The Besieged State: Insurgency and Counter insurgency in North

East India
Sajal Nag

Post colonial India confronted secessionism from some of its constituents even before India
attained its independence on 15 th August 1947. The Naga tribes felt that they had never been part
of Indian nation before the British conquered them and since the British were withdrawing from
India, they would like to be reverted to their independent status. Similar debate took place in
Mizoram and Manipur in north eastern India too. While others negotiated their merger with
India, Nagas declared their independence unilaterally on 14 th August 1947. The Indian state
ignored the declaration and negotiated with the Naga leadership about their future. But Naga
secessionism developed into a full-fledged insurgency from 1952 unleashing violent
confrontation between India and the Nagas. As the Naga movement grew in strength, the Mizos
and Meitheis of Manipur too launched a long-term insurgency against the Indian state. By the
1980’s many other tribal and ethnic communities of north east India too demanded either
autonomy or independence through a violent insurgent activity. The Post colonial Indian state
negotiated these violent insurgencies through a policy of carrot and stick. While strong
repressive and violent counter insurgency measures were launched to fight the insurgents, over
ground negotiations with the aggrieved parties too were experimented with which mostly were
successful. The present essay is about the history of secessionist insurgencies in north east India
and the counter insurgency measures that were adopted by the post colonial Indian state to
negotiate with the secessionist politics.

Dilemma of a liberal state

Right from the very beginning of its independence from British colonialism, Indian state
was confronted with multiple forms of dissidence, secessionist threats from the Princely states,
disputed mergers, sub-nationalist movements, Left wing uprisings, foreign invasions, and
withdrawal threats even from tiny minority tribes like the Nagas and Mizos. In the face of such
crisis the infant nation state began to crumble. Immediately began to transform its character. Its
liberal façade was giving way to ruthless repressive machinery. It endeavoured to counter the
multiplying crises by emulating European methods of negotiating dissidence and rebellion. New
modes of disciplining and punishments were evolved.

As a new independent nation-state, India encountered one of its first crises in the form of
Naga secessionism. At the helm of affairs was Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. Nehru was a
Cambridge educated intellectual. A great liberal and Fabian Socialist in ideology, Nehru had his
own liberal way of dealing with the crisis. He was convinced that if dealt with patience, Nagas
could be won over. Nehru waited from 1947 to 1956 before agreeing to use the army. Nehru was
convinced that ‘if the government keeps its head cool and restrain its hand the whole movement
may gradually fizzle out.’ The Naga recourse to violence angered Nehru left with him with few
options. He was against military solution and strongly vetoed a proposal to machine gun the
Naga hostiles from air.1 Even when he permitted the rush of army to Naga hills he urged the
army to act swiftly but not brutally. 2 The overall objective of the army should be to try and ‘win
the hearts of the people, not to terrify or frighten them.’ Nehru’s liberalism came to be tested and
severely criticized when various draconian colonial laws were invoked and enacted to provide
extra power to the military to deal with the Naga situation. There were Assam Maintenance of
Public Order Act 1953, Assam Disturbed Areas Act 1955 followed by Armed Forces Special
Power Act 1958, The Armed Forces (Assam, Manipur) Special Power Ordinance 1958 and the
Nagaland Security Regulation 1962 and the provisions of the Defense of India Rule 1962. Most
of these laws were colonial, conceived by the British to suppress the national uprising but re-
enacted freshly to give extra ordinary power to the army men. These laws gave the army men all
power to on the life of the Nagas and later Mizos and Meitheis in any which way they wanted
and even evict and resettle them anywhere else.

School of Counter Insurgency

The Indian State took its lessons in anti-insurgency measures from the British and the
Americans in Malaya and Vietnam respectively. In fighting the Malayan Races Liberation Army
in Malaya the British General Briggs had mooted what was known as Operation Starvation in
June 1951.3 It was the brainchild of a counter-insurgency thinker, Robert Thompson. Its object
was to deprive the guerrillas of their source of food and stop them from taking shelter in the
villages. The scheme was most effective due to the intervention of Sir Gerald Templar, General,
High Commissioner and Director of Operations of Federation of Malaya (1952-1954). 4 Besides
imposing restrictions on the selling and distribution of food items, the army also rearranged the
Chinese settlements and regrouped the tin and mine workers so as to check the infiltration and
exfiltration of the guerrillas with the settled population. The population was no longer scattered.
It was concentrated in units of 40,000 moved into just 400 villages, which made it easy to keep a
strict watch over them. 5 The device was later tested by the Americans in Vietnam. The British
had huge success in the implementing it in Malaysia. They had scored singular success in
segregating the Chinese segments from the rest of the population. The Americans had done it on
a limited scale in Vietnam; limited because they could pound the enemy bases from the air at
will. In Malaya, the colonialists had concentrated on the rubber and tin mine workers. There was
inspiration from the Ma Ma Operation of the Burmese in this operation. In October 1966 Lt
General Field Marshall Manekshaw, G-O-C in C Eastern Command advocated the application of
the same in the insurgency affected areas of Nagaland and Mizoram. 6 The measure was already
experimented in Naga hills.
Spatialization and Modes of Surveillance: Grouping in Nagaland

