Rule 78 to 79
Advincula vs. Teodoro R 82 1 99 phil 413
Emilio Advincula was appointed special administrator, then later regular administrator of his
deceased wifes estate. After he qualified as administrator, his brothers-in-law submitted a
document purporting to be the deceased will. Emilio opposed heprobate of the will on the ground
that the signature was not his wifes and even if it was, the same was procured by fraud. One of
the brothers-in-law, Enrique Lacson, prayed that he (Enrique) be appointed administrator in lieu
of Emilio.During the hearing, it was alleged that Emilio was incompetent, incapable and
unsuitable to act as administrator because Emilio is foreign to the estate. The court ruled in favor
of Enriques motion. Emilio filed an MR but the same was denied so he instituted the present
action for certiorari to annul the lower courts order.
ISSUE:
WON the lower court acted with GADLEJ in granting Lacsons motion
HELD:
Yes. The appointment of Lacson as administrator in lieu of Advincula is predicated on the fact
that Lacson was named executor of the deceased will. This provision, however cannot be
enforced until the said will is admitted to probate. The discovery of a will of the deceased does
not ipso facto nullify letters of administration already issued or even authorize the revocation
there of until the alleged will is proved and allowed by the court. Further more, the lower court
appears to have followed the argument of the respondents that Emilio, being foreign to the
deceased estate Is incapable of being an administrator. Thisargument is untenable because from
the view point of logic and experience, a stranger may be competent, capable and fit to be
administrator of the estate in the same way that a family member can be incompetent, incapable
and unfit to do so. Besides, Emilio as the surviving spouse is a forced heir of the deceased. He is
entitled to of all property apart from his share of the other half thereof as heir of the deceased
since all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership
The writ of certiorari prayed for is in order. Lacson’s appointment, in lieu of Advincula, as
administrator of the estate of Josefa Lacson Advincula, is predicated upon the fact that the former
is named executor in the alleged will of said deceased. The provision therein to this effect cannot
be enforced, however, until after said document has been allowed to probate, for section 4 of Rule
79 of the Rules of Court provides:chanroblesvirtual 1awlibrary
"When a will has been proved and allowed, the court shall issue letters testamentary thereon to
the person named as executor therein, if he is competent, accepts the trusts, and gives bond as
required by these rules." (Italics supplied.)
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON,
Petitioners, vs. MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE
QUIAZON, Respondent. G.R. No. 189121
July 31, 2013
FACTS Elise Quiazon is the daughter of Eliseo Quiazon and his common-law wife Ma.
Lourdes Belen. When Eliseo died intestate, Elise represented by her mother, Lourdes, filed a
Petition for Letters of Administration before the RTC of Las Piñas City in order to preserve
the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value. She likewise sought her
appointment as administratrix of her late father’s estate. Amelia Quiazon, to whom Eliseo
was married, together with her two children, filed an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of improper venue asserting that Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of
Las Piñas City. In addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there
are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseo’s estate. RTC
rendered a decision directing the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting
the necessary bond. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the
Court of Appeals. In validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise
was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by
establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las
Piñas City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseo’s death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the
venue of the settlement of Eliseo’s estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion
reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City.
ISSUE/S: 1. Whether or not Las Pinas City was the proper venue. 2. Whether or not Elise is
qualified to be administrator of the estate. HELD:
1. YES. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where
the decedent resides at the time of his death: Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons
settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether
a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court in the province in which
he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court
of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any province in which he had estate. The court
first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as
it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall
not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original
case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. The term "resides" connotes ex
vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term
"resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the
light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application
of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.13 Even where the statute
uses word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and
"domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be
viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a
place and actual stay thereat. Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special
proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus defined, "residence," in the context of
venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of abode,
provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. Viewed in light of the foregoing
principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the
venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is
evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road,
Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his
estate may be laid in the said city.
2. Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo’s
estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record
produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners’ pounding on her lack of
interest in the administration of the decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway
this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be
appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right
as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the
estate are satisfied. Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s estate as one of his
natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview
of the law.
