CHAPTER- II

PRAMËÛAS IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT

Dar¿ana meaning ‘vision’ or ‘the instrument of vision’1 in Indian

literature is referred as philosophy in the Western one. Dar¿anas and the

traditions based on these (samprad¡yas) together constitute the system of

Indian spirituality and religion, their synthesis and practice. Dar¿ana in terms

of the spiritual philosophy serves the purpose of a window to observe the true

nature of the world. Traditionally, dar¿ana is defined as one that explicit the

true nature of the world (sams¡ra), the cause of binding (bandha k¡ra¸a) and

the path to liberation of Self (ni¿reyasa).2 The ultimate aim of dar¿ana is to

show the path to liberation by eliminating the source of binding. The

knowledge of Self (j¢va), the phenomenal world (jagat) and the absolute

reality altogether forms the basis of liberation. The UpaniÀads is the

foundation of Indian Philosophy. The systems of Indian philosophy are

comprised of systematic speculations on the varied nature of reality,

harmonious with the teachings of the UpaniÀads, which are the treasures of

1
¶É¤nùEò±{ÉpÖù¨É&
2
Shankara Bharadwaj Khandavalli, Hindupedia, The Hindu Encyclopedia
 18

truth. The corresponding term in the western world ‘philosophy’ comes from

two Greek words ‘Philos’ meaning ‘love’ and ‘Sophia’ meaning ‘wisdom’.3

It is a scientific and logical inquiry into the nature of existence, knowledge,

values, reason, mind, time, space, causality, evolution and language. It has

three parts a) Epistemology which is theory of knowledge, b) Ontology – the

theory of reality and c) Axiology- study of values.4

Dar¿anas basically include two schools of thought viz., Ëstika

(orthodox) and N¡stika (heterodox). The nine Indian Philosophical systems

have been classified under these two broad divisions depending on whether

the system believes or not in the infallibility of Vedas. The systems that

believe in the existence of God or consider Vedas as infallible are considered

as Ëstika; whereas N¡stikas or heterodox are those who neither consider the

Vedas to be infallible nor derive their own validity from the authority of the

Vedas. The Schools of Materialism, Buddhism, and Jainism fall in this

category as they repudiated the authority of the Vedas. The remaining six

Schools are Ëstikas as they either directly or indirectly accept the authority

of the Vedas. Of these, M¢m¡msa and Vedanta depend entirely on the Vedas

3
. Mukta Biswas, S¡´khya Yoga Epistemology, D.K. Print world private Ltd. Ramesh Nagar. p.1
4
ibid.,
 19

and exist in continuation of the Vedic tradition. S¡´khya, Yoga, Ny¡ya, and

Vai¿eÀika are not based on the Vedas, but they accept the authority of the

Vedas.5

Although each school of philosophy is unique, all of them have certain

common characteristics such as direct experience, acceptance of authority,

harmony amongst schools, parallel growth and coexistence of a number of

schools, open mindedness, support of logic and reasoning, belief in eternity,

law of karma, moral and ethical teachings, acknowledgement of suffering,

thoroughness and practicality. All schools are thus interrelated and therefore

none of these can be studied without reference to another in which it finds a

mention. In the theoretical side, Ny¡ya is connected with Vai¿eÀika, S¡´khya

with Yoga and P£rvam¢m¡msa with Uttaram¢m¡msa. Even though they

differ in their essence, they share some basic principles in common and hence

work complementary to each other.

All these philosophical schools in ancient India have been born out of

an urge to inquire about the reality. Indian Epistemology involves four

foundational factors: Prama – the valid knowledge; Prameya- the knowable,

5
Mukta Biswas, S¡´khya Yoga Epistemology, D.K. Print world private Ltd. Ramesh Nagar. p.4.
 20

the object known; pram¡¸a- the chief instrument or organ of knowing the

source of valid knowledge; and Pramata- the knower. This chapter deals in

detail with the third factor of Indian Epistemology i.e., Pram¡¸a- the source

of knowledge.

The concept of Pram¡¸a is derived from the Sanskrit root ‘ma’ which

means correct notion, true knowledge base, foundation and accurate notion.

The literal meaning of ‘ma’ is “proof”. It is defined as the k¡ra¸a or the

extra ordinary cause of a prama or right knowledge. It implies that which is a

“means of acquiring prama or certain, correct, true knowledge”. It is that

which gives valid knowledge and only valid knowledge of objects. It forms

one part of a tripu¶i (trio) of concepts, which describe the ancient Indian view

on how knowledge is gained. The other two concepts are knower (Pram¡ta)

and knowable (Prameya).6

Although all Indian Philosophers and thinkers accept pram¡¸a as the

karana or the extra ordinary means of prama, they differ in their opinions

regarding the nature of pram¡¸a.

6
Ibid, pp. 57-59
 21

2.1 Pram¡¸as in S¡´khya Philosophy

S¡´khya- one of the ancient systems of Indian Philosophy belongs to

‘¡stika’ schools. It is regarded as the most accurate system of philosophy.

The word S¡´khya is derived from the root ‘khya’ (jμ¡na) prefixed by ‘sam’

meaning ‘number and ‘right knowledge.’ The school specifies the number

and nature of the ultimate constituents of the universe and thereby imparts

knowledge of reality. Mahabharata states that the S¡´khya and Yoga are

very ancient.7 Generally S¡´khya means numbers like one, two, three etc…..

In ¿¡stra, s¡´khya is used for counting of tattvas. Thus, the word S¡´khya is

used in the sense of thinking and counting.8 Thinking may be denoted by

twenty five principles which include nature, the great one, egoism, five

intellectual organs, five organs of actions, mind, five qualities, five gross

elements and puruÀa (soul). Bhagavad-G¢ta used the word in the sense of

perfect knowledge. Hence, S¡´khya can be called a system of perfect

knowledge. Kapila the great, is the founder of this school of thought.

S¡´khya is a dualistic philosophy that believes in the coexistent and

interdependent realities, PuruÀa and Prak¤ti. PuruÀa is ever pure, wise and

7
SÉSÉÉÇ ºÉÉÆJªÉÊ´ÉSÉÉ®úhÉ&* – AmarakoÀa (AK) I.V.3
8
Mukta Biswas, S¡´khya Yoga Epistemology. p.7.
 22

free but it becomes a subject of pain and pleasure when it identifies itself

with Prakrti. It is neither body nor senses nor brain nor mind (manas) nor

ego (ahamk¡ra) nor intellect (buddhi). It is not a substance which possesses

the quality of consciousness. It is the indubitable real, the postulate of

knowledge, and all doubles and denials pre-suppose its existence. It is called

nistraigunya, ud¡s¢na, aka¤ta, kevala, madhyastha, s¡kÀi, draÀta,

¿adapraka¿asvar£pa, and Jμ¡ta. Prak¤ti on the other hand is the material

cause of the universe and is composed of three gu¸as - sattva, rajas and tamas

that correspond to light, activity and inertia respectively. The state in which

the gu¸as are in equilibrium is called Prak¤ti but when disturbed, the state is

called Vik¤ti. Disturbance in the equilibrium of Prak¤ti produces the material

world, including the mind, which is supposed to be the finest form of material

energy. Prak¤ti alone is the final source of this world of objects which is

implicitly and potentially contained in its bosom. As a philosophy of

‘number’, it might have influenced the Pythagorean philosophy. S¡´khya

thus maintains a clear cut dualism between puruÀa and prak¤ti and further

maintain the plurality of the puruÀas. The system is predominantly intellect

and theoretical. According to S¡´khya right knowledge means the knowledge

of separation of the puruÀa from the prakrti.9

S¡´khya philosophy is the mother of mathematics and is considered as

the basis of Eastern philosophy.10 It believes in Satk¡rya V¡da. All the

material effects are the modifications (pari¸¡ma) of prak¤ti. The Original

S¡´khya was monistic and theistic. But the classical S¡´khya, perhaps under

the influence of Materialism, Jainism and Early Buddhism, became atheistic.

