MOCK EXAM: Answer the following questions like you are taking the bar examination.
Conduct a research from internet websites on how to answer bar examination questions
and apply them to your answers. The suggested cases only serve as guides in looking for
the appropriate legal principles and not the sole basis for the answers. (Your answers may
be submitted until 12:00 midnight tomorrow. Late submission is not allowed).
1. A law was passed converting the municipality of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur into a
component city. Atty. Julie Ray, a resident of Digos City, Davao del Sur and the
incumbent President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines of Davao del Sur Chapter
which is a lawyers’ organization bound to protect and uphold the rule of law, filed a
case for declaratory relief questioning the validity of the law. Atty. Julie argued that
the new corporate existence of the new city will restart the term of the present
municipal elective officials making it favorable to incumbent Mayor Francis Day who
is in his last and final term as municipal mayor. As such, this circumvents the three-
term limit rule provided by the Local Government Code.
When asked for comment, the Solicitor General argued that the case should be
dismissed in the absence of any actual case or controversy. Is the Solicitor General
correct? Explain. (10points)
(IBP vs. Zamora)
Facts:
Petitioner Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del
Sur in the elections of 1992, 1995, and 1998. In February 2001, he filed his
certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the 2001 elections. He stated therein
that he is eligible therefor, and likewise disclosed that he had already served
for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos and is now
running for the first time for the position of city mayor.
Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in the said elections, filed before the
COMELEC a petition to deny petitioner's candidacy since the latter had
already been elected and served for three consecutive terms. Petitioner
countered that this fact does not bar him from filing a certificate of candidacy
for the 2001 elections since this will be the first time that he will be running for
the post of city mayor.
The Comelec’s First Division denied petitioner's certificate of candidacy.
However, his motion for reconsideration was not acted upon by the Comelec
en banc before election day and he was proclaimed winner. Only after the
proclamation did the Comelec en banc issue a resolution that declared him
disqualified from running for mayor of Digos City, and ordered that all votes
cast in his favor should not be counted.
Petitioner appealed, contending that when Digos was converted from a
municipality to a city, it attained a different juridical personality separate from
the municipality of Digos. So when he filed his certificate of candidacy for city
mayor, it should not be construed as vying for the same local government
post.
Issue:
Is petitioner Latasa eligible to run as candidate for the position of mayor of the
newly-created City of Digos immediately after he served for three consecutive
terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos?
Held:
As a rule, in a representative democracy, the people should be allowed freely
to choose those who will govern them. Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution
is an exception to this rule, in that it limits the range of choice of the people.
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no
such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.
An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running again in for
same local government post, unless two conditions concur: 1.) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local
government post, and 2.) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct
from that of the municipality. This does not mean, however, that for the
purpose of applying the subject Constitutional provision, the office of the
municipal mayor would now be construed as a different local government post
as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial
jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the municipality.
Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in the
city. These inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected petitioner
Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. These are
also the same inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their
chief executive for nine years.
The framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the
peoples freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the
evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular
territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To
allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served
for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the
very intent of the framers when they wrote this exception. Should he be
allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos,
petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the
same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive
years. This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if
not abhorred by it.(Latasa vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 154829, 10 December 2003)
Note:
● It cannot be denied that the Court has previously held in Mamba-Perez v.
COMELEC that after an elective official has been proclaimed as winner of the
elections, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to pass upon his qualifications.
An opposing party's remedies after proclamation would be to file a petition for
quo warranto within ten days after the proclamation. Time and again, this
Court has held that rules of procedure are only tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice, such that when rigid application of the rules tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court is empowered to
suspend their operation. We will not hesitate to set aside technicalities in favor
of what is fair and just.
SC rules on officials’ term limits
posted February 15, 2019 at 10:50 pm
by
Rey E. Requejo
The Supreme Court has declared that conversion of a municipality into a city does not
interrupt the term of office of the incumbent elected officials or affect the three-term
limit imposed on them by the Constitution.