Gaspay vs CA
Facts: Flaviano Gaspay died without a last will and testament. private respondent
Guadalupe Gaspay Alfaro files a petition that she is the acknowledged illegitimate daughter
of the deceased Flaviano Gaspay, who died without a will and left certain real and personal
properties. She identified her mother as Claudia Pason with whom decedent allegedly had
an illicit relationship. She prayed for issuance of letters of administration of the decedent's
estate. Petitioners Flaviano S. Gaspay, Jr., and Eriberta Salvatieva Gaspay opposed the
petition with motion to dismiss. Flaviano, Jr., is an adopted son of the decedent while
Eriberta is also not a next of kin. They alleged that private respondent is a stranger and even
assuming her illegitimate status, there is no proof of her recognition or acknowledgment. The
motion to dismiss was denied. The trial court 2 ruled it was not based on indubitable grounds
Private respondents appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals. The respondent court
reversed the trial court. the evidence is ample to prove the filiation and recognition of private
respondent as an illegitimate child of the decedent; (2) the evidence is also sufficient to show
that private respondent consented to her recognition by the decedent; and (3) actions based
on voluntary recognition can be instituted after the death of the putative father. private
respondent filed the instant petition for certiorari
Issue: Whether or not Guadalupe Gaspay Alfaro is an illegitimate child by the decedent
through voluntary recognition?
Ruling:
YES. The death of Flaviano Gaspay, Sr., does not constitute a time bar to private
respondent's claim as his acknowledged illegitimate daughter. Settled is the rule that
"actions based on voluntary acknowledgment may be brought even after the father's death.
Section 6 of Rule 78 is in her favor, thus: Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration
granted. — If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent,
refused the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be
granted: (c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to
such other person as the court may select. For a fact, petitioners neglected to apply for
letters of administration thirty (30) days after the death of Gaspay, Sr..
APPOINTMENT OF CO-ADMISTRATOR
GABRIEL v. COURT OF APPEALS [GR. No. 101512; August 7, 1992] “Widow and
illegitimate son fighting over who should be the administrator. In the end, both of them were
appointed”
Facts: 9 months after Domingo Gabriel died, his son Roberto Gabriel filed with the RTC of
Manila a petition for letters of administration o The court directed the publication of the order
in the newspaper "Mabuhay," once a week for 3 consecutive weeks o No opposition having
been filed, Roberto was allowed to present his evidence ex parte. Thereafter, the probate
court issued an order appointing Roberto as administrator Subsequently, a notice to
creditors for the filing of claims against the estate was published in the "Metropolitan News."
o Aida Valencia, mother of Roberto, filed a claim alleging that the decision in a civil case
between her and the deceased remained unsatisfied and that she thereby had an interest in
said estate o The oppositors herein, including the widow of the deceased, filed an opposition
claiming that (I) they were not duly informed by personal notice of the petition for
administration; (2) Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter, should be preferred over
Roberto Gabriel; (3) Roberto Gabriel has a conflicting and/or adverse interest against the
estate because he might prefer the claims of his mother and (4) most of the properties of the
decedent have already been relinquished by way of transfer of ownership to the oppositors
herein and should not be included in the value of the estate sought to be administered by
private respondent. The probate court denied the opposition since no proof was adduced
to show that Roberto Gabriel is unworthy, incapacitated or unsuitable to perform the trust
The oppositors filed a certiorari before the CA claiming that the order of preference stated in
the Rules of Court provides that the surviving spouse, who in this case is Felicitas Jose-
Gabriel, is first in the order of preference for the appointment of an administrator Also, as
between a legitimate and an illegitimate child, the former is preferred, hence Nilda Gabriel,
as the legitimate daughter, must be preferred over Roberto Gabriel, who is an illegitimate
son Roberto Gabriel contends that the preference in the Rules of Court may be disregarded
by the court where said persons neglect to apply for letters of administration for 30 days after
the decedent's death. In this case, the oppositors failed to do so.