In 1956-57 the Defence ministry of the government in a statement declared, “early in 1955
due to hostile activity by misguided Nagas the law and order situation deteriorated in the
Tuensang area of the North Eastern Frontier Agency, NEFA. It was stabilized with the help of
army units working in close cooperation with the Assam Rifles. But the disturbance spread into
the Nagas Hills and could not be contained even with the help of the army. The former Director
of Intelligence Bureau (IB) B N Mulllik wrote that “troops moved into Tuensang by October
1955 and the war with the Nagas started from then.”7 On 2April 1956 the responsibility of
maintaining law and order in the area was handed over to the Army.” 8 By 1956 nearly two
divisions of the army and thirty five battalions of the Assam Rifles and armed police were in
operation in Naga areas “exerting maximum pressure.’ 9 But the federal government of
Nagaland, the government in exile of the Nagas raised a standing army, the Naga Home Guards
within two months to match the might of the Indian army which was strong enough to recapture
the headquarters of the General Officer Commanding of the Indian Army in the region. As a
result more army units were deployed as a result of which, “there was nearly one security troop
for every adult male Naga in Naga Hills Tuensang Areas but there was never a time when it
could be claimed that the Naga guerillas has broken into submission. They (Nagas) had few odd
varieties of arms, muzzle loaders, for example, they suffered terrible privations and causalities
but did not give in.”10 This was the time when Spatialisation of population to cut off the supply
link and support base of the underground from the villagers were mooted through the notorious
scheme of Village Regrouping Plan.

By grouping, in theory, it meant a number of villages being joined together under army’s
protection. They were provided with rations and were not allowed to go out of the stockaded area
even for cultivation. In practice it meant the forcible eviction of the villagers from their ancestral
habitats and relocation in a site alongside the highway where their movement could be monitored
by the army. The India army office through a secret order dated April 23, 1959, permitted that
the villagers be ‘isolated, searched and all inhabitants gathered at central places in the village for
identification/apprehension of hostiles.11 All these meant the complete take over of
administration and control of lives of the Nagas by the Indian army. With such monstrous power
the Indian army ran amok. According to this plan people of several villages were uprooted and
shifted to new locations called Village Grouping Area. The ‘grouping’ of villages began in
earnest later that year and continued into 1957. This involved moving the entire population of
adjacent villages to one village, typically close to a road or an army camp. The modus operandi
of the grouping system was not the same in Naga hills and Mizoram. In Nagaland first selected
villages were burnt and villagers were terrorized so that they take to the jungles. Hundreds of
villages along with their granaries were burnt and villagers pushed to jungles. 12 After some time
army men would ask the villagers to return to their villages as they have been granted general
amnesty and when the exhausted villagers return only to find that there is nothing left in the
burnt villages, they would be asked by the military to shift to a new pre-selected site and
construct a new village there which would be under the hawk eye of the army men. The idea was
to settle the villagers in sites which would be under the control of the army men and the
movement of the villagers could be easily monitored from the army camps. In such a way
hundreds of villages constructed and the evicted people from burnt villages would be settled in
these sites. In February 1957, the whole population of Mangmetong was taken to Longkhum.
The thousand-odd families of Longkhum and Mangmetong were moved into an area enclosed by
two bamboo fences; in certain places, spikes were installed between these fence lines. Families
of individuals who had gone underground were further segregated from the general population
(referred to as ‘General’), with a third fence around them. The villagers were given one-week
advance warning before being made to move. 13 The grouping was preceded by burning of the
villages so that the villagers could not return and the insurgents could not return. Villages were
evicted and resettled in new barricaded sites. The villagers were allowed to go out during the day
and cultivate their fields under escort but had to return to the barricaded villages before nightfall.
The grouping was intended to break the supply and intelligence network of the hostiles.

In Mokokchong district almost every village was burnt, not just once but several times as
a prelude to regrouping.14 Army trucks would come and inform the Gaobura or village headman
that the village would be burnt. Mongjen village was burnt seven times and Mamtong nineteen
times before the village could be forced to leave. 15 Sometimes the regrouping took place much
after the village had been burnt and villagers spent the intervening period in the jungles or fields
around their former homes. Grouping centers were chosen on the basis of size, proximity to the
main road, and suitability for any army camp. Often residents of the original village were made
to work as unpaid labourers and porters to help transport the belongings of the refugees. Initially
the refugees would be asked to take shelter with the older residents, or occupy church or school
buildings or makeshift bamboo shelters before their own houses were built. Army would
sometimes allow them to dismantle their houses and carry some of the building material to the
new site. The new houses were given tin shed. The move had to be completed within a week.
Each of the villagers would be given an identity number by the army on the basis of which they
were allowed entry or exit from the village. The identity number was displayed on the arms of
the villagers through seal. Sometime the seal was put on the forehead. If the seal was wiped out
due to sweating or any other way, the entry to their own village would be prevented until the
Gaon bura intervened.16 “Most of the villages and granaries were burnt down and the people
preferred to run away and hide in jungles for safety.” 17 In these areas several uprooted villages
were made to settle in a new site allocated by the army. Several of them were round up and put
into camps far way from their homes. The camps were fenced and strongly guarded and people
lived there under constant watch of the army. They were constantly interrogated and watched in
these camps.