It believes in the authority of the Vedas and does not try to prove the non-

existence of God.11 Instead, it resumes to the study of Prak¤ti and PuruÀa

which it considers enough to explain the universe.

The S¡´khya concept of pram¡¸a differs from all other schools.

Ì¿vara K¤À¸a uses the term pram¡¸a in his S¡´khya k¡rika but does not give

any explanation. Yet, it could be inferred that for him pram¡¸a meant

ascertainment of an object which is nothing but a characteristic function of

buddhi.

Pram¡¸a is defined by the S¡´khya-¿¡stra as the determination of an

object which is not previously cognised by either of the two. V¡caspati Mi¿ra

9
où¶ªÉiÉä ªÉlÉÉlÉÇiÉi´É¨ÉxÉäxÉ <ÊiÉ nù¶ÉÇxɨÉ - ¶É¤nùEò±{ÉpÖù¨É&
10
Sanjeev Nayyar. Six systems of Indian Philosophy. 2012.
11
Ajitha T.S. Indian Philosophy-Vedic School, Calicut University, 2008, p.44.
 24

also accepts pram¡¸a as the means of valid knowledge and describes it as a

modification of buddhi (buddhiv¤tti) the object of which is not doubtful,

contradictory and the like. 12

According to áivan¡r¡ya¸a á¡stry, senses are the means of prama

(real knowledge) in the form of the operation of buddhi (intellect). It is the

apprehension of puruÀa and is prama in the form of the knowledge of an

object.

Vijμ¡nabhikÀu defines pram¡¸a as the v¤tti or buddhi and prama as

the reflection of buddhi having the form of the object absorbed in puruÀa. He

argues that the knowledge as located in puruÀa is right because in S¡´khya

the operation of organs is to serve the purpose of PuruÀa.

The S¡´khyas hold that both truth and error are intrinsic. This is

grounded on the view that an effect pre-exists in its cause (Satk¡ryav¡da).

They hold that nothing can be destroyed just as nothing can be produced.

Validity and invalidity according to them belong to knowledge itself.

Novelty, reality of object, and definiteness are the characteristics of valid

12
Mukata Biswas, S¡´khya Yoga Epistemology, p.66
 25

knowledge. S¡´khya recognizes Perception (pratyakÀa), Inference (anum¡na)

and Verbal testimony (áabda or ¡gama) as the three means of knowledge. 13

Perception (PratyakÀa) is the knowledge produced by the contact of a sense

organ with an object. The term consists of two parts, prati which means

before or near or related and ‘akÀa’ meaning ‘eye’. It is the first and

foremost of all the pram¡¸as. It is the primary and fundamental of all the

sources of valid knowledge and it is the most powerful means of valid

knowledge because it gives a direct or immediate knowledge of reality of an

object and there is the root of all other pram¡¸as. Both Ëstika and N¡stika

schools accept pratyakÀa as a source of valid knowledge.

S¡´khyakarika of Ì¿vara K¤À¸a uses the term d¤sta in the place of

pratyakÀa. D¤sta is defined as a determinate knowledge in respect of every

individual object. There is no reference to sense-object contact here. The term

in S¡´khya ¿¡stra denotes only a small portion of immediate experience. The

experience of inner phenomena remains outside the range of the definition of

pratyakÀa. V¡caspati interpreting the definition of Ì¿vara K¤À¸a states that

perception is a modification of the mind which gives definite cognition of

13
S¡´khya pravacana bhashya, i-89
 26

objects affected by the sense- object contact.14 According to him, through

intellect (buddhi), ego (ahamk¡ra), mind (manas) and the senses an external

object is apprehended by the subject. S¡´khya-Yoga accepts two kinds of

perception viz., normal (laukika) and abnormal (alaukika). The former

requires a particular process in sense object contact with the respective sense-

organ. V¡caspati refers to Yogic perception as an abnormal kind of

perception. Nirvikalpaka and Savikalpaka are two stages of perception

according to S¡´khya School. They refer to indeterminate perception as the

immediate, pure and simple cognition of an object. 15

S¡´khya strongly advocates the interaction between sense and object.

They also insist that the function of every sense-organ or in other words, the

sense-organ itself moves to the object cognised.

Inference (Anum¡na) is considered as a distinct means of knowledge by all

systems of Indian philosophy except C¡rv¡kas. Anum¡na literally means

such knowledge that follows some other knowledge. The term is derived

from ‘anu’ followed by the root ‘ma’ with the suffix ‘lyut’. Mana means an

apprehension or a way of apprehension of an object and the prefix anu

14
S¡´khya karika, 5
15
Jadunath Sinha, Indian philosophy, Vol.2, p.61
 27

denotes after. It is considered as a process of arriving at truth not by direct

observation but by means of the knowledge of vy¡pti (invariable

concomitance) or a universal relation between two things. Ì¿vara K¤À¸a

defines inference as the knowledge which is preceded by the knowledge

(li´ga) of the sign and the signate (li´gi) or the middle term (vy¡paka).16

V¡caspati Mi¿ra explains it saying that li´ga means pervaded (vy¡pya) and

li´gi means pervasive (Vy¡paka).17 The S¡´khyak¡rika speaks of three kinds

of anum¡na which is propounded by Gautama viz., P£rvavat, áeÀavat and

S¡m¡nyatod¤Àta.18 P£rvavat is that in which an effect is inferred from its

cause. For example from the rise of cloud it is inferred that it will rain.

áeÀavat is that in which the cause is inferred from its effect. Inferring rain

from a newly formed flood in the river during the return trip of a native is the

example. The S¡m¡nyatod¤sta is the third type of inference caused of the

occurrence of something at regular intervals. Example of this type of

16
|ÉÊiÉʴɹɪÉvªÉ´ÉºÉɪÉÉä où¹]õ¨É ÊjÉÊ´ÉvɨÉxÉÖ¨ÉÉxɨÉÉJªÉÉiÉÉ iÉα±ÉRÂóMÉʱÉÎRÂóMÉ{ÉÚ´ÉÇEò¨ÉÉ{iɸÉÖÊiÉ®úÉ{iÉ´ÉSÉxÉÉxiÉÖ -
S¡´khya Karika (SK) -5.
17
ʱÉRÂóMÉÆ ´ªÉÉ{ªÉ¨É ʱÉÎRÂóMÉ ´ªÉÉ{ÉEò¨É - S¡´kha Tattva Kaumudi (SKT) -5.
18
ÊjÉ´ÉÒvɨÉxÉÖ¨ÉÉxɨÉÉJªÉÉiÉÆ - SK.5.
 28

inference is the movement occurred due to the regular observance of stars at

times different locations on the sky. 19

Verbal testimony authoritative statement (¿¤uti) of a reliable person

(¡pta) is another source of valid knowledge. The S¡´khya does not recognize

testimony as an independent source of valid knowledge because it depends

upon perception and inference. Valid testimony is a true revelation and is

considered as ¡ptavacana by S¡´khya proponents. According to them, the

Vedas are ¡ptas. They are revelations of supersensible realities, which are

beyond one’s perception and inference. They are the outcomes of inspiration

and not composed by any person. The Vedic testimony is self-evident and it

has no one behind it for its production. Its authority is in no way depends

upon the true knowledge of any person who could know its contents. The

Vedas definitely have an intrinsic power of revealing truth.20

For S¡´khyas, knowledge is a mode of buddhi (intellect); puruÀa

(soul) is immutable and consciousness is a property of buddhi (whereas

prak¤ti is the evolvent of these). Knowledge is a matter of buddhi which

19
SK, 5.
20
S¡´khya pravacan abhashya, v.51
 29

21
changes according to the outward form of object. The S¡´khya s£tra

defines pram¡¸a as that which is most conducive to the prama which is again

defined as the determination of an object which is not previously cognized by

either of the two.22

2.2 Pram¡¸a in Yoga Philosophy

Yoga is intimately allied to S¡´khya. Bhagavat G¢ta finds no

difference between them. Mah¡bh¡rata on the other hand mentions them as

two eternal systems of thoughts. Yoga adopts the S¡´khya metaphysics and

engrafts the concept of God upon it. Yoga means spiritual action and

S¡´khya means knowledge. It literally means union i.e., spiritual union of the

individual soul with the universal soul. Pataμjali is the founder of Yoga

system. According to him Yoga is a spiritual effort to attain perfection

through disciplining body, senses and mind and through right determination

between PuruÀa and Prak¤ti.23

An integrated system of Yoga does not only concentrate on the control

of mind and it’s functioning, but in its stride cures various diseases of both

21
S¡´khya Yoga Epistemology, p.46
22
uùªÉÉä®äúEòiÉ®úºªÉ ´ÉÉ{ªÉºÉÊzÉEÞò¹`öÉlÉÇ{ÉÊ®úÎSUôÊkÉ& |ɨÉÉiÉiºÉÉvÉEòiɨÉÆ ªÉkÉiÉ ÊjÉÊ´ÉvÉÆ |ɨÉÉhɨÉÂ** S¡´khyas£tra 1-87.
23
S¡´khya Yoga Epistemology, p.34
 30

