUFFS was also mounted aboard several later US diesel submarines, and on the Guppy IA submarine Blenny. The original FRAM program of December 1958 called for the modernization of 35 submarines to FRAM Mark II standard, which was expected to extend their useful lives by five years one prototype under the FY 59 program, then 4 in FY 60, 8 in FY 61, and 11 each in FY 62 and 63. This conversion was, designated SCB 223 in the series of new construction and conversion projects of the Ship Characteristics Board (Guppy IT had been SCB 47, TA had been SCB 47A, the “fleet snorkel’ SCB 47B, and IA SCB 47C). In 1958 a total of 48 Guppies s were active and two had been lost, Cochino and Stickleback, the latter toa 1958 collision with a destroyer escort. FRAM modernizations were to apply to those units with the Jongest remaining working lives and probably would have included all 23 surviving Guppy Ts and some of the 15 surviving Guppy IIAs. However, the Guppy III program was reduced to 24 and ultimately to 9 submarines. One reason may have been a growing skepticism as to the value of such lnited refts in elderly hulls with very limited sonar capabilities against modern submarines; new nuclear boats equipped with very long range sonars (and presumably able to dive deeply enough to reach optimum sonar conditions) and SUBROC must have seemed a far more economical proposi Even so, the Guppies were retained in service into the 1970s and many now serve in foreign navies alongside the surviving ‘fleet snorkels’. During the 1960s US yards converted a number of the Surviving fleet boats, as well as several which had already been transferred abroad, to the late ‘fleet jorkel’ configuration including the new type of sail. US ‘fleet snorkels’ remained in service alongside the Guppies as late as 1973 showing, perhaps, the wisdom of the austere conversion. This last is perhaps a ‘good way to conclude this brief a ‘USS Tiru ($S-416) was a GUPPY Ill. The domes along her upper deck are patt of the PUFFS (BOG-4) passive ASW targeting system, which was ako fited on some newer Submarines, including Tullbee (SSN-597}. Here she is shown on 10 June 1963. Note the speckled periscope shalt, and also the absence ‘ofan alr seareh radar ~ for a modern dar isa hindrance itcan be USN by courtesy of Norman Polmar. account. In the late 1940s the advance of wartime technology and the magnitude of the potential Soviet threat seemed so impressive that all of the proposed solutions involved wholesale reconstruction of the existing ASW fleet, much of it well under a decade old. It was impossible for the Navy to secure that kind of funding and in retrospect one of the great surprises of the 1950s was just how well the Fleet could do with far more austere measures, such as the ‘fleet snorkel’. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Tam indebted to the personnel of the US Naval Historical Center, particularly Cal Cavalcante, for their assistance in obtaining ‘material for this article. Photographs were supplied by Robert Carlisle of the US Still Photography section.GUPPY CONVERSIONS No Boat Cowersionyard and date ‘Transerredfate curry 484 ODAX P 946-847 8.772, Brasil 486 POMODON M 1046-747 1. 870 Scrapped urrvit Siy"" CATFISH 848-549 1.771 Argentina 343, CLAMAGORE* Ph 1247— 748 27. 675 Turkey Bit COBBLER™ BE 2as> 849 21173, Turkey 3s COCHIN 2 346 CORPORAL" E 347-248 211173 Turkey 347 CUBERA Ph 747~ 3.48 5.172 Venezuela 349 DIODON Mo 8Aa7~ 3s 350 DOGTISH Pho 847- Aas 28,.7.72 Brasil 331 GREENFISH* E Las sds 19.1273 Braal 352, HALFBEAK P 99-150 1771. Scrapped aio THRU" 17.75. Turkey 425 TRUMPETHISH* 151073. Brea 426 TUSK 181073 Taiwan 478 CUTLASS Ph 148-249 12.473 Taiwan 48) SBALROPARD Ph 128-49 27, 373 Braal 485 SIRAGO Ph 1248-749 1, 672 Scrapped 487 REMORA* M ‘247-1147 29/1073 Grose 490 VOLADOR* 522 AMBERIACK Po 1246-148 174073 Brazil 323 GRAMPUS™ B = 10.49 13,572 Brasil 524 PICKEREL P ei 325. GRENADIER™ B = 251 15, 5.73 Venezuela GUPPY IA 319 BECUNA B 1150-831 15. 873 Venemela 322. BLACKEIN M 130-531 15. 9°72 Sunk (arwet) 323, CAIMAN M a3t- 30, 673. Turkey 324 BLENNY M = st 15. 873. Sunk Carget) aul Civo B 1050-731 1.771 Argentina 382 CHOPPER E 531 11071 Scrapped 306 HAWKBILL E 333 RNUbN So? ICEFISH E 333 RNehN 403. ATULE. P : 15. 873. Pert 406. SEA POACHER ch = 15.873 Peru 407 SEAROBIN 5 1.10.70 Scrapped 417 TENCH 15.873 Sunk (arget) Gury, 340 ENTEMEDOR E 252-1052 1, 873. Turkey 365 HARDHEAD BE 452-133 26. 772 Greese 368 JALLAO E =1233 36. 64 Spain 377 MENHADEN M — 8s2— 353 15. 873 Stink (target) 382 PICUDA P = 833 TaL74 Spain 385. BANG P 252-1032 XIL34 Spain 301 POMFRET M 432-133 1873. Turkey 304 RAZORBACK po 832. 4°33 301170 Turkey 396 RONOUIEL M 532-258, 1. 