To regularize such relocation, the Government of India passed the Nagaland Security
Regulation 1962, in addition to the Armed Forces Special Power Act 1956. According to the
provisions of its section 34 (1) and 36 (1)”no suit or other legal proceeding shall lie against any
person or Government for any danger caused or likely to be caused by anything which is or is
deemed to have been done in pursuance of this regulation or any order made or deemed to have
been made thereunder.” This Regulation also provided the Governor, under Section 5A(1) to
remove all or any class of residents to any other area for any length of time, if he considers to do
so in public interest or in the interest of the safety and security of Nagaland and to interfere with
private rights to achieve the removal.” Along with the Regrouping of villages the army raised a
militia called the Village Guards in 1957 with 300 ‘loyal Nagas.’ These bands were armed to the
government against the rebels. ‘The expansion of the village guards or Naga militia created fear
among the underground. Their own people who could recognize them, who knew their language
and their habits and hideouts were now fighting them.’18

Army writings approvingly cited the British model in Malaya in resettling the villagers in
Naga hills in large, grouped villages established under army control. The Grouping scheme
began early in 1957 in the Sema Naga area. The experiment though successful in Malaya, failed
in Nagaland. The army sources agreed that “the Indian government’s policy post independence
of relocating the Nagas was viewed by them as an attempt to impinge o their right to live with
their age old way of life. It succeeded in alienating them from not only the government but also
the army. And rather than stopping the flow of support for the militants, it only strengthened the
case of the insurgent groups, and enhanced animosity towards the army which adversely affected
the ability to collect intelligence and amalgamate the Naga into national mainstream.” 19
Complaints and logistical difficulties compelled the army to stop the experiment by the end of
1958.20 Before ending it another attempt was made in 1964 in Kohima-Mokokchong area to
regroup a cluster of villages as a punitive measure which too failed in the face of resistance from
people.21

The grouping system in Naga hills was given up in the face of fierce opposition from
moderate (over-ground) Nagas.22 In 1957 the system was experimented with in Naga hills. B N
Mullick who was the Intelligence Bureau Chief and a close aide of Prime Minister Jawaharlal
Nehru supported the grouping wholeheartedly. It did have a positive effect on the counter
insurgency operations according to B N Mullick who felt it had actually broken the spirit of
defiance of the Nagas.23 But others felt it had produced more hostiles. In fact the opposition to
the scheme was so strong that the authorities had hurriedly de-grouped all the Naga villages.
Although the IB chief in Nagaland B N Mullik was of the view that , “the Assamese officers
Kapoor and Carvalho- assisted by Dutt and in full co operation with the army, had done
marvelously well and had brought hostile Nagas almost to their knees by one single step of
grouping of the villages. This is what had killed the Communists in Malaya and it was only a
question of time before the hostiles would have been forced to surrender,’ 24 another Indian
Frontier Service official, who spent his life tackling Naga insurgency, wrote, “But in the long run
it increased the misery of the people and sufferings fo the common man and made them bitter
against the administration. It was true that the rebels were cut off from their own natural bases
but they found sufficient help elsewhere.”25 Dr Ram Manohar Lohia who managed to sneak into
the Naga Hills despite a curb on such visits, stated on the floor of Lok Sabha that he found the
Indian armed forces were indulging in an orgy of murder and rape. 26 A petition to Supreme Court
against the violation of human rights stated that “in the past especially in the 1950’s and early
1960’s mass torture of villagers and shifting of the whole population into concentration camps in
Naga areas had been a common feature. Hardly any village untouched both in present state of
Nagaland and Manipur.”27 An officer of the Government of India narrated his dismay at his long
years of Naga experience, “After several years of carrot and stick… with nothing to show for it
except a puppet government. ….Much as one admired the armed forces and sympathized with
them, were they really serious when they said they could finish the job? Destroy Nagaland. Yes,
by regrouping the villages so as to isolate them from contact with the hostiles, by filling the jails
with suspects, by literally creating a scorched earth pace, but end the movement – by eliminating
all resistance, smashing all armed band, killing or driving away forever all the hard core
resistance? I wondered as I used to listen.”28
It was evident that all these hardly defeated the will of the Nagas. In fact “… the grouping of
villages, the isolation of all underground families in heavily guarded camps at Ghospani and…
declaring of curfews in many of the villages during harvest season to pressurize…was to no
avail.”29 In Nagaland grouping of villages could not sustain for long due to the resistance of
people. There staunch opposition from the people to such relocation. In the mean time the
Chinese invasion made the government divert the armed forces to the NEFA frontier. Hence the
grouping plan slowly died down. The army did not insist on its implementation in any new area.
The regrouping lasted about two-three years from 1956-57. After the regrouping ended most of
the villagers went back to their respective villages and continued their struggle.