body and mind.24 Pataμjali defines Yoga as the cessation of the modification

of citta.25 It (citta) includes the three internal organs namely- buddhi or

intellect, anukar¸a or ego and manas or mind. Yoga states that citta is all

pervading in such a way that each puruÀa has a citta in which the

phenomenon is reflected. In other words Citta is same as anthahkara¸a. Citta

is the first evolute of Prak¤ti and has the predominance of sattva (goodness).

Citta has five different modifications; (i) right cognition ((pram¡¸a), (ii)

wrong cognition (vipary¡ya), (iii) verbal cognition or imagination

(vikalpaka), (iv) absence of cognition or sleep (nidra) and (v) memory

(sm¤ti).26

Yoga also accepts the twenty five principles pertinent in S¡´khya

(prak¤ti, mahat, ahamk¡ra, manas, ten external sense organs, five tanm¡t¤as,

five gross elements and PuruÀa). It also acknowledges that bondage is due to

non-discrimination between the Self and nature and that liberation can be

achieved only by knowledge. Thus, both S¡´khya and Yoga aim at attaining

24
Fernad tola and camerdragoneti translated by KD Prithi Paul; Motilal Publishers Pvt. Ltd.,
Delhi, 1987, Introduction, p.10.
25
ªÉÉäMÉζSÉkÉ´ÉÞÊkÉÊxÉ®úÉävÉ& - .Yogas£tra (YS) 1.2
26
|ɨÉÉhÉÊ´É{ɪÉǪÉÊ´ÉEò±{É ÊxÉpùɺ¨ÉÞiɪÉ& - YS, 1-6
 31

discriminative knowledge. Although the two systems differ slightly in

certain matters, they are akin to the fundamental principles.

PratyakÀa (Perception)

Perception is that in which the knowledge is obtained directly through

the senses. It is of two types- external and internal. Perception resulted by any

of the five sensory organs is external. Mental perception is internal.27

Anum¡na

The inference means the method by which knowledge is derived from

knowledge. The knowledge gained through this process is inferential

knowledge and is called anumiti in Sanskrit. Vy¡sa in his Yoga Bh¡Àya

remarks anum¡na as coming under the system of yoga. Vy¡sa defined

inference as modification of citta brought about by the relation which exists

in objects of heterogeneous nature, and ascertains chiefly the generic nature

of an object.28 Generally, they define knowledge as sambanda and pratibanda.

The word sambanda denotes relation or invariable concomitance. Therefore,

27
ibid, p.41
28
+xÉÖ¨ÉäªÉºªÉ iÉÖ±ªÉVÉÉiÉÒªÉä¹ÉÖ +xÉÖ´ÉÞkÉÉè ʦÉzɪÉʱɪÉ䦪ɴªÉÉ´ÉÞkÉ& ºÉ¨¤ÉxvÉÉäªÉ¹]õÊnùÊ´É¹ÉªÉ ºÉɨÉÉxªÉÉ´ÉvÉÉ®úhÉ |ÉnùÉxÉ´ÉÞÊkÉ®úxÉÖ¨ÉÉxÉÆ,
YS. 1-7.
 32

the definition of inference in Yoga denotes modification of citta brought

about by vy¡pti. 29

The five members of syllogism are applied to inference in Yoga as in

Ny¡ya philosophy. In Yoga also there are three kinds of inference named as

p£rvavat ¿eÀavat and s¡m¡nyatod¤Àta.

Verbal Testimony (¡gama)

Yoga accepts verbal testimony of S¡´khya School as a valid means of

knowledge. However, Yoga S£tra uses the term ‘agama’ instead of sruti.

Vy¡sa Deva the commentator of Yoga S£tra clarifies about the significance

of the term Ëgama.30 The reliable person communicates his knowledge to

others by words.31 In Vy¡sadeva’s opinion all trustworthy persons need not

know everything. Vijμ¡nabhikÀu states that an ¡pta (reliable person) is one

who is devoid of defects like confusion, negligence, desire of selfish gain and

inefficiency of organs.32 He considers Veda as the absolute authority.

29
S¡´khya Yoga Epistemology, p. 161
30
+É{iÉäxÉ où¹]õÉxÉÖʨÉiÉÉè ´ÉÉ +lÉÇ& {É®újÉ º´É¤ÉÉävÉ ºÉÆGòÉxiÉMÉä ¶É¤näùxÉä{ÉÊnù¶ªÉiÉä ¶É¤nùÉiÉnùlÉÇʴɹɪɴÉÞÊkÉ& ¸ÉÉäiÉÖMÉǨÉiÉÉ&*
Yoga Bh¡sya (YB)- 1-7
31
iÉi´Éinù¶ÉÇxÉEòɯûhªÉEò®úhÉä {ÉiÉ´ÉʦɶÉÉÆ ¤ÉxvÉ& +É{iÉ& iɪÉÉ ´ÉÉiÉÉÇiÉèiªÉ{ÉÊnù¹]äõxÉ pùiÉÉäxÉÖʨÉiÉÉä´ÉiÉÇ& -
Yoga vartika (YV) on YS. 1-7.
32
¥ÉÀ& |ɨÉÉnùÊ´É|ÉʱÉ{ºÉEò¨ÉÇ {ÉÉiÉ´ÉÊnùnùÉä¹É®úʽþiÉäxÉ - YV on YS. 1-7.
 33

Restraint (Nirodha)

Restraint refers to the cessation of the process of the mind. Pataμjali

refers in his s£tra the total restraint of the mental process to which s£tra

refers “abhy¡savair¡gya bhy¡m tannirodhaÅ.”

2.3 Pram¡¸as in Vai¿eÀika System

The Vai¿eÀika system is one of the oldest schools of Indian philosophy

and is first expounded in the Vai¿eÀika sutra. Vai¿eÀika is primarily interested

in an analysis of nature considering its uniqueness or peculiarities

(vi¿eÀa).The Vai¿eÀika displays an interest in investigating the fundamental

categories of reality (pad¡rtha). The different systems of Vai¿eÀika and

M¢m¡msa are to represent the same attitude of dharma. The Vai¿eÀika sutra

defines dharma as the object or good marked by a Vedic injunction or

command.33

The term Vai¿eÀika is derived from the Sanskrit word vi¿eÀa which

means the characteristic that distinguishes a particular thing from all other

things. As a system of philosophy, this school considers uniqueness, as an

aspect of reality and studies it as a separate category. It discusses seven

33
Richard King, Indian philosophy an introduction to Hindu and Buddhist thought, Edinburgh
University press, 22, George square, Edinburgh.1999, p.57
 34

categories: substance, quality, action, generality, uniqueness, inherence and

non-existence. As a system of philosophy the Vai¿eÀika tries to promote that

branch of study in which the nine eternal realities (dravy¡s) earth, water, fire,

air, ether, time, space, soul and mind are separately taken or analyzed so as to

know them well with their distinguishing features.34

Ka¸¡da also known as Ka¿yapa, Uluka, and Ka¸abhuk is the founder

of this school. The name Ka¸¡da is derived from the compound of ‘ka¸a’