771 Spain 402 SEAFOX M = 1032-733 151270 ‘Turkey 410 THREADFIN Po 1133-833 1873 Turkey 415 STICKLEBACK M 1152-633 28, S58 Sunk Gammed) 418 THORNBACK Ch "652-333 1873 Turkey 420. TIRANTE pl 3521252 11073. Sermpped 421 TRUTTA ch 3530 '133 172 Scrapped 434 QUILLBACK pi 3520 133 23, 373. Serapped “Boats converted to Guppy IL *=Boats completed as Guppy. Key to conversion Yai Ba dioston Navy Yard Ch, Chareson Navy Yard B blac Boat Co Mi Mae land P Portsmouth Navy Yard PhyPhialphia Navy YardA’s and A’s AIRCRAFT ON TIGER from Adrian Vicary, Cromer Thave received today Issue 6 of Warship and am paren interested in the photographs on page 89. The photograph captions Incorrectly state the aeroplane’s serial number as $6797; this should be N6797. However more important than thisis that itis actually a Sopwith 2F1 Camel not a Sopwith Pup. This is one of a batch of 100 built by William Beardmore & Co Ltd, of Dalmuir (Serials N6750 - 6849). The date of the photograph must therefore be Sometime after March 1918 as the first Beardmore built Camel flew in February 1918 and deliveries to Rosyth commenced in March, Incidentally Culley’s Camel, in! the Imperial War Museum, is also from this batch of Beardmore Camels (N6812). According to Marine Aircrafi of the 1914-1918 War the turret ramp was built on Tiger in February 1918, and another Camel (N6603) was carried. Dirt NSIS cer tly ater competion, the fist Pup exclang ‘Si protoypes) tobe manelacored by Sopwith Laker production modes were febeverproducdlby Beardmore wo tance a lrpe number under Ribeontace Soutsy 1 Hoodman 2 an ots engl See Ce FEE steer Geran aah far tee lope {pone ine owe aiaepemeunel ae46 SE Vie VIRIBUS UNITIS from Harry Woodman, London ‘The feature on Viribus Unitis was of great interest to me but I regret that Herr Prasky had to damn all previous atiempts to describe these ships with his remark thai “Articles have been published on these ships but all of them contain errors of fact”, As one of the writers ofa previous article I find it a litle off-putting. Apart from myself the only other accounts that spring to mind were written by an Austrian, a Czech and a Dutchman. My own feature which was published in Battle magazine, in three parts, in 1976 was based almost entirely on Austrian material and [had the help and advice of Ing Rene Greger ‘of Prague and the Graf von Aichelberg of Vienna. My drawing was, as is Herr Prasky’s, a tracing of the original drawing held by the Austrian State Archive. As my. work was to be reduced to 1:700 ‘scale much small detail was omitted but I did modify it to show the vessel as she appeared in 1916/17 with some of the 7em guns removed and anti-bomb baskets fitted to the funnels. Apart from this, despite Herr Prasky’s remarks, a good drawing was available some time ago in the US which was also traced from the original Austrian material My feature was entitled The Tegetthoffs for the simple reason that contemporary Austro- Hungarian literature and material (which I possess) refers to these ships as Tegetthoff Klasse. ally I think that your readers may be alittle puzzled by the statement at the top of page 106 that Szent Istvan was... ‘completed in Poland’. It is of course a misprint for Pola. CRUISER RADAR from Alastair H Mitchell, Sussex, UK Iwas very interested in Norman Friedman’s article on cruiser electronics in Warship 6 as, having spent seven years on radar maintenance in the RN in the 1950s, I worked on some of the later equipments mentioned. Reading the article I got the impression that Mr Friedman was ‘more at home with US Navy radars than he was with the RN. There was a fair degree of supposition as regards some aspects of the performance and operational use of the British sets. To take a few examples a. Page 81 ~ 1. “The wide beams of the British systems (Types 79, 281 etc) presented a serious problem if their warning were to be translated into data suitable for gunnery or probably even for fighter control.” 2. “The RN appeared to have had difficulty in synchronising the rotation of two aerials.” In (1) it depends on what period of the war we are talking about. Initially the sets were classified as purely early warning and were used by the few ships fitted to give the fleet warning of an impending air attack. Tracking and ranging were normally done visually by the AA. directors. In 1945 the Types 79, 279 and 279M were listed as long range early warning of aircraft and ships and as AA gunnery rangin; ‘Types 281 and 281M were listed as for long range warning and short range ranging against aireraft, and for range and bearing of surface targets. In addition, of course, facilities existed for ‘putting on’ the centimetric radars Type 277, 275 te, to give accurate height and ranging guidance; eg display units Type JJ and 19. Iwould therefore agree that the radar could not give accurate bearing information but then as the range lessened so would the distance of are until visual contact ‘was made. In any case beam-width is measured between the half power points so as you come