Grouping of People in Mizo Hills

By the time the Mizo insurgency had broken out, the Indian State was quite experienced in
dealing with insurgency. The only problem was though violence in other areas were somewhat in
control, the insurgency problem in Nagaland was nowhere under control. Despite monstrous
power given through many legislations, the Indian army could neither win the Naga war nor
could promise any end to it. The Indian State could not afford another one in the north east India.
Therefore they acted very swiftly. All the legislations that they had used in Nagaland were
promptly promulgated. In Nagaland army was sent only after initial negotiations failed and
violent activities were reported. In Mizoram such ‘mistake’ was avoided. Army was promptly
called in. The army was under pressure to provide evidence of higher level of competence than
they had shown over the past year, particularly in the background of their overall decade long
performance in counter insurgency operations in Nagaland.30

Immediately on receipt of information about the outbreak of violence in Mizo hills, the
government sent a team of officers, consisting of the Commissioner of the division, the inspector
general of Police (Assam Rifles) and a senior officer of the army to Aizawl to study the situation
and suggest ways and means to quell the rebellion. It suggested that the area be handed over to
the army. On 2 March 1966 the Government of Assam declared the district a disturbed area. The
Extra Ordinary Gazette Notification of the Government of India published on 6 March 1966
declared the activities of MNF “prejudicial to the security of the Mizo district in the state of
Assam and the adjoining parts of the territory of India. The Central government by effecting
necessary amendment ordered that Rule 32 of the Defense of India Rule 1962 Rule shall be
applicable to the MNF. The army reached Aizawl on the evening of 6 March. The security forces
gained control of the district headquarter after which the army marched towards Lunglei but the
town was completely under the control of rebels. The army threatened to bomb it. The church
leaders interfered and requested the army not bomb the town and they would secure the
surrender of the rebels. The troops entered Lunglei on 13 March, to Champai the next day and
Demagiri on 17 March. In an operation all the important towns and posts were cleared of the
influence of the MNF armed forces. The MNF volunteers took the jungles of Pakistan and
Burma.

The Indian state also resorted to what they had never done on any of its people, either
Nagas or Kashmiris: bomb the areas from air. There is a controversy over the reported air
bombing of Aizawl town as the Government of Assam subsequently denied it and there was no
evidence by any outsiders. However the army sources stated, “the Indian Air force attempted to
land reinforcements and supplies by helicopters but failed due to heavy and accurate sniping by
the rebels who had by now surrounded the garrison (Aizawl) from all sides. Ultimately air strikes
by fighter aircrafts were called at 11.30 AM on 5 th March. The air strikes were repeated in the
afternoon which forced the rebels to disperse. When another strike came on 6 March the rebel
guerillas had melted away in the jungles. The IAF fighters strafing hostile positions all around
the Battalion area. The strafing was repeated in the afternoon and it soon became apparent that
the hostiles were beginning to scatter….’ 31At the end of air action, Aizawl town caught fire.
Later ‘from 9 to 13 March the IAF strafed the hostile positions, forcing them to scatter and
brought some relief to the hard pressed garrison (at Demagiri.)’ 32 Once the armed cadres of the
Mizos moved back to the jungles and the neighbouring country of East Pakistan, the Government
thought of some permanent solution to the insurgency problem: ‘Grouping’ by which they tried
to cut off the connection between the insurgents and the civilian population. For this they
invoked the ideas of counter insurgency from the experts on the field: the European counter
insurgency experts.