which means ‘atom’ ‘particle’ or ‘grain’ and ‘ad’ means ‘to eat’ literally

meaning the atom or grain eater. The system is also called Auluaka dar¿ana

that means something related to uluka- owl. This name seems to be the nature

of Ka¸¡da’s habit of meditating all day and seeking his food during the night

like an owl. Ka¸¡da was used to this way of life.35

The Vai¿eÀika School accepts only two independent sources of valid

knowledge (pram¡¸a) i.e., Perception (PratyakÀa) and Inference

(Anum¡na).The Vedas are a valid source of knowledge, and are based on the

perception (pratyakÀa) of wise sages. Perception is dependent on sense organs

that include both external and internal. Internal perception is due to

34
{ÉÞÎl´É´ªÉÉ{ºiÉäVÉÉä´ÉɪÉÖ®úÉEòɶÉÆ EòɱÉÉä ÊnùMÉÉi¨ÉÉ ¨ÉxÉ <ÊiÉ pù´ªÉÉÊhÉ* Vai¿eÀika S£tra 1.1.5.
35
ibid, p.44
 35

conjunction of the Self with the internal organ. External perception arises due

to the contact of the five sense organs with their concerned objects. External

perception are of five types; olfactory, gustatory, visual, cutaneous and

auditory. Vai¿eÀika admits yogic perception also.

Similarly, the Vedic injunctions are not accepted by the Ny¡ya-

Vai¿eÀikas. They accept only those theories which can be logically proved.36

Vai¿eÀika holds that anum¡na is the knowledge of probandum derived from

the knowledge of the probans. It is derived from the mark from which the

existence of the probandum is inferred as its effect or cause. For instance,

from smoke, the existence of fire is inferred. Thus mark is the means of

inference in Vai¿eÀika and it is based on the relations of causality,

conjunction etc.

2.4 Pram¡¸as in P£rva M¢m¡msa

The word M¢m¡msa literally means the revered thought and was

originally applied to the interpretation of Vedic rituals which commanded the

highest reverence. Jaimini was the founder of this system that accepts the

Veda as the final authority on all questions. It provides a comprehensive

36
ibid, p.58
 36

method for interpreting and understanding the underlying meaning of the

Veda. M¢m¡msa deals with the earlier portion of the Vedas and is therefore

called P£rvam¢m¡msa and also Karmam¢m¡msa.37

P£rvam¢m¡msa regards the Vedas as eternal, authorless and of

infallible authority. The aim of the M¢m¡msa is to supply principles

according to which the Vedic texts are to be interpreted and to provide

philosophical justification for the views contained therein. The ideal of the

earlier M¢m¡msaka was the attainment of heaven (svarga). Eventually this

school was divided into two groups: the school founded by Prabh¡kara and

the one founded by Kum¡rila Bhatta.

Prabh¡kara defines valid knowledge as apprehension (anubh£ti). As

against to this Kum¡rila defines it as apprehension of an object which is

produced by causes free from defects and which is not contradicted by

subsequent knowledge. Valid cognition therefore must fulfill four conditions.

First it must not arise from defective causes (k¡ra¸adoÀarahita); second it

must be free contradiction. It must be self-consistent and should not be set

aside by subsequent knowledge (b¡dhakaj¸¡narahita); third it must

37
Chandradhar Sharma, Critical survey of Indian philosophy, p.211
 37

apprehend an object which has not already been apprehended. Novelty is an

essential feature of knowledge (ag¤hitagr¡hi); fourth it must truly represent

the object. (yath¡rtha)38

Prabh¡kara and Kum¡rila both believe that the goal of human life is

liberation. Jaimini regards knowledge itself as pram¡¸a or means of

knowledge and admits three pram¡¸as- perception, inference and

testimony.39 Prabh¡kara adds two more - comparison and implication.

Kum¡rila further adds non-apprehension Prabh¡kara and Kumarila regard

knowledge itself as pram¡¸a or means of knowledge.

Prabh¡kara and Kumarila recognize two kinds of knowledge;

immediate knowledge that arises from the contact of the senses with a real

object through meditation of the mind and mediate. Perception is regarded as

immediate knowledge by both. They both admit two stages in perception-

Indeterminate and determinate. Prabh¡kara defines perception as direct

apprehension. Against this, Kum¡rila defines it as direct knowledge produced

by the proper contact of the sense organs with the presented object, which is

38
ibid, p.212
39
ibid, p.218
 38

free from defects. M¢m¡msa broadly agrees with Ny¡ya in its view of

perception.

Inference in the M¢m¡msa generally agrees with that of the Ny¡ya.

However, the M¢m¡msa recognizes only three members of a syllogism, either

the first three or the last three.

The M¢m¡msa view of comparison or upam¡na differs from the

Ny¡ya view. According to Ny¡ya, comparison is the knowledge of the

relation between a word and the object denoted by that word. It is the

knowledge of similarity of an unknown object like wild cow with known

object like a cow. The M¢m¡msaka refutes this account of comparison. He

postulates the similarity of the remembered cow with the perceived wild one.

The knowledge derived will be: ‘the remembered cow is like the perceived

wild one’ (gavayasad¤si gauh). It is the cow possessed of similarity with the

wild cow which is known by comparison.40

Sabdapram¡¸a (verbal testimony) is regarded with great esteem in

M¢m¡msa philosophy. Testimony here is verbal authority. It consists in true

knowledge of objects derived from the understanding of the meaning of a

40
ibid, p.219
 39

sentence. Kum¡rila divides verbal testimony into personal (pauruÀeya) and

impersonal (apauruÀeya). The former is the speech or words of a trustworthy

person ¡ptav¡kya; whereas the latter is concurrent with the words of Veda

(Vedav¡kya). Kum¡rila maintains that verbal testimony is distinct from

inference. Word though cognizable, at times may reveal its sense through

inference also. But in the case of a sentence, there is no other way to cognize

its meaning than verbal cognition.41

Presumption (arth¡pathi) is accepted by the M¢m¡msakas a means of

knowledge. It is the supposition of something unseen (ad¤Àta). It is to avoid

contradiction which would be involved in accepting cognition of an object by

any one of the six means of valid knowledge. Kumarila gives instance of

presumption based upon sense cognition, inference, verbal testimony,

knowledge by similarity etc.

The next means of knowledge recognized by Kum¡rila is non-

existence (abh¡va). It is the only mode of knowledge to establish the

existence of a thing where the other five means of knowledge fail.42 He

41
Arbid Kumar Jha, Dr., Ny¡ya Philosophy, Epistemology and Education, Standard publication, New
Delhi, 2005, p.52
42
ibid, p.53
 40

observes that negation cannot be perceived since there exists no sense-object

relationship.

2.5 Pram¡¸as in Ved¡nta Philosophy

The word Veda means knowledge and the word Ved¡nta means the

end or aim of all knowledge. The aim of Ved¡nta system of philosophy is to

help the philosophers to rid oneself of avidya (nescience or ignorance) which

causes him to mistake his personality for his real Self by showing him the

true relationship between subject and object. The whole teachings of

Ved¡nta, says Maxmuller, is summed up in the word ‘Br¡Åman’ which

comes from the root ‘B¤Å’ meaning to grow or to evolve. Br¡Åman is that

which spontaneously bursts forth as nature and soul. It is the ultimate cause

of this universe. Br¡Åman is true and the world is false. The soul is a part of

Br¡Åman. In this regard, the phrase ‘Thou art that’43 is well known.

According to áa´kara, Br¡Åman is the whole complex of pre-nominal

existence and is considered a separate truth as long as the identity of

Br¡Åman with the Self is not realized, just as the phantoms of a dream seem

to be true until the sleeper awakens. áa´kara teaches that the philosopher and

43
Albert schwetzer, Theories of Indian Philosophers, Bhartiya Kala Prakashan, Delhi, 2001, p.172
 41

his philosophy, the knower and the known, etc., are all nothing but illusions.

They are separate things as they seem like mind. But both are mere

manifestations of an absolute being of unknowable entity.