Issue/s:
1. WON the preference in the Rules of Court may be disregarded by the court to exclude the
widow from the administration of the estate of her husband- NO
2. WON there is sufficient ground to revoke the appointment of Roberto as an administrator
– NO
3. WON both the widow and the illegitimate son should be appointed as a co-administrator --
YES
Held/Ratio:
Petition GRANTED. Both the widow, Felicitas Jose-Gabriel, and the illegitimate son,
Roberto Gabriel, must be appointed as co-administrators
1) NO. While it is true that Section 6(b) of Rule 78 provides that the preference may be
disregarded by the court where said persons neglect to apply for letters of administration for
30 days after the decedent's death, such failure is not sufficient to exclude the widow from
the administration of the estate of her husband. There must be a very strong case to justify
the exclusion of the widow from the administration In the case at bar, there is no such
compelling reason Just as the order of preference is not absolute and may be disregarded
for valid cause, so may the 30-day period be likewise waived since the rule merely provides
that said letters, as an alternative, "may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors”.
2) NO. Administrators can only be removed for just cause Section 2 of Rule 82 provides the
legal and specific causes authorizing the probate court to remove an administrator A mere
importunity by some of the heirs of the deceased, there being no factual and substantial
bases therefor, is not adequate ratiocination for the removal of private respondent
3) YES. It is equitable and advisable that there be a co-administration of the estate in this
case. The purpose of having co-administrators is to have the benefit of their judgment and
perhaps at all times to have different interests represented, especially considering that in this
proceeding they will respectively represent the legitimate and illegitimate groups of heirs to
the estate Thereby, it may reasonably be expected that all interested persons will be
satisfied, with the representatives working in harmony under the direction and supervision of
the probate court The appointment of co-administrators has been upheld for various
reasons, viz: (1) to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have
different interests represented; (2) where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or
factions be represented in the management of the estate of the deceased; (3) where the
estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle; (4) to have all
interested persons satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for the best interests
of the estate; and (5) when a person entitled to the administration of an estate desires to
have another competent person associated with him in the office
[G.R. No. L-5236. May 25, 1953.]
Intestate estate of the deceased Luis Morales, JOSE TORRES, Petitioner,
PEDRO DE JESUS, administrator-appellee, v. HERMENEGILDA SICAT VDA. DE
MORALES, Oppositor-Appellant.
Filemon Cajator for Appellant.
Aganon & Aganon for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATORS, APPOINTMENT OF; ORDER OF PREFERENCE, WHEN MAY BE
DISREGARDED. — The order of preference for the appointment of administrators
provided in Section 6, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court, may be disregarded only if the
person enjoying such preference appears to be unsuitable for the trust, he having an
adverse interest or is hostile to those immediately interested in the estate, to such
an extent as to render the appointment inadvisable.
2. ID.; CLAIMS AGAINST ESTATE; EFFECT ON POWER OF COURT TO APPOINT
ADMINISTRATORS. — Under Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, the creditors’ claims may
be filed and considered only after the regular administrator has been appointed,
hence in selecting the administrator, the court could not yet normally accord priority
treatment to the interests of those whose credits were in dispute.
3. ID.; ID.; WHO ARE CONSIDERED CREDITORS. — The creditors of the estate are
those declared to be so in appropriate proceedings. Before their credits are fully
established they are not creditors. So it is not improper — it is even proper — for
the administrator or whoever is proposed for appointment as such, to oppose, or to
require competent proof of, claims advanced against the estate.
On August 25, 1950, Luis Morales, married to Hermenegilda Sicat, died in the municipality of
Tarlac, Tarlac Seven days later, Jose Torres alleging to be a creditor of the conjugal partnership
commenced this special proceeding in the Tarlac court petitioning for the issuance of letter of
administration in favor of Atty. Pedro B. De Jesus, for the purpose of settling the estate of the
deceased.
Twelve days afterwards the widow voiced her opposition, and claimed preference to be
appointed as administratrix. She said the only close relatives and forced heirs were her six
legitimate minor children, besides herself.
The petitioner presented evidence. The oppositor submitted none. Then the trial judge,
disregarding the preference established by law for the surviving widow, entered on August 16,
1951 an order appointing Atty. Pedro B. De Jesus as administrator.
The widow appealed on time, and argued several assignments of error revolving around the
principal issue whether this appointment should be upheld, ignoring the surviving widows
preferential right.
The order making the appointment is undoubtedly appealable. (Section 1, Rule 105, Sy Hong
Eng vs. Sy Lioc Suy, 8 Phil., 594, Moran, Comments, 1952 ed., Vol. 2, p. 592.)