In Mizoram it was introduced when some of the well planned military operations failed
miserably against the MNF. In April 1966, 61 Mountain Brigade was mounting numerous
combing operations both in the interior and in the border areas. The Mizo National Army was on
the run and a large number escaped to Chittagong Hill Tracts. During the monsoon the insurgents
regrouped themselves and once they rains abated they infiltrated back into Mizo hills. With the
induction of a number of armed police detachments, new posts were established all over Mizo
hills. However it was difficult to keep vigil on all the small villages; some willingly and some
under coercion continued to supply food and shelter to the rebels. So a new concept was evolved
code named Operation Blanket which envisaged each company or equivalent of Assam Rifles or
army to establish two posts of about 20 men each nest to villages within its area of responsibility.
The sub posts were to be self contained for a fortnight and sufficiently mobile to reach remote
villages threatened by undergrounds. The aim was to instill confidence in small village and gain
information about the hostile and terrain. The scheme proved a partial success as the villages
were too numerous for the troops to vigil and therefore the lifeline of the underground could not
be cut off.33 The failure of the Operation Blanket led to reappraisal of the situation. It was then
decided that the only way to totally isolate the guerillas from the inhabitants would be to group a
number of villages into large hamlets which could then be easily watched and the depopulated
areas could be easily operated upon freely. Thus a new scheme under the code name Operation
Accomplishment was started for grouping of villages.
As per the scheme the grouping of villages into large units by eviction and coerced
resettlement was carried out during 1967-70. It was introduced under the provisions of Defence
of India Rules 1962 and the Assam Maintenance of Public Order Act 1953. The scheme
envisaged four distinct categories of grouping of villages. The first category of grouping was
called Protected and Progressive Villages recommended under the within ten miles radius on the
main line of Silchar-Kolashib-Aizawl-Lungleh national highway and the operation was
completed in ten weeks. It involved 106 villages grouped together into eighteen grouping centre
involving a total population of 52,210. By the end of February 1967 all the centers were taken
over by the civil administration while the actual operation of the grouping scheme and the
actually day to day security arrangements were undertaken by the military personnel. The
administration of a grouping centre in this category was normally manned by a member of the
Assam civil service designated as Administrative Officer or Area Administrative officer. 34 The
Second categories of grouping of villages were called “New Grouping Centre.” It was introduced
in August 1969 under the provisions of the Assam Maintenance of Public Order Act 1953. It
covered five sectors of the population: Tripura border, Lunglei-Lawngtlei road, Darngawn
(Khawazawl) – Bungzung north Vanlaiphai-Serchchip raod and Seling-Champhai road. It
involved 184 villages grouped together into 40 grouping centre with a total population of 97,
339. the actual operation of shifting of population had already started from 1967 onwards while
the 1969 order regularized the movement. As in the case of the first category the civil
administration in the grouping centers were left to Administrative Officers who may be in the
Assam Civil Service or Senior Government employees. Military posts were created in each of
the grouping centers to carry out security arrangements. The third category of grouping called
Voluntary Grouping Centre which was introduced in August 1970 again under the provisions of
Assam Maintenance of Public Order Act 1953. It covered the population from different parts of
Mizo hills, involving villages grouped into twenty six grouping centre with a total involved
population of 47,156. Although it was called ‘voluntary,’ the entire eviction and resettlement of
people was forceful and under the military supervision. The operation had already been started in
1968 and completed by 1970 when it was legitimized by a government order. The last category
of grouping was called Extended Loop Areas ordered in 1970 again under the same 1953 law. It
involved shifting of 63 villages into 17 grouping centre and a total population of 34,219. Again
the actual operation had begun in 1968 and was over in 1970 when it officially flagged off.
Besides the above category there were three more grouping centre in the villages Mamit,
Tuipang and Sangau also where people forcefully evicted were resettled. The three villages had a
population of 4938. thus grouping of villages in Mizo Hills during 1967-70 had affected a
population of 2,36,162. All the 104 grouping centre were attached to Army posts and civil
administration. As the number of grouping centre increased, the civil administration in some of
the grouping centre were left under the supervision of Senior Clerks and even gram sevaks who
were upgraded to the rank of Administrative Officers. Interestingly, in some parts of Mizo hills,
where the MNF influence was comparatively less, the grouping was not enforced. The total
number of people ungrouped in Mizoram was 81,931. Thus out of a total population of 3,18,093
in 1970 a total of 2,36,162 or 82 percent was affected by the grouping system. In other words
82% of the total population of Mizo Hills were forcefully uprooted from their ancestral habitat
and resettled in newer sites selected by the military. It had completely transformed the
demographic and spatial distribution of the Mizo hills.