Br¡Åman and the Universe being conceived identical as cause and

effect, must also be considered that they are being one and the same. The

effect must always be hidden in the cause and will attain causality when it

begets something new. Based on this, the Ved¡ntin puts forth that they are

one and not different from each other.44

The main teaching of Ved¡nta is that self-realization should be the

actual goal of life; that the essence of the Self is the ever existent

consciousness and bliss; the Self is free from all qualifications and

limitations; the Self is essentially Br¡Åman, supreme consciousness and this

Br¡Åman is the absolute, transcendent, reality devoid of all kinds of

attributes. But it eternally embodies itself within itself the capacity or power

called m¡ya, which is the basis of mind and matter.

The earlier teachers of the Ved¡nta aimed at the removal of avidya

from the minds of their followers. Later teachers insist more on the necessity

44
ibid, pp.172-173
 42

to get rid of M¡ya or illusion. The Prak¤yas or the different categories in the

philosophy of Ved¡nta are the fundamental rudimentary principles with

which its ethics and metaphysics are built up. They take into account both the

un-manifest and the manifest- Br¡Åman, m¡ya, ¢¿vara, j¢va and the universe.

The nature of reality, the characteristic of the phenomenal appearance and the

constitution of the individual Self are the subjects of study in Vedantic

philosophy.45

The Advaita recognizes all the six pram¡¸as viz., pratyakÀa

(perception), anum¡na (inference), upm¡na (comparison), ¡gama (scripture),

arth¡pathi (presumption), and anupalabhdi (non- apprehension).46 The major

schools of Vedanta are Advaita (Non dualism), Dvaita (Dualism),

Dvaitadvaita (a combination of dualism and non-dualism), Vi¿iÀtadvaita

(qualified non-dualism), and Shuddhadvaita (pure dualism). Of these,

áa´kara’s Advaita, R¡m¡nuja’s Vi¿iÀtadvaita and M¡dhva’s Dvaita are the

most important. These early aspirants adhere to the view that eternal scripture

45
Swami Sivananda, Vedanta for Beginners, A divine life society publication yoga Vedanta first
academy press, Poshivananda Nagar, Tehri Garhwal up, Himalayas, 1996, p.68
46
M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian philosophy, Motilal Banasidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., Delhi,
1994, p.357
 43

is the sole means of knowledge (pram¡¸a) for what is beyond the scope of

sensory perception and inference.

Perception: For the Advaita Vedantins it is the direct consciousness of

objects obtained through the exercise of senses. Here, the sense-organs

constitute the k¡ra¸a or the unique cause of perceptual cognition. Perception

is the immediate knowledge in which the mental modification is identical

with the object and is grasped by the self’s own light.

Anum¡na: For Vedantins anum¡na is made by he notion of vy¡pti between

two things, acting through past impressions (samsk¡ra). Vy¡pti or Universal

proposition is the result of an induction by simple enumeration. It rests on the

uncontradicted experience of agreement in presence between two things. If

one finds two inseparable things with no exception to their relation, one may

take them as universally related.

áabda or Verbal testimony for Vedanatins envelops sentences or

propositions which assert a relation between things free from conundrum.

Comparison: It is the means of knowledge based on similarity. When one is

aware of the similarity between a wild cow and a village cow, the knowledge

born from awareness need not stretch to the subjective cow tied in the
 44

cowshed. Here, there is no scope for inference. The similarity at the same

time sustaining in the viewer’s cow comes into existence only through the

knowledge of Upam¡na or comparison.

Arth¡pathi is a means of knowledge accepted by M¢m¡msakas and Advaita

school of Ved¡nta. It is the presumption of something from the explanation

of a known fact. According to Vedantins, Arth¡pathi is the presumption of

the ground of explanation through the knowledge of what is to be explained.

It happens when a perceived fact cannot be explained without some other

fact. In such cases one can presuppose or postulate the existence of this other

fact even though it is not perceived.

Anupalabdhi: For Vedantins it is the particular cause i.e., the instrument of

the cognition of non-existence which is not generated by any knowledge. For

instance, there is no pot on the floor as it is not cognized. It is a means of

knowledge through cognition of non-existence. Here negation becomes a

means of valid knowledge. It is however a contended issue as several

scholars does not consider negation as a valid means. Hence, while some

accept it as a separate source of valid means of knowledge, others do not.

2.6 Pram¡¸as in C¡rv¡ka System

The metaphysical conception and theoretical knowledge are

interdependent in philosophy. C¡rv¡ka admits four elements viz., earth,

water, air, and fire. All the vouchers of these elements undergo perception.

Therefore, according to C¡rv¡ka school, perception is the only authority or

valid source of knowledge. C¡rv¡kas divide perception into two categories;

external and internal. External perception comes through the contact of

external senses with the object. Internal perception is the perception of

mental states like pleasure pain etc. It depends upon external perception.

Inner actions of the mind are based upon materials received through external

perception. For them, that which is perceived is the only reality.47

C¡rv¡ka philosophy repudiates other sources of knowledge. They

refute inference saying that in Ny¡ya philosophy inference depends upon

vy¡pti (invariable concomitance). For them vy¡pti is impossible on two

grounds; a) it is not purely based on perception and b) it deduces

imperceptible from the perceptible one. The smoke as an inevitable

concomitant of fire cannot be inferred from seeking smoke with fire at some

47
Dr. K.S.Radhakrishnan, Bharatiya Darsanam, Mathrubhumi printing and publishing company, Ltd.,
Kozhikkod, 1996, p.253.
 46

odd place. C¡rv¡ka argues that a general rule can be formed only after

checking all the occurrences of that type. Unless witnessing fire of all times

past, present and future and at all places, one cannot vindicate the rule that

fire is always invariably accompanied by smoke. Since it is not possible, they

are not ready to accept vy¡pti as an evenhanded criterion to prove something

through inference.

Vy¡pti cannot be established by inference either, because the inference

will also depend on Vy¡pti and perception will again be required to prove the

vy¡pti. Vy¡pti is based on inference and vice versa. So they suffer from the

fallacy of inter-dependence. Vy¡pti cannot be known by verbal testimony,

because the authority of the latter is also based on inference. Similarly, if

inference is based on verbal testimony everybody will have to depend

somebody’s words so as to infer something which will stretch long way to an

unknown end. It will again lead to inter-dependence.

The validity of causation cannot be established through perception

alone. Jati or s¡m¡nya is not subject to both external or by internal

perceptions. The Naiy¡yikas try to establish the inevitable relationship

between fire and smoke not knowing whether the allied objects will be so at
 47

all times. Perception of all kinds of smoke is required to know smokiness. It

being patently infeasible, smokiness can be equated only with those objects

with which smoke is perceived. Evidently smokiness’ is not something

inevitable and it cannot lead to vy¡pti of any kind.

Vy¡pti cannot be established on the basis of comparison too.

Comparison depends upon the universal relation between the words and the

objects signified by them. This again goes back to the tale of perception.

Vy¡pti is unconditional. But the conditions of an inference are difficult to

understand. Pratijμa and upanaya are closely related to wait on any condition.

The knowledge of condition must necessarily continue the knowledge of its

absence. The knowledge of all conditions being impossible, one cannot know

the absence of them and hence cannot be certain of vy¡pti. 48

Like all the western philosophers Hume is also of the opinion that the

C¡rv¡kas do not believe in causation as well as universality, which also

depends upon vy¡pti. The regular occurrence of two make one believe that

they invariably go together. The supposition of causal relation between fire

and smoke own to their allied nature, at times will cheat the observer as and

48
Sarvadarsana Samgraha, Chapter. 1
 48

when one observes the wetness of wood giving rise to smoke. The

relationship of cause and effect cannot be established after knowing all

conditions and the conditions cannot be known with the help of inference or

testimony because they themselves are not valid. The accidental conjunctions

of an antecedent and a consequent are not a proof of vy¡pti. So inference

cannot be immune from doubts.

Though C¡rv¡kas claim that they accept no other source of knowledge

than perception, they, as Buddhists say, deal with certain objects, the

existence of which is proved by other philosophers with the help of inference.