close-in problems with main lobe width and sidelobes arise at the lower frequences. I do not know how effective the radars were in the gunnery data role as by the time I ‘came on the scene it was all done by the 10cm radars, the Type 960 metric set having reverted to purely Jong range warning. As to the rotation of the aerials (2) this was done mechanically by hand through 360° and back, The only report I have seen of this stated that one man rotated both aerials. I have no information as to how this was actually done but given that the RN could get 15in turrets weighing over 700 tons to follow a director ‘would not have thought the problem was beyond them! b. Page 82 ~in describing the roles of Types 277 and 293 radars there are Several mistakes, The Type 293 was a 10em radar (not 3em) with a beam-width in the final Q version of plus and minus 13° and a vertical beam-width of plus and minus 30° tilted at 15° to give air cover up to 45°. The broad elevation beam meant it did not have to be stabilised in any plane to give effective surface cover out to the horizon (12 - 25 miles depending on the height of the aerial and target size). It was primarily a surface warning and target indicating set and was only fitted to ships with a runnery director. The very narrow eam made it a doubtful proposition as an air warning set and whether you picked up anaircraft or not depended on its and altitude. ‘The same radar was used in conjunction with a dish aerial and then became Type 277. This gave a relatively narrow beam in both horizontal and vertical planes, was stabilised in one plane and was used asa combined surface/air warning set on all types of ships and as a height-finder in conjunction with ‘Types 279M and 281BQ. The official ranges quoted for Type 277M were 25-30 miles for surface targets (including coastlines) and 50-100 miles for aircraft with maximum elevation for heightfinding of 40°. The ‘P’ version had an improved receiver giving 15% range increase while the elevation of the aerial was increased to 75°. In the 1950s the normal method of operation was to rotate the Type 277 with the dish vertical and when required stop it on the approximate bearing indicated by the Type 281/960 and ‘nod it’ up and down to obtain the elevation, Having complained for most of this letter I would like to say that I do think Mr Friedman is correct in his general assessment of the different tactical concepts applied in the two navies with the emphasis on gunnery in the RN and that I enjoyed reading the article. Very tile is ever written about the development of shipborne radar. FAULTS IN VIRIBUS UNITIS CLASS Friedrich Prasky the author of the article on the Viribus Unitis class published in Warship 6 has sent us the following additional information, Itis taken from an official document listing the faults of the class. 1, The ships were about 2500 tons too small for their armament. 2. Inbattle condition the bow lay 20cm too deep in the water. 3. The freeboard at the forecastle ‘was too low; the ships were not ‘ocean going types. The ram bow was obsolete. 4, Because of their low stability the ships heeled over very much even in turning at low speed. Turning at full speed during a battle was impossible otherwise the side armour would have come out of the water. 5. The ships were too slow. During the raid of the Austro-Hungarian Fleet against the Italian coast at the beginning of the war Viribus Unitis only reached 17.5 knots as, maximum speed. 6. The openings in the armoured deck were too large, especially around the smokestacks where large openings were arranged, so a projectile as small as 7em could penetrate the wall of the boiler room. With the resultant loss of air pressure in the fire rooms the speed would have been further reduced. The funnel uptakes were unprotected and the ships carried nets on the top of their funnels against bombing ~a very pointless construction. 7. The turrets also had some faults. As you can see in my drawing there ‘was an unprotected slot between barbette and gun house. The cupola of the rangefinder on the turret roof was too large. A hit on it would have opened the thin turret covering like a tin can, Under battle conditions the gun houses could not be ventilated and the oxygen in them only lasted for 15 minutes. Before firing the ventilation had to be turned off, otherwise the explosion gases would have been sucked in. The 15cm barbettes had no ventilation; when smoke got into them they were out of action In summary it can be said that the ships of the Viribus Unitis class were powerful looking and beautiful but they were not suited for action. The ‘Austrian Naval Staff knew the faults Of these ships as there exists a document about these drawbacks dated before the sinking of the Szent Istvan,TRIBALC FRIGATES BY PETER HODGES HMS Zulu in 1975, some eleven years “after her launch. She