Manipur: The Human Tragedy

The Princely state of Manipur had been reeling under a series of insurgencies from the
colonial period itself. But after the British withdrew from India and Manipur was integrated with
the new nation, anti-India insurgencies multiplied in the province. A number of radical groups
with left ideological leanings sprung up which was leading a secessionist insurgency from
underground. In the 1970’s the insurgency was spearheaded by a former Revolutionary
Government of Manipur activist in N. Bisheswar who formed the Peoples Liberation Army of
Manipur (PLA) to fight India and secure Manipur’s sovereignty. The PLA professed to be a
military organization, which believed in the Maoist line of thought and action. It announced the
dissolution of the ten-year old RGM and of reorganizing the group into a strong party
representing all nationalities and the broad interests of the masses. Due to this radical change in
ideology, insurgency was resurrected in the Imphal Valley. By June 1978, the PLA had
consolidated its organization, acquired weapons and unleashed a series of violent actions in the
valley. As a counter insurgency measure, the Imphal Valley was first declared as a ‘disturbed
area.’
Since September 8, 1980 when Manipur was declared a Disturbed Area and Armed
Forces Special Act 1958 was imposed Manipur became a beleaguered state. A separate ‘M’
(Mike) Sector was opened for Manipur specifically to counter Meithei insurgents and army was
called in to deal with the insurgency. The draconian AFSPA provisions grant unrestricted powers
to army personnel and complete legal immunity. 35 Members of the army, down to the rank of a
non-commissioned officer, may shoot to kill and search and arrest without warrant any person on
mere suspicion of insurgency. The AFSPA authorized the army to conduct body searches, storm
homes at night and seize goods and hold families of suspected militants hostage. The army
engages in rampant sexual violence in the name of counter- insurgency – gang rapes, assaults on
pregnant women, rubbing chilli powder into women’s genitals, stripping and flogging and child
abuse. Women from insurgents’ families have been specially vulnerable. They are tortured to
extract information, raped and beaten and made victims of an ‘exemplary’ punishment. 36To
institute legal proceedings against injustices perpetrated under the AFSPA, a citizen must seek
prior sanction from the central government. This makes it nearly impossible to redress
fundamental rights violations under AFSPA. This Act is intended specifically to be used in
‘disturbed areas’, though no precise definition of what constitutes ‘disturbance’ is given. From
1980 large parts of Manipur characterised as ‘insurgent’ areas have been put under this Act.
Thirteen battalions of the Assam Rifles, a paramilitary force of the Ministry of Home Affairs,
four of the Indian Army, eight of the Central Reserve Police Force as well as local security
forces have been deployed continuously in the state. The imposing armed line up was as follows:
Two battalions of Border Security Force, one battalion of Rajasthan Armed Constabulary, Four
companies of Central Reserve Police Force in addition to the permanent companies of Assam
Rifles and Manipur Police. The Manipur Police and Manipur Rifles alone accounted for about
2200-armed men. Hence there is 1 soldier for every 15 Manipuris. Human rights abuse under this
act has been rampant in Manipur. With such menacing presence of armed state personnel
fighting invisible enemy who were indistinguishable from the common Meithei, tragedies were
bound to occur.
In the third week of October itself two incidents of army brutality took place in the
villages of Salungfam and Leimram, both within 30 kms of Imphal. In one a chowkidar was
allegedly beaten to death while in another several people of Leimram were man-handled. These
happened during one of the regular search operations. In one cited incident the army picked up a
19 year old boy and taken to the army camp for interrogation, his hands and feet chained
together. In January 12, a boy of 12, Basant Singh is taken for interrogation. Next day his body
was found on the street. The army press release said he was shot while escaping. Basant was
found innocent on enquiry and the Government paid Rs. 10,000 as compensation to the parents
of the boy.
The search operations were equally violent for the villagers. The suburb of Kodompokpi
near Imphal woke up to gunfire in April 1982 when army opened fire at a house on the
information that 14 Peoples Liberation Army rebels were hiding in in the upper storey of farmer
S Bira’s house. The Army surrounded the village, shepherded the men folk to the playground,
women fled in panic and the battle began. Four hours later, the army had burnt down the five
houses in which the rebels were hiding and killed nine PLA men including Ojha Kunjabihari and
captured five. Although the army provided tents and some monetary compensation to the owner
whose houses were destroyed, the villagers still shivered recalling the incidence.
Manipur was not ravaged by the army’s counter with the Meithei insurgents only. The
hut of NSCN activity is also Manipur. The Namtholok ambush by the NSCN brutalized both the
army and the people. On February 1982 the army convoy was ambushed near a bridge called
Namthilok near Imphal. Twenty jawans and civilian were killed and the attackers vanished into
thin air. Enraged the army turned upon the people to avenge the murder of their comrades. It
killed as many civilians in cold blood. The last reactions came from the District Magistrate,
Gyan Prakash Joshi who slapped a fine of Rs. 100/- per household on the three villages of
Sikibung, Shangkai and Kamlachaingphei, Situated close to the spot of ambush. When some
poor villagers could not pay the fine, their property was seized. The day after the ambush a
dozen woodcutters were trekking towards their workplace when an army patrol intercepted them
their saws, axes and machetes were thrown asie for three hours they were systematically neaten
up. The soldiers believed that S Ragin, an 18-year old boy in the group was a rebel. Regin had
been beaten severely. The district hospital records later snowed that he had suffered from
extensive haematoma – clotted blood and subcutaneous bleeding. 37
Similarly thing, a boy of 20 years was severely tortured by the Awang Kasom army camp
during interrogation. In fact this particular camp had earned notoriety for atrocities on villagers.
Shangkhai, the 52-year old villager was sodomised by army personnel while grazing. The
hospital records say “Contusions on waist and backbone, bleeding injury in anus… forcible
intermission of blunt weapon of penis…resulting from acts of sodomy.” 38 On complaint, the
soldier Bakshi Singh was sentenced to two years of rigorous imprisonment but Shangkhai was
unable to walk again. Rashing, 30 of the Huining village was dragged away to the army camp on
March 1982 and tortured for 41 days which included electric shock even in his private parts,
hung upside down and shoving chilli power in his rectum.” 39 Four days after Rashing was
arrested, the soldiers came back and took away C Paul, assistant Pastor of Huining Church and C
Daniel, headmaster of the village school. The army said they were released but the men never
returned while the children and wives continue to wait for them to come back home. 40
From the 1990’s cases of fake encounters were highlighted by the local and international
human right groups. Some of them were confessed by the army while in other cases the Court
intervened.41 The army atrocity on Manipur received international publicity with the rape and
murder of Thangjam Manorama who was picked for being a member of an underground outfit
subsequent to which her raped and bullet ridden body was found outside her home. There was
huge cry for justice and withdrawal of AFSPA which allowed the army to get away with such
brutal rape and murder of Manipuri women. Following this there was a Naked protest by
Manipuri women challenging them to come and rape them which rattled the conscience of the
nation. Subsequently a young Manipuri woman, Irom Sharmila, started a fast unto death
demanding the withdrawal of the draconian act which lasted for more than a decade.