So, in a way the C¡rv¡kas accept inference, the refutation of which will only

be possible through another inference.49

While interrogating the validity of inference, the C¡rv¡kas depend on

a discursive method which itself turns into a type of inference. In fact,

C¡rv¡kas find it difficult to prove their own theories without the help of

inference. 50

The main argument raised against vy¡pti (invariable concomitance) by

the C¡rv¡kas is that it cannot be ascertained in all the conditions. This

49
The Philosophy of ancient India. p. 25
50
Nyayamaμjari, p.119
 49

argument is applicable only when it is valid in all the cases. Even if it is not

so, vy¡pti cannot be proved to be invalid. The C¡rv¡kas do not accept any

argument without conditions. Thus their own argument becomes self-

contradicted, as it is not without conditions.

According to Udayana, a leading Naiy¡yika, life depends not on

probabilities and presumption but on the definite knowledge of presence or

absence. According to him wherever there is doubt there is inference and the

absence of doubt conclusively proves the latter. Regarding vy¡pti as up¡dhi

(with condition), the C¡rv¡kas point out the probability of its exception in

future or at remote places. This argument itself is based on inference, because

the future and remote places depend not on perception but on inference. As a

matter of fact, after the start of an action definite knowledge replaces doubt

and presumption.

According to C¡rv¡kas, the words of reliable person are authoritative

in the case of perceptible things. These words are also known by perception.

However, with regard to imperceptible things, even the Vedas are no

authority as the C¡rv¡kas believe that the imperceptible things have no

existence. According to the C¡rv¡kas the knowledge gained through words is

also based on inference. The word of all reliable people are valid, is the

general rule on the basis of which one indicates faith in these words. But

inference itself is not valid. How can, then, the word based on it be valid?

Words also come to be true casually, just like the inference. But it does not

indicate the view that the word is necessarily and invariably an instrument of

authoritative knowledge.

2.7 Pram¡¸as in Buddhist Philosophy

Buddha Gautama or S¡kyamuni born at Kapilavastu in 570 BC and

attained ni¤v¡¸a at Kushinagara in 490 BC is regarded as the real founder of

Buddhism by modern scholars. He has delivered his teaching in the Magadhi

or P¡li language. In its early stage, Buddhism was divided into H¢nay¡na and

Mah¡y¡na Buddhism. The teachings of Buddha are primarily found in the

three pitakas or baskets of the law which constitute the P¡li canonical

literature. They are basket of expected discipline (Vinaya Pitaka), basket of

discourse (S£tra Pitaka) and basket of special doctrine (Abhidharma

Pitaka).51

51
Jadunath Sinha, Indian Philosophy, Vol II, p. 279; Tipitaka Encyclopedia Britannica, 2015.
 51

The whole of the teachings of Buddha can be summed in the four

noble truths (¡ryasatya); (a) that there is suffering (dukha) (b) it has a cause

(samud¡ya) (c) cause can be stopped (nirodha) and d) there is a way to stop

suffering (m¡rga)52

Valid knowledge has been defined as the knowledge that is in

harmony with its objects. Buddhists consider knowledge to be true if it

harmonizes with volitional experience. There are two kinds of valid

knowledge; Perception and Inference.

Perception according to them is a non-erroneous presentation devoid

of all determination or conceptual construction. It is the immediate

apprehension of an object in its uniqueness unassociated with names and

other determination (kalpana). Indeterminate perception alone is perception.

It is valid because it apprehends the uniqueness or individuality of an object,

devoid of all qualifications. Determinate perception on the other hand is not

considered valid. In determinate perception there is similarity between the

form of cognition and the form of its object.

52
ibid, p.281
 52

Perception is of four kinds: (a) sense perception, (b) mental

perception, (c) self-awareness (svasamvedana) and (d) Yogic intuition.

Sense perception is the immediate apprehension of an object through a

sense organ. Visual perception of a color belongs to this kind. Mental

perception is produced by sense perception, which is its immediately

preceding cause and the objective datum which comes into being in the

second moment and which is similar to the object of sense perception. When

the visual organs continue to function, there is sense perception of colour. All

the cognitions and feelings are aware of themselves. They are self-luminous.

They are not apprehended by the self which is non-existent. Each cognition

immutably apprehends itself rightly without any determinations so much so

this self-aware cognition is perception. Yogic intuition is direct and distinct

perception of real nature of objects brought about by the most intense

meditation. It is not brought about by the sense organs. It’s indeterminate and

in harmony with its object.

A real object is characterized by its capacity to produce fruitful

activity (arthak¤yas¡marthya). That which is different from it, is the general

character of an object (s¡m¡nayalakÀa¸a). It is its common character. It is

apprehended by inference.

Inference is of two kinds; a) inference for one’s own sake

(sv¡rth¡num¡na) and b) inference for the sake of other (par¡rth¡num¡na).The

former is the knowledge of an inferable property (s¡dhya) from the

knowledge of a mark of inference (li´ga) which abides in the minor term or

the subject of inference (pakÀa) or in cases which are homologous (sapakÀa)

or which does not abide in cases which are heterologous (vipakÀa).

Hetu possesses three characteristics: (a) reason which is identical in

essence with the probandum; (b) a reason which is an effect of the

probhandum and (c) a reason which is not perceived in negative instance.

This is a tree because it is a sim¿apa tree. This inference is based on

uniformity in essence (t¡d¡tmya) which is uniformity of co-existence. There

is fire here because there is smoke here. This inference is based on uniformity

of causation (tadutpatti), which is a uniformity of succession. Smoke is the

effect of fire. This cause is inferred from its effect.53

53
ibid, pp. 414-416
 54

Inference for the sake of other (par¡th¡num¡na) resembles inference

for one’s own sake (sv¡rth¡num¡na) in all essential characteristics; but it

differs from it in the fact that it is formally stated in the form of a syllogism.

Inference for the sake of other is of two kinds a) positive or homogeneous

(s¡dharmy¡t) and b) negative or heterogeneous (vaidharmy¡t) For instance,

sound is non-eternal because it is a product, all products are non-eternal as a

pot (positive) Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, no non-eternal

(eternal things) is a product as ether (negative).54 The Buddhists accepted

three members of syllogism. They are: conclusion, the minor premise and the

universal major premise with an example. Inference is based on vy¡pti or

inseparable connection between the probans and the probandum.

2.8 Pram¡¸as in Jaina Philosophy

ÎÀabha is considered to be the founder of Jainism. Its teachings were

taught by twenty four T¢rtha´karas who attained liberation. ÎÀabha was the

first T¢rtha´kara and Vardham¡na, the last. Vardham¡na the last prophet was

a contemporary of Buddha. He was born in 599 BC and attained nirv¡¸a in

527 BC.55

54
History of Indian logic, p.312
55
ibid., p.159
 55

There are two main sects of Jainism; ávet¡mbaras and Digambaras.

They both agree on all the fundamental tenants of Jainism. The digambaras

hold the view that the T¢rtha´karas live without food; that a monk who owns

any property and wears clothes cannot attain liberation; and that no women is

eligible for liberation. The digambaras are sky clad or nude. The ávet¡mbaras

are clothed in white.

According to Jaina tradition, valid knowledge is of two kinds;

immediate knowledge or perception (pratyakÀa) and mediate or indirect

knowledge (parokÀa).56

PratyakÀa

In Perception- PratyakÀa is the knowledge that is gained directly by

the Self without the mediation of mind and senses. It is a distinct (spaÀta)

knowledge. Distinctness consists in the apprehension of an object with its

specific qualities without the mediation of any other knowledge. It is

independent of other pram¡¸as. It apprehends its specific qualities distinctly-

knowledge of ‘thisness’ and particular qualities constitute distinctness of

perception. Perception is stronger than indirect knowledge as a kind of valid

56
Pram¡¸a – naya – tattvalokala´kara, ii-1
 56

knowledge. There are two kinds of perception, empirical (vyavah¡rika) and

transcendental (param¡rthika). The former is practical. It is uncontradicted

perception which prompts successful action in the form of attainment of a

desired object or rejection of an undesired object. It depends on the sense

organs and other conditions. Ordinary perception is empirical and has two

forms, sensuous (stimulated by external objects) and non-sensuous (mental).