The SC ruling means that if a town mayor has served for three consecutive terms or
for nine consecutive years and in between his or her terms the municipality was
converted into a city, he or she cannot run again for mayor for another term.
The high court cited Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, which provides
that “the term of office of elective local officials… shall be three years and no such
official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.”
“The intention behind the three-term limit rule is not only to abrogate the
‘monopolization of political power’ and prevent elected officials from breeding
‘proprietary interest in their position’ but also to ‘enhance the people’s freedom of
choice,’” the SC ruled, in a decision penned by Senior Justice Antonio T. Carpio,
involving the case of Mabalacat City in Pampanga.
The SC reiterated its previous ruling that “the conversion of a municipality into a city
does not constitute an interruption of the incumbent official’s continuity of service.”
“We held that to be considered as interruption of service, the ‘law contemplates a rest
period during which the local elective official steps down from office and ceases to
exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a
particular local government unit,’” it said, as it affirmed the Aug. 3, 2016 resolution
of the first division of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) and the May 26, 2017
resolution of the Comelec en banc.
Court records showed that Marino P. Morales was elected and served as mayor of the
then municipality of Mabalacat for three consecutive terms from 2007 to2010, 2010
to2013, and 2013 to 2016.
On May 15, 2012 during Morales’ second term, Congress passed Republic Act No.
10164 which converted Mabalacat town into Mabalacat City. RA 10164 was ratified
by the town residents in a plebiscite.
On Dec. 8, 2015, Morales filed his certificate of candidacy (COC) for mayor of
Mabalacat City for the 2016 elections as a substitute candidate for Wilfredo Feliciano.
Mayoralty candidate Pyra Lucas filed a petition to cancel Morales’ COC with an
argument that he (Morales) had served three consecutive terms prior to the 2016
elections.
In his answer, Morales insisted that he did not violate the three-term rule because the
conversion of Mabalacat town into a city interrupted his term.
He maintained that his term as mayor of Mabalacat City was not a continuation of his
term as mayor of Mabalacat town.
On May 10, 2016, Morales was proclaimed elected city mayor with Christian C.
Halili as elected vice mayor.
On May 20, 2016, Crisostomo Garbo intervened in the case before the Comelec and
pointed out that he obtained the second highest number of votes and should be
proclaimed city mayor.
For his part, Halili also intervened with an allegation that since he is the incumbent
city vice mayor, he should be proclaimed mayor.
The Comelec’s First Division, in a resolution dated Aug. 3, 2016, cancelled Morales’
COC and declared that all votes cast in his favor were stray votes.
It directed the city board of canvassers to reconvene, annul Morales’ proclamation,
and proclaim the qualified candidate with the next highest number of votes.
The Comelec en banc allowed the interventions filed by Garbo and Halili. On May 26,
2017, it ordered the proclamation of Garbo as the duly-elected city mayor.
Morales and Halili elevated the Comelec’s ruling before the SC.
The high court found that Morales misrepresented his eligibility “because he knew
full well that he had been elected, and had served, as mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga
for three consecutive terms; yet, he still certified that he was eligible to run for mayor
for the next succeeding term.”
“Morales’ representation in his COC that he was eligible to run as mayor constitutes
false material representation as to his qualification or eligibility for the office, which
is a ground for a petition to deny due course to or cancel a COC,” it said.
“Where a material COC misrepresentation under oath is made, thereby violating both
our election and criminal laws, we are faced as well with an assault on the will of the
people of the Philippines as expressed in our laws. In a choice between provisions on
material qualifications of elected officials, on the one hand, and the will of the
electorate in any given locality, on the other, we believe and so hold that we cannot
choose the will of the electorate,” the SC added.
“Accordingly, we find that Morales’ COC is void ab initio, and he was never a
candidate at all, and all votes for him were considered stray votes,” the SC ruled.
Topics: Supreme Court , Antonio T. Carpio , Commission on Elections , Marino P.
