Aristotle’s basic teleological framework extends to his ethical and political theories, which he regards as complementing one another.

He takes it as given that most people wish to lead good lives; the question then becomes what the best life for human beings consists
in. Because he believes that the best life for a human being is not a matter of subjective preference, he also believes that people can
(and, sadly, often do) choose to lead sub-optimal lives. In order to avoid such unhappy eventualities, Aristotle recommends reflection
on the criteria any successful candidate for the best life must satisfy. He proceeds to propose one kind of life as meeting those criteria
uniquely and therefore promotes it as the superior form of human life. This is a life lived in accordance with reason.
When stating the general criteria for the final good for human beings, Aristotle invites his readers to review them (EN 1094a22–27).
This is advisable, since much of the work of sorting through candidate lives is in fact accomplished during the higher-order task of
determining the criteria appropriate to this task. Once these are set, it becomes relatively straightforward for Aristotle to dismiss some
contenders, including for instance hedonism, the perennially popular view that pleasure is the highest good for human beings.
According to the criteria advanced, the final good for human beings must: (i) be pursued for its own sake (EN 1094a1); (ii) be such
that we wish for other things for its sake (EN 1094a19); (iii) be such that we do not wish for it on account of other things
(EN 1094a21); (iv) be complete (teleion), in the sense that it is always choiceworthy and always chosen for itself (EN 1097a26–33);
and finally (v) be self-sufficient (autarkês), in the sense that its presence suffices to make a life lacking in nothing (EN 1097b6–16).
Plainly some candidates for the best life fall down in the face of these criteria. According to Aristotle, neither the life of pleasure nor
the life of honour satisfies them all.
What does satisfy them all is happiness eudaimonia. Scholars in fact dispute whether eudaimonia is best rendered as ‘happiness’ or
‘flourishing’ or ‘living well’ or simply transliterated and left an untranslated technical term. [24] If we have already determined
that happiness is some sort of subjective state, perhaps simple desire fulfillment, then ‘happiness’ will indeed be an inappropriate
translation: eudaimonia is achieved, according to Aristotle, by fully realizing our natures, by actualizing to the highest degree our
human capacities, and neither our nature nor our endowment of human capacities is a matter of choice for us. Still, as Aristotle frankly
acknowledges, people will consent without hesitation to the suggestion that happiness is our best good—even while differing
materially about how they understand what happiness is. So, while seeming to agree, people in fact disagree about the human good.
Consequently, it is necessary to reflect on the nature of happiness (eudaimonia):
But perhaps saying that the highest good is happiness (eudaimonia) will appear to be a platitude and what is wanted is a much clearer
expression of what this is. Perhaps this would come about if the function (ergon) of a human being were identified. For just as the
good, and doing well, for a flute player, a sculptor, and every sort of craftsman—and in general, for whatever has a function and a
characteristic action—seems to depend upon function, so the same seems true for a human being, if indeed a human being has a
function. Or do the carpenter and cobbler have their functions, while a human being has none and is rather naturally without a function
(argon)? Or rather, just as there seems to be some particular function for the eye and the hand and in general for each of the parts of a
human being, should one in the same way posit a particular function for the human being in addition to all these? Whatever might this
be? For living is common even to plants, whereas something characteristic (idion) is wanted; so, one should set aside the life of
nutrition and growth. Following that would be some sort of life of perception, yet this is also common, to the horse and the bull and to
every animal. What remains, therefore, is a life of action belonging to the kind of soul that has reason. (EN 1097b22–1098a4)
In determining what eudaimonia consists in, Aristotle makes a crucial appeal to the human function (ergon), and thus to his
overarching teleological framework.
He thinks that he can identify the human function in terms of reason, which then provides ample grounds for characterizing the happy
life as involving centrally the exercise of reason, whether practical or theoretical. Happiness turns out to be an activity of the rational
soul, conducted in accordance with virtue or excellence, or, in what comes to the same thing, in rational activity executed excellently
(EN 1098a161–17). It bears noting in this regard that Aristotle’s word for virtue, aretê, is broader than the dominant sense of the
English word ‘virtue’, since it comprises all manner of excellences, thus including but extending beyond the moral virtues. Thus when
he says that happiness consists in an activity in ‘accordance with virtue’ (kat’ aretên; EN 1098a18), Aristotle means that it is a kind of
excellent activity, and not merely morally virtuous activity.
The suggestion that only excellently executed or virtuously performed rational activity constitutes human happiness provides the
impetus for Aristotle’s virtue ethics. Strikingly, first, he insists that the good life is a life of activity; no state suffices, since we are
commended and praised for living good lives, and we are rightly commended or praised only for things we (do) (EN 1105b20–
1106a13). Further, given that we must not only act, but act excellently or virtuously, it falls to the ethical theorist to determine what
virtue or excellence consists in with respect to the individual human virtues, including, for instance, courage and practical intelligence.