was the last ship of the class (ziving the Z of her name a hint of 5 finality) and was the only one having Seacat ystems {rom building. Both the Aion nkcbasers andthe bartelled ‘rocket launcher were later additions. The blu bow at foreeastle deck level is clearly TMS OspreyThe Type 81 General Purpose Frigate emerged from a 1954 design in which it was hoped to combine the attributes of the specialised Type 12 (A/S) Type 41 (A /A) and Type 61 (A /D) frigates. These three classes of six, four and four ships respectively were completed between 1956 and 1959 (together with a dozen Type 14s, the latter honestly described as ‘3rd rate’); but the concept proved costly. Economie strictures had already dictated that only the Type 12s ‘would have the steam turbines necessary for them adequately to fulfil their function as AS vessels. ‘The remaining eight diesel propelled AA and AD frigates were embarassingly slow in company with the Type 15 conversions ~ and indeed with most of the existing fleet including, of course, the aircraft carriers. ‘The first three ships of the “Tribal class were ordered under the 1955-56 Estimates and soon featured in contemporary publications. The details therein proved to be so inaccurate that one isleft wondering whether they were the pure conjecture of the publishers or had been collusively teleased from Whitehall with. deliberate intent to deceive. Bither way, surely only the most naive could have believed that on a displacement of 2800 tons with 20 000 shp and one shaft the class had been designed for 30 knots. The imagined armament was equally erroneous and mysteriously suffered a multiplication factor of two. Thus, the class were to have ‘two twin 4,Sin DP, two twin 40mm Bofors and two Limbos to say nothing of eight 21in torpedo tubes. Even now they are cryptically described as having ‘Optical Seacat Directors’. ARMAMENT ‘The armament isin fact a strange mixture of ancient and modern. ‘Two single 4.5in Mk 5 mountings, which are fundamentally cleaned-up 4.7in Mk XXIIs of Second World War vintage with electric power added, are set in’ and Y positions. Like their valiant forebears the50 present day shell and cordite joading numbers must needs take what comfort they can behind an open-backed gunshield cradling a ‘S5lb projectile and 351b cartridge case in their arms. No doubt the ‘single four five’ concept was economically attractive (since there were mountings a-plenty from serapped 'C class destroyers) butt seems hardly the armament for the nuclear age. The layers’ and trainers’ sighting ports have been plated over to improve the ‘watertightness of the front face shield and the hand ramming arrangements removed from the spring powered loading tray to reduce maintenance effort; but the mounting as a whole cannot be ‘Nubian at anchor with the hateh-covers inpposition on the ight deck covering the open ft wll. Note that the red “danger circle around the 4.5in delines the swept arcof the muzzles. The GWS 21 ditectors are uncovered and the aerial dish ean be seen, centrally on the drum shaped shield. C&STAYLOR claimed to be other than the stop-gap it was acknowledged to be when it was first designed in the carly 1940s. ‘A’ mounting has triple 2in Rocket Flare Launcher (RFL) rails on each side for illumination purposes which allows the gun to be supplied with HE rather than starshell. The RFLs are less flexible than conventional fused starshell since their range is less and they are ata fixed elevation. They date from the Battle of the Atlantic and were originally designed for one gun escorts to enable them to illuminate and engage surfaced U-boats without the need to change ammunition type from starshell t0 HE. ‘The 4.5in armament is controlled by the first frigate-fit of the MRS3 system which before the advent of the latest digital computers was the standard gunfire control system in the Royal Navy. MRS3, which is analog-electronic, is ‘Chinese copy’ of the USN Mk 63 system, and the discerning will note a similarity FIGURE 1. TYPE 81 (TRIBAL? CLASS) FRIGATE |. VDS gantry operator's compartment VBS gantry -d acoustic torpedo decoy winch in main MkS mounting - Hangar rooflight deck 5. Triple-barrelled A/S mortar Mk10 . Secondary control for Y mounting abaft after funnel (by STD) 8. IF. 9. Type 965 long range surveillance radar 10. UHF 1, Navigation/helicopter landing contzol radar 12, Medium range/weapon direction radar 13. MRS3 (Gunnery) director, with radar Type 903 14, Visual gun direction positon 18. A4.5in Mk5 mounting 16. Attack and search sonars 17, Triple 2in rocket flare launcher, left and right 20mm Oerlikon, port and starboard 19, B.barrelled 3in decoy rocket launcher, port and starboard ‘Quadruple Seacat launcher, port and starboard Boat stowage space, port and starboard 2. GWS 21 director, port and starboard 23, Mortar bomb handling room 24, After capstan 20, a