Under section 6, rule 79 of the Rules of Court, when a person dies intestate, administration
should be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or nect of kin, or both, . . . ;
(b) if such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, . . . it may be granted to one or more of
the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such
other person as the court may select.
The order of preference provided in this section is founded on the assumption that the persons
preferred are suitable. If they are not, the court may entirely disregard the preference thus
provided. This is the reason for the rule that in the selection of an administrator courts may
exercise discretion, and, as stated elsewhere, the person appearing in the order of preference
may not be appointed where he appears to be unsuitable for the trust, he having an adverse
interest or is hostile to the interested parties to such an extent as to make his selection
inadvisable. But, of course, the order of preference may be disregarded only when the reasons
therefor are positive and clear." (Moran, Comments, 1952 ed., Vol. 2, p. 387.)
The trial judge was cognizant of this statutory preference. But he expressly stated his reason for
disregarding it, saying in effect: "Apparently the amount of credits exceeds the value of the
conjugal assets; therefore the interest of the creditors deserves paramount consideration. Now
inasmuch as the widow has shown hostility to the creditors by openly disputing their credits, she
is therefore unsuitable, for having adverse interests." He reasoned from the above-quoted
statement of principles and others, particularly Sioca vs. Garcia, 44 Phil., 711:
A probate court cannot arbitrarily disregard the preferential rights of the surviving spouse
to the administration of the estate of a deceased person; but if the person enjoying such
preferential rights is unsuitable the court may appoint another person.
Unsuitableness for appointment as administrator may consist in adverse interest of some
kind or hostility to those immediately interested in the estate of such an extent as to
render the appointment inadvisable.
"The surviving widow" the trial judge stated, "has always consistently refused to recognize the
credits" and manifested her determination to "resist the claims of creditors."
In our opinion it is a sound juridical principle that the administrator should not adopt attitudes nor
take steps inimical to the interests of the creditors. The administration of the intestate is
undertaken for the benefit of both the heirs and the creditors. but by creditors we mean those
declared to be so in appropriate proceedings. Before their credits are fully established they are
not "creditors" within the purview of the above principle. So it is not improper — it is even proper
— for the administrator or whoever is proposed for appointment as such, to oppose, or to require
competent proof of, claims advanced against the estate. "The propriety of contesting particular
claims must frequently be left largely to his discretion and no presumption of bad faith or
misconduct will be made against him." (34 C. J. S., p. 259.)
At the hearing of the petition for the appointment of administrator, this widow practically did
nothing more than to inform the alleged creditors, "prove your credit before I honor it." That is not
necessarily dishonest nor contrary to real creditors. And then, not having opposed all creditors,
because she did not deny the estate's liability to the People's Bank, she could not strictly be
considered hostile to the creditors. Had she acknowledged indebtedness to every one coming
forward with a claim, regardless of its merit, she would be useless, even harmful, both to the
heirs and the actual creditors.
Under the rules (Rule 87) creditors; claims may be filed, and considered, only after the regular
administrator has been appointed. Hence, in selecting the administrator, the court could not yet
normally accord priority treatment to the interests of those whose credits were in dispute. And
counsel for herein appellant did well in opposing the presentation of evidence of the objected
credits at the hearing, arguing in part,
. . . the time has not yet arrived when this court can even entertain the presentation of
those exhibits because the stage of presenting claims has not yet arrived. Consequently,
this court can not even receive as evidence the said documents as evidence of
indebtedness, because if those evidence will be accepted then we will be in a position to
rebut them and to enter into actual trial to show that they are not really evidence of
indebtedness, and in that case we will not terminate because then we will be contending
as to whether those were really executed or really contracted. . . .
On the other hand, the appealed order conceding that the evidence "showed clearly that the
surviving widow is fully competent in a high degree to administer the intestate of her deceased
husband", plainly indicates that except for her supposed hostility to creditors she was suitable for
the trust. Consequently, having found that her attitude did not per se constitute antagonism to the
creditors, we must necessarily declare and enforce her superior right to appointment as
administratrix under Rule 79.
Wherefore, the questioned order appointing Atty. Pedro B. De Jesus is annulled, and one will be
entered requiring the issuance by the court a quo of letters of administration to the widow
appellant subject to such terms and conditions as are appropriate under the Rules. Costs against
the appellee.