This is why so much of Aristotle’s ethical writing is given over to an investigation of virtue, both in general and in particular, and
extending to both practical and theoretical forms.
For more on Aristotle’s virtue-based ethics, see the entry on Aristotle’s Ethics.
Aristotle concludes his discussion of human happiness in his Nicomachean Ethics by introducing political theory as a continuation and
completion of ethical theory. Ethical theory characterizes the best form of human life; political theory characterizes the forms of social
organization best suited to its realization (EN 1181b12–23).
The basic political unit for Aristotle is the polis, which is both a state in the sense of being an authority-wielding monopoly and a civil
society in the sense of being a series of organized communities with varying degrees of converging interest. Aristotle’s political theory
is markedly unlike some later, liberal theories, in that he does not think that the polis requires justification as a body threatening to
infringe on antecedently existing human rights. Rather, he advances a form of political naturalism which treats human beings as by
nature political animals, not only in the weak sense of being gregariously disposed, nor even in the sense of their merely benefiting
from mutual commercial exchange, but in the strong sense of their flourishing as human beings at all only within the framework of an
organized polis. The polis ‘comes into being for the sake of living, but it remains in existence for the sake of living well’ (Pol.
1252b29–30; cf. 1253a31–37).
The polis is thus to be judged against the goal of promoting human happiness. A superior form of political organization enhances
human life; an inferior form hampers and hinders it. One major question pursued in Aristotle’s Politics is thus structured by just this
question: what sort of political arrangement best meets the goal of developing and augmenting human flourishing? Aristotle considers
a fair number of differing forms of political organization, and sets most aside as inimical to the goal human happiness. For example,
given his overarching framework, he has no difficulty rejecting contractarianism on the grounds that it treats as merely instrumental
those forms of political activity which are in fact partially constitutive of human flourishing (Pol. iii 9).
In thinking about the possible kinds of political organization, Aristotle relies on the structural observations that rulers may be one,
few, or many, and that their forms of rule may be legitimate or illegitimate, as measured against the goal of promoting human
flourishing (Pol. 1279a26–31). Taken together, these factors yield six possible forms of government, three correct and three deviant:
Correct Deviant
One Ruler Kingship Tyranny
Few Rulers Aristocracy Oligarchy
 Many
Polity Democracy
Rulers
The correct are differentiated from the deviant by their relative abilities to realize the basic function of the polis: living well. Given
that we prize human happiness, we should, insists Aristotle, prefer forms of political association best suited to this goal.
Necessary to the end of enhancing human flourishing, maintains Aristotle, is the maintenance of a suitable level of distributive justice.
Accordingly, he arrives at his classification of better and worse governments partly by considerations of distributive justice. He
contends, in a manner directly analogous to his attitude towards eudaimonia, that everyone will find it easy to agree to the proposition
that we should prefer a just state to an unjust state, and even to the formal proposal that the distribution of justice requires treating
equal claims similarly and unequal claims dissimilarly. Still, here too people will differ about what constitutes an equal or an unequal
claim or, more generally, an equal or an unequal person. A democrat will presume that all citizens are equal, whereas an aristocrat will
maintain that the best citizens are, quite obviously, superior to the inferior. Accordingly, the democrat will expect the formal
constraint of justice to yield equal distribution to all, whereas the aristocrat will take for granted that the best citizens are entitled to
more than the worst.
When sorting through these claims, Aristotle relies upon his own account of distributive justice, as advanced in Nicomachean Ethics v
3. That account is deeply meritocratic. He accordingly disparages oligarchs, who suppose that justice requires preferential claims for
the rich, but also democrats, who contend that the state must boost liberty across all citizens irrespective of merit. The best polis has
neither function: its goal is to enhance human flourishing, an end to which liberty is at best instrumental, and not something to be
pursued for its own sake.
Still, we should also proceed with a sober eye on what is in fact possible for human beings, given our deep and abiding acquisitional
propensities. Given these tendencies, it turns out that although deviant, democracy may yet play a central role in the sort of mixed
constitution which emerges as the best form of political organization available to us. Inferior though it is to polity (that is, rule by the
many serving the goal of human flourishing), and especially to aristocracy (government by the best humans, the aristoi, also dedicated
to the goal of human flourishing), democracy, as the best amongst the deviant forms of government, may also be the most we can
realistically hope to achieve.
For an in-depth discussion of Aristotle’s political theory, including his political naturalism, see the entry on Aristotle’s Politics.