Epilogue

The apparent success of the counter insurgency strategy in Nagaland, Mizoram and Manipur
made the thinkers of Indian counter insurgency school jubilant and wanted to institutionalize
their ideas into sustainable counter insurgency practices. A counter insurgency training centre
called ‘Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School’ was immediately established in 1967 in
Vairengte, Mizoram to implement the idea. It was a training institution of the Indian Army
specializing in unconventional warfare, especially guerrilla warfare, which quickly developed a
reputation as one of the premier counter-insurgency military training institutions in the world.
The motto it adopted was to "fight a guerrilla like a guerrilla" has been its forte for years.
General Sam Manekshaw had mooted the idea. It provided training to Mukti Bahini during the
Bangladesh war. The beginning of terrorist attacks by different Islamic militant organization on
various European nations and USA in the 1990’s only reaffirmed the need of training of army in
counter insurgency methods. Various American and European Universities began new course on
counter terrorism. One such course offered by Monash University of Australia became quite
popular. But for counter insurgency the institution in Mizoram, (India) remained unparalleled.
This unknown institution in a remote part of India thus began to play host to visiting military
units from the United States, Singapore, Nepal, Bhutan, Russia, Britain, France, Bangladesh and
many other countries. The success of this school prompted another counterinsurgency training
centre, the Kaziranga Special Jungle warfare training school in North Eastern India. Interestingly
the CIJW not only provided trained personnel to tackle the newly emerged Maoist insurgency in
central and Eastern India, the same the Mizo and Naga armed forces who had once suffered the
trauma of Indian State’s counter insurgency measures were made to practice the same on the
tribal people of Chattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh. This was an interesting reversal.
 1
Most of the information in this paper has earlier been used by the author in some of his earlier books and articles.
The duplication is intentional and necessary due to the nature of the article.

Nehru to Defense Secretary, 19 June 1956 in S Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, vol.2, 1947-56, OUP, Delhi,1983,
p.207, p.212
2
S Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, vol.2, 1947-56, OUP, Delhi,1983, p.207, p.212
3
Edgar O’balance, ‘Malayasia : The Communist Insurgent War’, cited in Amrita Rangasami,
4
Kumar Ramakrishna, ‘Transmogrifying Malaya: the Impact of Sir Gerald Templar (1952-1954) in Journal of South East
Asian Studies, vol.32, no. 1, February 2001, Pp. 79-92
5
Kumar Ramakrishna, ‘Transmogrifying Malaya: the Impact of Sir Gerald Templar (1952-1954) in Journal of South East
Asian Studies, vol.32, no. 1, February 2001, Pp. 79-92

6
S. Chatterjee, Mizoram Encyclopaedia, Vol. 2, Delhi: Jaico, 1990, pp. 355-6.
7
B N Mullik, My Years With Nehru,1948-1964, allied, Delhi, 1972, p.308
8
Government of India, Ministry of Defense, Brief Statement of Activities of the Ministry During 1956-57. p.52
9
B N Mullik, My Years With Nehru,1948-1964, allied, Delhi, 1972, pp.310-311

10
B N Mullik, My Years With Nehru,1948-1964, allied, Delhi, 1972pp. 313-314
11
Document no, 2908/AC singed by Officiating Captain Adjt Kanwal Singh, reproduced in IWGA, The Naga Nation and
Its Struggle against Genocide, Copenhagen, 1986, p. 141
12
For details please see Kaka D Iralu, The Naga Saga: A Historical account of the 62 years of Indo-Naga war and the story
of those who were never allowed to tell it,’ Author, Kohima, 2009, Pp.78-144; Also Mar Atsongchanger, Unforgettable
Memories from Nagaland, Tribal Communications and Research Centre, Mokokchong, 1994, 29-106

13
Bela Bhatia, Awaiting Nachiso, Naga Elders Remember 1957, Himal South Asia, August, 2011. Pp.14-19
14
Nandini Sundar, ‘Interning Insurgent Populations: The Buried Histories of Indian Democracy,’ paper presented in a
Seminar on Grouping in Mizoram, Aizawl , September, 2010. Subsequently published in Economic and Political Weekly,
February 5, 2011 vol xlvi no 6, pp.47-57

15
Nandini Sundar, ‘Interning Insurgent Populations: The Buried Histories of Indian Democracy,’ paper presented in a
Seminar on Grouping in Mizoram, Aizawl , September, 2010. Subsequently published in Economic and Political Weekly,
February 5, 2011 vol xlvi no 6, pp.47-57
16
Nandini Sundar, ‘Interning Insurgent Populations: The Buried Histories of Indian Democracy,’ paper presented in a
Seminar on Grouping in Mizoram, Aizawl , September, 2010. Subsequently published in Economic and Political Weekly,
February 5, 2011 vol xlvi no 6, pp.47-57

.
17
S C Jamir, the Reality and the Myth, Calcutta, the Statesman Press,, 1974, p.3 cited in N Haksar and L Luithui, Nagaland
Files: A Question of Human Rights, Lancer International, New Delhi, 1974, pp. 28-30
18
Mukot Ramunny, The World of Nagas, Northern Book Centre, New Delhi, 1988, rev 1993, 71
19
Vivek Chaddha, Low Intensity Conflicts in India, Sage, Delhi, 1984, p 288
20
Ali Ahmed. Mizoram: The early Counter Insurgency Experience, paper presented in a seminar on Grouping of villages in
Mizoram, Aizawl, September, 2010.