Morales
2. In continuation to the problem above, notwithstanding the cases filed questioning the
validity of the cityhood, the newly created City of Sta. Cruz commenced to conduct
business as a new legal entity. It entered into supply agreements for office supplies. It
also issued business permits under the name of City of Sta. Cruz. However, six
months later, the Supreme Court declared the cityhood law of Sta. Cruz as
unconstitutional, hence, null and void for failure to comply with the criteria for
cityhood under the Local Government Code. As, such the City of Sta. Cruz was
reverted to its previous status as a municipality.
PerfectJob, the supplier contracted by the City of Sta. Cruz for office supplies, sued
the Municipality of Sta. Cruz for collection of sum of money for the office supplies
obtained by then City of Sta. Cruz. However, the Municipality of Sta. Cruz filed a
“motion to dismiss” arguing that PerfectJob has no cause of action against the
Municipality of Sta. Cruz since it was the City of Sta. Cruz that PerfectJob had a
contract with, and since the charter of the City of Sta. Cruz was declared null and void,
the contract of PerfectJob with the said City of Sta. Cruz should likewise be
considered as null and void for being an effect of an unconstitutional law. Should the
“motion to dismiss” be granted by the court? Explain. (10points)
(League of Cities vs. Comelec)
Suggested answer: NON DISMISSAL. Use this Article III, SECTION 10. No
law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed. And LGU Code below.
RA 7160 or LGU Code SECTION 5. Rules of Interpretation. - In the interpretation of the
provisions of this Code, the
following rules shall apply:
(d) Rights and obligations existing on the date of effectivity of this Code and arising out
of contracts or any other source of presentation involving a local government unit shall be
governed by the original terms and conditions of said contracts or the law in force at the
time such rights were vested
3. Professor Fernando filed a Petition before the Supreme Court questioning the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9522 known as “An Act To Amend Certain
Provisions of Republic Act No. 3046, As Amended By Republic Act No. 5446, To
Define The Archipelagic Baseline Of The Philippines And For Other Purposes. He
argued that RA 9522 abdicated the country’s sovereignty and jurisdiction over the
Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal (SS) as they were removed
from the scope of the Philippine Archipelago and were only treated as Regime of
Islands. Thus, losing a substantial portion of Philippine Territory is in violation of
Section 1, Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution. What is the Archipelagic Doctrine?
What can you say to the contention of Professor Fernando correct?
(Magallona vs. Ermita)
YouTube Link to possible answer:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AcSFDRYH4VM
4. PEDERALISMO, a group of political advocates for a federal form of government,
filed a Petition with the Commission on Elections for the holding of a plebiscite on
their “Initiative To Amend the Constitution” which proposes a change to a federal
form of government. The Petition was duly signed and verified by the required
number of registered voters per legislative district nationwide. Can the Petition
prosper? Explain properly. (10points)
(Lambino vs. Comelec)
Lambino vs COMELEC00000...
G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
FACTS:
On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a
plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution under
Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and
Referendum Act.
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals
constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each
legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters.
The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the
signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying
Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII
(Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions.”
These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC
indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their
initiative.
The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC declaring RA 6735
inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII
of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to implement the initiative
clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and
HELD:
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that
allows a people’s initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section
states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three
per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of the proposed constitutional
amendment” should be “ready and shown” to the people “before” they sign such proposal.
The framers plainly stated that “before they sign there is already a draft shown to them.”
The framers also “envisioned” that the people should sign on the proposal itself because
the proponents must “prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature.”
The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two
essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire
proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative
upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is
first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such a complete proposal in
a petition. Thus, an amendment is “directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition” only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the
proposed amendments.
There is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in
gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied
with the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures – that the petition
contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the
paper that the people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to
this Court a copy of a signature sheet after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006
when they filed their Memorandum on 11 October 2006.
2. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements
of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people’s
initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court’s ruling in
Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and
conditions” to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or
reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court
must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply
with the requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on
amendments to the Constitution.