Transcendental perception depends upon mere proximity to the Self. It

does not depend upon the sense organs and other conditions. It is revelation

of knowledge of all objects due to the extirpation of the karma, matter that

enters into the soul. It is non-sensuous; it is independent of the sense

organs.57

Mediate knowledge (ParokÀa)

ParokÀa knowledge is that which is acquired by the Self through the

mediation of the mind and the sense. It is aspaÀta (unclear). It is devoid of

vividness. It is of five kinds: recollection (sm¤ti), recognition

(pratyabhijμ¡na), induction (tarka), deduction (anum¡na) and verbal

testimony (¡gama).58

57
Ratnakaravatarika of pram¡¸a – naya - tattvalokala´kara, ii-4
58
Prof. M. Hirung, Outlines of Indian Philosophy. Pilgrim books (P) Ltd, pp.124-125
 57

Recollection is the knowledge of an object perceived in the past as that

due to revival of its disposition (samsk¡ra) which is a particular power of

Self. It is revived and produces its effect in the form of recollection. It is the

effect of the revival of the disposition of the previous perception of an object.

It remembers either conscious beings or unconscious things.

Recognition is the composite cognition produced by perception and

recollection. Recognition includes the apprehensions of an object in the

forms: this is that; this is like that; this is different from that; this is correlated

to that and the like. Recognition envelops a perception of an object known in

the past as in, this is that devadatta. Here, ‘this’ stands for the perception,

‘that’ for the recollection, ‘knows this’ is that represents recognition.

Induction is the knowledge derived from the invariable concomitance

of two concurrent objects which have existence in the past, present, and

future. It saves the knowledge arrived from the presence or absence of two

concurrent things. It is a sort of knowledge sprung from the condition that

governs the presence and absence of two objects of equal existence. It is also

called uha. Vy¡pti is of two kinds: anvayavy¡pti and vyatirekavy¡pti. Smoke

arises only if there is fire, wherever there is smoke, there is fire. This is
 58

anvayavy¡pti. Smoke does not arise, if there is no fire; wherever there is no

fire, there is no smoke, this is vyatirekavy¡pti.59

Anum¡na (Inference) is the knowledge of the major term derived from

the knowledge of the middle term. Fire is inferred from smoke. Smoke is the

middle term and fire is the major term. Inference is based on universal

accompaniment of the middle term by the major term in simultaneity or

succession. It is based on vy¡pti derived from induction. The Jainas do not

recognize the five marks of the middle term recognized by the Naiy¡yikas,

viz. pakÀasattva, sapakÀasattva, vipakÀasattva, abadhitaviÀayatva and

asatpratipakÀtva.60

There are two kinds of Inference: Inference for oneself and Inference

for others. In the first, a person perceives the reason (hetu) or middle term

(s¡dhana); remembers the inseparable connection between the reason (hetu)

and the inferable object or the major term (s¡dhya) determined by induction

(tarka) and immediately knows the major term.

59
ibid, iii-7,8 PareekÀamukhas£tra, ii, 7-8
60
ibid, iii, 11 -13
 59

Inference for others consists in the statement of the middle term, the

major term and the minor term. It consists of two propositions; a) the hill is

fiery and b) because it is smoky.

Verbal Testimony (Ëgama)

Verbal testimony is the knowledge of object derived from the words of

reliable persons. A reliable person is one who knows object as they really are

and express his ideas correctly. He is free from attachment and aversion. His

word is in harmony with their objects.61 They do not contradict the nature of

their objects. Verbal testimony is of two kinds: secular (laukika) and non-

secular (lokottara). Verbal testimony of Janaka and such others is secular.

Testimony of T¢rthankaras is non secular. Verbal testimony depends upon

excellence or perfection of the speaker.

Umasvatmi divides knowledge into five kinds (i) sense knowledge

(mati) (ii) verbal testimony (¿¤uti), (iii) clairvoyance (avadhi), (iv) thought-

reading (manahpary¡ya) and (v) omniscience (kevalajμ¡na).

Mati and ¿¤uti are mediate knowledge (parokÀa). Avadhi

manahpary¡ya and kevalajμ¡na are immediate knowledge or perception.

61
Pram¡¸a - naya – tattvalokala´kara, iv -4, 5
 60

2.9 Pram¡¸as in Ny¡ya Philosophy

Every system of Indian philosophy considered epistemological and

logical problems to provide methodological explanations for metaphysical

investigation. Epistemology is correct understanding of the metaphysical

experiences that were handed down to the next generation. The study of

epistemological and logical problems of Indian philosophies aims at

discussing the process of knowing and argumentation. The works on various

systems of Indian philosophy discuss problems related to epistemology. The

results of discussions give extension of metaphysical problems. It is admitted

that the true knowledge of the objects is the source and indispensable means

of the attainment of the highest end of life, liberation or mokÀa. Therefore the

means of knowledge gives the path for correct understanding of the worldly

objects as well as metaphysical investigations.62 The Ny¡ya School was

founded by the sage Gautama. Sixteen categories were discussed in this

system, the most important of which is pram¡¸a, the source of valid

knowledge. Knowledge, according to Ny¡ya is derived from the results of

contact of the sense with the object. Valid knowledge is called prama and, is

62
Upam¡na in Indian philosophy, p.2
 61

defined as the right apprehension of an object. Actually, Ny¡ya is a school of

logic, and all other schools of Indian philosophy use the Ny¡ya system of

logic, in whole or in part, as a foundation for philosophical reasoning and

debate. Ny¡ya accepts four valid means of knowledge viz. perception,

inference, verbal testimony and comparison.

PratyakÀa (Perception) is the first kind of pram¡¸a. In Ny¡ya philosophy

perception has been considered as fundamental source of knowledge.

Inference, comparison and verbal testimony depends upon perception.

PratyakÀa is of two types according to Ny¡ya i.e., laukika (ordinary) and

alaukika (extraordinary). Laukika perception occurs when the sense-organs

come into contact with the object present to them in the usual way. Whereas

Alaukika perception happens, if the contact of the sense - organs with the

objects is in an unusual way, i.e., if the objects are not ordinarily present to

the senses but are conveyed to them through an extraordinary medium.63

In the Ny¡ya system, Perception takes place through six senses

according to which perception has been classified into two -Internal and

External. In internal perception, manas (the mind) which is the internal organ

63
History of Indian Logic, p.93
 62

comes into contact with the psychical states and processes like cognition,

affection, desire, pain, pleasure, aversion etc.

External perception, on the other hand, takes place when the five sense

organs of sight, sound, touch, taste and smell come into contact with the

external objects. Thus Ny¡ya recognized mind as a sense organ. This

characteristic feature leads the Naiy¡yikas to accept mind as an atomic

substance which is conjoined with the sense organ when knowledge is

produced. Accordingly, the application of mind has a significant role in

perception.

The contact of sense and object is the most required cause of

Perception. This contact takes place in six ways : (a) samyoga when jar is

perceived through its conjunction with eye (b) samyukta samav¡ya

(conjoined inherence) when the color of a jar is perceived by eye which is

already in conjunction with the jar (c) samyukta samaveda samv¡ya

(conjoined inherent inference ) when the nature of the color is perceived by

the eye which has already perceived the jar with color; d) samav¡ya

(Inherence) perception of sound which inheres in the ear cavity; (e)

samaveda samav¡ya (Inherent inference) perceiving the generic nature of

sound through the perception of sound inherent in the ear cavity; (f) vi¿eÀa¸a

vi¿eÀya bh¡va (Particularity) the perception of the non-existence of a thing

through the particularization of the spot where the thing could occupy on

earth. The first type of sense object contact is exemplified in the perception

or quality of an action. The third one is the perception of the generic nature of

a quality or an action. The fourth kind sense objects contact is the perception

of sound. The fifth is the auditory perception of soundhood; the sixth is

illustrated in the perception of non-existence. 64

Ordinary perception in Ny¡ya is gained through sense-object contact.