21
Rajesh Rajagopalan, Fighting Like a guerilla: The Indian Army and Counterinsurgency, Routledge India, Delhi, 2018,
p. 151
22
Brigadier S P Sinha, VSM, Lost Opportunities: 50 Years of Insurgency in the North East and India’s Response, , Lancer,
New Delhi, 2007, p.259

23
B N Mullick, My Years with Nehru: The Chinese Betrayal, Allied, New Delhi, 1971, p. 313; R D Paloskar, Forever in
Operations: A Historical Account of 8 Mountain Division in Counter Insurgency Operation in Nagaland and Manipur and
In 1971 Indo Pak conflict, (56 APO Mountain Division, 1991, p.30 cited in Brig S P Sinha, VSM, Lost Opportunities: 50
Years of Insurgency in the North East and India’s Response, , Lancer, New Delhi, 2007 , p.30
24
B N Mullick, My Years with Nehru: The Chinese Betrayal, Allied, New Delhi, 1972, p. 325
25
Mukot Ramunny, The World of Nagas, Northern Book Centre, New Delhi, 1988, rev 1993, 71
26
B N Mullick, My Years with Nehru: The Chinese Betrayal, Allied, New Delhi, 1972, pp. 315-316
27
Petition to the Supreme Court by the Naga Peoples Movement for Human Rights, New Delhi, 14 April 1982. appendixed
in Nandita Haksar and L Luithui, Nagaland Files: A Question of Human Rights, Lancer International, New Delhi, 1974, pp.
248-50
28
Y D Gundevia, War and Peace in Nagaland, Lancer Publications, Delhi, 1975, p. 51
29
S C Jamir, the Reality and the Myth, Calcutta, the Statesman Press,, 1974, p.3 cited in N Haksar and L Luithui, Nagaland
Files: A Question of Human Rights, Lancer International, New Delhi, 1974, pp. 28-30
30
V S Jafa, ‘Grouping of Villages 1968-1970,’ Paper presented in a Seminar on Grouping in Mizoram, in Aizawl,
Mizoram, Aizawl, September, 2010.
31
D K Palit, Sentinels of the North East, New Delhi, Palit and Palit, 1984, p.264
32
Vivek Chadha, Low Intensity Conflicts in India, Sage, Delhi, 1984, p 262
33
D K Palit, Sentinels of the North East: the Assam Rifles, (Dehradun, Palit and Palit, 1984, pp.269-270
34
C Nunthara, Impact of the Introduction of Grouping of Villages in Mizoram, Omsons, Gauhati, 1989.pp.4-6
35
On AFSPA see the Justice Jeevan Reddy Commission Report (2005)
36
Paromita Chakravarti, ‘Reading Women’s Protest in Manipur: A Different Voice?, Journal of Peacebuilding &
Development; 02 Apr 2012; p. 52
37
Sreekant Khandekar and Raghu Rai, ‘The Army Takes Charge’, India Today, 1-15 December 1980, pp. 14-21, Pramila
Dandavate et al., ‘Report of a Fact Finding Team’, in A.R. Desai (ed.), Repression and Resistance in India, Bombay:
Sangam, 1990, pp. 291-308; Chaitanya Kalbag, ‘The North-East: The Human Tragedy’, in India Today, 31 October
1982
.
38
Sreekant Khandekar and Raghu Rai, ‘The Army Takes Charge’, India Today, 1-15 December 1980, pp. 14-21, Pramila
Dandavate et al., ‘Report of a Fact Finding Team’, in A.R. Desai (ed.), Repression and Resistance in India, Bombay:
 Sangam, 1990, pp. 291-308.; Chaitanya Kalbag, ‘The North-East: The Human Tragedy’, in India Today, 31 October
1982

39
Sreekant Khandekar and Raghu Rai, ‘The Army Takes Charge’, India Today, 1-15 December 1980, pp. 14-21, Pramila
Dandavate et al., ‘Report of a Fact Finding Team’, in A.R. Desai (ed.), Repression and Resistance in India, Bombay:
Sangam, 1990, pp. 291-308.; Chaitanya Kalbag, ‘The North-East: The Human Tragedy’, in India Today, 31 October
1982

40
Sreekant Khandekar and Raghu Rai, ‘The Army Takes Charge’, India Today, 1-15 December 1980, pp. 14-21, Pramila
Dandavate et al., ‘Report of a Fact Finding Team’, in A.R. Desai (ed.), Repression and Resistance in India, Bombay:
Sangam, 1990, pp. 291-308.; Chaitanya Kalbag, ‘The North-East: The Human Tragedy’, in India Today, 31 October
1982
41
See Kishalay Bhattacharjee, Blood in my hand: Confessions of Staged Encounters, HarperCollins Publishers India; 2015
for details.