Based on the sense organ relationship the perception or knowledge has been

categorized as:

i) The visual perception also called eye-knowledge or color knowledge.

ii) The auditory perception also called ear-knowledge or sound knowledge.

iii) The olfactory perception also called nose-knowledge or smell

knowledge.

iv) The gustatory perception also called tongue-knowledge or taste

knowledge.

64
Jadunath Sinha, Indian Philosophy, p.499
 64

v) The textual perception also called skin-knowledge or touch knowledge.65

Naiy¡yikas further divide perception into two namely nirvikalpaka

(indeterminate) and savikalpaka (determinate).66 Bare sensation or simple

apprehension is nirvikalpaka perception; while the perceptual judgment or

relational apprehension is savikalpaka perception. The differences between

indeterminate and determinate perception is well known in the field of Indian

epistemology. Indeterminate perception refers to the awareness of an object

which is non-relational and nonjudgmental; whereas determinate perception

is the awareness of an object with its quality (genes). This distinction of

perception is accepted by all orthodox schools.

Extra-ordinary perception is classified into three: s¡m¡nyalakÀana,

jμ¡nalakÀana and yogaja. The perception of generic character comes under

s¡m¡nyalakÀana. For example seeing a cow, one immediately becomes aware

of the s¡m¡nya (class essence) of it i.e., the gotva (the cowness).

Jμ¡nalakÀana is that type of knowledge of a thing previously experienced.

E.g., Fragrance of jasmine. Yogaja is the intuitive perception of all objects-

past, distant and future due to some super normal powers generated in the

65
Upam¡na in Indian Philosophy, pp.92-93
66
Jadunath Sinha, Indian Philosophy, p.499
 65

mind by meditation. Thus, perception is the most important pram¡¸a in

Indian philosophy, without which others would prove unfit.

Upam¡na (Comparison): This is the third kind of valid means of

knowledge accepted in Ny¡ya. Gautama in his Ny¡yas£tras defines it as

prasidha s¡dharmy¡t s¡dhya s¡dhanam upam¡nam.67 It mainly refers to the

knowledge of the relationship between a name and the object named. In

Tarkasamgraha, the definition of upam¡na is upamiti k¡ra¸a. It is produced

by the knowledge of resemblance or similarity. It roughly corresponds to

comparison. A man who has never seen a gavaya (a wild cow) comes across

one in the forest and recognizes it remembering the words of the forester as

‘go sadrso gavayaÅ’- a wild cow resembles a domestic cow. This knowledge

he derives from upam¡na. Therefore comparison is different from verbal

testimony and perception.

Verbal Testimony: As in all other systems of Indian philosophy excepting

C¡rv¡kas, áabda (speech) is considered as a valid source of knowledge in

Ny¡ya. It is the statement of a trustworthy person and consists in

understanding its meaning. As for Gautama a man with good character and

67
V¡tsy¡na, Nyayabh¡sya, p.24
 66

has deep knowledge of the moral law is worth to be believed and his words

will come under the purview of the verbal testimony. The definition of verbal

testimony is ¡ptopade¿ah ¿abda- a word is a word when it is told by a

trustworthy person. The word ¡pta means trust worthy. It means a person

who perceives objects in their real nature, and communicates the right

knowledge to others without looking for his own benefits. The trustworthy

people help others to avoid evils and attain good.

Some argue that the verbal testimony and the inference are same. But

the difference can be explicitly seen while analyzing the content. Inference

gives the knowledge of an unperceived object through that which is

perceived; whereas in the verbal testimony, the knowledge of an unperceived

object is derived through the word which is once heard. In the inference the

connection is between a sign and the object signified by it, while in the case

of Verbal testimony the connection is postulated between a word and the

object signified by it. Therefore the verbal testimony is clearly different from

inference.

The ancient Naiy¡yikas believed that a word conveys a certain

meaning, sense and it is entitled to do so by the will of God. But the modern
 67

ones see this happening owing to long established convention. There are two

kinds of testimonies- laukika and alaukika.68 The authors of the Vedas are

considered ¡ptas (reliable). The cause of the verbal knowledge is akamkÀa

yogyata sannidhi and t¡tparyajμ¡na. These are essential for understanding the

meaning of a sentence. The Naiy¡yikas believe that all forms of knowledge

are comprehended by the first four pram¡¸as. The others like arth¡pathi,

anupalabdhi, saÆbhava, aithya etc., are pram¡¸a overruled by the

Naiy¡yikas. These are found included in perception and inference. Aitihya

sets an inclusion in verbal testimony. The knowledge of pram¡¸as is

inevitable for attaining an error free knowledge. The pram¡¸as further assist

a person to lead a good life so as to attain the desired end.

Anum¡na is the second significant source of knowledge in Ny¡ya

philosophy. It is both a source of cognition and a way of reasoning. As a

source of cognition, it produces inferential knowledge. It creates awareness

of an object through the consideration of some mark, which is invariably

connected with the object of the knowledge. Gautama in his Ny¡yas£tra

68
Jadunath Sinha, Indian Philosophy, p.499
 68

simply mentions inference as a source of knowledge following perception.

This will be discussed in the next chapter in a detailed manner.

Upam¡na is the third source of knowledge indicated by Gautama. He

classifies anum¡na into p£rvavat (as seen earlier), ¿eÀavat (as seen later) and

s¡manyatod¤Àta (commonly seen). The first two are based on the simple law

of causation, while the last one preoccupies coexistence.

P£rvavat stands for the inference of an unperceived object from a

perceived one. In this type of inference one can infer the effect from a cause

preceding it. For instance, seeing a dense of clouds one can infer future

rainfall.69 áeÀavat stands for the inferences of an unperceived cause from a

perceived effect. The inference of an abundant rainfall from the overflow of

water in the lakes can be taken as an example for it.70 S¡m¡nyatod¤Àta is that

type of inference derived of imperceptible object from its percept bale marks.

The movement of sun inferred from different position in the sky is taken an

example.71

69
V¡tsy¡yana, Ny¡yabh¡shya, p.24
70
ibid, p.25
71
ibid, p.25
 69

Conclusion

Every system of Indian philosophy is based on epistemology or theory

of knowledge. However, all the schools of Indian philosophy do not show a

homogenous approach towards the source of valid knowledge. Though some

similarity among a few schools can be noticed, there are schools which show

striking differences in their choice of pram¡¸as. Overall, there are ten

pram¡¸as mentioned by different schools of philosophy. They include:

Perception (PratyakÀa), Inference (Anum¡na), Verbal testimony (áabda or

¡gama), Comparison (Upam¡na), Postulation (Arth¡pathi), Non-

apprehension (Anupalabdhi), Probability (Sambhava), Tradition (Aitihya),

Indication (CeÀta), and Imagination or Intuition (Pratibha).

The C¡rv¡kas seem to accept the perception alone as the means of

valid knowledge. Buddhists and Vai¿eÀikas consider perception and inference

as pram¡¸as. The S¡´khya- Yoga aspirants recognized perception, inference

and verbal testimony as pram¡¸as. In contrast, the Ny¡ya School of

philosophy recognizes four pram¡¸as: perception, inference, comparison

and testimony. Prabh¡kara from M¢m¡msa School of philosophy

acknowledges perception, inference, comparison, verbal testimony and

presumption as pram¡¸as. Kum¡rila and Advaita Vedantins identify

perception inference, comparison, verbal testimony, presumption and non-

apprehension as valid sources of knowledge. Perception (pratyakÀa) or direct

knowledge and parokÀa -mediate or indirect knowledge is the pram¡¸as

admitted by Jainism. They discuss the nature of objects, conditions and

grounds of valid knowledge. Anyhow, inference is a chief means of valid

knowledge.

It is evident from the discussions about pram¡¸as that Perception and

Inference form the two major valid sources of knowledge as propagated by

Indian philosophical schools. According to several philosophers and scholars

all other pram¡¸as are dependent on these two pram¡¸as in one way or the

other.